THE

SOPHISTES AND POLITICUS

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

BY THE

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TO THE SENATUS

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This Work is respectfully Inscribed.

Τοῖς κοινῆ τι πράττονσιν ἀγαπητῶν ὀμονοεῖν.

Plat. Polit. 260 b.
PREFACE.

The present work is a continuation of an edition of Plato's Theætetus which appeared at Oxford in 1861. Where these are inconsistent with each other, the editor hopes that his later will be found to correct his earlier views.

Bekker's various readings from thirteen MSS., and Stallbaum's from the six collated by him, have been carefully consulted in revising the text. It is to be regretted that later editors of Plato have not had the opportunity of collating the seven MSS. which Bekker saw in Italy in 1817–18, but does not refer to in his Commentary. Schneider also, in his edition of the Republic, mentions having seen at Florence a MS. containing the Politicus, which appeared to him to be of considerable value. The readings of the Bodleian MS. are fully recorded by Gaisford in his Lectiones Platonicae, the publication of which led Bekker to dispense
with his intended visit to Oxford ("nolui actum agere"). The MS., however, has been consulted afresh, and several new readings from it will be found in the notes, for the most part of little moment, and agreeing with Vat. Δ. and Ven. II. The special errors of the Bodleian, as of other MSS. of the calligraphi, are generally of a superficial kind. The omission of accents and of the iota of the imperfect diphthongs is curiously frequent. In these dialogues this MS. has only one instance of contraction, viz. ὃν ὧν for οὐράνῳ in Polit. 273 c. But there is, perhaps, evidence of the earlier use of contractions in the mistaken expansion of ἀκρων into ἀκριβῶν (Theæt. 148 c), and of πραγμάτειαν into παραδειγμάτειαν (Polit. 279 a). Compare Phileb. 36 e: πᾶσας ἄφροσίναις v. l. παρα-φροσίναις.

Corrupt places have been marked with obeli, and the most probable corrections are printed in large type in the notes. Words whose authority is doubtful, from their omission in some MSS., are bracketed.

A few conjectural emendations, which appeared highly probable, have been admitted or retained from former editions. These are marked with asterisks, that the reader may have some intimation of the state of the text.
The Sophist has been edited in Germany, with explanatory notes, by Heindorf and Stallbaum: the Politicus only by Stallbaum, who, although abundantly familiar with Plato, is inferior to Heindorf in taste and judgment. Many scholars have contributed to the elucidation of particular points. But these dialogues, perhaps more than most other ancient writings, require for their interpretation that they should be taken as a separate whole, and studied by their own light. 

Τὸ δ' αἰτίον, ὡς οἴμαι, προϊσῶν οὐκ ἦττον ἔσται καταφανές. (Polit. 287 b.)
AS the discovery of truth and the direction of life are the twofold function of philosophy, so Plato saw a twofold counterfeit of his ideal educator and governor in the professors of wisdom and the public men of his time. The one corrupted inquiry with controversy, the other spoiled politics with faction. These Sophists and party leaders seemed to exhaust between them the serious interest of the Greek world; for the poets, sculptors, painters, and other "imitators with their child's play," were by this time of less account. There might be jealousies between these two great powers, who formed the intellect and heart of every state, but they were usually in league, and together held the public ear. Rarely, either in the present or the past, might be traced the footprints of a more august presence; of a Divine spirit "coming down in the likeness" of sage or legislator. Such glimpses of the Philosopher and true potentate were few and far between, and he had always been either misunderstood or rejected by mankind. The writer of these dialogues, whom for the present we assume to be Plato, seems to have viewed this spectacle with a feeling strangely mixed of curiosity, interest, and scorn. In approaching his subject by a circuitous track, he makes inquiry the vehicle of satire, and satire of inquiry. But it is not to be inferred from this that the inquiry or even the perplexity which he exhibits here is merely ironical. On the
contrary, Plato is nowhere more intensely speculative, nor is the aim of his discussion anywhere more real. This appears even from the form in which the questions are asked. In other dialogues the character of Gorgias or Protagoras, Thrasymachus or Polus, is dramatized, and certain hints thrown out as to the nature of their profession; casual remarks are made on the career of Pericles, Themistocles, and other servants of the state: but here not a single name is mentioned; the spirit of inquiry (as described in the Theaetetus) refuses to descend to individuals or to things near at hand, and the ideal Sophist, the ideal Statesman, each character in the utmost generality, is at once represented and defined. Again, in other dialogues certain abstract questions are proposed, such as, What is courage, prudence, justice? and in the Theaetetus, What is knowledge? But even "Sophistic" is not a purely abstract conception: the Sophists were a real class of persons, having, as Plato believed, certain common characteristics. The state also is an essentially complex thing; and the statesman can only be known in relation to the state. This union of the universal and the real, this personifying of a general notion, this attempt to descend into the complexity of life without losing hold of metaphysical conceptions, may be regarded, even on an external view, as a leading peculiarity of these two dialogues.

And the form in this case truly indicates the substance; for these writings are, together with the Theaetetus, the most distinct record which remains to us of a great effort, of which other tracés are found in the Parmenides and Philebus, by which Plato endeavoured to bridge over the gulf which the first impulse of philosophy had made between the absoluteness of Knowledge and Being and the relativeness of Sensation and Appearance. In some dialogues the phenomenal side of this antithesis, while dramatically represented with great liveliness, is dialectically annihilated; opinion, custom, the conceit of knowledge, are brought on the stage with ironical circumstance for a prepared overthrow; and the difficulty is stated, but not fully met—How can virtue, not based on science, be virtue at all? But here the same difficulty is presented in a more general aspect. The hollowness of pretended wisdom, and the futility of existing governments, are taken for granted or summarily proved. But the question is, How can the real and the apparent, the ideal
and actual, coexist? And yet they must. For the non-existent cannot be the object of attack; and unless true ideas can be brought to bear on the actual circumstances of men, there is no hope of remediing the evils of which the world is full. This speculative doubt, while giving rise to certain changes in Plato's theory of Knowledge, forms the link between these dialogues and the Theáctetus. That their connexion with that dialogue is not merely outward, is the more probable because the Theáctetus, though ending, like the Philebus, with a promise of further talk, wears no appearance of being the first instalment of a larger design. But if, as would appear from this, the two dialogues were conceived and written at a later time, their author would not, without good reason, present them as a continuation of an earlier writing. And it may be regarded as a sufficient reason, that he was now engaged with the more objective phase of the same antithesis, of which the subjective aspect was developed in the Theáctetus; for the opposition between the Absolute and Relative, which the mind experiences in contrasting Knowledge with Sensation and Opinion, is also seen by her as the contrast between the Real and the Unreal, and between the Ideal and the Actual; when, for instance, the pretended wise man is compared with the true lover of wisdom, and the great men of this world with the perfect King. The chief aim of each inquiry, however, is not so much to point the antithesis, as to draw together the opposite poles; to find room for the relative beside the absolute; to obtain a meeting-point between idea and fact. As in the Theáctetus the question, "How is false opinion possible?" was met by an unsuccessful effort to conceive the mode in which thought acts on sensation and memory, so in the "Sophist" there is raised the parallel question, How can that which is not, appear to be? And this doubt is, for the present at least, removed by raising Difference (i.e. Negation) to the rank of an idea or category, which has "communion" with, or participates in, Reality or Being, and may thus become the object of thought. The corresponding difficulty in the Politicus has a double aspect. First, What place is there for an ideal of government at all? This question is answered by the supposition of alternate cycles, in which the world is first guided and then left alone by God.
Secondly, How is science to be applied to government during the inferior cycle in which we now live? The latter question is only provisionally answered; but in a way which points to the conception of an accommodation or δευτερος πλοῦς, which Plato afterwards embodied in the Laws.

The main difficulty which assumes these different forms (that of the relation of ideas to phenomena) is clearly stated in the Parmenides (to which dialogue allusion is made in the Theaetetus, and again in the Sophist), and receives a passing notice at the opening of the Philebus. And the final elucidation of the whole subject, the delineation of the bright form of Being, the reconciliation of the speculative with the practical reason, and the attainment of a perfect method, were probably the destined task of the "Philosopher," a dialogue which was to have ended this series or tetralogy of dialogues, but which it does not appear that Plato ever composed. Whether he instinctively turned back from an impossible enterprise, or whether, after he had once descended into the phenomenal world, ethical and cosmical interests predominated over the merely speculative, it is clear that the aspiration after an ideal certainty which appears in these dialogues, and also in the Republic and elsewhere, but which is here combined with a promise that the very exactness of truth (αὐτῷ τάξιμής, Polit. 284d) shall be hereafter displayed, is nowhere satisfied. Nor was the hope attainable in the infancy of science. But it is not unlikely that Plato intended to place this keystone of the dialectical fabric when he should take in hand to define the Philosopher.

We have before us, therefore, the middle portion of an unfinished work, looking backwards on the Theaetetus, probably across an interval (with a momentary glance at the Parmenides), and forwards to an unwritten dialogue. Having taken note of this, we may draw a little closer,—to a point, however, from which the two dialogues can still be taken in one view. There are marked and obvious differences between them. But these will be better seen when they are examined separately: in a general survey it is more important to notice, without exaggerating, the features which they have in common.

§ 1. The subjects of both dialogues are nearly related to
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The Sophist and Statesman were, as already noticed, the main representatives of the world as it then was, of the leading thoughts and principles of Plato's contemporaries. Could these typical men be reduced under definitions? Was a scientific knowledge of them possible? Did the vagueness of the science which they professed extend also to themselves? In what relation did the Sophist stand to the Philosopher, or the members of existing governments to the true King? There is however this difference of treatment: that whereas the "Sophist" is from the beginning a search for the definition of pretended knowledge, the distinction between reality and pretence only appears in the Politicus towards the close.

§ 2. In both an extreme or premature ideal theory is modified: in the Sophist the dictum of Parmenides annihilating "Not-Being;" in the Politicus the Pythagorean notion of a theocracy under the Divine King. The mere abstract "numbers" of the same school, are exchanged in the Politicus (in another connexion) for a relative standard determined by the idea of Good (τὸ μέτριον); and, in the Sophist, either the same Pythagoreans, or the Megarians, or some of Plato's own followers, are criticized as the "Friends of Ideas."

§ 3. In both there is a deep vein of irony, or rather of satire. The assertion of Socher, that in these dialogues the Socratic irony is silent, could only be justified if it had been meant that the irony is rather that of Plato. The humour with which the chase after the Sophist is maintained, the fear of his great cunning, the solemnity with which he is described as a soul-purifier; and in the Politicus, the notion of the crane exalting himself at man's expense, the quiet substitution of Lydians and Phrygians for Hellenes as distinguished from Barbarians, and the description of a state in which navigation and medicine should be administered according to legal prescription, are touches of an irony singularly Platonic. It is true that the wild playfulness of the Phædrus and the dramatic liveliness of the Republic are absent, and that the humour is not unmixed with bitterness; but the occasional shadow of misanthropy is not more unlike the caustic cheerfulness of the Gorgias and Meno, than is the sad smile and sober colouring of the Laws. Two points may be noticed in which
the dialectical method conveys the effect of irony. First, it is remarked that science is a great leveller, she cares equally for small and great; hence the physician and the bathman are equally good examples of the purifier; the general is a species of huntsman, so is the vermin-killer; priest, prophet, archon-basileus, are servants equally with the shopkeeper and the household slave. Akin to this is the mode in which the Sophist is thrust down by the process of divisions, and is found in a low place amongst the class of imitators; just as Pleasure in the Philebus, after aiming at the highest rank, has assigned to her, by the same process, the fifth and lowest.

§ 4. Both dialogues are pervaded, or rather haunted, by the idea of scientific method. Every inquiry, even that concerning Government, is held to be important, chiefly as an exercise by which the dialectical faculty may be improved. The nature and function of this power are described in each dialogue in language which forcibly recals the well-known passages of the Phædrus and Philebus, and which even the most doubtful critic must admit to have a Platonic flavour.

"To distinguish things according to their kinds, and neither to account the same form to be another nor another to be the same, is surely the work of dialectic. And the dialectician is he who adequately perceives one idea pervading many separate things, and many distinct ideas embraced by one, and many such wholes pervaded and knit together in one crowning form,—many also completely isolated and sundered. And what is this but to know how to distinguish the respects in which each kind admits or rejects communion with other kinds?" (Soph. 253 d, e.)

"But because they have not been accustomed to distinguish the subject of an inquiry into its forms, they not only confound things so widely different as the More and the Too-much, the moment they see a similarity between them, but fall also into the converse error of dividing things not according to their parts; whereas the right way is, when one first perceives community in a multitude of things, not to desist till one have seen all the differences contained within that common nature, all, that is, which rest upon any logical distinction; and on the other hand when dissimilarities are seen in a mass of objects, the eye should be incapable of contentment or rest,
until one have confined all that is kindred within the pale of one resemblance, and fenced them round with the new creation of a single kind or category." (Polit. 285 a–c.)

The notions of Sameness and Difference, and of the corresponding arts of collection or combination, and division or distinction (συμαγωγή, διαφέρεις, συγκριτική, διακριτική), are prominent in many places of these dialogues. The Elenchus is described as purifying, that is, dividing the good from the bad. The chief "kinds" next to Being, are Same and Other. Dialectic is the science of the communion and exclusion of kinds, and language itself would be impossible without a similar process of combination and distinction. And these logical forms have also a practical bearing; for the art of the true statesman, like that of the weaver, consists in combining elements which have been first separated and purified. Thus it appears that the process of classification, involving generalization and division (συμαγωγή and διαφέρεις), is only a particular application of a form of thought to which a metaphysical and a practical as well as a logical importance is attributed. But it has been felt that the "dichotomous" classifications of these dialogues are a caricature of method, and are unlike anything which is to be found elsewhere in Plato. "Are we to suppose," it has been asked, "that the Dichotomous Method of the Sophistes Dialogue (I may add of the Politicus, for the method is the same in this dialogue also) is the method of division of a subject according to its natural members, of which Plato speaks in the Phædrus?"

Is it the same, it may be further asked, which Plato has himself used in the Phædrus, Gorgias, Philebus, Republic, and elsewhere? The likeness is unmistakeable, (compare especially the close of the "Sophist" with that of the Philebus and of the sixth book of the Republic); but so also is the difference, consisting partly in the extent to which the method is carried, and partly in the arbitrary and superficial character of some of the divisions, when compared with the dialectical analysis of madness in the Phædrus, or with that of pleasure in the Philebus. And although there is no reason to suppose that the division of each kind into two parts only was a novelty (for this is required in the Philebus), there appears a further

refinement on this notion, when, in the Politicus (262 b), the pupil is advised to divide each as nearly as possible in half.

It has been suggested, in order to explain this difference, that the Theaetetus and Sophista (with the Politicus) were meant respectively to serve as examples of the two parts of the Dialectic process; the Theaetetus of συναγωγή, the Sophista and Politicus of διάλεσις. But although the Theaetetus affords many good specimens of Socratic induction, it is not less fertile in the negative instances by which that induction was tested. Generalization thus alternates with distinction or division. On the other hand, no more striking example of συναγωγή could be given than the generalization of δεινομάντια in the Sophist, or the seven categories of industry in the Politicus. And in the latter dialogue a separate discussion is devoted to the subject of example, that is, the act of bringing resemblances together (συνάγειν). The existence of such an intention, then, can hardly be established, and the comparison of the Theaetetus only throws the characteristic peculiarity of these dialogues into stronger relief.

We learn from a comic fragment (quoted at length by Dr. Thompson of Cambridge, in his paper on the genuineness of the Sophista) that when Plato, Speusippus, and Menedemus were together in the Academy, they and their scholars were ridiculed for their endless minute classification of natural objects; and Aristotle speaks more than once of "written divisions" (γεγραμμέναι διαφέσεις), which, as they seem in some points to have coincided with those advanced in these dialogues, may be conjectured to have been extant in the school of Plato. It seems not improbable that this new passion for classification as a method of science, which had a germ in Socrates and the Eleatics, and ripened afterwards into the analytic of Aristotle, was in full bloom at the Academy when these dialogues were written, and that Plato, who entered into every phase of thought, but

\[\begin{align*}
\text{συναγωγή} & \quad \text{διάλεσις}, \\
\text{ἐπιστήμη} = \text{αἰσθήσις} & \quad \text{ἐπιστήμη Ὄφει ἀλήθειας} \\
\& \text{αἰσθανόμεθα} = \text{ψυχή} & \quad \text{δόξα ἀλήθειας, ψευδής} \\
& \quad \text{ἀλήθεια} \text{― ἀλήθεια μετὰ λόγου} \\
\text{kίνησις} = \text{ἀλλοιωσις, φορά}. 
\end{align*}\]

\[\text{b e. g.}\]

\[\text{Athen. II. 59; Com. Gr. Fr. VIII. p. 370, ed. Meineke.}\]
was entirely possessed by none, took up the method, as he takes up that of etymologies in the Cratylus, "for the day." This may account for the unusual number of the divisions. But how is the peculiar nature of many of them to be explained?

a. First, the lesson is meant to be progressive. Thus the external and superficial character of some distinctions is at once accounted for by the often-repeated Platonic maxim, that the elements of truth must be spelt out in easy syllables, before the meaning of truth can be read. The most obvious data of sense and experience are the primer of thought. The simplest examples are chosen to illustrate principles of reason, not as being adequate, but because they can be apprehended at once.

But there may be also traced in the method of these dialogues a progress of a deeper kind. The argument of the Theaetetus, though generally destructive, left two results: first, that the mind gathers from the impressions of different senses certain common perceptions; and secondly, that knowledge and right opinion imply distinction, i.e. definition by the characteristic difference. This definition by difference, we will suppose, was becoming recognised as an organ of knowledge, and the youth of Plato's school were delighted with their new exercise. We can imagine them, according to their master's description, rejoicing as if they had found a treasure of inexhaustible wisdom, first rolling up the ball and then unrolling and dividing, and never content till they had made everybody else to share their wonder. The negative aspect of Socratic inquiry, the controversial dialectic of Zeno, the Pythagorean \( \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \chi \alpha \) had all contributed something to the intellectual fashion now in vogue. In the "Sophist" Plato chooses to converse with this "old friend with a new face," he will assay to prove this weapon, which is obviously two-edged, and no less available for controversy than for inquiry. He begins with an example, which he executes in the most approved style, and the method is found to be abundantly adequate to define the fisherman. Then he tries several passes at the Sophist, but does not transfix him, though the creature is soon driven into a corner, and his enemy exults in an approaching triumph, when suddenly the wily monster disarms him and turns against him his own weapon. (Soph. 239 d.)
The exclusive divisions by which the game has been so far pursued proceeded on the ground that Difference meant logical exclusion; that, for instance, because *making* is different from *acquiring*, production and acquisition cannot be attributes of the same art: and we have been surprised to see the Sophist starting up on the left side of the *cordon* which we had drawn, when we thought to have secured him on the right. At last he seems to be convicted of pretence, that is of appearing to be what he is not. He retorts that "what-is-not" has no Being, and can neither be defined nor criticized: a position which is only met by reconsidering the whole question of negation and difference, and also of Being, in a discussion where the vaunted method of exclusions is laid aside. It is at last found that ideas which are distinguished from each other may still be mutually related. Whereon follows the remark that mere "oppositions of science" are not philosophy. (Soph. 259.)

The effect of this discovery may be traced in the *Politicus*. Not only are the two elements of generalization and distinction much more nearly balanced (it was always impossible for either of them to be entirely absent), but more care is taken to define the relation between the members of each division. The respondent is significantly warned that every logical segment must be a natural part, and have a form of its own, i.e. that the distinction must have a rational ground or principle; he is told that the external resemblances and differences of objects are easily mastered, but that there are qualities of another sort, which cannot be perceived without a "vision and a faculty divine." A mistake arising from dividing without generalizing sufficiently is corrected; side by side with the partition of science appears "the interrogation of every nature, in order to learn what special contribution each has to offer from the store of experience to the treasury of wisdom;" and we are reminded that it is not enough to define a subject by a single characteristic difference, for that nothing is completely known, until all other species, at least those of the same genus, have been also distinguished and defined. (Pol. 262, 285 c, 275, 272 c, 281 c.)

Thus mere logical division by means of negatives is criticized by Plato on nearly the same ground as by Aristotle, who objects that a negative term as such is not divisible. "Aristotle,"
says Mr. G. H. Lewes, "has here pointed out the scientific error of all classification founded on negatives, and his criticism reaches even the familiar division founded by Lamarck between vertebrata and invertebrata. The vertebrata form a natural division, characterized by an obvious peculiarity, but to lump together all other animals, no matter how manifestly different, merely on the negative character of their having no vertebral column, is, except as a provisional expedient, eminently unphilosophic." But Plato employs division by exclusions precisely as a provisional expedient. His object is not the classification of many things but the definition of one. He never attempts to divide a class which is only known by a negative characteristic. And he has himself striven to remedy the defect in question; for he has observed that things are not perfectly distinguished until the mutually exclusive positive qualities of both are known.

3. Further, the end of this progressive lesson in dialectic is not to exalt a formal method, but to quicken and regulate the free action of the inquiring mind. Plato never conceived, as some modern philosophers have done, that a new method could possibly level intellects, or become a substitute for invention. He never imagines a form of thinking as separable from thought. His dialectic is not a dead organon, but an inspiration, a divine gift, which may be imperfectly described in words, and by oral teaching may be awakened and stimulated in the philosophic nature, but cannot be once for all embodied in a book of aphorisms or a Chrestomathy. Dialectic is the right application to the highest subjects of the twin operations of distinction and combination, which are present as elements in the simplest exercise of the reason: whether the difference and resemblance noted be that of two fingers or of two virtues, the process is essentially the same. But thought is liable to perversion, and Plato is never weary of distinguishing argument from controversy (διαλεκτική from ἀντιλογίκη) or

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4 This remark also supplies an answer to the other objection of Aristotle, that the species of a genus are by this method sometimes unnaturally separated (e.g. birds are divided between the land and water animals), and to Mr. Grote's observation that Plato would have objected to class the wolf with the dog.

5 He always follows the "right hand" section: κατὰ τούτων δὲξᾶ ἄξιον μέρος τοῦ τριήμετρος. Soph. 264 c.
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ερυτική). Perhaps controversy is too respectable a name for that ape of the Elenchus, a barren hybrid between Zenonian and Socratic method, which seems to have been a favourite pastime in the schools of Athens as well as Megara. The faults which Plato assigns to the devotees of this "illogical logic" of disputation are chiefly the following. (1) They confused verbal with real agreement and difference. (2) They assumed that agreement and difference must mutually exclude each other not only in idea but in fact. (3) They argued about first principles when consequences were in question, and vice versa. (Phed. 101 e) (4) They generalized too hastily both in the way of induction and deduction. (Phileb. 17.) (5) They chose sensible in the place of ideal distinctions. (6) They substituted abstract reasoning from a single isolated notion for real inquiry into the nature of things. (7) They preferred the exercise of logical ingenuity to the common interests of mankind. ("Water, the cheapest of commodities, is the best, says Pindar," Euthyd, 304 b.) (8) From the want of any true command of ideas, they distinguished in the wrong place and failed to distinguish in the right. These errors arose in great measure from making victory and not truth the end of discussion, and the mental result of the process was a vain-glorious scepticism. Such at least is Plato's verdict on the character and tendency of much of the intellectual activity of his day. And he has occasionally, even in the person of Socrates, given not unconscious illustration of this Attic euphuism, just as our own master of thought and expression sometimes condescended "to speak most infallibly" in the "conceited" vein of his contemporaries.

Now it is a chief purpose of the present dialogues to counteract this vice of the reason, by conveying wholesome ideas about logical method. And one idea which they convey with tolerable clearness, by example if not by precept, is that the right course to be followed in an inquiry cannot be altogether prescribed by rules, but is in great measure the direct result of original thought and inventive power in the inquirer.¹

¹ Plato seizes upon this as the keystone of their method, a principle borrowed from the Eleatics, who in saying, "Being is," "Not-Being is not," suggested, in the infancy of logic, the notion that positive and negative attributes are absolutely incommunicable.

² Cf. especially Phaedr. 269 e.
Whether the method of divisions or some other shall be employed, what general form shall be selected for the primary division, where to draw the line in each subdivision, when to introduce example and comparison, when to exchange logical for metaphysical reasoning, and when to seek the aid of imagination; all such points are entirely left to the prescient insight and selective judgment of the leader of the discussion.

γ. Another lesson not doubtfully taught in these pages is, that the subtlety of nature is not exhausted by a single line of classification. The several paths by which the Sophist is approached, and the shorter and longer way to the definition of the genus Homo in the Politicus (not to dwell now on the ironical humour of this passage), shew that method has not yet stiffened into system. The division of the arts of life not into two but seven distinct “limbs,” warrants the same inference, which is strengthened by the comparison of other dialogues (see next section), and by the playful and satirical uses of generalization and division noticed above. (§ 3.) In both dialogues the “divisions” at the opening and the close belong rather to the framework than the substance of the thought, and the real movement of the argument is almost wholly independent of this outward form; though certainly not independent of the great laws of agreement and difference, of which Plato’s συναγωγή and διάλεκτος are the expression.

Plato’s views on method, when thus stated, may appear strangely simple, as the errors to which they are opposed were gross; but the errors, however gross, were typical: and his thoughts, however simple, may find many an instructive application in the later history of science. That all true method is an extension of the natural operation of the mind, and, instead of making inquiry an easy task for all men, is inseparable from that last and highest acquisition and gift, the philosophic spirit, are maxims of which the schoolmen and Bacon were equally in need. The “prudens quaestio” of the latter (the “mental initiative” of Coleridge) is a notion which, at the expense of consistency, redeems the misconception of a levelling method by approaching to the Platonic point of view. Nor is it fair to speak of the method which Plato approved as merely subjective (G. H. Lewes), in the face of his protest
against the arbitrary manipulation of logical forms. His
metaphysical ardour does not prevent him from blaming, but
rather constrains him to chaste those who in their frigid
ingenuity closed their eyes to the light of facts. His faith in
dialectic was, in other words, a faith in an order of the Uni-
verse which could be discovered by the patient use of genuine
inquiry, and by this alone. Although verification, in the
modern sense, was almost entirely absent from his method,
and his idea of "nature" was of course different from that
which later discoveries have made familiar; yet the importance
which he attaches to the duty of following the real lines and
veins of things as they are, of "hitting the joint" in carving
the body of truth, and, what amounts to the same thing, the
stress which he lays on the distinction between an accidental
and a natural part (μέρος and εἴδος, a mere portion and a
form h), are indications of a general conception of the task of
philosophy, which is not to be confounded with the German
notion of evolving thought from itself, or the Scotch method of
introspection in psychology. How facts are to be ascertained,
he has not determined; but that the discoveries of the true phi-
losopher are matters of fact, and not mere notions of his own
mind, is an axiom without which much that he has written
would be unintelligible. But it is no less an axiom with him
that every true fact is also an idea, and were it not so would
be incognizable; and that the only real concatenation of things
as they are, is that which dialectic gradually reveals to the
inquiring reason. Would Bacon have said otherwise, if "form"
were substituted for "idea," and for "dialectic" the "interro-
gation of nature," a phrase which occurs almost verbatim in
Plato's Politics? Or will any modern reasoner dispute the
assertion that the Laws of Nature are only discoverable by
the right exercise of Mind?

Plato's contribution to the positive science of Method was
indeed most simple, but, at that juncture in the history of
philosophy, of extreme value. Not to anticipate further here,
what must be described at length in examining the "Sophist,"
his position is briefly this, that to divorce analysis from syn-
thesis, negation from affirmation, variety from unity, distinc-
tion from mutual relation, is fatal to the interests of inquiry.

h Compare Protag. 329 d.
"Cupid comes forth from an egg whereon Night hath brooded, i.e. Knowledge is obtained by exclusions and negatives." Yes, but Knowledge is affirmative, and the negations are seen in the result, only like the dark spaces on a polarized spectrum, caused, as natural philosophers tell us, by the mutual interferences of waves of light.

A contrast and a parallel, both taken from within the limits of the Platonic dialogues, may fitly conclude this section.

a. When the peculiar form of dialectical exercise which at first sight appears to reign in the Sophist and Statesman, is compared with that of the more purely Socratic dialogues, abstracting from the Pythagorean notion of bisection and the Eleatic absoluteness of distinction, this mode of handling a subject appears like an abridgment of Socratic procedure. From long familiarity with the successive steps, the disciple is ready for a more summary process, and a generalization and distinction to which Socrates would have led the way through a morning of ironical banter, is now disposed of by a few rapid strokes. The argument from pleasure being the good to science being virtue, which fills several pages of the Protagoras, would not have occupied ten lines of the Sophist. And a further stage of this transition from conversational profuseness towards scientific exactness and compression may be observed in the latter of these two dialogues, where the dichotomies, by which the art of weaving is defined, are enumerated in close succession in a single sentence; a doubly condensed form of intellectual nutriment, which proves too strong for the respondent to assimilate at once. (Pol. 279 c—280 b.)

β. The parallel of the Philebus will be frequently suggested as we proceed by many likenesses of style and structure. We now confine ourselves to one point, which bears immediately on the question of method. There is a passage near the opening of that dialogue (p. 16) which distinguishes the right from the wrong application of the eternal opposition and interchange of the One and the Many to the analysis and synthesis of ideas. It is interesting to examine how far the directions there given correspond to the procedure here employed.

"In every enquiry we should set before us one idea, which we shall find, if we look for it, in the subject of our investiga-
tion.” So in each of these inquiries the idea of Knowledge, or of a person who knows, is immediately recognised and selected for analysis. “And in this one idea we must look for two, if we can find two, or if not two, then the smallest number possible.” This rule is also strictly followed, which is the more noticeable, because no such principle is laid down in the Phædrus. In the case of the seven “summa genera” of civil life (Polit. 287 c), we are expressly told that it is impossible to divide them into two parts; and it would be obviously difficult to reduce the number, except by an abscissio infiniti, which would be out of place, because some of the kinds which are in direct competition with the kingly art would then be left undefined. “We must then proceed to subdivide these units, until we see, not only that the one idea is both one and many, but also how many are its real subdivisions.” In the Sophist and Politicus, as well as in the Phædrus, the notion of the ἄμφροι εἴδος, or species infima, has an important place (cf. Soph. 289 d), and the danger of passing at once from the highest generality to the lowest specialty is exemplified (e.g. Polit. 263).

“In like manner, when one is compelled to start from the indefinite (in cases where there is not immediately apparent a single comprehensive idea), he ought not all at once to spring from infinity to unity, but should find a number in the undistinguished mass, and so proceed from number to number until he reaches unity.” (Phil. 18 b.) It is more difficult to prove that this precept is exactly obeyed. But the cautious spirit thus enjoined may be illustrated from several instances of gradual generalization, as where the speakers cry a halt to count up the number of forms in which the Sophist has appeared, previous to one of these being selected as the most universally applicable (Soph. 231 d); or where from the narrower generalization, “nurture of men,” they pass on to the wider conception of “care or superintendence of men” (Polit. 275); or where from the comparison of the king and the weaver (implying a provisional generalization) is evolved the more general notion of an art of combination (συντεκτική) (Ib. 282 b).

§ 5. The forms of Sameness and Difference appear in the Sophist amongst the five kinds or forms which are selected
for examination as being the "greatest," or the most universal. "Being," the highest of all, was found to embrace the opposite principles of "motion," the essence of the materialist, and "rest," that of the idealist philosopher. On comparing these three "kinds," each is seen to have sameness and difference,—to be the same with itself, different from the other two. And these predicates of sameness and difference are found to be no less universally applicable than the form of Being. Thus Being, Sameness, and Difference, to use Aristotelian language, are universal predicaments, or categories. Everything, of which we can speak, exists, is the same in one relation, different in others, and is either at rest or in motion or both in different ways. "Number" is incidentally mentioned in the same dialogue (238 b) as being also an inseparable attribute of every possible term.

Again, in the latter part of the Politicus, there is an enumeration of seven kinds, as an ultimate division of the industries which are the helpers of the ruling power in a state. These are—raw-material, instruments, reservoirs, vehicles, coverings, amusements, food. To these summa genera of human labour is added the work of servants of every sort. And it is not obscurely implied, that with the addition of the royal science as a moving and regulating cause, this enumeration affords an exhaustive analysis of human activity. Thus in both dialogues there is seen a tendency to select certain natures or ideas as being the highest and most comprehensive, either of all ideas, or of the ideas belonging to a particular subject.

If we except the Timæus, where something similar is observable in the constitution of the Psychical Substance (p. 35) and in the five elements, which however are not viewed as by any means ultimate, the only other dialogue where there is a similar enumeration of categories is the Philebus, where Being is analyzed into Limit, the Unlimited, their union, and the cause of this; and the end of Being, or the good, is embraced in five kinds, Measure, Symmetry, Reality, Mind, and Pleasure. An approach, however, to a similar notion may be traced in two places of the Theaetetus: first, where the ideas selected as the undoubted objects of pure mind are Being, Not-Being,

1 Tim. 48 b: οὐδ' ἐν συλλαβῆς εἰθεὶ μόνον. A remarkable anticipation of modern chemistry.
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Sameness and Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness, and Number; and again, where in the "aviary" of the mind, while most of the "birds" or knowledges are collected in larger or smaller groups, a few are seen careering through every part. (Theæt. 197 e.)

This peculiarity of these three dialogues, Philebus, Sophista, Politicus, affords a point of comparison or rather of approximation between Plato and Aristotle. The only previous attempt at ultimate classification had been the συστολία of the Pythagoreans, and in the greater number of Plato's dialogues, even where ideas (or forms) are mentioned, there is no selection of a certain number as supreme and as embracing all others, except partially in the case of moral ideas. Even when the form of good is described in the Republic as surpassing in glory and dignity the idea of Being, this saying has rather a cosmological and ethical than a logical or metaphysical meaning. But here not only is the word χέσος for the first time employed in the technical sense, but each of the terms so described is viewed as a universal, containing a variety of species, and obtained by a process of induction (συμπαθεία). See Phileb. p. 25); and each enumeration is, for the time being, and in relation to the particular question raised, regarded as ultimate. This is therefore a nearer approach to a doctrine of categories than the casual reference to quantity (Soph. 245 d, Phileb. 24 c), quality (Rep. 4, 438 b, Theæt. 182 b), relation (Soph. 255 c, Phil. 51 e), action and passion (Theæt. and Soph.), in scattered passages.

But the categories of Plato are not connected with the theory of Predication, towards which, as appears even from Soph. 261 c, Plato had made but little progress. Even those of the "Sophist" are rather ontological than logical, and are more nearly analogous to the "four causes" of the Metaphysics: denoting, to use a convenient distinction of Plotinus, rather the elements than the kinds of Being. And he is less bound than Aristotle to his own forms of thought. The enumeration is in no two places the same. In the highest region of dialectic Plato still asserts the freedom of Mind. He "stands

1 Theæt. 185 d. Compare Parmenides, p. 129 c, where Rest and Motion are added to these.

k The only exception is in Phædrus, 271 b.
behind" the forms which he has invented to express what cannot be fully expressed, the electric play of thought. Collection and distinction, union and division, finite and infinite, same and other, one and many, Being and Not-Being, are various names for the two poles on whose attraction and repulsion depend the "high-strung harmonies" of the ideal world.

§ 6. Not less peculiar than the method of these dialogues is their structure, style, and diction, which, however, receive considerable illustration from the Philebus, Timæus, and Laws.

To take first what is most obvious, Socrates is no longer the chief speaker. A stranger from Elea, with whom Theodorus, Thætetus, and the younger Socrates have been conversing, accompanies them to the place of meeting, where they are expected by Socrates; who, with his accustomed pertinacious politeness, brings on a conversation, but with the exception of a few words when there is a change of subject, is silent for the remainder of the morning. In this respect this pair of dialogues is like the Parmenides, Timæus, and Critias, and resembles the two last named also in another equally external point, namely, that each pair form the middle part of an unfinished tetralogy. Plato has only twice thus connected dialogues in a series. The Thætetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher, are in this the counterpart of the Republic, Timæus, Critias, and Hermocrates.

The retirement of Socrates, however, though in keeping with, will not account for, the other peculiarities of which we are now to speak. For the few words assigned to him at the beginning partake of the general change of tone. Nor can this be ascribed to the subject; for the subjects of either dialogue, though related to each other, are wholly distinct.

Every reader of Plato must have felt a difference in passing from the Republic or Phædrus to the Sophist and Politicus; or, may it not be added? to the Philebus or the Laws. He is like one who, after walking with a gifted friend in town and country, and hearing him converse with all men, sits down to listen to a lecture from the same person. There is an air of self-imposed restraint, at the first glance distinguishable from the absolute conversational freedom of the Gorgias, a didactic tone, unlike the Socratic dissimulation of knowledge, a vein of refined and biting satire, which may be contrasted as well
as compared with the naïve and playful humour of the Phædrus or Charmides. As the student proceeds, he is struck by the more elaborate, though not more regular conformation of the periods, by the more frequent, almost monotonous recurrence of a certain rhythmical cadence, which he may have noticed here and there in the Phædrus, Republic, and Theætetus, by the precision of manner into which the Socratic urbanity has been transformed. And if he examines more minutely into the diction, he will find that the natural order is more often inverted than in the dialogues with which he is familiar, and that a greater fondness is shewn for unusual words, both poetical and technical, than in any dialogue except the Phædrus, Republic, Timæus, and Laws. In some respects the language approaches to that of tragedy, in others to the formality of an Aristotelian treatise.

(i) To dwell a little more at length on some of these points: and first, on the more didactic and systematic manner of the conversation. Nothing can exceed the courtesy and modesty both of Socrates and the Stranger in the opening scene, but when the Eleatic guest and his respondent have once crossed blades, he deals with him, not without pleasantry, but with a becoming degree of gravity, and secundum artem. There are no sallies, like those of Glaucon in the Republic, no sudden bursts of eloquence, as in the Phædrus. With a tone of mild authority the philosopher, for the edification of the bystanders, guides his pupil by a path familiar to himself to conclusions which he foreknows. He acknowledges from the first that he is thoroughly conversant with the whole subject (διακηδούναι γέ φησιν ἱκανὸς καὶ οὐκ ἄμυνημονεῖν), and warns his new acquaintances that the argument will be a long one.

The peculiarity in question is obviously shared by the Parmenides; less obviously, though still perceptibly, by the Theætetus. It is also observable in the Philebus, Timæus, and Laws.

The Philebus has certainly more of the well-known playfulness and familiarity of Socratic talk, more light and shade, and, in parts, more dramatic liveliness. The fine contrast, for example, between the eager Protarchus and the petulant

1 See also the myth in the Protagoras.
Philebus is unlike the almost featureless masks of the facile respondents in these dialogues. But such lighter elements are controlled by a certain degree of formality, and by the consciousness of method. The speakers are playing at a "laborous game," to which they are evidently not unaccustomed, and which proceeds according to certain rules. We are not in the market-place, or the house of Callias, but in the groves of Academe. And though the "boys" are not quite so tractable as Theaetetus, Socrates guides them by a regularly intricate road to a definite end, which has a positive as well as a negative import. The structure of the Philebus is in many ways nearer to the Sophist than that of either is to any other writing. As the ideal pretender is chased through the one dialogue, so the idea of pleasure, more or less personified, is hunted down in the other. The difficulties which arise in both are solved by means of a harmony of ideas (called in the Philebus κόσμος τις ἀσώματος, a "bodiless creation"). In both, the transitions (μεταβάσεις) of the argument are only surpassed in dialectical subtlety by the Theaetetus. Both account for falsehood by a similar analysis of mental states; both examine contemporary philosophers as diviners of that which they do not clearly know. In both, higher subjects are discussed than that proposed at the outset, which is accordingly thrust down, in both by a similar method of divisions, to the lowest place in the scale of knowledge or of being. In some of these respects the Politicus also presents some analogy to the Philebus; and they resemble each other in the importance which they both attach to the philosophy of Measure. On the whole, the style of the Philebus may be described as intermediate between that of the Republic and that of the Sophist. That of the Sophist and Politicus, again, is intermediate between the Philebus and the Timaeus and Laws. In these the gravity of tone already noticed is deepened into solemnity, and becomes the pervading characteristic. The keen though suppressed irony of the Sophist and Politicus, directed not towards the respondent, but against mankind, is here softened (like wine becoming first austere, then mellow), and either disappears, or is replaced by grave and gentle reflections on human nothingness. The

m Parm. 137 b: πραγματευόντα παιδίαν παίζειν.
bitterness of a mind which had many thoughts which could not be realized, now takes the sober colouring of an eye

"That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality;"

and the didactic manner of the chief speaker is more decided. There is the most perfect modesty, but no dissimulation of knowledge. The leader of the conversation speaks with an authority to which the rest defer. The results, though still only approximate, are in the highest degree positive, and the method is throughout constructive. The thoughts of a lifetime had assumed something like a permanent shape: and they were the writer's own. They were still living thoughts, and could give a reason of themselves; but they no longer needed the art of Socrates to bring them into being. Cicero was substantially if not literally right in assuming the Athenian Stranger in the Laws to be Plato himself.

(2) The loss of conversational freedom and vivacity is accompanied by a corresponding decline of poetical grace and power. The fire of enthusiasm is not extinct by any means, but is concentrated on a few great objects (Dialectic, Being, the Philosopher, the creation and preservation of the universe by God), and is less ready to light up with a spontaneous glow every new world of imagination. The language is less instinct with harmonious energy. The fondness for poetic words is of the kind which belongs rather to a learned rhetoric than to poetry. The genius loci, so powerful in the Phaedrus, is here forgotten. The Eleatic Stranger is like the Sophist he describes, whose "sense is shut" to everything but the dry light of reason. Speaking in a palaestra, he alludes in the most distant and general way, when the topic is suggested by his argument, to "certain exercises in which men are trained in groups at Athens and elsewhere." (Polit. 294 d.) Speaking at the time when Athens was ringing with the trial of Socrates, he never once alludes to a matter so sublunar. Indeed he expressly disowns any intention of giving pleasure, and lays down the principle that the standard by which the proportions of an argument are to be judged is not that of artistic symmetry. (Ib. 286 d.) Such was not the spirit of the precept that "an argument must be like the picture of a living creature, having head and feet and every member drawn in
seemly proportion to each other and the whole.” (Phædr. 264 c.) It has been remarked that the allusions to previous writings, such as the Republic, which occur in the Laws, are unlike the manner of the earlier dialogues, where every touch is in perfect dramatic keeping. Now, not to mention the manifest allusion to the Parmenides in Soph. 217 c (more pointed than in Theæt. 183 e), the direct reference to the argument of the “Sophist” in Polit. 284 b (καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὑπ’), though not violating propriety, because the company is unchanged, has more of a literary than a dramatic turn, and is more in the manner of a treatise than of a dialogue. And this is still more obviously the case in Soph. 253 c, where the Stranger quotes the language of a conversation at which he had not been present. (Theæt. 172 d.)

(3) Yet although there is less of spontaneous movement and artistic lightness of structure than in some other dialogues, there is more appearance of studied order and arrangement. Thus a reason is given for the introduction of the example of the fisherman in the Sophist, and the example of the weaver in the Politicus occasions an explanation of the use and meaning of example as an instrument of thought. And in making the transition from the dichotomies to the myth in the same dialogue, the Stranger gives due notice of the change, and anticipates the course to be taken when they return from this digression. The “preludes” and “recapitulations” of which the Phædrus speaks so disdainfully are now recommended with some emphasis by Plato. This avowedly conscious and studied arrangement of the parts of a discourse is still more noticeable in the early books of the Laws, where, to explain the tediousness of the preliminary discussion, the speaker says (1, 638 e) that he is endeavouring to make apparent the right method to be pursued in all such arguments. He is in fact, like the Stranger in the Politicus, giving an Example of Example. Such carefulness about the form of a writing, at a time when the form was really becoming less perfect, and also the composition of great works, and the connexion of successive pieces in a series, may be thought to indicate a different sense of the value of books from that expressed in a well-known passage of the Phædrus. And this suspicion is con-
firmed by a striking expression in the Laws, where the chief speaker, reviewing the conversation which they had held since dawn, maintains that no better education could be devised for youth, than to learn by heart this new kind of poetry, which he and his companions have poured forth, “not unaccompanied with airs from Heaven.” (Legg. 7, 811 c.)

§ 7. (Δύνατο δ' ἂν τις, εἰ βουλοῖτο, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀνομαθεῖται τέχνας τάτας ἐπαριθμεῖν, καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐταῖς ὄνοματα, εἴτε σπουδάζων ἔχρητο τοῖς ὄνομασιν εἴτε καὶ μή. λέγω δέ, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ὄνομάτων βιαίωτερον χρήσαθαι. Pollux, Onomasticon, VIII. 33, p. 206, 7.)

More palpable, though not more real, than these general nuances of style, are certain peculiarities of diction. Of these perhaps the most obvious to a cursory reader is the use of technical expressions. Mr. Gope has well observed, in the Preface to his translation of the Gorgias, that one of the most striking peculiarities of Plato’s philosophical writings is the almost entire absence of any scientific terminology. He adds, that “with the exception of one or two peculiar terms, such as εἴθος or ὕδα and διαλεκτική, and the special appropriation of δίάνοια and θυμοειδές in the Republic, and possibly one or two others, Plato’s philosophy is absolutely devoid of any technical phraseology.”

This remark applies with perfect truth to the Gorgias, Protagoras, Phædo, and most other dialogues. The technicalities which occur in the Phædrus (except διαλεκτικός, σωφρογγύς, διάφρεσις) are quoted with contempt. But the Theætetus already bears the marks of an opposite tendency, which becomes more decided in the Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus. Each theory advanced in the Theætetus is characterized by an incipient terminology, which, like the theories themselves, is not entirely set aside. Thus to express the doctrine of Sense we have κίνησις, ποιοῦν, πάσχων, αἰσθήσεις, αἰσθητόν, φορά, ποιέται, αἰσθανόμενα, αἰσθητής, κριτήριον, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, ποιήσις, each having a definite meaning required by the theory; and two of them, αἰσθητής and ποιήσις, being evidently new-fangled words. Other terms of the same kind which are produced in the later phases of the discussion are ἐκμαγεῖον, μνημεῖον, ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν, κεκτήσαθαι, ἐπιστήμα, στοιχεῖον, συλλαβῇ, διαφορότης. There are words of a more general character,
such as ἀγαλαβέω, 'to resume,' διορίζεσθαι, 'to distinguish,' which receive a preciseness of meaning from familiar use which they could not have had in ordinary speaking or writing. It is true that even Plato's technicalities are fresh from the mint; they retain the gloss of novelty, and the hues of life. But no student of these dialogues can doubt that there was floating before him the conception of a scientific language, based on dialectic, which should express more perfectly than they were known to the first name-giver the true sections and combinations of things. The Heracliteans were indeed ridiculed in the Theaetetus (183 b), because their theory confounded the ordinary use of speech: but even this ridicule shews that the notion of a philosophic vocabulary was already there. (Cf. ib. 166 b.) And in defence of one of the strangest of his coinages (δοξομεμητική), towards the conclusion of the Sophist, the Stranger gravely says that for want of the power of dividing "kinds" into their "forms" the vocabulary of the ancients was most defective. (Compare Cratylus, 436–439.) Yet he is careful to vary his new-made words, so as to avoid the hearer's being enslaved to them, and commends the youth with whom he converses for not setting too high a value on the choice of a name. (Καλῶς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, κἂν διαφυλάξῃ τὸ μὴ σπουδάσει ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνόμαις, πλούσιατέρος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. Polit. 261 e.) Thus it is evident that the invention of new terms was intended to enrich language, and not to limit thought.

Of the words in these dialogues which are either new or receive a distinctly new significance, there are many which Plato does not use again; but there are others which are found to recur, especially in the Laws. The following are not used again by Plato:—

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The following are found in other dialogues:—


Besides this class of words, whose use is thus shewn to be
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not wholly confined to the two dialogues, there may be observed in them two other kinds of a language approaching technical, which are nearly related to each other: terms expressing the operations of dialectic, and words connected with the mathematical and physical sciences.


b. Words expressing physical and mathematical conceptions:

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γ. As the terms just enumerated betray Plato’s love for those physical pursuits which were rejected by Socrates, so the new word ἄθεστη, which occurs only in the Politicus and Laws in all Greek literature before the death of Plato (unless we must add the seventh Platonic Epistle), affords an indication of his tendency to religious thought. And it is a fact worth noticing in this connexion that the word αἴγως is confined to the Sophist, Critias, and Laws, amongst the Platonic writings, and οἱ κρείστωνες as a euphemism for οἱ θεοὶ to Soph. 216 b, Epist. 7, 326 e.

Perhaps the notion of technical language (voces artis) may be thought to be unduly stretched in being extended to some of the words under the last two headings. But in whatever way they are described they are equally suitable to be adduced in the present section, whose object is to define and illustrate peculiarities of diction. There remain to be noticed words borrowed from the poets, and especially from the tragedians: respecting which it may be observed that the affectation of unusual phrases, which appears in the Phaedrus as the result of a half playful dithyrambic and epic fervour, at which

* The introduction of this word is interesting in connexion with Aristotle's Material Cause, of which the πρωτογενές εἴδος in the Politicus is one of the few anticipations in Plato.
Socrates himself wonders, is here interwoven with grave and unimpassioned talk, giving a tone of sustained dignity to the style. To this class (γ) belong:—

Soph. — ἀνθισταθομικ, ἀφιένομαι, ἀπαρατία, ἀρχαιοπρεπής, ἀθέτητος, δυσειδής, εἰς ὅ,τι, εἰσύστερον, καθιστρόφω, μαλακώς, νείκος (quoted from Emped.), ἄλωσθηρός, ρημή, ύψιθεν.

Polit.— ἀλεξεπιρόμενο (Xen.), ἀλις (Xen.), ἀπαγώγ (Theophr.), ἀπολέομεν ἔχειν, ἀπτην, ἀργυραμοιβός (cf. χρυσαμοιβός), βοηλάτης, βουθοφόρος, γενείω, διώγμα, ἐξανθω, εὐγνωστος, εὐκριτος, ἐφεδρος, βλάσος, κάταγμα, κερασφόρος, μελανεσθαί, νομεύω, ὀπλισμα, παρεία, περιωτή, πολυπλανής, προσφέγγομα, συντρέχο. Under this head also might have been classed ἄστροφος and νυμφετής.

Soph. Polit.— ἀπερημώ.


Soph.— ἀπομαρτύρομαι, ἀπόρρητος, ἀναθήρετος, ἀπάλλαξις, εὐηνίως (adv.), καθό, κυλύνθησις, κώλυσις, προτάττομαι, *σκοτεινύς.

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The facts thus enumerated indicate as characteristic of the language of these dialogues, (1) An extreme minuteness of distinction, giving rise to new compounds and derivatives, and to the employment of old words with new shades of meaning. (2) An affectation of variety, leading to different modes of expressing the same thing. (3) Combined with these a learned fulness of diction, commanding the resources of the written as well as of the spoken language, and moulding old words to the expression of new ideas: e. g. νυμφευτής, "one who brings together in marriage;" ἀγράμματος, "unwritten;" ἀστροφος, "without twisting." (4) The frequent and familiar use of words denoting physical and mathematical as well as ethical conceptions. To which may be added (5) the tendency to fix in language some of the leading generalizations of philosophy. This last point affords a partial approach to the terminology of Aristotle, who has adopted several of the terms here used. The re-adoption of words from the poets and early writers, and the invention of new compounds, are characteristic also of Isocrates and Xenophon; and many of the words thus introduced became part of the vocabulary of the later prose writers. But when the five points are taken together, the language of these dialogues is seen to be that of Plato, with the peculiarities somewhat exaggerated; the most
marked features being the invention of technical expressions and the preference for words belonging to the tragic period of Greek poetry.

That these dialogues show an increased tendency to the use of a peculiar diction, is proved sufficiently by the occurrence in 108 pages (ed. St.) of 270 words not found elsewhere in Plato, and upwards of 90 words not found in other Greek writers. It is true that 60 of these 90 words, and about 90 of the 270, may be set down to the method of dichotomies, but there remain the goodly allowance of about 180 words peculiar to these amongst the Platonic dialogues, and at least 30 ἀπαξ εἰρημένα, a number which might be increased if it were lawful to add those words which do not occur earlier, and which later Platonists, like Plutarch and Clemens Alexandrinus, have evidently adopted from this source.

But there are Platonic dialogues in which there are equally marked peculiarities of diction. These are the Phaedrus, Republic, Timæus (including the fragment of the Critias), and Laws. The first of these abounds in poetical words, and there is probably no writing of equal length from which so rich a vocabulary could be procured. But this may partly be accounted for by the unwonted enthusiasm which Socrates confesses that he feels "swelling in his breast." The rich garment of expression, "stiff with cloth of gold," is confessedly worn for the occasion; and though bearing a certain relation to the language of these dialogues, has an air of wildness and novelty, and a brilliance of unpremeditated force which is absent here. The case of the Phædrus then may for the present be treated as exceptional. And the same may be said of the Republic, which abounds in peculiar words, not from singularity, but from an overflowing richness and variety.

The Timæus, Critias, and Laws, in 436 pages have 1492 words which occur nowhere else in Plato. Of these nearly a third part belong to the Timæus and Critias, which in 91 pages have 427 words which occur in no other Platonic dialogue. This large proportion is no doubt in part due to the peculiarity of subject; but in the Laws alone, which as a political and ethical treatise is not materially different in this respect from the greater number of Plato's writings, there are (in 345 pages) nearly a thousand words which he has not used elsewhere.
It remains to ask whether in those dialogues which have a peculiar vocabulary the peculiarities are of the same kind. This question may be partly answered by glancing at the lists of words given above, and counting the number of the words in each category which occur in the Sophist or Politicus, and in the Timæus, Critias, or Laws, but appear in no other dialogue. The coincidences noticed under the first head will appear especially striking. It will also be seen that the coincidences with the Phædrus, although not numerous are characteristic, especially under β. See especially γένος, γένεσις, πῆςις, σώμα, ὄλγῃ. This line of proof might be indefinitely extended by aducing words peculiar to the latter dialogues but similar in kind to those peculiar to the former a, and words which though not peculiar to them are found to occur with increased frequency in both r. It may be left to the student to examine these analogies for himself; but to give cogency to these "concomitant variations" it is necessary to present the negative side of the inquiry. It has been shewn that the Sophist and Politicus on the one hand, and the Timæus, Critias, and Laws on the other, have certain peculiarities of diction; and also that these peculiarities are to some extent the same or similar. It must be further inquired whether any other dialogues equally with the Sophist and Politicus share the peculiarities of the Timæus, Critias, and Laws. If account be taken of what I have ventured to call the technical words, the answer is clear. There is no dialogue which equally with these five combines the various elements of diction above-mentioned. In poetical and rhetorical words the Phædrus can hardly be exceeded; but the number of words which occur only in the Phædrus, Timæus, Critias, and Laws, is less in proportion than the number of those occurring only in the Sophist, Politicus, Timæus, Critias, and Laws; and considerably less than those confined to the Politicus, Timæus, Critias, and Laws, although slightly exceeding those found only in the

a Such as ἐκλειος, Legg. (β.); ἀβιαστος, Tim. (δ.); ἄβοδλητος, Legg. (α.); ἄγενες, Tim. (α.); ἄγεννητος, Tim. (α.); ἄγενεια, ἄγεια, Legg. (γ.); ἄγχιστεια, Legg. (β.); ἄγέαςμα, Legg. (δ.); ἄδιερευνητός Tim. (ε.); ἄδιοφυλα, Legg. (ε.); ἄθυσμα, Legg. (δ.); ἄθαλα, Tim. Legg. (β.); ἄθερω, Legg. (β.); ἄθυτος, Legg. (β.)

r Such as φράζω, περιέχω, περιλαμβάνω, μεταξεῖν, ἀνταργάζομαι, μεταχειρίζομαι, πρακτικός, πραγμάτικος, φύλος, φαντασία, ἀνόφεις, ἀρσένο, πράσινο, the indefinite ὅσονος.
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Sophist, Timæus, Critias, and Laws. But, if the Phædrus is treated as exceptional, there is no other dialogue which equally with these approximates to the language of the later dialogues, as measured by the number of words (in proportion to the number of pages) which the dialogue in question shares with the Timæus, Critias, or Laws, and with no other. The Sophist, which is neither physical nor ethical, but dialectical, and for this reason cannot be expected to abound in variety of words, is nearer to the Timeæus, Critias, Laws, when tried by this test, than the Republic, which abounds in peculiar words, which is linked by the author to the Timæus, and whose general subject is closely similar to that of the Laws; while the proportion of the Politicus is five times that of the Gorgias, and nearly ten times that of the Meno. The following table exhibits approximately the numerical ratios of the several dialogues according to the number of words at once common and peculiar to each with the Timeæus, Critias, and Laws:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Ratio with Timæus, Critias, Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polit.</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{11}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soph.</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phædr.</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symp.</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philæb.</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ion</td>
<td>$\frac{6}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theæt.</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prot. Lach. Lys.</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crat. Apol. Eu.</td>
<td>$\frac{4}{6}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The position of the Parmenides in this list, like that of the Phædrus, is partly accounted for by exceptional circumstances.

§ 8. In grammar, structure of sentences, and rhythm, these dialogues present the same affinities which were found in examining their vocabulary and general style. Bearing a certain resemblance to Plato’s other writings generally, they approach most nearly to the Philebus, Timeæus, Critias, and Laws.

(1) With respect to the grammar this remark will be seen to be justified by many parallel passages which have been collected in the notes to this edition. Of the following idioms several may be paralleled from other dialogues: some from other authors; but when taken together, they will be seen to be especially characteristic of the group thus indicated.

* Considered as one continuous dialogue. For confirmation of these assertions, see Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum.
i. The Ionic dative plural of the 2nd declension in στ occurs twice in the Politicus: 262 a. διπλασιωσι (MSS. with one exception, oση); 304 c. ἐπομένωσιν. Several instances of this form might, however, be collected from the Timæus and Laws. It does not occur elsewhere in Plato.

ii. Perfects with present (perhaps frequentative) meaning: ἔσπονδακα, Soph. 216, 251 c, 259 c; κέχρημα, ib. 223 e; τε-θαύμακα, ib. 251 c. Compare τετεύτακα, Rep. 7, 521 e, Tim. 90 b. The so-called “aorist of custom” and the perf. pass. with middle signification are too common to require special mention here.

iii. The participle is used with the auxiliary verb instead of one of the tenses of some other mood:

Soph. 217 c. ἀπαρνηθείς γένη; ib. 229 d. ἔστιν ἔχων; ib. 235 a. ἔχων τυγχάνει; ib. 244 c. λόγον οὐκ ἄν ἔχου (ἔστιν); ib. 245 c. γενέσθαι—δι. ib. d. εἰληφὼς φανεῖται; ib. 260 d. ἔξαρνον γεγονέναι. Polit. 257 a. ἀκηκότες εἶναι; ib. 268 c. λέγοντες—τυγχάνομεν; ib. 306 b. ἔστον ἔχουτε.

iv. The cognate accusative of the active becomes the subject of the passive voice. This extension of a common idiom occurs sometimes in tragedy, e. g. Sophocles, Trach. 169. τοιαῦτ' ἔφραξε πρὸς θεῶν εἰμαρμένα τῶν Ἡρακλεῶν ἐκτελεύτασθαι πόνων (=τῶν Ἡρακλῆς τελευτῶν τῶν πόνων τοιαῦτα, cogn. acc.). In the Sophist, where much has to be said of various processes, this form of expression is often found convenient, e. g. 221 a. τὸ τῆς—πληγῆς—ἀνασπῶμεν, “the stroke effected by an upward jerk;” cf. Polit. 271 a. τὸ ἔξ ἀλλήλῳ—γεννῶμεν. By a further extension of the same usage, the verbal noun in μα often means not the result of an act, but the act or process itself: so δήλωμα, Soph. 262 a; γέννημα, ib. 256 c; μῆμα Polit. 274 a; and, as I venture to think, στέρμα, ib. 272 e. The case of θρέμα, ib. 289 b, is even more peculiar; here a transition is made from the act to the means by which the act is performed, just as often happens with the English verbal noun in ing (e. g. furnishings, trappings, dressing, &c.).

v. One instance at least occurs of the infinitive used for the imperative: Soph. 262 c. σὺ μοι φράξεω.

vi. And one of the imperative put interrogatively:

Periphrases are altogether more frequent: e. g. τέλος ἔχεω.
vii. Partitive genitives are frequent: e.g.
Soph. 265 a. τῆς κτητικῆς.
Polit. 281 e. τῶν αὐτῶν.
Cf. Phileb. 56 a. καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῆ.

viii. Attraction,
of an adverb, Polit. 263. ὕθεν = ὑπετέθεν, οὐ.

ix. Apposition,
a. Sing. and plur. ἐν πάντα, frequent here and in Phileb.
Polit. 306 d c. τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα καὶ ὀξύτητα—αὐτό.
b. Φemin. and neut. Soph. τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλοῦμενον.
c. Masc. and fem. or neut. (concrete and abstract),
Polit. 259 d. πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικῶν—ἐν πάντα ταῦτα.

d. Of clauses,
(i.) To each other, Polit. 257 d. ταῦτα—ποιητέον ὡν ἀποστατέον.
(ii.) To a demonstrative: frequently τὸ δὲ or τὸ δὲ γε.
Soph. 244 a. τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνεται πᾶν τοῦντινον.
Polit. 263 d. τὸ δὲ γε—τὰχ’ ἄν—διονομάζοι. Ib. 308 c. ταυτὸν δὴ μοι τοῦθ’ ἦ βασιλικὴ φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.
(iii.) To a relative, Soph. 227 c, ὅπερ ἦρον, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 236 d. δὲ καὶ τὸτ’ ἡμφεγυνοῦν, κ.τ.λ.

x. The use of the neut. article with the genitive to express the abstract notion of a thing, is especially frequent in the Politicus and Laws. Polit. 263 c. τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως. Ib. 274 d. τὸ τοῦ μυθοῦ.

xi. Ellipse (more frequent in the Sophist),
Ib. 233 b. μήτ’ ἐφαίνοντο (ὁρθῶς ἀντιλέγειν).
Ib. 235 b. δεδεικται τοῖνυν (δεῖ).
Ib. 238 c. μὴ δὲν δὲ (ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν).
Ib. 248 c. τὸ δὲ (ἂν φαίνει).
Polit. 276 c. τὶ μὴν (ἐδει);—ἔλεγομεν (δεῖ).
Ib. 301 b. προσποιήσεται δὲ ὡς ἐπιστήμων (ἄρχειν).
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b. Of τὸ μὲν with τὸ δὲ following,
   Soph. 221 c. νευτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ πεῖν. 
   Ib. 267 b. νευμὴσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθὲσθω.
   Polit. 291 c. τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ. Cf. Phil. 36 c. νευθεὶς, αἱ δ’ ἀληθεῖς—ήδοναί. Hence in Phil. 66 c, ἐπιστήμας, ταῖς δ’ αἰσθήσεσιν, should probably be read ἐπιστήμας with corr. Σ. Legg. passim.

c. Of the apodosis after μὲν,
   Soph. 240 b. έυκος μὲν. 

xii. Pleonasm,

a. Simple, of δεῖν, Soph. 221 a. ὅπερ προθέμεθα δεῖν ἐκεῖνος. 
   Repetition of αὐτός, Polit. 268 a (cf. the fragment of Ἀσσ. in Rep. 2, 383 c) εἶναι, Ib. 300 c. εἰς ὑναμιν εἶναι. Comparative, Ib. 288 b c. μᾶλλον—ὁρθότερον.

b. Redundant or explicit use of the participle, Soph. 225 a. ὄνομα λέγειν—τιθεμένοι. 

(N. B. There is a strong tendency to the use of participial expressions generally.)

c. The same love of explicitness is shewn in the repetition, with or without modification, of a verbal notion which has been already expressed or implied; often causing a return from a more dependent to a less dependent construction, as from participle to infinitive, infinitive to subjunctive, infinitive or subjunctive to indicative. Soph. 216 c. τότε δὲ σοφισται, τότε δὲ δάξαν παράσχους ἄν. Ib. 225 c. ἄμφισθεται μὲν, ἀτέχνος δὲ—περὶ αὐτὸ πράττειν. Ib. 243 a. χαλεπών, καὶ πλημμελεῖς ἐπιτιμᾶν. Ib. 246 d. ποιεῖν—ποιοῦμεν. Ib. 248 c. λέγουσιν ὅτι—μὲν—δὲ—φασὶν. Polit. 263 d.
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προσείποι. Ib. 293 e. μεμιμήσθαι. Ib. 299 d. θεσαίμεθα. Ib. 302 c. ἐφαμεν. Cf. Symp. 177 c.; Apol. 19 e.

xiii. Πρὸς τὸ σημαωμένον.

The sentence is sometimes continued as if a word in composition were fully expressed.

Soph. 219 a. ἄτεχνον, ἀλλὰν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχον.

Ib. 249 d. τῷ—φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταύτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι.

Cf. Legg. 7, 810 a. φιλομαθοῦντι μηδὲ μισοῦντι.

xiv. "Pendent" constructions.

Of the nom., Soph. 247 c. πᾶν ὅ μὴ δυνατὸ—εἰσώ, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο ——. Polit. 303 c. τοῦτο μὲν ἄτεχνος ὡςπερ δράμα κ.τ.λ.

Gen. with peri, Soph. 258 c. peri ἑναντίου τινός—χαίρειν λέγομεν.

Dat., Polit. 295 c. τῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια—κ.τ.λ.

Acc., Polit. 295 d. πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνον—γέλως ἀν ὅ μέγατος γλυκοῦτον τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετήματος. Ib. 282 c. τὸ μὲν ἄτράκτῳ—ὅσα δὲ γε αὖ—. Ib. 283 a. τὸ γε τῆς ύφαντικῆς μέρος—. Ib. 306 c.'Οξύτητα καὶ τάχος—. With παρά, Ib. 300 b. παρά γὰρ οἴμαι τοὺς νόμους—.

xv. The construction as well as the diction is often varied in successive clauses.

Soph. 248 b. γενέσει—πρὸς οὕσιν. Ib. 244 d. ἦ μὴδενός—εἶ δὲ τινὸς. Ib. 245 c. τε—καὶ μὴν—γε.

xvi. The subject of the inversion of words belongs rather to the structure of sentences than to grammar. But it may be well in this place to call attention to the frequency of hyperbaton, especially in the use of particles. E. g. Soph. 263 c. ἐφαμεν—ποι. Ib. d. μένοιν. Ib. 264 a. ὅταν—αὖ.

Several of these modes of expression, such as the redundant participle, the use of the auxiliary verb, and the extension of the cognate accusative, not to mention the Ionic dative plural, and the peculiar effects of attraction, are in the manner of tragedy; and we may therefore be the less surprised at such directly tragic forms of expression as Soph. 238 a. μήπω μέγ’ ἐπει. Ib. 235 a. νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἦδη τὸν θύρα μηκέτί ἄνειναι. Ib. 229 c. ἄρχαιοπρεπῆς τί πάρτιον. Ib. 235 d. οὐ μὴ ποτὲ ἐκφυγόν ἐπεδρήσαται, or such "pregnant" constructions as in Polit. 271 a. ἀδηλον—διεφθείρετο. Cf. Legg. 11, 926 b. μανίσεμεν κηδεύματα.
(2) It may be remarked generally with regard to the structure of the sentences in these dialogues, that they are more elaborate and also more irregular than in the greater number of Plato's writings. They have less of the spontaneous movement of conversation, and in the Politicus especially are often more redundant and complicated. While the reader's ear is filled with a peculiar stately rhythm, his attention is quickened by artificial or poetical collocations of words. These traits are clearly marked in the dialogues before us; they may be traced also in the Philebus and some parts of the Phaedrus, and they are eminently characteristic of the Laws.

Note for example the elaborateness and balanced formality of the following replies:

Soph. 217 a. τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποιὸν περὶ αὐτῶν διαπο-ρθεῖς ἐρέσθαι διεινόησιν;
Ib. 224 c. καὶ τί τις ἄλλο εἰπὼν οὐκ ἄν πλημμελοῦῃ πλὴν τὸ νῦν ἵπτομενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;
Ib. 226 b. τὸ ποιὸν περὶ αὐτῶν βουληθεῖς δηλώσαι, παραδεχε-ματα προθεῖς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἰρόν;
Ib. 234 b. οὖθαμῶ: πάμπολον γὰρ εἰρήκας εἰδὸς εἰς εὖ πάντα συλλαβῶν καὶ σχεδοῦ ποικιλᾶτατον.
Polit. 262 c. ποιὸν οὖν δὴ φράξεις διαιρομένους ἥμᾶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀρτί δράν;
Ib. 270 b. φαίνεται γ' οὖν δὴ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως εἰρήσθαι πάντα ὡσ διελήλυθασ.
Ib. 277 a. καὶ κινδυνεύει γ', ὡς ἐνε, τελέως ἄν ἤμων ὀφθαλμοεις ἐνε εἰς ἕνει ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀπὸδειξεις.
Ib. 284 e. καὶ μέγα γ' ἐκάτερον τιμῆς εἴπες, καὶ πολὺ δια-φέρου ἄλλης.

Compare with these Phil. 29 d. τὸς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ψυχαί ων ἄν ποτε φανείη; Ib. 32 d. Ὑμνήστατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη τη δεὶ διαπορευθήσαι τὸ νῦν μεταδιδόταμεν. Ibid. 47 c. Πάντα, ὥς Σώ-κρατες, τὰ συμβαίνουτα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διε-πέρανας. Tim. 29 d. Ἀριστα, ὥς Σίμαι, παντάπασι τε ὅσ κελεῦες ἀποδεκτέον τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμων σου θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ λόγον ἤμων ἐφεξῆς πέραιει. Legg. 1, p. 627 c. Καὶ μάλα ἀτοποῦ, ὡς δέν, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ὅμως δ' ὢμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγ-καίνοσαι. Ib. 628 c. Ὑπὸ τῶν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἦς κείμον περὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ γένεσθαι πόλει. Ib. 639 c. παντάπασι τω λοιποῖν λέγεις, καὶ οὐθαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἄρχοντα, ἄλλα τοῖς σφόδρα γυναικαῖς.
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In these and numberless other places there is easily recognised the presence of a common type. The same careful precision is observable in the explicitness with which a question is often stated. See Soph. 218 c; 230 b, c, d; 248 d, e; 265 c; Polit. 262 c, d, e; 293 a, b; and compare Phil. 12 c, d; 15 b, c; 18 b, c, d, and Legg. 637.

Instances of redundancy and complication, of a somewhat harsher kind than those of the Phædrus, Gorgias, or Republic, arising more from lengthiness than fulness, will soon enough become familiar to the student of these dialogues. Meanwhile the following passages may be taken as samples: Soph. 230 c, d; Polit. 288 d, 293 b, 298 c, d, 309 b. Compare Phil. 17 d, e; Legg. 716 b, 740 d, 779 d. Such irregularities are especially frequent in the Politicus and Laws.

In point of rhythm and the collocation of words, these dialogues hold, with the Philebus, an intermediate place between the Phædrus (to which may here be added the Theætetus and Republic) and the Timæus, Critias, and Laws.

Every reader of Plato is acquainted with the poetic cadences, which in his more highly wrought passages he occasionally introduces, not without a smile at his own magnificence. In the myths especially (to use his own words), he speaks with a tragic air, as if telling a tale impressively to children. (Rep. 8, 545 e. εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν "Ὁπ(π)ως δὴ πρὸ- τον στάσις ἐμπεσε," καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὤς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρευχλησόσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδὴ λεγοῦσας ὕψηλο- λογουμένας λέγειν;) Examples will readily occur from the Protagoras, Symposium, Theætetus (172–177), and the conclusion of the Republic (where note especially the speech of Lachesis). It appears from the Phædrus that these harmonies were not unconscious. The Socrates of that dialogue is surprised to find himself discoursing in this unwonted strain. When the afflatus of the higher rhetoric first descends on him, he says, "I am speaking almost in dithyrambs," and afterwards, when he breaks out into a verse in the epic metre, he remarks on this as shewing a further access of enthusiasm. The ironical shyness with which he at first exercises his suddenly acquired gift wears off as he proceeds, and in the second long speech, or "palinode," he evidently "forgets that they are at play." Both speeches, besides
such mock-poetical turns as εύμμοι λαβέσθε τοῦ μυθοῦ,—πάρτε δ’ ἡ, θρέμματα γενναία, καλλίταπαδά τε Φαίδρου πειθεί, are full of a sententious solemnity and rich music, to which the choice and arrangement of the words contribute largely. The following single phrases will partly illustrate this: 246 d. ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν ὑπαρχώ Ζεὺς, ἐλαίων πτηνὸν ἄρμα, πρώτος πορεύεται. 247 a. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἄριστω τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες. Ib. b. ἀκράν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑποράνων ἀψίδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἀνατες ἦδη. Ib. βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἱππος μετέχει. Ib. 248 b. πολλά μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλοὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ ὁμοίαντο, πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἐξουσία πόνον ἀτελείς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται—where the alliteration also adds to the effect.

The music of language, thus half-humorously struck out, seems to have had an increasing fascination for Plato, and sounds on unreservedly in his latest works. In the Timeus and Laws these tragic and “dithyrambic” cadences are no longer occasional, but perpetual, and the speaker does not now “veil his face” with Socratic irony while uttering them. There appears an increasing preference for balanced phrases and “good mouth-filling” words. The rhythm, however, while more laboured, is less varied and less instinct with movement and life. The following examples are taken almost at random.

Tim. 41 c. δεόι δὲ σπαρείσαι αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκουσα ἐκάστας ἐκαστα ὄργανα χρόνου φύναι ζώων τὸ θεοσβέστατον. Ib. 47 b. τάλλα δὲ, ὅσα ἐλάττο, τί ἢ ὑμνοῦμεν; ἢν δ’ ὑπὶ λιθοσφοσ τυφλωθεὶς ἁδυρμένος ἀν ὑμνοῖ ματὴν. Legg. 1, 644 b. δει δὴ τὴν παίδελαι μνᾶμοι ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρώτοι τῶν καλλίστων τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἀνδραξει παραγυνόμενον. Ib. 2, 653 d. ὅσοι δὲ οἰκτεράντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον περικός γένος. Ib. 654 e. μάταιος δ ἡμᾶτα ταῦτα ἔμυσιν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἰς Ἐλληνικῆς εἰς βαρβαρικῆς λόγος ἢν εἰπ. Ib. 661 b. τὸ δὴ τέλος ἢπάσης μακρατύτητος εἶναι τὸ τάκτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὃ τί τάχυστα. Ib. 3, 677 e. μυρίαν μὲν τινα φαβερὰν ἐρήμων, γῆς ὑπὸ ἄρθρου πλήθος πάμπολυ, ζῶων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων βουκόλι ἄττα, καὶ εἰ τί που αἰηγοῦ περιελθέθη γένος. Ib. 7, 824 a. ἥ τῶν διαπαύματα πόνων ἐξουσία. Ib. 8, 831 b. τοῦ φαγεῖν παιστοδακαὶ καὶ πιεῖν ὑπάυτους καὶ ἀφροδισίων πάσαν πάντως παρασχέει πλησμονή. Ib. 842 e. ἀναγκαίων νομοθετούντα ἐστὶ τρέπεσθαι. Ib. 4, 716 σ, b, 9, 854 a, 878 b, 11, 919 a, b.
If we turn now to the Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus, we shall find a rhythm less inflated and monotonous than that of the Laws, less free and various than that of the Phaedrus, but essentially resembling both. If the cadences of the Phaedrus have a dithyrambic wildness, and those of the Laws are oratorical rather than poetical, these would most aptly be compared to the refined moderation and calm stateliness of Attic tragedy. So far as a thing of this kind can be reduced to rule, the artifices by which the effect is secured are chiefly two: (1) The careful balancing of words so as to relieve the tediousness of a lengthened phrase, by the counterposition of noun and epithet, verb and participle, subject and object, and by the alternation of emphatic and unemphatic words; (2) The adjustment of long and short syllables so as to quicken or retard the movement of the sentence. (That this is no mere fancy may be gathered from the re-introduction of the Ionic dat. plur. in στ. Sometimes short syllables are accumulated as in choric metres: more often a sentence is concluded with an iambic hemistich, or with a dochmiac, each generally terminating with a dissyllable, which is often divorced from the immediate context. But there is something beyond this unconscious mechanism, which can be discovered by the ear alone. A very few instances out of many are all that can be quoted here.

Soph. 218 d. εἰ μὴ σύ ποθὲν εὐπεπεστέραν ἔξεις εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰν οἶδον. 234 d. καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράθη τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων. 242 a. ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἔστενο, εἰ τούτῳ τις εἰργεί δραίν ὁκνος. 259 d. οὔτε τις ἔρεξεν οὔτος ἀλήθινος, ἀρτι τέ τῶν ὀντων τούτι ἐφαπτομένου δήλος νεογενῆς ὄν.

Polit. 261 c. πλουσιότερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσωσεν. Ib. τίνι δὲ ἀγέλασσοτροφικῷ ἢ ὑπάρθει θυς τις δίδυμον ἀποφιμάς τὸ χοπομένου ἐν δυπλασίους ταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἡμισέων εἰς τότε ποιήσεις ζητείσθαι. 268 b. οὐκ ἀλλος κρείττων παραμονεύῃς τι καὶ κηλῶν πραξεῖν μετὰ τα ὀργάνων καὶ ψυλλ τῷ στόματι τίνι τῆς αὐτοῦ πολύμην ἀριστα μεταχειριζόμενοι μουσίκην. 269 d. τοῖς πάντων θειότατοις προσήκει μονοίς. 270 a. τότε δ' ὅταν ἀνεθῇ, δὲ ἐαυτῷ αὐτὸν ἠλέα, κατὰ καρῷ ἄφθεντα τοιούτοι, διότι ἀνα-παλίν πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδους μυριάδας διὰ τὸ μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ μεγάλου βαίνου ποδὸς ἄλαι. 273 d. διὶ.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

The following are selected from many parallel examples in the Philobus. 18 d. τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν ἄλλον λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἑνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν ποιοῦντα, μιᾶν ἔτ' αὐτοῖς ὡς ὁδαι γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσεπών. 45 d. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑθριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἢ σφόδρα ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περίβοιτος ἀπεργάζεται. 46 b. σύμμικτον τοῦτο γ' ἀρ' θ' Ἠσίπτατο περηκατεί, ἐουκε γίγνεσθαι τι κακὸν. (Where there is a manifest approach to the structure of an Iambic line: σύμμικτον ἄρ' ἐουκε γίγνεσθαι κακὸν.*) 66 b. πρὸτον μὲν περὶ μέτρου καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν αἴδιον ἤρησθαί φύσιν. 67. καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔργας οὐοίονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

Whatever may be thought of a matter which depends so much on individual impressions as this of rhythm, there can be no question that the transposition of words from their natural sequence, either for the sake of sound or emphasis, which was noticed occasionally in the Thaëtetus, Appendix A. p. 218, becomes more frequent in these dialogues. See, for instance, the hyperbaton of νῦν in p. 218 b, and two other places of the Sophist; and Polit. 268 e (πολλά—ἐτη), 276 c (ἐπιμέλεια—καὶ—τέχνη), 280 d (ὅσαι τε περὶ τὰς κλοπὰς καὶ τὰς βία πράξεις διακωλυτικὰ ἐργα παρέχονται τέχναι φραγμάτων†).

In more than one passage this has been the chief source of difficulty to interpreters. Nor will it be denied that the same symptom of laborious and artificial arrangement reappears with increased frequency in the Laws.

*a Cf. Polit. 300 a. τοῦ κακοῦ τοῦ πρόσθεν μείζων ἀν' τούτο γίγνοιτο κακὸν: suggesting the line τοῦ πρόσθε μείζων τούτο γίγνεται κακὸν.

§ 9. The relation of our two dialogues to the Philebus on
the one hand, and on the other to the Timaeus and Laws, which
is indicated by this general survey of their scope, method,
sty le and diction, and may perhaps be confirmed when each is
examined separately, contains the answer to the question raised
by Socher, Are these dialogues Platonic or Antiplatonic?

The single point of authorship is indeed sufficiently decided
by three references of Aristotle (Met. vi. 2, § 3, 1026 B, Δώ
Πλάτων τρόπον τινά οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν
ἐταξέν; ib. xi. 8, 1064 B; xii. 2, 1089 C), and in reference to
the Sophist few Platonic scholars will not feel the force of
Dr. Thompson's words (Genuineness of the Sophista, p. 5):
"So far as the mere style is concerned, there is no dialogue
in the whole series more thoroughly Platonic. In their
structure the periods are those of Plato, and they are unlike
those of any other writer. Throughout, it seems to me, the
author is writing his very best. His subject is a dry one;
and he strives to make it palatable by a more than ordinary
neatness of phrase, and by a sustained tone of pleasantry.
His style is terse or fluent, as terseness or fluency is re-
quired: but the fluency never degenerates into laxity, nor the
terseness into harshness. The most arid dialectical wastes
are refreshed by his humour: and bloom in more places
than one with images of rare brilliancy and felicity. Few
besides Plato would have thought of describing the endless
wrangling of two sects (?) who had no principle in common,
under the image of a battle between gods and giants; and
fewer still, had they conceived the design, would have ex-
cuted it with a touch at once so firm and so fine. What
inferior master could have kept up so well and with so little
effort, the fiction of a hunt after a fierce and wily beast, by
which the Eleatic stranger sustains the ardent Thetetetus amid
the toil and weariness of a prolonged logical excercitation?
Or who could so skilfully have interwoven that excercitation
itself with matter so grave and various as that of which the
dialogue in its central portion is made up? If vivacity in the
conversations, easy and natural transitions from one subject to
another, pungency of satire, delicate persiflage, and idiomatic
raciness of phrase are elements of dramatic power, I know no
dialogue more dramatic than the Sophistes."

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But the objections of Socher are not thus met, or rather the difficulties which he raised are not explained. And yet the solution of them may contribute something towards a theory of these dialogues, and may even throw some light on the history of Plato's mind.

1. Socher objects first that the dichotomies, unlike the divisions of the Gorgias and Philebus, are meaningless, arbitrary, accidental, and tastelessly prolonged. It has been shewn that division as a logical exercise was at one time rife in the school of Plato; that the use of that exercise here is propedentie and provisional; and that the method while used is also criticized, modified, and partly rejected; that its use here is not more singular than that of etymologies in the Cratylus: and that as the Cratylus vein recurs occasionally in these dialogues, so traces of the method of dichotomies appear in the Laws. The use of the method is also seen to be an approach to Aristotle, who makes use of some of the divisions which are here invented.

2. "The absence of humour, seen especially in the gravity with which trivial examples are worked out." Whatever may be thought of the humour of these dialogues, they are not less humorous than the Timæus and Laws. And whoever misses humour in them, will probably find the same want in the greater part of the Philebus. Socher's objection is really based on the prominence which is given in these dialogues—and also in the Philebus and Parmenides, and in a different way in the Laws—to the idea of method. And it may be retorted that the "gravity" is often that of the accomplished humorist, who does not "himself laugh, to set on some quantity of barren spectators to laugh too."

3. "Plato identifies Being with the ideas; Not-Being with the objects of sense: the object of opinion being intermediate. (Rep. v. 477-480.) The Eleatic Stranger takes no account of this absolute antithesis of Being and Not-Being. Being, with him, is the sum of all positive notions. Plato, on the other hand, takes no account of the logical antithesis or correlation of Being and Not-Being."

4. "Further, the Sophist contains a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas."

These cardinal objections can only be fully met in the separate Introduction to the Sophist. Meanwhile the reader
may be asked to bear in mind what has been already said of Plato's modification of his theory of Knowledge, and the undoubted approximation to the Aristotelian point of view which appears in the Philebus, Timæus, and Laws. And we may notice, as a discrepancy of the same kind, the final rejection in the Theaetetus of a definition of Knowledge, which might well be thought essentially Platonic, namely, "True opinion able to give a reason of itself" (δόξα ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου).

5. To the Politicus, besides the general grounds (1 and 2), Socher objects that the political notions here advanced are not in harmony with the Republic, and still less with earlier dialogues. The examination of this point must also be reserved: but we are in a position to remark that there is a third case not put by Socher, viz. Is the Politicus intermediate between the Republic and the Laws?

6. Lastly, he observes that the idea of the Divine Government, implied in the mythical description of the Saturnia regna, is wholly unlike what appears in the Phædo, Republic, Timæus, and Laws: with which the notion of God ever leaving the helm of the universe is wholly irreconcilable. The significance of this remark will be developed, when the Politicus is considered separately. At present it may be enough to point to the well-known passage in the tenth book of the Laws (896 c), where an independent evil soul is postulated in order to account for evil; with which compare Rep. 2, 379 c, "God, since he is good, cannot be the cause of all things, as most men say, but of what happens to mankind little is due to him, and there is much of which he is not the cause: for our good is much less than our evil."

Each of Socher's objections, although inconclusive, arose from the perception of some real peculiarity, of which those who maintain the genuineness of these dialogues are bound to give account. It will appear in the sequel, whether any light is thrown upon this subject, when they are viewed, as by the indications of style and diction we have been led to view them, in especial connexion with the Theaetetus, Philebus, Timæus, Critias, and Laws.
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST.

Of the title given to this dialogue by the early grammarians, Σοφιστής, ἣ περὶ τοῦ ὁντος, λογικός, the name Sophistes is so far acknowledged by Plato himself, as in an allusion to it which occurs in the succeeding dialogue, the form of reference used is ἐν τῷ σοφιστή: i.e. "in discussing or defining the Sophist." And nothing can be more explicit than the manner in which this subject is proposed for definition in the opening scene. Yet it may not unnaturally appear to many readers that the remaining words, although of less authority, describe more accurately the real subject of the dialogue, in which, it may be thought, either two distinct inquiries are sought to be combined by a tour de force, or the former of these is only the occasion, excuse, or starting-point for the latter.

The questions which occupy the largest and certainly the most important place are concerned with the nature of negation, the relativity of ideas, and the defects of early speculation on the idea of Being.

It may not seem obvious why these metaphysical questions should be necessarily involved in the study of a class of persons whose procedure and influence was a matter of historical fact; or, again, supposing it necessary to raise and discuss such difficulties, why they might not have been equally suggested by some other example. We should bear in mind, first, the extremely abstract and general manner in which Plato looks at every problem; the rarity of the metaphysical atmosphere in which he lived. Rightly or wrongly, he passed at once from the simplest to the deepest matters of thought:

*Such an allusion to a previous dialogue is rare in Plato, and can hardly be paralleled except from the Timæus and Laws.*
like one possessed with a great passion, "examples, gross as earth," suggested to him the same themes, always old and always new. Just as, in the Philebus, the distinction of pleasures into good and bad suggests the problem of the one and the many, the description of the Sophist as a "phantastic artist" raises the whole question of the existence of the apparent beside the real. But, secondly, the connexion of thought, though at first sight remote, is, in this case at least, far from being arbitrary or accidental. As the question is a cardinal one, so is the instance by which the question is introduced. Plato is not merely clothing an ontological discussion in the garb of flesh and blood: it is at least equally true that in the ontological problem he sums up the difficulties of life and experience in the most abstract form: difficulties and contradictions which he had elsewhere illustrated with dramatic power. And the name Sophistes itself expresses a provisional generalization, or vindemiatio prima. As in the Theaetetus, the theory "Each man the measure of truth to himself" is the most general expression for all opinion that is not founded in reason, so the Sophist, even before definition, is, as he is described in the Republic, only the conscious reflection and embodiment of ordinary thought.

The fact remains, however, that the dialogue is naturally divided into two main portions, one of which is enclosed or embedded in the other. In the opening and concluding passages (I.) an attempt is made to form a definite conception of the genus Sophist by the method of dichotomies, i.e. through logical divisions to follow the ramifications of the tree of knowledge till the particular branch which supports him is discovered. But there is a point (p. 236 d) at which this series of divisions is interrupted by what is formally a long digression, but really the most serious part of the whole (II.), where instead of dividing and subdividing, the mind is carried up to reconsider the first principles on which this method of distinctions, and all criticism and controversy, rest; in other words, to examine the meaning of negation, which cannot be determined without also examining the nature of positive conceptions. When this question has been set at rest, the divisions are resumed (p. 264 b), and a definition is obtained, in which the interlocutors acquiesce with more satisfaction than is
usually expressed at the conclusion of a Socratic dialogue. It will be convenient to treat these portions separately.

In I. the problem is presented in the concrete, but still in a very general aspect. According to the habit of Socratic induction it is assumed that the name Sophist, though applied to a great variety of persons, has one meaning, which may be ascertained by a process of definition: just as the word 'angler,' which is defined as a preliminary example, has one meaning which can be clearly conceived and expressed. A modern respondent might have questioned this assumption at the outset, and have challenged Socrates to prove that the word had the same meaning when applied to the poets by Pindar, to the geometers by Socrates himself, to Zeno who denied motion, to the Heracliteans who denied all else, to the philologer Prodicus, and the astronomer Hippias, to Gorgias who ignored speculative truth, and to Protagoras who held every proposition to be of equal value. The possibility of such a doubt does not occur to Plato. He has in his mind a very simple, but a very sweeping distinction, for which the names σοφιστής and ψιλόσοφος afforded the most convenient expression: a distinction which occurred to him when he compared Socrates with other teachers, and which it was the work of his life to make clear to himself and others. This was the distinction between real and apparent Knowledge; the real knowledge which Socrates sought, and the apparent knowledge which the others professed. In the Phaedrus and Gorgias he had shewn that the so-called art of rhetoric had no scientific basis: in the Protagoras and Meno, that the virtue which was commonly praised and which the public teachers professed to give was the result of habit and common opinion and not of principle: in the Euthydemus, he had ridiculed the process of mere verbal argument as contrasted with the real treatment of logical difficulties: in many places he had satirized the practice of receiving fees for teaching. The present inquiry is more general than any of these; and is also restricted to the consideration of the Sophist in the highest and most technical sense, in which he is distinguished from the rhetorician and other artists, as the professor of knowledge and teacher of virtue. It was only in this aspect that the Sophist could compete with the philosopher. The name might be applied to particular
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artists, such as the poet or geometer, but only incidentally; and their partial claims were absorbed in the universal pretensions of the Sophist par excellence. Further, these pretensions are here idealized: for it is doubtful whether even Gorgias or Hippias, who were ready to answer all comers, carried their professions to the extent described in pp. 232, 233. The nearest approach to an equally general statement of the question is made in the Protagoras, pp. 312 b—314 c, where Hippocrates is told that he is going to give his mind up to a Sophist without knowing what a Sophist is. "It is not enough to know that he is an artist, without knowing what is his particular work." (p. 312 c, d, c.) "Perhaps he is a merchant or retail-dealer in the food of the mind. Take care that he does not cheat us by praising his wares. For, if we buy them, we cannot examine them, until we have received them in our own persons either for good or ill." (pp. 313 c—314 b. Compare Soph. 223, 224.) Here there is the same assumption, which appears in the "Sophist," that the common name implies a common nature. But the analysis of the conception is carried only a little way, and the characteristic chosen is external merely, (a sufficient answer to those who suspect these dialogues because the grounds of distinction which are adopted in them are sometimes superficial).

To return. Although no doubt is entertained that there is a common nature answering to the name Sophist, this nature is, however, by no means easily found. "The creature is wily and dangerous, and must be hunted with caution and good heed." "He is not to be caught with one hand: we must lay our snares in every path, till we have surrounded him." Whether or not the task was rightly chosen, it was no mean

b Other scattered hints respecting the Sophists are found in the Meno, where Anytus, who abhors them, cannot tell what they are, but knows that they are the ruin of their pupils: to which Socrates replies, "Perhaps there is something in that" (καί ινώς τε λέγει): in the Republic, where they are regarded more as an effect than as a cause, as the mere reflectors of popular opinion, only teaching men what they desire to be taught: in the Timæus (19 e), where the itinerant habits of the Sophist are said to disqualify him for the task of conceiving the true state in act: in the Theoctetus, where it is said that those who have "no need of Socrates," i.e. no genuine impulse towards philosophy, "may profit by the converse of Prodicus, or of other wise and Heaven-taught men": and in the Gorgias (520), where Socrates asserts that it is difficult to distinguish the Rhetor from the Sophist.
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Effort of generalization, to include in one notion persons so different as Protagoras and Hippias, and still more to embrace the versatile activity of any of them in one description. This meant little else than to express in one formula the intellectual spirit of the age. Plato shews his consciousness of this difficulty, and at the same time finds an occasion for satire, by giving four distinct classifications, according to each of which the Sophist may be referred to a different genus, while even under the same genus it is not always clear to which of the lesser species he belongs. To begin with the most obvious characteristic, all art having been first divided into acquisitive and creative, the Sophist is seen to angle for rich young men, and is accordingly ranged with the angler under the art of hunting, or catching by guile, which is one of the two main branches of appropriation without consent: which was previously distinguished from acquisition by contract. This aspect of him is treated playfully. He is the congener of the angler, with whom he parts company when they reach the art of hunting live things—the Sophist turning to rich meadows of youth, which are irrigated by rivers of wealth. There he pursues, not like other huntsmen a wild, but a tame quarry, (at least if man is tame): nor this, as kidnappers and warriors do, by force, but by persuasion. And he persuades, not like the lawyers, in public, but in private: not like the lover, at his own expense, but for reward: and this, not like the flatterer's reward, a bare maintenance from hand to mouth, but in the form of money. (218 c—223 b.)

This last touch is made the basis of a new line of definition, starting from the other main branch of acquisition, viz. exchange. According to this, the Sophist is a merchant of mental wares: which may be either taken at second-hand and exported from city to city, in which case the Sophist is an itinerant trader; or he may be a retail dealer, or a manufacturer, in his own city. (223 c—224 c c.)

Plato next fixes on a characteristic of a less trivial kind, to which he refers afterwards as the most essentially distinctive of those which have been put forward. The Sophist talks, as has been said, to men in private on a great variety of topics; but his conversations have one feature in common. They are con-

* It is curious that paid teaching as re-admitted to Plato's favour in the well as the "Rhetoric of Nestor" are Laws.
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troversial. He is a controversialist and a teacher of the art of controversy. This brings him under the remaining branch of acquisition without consent, namely, forcible acquisition or contention: the art of open, as opposed to that of secret, appropriation. Not that the Sophist is here viewed as acquiring knowledge, but, as one engaged in preventing others from making good a position by argument, he is said to be concerned with acquisition (cf. p. 219 c: Ἔστειλη δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τοῦτον, τὰ δὲ οὕτα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροτέται λόγοι καὶ πράξει τὰ δὲ τοῖς χειρομένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει). He contends, then, not with bodily but mental force; not with long arguments, as in court, but through brief questions and replies: not on the infinity of details about which men wrangle, but on the general nature of the Just and Unjust, and of all other things: not, like some wearisome talkers, to the injury of his property, but (to note this point once more) to the increase of his gains. The Sophist's procedure is here characterized as essentially abstract and negative: being distinguished by the former quality from ordinary converse, and by the latter from positive science and philosophy. (225 a—226 a.) It is not immediately apparent, however, how, under this description, the work of the Sophist is to be distinguished from the work of Socrates, except by the outward symptom that the one becomes rich by his trade and the other poor. And accordingly the two are brought into close companionship in the remarkable passage which follows. (226 b—231 a). Controversy is, or should be, an art of separating the false from the true, of determining what propositions are not tenable. And this amounts to a most valuable purification of the mind. For of separation there are two kinds, the separation of like from like and the purgation of the good from the evil: and of mental evils there are two kinds, that civil war of reason and passion which is the disease of the soul, and ignorance, or spiritual ugliness, which is either conscious or unconscious. Unconscious ignorance is the last stage of mental deformity. And it is from this that men are freed when they are asked questions about something which they think they know, and are thus purged from the obstructions of conceit, without which purgation no learning will do them any good. This process is no other than the Elenchus. Shall we attribute this to the Sophist? Plato stands in doubt.

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We are thus led from observing a feature of the Sophist which any one might verify, to a theory of his end or function which is only temporarily admitted, and from which something is at once detracted. For the value of his office, as a purifier of the mind, clearly depends in some measure on the reality of the arguments by which he convinces men of error. And these are presently shewn to be unreal. Yet Plato had a meaning in assigning to him this function even provisionally: and we have here perhaps the most striking appreciation of a contemporary phase of thought which is to be found in ancient philosophy. For it is the simple truth that Protagoras and Gorgias did imperfectly and unconsciously a part of the same work which Socrates did thoroughly and consciously: that their reasonings were to be valued chiefly for their negative results: that in breaking up the ground of old beliefs they did indispensable service as the pioneers of philosophy: and that this clearing of the way, by the application of a shrewd and fearless intellect to all matters sacred and profane, familiar and unfamiliar, and that chiefly in the way of question and denial, was a necessary step of progress, as it was certainly the most widely-spread intellectual phenomenon of the generation which immediately preceded Socrates. The difference between him and them, which is left unnoticed here though implied in what follows,—partly because the historical Socrates no longer exactly squared with Plato's ideal,—is that the Sophist disputes as if he knew; Socrates asks questions as one desiring to know: the Sophist is contented with demolishing an opponent's theory, he is not conscious of any further aim; with Socrates each negative result is valued at once as a liberation of the mind from error, and as a forward step towards the positive apprehension of truth. This union or balance of the positive with the negative "arm," it is Plato's aim in this dialogue to vindicate and preserve. Thus the History of Philosophy, although not endorsing the assumption with which Plato sets out, that the common name Sophist must be significant of a common nature, confirms his estimate of the general tendency and common function of those to whom he assigns the name.

Up to this point all is tentative and uncertain: and the definitions hitherto obtained are phenomenal merely. This is
manifest from their number and variety. For, of an object which is fully comprehended there is one adequate definition and only one. In order to come nearer to understanding the Sophist's nature, we take up again the definition which appeared most suggestive, that which described his procedure as controversial. This art of controversy or disputation embraces all topics in heaven and earth. And those who admire the Sophist believe him to know all the things about which he disputes. This pretension refutes itself, for omniscience is not given to man. The essence of the Sophist is that he pretends to a knowledge which is unreal. Thus the disguises of our Proteus are stripped off, and we see him in his true colours, neither as a huntsman, nor as a merchant, nor as an intellectual wrestler, nor as a physician of the soul, but as the master of an art of illusion: a juggler, who imposes with the appearance of knowledge on inexperienced minds: just as the painter can pass off his shows for realities on the more thoughtless amongst young children. Hence he belongs to the multifarious class of imitators, or likeness-makers, and, not to dwell at present on the cardinal difficulty which this new notion involves, he is brought once more under a different summum genus. Hitherto, his race has been derived, by different lines, from the art of "getting," his origin must now be referred to the art of "making," all art having been at first divided into these two branches. "Creation" is Divine and Human, and each of these again is divided according as the thing made is real or only a likeness of what is real. A dream, for instance, is a divinely-made likeness or illusion. A picture may be called a humanly-made dream. Of human likeness-making there are two kinds: one where the likeness is real, the other where the likeness is only apparent and relative to the individual who sees the likeness. The Sophist's arguments belong to this more shadowy or "phantastic" kind. And here he works not with instruments, but with his own person; not with knowledge of the things he imitates, namely, justice and virtue, but only having opinion respecting them: not innocently thinking that he knows them, but hiding a guilty consciousness of charlatanry. By pausing here we should include the public speaker, who is the counterfeit of the statesman as the Sophist is of the philosopher. He, however, imposes on the public in lengthened addresses,
whereas the Sophist's business, as we have already said, is, by brief arguments, to compel individuals to contradict themselves. (281 c—236 a, 265 a—268.) The name is thus restricted to the dialectical as distinguished from the rhetorical aspect of the false use of the intellect. This is a distinction which Plato had not always observed: and in treating individual Sophists it was not easy to do so, for the two characters were often combined in the same person. Protagoras, for instance, as we learn from Plato's dialogue of that name, professed himself to be equally a master of copiousness and brevity. And Socrates observes in the Gorgias that Sophists and rhetoricians are mixed up together, and know not what to make of one another, nor do other men know what to make of them d. But Plato is here describing the ideal Sophist: and the function of fallacious scientific argument is ideally distinguishable from that of speaking so as to influence the feelings. The word is, however, allowed to regain the more extended application in Polit. 291 b, 303 c.

Σοφιστική is here characterized as a method, and is to philosophy what ἀντιλογίκη is to διαλεκτική, what disputation is to scientific inquiry. It is possible that while restricting the application of the term on one side, Plato here extends it on another beyond the limits of his own habitual use, so as to include some of his own brethren of the Socratic family. He perhaps indicates that the Eristic tendency, which was growing strong by this time amongst the pupils of Euclides of Megara, was defective in some of the elements of a true philosophy. The reason for thinking that he means this is not merely the emphatic mention of the art of controversy, which Plato is fond of distinguishing from real inquiry e, but the direction of the whole dialogue against the extreme of Eleatic doctrine, on which we know that the Megarian logic was based. This hypothesis also accounts for the Sophist being identified with a picture of the cross-examining spirit, which, as Mr. Grote

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d He tells Callicles afterwards (p. 520 a) that the Sophist is superior to the Rhetor, as the lawgiver is to the judge: i.e. the Sophist furnishes the Rhetor with ideas and arguments.

e The chief passages in which Plato censures ἀντιλογίκη are the following: Rep. 5; 454 a—c; Phæd. 90 b, 101 e; Theext. 164 c; Men. 80 e. In this enumeration the description of the young dialecticians in Philib. 15 d e, should not be omitted: with which compare also Rep. 7; 539 b.
observes, not only resembles Socrates, but resembles no one else. For the Megarians followed Socrates in refuting opinions: but departed from him by separating the negative process from the inductive aim, and, in directing their method to the resolution of phenomena, and the establishment by this means of an abstract being, or goodness, or thought, returned partially to the dogmatism of Zeno.

There are a few detached points which it will be well to notice before we turn from this frame-work of satirical definition to the larger and more dialectical portion of the dialogue.

1. Though the Sophist is of course an artist and a man of science (for the definition proceeds through a classification of the sciences), yet the science of learning and knowing (τὸ μαθηματικὸν—ἐίδος ὅλου τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως) is the only heading of those introduced at first, viz.;

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under which no attempt is made to bring him. This touch of satire can hardly be unintentional.

2. The variety of definitions to which we are led by the process of dichotomies when applied to the Sophist, not only shews that his nature is difficult to grasp, but also proves the method to be one-sided and inadequate. The angler, an artist, by the way, who is known to Homer (Od. 4, 369), has easily a place assigned him, because the conception of his art, when analysed, is not found to contain elements which are imperfectly known. But the activity of the Sophist is complex and various; and when the principle, on which his other traits depend, is at last found, this leads the way to difficulties, which the process of mere logical distinction is powerless to resolve. And this for two reasons: because the difficulty lies in that notion of absolute difference on which the method itself rests; and because for the solution of the difficulty there is required the complementary notion of combination, communion, correlation: which division cannot dispense with indeed (since the members of each division are unities and general forms), but throws into the background. Διακριτικὴ needs to be supplemented by συγκριτικὴ: the διάλεκτικὸς only knows
when and how. Hence it is further necessary to examine how the two great categories of sameness and difference, on which this double process depends, are related to each other in their most abstract form.1

3. The idea of purification, connected here with the Elenchus, or negative dialectic, and in the Politicus with the banishment of offending members from the state (this being a political as the former was a mental purgation), though in both places illustrated from the art of medicine, probably originated in the mysteries and was derived by Plato from a Pythagorean source. Compare the καθαρμοί of Empedocles, and see pp. 80–82 of the Phædo. It may be noticed that, in the Phædo, the notion of impurity is associated with all that is sensible and bodily, as contrasted with the ideal: in these dialogues the evils deprecated are falsehood in the mind and wickedness in the state, which are only mythically identified with the corporeal element, and purification is the separation of the evil from the good.

4. The comprehension under one heading of the processes of dialectic, pharmacy, ablution, scouring, sweeping, and even clothes-brushing, gives rise to the remark that scientific method ignores all those distinctions of worth, respectability, triviality, and baseness, which rest on feeling and habit, and looks only on those resemblances and differences which are acknowledged by Reason. This may be compared with the saying of Parmenides to the youthful Socrates, that when philosophy has taken hold of him as it will one day take hold, he will no longer have regard to the opinions of men, but will view all things, however vulgar or base, in the light of Universal Forms. On this point enough has perhaps been said in the notes. But there is something extremely characteristic of the spirit of these dialogues, in the mixture of scientific calmness and ironical satisfaction with which the high things of this world are thus brought to the level of the meanest.2

1 See the passage of the Politicus (285 d) where the argument from example is vindicated on the ground that the highest subjects have no analogies which are immediately palpable to sense. It is to such as these that classification, as a method of definition, is only partially applicable.

2 Compare the treatment of rhetoric in the Gorgias as coordinate with cooking, and in the Euthydemus as a department of magic (τῆς τῶν ἐπέδαυν τίχρη).
5. The form of evil from which deliverance is effected by refutation deserves a passing notice, although the thought is one of the most familiar to readers of Plato: the greatest ignorance, i.e. ignorance which the mind mistakes for knowledge. So the false statesmen are said to have the greatest ignorance of the greatest of all subjects, in that they are ignorant of statecraft, when they think they are most certainly informed of this. And in the analysis of the ridiculous, in the Philebus, the same bad eminence is given to the conceit of knowledge. (See also Legg. 9, 863 c.) Yet in the conclusion of this dialogue it would seem as though unconscious ignorance were the less culpable; for the Sophist is defined as having a guilty suspicion that all is not right within. The inconsistency of these two views does not seem to be noticed by Plato, who would probably, however, have said, if he had been taxed with it, 'that he meant by conscious ignorance, the ignorance of one desirous to know.'

Still, the notion of a state of ignorance acquiesced in, notwithstanding a suspicion that it exists, is hardly reconcilable with the Socratic principle, which is here made the ground of the Socratic cross-examination, that no soul is willingly ignorant of anything.

The more practical view, which is turned to the disadvantage of the Sophist as an "ironical mimic," belongs to the later phase of Platonism. See the passage in the ninth book of the Laws, already quoted, where an attempt is made to reconcile the theory that injustice is never voluntary, with legislation for the exemption from punishment of involuntary crime.

6. Plato's later manner may also be detected in the grave digression, suggested by the logical distinction of the Art of Making into Divine and human, in which it is solemnly asserted that the world was made by God in accordance with Reason, and not by the spontaneous working of Nature or Chance. The tone of this passage closely resembles that of the tenth book of the Laws: where the persuasive demonstration, the λόγος μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας here spoken of, is applied to an imaginary case. The strong reprobation in which the opposite view is held, and the moral and religious fervour with which the answer of Thecetus is received, are

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h Polit. 302 a.  i Phileb. 48 e.  k Laws, 861-864.
in keeping with the impressive solemnity and earnestness of Plato’s latest writings. (See especially Legg. 10, 889.)

II. In defining the Sophist as an illusory controversialist, we seem to have caught him in our net; but we only seem to have caught him: for by his controversial art he will prove that our net is non-existent, and as we are allowed no weapons but arguments, to be refuted is to fail. However shameless it may appear for a controversialist, who is daily detecting falsehood, to say that falsehood is impossible, he will use this argument in self-defence, and we must meet his logic with a higher logic or give up the battle. Our object will not merely be to refute him, for that would be after all only a controversial victory like his, but to throw fresh light upon the whole question which his art confuses,—that of the nature and correlation of the affirmative and negative elements in thought, or, according to the more objective mode of conception which Plato still preserves, of Being and Not-Being.

Thus we are led at once to the most abstract form of the inquiry, the nature of the negative idea; even the relation of this idea to a subject being through the greater part of the discussion left out of view. The Sophist is accused of making a false impression. But to speak of false impressions is to assert an existence which is in the same breath denied—to predicate reality of the unreal. Is this possible? That depends on the meaning of the word not, and of the word existence, and their relation to each other. This question has a double bearing on the Sophist, of whose definition we are in search. If it is proved that this combination of existence and non-existence is possible, he exists, but his foundation is insecure, for his controversial art is based on the absolute mutual exclusion of these alternatives. If on the other hand his art is sound, he escapes refutation, but only by proving his own non-existence. There is hardly to be mistaken in the dialogue this twofold reference, which is not a little perplexing to the modern reader, a reference on the one hand to the problem of the existence of phenomena, one of the deepest of all to Plato, and, on the other, to the oppositions of false science, that “last decomposition of the reason, which consisted in separating everything from all things!” Yet both this error and that difficulty

1 Soph. 259 e.
are included in the sweeping generalization of the μη διν, and both are met by the new formula of the Relativity of Negative Expressions. This has also a bearing, as Plato did not fail to discover, on the method of logical divisions. Diacesis cannot be safely used apart from Synagŏgê. Classes mutually exclusive are still to be viewed in their relations to each other. The mind must not be dazzled by difference, so as to overlook resemblance, nor by resemblance, so as to neglect true differences. By a resuscitation of the Heraclitean principle in the world of mind, it is again found that the objects of thought are held asunder and together at once (διαφερόμενον αἰτι συμφέρων). And thus the notion of Being is not less modified than the notions of Appearance and the Negation of Being. For Being can be no longer held as a mere Absolute, but stands related to Not-Being, which it differs from, and yet includes. Here also it appears to the modern reader as if conceptions, which are to him radically distinct, are blended, not to say confused. For Being seems to be conceived at once logically, as the positive in thought and speech, and metaphysically, as an "hypostatized" idea.

But in order to enter into Plato's meaning, it is necessary to study his position in this dialogue, as he has in some measure enabled us to do, historically.

The fallacies which we find satirized in the Enthydemus are chiefly of two kinds; in one of which all resemblance or analogy is supposed to imply identity and to exclude the notion of difference, while in the other all difference is conceived as absolute difference, exclusive of all resemblance and relation: 'If I know one thing, I know all things, for I cannot know and not know;' 'If Zeus is my God, he is mine to do what I please with him;' 'That which is different from the idea of beauty cannot be beautiful,' and so on. And thus all propositions except identical propositions are declared impossible, a theory which Aristotle imputes to the followers of Antisthenes. Another paradox, which is likewise attributed to the Cynic, appears in the same dialogue,—the impossibility of negative argument (μη εἶναι ἀντὶλέγειν). The above is a humorous picture of the same notions with which Plato deals seriously in the present dialogue. That the same cannot be different, nor the different the same; that predication is impossible, that is,
there can be no relation between different ideas; above all, that falsehood cannot be disproved, for that to deny existence, while naming existence, involves a contradiction in terms,—these are in substance the very theories which Plato here undertakes to modify. Now in accounting for these aberrations of thought, to say that the Organon did not yet exist, is to state what, though true and important to remember, does not afford a sufficient explanation—αληθές μέν, οὖθεν δὲ σαφές. It is true that in the shape in which they then appeared, they could have no strength now. But their strength then lay in a mode of thought, which prevailed very extensively in that age, and which had exercised a more powerful influence over Plato himself than any other except that of Socrates; a mode of thought derived in great part unconsciously from the philosophy of Parmenides and the dialectic of Zeno: the same which appears in such assumptions (familiar to the student of the Theætetus) as that Socrates ill is a different man from Socrates well (Theæt. 159 b), and that everything must be either known or not known by the mind (Ib. 188 a). This may be described as the tendency to view every subject in the light of abstract alternatives: to apply the language of logic immediately to the sensible world: to reject as matter of fact that which cannot at once be formulated as an idea. This "disease," as we can imagine him to have called it, Plato here traces to its origin in the teaching of Parmenides, and thus redeems the promise made by Socrates in the Theætetus, there not fulfilled, to examine the deep wisdom of this man: the greatest of those who uphold the indissoluble unity of Being. (Theæt. 183 e.) In doing so, he not only confutes others who had pushed the tendency in question to an extreme, (he rather uses them as a beacon to indicate where the truth does not lie,) but, what is of more importance, develops further, or at least defines more clearly, his own central point of view. For he also had yielded to the charm of "the Eleatic Palamedes" and had held Parmenides "in reverence and awe:" nor had the dominance of this idea been merely logical, but had amounted to a speculative conviction, may we not even say, a theological belief?

We cannot tell whether this impression had at all been derived from Socrates, whom he has represented as meeting
TO THE SOPHIST.

with the philosopher in early youth. Socrates may have spoken of Parmenides, as he did of Heraclitus, though his own work in philosophy was independent of all influence from without. At all events it is quite possible that even during the time of his converse with Socrates, Plato may have been attracted towards the Eleatic School. His master’s influence was unobtrusive, not hindering the accretion of ideas from all sides, and only after his death would be found to “comprehend all other.” It was probably at a still earlier time that Plato’s interest and curiosity was excited by the fine discourses and immense popularity of Protagoras and Gorgias; and it is certain, on the authority of Aristotle, that his first deep draught of philosophy had been received from Cratylus, who taught him the Heraclitean doctrine that “all was motion.” This theory, as then held by the enthusiasts of Ephesus, whom Plato has satirized, was the secondary and less noble phase of a great thought—that all which abides eternally is a universal ever-active Law of Becoming. Heraclitus was no materialist. “Matter” had no existence for him, and he denied the separate existence of all “Form” except the Highest Law, whose Permanence is Perpetual Energy. In the hands of his followers, however, the assertion of this universal law seems to have degenerated into a mere doctrine of the relativity of particular being. And here the Eastern theorists were met by Zeno, who in support of the Eleatic faith in One Sole Being, proved that all relative existence was self-contradictory and inconceivable by Reason. Time and Motion, into which the sensible universe had already been resolved, were themselves annihilated. The movement of the intellect, by which this defensive negative process was effected, was the first conscious dialectic, the germ of much in Plato and of more in Aristotle, and, in conjunction with the Socratic Elenchus, the direct parent of the method which in this dialogue, and somewhat differently in the Parmenides, is turned against the hypothesis of the simple absoluteness of Being. But however important logically, the philosophy of Zeno, like that of Cratylus, while more definite, was also narrower than that of his master. He had

m The Zenonian method is “parri-

cidally” turned against the Eleatic

document in the thesis of Gorgias: οὐδὲν

ἐστιν: εἰ καὶ ἐστιν, ἀκαταληπτον ἄν-

θρόπως: εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀνερμήνευτον

καὶ ἀδιεξήθητον τοῖς πέλας.
INTRODUCTION

descended from metaphysics to logic, and in endeavouring to hold the Absolute against all comers had assumed an attitude which was purely negative, and had adopted a method which, though of great significance, was merely abstract, and not directly applicable to the solution of any real problem.

Plato, however, had "risen to the height of the great argument," and had felt, not only the dialectical might of Zeno, but the transcendental sublimity of Parmenides. It is possible that he may have derived some of his own most famous imagery from the opening lines of the poem on the Nature of Things, where the philosophic impulse is represented as a car drawn by swift steeds, and the philosopher as the comrade of immortal charioteers. Be that as it may, a modern reader can hardly imagine the effect which the impressive lines of Parmenides must have produced on the mind of Plato, when already convinced by Cratylus of the utter changeableness of "all that seems." Something analogous may have been experienced by individual students of Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel; but philosophical belief in modern times presents for the most part but a faint image of the heaven of contemplation into which Plato must have been carried away on hearing reiterated with the eloquence of energetic faith, and proved as a necessary truth of Reason, the absolute Existence of One Being, inseparable from thought, equable, unchangeable, without beginning and without end, with no past or future, but an everlasting Now; however apparently discrete, yet really continuous or omnipresent, so that differences of space are done away as completely as differences of time; whence phenomenal distinctions of all kinds, relation, change, beginning, ending, time, space, motion, are thrust out of sight or are seen to vanish away.

This intellectual movement, by which we suppose Plato to have been affected, was confirmed, but also gradually modified, by his contemplation of the work of Socrates. In reflecting on the manner and substance of that wonderful endless talk, and on the ruling motive of that unswerving life, he saw the elements of all previous speculation brought into antagonism and yet into immediate relation with the common thoughts and common life of men,—to whose mental and political state the issue of that antagonism had given a deep and bitter interest.
Before the cross-questioning of Socrates, which brought men to know the vanity of their own knowledge, the most fixed opinions were seen first to waver, and then to disappear. This Plato associated with the changeableness of phenomena according to Heraclitus; which viewed subjectively becomes the relativity of sense, according to the doctrines of Protagoras and Aristippus: a relativity which at the touch of negative dialectic, such as that of Zeno, is reduced to nothingness.

But the result of the method of Socrates was not merely negative. His aim was to define, that is, to lay bare the one conception which belongs universally and unalterably to each subject of inquiry. In such a conception, if it were found, his mind would gladly rest. This is well expressed by Aristotle, who says that Socrates was the first who checked the aimless career of thought, and fixed the mind on Definition: τρόπον περί ὁρισμοῦ ἐπιστήμων τῆς διάνοιας. Now there is here implied a new and independent assertion of the Absolute; for the endeavour of Socrates had no meaning, if the "Knowledge" which he sought were less than the knowledge of that which is always and everywhere true; if the ignorance of which he accused himself and convinced others, were ignorance only of the relative, the transient, or the phenomenal. But this Absolute of Socrates differs from that of Parmenides in two important respects.

1. The Substance or Reality of which he speaks is not asserted as if known, but sought for as still unknown. The Existence of Being, which Parmenides asserted with so much vehemence, is taken for granted, and the mind is called away from the absorbing contemplation of this truth to the consideration of a new problem, which may be thus stated generally: "What is Being? or What is the form of Being?" The change of mental attitude expressed in these few words,—from asserting "Being is" to asking "What is Being?" is of the highest importance; for without the consciousness which is here evolved, that knowledge is a synthesis of a less general with a more general notion, the growth of science would have been arrested. Philosophers would have been contented with either assigning universality to some particular thing, or, like the Eleatics, excluding the particular from cognition.

2. Further, he did not ask the question in this merely
abstract form: he implied an absolute standard of truth and good; but, as the word "good" reminds us, his inquiries had an immediate bearing on the life of men. Hence, instead of attempting at once to solve the problem, "What is Being?" he sought to determine "What is righteous, what is unrighteous, what is a state, what is the true statesman, what is government, what is it to be fit to govern?" The solution of these problems was approached by what Bacon would have called a process of exclusions, through a series of hypotheses, which were successively modified or relinquished when in some case not found to apply to the subject of definition. And while things commonly confused were thus distinguished, things commonly distinguished (e.g. folly and madness) were not less unexpectedly combined.

3. The personal attributes of Socrates enhanced this union of the universal with the particular, and of the abstract with the concrete, in his method of talk. The eye that was fixed on the unchangeableness of truth and right, was the same which pierced through and through the follies of his contemporaries; the lofty soul had a cynical exterior, the widest generalizations were hidden beneath the meanest instances, the imperturbable, urbane, ironical demeanour, helped to bring the dry light of reason into continual, immediate contact with the infinite anomalies of opinion and action; the strange being, unlike all other men, had a direct, unmistakeable influence on almost all. By contrast with him the hollowness of all pretence, especially in other teachers, was clearly seen, while his example gave the appearance of meanness to those who taught for pay. Yet he was the first to admit their individual excellences and accomplishments; while in conversation with him their real characteristics, their strength as well as their weakness, were most truly manifested.

Thus with Socrates began a philosophic movement which in some elements was kindred to the Eleatic, but radically different in others;—kindred, because vindicating by the refutation of falsehood an ideal truth; different, because inductive in method, and practical as well as speculative in ultimate aim—identifying truth with good.

But in continuing and interpreting this movement, Plato at first dwelt consciously rather on the former than the latter
aspect of Socratic thought; rather on the absolute contrast between the actual state of human opinion and the ideal of Knowledge, than on the nature of Knowledge as implying a relation of the mind to "Being," or of the Universal to the Particular. This, as may be gathered indirectly from this dialogue, was partly due to the prevalence of the Eleatic impulse—the conviction, namely, of the incommunicable perfection of abstract Being, the sole object of Knowledge or true thought: but partly also to the general law by which belief always precedes criticism. The problem of the post-Socratic philosophy for those who did not hold with Antisthenes that Definition was merely nominal, was, granting the possibility of Knowledge and the existence of general forms, 1. What is Knowledge? 2. What are the η? And, from the objective character of the Greek philosophy, the first of these two questions was chiefly, although not wholly, studied in the light of the second. In other words, the effort of Socrates was to find the ης of man, justice, temperance, &c.; that of his followers was to find the nature of the ης generally. But, just as the Existence of Being was asserted, before any one thought of asking, What is Being? so, in entering on this new stage of thought, Plato believes in Knowledge and the Ideas before he examines them, and his dialectic is for a time coloured with a haze of imagination. He is at first contented with declaring that Knowledge is the only real ground of virtue, and that accordingly all virtue is essentially one. Presently a question rises about the Origin of Knowledge—How can Knowledge have a beginning? For how can a man inquire into what he does not know? How are we to conceive the transition from ignorance to certainty? This question is answered, as Plato elsewhere answers questions which are not ripe for solution, mythically. We learn by recollection, as appears from the lessons of geometry where the teacher leads the pupil to draw forth from his own mind what the moment previously he did not know. Thus the "Eristic" objection is removed, that a man cannot inquire about either what he knows or what he does not know: and the anticipation of poetry and prophecy, that we are immortal beings, is confirmed. To learn is to awaken slumbering knowledge. "The Soul has been everywhere and has seen all things, and therefore must have known
all things before coming hither: and if she can recover one thing only, there is hope that she may by courageous efforts regain the rest." (Men. 81 c.) By this hypothesis the true objects of knowledge are relegated to another world than this and to a previous life. The objects of sense remind us of them through a process of association. (Phædo.) These Eternal Forms the Soul beheld in her first flight, ere she lost her wings, when the impulse of the higher love carried her amongst immortal chariots, beyond the visible sphere, into the plain of truth, where Beauty, Justice, Temperance, Wisdom, dwell eternally, not as they are imagined but as they are known. (Phædr.)

This is the poetical mode of conceiving of the ideas, in which Plato embodied the feelings of wonder and delight with which he contemplated the first real inquiry which the world had seen. The object and end of that inquiry appeared to him surrounded with a mystic halo,—like his own image of Beauty, lightening from a transcendent height,—annihilating and making worthless the shadows which surround us here.

But Plato was far from resting in this as a final theory of Knowledge. His belief in immortality and pre-existence remained, it is true; but did not supersede other inquiries concerning the ideas, which were wholly independent of such a theory, and proceeded simply by experience and reflection. Thus in the Republic, the vision of the ideas in their purity, without help from sense, is the goal towards which the mind is allowed to climb up the ladder of hypotheses, and although we hear of an intellectual region, the context shews this language to be metaphorical, rather than mythological as in the Phædrus and Phædon. The line is still drawn sharply and broadly between Being as the object of knowledge and Not-Being as the object of ignorance; but, first, an intermediate state, having for object the changeable, which is and is not, is crudely imagined, and, at a later period of the discussion (bk. vii.), the successive steps by which the mind rises from the lowest ignorance to the highest knowledge are supplied. No mention is made of recollection, unless we count as such the mythical account of Lethe in bk. x.; and immediately after the allegory of the cave, in which the sensible has been represented as the copy of the ideal world, we have a piece of psychological analysis, in which
the idea is spoken of as the universal element evolved by Reason from the impressions of Sense. "Intelligence is called in to determine between the contrarieties of sense. I see two fingers, one large the other small. Sight gives me opposite impressions respecting objects which are alike. But sight cannot answer the questions which the mind cannot but ask hereupon. Is this puzzling impression one, or two? If two, then each is one, and so on. Thus intelligence distinguishes between great and small, which in the sensation of vision were confused. And then only are we induced to ask the question which reason suggests, 'What is the nature of greatness and smallness?' The ideas thus distinguished are objects of Reason, the former confused impression was received through sight." (vii. 524.)

Such a relation between intelligence and sensation is acknowledged even in the Phædrus, in the midst of the mythical description of the Plain of Truth: Δεὶ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ’ εἰδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογίσμῷ ἐνναυρώμενον: though it is immediately added, "Now this is recollection of what the mind has seen in a previous state."

In both these passages the mind is seen to approach the εἴδη through reflection on the experience of sense. The same notion is still more clearly expressed in the Theætetus (184, 5): "We speak commonly of seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, and so forth: but in truth it is with the mind that we see and hear, and feel and taste, and smell. The mind receives these particular impressions through the organs of the different senses. (Cf. Phileb. 33 e.) But there are some things which the mind perceives without any such corporeal aid. These are not particular but universal. For instance, the mind receives through touch an impression of softness from a soft thing, of hardness from a hard thing. But when the mind says this is hard, a new element arises, viz. the Being of the hardness, which is perceived, not through any of the senses, but by the mind alone, and the Idea of hardness is then first perceived. Further, that hardness and softness are opposed and that the opposition between them is real, these and the like thoughts the mind herself determines, when she reviews and compares the impressions which she has received through the senses." The idea, then, in this, which may be termed the psychological
aspect, is that unity which the mind seeks amidst the variety of sensible impressions, distinguishing what is confused in sense, and uniting scattered phenomena in one conception: the universal element, which is latent in the mind’s first impression of each object, and is disengaged by reflection to be contemplated by reason. The right performance of this process is the secret of method: “to unite and divide in thought according to natural forms, that is, according to the reality of things, not mangling the victims like a bad sacrificer.” (Phædr. 265 e.) It is in connection with this logical or dialectical process that the word εἰδος is most frequently used by Plato.

The ideas are now seen as objects of intelligence, which remain unchanged, while the sensations through which the mind is awakened to perceive them are perpetually giving place to new and perhaps opposite impressions. (See Cratyl. 440.) Each is separated from the phenomena through which it was at first recognized, in an isolation like that of the Eleatic Being, as the absolute in which the relative is done away: the ἄνωθεν, independent of external support; the universal absorbing the particular. But here several difficulties arise.

1. How is the absoluteness of Knowledge reconcileable with the possibility of error? For if everything is either known or unknown, how can that which is unknown be in any way the object of belief? Hence the hypothesis in Rep. bk. v. of "that which is and is not" as the object of opinion, and the elaborate ἄπορος of the Theætetus, where it is attempted to account for error by imagining thought as a process between sensation and memory, or between memory and memory. A nearly parallel difficulty is put in the Parmenides. If there is no relation between the perfect and the imperfect, man cannot know the ideas, nor can the divine mind be cognizant of human thoughts.

2. How can the universal be absolute and yet embrace particulars? This or a cognate difficulty is raised in the Theætetus, where it is found impossible to distinguish the whole from the sum of the parts: the same ἄπορος is explicitly stated in the Philebus, where it is asked, how can One exist in many and yet be One?—and in the Parmenides, through the illustration of the sail, which covers many men, but covers each only by a part of itself. The notion of μεθεξίς, which Socrates
introduces in the Parmenides, only creates new difficulties, but something approaching a rational solution appears in the Philebus, where Number is seen to mediate between Unity and Infinity.

3. Granting the existence of abstract ideas of resemblance, difference, justice, beauty, good; shall we say that the idea of man, or fire, or water, or, still more, of mud, dirt, hair, exist absolutely? (Parm.)

4. Must not ideas be related to one another? For is not dialectic, and even language, a movement or process between ideas? Nay, if the idea is the cause of phenomena, must there not be a principle of life or movement inherent in each idea? In the Republic, for example, the operations of science are conceived as a movement along the chain of true ideas, a way upwards and downwards which is the same. And at the head of this nexus of εἴδη is the form of Good, which in some way unexplained is the cause of Being and of Knowledge. In the Philebus also there is imagined a process between the limit and the unlimited, the one and the many, and a cause of this process is supposed. And in the Timæus the Creator prepares for his work by welding together opposite ideas. Thus the Sophist and Parmenides are not the sole response in Plato to the challenge of Socrates, "I should admire any man who could shew that Resemblance, Difference, Plurality, Unity, Motion, Rest, admitted of composition and division (ἐν ἕαυτοις ταύτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι . . . τίν αὐτήν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην . . . ἐπιδείξαι. Parm. 129 c).

5. If the idea, as Socrates urges when pressed by Parmenides (Ib. 132 b), is a conception of the mind, yet that conception must have an object, and Knowledge is in some way a process between subject and object, in which, if the mind is active, the object of Knowledge must be conceived as passive. In this way also the Eternal Form is brought back from the

When Plato makes Parmenides remark on this, "Philosophy has not yet acquired her final hold on you," he is perhaps covertly satirizing the thoroughness of the Megarian logic.

See Rep. 6, 490 b. Πρὶν αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄφασθαι δι᾽ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τιμώτου· προσήκει δὲ ἐν γεγενητι· ὁ πλησισμὸς καὶ μεγεῖς τῇ ὑπὲρ ἐντός, γεννήσας νόμον καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοὴ τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῇ τε καὶ τρέφοντο, καὶ ὄστω λήγοι ἀδιόν, πρὶν δὲ ὄβ.
fruitless isolation in which it has been placed by the first efforts of purely abstract thought; and the reflection rises that Perfect Being must include the attributes of consciousness and life, and therefore, in a certain sense, of motion. (Soph. 248.)

The difficulties which attend the hypothesis of the ideas are at least as clearly stated by Plato as by Aristotle: and his statements have also the advantage of being directed against the phase of the doctrine which he knew and to which he had been himself inclined, and not to the confused Pythagorean fancies of his followers. The question is most clearly enunciated in the Theaetetus from the side of Knowledge, and in the Parmenides from the side of Being. But those who remember the various fertility of Plato's mind will not expect the objections raised in different dialogues to be precisely the same. He never sought to bind the play of thought in a single formula. When it had once occurred to him to criticize the theory of ideas, the problem was sure to be seen by him in changing lights, although the elements of the question remain essentially unaltered. Is each idea one or many, at rest or in motion, isolated or related to others, limiting or limited; is Being inanimate or endowed with life, exclusive of particulars, or how related to them? Is it possible wholly to separate Knowledge from sense and opinion? These, if not the same question, form a class of questions, of the reality of which Plato is conscious in some dialogues, but appears wholly unconscious in others (for instance in the Phædo and Cratylus). The dialogues, besides the Sophist and Politicus, in which the effect of this movement within Platonism in the mind of its founder are most evident, are the Philebus, Timæus, and Laws. In the Philebus, not only is the difficulty stated at the outset, in the form of the problem how to reconcile the antithesis between the one and many, but the combination and resolution of ideas is elaborately exemplified, and a Cause of their combination in reality is conceived. The earlier part of the Timæus contains a similar passage, and in both the author has laboured to imagine the mode in which the ideal and corporeal are conjoined. Both anticipate Aristotle in speaking of matter (ἀπειρον, τιθημι), and of a cause by which form is impressed on matter. The Philebus has also a graduated scale of Knowledges, in which the knowledge of the particular and concrete,
although regarded as "impure," is deliberately allowed to have a place. And in the Laws, while the ἐπὶ are not heard of except as logical forms, and a higher movement (namely that of mind) is imagined as the cause both of rest and motion (10, 895), Plato is vehement in asserting that mind in all its manifestations is prior to the elements and controls them.

The object of the preceding remarks has been to shew (1) That side by side with the poetical or metaphysical there grew up in Plato's mind a logical mode of conceiving the ideas; (2) That as he viewed them in this two-fold aspect, and saw the latter of the two more clearly, he became conscious of the difficulties which the theory involved; and (3) That he was led, partly through the consideration of these difficulties, to alter considerably his theory of Knowledge and Being: passing from the bare assertion of an absolute object of Mind, to which he had been led by interpreting Socrates through Parmenides, towards the Aristotelian conception of logical categories and of Being as composed of Matter and Form by an efficient Cause.

Turning now to the Sophist, from which we have been too long detained, we find the elaborate treatment of a difficulty, which is allowed to have been occasioned by the exclusiveness of the Eleatic point of view. This difficulty is not, as in the Philebus, how to find a meeting-point between unity and infinity, but one more abstract still, how to explain the possibility of combining the positive and negative in thought. Philosophy by aspiring to the pure form of Being had become "dark from excess of light;" had soared beyond the ken of mortals into an unseen heaven; and in "turning away her mind" from that which is not—from the unreal, and therefore from negation—had deprived herself of the only weapon which could be of any avail to her against the spurious counterfeits of herself. She must deny as well as affirm, and she cannot deny without giving a certain place to Not-Being. It has been already said, that the Negative is here viewed in its ultimate abstraction. The distinctions of Aristotle, between ψεῦδος, στέρησις, and δύναμις or κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which he employed in criticizing Plato, are certainly not thought of, but neither were they required, at least in the statement of the question. For falsehood is the object or correlative of denial, and both are equally
expressed whenever the word "not" is uttered: and negation "per accidens" must obviously be explained through the theory of simple negation. The question is, does this word "not" imply such absolute severance between the terms which it divides, as to exclude the possibility of any relation between them? If A is exclusive of B, is B therefore incapable of all communion or combination with A? If so, a counterfeit of reality is inconceivable, for it is not reality, and yet partakes of reality in so far as it is really a counterfeit. This question is raised not with respect to individuals, or infimae species, in which the coexistence of sameness and difference was an admitted fact (Phil. 15 d), but with respect to general ideas, and the most universal of these, beginning with the most comprehensive of all ideas, viz. that of Being. The "absolute severance," which the injunction of Parmenides requires, between that which Is, and that which Is Not, was the origin and type of the spirit "which would separate each thing from every other" (Soph. 259 e); and the correction of this deeply-rooted tendency was necessary in order to make inquiry possible.

After a statement of the perplexities in which the notion of Not-Being is involved according to the ordinary conception of it as the opposite of Being, shewing that it is inconceivable either as a predicate or as a subject, or as the object of refutation and denial; the Stranger expresses his intention, in this desperate case, of attacking the revered authority of Parmenides. This opens the whole question of the Nature of Being, and the theories of previous and contemporary philosophers on the subject. And in the course of the inquiry it is found that the notion of Being, according to prevailing views, is no less full of contradictions than that of Not-Being. Amongst the earlier thinkers, those who hold a fixed plurality of Beings must admit that existence is common to all these, and hence whatever number they assert must either be increased, or reduced to one. Those who, with Parmenides, believe in the Unity of Being, will find it hard to keep this unity inviolate while they use the terms Being, One, Whole, each with a distinct meaning, and while they admit, as they needs must, that a whole has parts.

These difficulties are only briefly indicated: the chief criticism of Parmenides, or rather the modification of his view,
which has been promised above, is made indirectly, and only emerges when the contemporary phase of Greek philosophy has been examined in its two chief aspects.

Here no attempt is made to determine the exact number of Beings. The battle rages about a different point. Is Being corporeal or ideal? Some hold that nothing exists but bodies, which they can touch and handle: their opponents break up these bodies by dialectic into a flux of change, and assert the sole existence of certain bodiless ideas.

Now the former, if pressed, and if they were capable of argument, would admit the existence of a soul, and of virtue and vice as attributes of the soul; and, though they might contend that the soul is corporeal, they could hardly maintain this of justice or wisdom. Hence they may be willing to substitute for body as the characteristic of Being, the power of acting or of being acted upon. Being is possibility of energy.

But the idealists will refuse this definition. Acting and suffering they say are properties not of Being, but of Becoming: for Being is exempt from change. Whereupon we ask them whether to know is an active, and to be known a passive verb; and whether Being therefore, so far as known, is not acted upon? And here, apart from logic, the reflection rises, that Perfect Being cannot be devoid of life and movement, and the power of thought. That which has thought has life, that which has life has a soul, and that which has a soul cannot be motionless. And yet it is most true that reason could not exist nor come into being without uniformity and permanence, which imply a principle of rest in the object of reason. Being therefore has both Motion and Rest. But Being is neither Motion nor Rest. We are in the position of the dualists whom we compelled to admit a third principle. Motion and Rest are opposites, yet both exist. Being therefore comprehends both, and is different from both, and though essentially partaking both of motion and rest, in its own nature neither rests nor moves. In solving this apparent contradiction, we stumble on the solution of the original problem of the reconciliation of Being and Not-Being. As we endeavour to harmonize the discords which have arisen within the sphere of Being, we are led to modify our notion of the mutual exclusiveness of Being and that which had been hitherto regarded as the opposite of Being.
Before proceeding with the argument, we may glance at one or two points in the interesting passage which has just been analyzed. (Soph. 246-250.)

Under the titles of the Earth-born and the Friends of Ideas does Plato allude to any particular schools, and, if so, to which of those existing round him?

It is difficult to bring either description into exact harmony with the tenets of any single school. The γνησευτις would at first sight appear to be the same who are mentioned in the Theaetetus as “stubborn and repellent” men, but are there emphatically, though somewhat ironically, distinguished from the “disciples of Protagoras.” whereas here the ἀλήθεια of Protagoras appears to be brought under the general censure. It may be remarked, however, that there is a distinction amongst the γνησευτις also, for some are viewed as more hopelessly irreclaimable than the rest (οι αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτό-χθονες). According to this view, Antisthenes may possibly be included, but the whole description and the line of argument pursued point rather in the direction of a physical school. The moral maxims of Democritus, when taken in connexion with his general principle, might lay his followers open to the criticism here employed. But on the other hand, his analysis of the senses makes it improbable that he is alone intended. It remains, therefore, most probable that Plato has here idealized, if such a paradox may be allowed, the materialistic tendency in contemporary thought. In the other description, of the friends of motionless forms, there are some marks which answer to the Pythagoreans, and others which point rather in the direction of Megara. That the Pythagoreans, whose ἀκώντος οὐσία is very similarly criticized by Aristotle, are intended here, is an opinion which Proclus\(^p\) takes for granted, and which has been recently advanced, quite independently as it would seem, by a French critic, M. Mallet. That the Megarians are meant, has been the common belief, since this was somewhat doubtfully asserted by Schleiermacher. The Pythagoreans certainly

\(^p\) Comment. in Parmen. p. 149 ed. Pont.: ἢν μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγόρεως ἢ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν θεωρία καὶ δηλοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Σοφιστῇ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους προσαγορεύων τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σοφοὺς. A comparison of Parmenides, Philolaus, and Empedocles shews that the Eleatic and Pythagorean speculations were kindred in their origin.
believed in purely immaterial forms, and the absence of an efficient cause to aid the formal was their weak point. But there is no evidence that they brought a subtle dialectic to bear on the resolution of phenomena. This trait (κατὰ συμπραξίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις) belongs rather to the Megarians: and so does the sharp opposition between the flux of Becoming and the permanence of Being. This is an Eleatic feature. But then although we know that Euclides said that the good was "one called by many names," his reaction towards Eleaticism would probably, though not certainly, incline him to lay the emphasis on "one" rather than on "many," and we have no evidence (this passage apart) that he admitted a real diversity of forms. This is one of Socher's grounds for supposing that the "Sophist" was written by a Megarian and directed against Plato, whose theory of ideas he imagines to be here directly impugned. We have seen that however much some of Plato's statements (e.g., Crat. 440) may seem to countenance the doctrine here criticized, such was not his final theory of knowledge and being. But the hypothesis of Ueberweg and of Mr. Grote, that Plato is here examining a view which he at one time held, is well worth considering.

We shall only make a slight modification of this hypothesis in expressing our own opinion that Plato at a late period of his course directs this argument against those amongst his disciples in the Academy who, resting in their imperfect realization of an earlier phase of his own teaching and reverting to Pythagorean and Eleatic elements, held the doctrine of ideas in the form in which it is often controverted by Aristotle. That Aristotle should not have observed this divergence between the master and the school may be inexplicable, but not more so than his silence about the Parmenides. On this supposition, the avowal of familiar acquaintance with the men (ἐγὼ δὲ ἵσως διὰ συνήθειαν) is not made by the Eleatic Stranger, but by Plato himself, whose close relation to the persons indicated accounts for a peculiar gentleness of tone (e.g., ἵμεροτερόν γάρ); and the plurality of ideas, their immobility, and the wide gulf between Being and the changing world, are tenets which we clearly know to have been held together by one and the same school.

This interrogation of the philosophers is one of the earliest
chapters in the critical history of philosophy: and approaches to the manner in which Anaxagoras and Empedocles are handled by Aristotle, when he endeavours to penetrate to their meaning or inmost tendency through the haze of their language. There is a similar effort made in the Theaetetus, in the development of the theory of sense, where Heraclitus and Protagoras are shown to meet in an unconscious harmony, and the same appears in the allusion to Parmenides and the twofold difficulty of understanding his expressions and his thought (μὴ οὐτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἔννοιμεν, τι τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπόμεθα). But the conception of studying philosophical ideas in the light of their history, and almost of the impossibility of studying them in any other way, comes more distinctly into consciousness in this passage than even in Aristotle.

There are several points even in these few pages, besides the criticism of the εἰθ, which confirm the hypothesis that the Sophist is a late dialogue. These are chiefly: 1. The identification of the Highest Being with Soul or Mind, which appears with equal distinctness only in the Philebus, Timæus, and Laws. 2. The abruptness with which this thesis is introduced, not suggested directly by the argument but prompted apparently by a deep emotional impulse. This is in the manner of the Laws. 3. The admission of motion into the intelligible sphere. 4. The close union of the ideas of Being and Becoming, which Plato's earlier speculations had divorced. This notion is applied in one place to the Eleatic Whole (245 d, τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γένομεν ὁλον), notwithstanding the fact that Parmenides denied γένεσις altogether; and in another place, in immediate connexion with the idea of permanence or stability, it is said that this kind is necessary to the production as well as the existence of mind (249 c, ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾶ ὡτα ἃ γενόμενον ἄν ;).

We return to the argument. The notion of perfect being includes the attributes of motion and rest, yet neither of these is the same with Being: Being differs from both, and, quâ Being, neither rests nor is moved. Yet it would seem as if everything must either be at rest or in motion.

Now these contradictions may be solved, if we admit the possibility of a relation or intercommunion between different kinds. If Being subsists in its own nature and at the same time partakes in one respect of rest and in another of motion,
this perplexity is removed. The same question of the correlation of ideas or kinds is raised by the simplest instance of predication. Every proposition implies a relation between things which are not identical. Even this process has been pronounced impossible by some, who hold that you cannot say "Man is Good," but only "Man is Man" and "Good is Good." Not to pass over any class of thinkers, however extravagant, we address these belated scholars in common with the rest with the following question. Are all ideas totally disparate, as these say, or do all admit of indiscriminate intermixture, or do some enter into relations with each other while others do not?

If there is no "communion of ideas," (1) motion and rest cannot exist, for neither can partake of Being; and the philosophy of motion and that of rest are equally undone; and so (2) are the philosophies which rest on the union of one and many, whether these are viewed as alternating or as being always combined, and whether unity or a plurality of elements be made the starting-point. But still more sorry (3) is the plight of the opponents of predication themselves. For they cannot move a step in their own argument without the combination of ideas.

Again, if there is to be commixture of all ideas, motion could be predicated of rest, and rest of motion.

It remains that some ideas admit of union and others do not. Just as some letters can be combined in syllables and others cannot. And it may be that as the vowels are present in all syllables, so there may be a select few amongst the ideas whose presence is necessary to every combination.

But as a science is necessary to determine what combinations of letters make syllables, and again another science to distinguish the proper combinations of musical sounds, so a science, namely that of dialectic, is necessary in order to determine the true relations of ideas. The dialectician sees one form traversing a multitude of scattered objects, and several forms embraced in a higher generality: he sees many such wholes bound together in one universal notion, and also many that are wholly sundered from one another.

In looking for the Sophist, we have unexpectedly stumbled on the philosopher, and we shall know where to look for him
when it is his turn to be defined. The Sophist hides in the
dark cave of Not-Being, wherein he feels his way by the
trick of use. We lose the philosopher, "as we lose the lark
in heaven," in an abyss of light, where he clings, by the
effort of pure reason, to the form of Being. Plato does not
expressly notice, what his argument however implies, that the
word "Being" is here used in a new sense. The "Being"
here spoken of is clearly the object of philosophy, that is of
dialectic: and the function of dialectic is to determine which
kinds harmonize and which are mutually exclusive. Hence
"Being" can be nothing else than the sum or principle of
true determinations, whether positive or negative.

But "Being" was previously reckoned, and is again reckoned
(inf. 254 d), with rest and motion as one of the several kinds
amongst which the determinations are made. The first notion
of Being in the Abstract, on which the Eleatic doctrine was
founded, remains side by side with that of Truth, as consisting
in the real agreement and disagreement of ideas. The latter
seems to be expressed by the word ὅv in the present passage,
which contains the answer to the question raised in p. 250 a,
viz. what common quality of opposites is expressed by saying
that they both exist. Their common quality is (according to
this) that each is really predicable of some other thing. This
is almost but not quite expressed inf. 258 b, ἡ τῆς θατέρου—
ordinator. But to proceed. As it is admitted that communion exists
to a greater or less extent amongst different kinds, some for-
bidding communion, while some may hold communion with all;
we proceed to apply the dialectic method which is now come
into view to the three chiefest kinds, which have been already
before us: Being, Motion, Rest. The two latter, as was said
above, have no communion with them both. Each of these three is other than the remaining two,
but the same with itself. Thus emerge two fresh and distinct
kinds, or categories, holding communion with the three already
mentioned, but different from them all, the categories of Same
and Other. They are certainly both distinct from Rest and
from Motion, for if either of these were identical with that in
which both participate, they would be obliged to participate
in each other, which we have seen to be in the highest degree
impossible. Nor can Sameness be identified with Being, else in asserting that motion and rest exist, we should assert that they were both the same. Thus are made out four distinct kinds: motion, rest, being, same. The form of Other alone remains. Is this a fifth kind, or are Being and Otherness two names for the same thing? They are distinct, for this reason, that every Other is always relative to an Other, whereas Beings are sometimes thought of in themselves and sometimes in relation. (Aristotle’s category of Relation is here incidentally anticipated.)

The form of Otherness is therefore a fifth kind; and, together with that of Sameness, it is found in combination with everything, like the vowels in the illustration from letters. (These two in fact are the positive and negative aspects, which are indissolubly connected in the notion of Being, as defined above.)

In applying this discovery we find that Otherness is more simply expressed by the word “not.” Motion is quite other than Rest; i.e. is not Rest:—is other than Sameness; i.e. is not Sameness. Yet Motion is, i.e. exists: and is the same with itself through participation in Sameness. In these different senses or relations, Motion is and is not the same: partaking of Sameness in relation to itself and of Otherness (expressed by the word “not”) in relation to sameness. So if motion could partake of rest, it might be said, “Motion is at rest and is not Rest.” And it is certainly true that Motion being other than the Other, i.e. partaking of Otherness in relation to the Other, in the same phrase both is and is not Other. Thus Motion is distinct from three of the four kinds, partaking of the Other in relation to each: and it is also distinct from, and partakes of the Other in relation to, Being. But Motion also partakes of Being, and thus both is and is not Being.

Now this applies equally to every kind. All partake of Being, for they all exist, but each is distinguished from the abstract, or universal, notion of Being. They are and are not, are existent but are not existence. Being and Not-Being are equally predictable of every form. And, if this result is turned the other way,—the form of Being is distinguished from (partakes of Other in relation to) all other forms. Being is in
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itself once for all, but is-not times infinite, viz. in comparison with everything which partakes of being.

It appears then that Non-Being includes everything except the abstract idea of Being; and that the word not expresses only otherness or difference, and not necessarily contrariety. The not-greater is not necessarily smaller. Now every positive conception has a corresponding negative, which is not necessarily opposite but only different, and includes a really existing kind. Thus the not-beautiful is a kind by itself. The word "not" distinguishes between positive existences; and the Other has as many branches as science has.

It follows that negative determinations have as much objective reality as the positive ones which are summed up in Being q: and they signify when taken severally, not the contradictory of the corresponding affirmatives, but only something not identical with them. Now the sum of these negations, or of their objects, is no other than the non-existent or unreal, after which the Sophist led us such a dance.

We have not only established against Parmenides that this Non-Being has a real existence, but we have also laid bare the nature of it as the sum of negations, or of all which falls on the left-hand side in the distinctions of science.

(Plato here notes a change in the meaning of μὴ ὁν' similar to that above noticed in the meaning of ὁν'. The merely abstract notion of Nothing seems at first sight contradictory to the merely abstract notion of Being. But when Being is recognized as the complex object of the determinations of thought, Not-Being becomes the negative side or aspect of those determinations, and is thus a part of being. Moreover every such negative expression, from the nature of the case, since negation is difference and difference always implies relation (τὸ ἔτερον ἀλὲ τὸ ὁν' ἔτερον), has a positive content.)

Further, while we have shewn the existence of non-being, we have proved that Being in innumerable relations is not, i.e. is different from, or other than, every existing kind.

Being and difference (or positive and negative Being r) are two categories (to use a convenient term of later growth) which

q "Being" is here used with a third variety of meaning — the sum of positive determinations.

r The ideas of τάνδν and ὁν' seem to run together again, though distinguished for the sake of argument above.
traverse all things—even each other, since the Other exists, and Being is other than the remaining kinds, which partake of Being, and of the Other in relation to each other and to the form of Being.

Here is a nut for the Eristic philosophers to crack. They may exhibit contradictions till they are weary, but until they can refute the preceding argument, they will labor in vain. The dialectician's is a far nobler task, to follow every argument having respect to the relation in which things are compared or distinguished. To insist without this on the contradiction of sameness and difference is mere childishness, as has now been shewn. We have swept the ground from under the feet of the analytical and controversial gentry, by abolishing the absoluteness of distinctions: which indeed was necessary if argument, or even language, is to be maintained at all. For, as has been already shewn in answer to Antisthenes, the nature of proposition rests on the combination of different forms.

But if language were done away, all our toil would have left us where we were, so far as the Sophist is concerned. For falsity can only be found in propositions, either spoken or silent. Opinion is silent proposition.

There still remains, therefore, a new problem, after it has been decided that there is a communion amongst several kinds, and that Non-Being is one of these; viz. Is there communion between Non-Being and the proposition? Does that which is other than being enter into language? We must answer this before we can tell whether the Sophist is to be accused of falsehood, and, if the answer is in the negative, we must begin the whole inquiry afresh.

Theaetetus is cast down by the apparition of this new difficulty: but is encouraged to proceed. "Faint heart never took a city. Some progress has been made, and that is more than we at one time expected. And after all not much remains." Speech is then defined as the combination not of nouns with nouns or verbs with verbs, but of nouns and verbs (which are also defined)—just as vowels and consonants were seen to be combined in syllables.

It is shewn also that every proposition has a subject and is of a certain quality; by which is meant, not the formal m
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difference of affirmative or negative, but the material difference of truth or falsity.

The false proposition attaches to its subject a predicate, which has a meaning indeed, but a meaning other than that which consists with fact (ὅντος—ὅτα ἐσεῖα, Soph. 263 b); a meaning, therefore, which is the proper object of a negative determination in thought. False speech is the affirmation of this other predicate, which means, not nothing, but a wrong something. (It is of course implied that false negation is the wrong affirmation of non-being.) Now thought is a silent dialogue of the mind with herself (cf. Theaet. 189 e): opinion is the positive or negative determination of thought; and imagination is opinion in contact with sense. Hence whatever is essentially true of speech, is also true of thought, opinion and the intellectual element in sensation. False opinion is therefore conceivable and possible. And the phantastic art, in which we placed the Sophist, has more than a chimerical existence. The existence of the said "kind" being vindicated, the division of kinds is resumed from p. 236 c in the manner already indicated, and the dialogue "grows to a point."

In closing this long introduction, it is still necessary, for the sake of clearness, to make a few remarks on the discussion of which an analysis has been here presented to the reader.

1. The last step in the argument will be more intelligible when put into modern language.

It has been shewn that Non-Being is merely the object of negative determination: the form of Difference, coming in between two positive conceptions. Before the existence of falsehood can be established, the question remains, Are thought and speech themselves ever the proper objects of negative determination? Can a proposition as well as a term be denied? Does the Form of Difference enter into thought as the object of thought, so as to divide the real (ὁν in the sense of Truth) from the unreal (μὴ ὁν=that which is other than the Truth) which still has a certain reality as being really distinguished from the real? Plato answers this question, as he answers the question in the Theaetetus, "Is true opinion knowledge?" by an appeal to fact. The proposition, "Theaetetus, with whom I now converse, is flying," is manifestly the legitimate object of
denial. And thus the existence of falsehood, and of a denial of falsehood, as well as that of simple negation, is established. It may be asked, why sensation takes the place of dialectic at this stage? Might not the Sophist, who can shut his eyes at pleasure, profess ignorance, until convinced by rational proof, whether Theaetetus is sitting or flying? The answer is, first, that it was immaterial to the proof whether the fact appealed to were one of sensible experience or otherwise. Any proposition which the mind of the particular hearer instinctively rejected would have served the purpose equally well. A fact of sense is chosen, according to the law of parsimony, as being the simplest. And, secondly, all the dialectical difficulties had been surmounted, and the question of fact alone remained. It had been shewn that non-being existed, and that different kinds might be combined in thought. The only doubt left was whether a combination of non-being with thought and speech was possible. All combinations are equally possible or impossible in the abstract. The existence of any particular combination is a question of fact. The combination of rest and motion was proved impossible by an appeal to mental experience. That of thought with non-being happens to be proved by an appeal to an opinion based on sense (φαίνεται δ' ὁ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης). The example is chosen from φαντασία rather than διάνοια or δόξα. But this is an accident which does not in the slightest degree affect the validity of the argument.

2. The definition of λόγος as the combination of ὄνομα and ἰδέα, and as a positive or negative determination (φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν), is the earliest clear account of the proposition. It was seen in examining the Theaetetus (Theat. Introd. p. lxxiv.), and has been evident in the course of this dialogue, with how much difficulty the Greeks formed the conception of the relation of subject and predicate. But in this passage not only is it asserted that every predicate must have a subject (λόγου ἀναγκαίων τινὸς εἶναι λόγον), but the words expressive of subject and predicate (nouns and verbs*) are for the first time accurately distinguished and defined. Now this is in a great measure due to the preceding argument, in which Being is

* See the instructive excursus of Benfey on the meaning of the words ὄνομα and ἰδέα in the Cratylus, Ueber die Aufgabe des Kratylus, p. 139.
declared to be the relation of ideas, and to the subversion of the extreme view of those who held that a συμπλοκή τῶν εἴδων was impossible.

3. The psychological definitions in pp. 263 d—264 b also demand a passing notice. They mark a stage in the development of Plato’s psychology more advanced than that in the Theaetetus (contrast Theaet. 189 e—190 a with the brief summary δόξα—διάνοιας ἀποτελεύησις), and nearly corresponding to that in the Philebus; (see especially Phileb. 33—41). The gradations (αισθησις, φαντασία, δόξα, διάνοια, λόγος) are almost in the manner of Aristotle; (cf. Met. i. i, and compare Legg. 892 b, Δόξα—καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρῶτερα ἀν ἐίη). Now just as the beginning of a sound logic by the definition of the proposition was impossible so long as Being and Non-Being were viewed in their incommunicable abstraction; so the absolute severance of knowledge from opinion had been an impediment to the growth of an inductive psychology. Both hindrances are removed by the preceding argument: and to this may be referred the increasing clearness in which logical and psychological questions are viewed.

It remains to say a few words on the general reasoning. The whole energy of the piece is spent on the metaphysical question of the possibility of error, or false appearance. The arguments by which the Sophist is entrapped in the form of non-being are comparatively trifling: and the refutation of particular tenets is obviously left over to another day. The form of non-being itself remains the cardinal point of interest and difficulty. The solution is obtained through a modification of the notions of Being and Negation, which by a process of dialectic are brought out of their first naked abstraction, and are shewn to be logical determinations, both of which are necessarily present in every conception, i.e. in every act of thought. It is found impossible to maintain the sole existence of a Being which is identical with itself, but has no other relations: and true being, as necessarily comprising reason and life, is shewn to partake of the opposite elements of permanence and change.

“Being,” at this point, is equivalent to the “sum of all positive notions.” But in contemplating the union of being with
permanence and change, two thoughts arise: first, that negation in the form of difference pervades all things, separating every form from every other; and, secondly, that this separation is not necessarily absolute, and does not exclude the possibility of relations between the forms thus separated. The separation is as essential to thought as the communion, and hence arises a third notion of Being, as the sum of true determinations, both positive and negative. This new form (by the "gliscens intellectus" of dialectic) is again distinguished from that which is not Being (which is unreal or false), which however, according to the theory, partakes of Being, if in no other way, as being the object of true negative determination.

A close perusal of the dialogue will convince the reader that Plato is not here engaged in impugning the axiom of contradi-
tion. That axiom, though not expressly brought forward, is tacitly assumed throughout. It is taken for granted that an assertion or negation cannot at once be true and not true in the same sense and in the same respect; (see especially the words in 259 d: Καθ' ἑκαστὸν ἑλέγχουτα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἐτέρον ὅν πῇ ταύτῳ εἶναι φη καὶ ὅταν ταύτῳ ὄν ἐτέρον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο δ' φησὶ τούτων πεπουθέναι πότερον). This is not formally drawn out: for Plato is engaged rather with thought than language, and passes by the formal to grapple with the real; but is nowhere ignored, much less denied. Nor is it quite true that negation is merged in affirmation. But what happens is this. When it is found that Being, though an omni-
present notion, is inconceivable without the help of others from which it is distinguished, it becomes evident that no-
being is not equivalent to nothingness, but in one sense in-
cludes the forms which are distinguished from Being; and generally that the negation of a term is implicitly the predi-
cation of all which is not included in that term:—when a thing is not-beautiful, it is to be sought for amongst the mis-
cellaneous class of objects of which beauty cannot be predi-
cated. All negation therefore is limitation, and in so far deter-
mination. The meaning of this is evident and important in connexion with scientific inquiry. Every exclusion and rejec-
tion is a step in the direction of discovery. The sum of these exclusions is Non-Being. Thirdly, it is shown that where iden-
tity is denied, participation may still exist. Things different
are not necessarily opposite. The same thing may partake of two things which are different from it and from each other. This is the communion of kinds.

Another objection is more plausible, viz.: that Plato is deceived by language and has confused together three distinct notions under the name of Being: namely, Existence, Identity, and Participation. We have seen that he passes from the bare notion of Existence to that of determination in thought: and that under this notion of determination he himself carefully distinguishes between participation and identity. How then, it may be asked, does he include these different relations under the same term ὅν? For the same reason, it may be answered, for which he assigns ὅσοια to non-being, viz. that Being has come to mean reality, or the sum of true determinations. Participation, as such, is no less real than identity.

It has been unavoidable, in the preceding sketch, to translate Plato’s thoughts into language somewhat more subjective than is in perfect keeping with the tenor of ancient philosophy. Or rather the distinction of object and subject, imperfectly known to Plato, has for the sake of clearness been applied throughout. This may perhaps, however, be excused, if his real meaning (τὸ διανοοῦσαν ἔτε) has been made at all more intelligible to the English reader. And if his speculations have been rightly interpreted, it may be left to professed metaphysicians to determine their value.

The criticism of Aristotle on the Platonic doctrine of Non-Being (Met. N. 1089), though in parts irrelevant to this dialogue, yet bears to it nearly the same relation which his remarks on the Platonic numbers bear to the Philebus. The cosmological notion of Non-Being as necessary to production, to which he chiefly adverts, may perhaps be traced in the Timea, but is wholly alien to the purpose of the “Sophist.” Plato or his followers may have latterly said that the phenomenal Universe would be impossible without an element of falsehood, but no such observation occurs, or could occur in the course of the discussion which we have reviewed. Yet there are

† For Plato’s definition of Opposites, see Phaed. 103 b; and cf. Repub. 4, 436 e.
indications that Aristotle, when writing the passage in question, had this dialogue in his eye. Such are, (1) the language in which the quotation from Parmenides is introduced, especially the words ἄνάγκη εἴναι τὸ μὴ ὄν δεῖξαι δτι εστὶ. (In the next phrase, however, οὖτω—εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, the writer's memory seems for once to have wandered to the Parmenides.)

(2) The expression ταῦτην τὴν φόσω νέγει τὸ ὄν ὄν. His recollection of Plato's writings is partly derived from and partly tinged by the conversations which he has held with younger Academicians. Of the arguments which he adduces only two are applicable to the "Sophist:"—That to proceed by a criticism of Parmenides was in effect to revive the philosophy of an earlier age (ἀπορήσαε ἄρχαικός); and that Being and Not-Being have each several meanings, and these are not distinguished by Plato.

It has been already shewn that the negative side of the philosophy of Parmenides was still powerful when Plato wrote, and that he was probably right in viewing it as the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the modes of thinking in his own and other schools, which interfered with the real progress of inquiry. The accusation of an "old-fashioned" way of putting the question, only means that Plato did not take for granted the distinctions which Aristotle, building on the foundation of his predecessor, afterwards introduced. These distinctions are, however, not strictly relevant to the matter in hand. For, as Aristotle himself observes, there are positive and negative determinations under all the categories. And although the affirmation or negation of quality or quantity is not identical with, but only analogous to, that of substance; yet the word "analogy" does not explain the relative significance of affirmation and negation generally. With regard to "falsity," which, it may be presumed, is also to be found under all the categories, and which Aristotle conceives to be the principal meaning of Plato's μὴ ὄν, it has been shewn above that the term is so extremely abstract as almost to supersede the distinction between falsity and denial. That which is falsely predicated is truly denied, and vice versa. Falsehood, in Plato's sense, arises when Not-Being is predicable of speech or thought, and this happens when Not-Being is affirmed or Being denied.

The other species of Not-Being to which Aristotle alludes is
his own principle of potentiality, which is in one sense but is not in another, is potentially, but not actually, existent: the same which he also compares with the ἀπειρον of the Philebus, and the ἀπειρος δύας of the Platonists. This, he says, is the real "other" which along with the form enables us to account for production. But, as we have said, Plato is not here engaged in accounting for production; and, to use Aristotle's own language, this δυνάμει ὁν is μὴ ὁν only κατὰ συμβέβηκός. And the converse is equally true. In saying "a cloud is not a shower," we are only incidentally interested in the question whether a cloud can be converted into a shower. Whether this be so or not, the meaning of the negative proposition remains the same. That the notions "cloud" and "shower," although separated by the negative particle, may still bear to each other a relation such as that of the potential to the actual, is a truth which could not easily have won acceptance before the "Sophist" was written.

This question, like that of the unity of Good, brings into strong relief the different genius of the two philosophers, universality being Plato's watchword, and distinctness that of Aristotle.

It may be worth while to see how Aristotle himself answers Parmenides in the opening of the lectures on Physics. (Physic. Auscult. I. 3.) "Parmenides did not see that Being has several meanings, and that each kind of being, although one in meaning, yet in point of continuity is many. For there is a difference, which philosophers in those days had not perceived, between whiteness and that to which whiteness attaches. Substance and attribute exist in a different sense (τὸ εἶναι ἐτερον). But those who assert the unity of Being, must hold that whatever is said to exist, exists as substance. Otherwise that which happens to exist (which partakes of existence) is other than Being. And hence there will exist something which has no existence. For nothing has existence (ex hypothesi) but the form of Being. No particular thing can have existence, unless Being is allowed to signify a plurality of things in the sense which makes this possible. For if essential Being cannot be an attribute, Being may signify that which is not as well as that which is. For to speak of a white thing as white is truth, i.e. Being; but whiteness is a distinct notion from essence;
and therefore, ex hypothesi, is not, in the most absolute sense, Therefore Being is not; which is absurd, therefore Being must signify a plurality.

"Again, if essential Being is one, it can have no extension; for there will then be a difference of parts. But the parts even of a logical whole exist as essentially as the whole; for they are not mere accidents, even of the kind which implies the definition of the subject: (as, for instance, the accident of snubness implies a nose). The elements of concrete existence (matter, form, ῥό ἐξ ἀμφοῖν) have each an indivisible existence: and the notion of each is different. The Atomists perceived something of this, when they attempted, while admitting that if being has one meaning, all must be one, to introduce diversity by the assertion of the existence of Not-Being, and by breaking up the continuity of Being into particles. But even if it be granted that Being has one meaning, and the contradictory of being cannot exist, there may still be Not-Being: for this may mean not absolute non-entity, but the negation of some particular Being. On the whole, it is most unreasonable to say that all things will be one unless there is something besides Being. For who understands what is meant by Being, unless particular substances are meant? But if this be so, nothing prevents a plurality of Beings in the sense indicated above."

This dialogue, although not generally thought the most attractive of Plato's writings, has at least twice received signal attention from great philosophers. By the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus and Proclus, the words of the "Eleatic Stranger" are quoted no less frequently than those of Socrates: and the five categories, Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, Difference, are deliberately preferred by them to the ten of Aristotle. (Plotin. Ennead. 5, 1-3; 6, 1-3.) More recently, Hegel found in the Sophist not only the highest point reached by Plato, but an anticipation of his own dialectic; and he enhances the resemblance by a curious mistranslation of the passage 259 d: τὸ ταύτα ἐδώσαντα—νεογενῆς ὄν. "Das Schwere und Wahrhafte ist dieses, zu zeigen, dassz das, was das Andere ist, Dasselbe ist, und, was Dasselbe ist, ein Anderes ist: und zwar in derselben Rücksicht, und nach derselben Seite, dassz das Eine ihnen geschehen ist, wird auch die andere Bestimmung an
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST.


Both the ancient and the modern appreciation were influenced by preconceptions; and supposed a dogmatic and systematic intention which is not to be found in Plato. Whether the movement of modern philosophy, from Spinoza through Kant to Hegel, is in any respects analogous to that which has now been traced from Parmenides through the Plato of the Phaedrus to the Plato of the Sophist, is a question which it belongs to the historian of philosophy to decide.
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

TA TOT DILOGOY PROSOPIA

ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΞΕΝΟΣ ΕΛΕΑΣΗΣ,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

KATA TIN CHBES OPOLOYIAV, O SOKRATES, HXOMEN

1. The word σοφιστής, like many others in Plato (e.g. λόγος, διάνοια, γένεσις, στοιχεῖον, σόφια), may be observed in the act of passing from the common or vernacular, towards a technical and philosophical use. When Aristotle defines the Sophist χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ ὁπότις, he gives the name a meaning which had no existence before Socrates, and which became fixed only through the present dialogue. In Men. 85 b Socrates, addressing the slave, employs the word in the most popular sense: καλοῦσι δὲ γε ταύτην διώμεστρον οἱ σοφισταί. Here the geometers are called σοφισταί, as the poets were by Pindar, because practising a clever thing (σοφιζόμενοι τι σοφισμα) beyond the reach of ordinary men. That the name thus used acquired an association of ignorant dislike, mingled either with contempt or fear, appears from two places in the Promethes of Aeschylus, where the wise Titan is so called by the servile ministers of Zeus (1. 62: ΚΡ. ἱνα μᾶθη σοφιστής (contriver) ἀν Διὸς νοθέστερος. 1. 946: ΕΡ. σὲ τὸν σοφιστήν (thou who meddlest with deep matters) τῶν πυκνῶς ὑπέριπλοκων). It was with something of a similar feeling that the conservative Athenian citizen spoke of the public teachers of the Socratic age. See the words of Anytus in the Meno, 91 c, where this hatred finds an extreme expression. The sentiment with which they were regarded must have had various phases, from this utter abhorrence to the eager interest and curiosity of Hippocrates (Prot. 310), who however (Ib. 312 a) would not for the world be himself taken for a Sophist. There was added to the jealousy, fear of an influence not understood (Ib. 316 c), the sort of caste-antipathy with which the Athenian
gentleman looked on those who followed any trade. Cf. also Lach. 197 d: πρέπει . . . . . . σοφιστή μᾶλλον τά τοιαύτα κομψεῖνεισθαί ἢ ἄνδρι κ. τ. λ. The "Sophists" in Plato's time were already commonly viewed as a separate class. Cf. Tim. 19 e, Rep. 6, 492 a. Plato—who, as we learn from Phutarch in his life of Dion, was himself called Sophist by the courtiers of Syracuse (cf. Polit. 299 c, where the true philosopher is called by the vulgar ἀδολέσχων τινά σοφιστήν, and inf. 216 c: τοτε δὲ σοφισταὶ)—endeavours in this and the following dialogue to limit the application of the term, with the odium belonging to it, to that false or pretended wisdom which he desires to distinguish from the true—to the professors of knowledge who "had their reward" amongst his contemporaries. And the termination, -ιστής, which might imply affectation or pretension, was conducive to this purpose. In a similar spirit the meaning of the word διαλέκτικος was modified by Aristotle. The necessity of defining the Sophist is asserted by Socrates in Protag. 313 e. P. 1, 3. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ] Here, as in the Parmenides and Timeaus, Socrates introduces but does not conduct the conversation (Tim. 17 b: ΤΤ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἃν εἴη δίκαιον, χθὲς ἦπο σοῦ ξεινο- σβήτας οἱ ἦν πρέπον ξεινος, μὴ οὐ προθύμων οί τῶν λοιπῶν ἴμων ἄντερεστάμ. Ib. 26 c: ΣΩ. χρῆ λέγει μὲν ύπάς, ἐμὴ δὲ ἀντί τῶν χθὲς λόγων ἡσυχίας ἄγεις). But although the person of Socrates is in the background, the Socratic spirit of inquiry still reigns in this and the following dialogue. There are at least four points in which this intellectual (as distinguished from the personal) influence of Socrates may still be traced. 1. The use of trivial and grotesque examples to illustrate general truths (see Xen. Memorablia I. 2. § 23, and compare the words of Callicles in the Gorgias, 491 a: ἤδε σκυτὰς τε καὶ καφνίας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἱστρῶν οὐδὲν πανί, and the elevation of this practice into a principle of scientific method. The anger has a definition no less than the highest artist. Philosophical classification respects not persons, but views the military commander and the destroyer of vermin as equally deserving a place in the category of huntsmen. The Sophist is a salesmain, a magician, a sportsman, a scene-painter. The image of the "herdsman" (compare Xen. Mem. I. c.), used satirically in the Theaetetus (p. 174 d) and in Rep. 1, and with a more serious meaning in the Laws (4, 713 b, c), appears again in the Politicus, at first in the humorous but afterwards in the deeper signification. In the same dialogue an elaborate parallel is drawn between the statesman and the weaver, and this leads to a vindication of the argument from Example. Here also the Socratic mode of teaching by instances (coinciding with the Pythagorean parable) is not only imitated
but is made the object of reflection and study. 2. The conviction, which appears chiefly in the Politicus, that all practical wisdom may be resolved into pure knowledge, and that this master-science is one only, and stands in close relation to all others. 3. The destructive, cross-questioning method of Socrates is characterised as a purgation of the soul (καθαρμός, a Pythagorean word) from the vapours and obstructions of conceit. It is this true purification of the mind, the inalienable privilege of the philosopher, of which the mere controversial art of the Sophist is a false mimicry. In this, however, there is also a reference to the negative dialectic of Zeno. 4. The irony of this dialogue (and still more of the Politicus) while truly Platonic accords well with the character of the Platonic Socrates. The position assigned to the Sophist, not in the first, nor in the second, nor in the third portion of imitative art; and the discovery of the politicians of Greece far down amongst the class of servants, are instances of this: also the ludicrous description of a state in which navigation and medicine should be regulated by law, of which there is perhaps a germ in the question of Socrates, Would they choose a pilot, or a carpenter, or a flute-player by lot? In these and other passages there is revived, with an increase of bitterness which is Plato's own, the "provoking irony and strange in-sight into the world," which is one of the most marked features of the Platonic, as it was probably of the real, Socrates.

P. 1, 4. Κατὰ τὴν χειρὶ ἀμοιλογίαν
Theat. 210 c. Socrates is already at the place of meeting: according to the Thevetetus a palaistra, possibly the Lyceum, or the school of Taurreas. There is, however, no reference to the scene of the conversation, either in this dialogue or the next.

§κομεν αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἀγομεν
Rep. 4, 427 d: σκόπει—αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει. Cf. also Xen. Anab. III. 1, § 44. The expression is modified by a return to the indicative mood, as the sentence grows under the author's hand.

P. 2, 1. κοσμίωσι] "Like well-behaved people," "As in duty bound."

1. έταιρον—τέταιρον] Several MSS. have ἔτερον in the first place. (Ficinus, longè vero alterum ac dissimilèm a Parmenide et Zenone suis aqua-libus.) But the Stranger afterwards identifies himself with the followers of Parmenides, though he is not a servile follower, and Socrates in this place alludes to the ζηλοχος of Zeno. The corruption may be due to some one who thought the criticism of Parmenides in the sequel inconsistent with the words as they stood. The passage is thrice quoted by Proclus; Comment. in Parmen. p. 42: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἔλείατης σοφὸς καὶ τῶν περί τῶν Παρμενίδην καὶ λόγων ἄταιρων αὐτῶν ὄν. Ib. p. 72: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνων

B 2
Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates is awe-struck. "What if he be some God in disguise, who, as poets

καὶ Ζήνωνα ἔταίρων, μᾶλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλό- p. 2
σωφόν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλὰ τινα θεόν ἁγιόν κατὰ τὸν Ὀμήρου λόγον λέληθας; ὥς
5 φησιν ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅποσοι μετέ- b

οὕτω προσεῖρηκεν, ἔταίρων τῶν ἀμφὶ Π. καὶ Ζ. μᾶλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον. Ib. p. 83: ἔταίρως τοῖς υπάρχων. ἔταίρων is probably a gloss on τῶν. (Bodl. τῶν.) The word is transposed in one MS. (A), which gives ἔταίρων καὶ ἐξήκον. It is doubtful whether τῶν is a partitive genitive or governed by ἔταίρων:—"A companion of the number of those" or "a companion of those." The former is more idiomatic, gives a better emphasis to ἔταίρω, and is on the whole more consistent with the quotations of Proclus.

For the use of the word ἔταίρως, cf. Theae t. 180 e: οὐ γὰρ σοι ἔταίροι εἶσιν. "This stranger is of Eleatic race, an adherent of the school of Parmenides and Zeno, and he is a true philosopher."

Ἤλιν ὁ, οὐ μὲν καὶ ἑξαλείς διάτητον ἀλῆτην, οὐλὸμεν, εἰ δὴ ποὺ τις ἐπούρανος θεὸς ἐστιν, καὶ τε θεοὶ ξεῖναις εἰκότες ἀλλαδόταισιν, παντοῦι τελείωσες, ἐπιστρωθῆσαι πόλης, ἀνθρώπως ὑμῖν τε καὶ εὐνομίης ἐφιπρώτες.

Ib. 1. 270, 1: Ζεὺς δ’ ἐπιτιθέμετρ᾽ ἵκεταίων τε ξείνων τε, ξεῖνος, ὅς ξεῖνοις ἀμ’ αἰδοίοισιν ὑψεῖν. Both these passages are present to the speaker's mind, but the second less distinctly than the first: for ξεῖνοις is dropped, and αἰδοίοισιν taken actively, = respectful or merciful. The substitution of θεῖος for Ζεὺς, the general for the individual, belongs to the later phase of Greek religion. Bodl. ἄλληλοι: but the correction is not by the first hand.

Cf. Legg. 5, 730 a: ὁ ξένως ἐκατότων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξείῳ συνεπομένων διὰ. Ib. 12, 953 c: τιμῶστε ξείνων Δία. ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] The apodosis of these words is
have sung, accompanies the good man’s going, and comes to expose the nothingness of Athenian wisdom!"

Theo. “He is not contentious, as some are: and certainly no God, though I must call him, as I do all philosophers, divine.”

absorbed in συνσταδόν γνωριμενον.

1. ὑπόσεις—δικαιάς] Said in compliment to Theodorus, who, in reward for his modest and candid temper (see the Thetetus), may unawares be entertaining a superior being. Compare the combination of ἄδων with δική in the Protagoras (322 e), and in Hesiod.


5. ἐποφυμένον] Referring to ἐφοράντες in the line of Homer.


tων περὶ τάς ἔριδας ἐπιστοδακτότων] Cf. Isocrates Soph. 20: των περὶ τάς ἔριδας καλυπτομένων. And for ἐπιστοδάκτων inf. p. 259 b, c: εἰτε—καρία—τούς λόγους ἑλκών, οὐκ ἀξία πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐπιστοδακτέ. The Stranger is represented as not contentious, that the reader may be prepared for the modification of the Eleatic doctrine in what follows, and for the general scope of the dialogue, which tends to deprecate the arts of controversy.

9. ἀνήρ] In this and similar places the MSS. persistently give ἀνήρ. This is equally the case in tragedy (e. g. Soph. Aj. 9: ἐννυ ὑπ ἀνήρ), where the quantity proves the presence of the article.


ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὠ φίλε. τὸτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει π. 21. τὸ γένος οὐ πολῦ τι βάλων, ὡς ἔτοσ ἐπείν, εἶναι δια-
κρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. πάνω γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι
παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιαν
ἐπιστροφῆς πόλης, ὁ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως
φιλόσοφοι, καθορότετε ὑψόθεν τῶν τῶν κάτω βίων,
καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιον, τοῖς

1. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ γένος] The more remote purpose of the dialoge appears in these words. The definition of the Sophist
is preparatory to that of the philosopher.

3. τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ] Note the singular case with the article, expressing a generalized conception—as in τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: Thucy-
d. 1. 140.

πάνω] "certainly;" almost = ἀτεχνός, referring to the words of Homer. Compare the use of πάνω γε, πάνω μὲν οὖν in re-
plies.

4. παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι] φαν-
tοῖς is substituted for τελέθοντες because the philosophers do not
really change, but appear in various disguises through the ignorance of men. Compare Rep. 2, 381-2, where there is
a reference to the same pas-
sage of Homer. See also Timaeus 41 a, where the traditionary deities are spoken of in
contradistinction to the heaven-
ly bodies as ὧσον φαίνονται καὶ ὧσον ἄν ἐθέλωσι θεοί.

5. οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως
φιλόσοφοι] “The real, not the
would-be philosophers.” Cf. Theaet. 173 c: Λέγωμεν—περὶ
tῶν κορυφαίων, τί γὰρ ἐν τις τούς
γε φαύλως διατρίβονται ἐν φιλο-
σοφίᾳ λέγοι. And see the de-
scription of the "little bald blacksmith" in Rep. 6, 495 e. For πλαστῶς, cf. Legg. 1, 642 d:
ἀλῆθες καὶ οὐ τι πλαστῶς εἶναι ἄγαθοι. Ib. 6, 777 d.

6. καθορότετε] Echoing καθο-
ρῶν supr., but with the addi-
tional meaning of "down-
wards." For καθ. ὑψόθεν τῶν
tῶν κάτω βίων, see the digression
in the Theaetetus 173 b, 175 c, d. Also Rep. B. 7.

7. τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν—μανικῶς]
“The true philosopher appears
to some men nothing worth : to
others, worth all the world: now
he presents the semblance of a statesman, now of a public
teacher: and, again, he may
give to some men the impres-
sion that he is clean mad.” The
philosophic spirit is a treat-
ure whose value is un-
known: a pearl of great
price, for which he who has
found it will sell all that he
has: appearing now in the
practical, now in the specula-
tive sphere: in both apt to be
confounded with lower types
of wisdom by ordinary men,
who, when they begin to see
the real issues towards which
the spirit leads, will brand it
with the name of foolishness
or madness. For τοῦ παντοῦ, cf.
Phædr. 235 e. The article is
Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher:
What has our Italian friend to tell us of these things?

10 now as

Sophist,
Statesman,
Philosopher:

1. toto μέν—τοτε δὲ] Bodl.
2. πολιτικοὶ] E. g. Epimenides,
Solon, Pythagoras.

2. σοφισταὶ] As Socrates in
the Clouds, or Plato at Syracuse.
The word is used here without
any invidious association,
like πολιτικοὶ, merely denoting a
recognized class. The variation
of language in τίμιον—άξιον is
in keeping with the studied
refinement of this dialogue.

3. παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς]
Cf. Phaedr. 249 c, d: Ἰβ. ἕ: αἰ-
τιάν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος:
and the words of Alcibiades
in the Symposium 218 b: πάντες γὰρ κεκουρωνηκαί τῆς φι-
λοσοφίας μανίας τε καὶ Βακχίας.
Note the emphatic position of
μανικῶς.

4. τοῦ μέντου ἔχον] The double
μέντου marks a double transition:
from the person of the Stranger
to the nature of philosophers,
and from this to the Stranger
again, who is addressed
with an inquiry bearing on the
subject which has been thus sug-
gested. "The philosopher is apt
tobe confounded with the States-
man and Sophist, except when
he is looked upon as mad. Will
the Stranger clear the confusion
by defining each of the terms
in question?"

ἡμῖν gives a courteous turn
to the expression, like μοι
after a vocative.

5. τί ταῦθ'—ωνύμαζον] "What
his countrymen (in Magna
Grecia) thought of these mat-
ters, and how they used to
apply the terms." The imper-
fect implies the qualification
"When he was amongst them."
For the adverbial τί, cf. Phaedr.
234 c: τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος;

9. τί δὲ μάλιστα—διενόθησι] The curious formality of this
address belongs to Plato's later
style. (See General Introduct.) Cf.
infr. 226 b: τὸ ποίον αὐτῶν πέρι
βολήθηκαί δηλώσατα, παραδειγμάτα
προβείς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἄρων;
240 c: πῇ καὶ τὸ ποίον τι φοβοῦ-
ΣΩ. Τόδε πότερον ἐν πάντα ταύτα ἐνόμιζον ἡ ρ. 26
διός, ἡ καθάπερ τὰ ὄνοματα τρία, τρία καὶ γενή δια-
ρώμενοι καθ ἐν ὧνομα γένος ἐκάστῳ προσήπτου;
ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' οὐδείς, ὥς ἔγορμα, φθόνοις αὐτῷ διέλ-
θεν αὐτά. Ἡ πώς, ὥς ἔγενε, λέγομεν;
ΞΕ. Οὔτως, ὥ Θεόδωρε. φθόνοις μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς, ὥ
οὐδὲ χαλεπῶν εἰπεῖν ὃτι γε τρί' ἡγούμενο' καθ' ἐκαστὸν
μὴν διωρίσασθαι σαφῶς, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐκ οὐδὲ
ῥέοντων ἔργον.

10 ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὥ Σώκρατες,
λόγων ἐπελάβον παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς
dεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτῶν ἐτυγχάνομεν. ὥ δὲ
ταύτα, ἀπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν, καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς
ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἴκανῶς καὶ οὐκ

15 ἀμφιμονεῖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τούνυν, ὥς ἔγενε, ἡμῶν τὴν γε πρώτην ε
μενὸς οὐτω λέγεις; Legg. 6, 752 b: περὶ τι βλέπων καὶ ποι μᾶλλον
αὐτὸ εὑρίσκασ τὰ νῦν; Ἰβ. 4, 705 d: εἰς δὴ τί τῶν εἰρημένων βλέψας,
eἰπές ὥ λέγεις; "In regard to what point, and with a view to
what difficulty respecting these things, did the question occur
to you?"

2. τρία καὶ γένη] The Bodleian
MS., as well as ΔΠι, has καὶ γένη,
which is manifestly right. τὰ
gένη does not suit with διαρρώ-
μενοι. They do not divide the
classes, but distinguish three.
"Did they, as the names are
three, distinguish also three
kinds, and assign one severally
to each name?"

6. φθόνοις—εἰπεῖν] φθόνοις is
not to be joined with εἰπεῖν.
"You are right, Theodorus; I
have no wish to withhold any-
thing."

7. τρί' ἡγούμενο] So Bodl.
Π.λόγων—ἀνδιερωτῶντες] For
the apposition of the clause to
the relative, cf. Theaet. 158 b: τὸ
τοιόνδε ἅμαθρητημα,—ὁ πολ-
λάκις σε οἷοι άκηκοέναι ἐρωτώ-
των. Compare Tim. 20 d: καὶ
ἐτὶ πρότερον καθ' ὄδον αὐ ταύτα
ἐσκηπόμεν.

παραπλησίαν ὧν] As para-
πλῆσιος is rarely found with the
genitive, there is probably here
a double attraction: i. e. ὧν =
ois = τοιοῦτοι οὐ.

12. ὥ δὲ ταύτα] Heindorf's
slight emendation (ταύτα for
ταύτα) seems to be required by
the antithesis πρὸς σὲ νῦν—τότε
—πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

16. Μὴ—γένη] "Be not so
cruel as to refuse our first boon
when we have asked it of you."
The use of the auxiliary verb (see Gen. Introd.) is a feature of Plato's later style: and is one of the points in which that style approximates to the language of tragedy.

2. ἐώθας ἢδιον] "Do you commonly prefer?"

3. μακρφ λόγω διεξίναι λέγων] There is a slight emphasis on λέγων. "Do you prefer to enlarge in an extended speech on the subject which you desire to explain, or to discuss the matter (διεξίναι) by means of questions, a practice which I remember that Parmenides used—?"

4. οἶνον — χρωμίνοι] οἶνον is cognate or adverbial aces., like τι—ηγούντο above. Compare THEAT. 170 b: τι—χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, and LYS. 213 c: τι οἶνον δὴ χρησόμεθα, where there is an ellipse of the dative, τῷ λόγῳ or τοῖς λόγοις, as here. It seems probable that the Parmenides had been composed, or at least planned, when this passage and THEAT. 184 a were written.

8. Τῷ — ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐπνίως προσδιαλεγομένα] "With a respondent who gives no trouble and is guided easily." It must be acknowledged that most of the respondents in Plato's dialectical dialogues have this virtue. They answer in the spirit of the questioner, and accept true reasoning when it is placed before them. When a sally is permitted them, this is obviously done either for the sake of relieving the gravity of the argument, or in order that they may derive instruction, from their own mistakes, or thirdly, in one or two rare cases, that they may shew that the highest truths are sometimes the intuitions of the simple mind. Docility in the pupil as well as the mens director in the teacher is required for the purposes of dialectic. This is less obviously the case in the Republic and Phædo, where Glaucn and Adimantus, Simmias and Cebes, are allowed to propound their difficulties, thus exhibiting another aspect of the philosophic spirit. Yet Glaucn claims the merit of being a more facile respondent than some others would be. Rep. 5. 474 a: ἵστω ἄν ἄλλοι τοὺς ἐμπελεκτέρους ἀποκρινόμην. Cf. Legg. 7, 797 d. It

He chooses to proceed by questions, as Parmenides used, and accepts Theocritus for his respondent; who, when tired, will be relieved by Socrates the younger.
is curious to observe that the Heracliteans of Ephesus (Theoet. 180) and the extreme materialists (Soph. 246) are de-
spaired of in this respect as being incapable of dialectic, τοῦ
dοκίναι καὶ δεξιάσατα λόγον. For the use of προς in προσδιαλ-
gομένων, compare Theoet. 162 b, προσπαλαίεσ; ib. 169 c, προσα-
tροφάμενοι; and for ὑπακούοντας πράσων, paullo infra, cf. Theoet. 162 a: μὲν ἐμμέλδος σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. The community of
spirit between those convers-
ing is also dwelt on in Phad. 58 d: καὶ μὲν, δὲ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς
ἀκοουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἄλλους ἐχεῖς. The adj. εὐπρός occurs with the ethical meaning =
obedient, tractable, Legg. 5, 730 b, 9, 880 a.
1. τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον — τὸ καθ’
αὐτὸν] Sc. διεξεῖται τοὺς λόγους.
4. πράσως = ὧν δυσμένοις οἴδὲ
μαχητικῶς, Theoet. 168 b.
5. τῶν νέων τιμᾶ] As being
free from prepositions and more supple to follow the wind-
ing of an argument, cf. Parn. 137 b: ὃ νεώτατος; ἡκιστὰ γὰρ
ἀν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἄ οιται
μάλιστ’ ἐν ἀποκρίνατο. Theoet. 162 b: μὲν ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γνωμά-
σιον σκληρῶν ἤδη ὑπατ, τῷ δὲ δὴ
νεωτέρῳ καὶ ἐγκατέρω ὑπὲρ προσπα-
λαίειν. Ib. 146 b.
8. αἰδώς τίς μ’ ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον
συγγενόμενον ὡμή κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐπος πρὸς ἐπος

* The Bodleian has τῶν νεῶν, with the omicron erased.
217. ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνυφαίαν, ἀλλὰ ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκω- 

ev λόγου συχνῶν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἰτε καὶ πρὸς ἑτερον, 

οἶνον ἐπιδείξειν ποιοῦμενον τῷ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν 

οὐχ ὅσον ὥσε ἐρωτηθέν ἐκπίσειν ἂν αὐτὸ ἐπιν αἰ 

ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου παμμῆκους ὧν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ 

ἂν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοίσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος 

ὡς ἑπες, ἡξεννό τι καταφαινεῖται μοι καὶ ἄγριον. ἑπεὶ 

Theaïtētου γε τοῦ προσδιαλεγόμενου εἶναι δέχομαι 

παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε πρότερον διειλεγμαί καὶ 

σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει.

stoph. Νουβ. 1379: καντείθεν μὲν, 

οἶνον εἴκος, ἐποὶ πρὸς ἐποὶ ἴσχευ- 

μεσθα. Ἀν και γιγο σημεί 

1. ἐκτείναντα — συχνῶν] Cf. 

Prot. 329 a, b: ὡσπερ τὰ χαλ- 

κία πληγέντα μακρῶν ἤχει καὶ 

ἀποτείνει — καὶ οἱ βίτορες οὕτω 

dολιχῶν κατατέληνες τοῦ λόγου. 

The whole passage should be 

compared, also ib. 335 a, and 

infr. 268 b, ἐκτείναστα ἀπομη-

cων is probably a metaphor 

taken from the act of drawing 

out a thread in spinning, "to 

spin off a long yarn by my- 

self."

2. εἰτε — ποιοῦμεν] As in 

the conversation of Protagoras 

with Socrates and Hippocrates 

in Prot. 316—318. On the 

other hand, the myth and ar-

gument of Protagoras, pp. 320— 

328, are not addressed to any 

one in particular, and might 

be said to be uttered either εἰ-

τὸ μέσον οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν.

4. οὐχ οὖν ὥσε ἐρωτηθέν φαί-

νετα] Cf. Theet. 1.47 d: 'Ῥάδον, 

ὡ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται:

ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτάν των κ.τ.λ. 

For the participle, cf. Φιλεβ. 

14 ε: εὖ—τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ 

ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστῶν λέξειν. 

5. λόγου παμμῆκους ὧν] "Re-

quiring a lengthened argu-


de συχνῆ πείδουσ. Leegg. 5, 730 : 

πολλῆς εἰλειασίας.

6. σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἰπές] i. e. 

so courteously—referring chie-

fly to the opening words of 

Socrates. Note the studied 

variation of λέξαντος—εἰπές.

7. άξενον] "Uncivil;" in-

consistent with the courtesy 

ap. Stob. Fl. 1.26, 6: 'Ἀνήρ 

έξοικοςιν άξενος, 

catafaiνετα] A strengthened, 

perhaps chiefly poetical, 

form of φαινετα = "appears dis-

tinctly." Cf. Hom. Η. Αρ. 431, 

and compare καθορών, καθεῖν, 

catakoνεων.

ἐπεὶ] "It were ungracious: 

for I can make no objection to 

the respondent whom you offer 

to me." Theaetetus had joined 

in the conversation between 

the Stranger and Theodorus on 

the way.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, οὔτω καὶ, καθάπερ εἶπε ἡ ΘΕΑΙ. 

Σωκράτης, πάσι κεχαρισμένος ἐσεί;

Σ. Κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἕτι λεκτέων εἶναι, Θεαίτητε πρὸς δὲ σε ὑδη τὸ μετὰ τούτο, ὡς ἐοικε, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τῷ μὴκε 

ποιῶν ἀχθη, μὴ ἐμε αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε 

tou's sou's ētaíروع.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' οἴμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὔτως οὐκ ἀπερεῖν' ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τὸνδε παραληψό-

μεθα Σωκράτης, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμόωνυμον, ἐμὸν 

dē ἥλκιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ὦ συνδιαποινεῖν μετ' 

ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλά οὐκ ἀθήνεις.

Σ. Εὐ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἴδια βουλεύεσθε 

προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινὴ δὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ σοι συν-

1. Ἄρα τοίνυν—ἐσεί.] "Will you then in this (in selecting me) be doing also what Socrates desired—ministering to the gratification of all present?" καὶ is separated from πάσι κεχ. ἐσεί by the insertion of the clause καθάπερ εἶπε Σωτράτης. So infr. p. 241 c: καὶ, καθάπερ νῦν εἰπτε, ἀγαπήσει; Tim. 20 e: καὶ μὲν δὴ, καθάπερ εἶπε Τίμαιος ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Theat. 210 b: καὶ, γαί μᾶ Δή ἐγγενε, πλείω κ.τ.λ. εἶπε Σ. refers to ἡμῶν —ἀἰτιῶντων χάρα, in which words Socrates had included all present.

3. Κινδυνεύει — ἐταίρους] A murmur of assent from the bystanders must be supposed to follow Theaetetus' words.

5. τῷ μὴκε ποιῶν] Stallbaum, in his note, has substituted ποιῶν for ποιῶν, but the participle is obviously right. For the dative, cf. Soph. Trach. 681: ποιῶν πλευρὰν πικρὰ γλω-

χαλ. 6. μὴ ἐμε αἰτιᾶσθαι] Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. με. The infinitive is a softened imperative, cf. Rep. 5, 473 a; infr. 262 c: σοῦ μοι ἀφάειν. 9. ἐὰν δὲ—Σωκράτης] So Pro-
tarchus relieves Philebus, when tired. Phileb. 11 e: ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι, Φιληππὸς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

12. τὰ πολλὰ is better taken as cognate accusative after συνδιαποινεῖν than as adverbial to οὐκ ἀθήν. “Who is well used in most things to share labours with me.” Young Socrates appears in the Theaetetus as a mute personage, and shares the credit of the geometrico-

arithmetical definition of the irrational roots. Theat. 147, 148.
18. κεπτεόν ἀρχὸμενον πρῶτον, ὅς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ἔτοιμον καὶ ἐμφανίζομαι λόγῳ τί ποτε εέστι. νῦν γὰρ διὰ τούτοι κάγῳ τούτοι πέρι τούνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῷ τὸ δὲ ἔργον, ἐφ᾽ οὐ καλοῖμεν,

1. νῦν, which is opposed to προϊόμενος τ. λ., and would be joined most naturally with συνεκπεπτον, appears to be displaced by a conversational hyperbaton, perhaps to avoid the hiatus φαίνεται—ἀπό, perhaps drawn by a sort of attraction to the words which indicate the immediate subject of discourse. νῦν is again displaced, apparently for euphony, infra. 221 c, 231 b; cf. also Legg. 1, 627 b: τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ σοῦ λεγόμενον μανθάω νῦν.

2. ἐμφανίζομαι λόγῳ ] "Making clear by argument." Dialectic is at once a process of discovery and of proof. ἐμφανιζομαι of course agrees with σοι and not with ἐμοὶ, as Ast seems, by some strange oversight, to have supposed. λόγῳ is slightly emphatic, and is referred to in what immediately follows. ὄνομα = the name, is distinguished from each other hand from ἔργον or πράγμα, the thing, and on the other from λόγος, the definition or true conception of the thing. For the former, cf. Cratyl. 413 e: αὐτὸ μηνέα τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὅνομα ή ἀνρεία, and for the latter, Theaet. 202, which is closely related to the present passage. The conception of λόγος is the same in this place as in the conclusion of the Theaetetus, viz. definition through division or the expression of the characteristic difference. ἔργον and λόγος are here correlative, and not opposed, as in the common antithesis ἔργον οὐ λόγος. The union of both, τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ διὰ λόγου, is opposed to the mere name, τὸ ὅνομα μόνον χωρὶς λόγου. The variation of ἔργον and πράγμα is perhaps due to the same refinement to which that of φύλον and γένος is owing. But ἔργον is rather the Sophist's function, πράγμα simply the thing meant by the word. Cf. also Legg. 9, 864 b: ἥμιν δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν ὅνομαν περὶ ὅνους λόγου. I. b. 10, 895 a: ἄρα οὐκ ἀν εἴλοις περὶ ἑκάστου τρία νοεῖν,—ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν λόγων, ἐν δὲ τὸ ὅνομα κ.τ.λ. I. b. 12, 964 a: σκοπώμεν τὸν εἰδότα ἰκανὸς περὶ ὀντιοννοιν, οἷς ἐστὶ μὲν ὅνομα, ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ λόγος, πάτερον μόνον ἐπίσταται τοῦνομα χρῶν ἢ τὸν γε διὰ τι καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφράζων μεγίθου καὶ κάλλει πιάτα τα τουατά ἄγγειν αἰσχρόν. φίλον, tribe, is more poetical, because a newer, metaphor, for the idea of Sort or Kind than γένος, race or family. The search for the Sophist is spoken of as a branch of natural history. For τὸ ὅνομα—συνομολογησαθά, cf. Theaet. 164 c: πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὅνοματων ὁμολογίας ὁμολογησάμενοι.

3. σὺ [τε] κάγῳ] The Boullian MS. gives σὺ κάγῳ with the rest, except Flor. i.

which, it may be, we have severally within our minds.

Great subjects, it has long been felt, should be approached through easy examples. And, as the Sophist is a creature difficult to

έκάτερος τάχι ἄν ιδίᾳ παρ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἑξομεν’ δεῖ μὸνον διὰ λόγων ἡ τούνομα μόνον συνυμολογήσασθαι χωρίς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φύλον, ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ἐξεῖν, οὐ πάντων ράστον συνιστήσω τί ποτ’ ἐστιν, ὁ σοφιστής. Ὑστα ὁ ἀρμαγγέλων δεὶ διαποιείσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν συμπροσ καὶ ράσοιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἐγώγε ταῦτα καὶ νῦν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπῶν καὶ δυσθήρευτον

4. τὸ δὲ φύλον—ὁδὼν] "Now the Sophist tribe, which we are at present minded to examine, is of a nature which is not the easiest in the world to comprehend. Again, when a great subject is to be adequately handled, it has long since been the approved course in such a case to try one’s hand upon the question in trivial and easy instances, before attempting it in the great matter which has been undertaken. On the present occasion therefore, Theaetetus, I would recommend that you and I, considering the Sophist to be of a kind which is difficult to capture and to chase, should try our prentice hand on some easier quarry, and make this a preparatory study of the way to find him, unless you have at your command some more feasible proposal.” Perhaps in τὴν μέθοδον αὐτῶν there is an allusion to the literal meaning of μετέιναι, ‘to pursue.’ Cf. infra 235 d.

οὐ πάντων ράστον] Cf. infra 244 c. In Rep. 6, 497 d, οὐ πάντων ράστον διελθέων, πάντων should probably be read.


τὸ—δεῖν] The article marks the infinitive as the subject of the verb. περὶ τῶν τοιούτων may be construed with δέδοκται, but belongs rather to the whole sentence. “In dealing with such subjects it has long been the general opinion that one should first examine inquiry on lesser and easier topics.” αὐτὰ is vague, resuming τῶν τοιούτων, but in a more general sense = the inquiry or the method of procedure.

10. χαλεπῶν—προμελετάιν] These words are in apposition to οὕτω αὐτῷ συμβουλεύω. χαλεπῶν = “troublesome.” As if he were some animal we were trying to lay hold of. Cf. Polit. 273 b: ἄσα χαλεπᾶ τὰς φύσεις (sc. τῶν θηρίων), and Rep. 6, 493 b: ὅποτε χαλεπῶσατο καὶ πραοῦσατο καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται. The metaphor, which appears very slightly in τὸ φύ- λον — συνιστήσω, is more distinctly present here, and in
218. ήγγεσαμένοις εἰναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον εὖ ἀλλο ράον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετάτω, εἰ μὴ σὺ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἀλλην ὁδὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἔχω.

ΞΕ. Βοῦλει δὴ τα περὶ τινος τῶν φαύλων μετίστες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δὴ τα προταχαίμεθ' ἄν εὖγνωστον μὲν καὶ σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν μείζονον: οἷον ἀσπαλειτής' ἂρ' οὐ πάσι πε γνώ-ριμον καὶ σπουδὴν οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινὸς ἐπάξιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Μέθοδον μὴν αὐτοῦ ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδεουν ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὁ βουλόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλὸς ἄν ἔχοι.

the word δυσθήρετον, which is partly suggested by χαλτόν and partly by οὐ μᾶλιν συλλα-βέων, the image of the chase, which is continued afterwards, is fully brought out.

2. τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελε-τῶν] "To practise beforehand the method, which is proper to be applied to him." For the genitive αὐτοῦ, see below: μέθο-δον μὴν αὐτῶν ἔλπίζω — ἔχειν.


5. metioutes] Used absolutely, as in Protag. 350 d: εἰ οὕτω με-τίων ἔροι μὲ. It is natural that words like μετίσται and χρώσθαι (supr. 217 c), which recur often with the same object (λόγος), should sometimes be used alone.

6. παράδειγμα θείων] Cf. Polit. 277 c sqq., where the nature of such examples is explained. The "large letters" of the Republic afford an apparent instance of the converse method. But in each case the inquiry advances from the less known to the more known.

8. προταχαίμεθ' ἄν] Sc. ἔχειν or μετίσται.


11. οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινὸς] "Worth no very great amount of interest."

15. Καλὸς ἄν ἔχοι] "That is well." The expression is slightly hypothetical. Theetetus takes the Stranger's word for what he himself does not clearly see.
He is an artist, and there are two kinds of art:


3. **Ἡκιστά γε** ye, though omitted by the Bodleian MS., with δι, is probably right, and expresses assent to the meaning of the question.


11. **δικαιότατον ἀν ἐνί]** The Bodleian, with a corrector of the Coislinian MS., gives ἀν twice over, after δικαιότατον and ἀν προσαγορεύοντο.

14. **Πᾶν ὁπερ** ἀν μὴ πρὸτερόν τις ὃν ἀμφότερον εἰσ
219. οὖσαν ἄγη, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαι ποῦ φαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως.

ΞΕ. Τὰ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ [ἀ] διήλθομεν ἀπαντα εἰχὲν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰς ἡρ ὄνων.

ΞΕ. Ποιητικὴν τοιῶν αὐτά συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν.

ε ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστώ.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὕτα τοῦτο εἴδος ὀλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γυναικείως τὸ τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγω-

άλα ὑστερον τοῦτο εἰςαὶ ἀνεν τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι αὐδώναν; Συμπ. 205 b: ἢ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀντικεῖται τὸ δὲ λόγῳ αὐτῶν αἰτία πᾶσα ἐστὶ ποίησις. Προ-
duction is more fully described in Legg. 10, 894 a: γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γίνεσις, ἢν ἄν εἰς τὸ πάδος ὅ; δὴ λοιπὸν ἂν ὧν ὀπόταν ἀρρηκτὰ λαθοῦσα αὐξάνεται εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἑλθῃ μετά-
βασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλη-

σίων, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἑλθούσα αὐξάσθαι αἰσθήσθαι τοῖς αἰσθητοψεόνως.

4. Τὰ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ [ἄ] διήλθομεν] "But those things which we just now enumerated." ἄ is omitted in the Bodleian and seven other MSS. The reading ἄ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, which is adopted by the Zurich editors, is due to a corrector of the Coislinian MS. But the reading in the text is preferable as being less obvious; and the inversion (νῦν δὴ ἄ for ἄ νῦν δὴ) is in the manner of these dia-

logues. (The old edd. had νῦν ἄ δὴ with B.E.F.)


10. Τὸ δὴ — πρὶντο γὰρ ἄν]

"Well, if we take next to this the whole department of learning and of acquiring know-

ledge, with those of money-

making, contention and pursuit, since none of these produces, but they are engaged either in con-

quering, or in preventing men from conquering, that which already exists and has

been produced,—on account of all these sections, it will ap-

pear most suitable to use the term 'acquisitive art.'" "It will indeed wear an appro-

priate look." Observe that no attempt is made to look for the Sophist either in the μαθημα-

τικῶν or γραμματικῶν εἰδοι τῶν τεχ-

τηνῶν. The construction of the sentence is not determined from the beginning, but the accusa-

tives (which are resumed in ταῦτα ξυνώματα τὰ μὲν) simply follow the analogy of ποιητικὴν —αιτᾶ.

μαθηματικῶν] So the Bod-

leian MS. Here, as in Ar. Met. 1. 1, the MSS. vary between μαθημ. and μαθήτ.
And an art of getting.

2. τά μὲν χειροτότα λόγους] Cf. Euthyd. 290 b, where geometers &c. are classed amongst θηρευτικοί.

4. ἐπιτρέπειν] sc. χειροσθειαστά, μάλιστ' ἂν ποῦ—διαπρέψειν] So Bodl. Δ. Π. i.: cett. διαγράψειν. If we compare the corresponding clause in the preceding context, supr. 1, ξύμπαντα ταύτα — ὀνόματι, it appears that no rendering of these words is satisfactory which separates ταύτα from ξύμπαντα τά μέρη (e. g. Stal1. "maximē propterea has partes cunctas—dixi deecibit:" which is also objectionable because of the harshness of the attraction, λεγθέοτα for λεγθέντα). The same objection holds (unless διὰ were omitted) against the reading διαγράψεως, which was justly suspected on other grounds by Heindorf. Hence the preceding accusatives, which are absolute, are resumed with a new construction in ταύτα ξύμπαντα τά μέρη: and the words mean either, as above rendered, "an art of acquisition is the most suitable to be named on account of all these parts" (cf. Polit. 269 c: πρέψεις ῥήθεν. ib. 288 c: τοῦτο—τοιτόσον εἰς ὅψημα ἄπασιν πρέψει προσαγορεθεῖν), or, by a return to poetical usage, suggested by the rare verb, διὰ may perhaps be construed "throughout," and διαπρέψεις may retain something of the original meaning of "looking brightly forth." "An art of acquisition will, when named, be seen clearly to pervade all these sections." Cf. Emped. Fr. vv. 5, 6: τρίς μὲν μυρίας ὄρας ἀπὸ μακά- ρων ἀλληλογοί, γενόμενον παντοία διὰ χρόνο εἶδεα βιοτόν. Ητοι. Hymn to Hermes, vv. 350, i: ἀφρά μὲν οὖν ἐδίωκε διὰ θυμά- "θωδέα χῶρον, μεία μαλ' ἵκνα πάντα διέπρεπεν εἰς κοινήν. The latter interpretation makes the anacoluthon easier, and gives a more appropriate meaning to the compound verb, but is too singular to be asserted with confidence. For μάλιστα, cf. infr. 266 a: τῷ δὲ ὑπολοίπων σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἀν λεγοῦσθν εἰδωλοτοικό. 6. πρέποι γὰρ ἄν] Sc. οὗτο λεγθέωτα. 10. δῆλον] Sc. ὑπε. The angler's is an art of getting.
ΣΩΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 19

219. ΞΕ. Κτητικῆς δὲ ἀρ’ οὐ δόει ἡ; τὸ μὲν ἐκόντων πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικῶν ὄν διὰ τε δωρεῶν καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων; τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἡ κατ’ ἑργά ἡ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον ἐξύπαν χειρωτικῶν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἀρ’ οὐ διχῇ τιμητέον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλων ἀγορωστικῶν ἃθέν- τες, τὸ δὲ κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικῶν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἁλογον τὸ μὴ οὗ τέμνειν διχῇ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε ὑπη.
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ’ ἵστ ἐμψύχου.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν; εἴτερ ἐστον γε ἄμφω.
ΞΕ. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἐστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν λόγος] I. c. while undivided. So ὅλων, πᾶν, κ.τ.λ., in what follows.
9. ἃθέντες] Sc. τέμνουμεν. δέντας Heind. and Par. E. corr. The MS. confirmation is too slight to justify the admission of a conjecture, which must however be regarded as probable. Cf. infr. διελομένους. But see Polit. 302 d: καὶ ταύτην ἡμῖν θετεόν εἰτι διπλῆ. Πῶς δή; καὶ τίνι διαιροῦστε ταύτην.
12. ἁλογον] "Illogical."
4. χειρούμενον is possibly passive, like ἀναστῶμεν, infr. 221 (where see note), but this is less probable with the active χειρωτικὰ preceding, supr. c. See also 220 e: τὸ μὲν — ποιεῖται τῷ δήπερ. 225 e, ἀμφι- σβητοῦν.

Not by contract or exchange, but conquest.

And this not by force but craft.

Now of catching by
and the art of animal-catch

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰστω.

ΞΕ. Ζωοθηρίης δὲ ἀρ' οὐ διπλοῦν εἰδὸς ἂν λεγοιτο ἐν δίκη, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοὶς εἴδει αὐτοὶ καὶ ὀνόμασι διηρημένον, πεζοθηρίκων, τὸ δ' ἐτερον νευστικοῦ γίγον πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρίκων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φύλον ὅρῳμεν, ἰδον τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἦ πάρα λέγεται ποῦ τις τῶν ὀρνιθευτική.


11. Νευστικοῦ] "of what swims." The article is sometimes omitted before a generic or collective word. Cf. infr. 221 b: ἐξωπηραίον—τέχνης. Mr. Grote remarks on this (Plato, &c., vol. ii. p. 401): "Plato considers the air as a fluid in which birds swim." But the neustikos πτηνά are the water-fowl. The expression πᾶσα—ἡ θῆρα below probably implies that only a part of ὀρνιθευτική has been previously mentioned. In Legg. 7, 824 e the ἐνυγροθηρίκης is distinguished from the ὀρνιθευτική, and is forbidden to exercise his art in harbours, or in sacred rivers, marshes, or pools. In the present passage ἐνυραὸς is distinguished from ἐνυδρος, "in wet" from "under water," the former term including the latter. The Eleatic shews his dialectical skill in proving that "aquatic sport" is not an adequate definition of the fisherman's craft.

14. πᾶσα—ἡ θῆρα] I. e. not only of the neustikos πτηνόν but of all that flies. The objection
of fishing there are two chief parts, one working by enclosure, as with baskets, creels, and nets, the other by striking; and this sometimes at night, by torch-light, sometimes by day with barbed points.

10. Τὸ μὲν—τοιοῦτον] The sentence is interrupted by the minor premiss, κὺρτος κ.τ.λ., in which the general definition of ἔρκος is applied, and τὸ μὲν is more explicitly resumed in τοῖς μὲν. τοῖτο refers to the processes connected with creels, nets, and the other implements just mentioned, amongst which πόρκος seems to have been rather a rush-basket than a net. "One kind—since all that encloses anything to prevent egress may naturally be termed an enclosure. (Certainly.) Whence baskets and casting-nets, and nooses and creels, and the like must be called enclosures and nothing else. (Exactly.) This department therefore of the sport we shall name 'fishing by enclosure.'"

These are either impelled from above, as in spearing, or jerked up from beneath, with canes or rods, into the head or lips of the prey.

8. [ο] Ξ. i.
12. πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γεγυμένων] The nocturnal branch of the art of striking fish, as it is pursued by fire-light, has received from those who practise it the name of 'firing.'
16. πῶς ἀγκιστρευτικῶν] Sc. ἐπὶ ῥηθήναι συμβέβηκεν. ἀγκιστρευτικῶν] This notion reappears in Legg. 7, 823 e
(a curious passage) : δο φίλου, εἰθ' ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία μήτ' ἔρως τῆς περὶ βάλλαταν θήρας ποτὲ λάβασα, μηδὲ ἀγκιστρεύεις: μὴδ' ἀλος τῆς τῶν ἐνύδρων ζώων, μήτε ἐγγυγόρασα μήτε εὔδοσιες κύρτους (cf. supr. b.) ἄργον θήραν διαπονωμένοις. (Cf. Opp. Halicut. 3, et sqq.: κύρτους, οἱ κινούμενοι οὖν ἱππηραν ἄνακτας.)
3. \(\text{ἐν} \text{τι} \text{τίχῳ} \) “Wherever one may chance to hit.” Τυγχάνω is here in transition from the literal to the metaphorical meaning (from “hit” to “chance”).

4. \(\text{ὁστερ} \text{τοίς} \text{τριόδουσι} \) Sc. γίγνεται ἡ πληγή.

6. \(\text{ἀναπόμενον} \) This neuter participle, like γεγόμενον, is passive, the cognate accusative of the active becoming the subject of the passive verb. See General Introduction. “The kind which is characterized by the stroke opposite to this, made with a barbed point not in any chance part of the body as is done with spears, but about the head and mouth of the prey, and in the opposite direction, being effected with an upward jerking movement by means of rods and canes.”

9. \(\text{ἀστερ—εὑρείων} \) “The discovery of which we set before us as a task.” Cf. τί οὐν προτειόμεθα supra, and, for the leoninasm of δειν, Rep. 6, 503 c: ἧν γὰρ διῆλθόμεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπ’ ἀρχεῖν αὐτόν. Ib. 7, 535 a: δεῖν ἐκλεκτέν. Phil. 50 d.

12. \(\text{τὸν} \text{λόγον} \text{πέρι} \text{αὐτῷ} \text{τούργον} \) “The definition embracing closely the thing itself,” vid. supr. 218 e. Cf. also Legg. 10, 895 d (already quoted): περὶ ἐκαστὸν τρία νοεῖν — ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, with which compare Ep. 7, 342.

13. \(\text{ἄληθεμεν} \) The expression is amplified in the second clause and a new verb introduced, as often in Plato.

14. \(\text{τὸ} \text{μὲν} \) \(\text{ἡμῖν} \text{μέρος} \) “The one half”—the other, ποιητική, is passed over here.

This last distinction completes the definition of the “Art of angling.”

Of which we now possess in common, not the name alone, but an exact conception expressed in words.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

dé θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικοῦ, ζωοθηρικοῦ dé εὐγνυροθη-

ρικοῦ, εὐγνυροθηρικοῦ dé τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλου

ἀλευτικοῦ, ἀλευτικῆς dé πληκτικοῦ, πληκτικῆς dé

ἀγκιστρευτικῶν τούτου dé τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω

5 πληγήν ἁναστομομένην, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἄφο-

ε μοιώθεν τούνομα, ἢ νῦν ἀσπαλειντική ζητηθεῖσα ἐπι-

κλῆν γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἰκανῶς δεδή-

λωται.

2. τὸ κάτωθεν] Cf. infr. 266 α.


τῶν λόγων περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργου.

5. ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἄφο-

ε μοιώθεν τούνομα] I.e. it is pro-

posed to derive ἀσπαλεῖν from ἀναστομῶ. See also Tim. Lex.

52 : ἀσπαλεῖν, ἀλλιώς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀναστῶν τὴν ἄγραν. Hesychius

has preserved the real derivation from ἄσπαλος, an Athama-

τέχνη

(ποιητική) — κτητική

(μεταβλητική) — χειρωτική

(ἀγωνιστική) — θηρευτική

(θῆρα τῶν ἄφυχῶν) — ζωοθηρική

(πεζοθηρική) — εὐγνυροθηρική

(ἀρμοθευτική) — ἀλευτική

(ἐρῳδηρική) — πληκτική

(πυρευτική) — ἀγκιστρευτική

(τριφυλία) — ἀσπαλειντική.

8. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἰκανῶς δεδήλωται] The method

dichotomies has proved ade-

quate for the definition of an

art so simple and familiar as

that of the angler. The notion

of the Sophist, however, is more

complex, and after several par-

tial attempts, the definition of

him is found to be impractic-

cable, until we lay aside this

nian word for ‘fish.’ (Passow

Lexic. s. v.)

6. ἢ νῦν ἀσπαλειντική ζητη-

θεῖσα] I.e. ἀσπαλειντική, ἢ νῦν

ζητηθεῖσα. Cf. infr. 231 b: ἐν

τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανεῖτι. Note

the apposition of neuter and

fem.: τὸ περὶ — ἡ κ.τ.λ., and of

the name with the thing: τοῦ-

νομα with ἡ ἀσπαλειντική. The

following is a summary of the

above divisions:

method for a time and review

some of our fundamental ideas.

It is difficult to say how far —

the first or tentative part of

the inquiry is seriously intended

by Plato as an illustration or

application of method. There

is a tinge of satirical humour

obvious in almost every line.

This was the motive for the

choice of the angler as an ex-
221. \textit{ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.} 25

\textit{ΣΕ.} Φέρε δή, κατά τούτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστήν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν, ὦ τί ποτὲ ἔστιν;

\textit{ΘΕΑΙ.} Κομμὴ μὲν οὖν.

\textit{ΣΕ.} Καὶ μὴν ἔκεινό γ’ ἢν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἐχοντα θετεον εἶναι τὸν ἀσταλιευτήν.

\textit{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναὶ.

\textit{ΣΕ.} Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτον ἰδιώτην θήμορεων, ὦ Θεαῖα
tις, ἡ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν;

\textit{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην μανθάνω γὰρ ὦ λέγεις, ὥς ἂν παντός* δεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶναι τὸ γε ὑμοία τοῦτο ἔχων.

\textit{ΣΕ.} Ἀλλὰ τινὰ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἢμῖν ἐχοντα, ὡς ἐνίκη, θετεον.

ample, this prompts the inclusion of war and tyranny, pleading and arguing, under ἰθνετικῆ, and that of poetry and learning amongst the merchant's wares, and the definition of higgling in the market as an artistic kind of controversy. A deeper irony underlies the admission of the Sophist's claim to be considered as a purifier of the soul. Yet inseparably bound up with this tone of sarcasm there is the scientific spirit, which seeks for general truths and disregards common opinion. The definition of the tyrant or the warrior as a hunter of men falls in with Plato's satiric fancy, but has also an element of scientific truth, and belongs to the effort to connect things apparently diverse under one idea. This mixture of satire and inquiry finds characteristic expression in infr. 227 b: τὸν κτῆσαθαι γὰρ ἐνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ἐγγεγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐγγεγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη (ἢ τῶν λόγων τέχνη) τιμᾶ. πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἰδίου πάσας—σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἤ φιλοσοφικῆς δηλοῦντα ἰθνετικὴν ὁδέων νοῦ· μικα, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαινότερον.

8. Καὶ νῦν δή] "So now also." kai to be taken closely with νῦν.

9. ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν] The word here approaches the ancient meaning of "contriver," "clever one," "skilled practitioner."

II. *παντός* δεὶ] The MSS. vary between πάνως and οὐ πάνως, the latter of which has grown out of the former. A further corruption (Pi) is τοιοῦ· τὸν—ἐχοντα. The correction is due to the Zurich editors. For παντός δεί, cf. Aesch. Prom. 961: πολλὸν γε καὶ τοῦ παντός ἔλλειπο. ἰβ. 1008: τοῦ παντός δείω.


Following this example let us endeavour to find the nature of the Sophist also.
But his relation to the angler does not end here.

They are both sportsmen; and each pursues a certain living prey.

From this point their paths diverge when they have reached the art of animal-hunting, the one turning to the seashore and to rivers and lakes, to angle for the creatures that are therein.
paths diverge. The angler seeks the rivers, lakes, and teeming seas. The Sophist turns him to the land: or if to rivers they are the rivers of wealth, which nourish bounteous

1. ἔοις gives the touch of conscious indefiniteness in which the preciseness of the Greek language delights.

4. "To very different rivers of wealth, and rich meadow-lands of generous youth." Lit. "to rivers of wealth, a different sort of rivers." This punctuation avoids the confusion of the two metaphors (river and meadow) and preserves the appropriateness of each. For the former, cf. Ἀσχ. Prom. 8οί: οἱ χρυσόρροουν ἀκόουσιν ἀμφὶ νάμα Πλαῦτονος πόρον, where the notion of abundance is associated with the image of golden sands; and for the latter, Soph. Trach. 143: τὸ γὰρ νέασον ἐν τοιούτῳ βόσκετοι χάρωσιν αὐτῶν.

For the metaphorical use of the word ποταμός to denote abundance, cf. also Tim. 43 a: αἱ δὲ εἰς ποταμὸν ἐνδεδέσθαι πολύν—viz. the flux of corporeal particles in the body. The word λεμόνας is naturally suggested by the notion of a fertilizing river with green banks, and perhaps partly by a false echo from λέμας preceding.

8. Τῇ πεζῇ θῆρας κ.τ.λ.] The description of θηριτική in Legg. 7, 823 b should be compared, line by line, with this passage: θῆρα γὰρ παμπολύ τι πράγμα ἐστι, περιειλθουμένων ὁμώματι νῦν σχεδὸν εἰς. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνυδρῶν, πολλὴ δὲ ἢ τῶν πτηνῶν, παμπολύ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα, οὐ μόνον θῆριαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄξον ἐννοεῖ θῆραν, τὴν τε κατὰ πόλεμον, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἢ κατὰ φιλιάν θηρεύουσα, ἢ μὲν ἔται- νον, ἢ δὲ ψόγον ἔχει· καὶ κληπτεῖ, καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στραταπέδων στραταπέδως θῆραι.

γίγνεσθαι] Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. γίγνεσθαι, which might be defended from εἰσερχομένων following. But the word is explanatory of εἰστρεπθῶν in what precedes, and the ν is more likely to have been dropped than to have been inserted wrongly, especially considering the ὄμοιοτελευτῶν of μεγίστω. The θῆρα τῶν ἡμέρων is termed μεγίστου as including στρατηγία, ληπτική, δικαική, ἐρωτική, κυλική, σοφιστική.
pastures of generous youth.

Now land animals are tame and wild; and, if man is a tame creature, tame creatures also can be made a prey.

2. eιτα expresses surprise. Cf. Theat. 207 d.


7. τόποτέρ’ ἄν ἦγει φιλόν ειρήθαί σοι] The plural ὀποτέρα, with φιλόν and τόποτο following, is difficult; and the word implies two, whereas there are three if not four alternatives. Badham’s conjecture, δ τι πέρ ἄν (cf. infr. 255 a, Legg. 1, 645 c), is probably right. ἦγει is the Bodleian reading; ἄν is to be taken with εἰρήθαί φιλόν σοι: "Whichever of these alternatives you think will please you when spoken." Com-

pale infr. 223 b: το προσήκον ὄνομ’ ὑ εγόμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν. There is no objection to the repetition of the same word ἦγει in a somewhat different connexion; cf. Theat. 148 b: ωκ ἀν δυνάμηι—όποτε περιν—

τῆς δυνάμεως. alib.

8. τούτο ἡμῖν διάρισον] The Bodleian and the cognate MSS. (including Flor. i.) have διοριστόν. This could only mean, "Whichever of these alternatives you think will please you, this we must decide upon." But this reading, though not altogether absurd (cf. Polit. 261 e: καθάπερ διακελέως παράγων), may probably be classed amongst those which, although occurring in the best MSS., are traceable to the wrong-headed ingenuity of the scribes, like εξαισθαι σοφοί for εξής οἱ σοφοί in Theat. 152 e (Bodl.), ακριβῶς for ἄκρων, ib. 148 c. (Bodl. Δ. Π.) The imperative is required by θές preceding. For τούτο ἡμῖν διάρισον, cf. Gorg. 488 d: τούτῳ μοι αὐτῷ σαφῶς διάρισον, ταυτών ἢ ἐτερών ἐστι τὸ κριτίτον καὶ τὸ βέλτιτον καὶ τὸ ἴσχυρότερον. Rep. 10, 598 a: 'Αρα οἷα έστιν ἡ οἷα φαινεται; τούτῳ γάρ ἐτι διάρισον.
ΤΟΙΟ. 'ΑΛΛ' ἤμας τε ἡμερον, ὁ ἕμεν, ἤγοιμαι κε ἰδον, θήραν τε ἀνδρώταν εἶναι λέγω.

ἔστην τοίνυν καὶ την ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν. Δια τα τί λέγοντες; ἔστην μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ ἔμπασαν την πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα βίαιον θήραν ὀρισάμενοι.

Καλὸς.

ἡμέραν, καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπολον πιθανουργικὴν τῇ τινα μίαν τέχνην προσεπόντες.

ὦ ορθῶς.

δὴ πιθανουργικὴς διπτά λέγωμεν γένη. Ποία; ἔστην μὲν ἐτερον ἴδια, τὸ ἀνδρομαχία γεγονόμενον. Γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἰδὸς ἐκάτερον.

καὶ ἰδιοθηρευτικῇς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνευτικῶν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικῶν;

Ωὐ καὶ αὐτῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνευτικῶν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικῶν; Οὐ μανθάνοι.

οὐπό προσέσχες.

5. ἔστην μὲν ληστικὴν—] Compare Ar. Pol. I. 3: οἷς δ' ἀπὸ βήρας ᾧ σαυτόν καὶ βήρας ἐτερον ἔτερος, οἷς οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστικής, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλλως—οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ἄρνητος τῆς ἱερείας ἄγριας. Διὰ καὶ ἡ πολέμικα φύσει κτητικῆ πώς ἔτερος ἡ γὰρ δημοτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ χρήσιμα πρὸς ταύτα ἱερα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡς πεποίηται ἢ ἠρεσθαι μὴ βέλουσιν.

10. προσομιλητικὴν = the art of intercourse. The word is invented in order to include love-making and sophistry under one heading.

Παρατηρεία: ἰδιοθηρευτικοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ] I prefer giving the form of the word which appears in all the MSS., (instead of μισθαρνευτικῶν), though suspected by Heindorf, whose dictum (Quod in Lexicis, auctore nullo, profertur verbum μισθαρνευεῖν, vel dè vedor ne a sermonis analogiâ abhorreat) is open to question. Why not μισθαρνεῖν from μισθαρνοῦ, as καπνεῖν from κάπηλος? Still it may be corrupted from ιδιοθηρεῦετ.
Lovers, for instance, lavish presents on those whom they win.

Of mercenary persuasion, one branch allures through pleasure, and, as for hire, expects no more than to be fed. This is called flattery. Another kind professes to impart virtue, and takes a money fee. What is called virtue is without any material foundation, and, like virtuous men, must be supported through some means of gain.

2. Προσεπιδειδόσων] The prepositions imply "in addition to all the means employed to win them," (προσεπτί δόρα γρ. Σ.Β.)


6. Τὸ δὲ γε μισθοφοροῦν—εἶναι] "But that sort of hireling, the object of whose commerce is to gratify, and whose lure is baited with any kind of pleasure, while the only hire which he exacts is sustenance for himself, I presume we should all describe as the flatterer, who is one of the sweeteners of life."

8. Πεποιημένου] pf. passive with middle signification.

10. Ἑνωτικῆς τῶν τέχνης] "an art of sweetening." These words express the function of κολακεία more precisely. There is no need of inserting ἥ before ἤδυντι before Heindorf and some later editors. Cf. Thaet. 175 e: μηδὲ ὁφὸν ἤδυναι ἢ θώπας λόγον ἢ κοκάρα, ὠρίματος, ὠρίματος, and the rest. Other instances occur (e. g. μεταδηλοτική) with middle signification. in which the same word has alternately a general and specific meaning.

12. Τὸ δὲ— ἄνωματοι] "But another sort, professing to make virtue the end of his intercourse, while exacting his hire in the shape of coin,—is it not worth while to address this kind by a different name?"
4. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὁ Θεαίτης, λόγον, ὅς

The observation of Schleiermacher, that there are several redundant words in this passage, was misapplied by Heindorf and Stallbaum when they rejected μυστηρικὸς as well as κτητικὸς, πεζοθηρίας, and ἡμεροθηρικὸς. For the science which takes rewards includes the flatterer with the Sophist, who stands alone however in taking his reward in money. The word πεζοθηρίας can hardly be retained, χειρωτικὴ being evidently substituted for this with reference to supr. 222 a: ὅ δὲ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. The case of ἡμεροθηρικὸς is somewhat different. For there might be other tame creatures besides man which became the objects of the chase (e.g. pheasants and deer in modern times); compare Polit. 262 b. The MSS., however, vary as to the form of the word.

χειρωτική, which the editors retain after ὀἰκειοστική, has very slight authority (Ven. Σ. Ald. Bas. 1, 2, St.) The word is not indispensable; for ὀἰκειοστικὴ might be fairly substituted (according to the spirit of the present passage) for χειρωτικὴ, as a softer word—"Convey the wise it call." We may therefore either read κτητικῆς, ὀἰκειοστικῆς, or omit χειρωτικῆς and κτητικῆς, taking ὀἰκειοστικῆς as a substitute for both. The Stranger is not always quite exact in recapitulating. Thus, infr. 224 d, μεταβλητικὸς is substituted for ἀλλακτικὸς, and the μεταβλητική of the previous argument is omitted. Hence it is unnecessary, with Heindorf and Stallbaum, to supply the missing link πεζοθηρίας in the present passage. Cf. Polit. 261 e, where such variation of terms is justified.

πεζοθηρίας, if genuine, distinguishes πεζὰ from πτημά, χειρωσιᾶς, πεζὰ from ἐνιβά, but χ. should then come first.

The divisions have been as follows:
Still let us look at this many-sided creature in another aspect. For the divisions we have made afford an opening for defining him in a different way. One

\[\text{\textit{THEAI.} Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.} \]

\[\text{\textit{ΞΕ.} Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἰδωμεν' οὐ γὰρ τι φαύλης μέτοχὸν ἐστὶ τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα \[\text{ποικίλης.} \] καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένους φάντασμα παρέχεται, μὴ τούτο ὃ νῦν αὐτὸ ἥμεις φαμέν, ἀλλ' ἔτερον εἶναι τι γένος.} \]

\[\text{\textit{THEAI.} Πὴ δὴ;} \]

\[\text{\textit{ΞΕ.} Τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλῶν ἢν εἶδός \[\text{ποῦ, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχου, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικὸν.} \]

4. \[\text{δοξοπαίδευτικῆς} \] This refers to supr. a: ἑπαγγελλόμενον—ποιούμενον.

καὶ ἐνθόδωρον] Cf. Protag. 316 b, where Socrates recommends Hippocrates to the consideration of Protagoras: 'Προταγράφης ὁ δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπικριτῶν, Ἀπολλοδόρου νῦν, οὐκις μεγάλης τε καὶ εἰδαίμονος· αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιῶσαῖς. ἐπηθυμεῖν δὲ μοι δο- κεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει.

The use of μέτοχόν ἐστὶ for μετέχει, like that of the participle and auxiliary verb noticed above, is in the style of these dialogues. Cf. also Phadr. 262 d.

7. \[\text{οὖν} \] "In accordance with this remark," i.e. consistently with the creature's manifold cunning.

8. \[\text{τῆς ἰδωμεν} \] Bodl. ΓΔΛΠ εἰδώμεν. This might be defended from Theaet. 202 e: ἵστεων δὴ. But the text presents a more lively image, and is in better accordance with Plato's usual manner. This corruption is frequent.

11. \[\text{φάντ. παρέχει} \] "He (autó, the subject of our inquiry) holds forth the appearance; leads us to imagine." No English word exactly corresponds to φάν- τασμα here, which retains the verbal notion: the German \textit{Schein} is perhaps nearly equivalent. Cf. Theaet. 199 e: δεινότερον μὲν τῶν πάθεων ἀλλὰ παρα- φαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. As we review the previous argument, the Sophist shews his face to us on the other side of our division-line.

15. \[\text{τὸ μὲν θηρευτικῶν} \] Here again the recapitulation is not
quite exact: κτητική was divided into μεταβλητικών (= ἀλλακτικῶν) and χειρωτικῶν, and χειροτικῶν into ἄγοραστικῶν and θηρευτικῶν. Supr. 219.

3. τὸ μὲν δωρητικὸν] These words are suggested by δωροφωρικῶν in the previous argument; the new discussion, as so often in Plato, taking colour from that which precedes. But cf. also supr. 219 d: μεταβλητικῶν ὄν διὰ τε δωρεῶν καὶ ἄγοραστεων.

9. Τὴν μὲν — διαφορμευμένην] “Those who make what they sell being distinguished as ‘producers.’”

τῶν αὐτοπρογόνων] Those who manufacture what they sell. The word is used etymologically. The usual meaning is, ‘one who farms his own land.’ Cf. e. g. Rep. 8, 565 a: δῆμος —ὁσοι αὐτοπρόγονε τε καὶ ἀπρόγονοι, οὐ πάνω πολλὰ κεκτημένοι.

9. διαφορμευμένην (passive) answers better to the question πὴ (φήσομεν τέμνεσθαι) than διαφορομενοῖ, which is read only in two MSS. of inferior note, and appears in two others (113) as a correction.

11. μεταβλητικῶν] This name was previously given to the whole class which is now called ἀλλακτικὴ.


14. σχεδὸν—ἡμισὺ] And therefore fit to form our next division.

κατηλκική] The notion of retail business in Rep. 37 b. c. εἰς αὐτὴ τῇ πόλει κ. τ. λ. is more exact than here. Boll. p.m.: καὶ πηλικὴ.
Now the export trader deals in food for the body or in food for the mind.

1. διαλλασσόμενοι] Prob. middle voice, as μεταβαλλόμενων supr., ἀλλάττεται infr. But perhaps passive, like ἄναστόμωμεν and other words noticed above. δια signifies ‘transmission,’ as in Rep. 1, 328 a: λαμπαδία ἔχοντες διαδόσασθαι ἄλλην οὖν;

5. κέχρηται] Heindorf changed this into καί χρῆται without giving a reason. Stallbaum, who objects to this change, gives καί κέχρηται, apparently taking this to be the MS. reading. Bekker: "καί χρῆται Heindorffus: libri κέχρηται." And so the Bodleian MS., viz. τρέφεται κέχρηται. For the perfect, cf. Rep. 3, 409 c, Tim. 65 c. The objection to this is that the seller cannot be said to use that which he sells. Stallbaum's reading is preferable, if κέχρηται be rendered "stands in need," sc. αὐτῶν, for which meaning see Legg. 4, 717 c. There is a similar difficulty about the reading of Euthyd. 289 a.

8. ἄγνοούμεν—ἐξυνίεμεν] The first pers. plur. is used with a kind of playful condescension, as in Thucyd. 210 b: ἡ οὖν ἐτί κυοΐμεν τι καὶ ὁδώμεν, ὥ φιλε, ἡ πάντα ἐκετόκαμεν;

11. Μουσικήν—παρασχέων] A somewhat awkward sentence, where, as in supr. 219 b, πᾶν ὅπερ κ.τ.λ., the end does not seem to have been clearly seen from the beginning. The construction is, however, clear. "Speaking of all music, and painting, and juggling, and many other things which are carried about and sold, some for the delectation, and some for the serious purposes of the mind, let us say that when bought in one place and carried elsewhere to be sold, they give to him who carries and sells them, quite equally with the sale of food and drink, a just title to the name of merchant." Besides the general irregularity of the sentence, the concrete μουσική—ἀφρείνα is made parallel to the abstract στὶμων—πρᾶσις. For the use of παρε-
224. πόλεως εκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν εύθεν μὲν ὄνηθείσαν, ἐτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιτραστοκομένην, καὶ γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποιικήν καὶ πολλὰ ἐτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἄχθεντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἢττον τῆς τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἐμπορον ὀρθῶς ἃν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐξωνομοῦμεν πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταυτὸν ἐπὶ προσερεὶς νόμοια;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἀρ' οὖ τὸ μὲν χαίν, cf. Phadr. 238 a: καὶ τούτων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἐκπρεπῆς ἢ ἃν τυχὶ γενομένη τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμιὰν ώςμαζίμον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται. In the mention of painting and juggling there is probably a tacit anticipation of pp. 234, 5, where the art of the Sophist is compared to both. For the two genitives ψυχῆς παραμυθίας χαίν, cf. Rep. 7, 525 e: οὐκ ὄνης εὗτε πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπλύους μελέτωντας, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς, μαρτύρους τε μεταστροφῆς (sc. αὐτῆς) ἐπὶ ἀληθεῖαν τε καὶ οἰςίαν.

9. μαθήματα ἐξωνομεῖν.] 1. c.

Buying knowledge from all quarters.

10. πόλιν—ἐκ πόλεως] "And exchanges them from one city to another for money." The former of the two prepositions is dropped, as in Ἀσχ. Prom. 682: γῆν πρὸς γῆς ἐλαϊνομαι. Compare Polit. 289 e: τὰ τε γεωργίας καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἔργα διασκοριζόντες ἐπὶ ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀνισοῦντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἀγορᾶς οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ βάλανσαν καὶ πεζῷ, νόμισμα τὶ πρὸς τὰλα καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτό διαμείβοντες. Heindorf renders in both passages, "exchanging one city for another." But in this case π. e. p. νομ. ἀμ. could only mean "being induced by a money payment to change their abode," which is plainly not intended here. Hence Stallbaum's objection to νομίσματος. In Ἀρν. 37 d, ἀλλην ἐξ ἀλλης πόλεως ἀμείβομεν, it is observable that the middle voice is used; cf., however, Ἀσχ. 276 e. The meaning is the same as supr. 223 e: ἐξ ἀλλης εἰς ἀλλην πόλιν διαλλάσσομεν ὅης καὶ πρισίς. 224 a: ἐκ πόλεως—εἰς πόλιν—πιτρασκομένην. For λέγομεν, cf. Theawl. 159 a: λέγωμεν ὅτι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ ἤδη κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον.

13. Τῆς δὴ—ἀπίθηκη] "Well, of this mental merchandise one
wares is conducted either through eloquent display, or the communication of points of learning. And the learning thus bartered may concern the arts, or virtue. The purveyor of arts may be called an art-seller: but what name is applicable to the seller of virtue? The name of Sophist alone.

kind might be most fairly termed the art of display: but there is another, which will sound no less oddly than the last, but yet, as dealing in learned ware, it must be called by some name which smacks of learning." Heind. and Stalib. think that γελοίων applies to the name μαθηματοπωλικῆ as compared with ψυχεμπορικῆ, and suggest γελοίων. The interpretation is probably right, but the emendation is unnecessary.

(13.) ψυχεμπορικῆ] The word calls up the same contemptible association which is contained in ψυχαγωγία. Compare also the expression of Soph. Antig. 1063: ὅσ μὴ ἐμπολήσων ἱσθι τὴν ἐμφέραν. 7. ἐτέρῳ — ἄλλῳ] For the variety, cf. Theaet. 185 a: ὅ δε ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄλλας ταύτα αἰσθάθαι. alib.


16. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο] Sc. εἰπὼν ὅσ ἂν πλημμελοῖν. In the following recapitulation μεταβλητικῆ is again used for ἀλλακτικῆ, and the distinction between αὐτοπωλικῆ and ἀλλακτικῆ is omitted, although alluded to in the next sentence. 17. μεταβλητικῆ] Bodl. μεταβλητικῶν, which is, however, probably taken from a few lines below.
The same is found to apply, thirdly, to the home merchant or manufacturer of learned stores.
Once more, dividing violent conquest, which was a portion of acquisitive art, into emulation and contention: we see that bodily contention is the art of quelling by force. Logical contention, of controversy is either forensic, being held through long speeches in public on questions of right, or disputations, consisting of short questions and answers in private.

2. ἄπο] So the Bodleian MS. here as in Theaet. 143 c.

5. Τὸ μὲν ἀμιλλητικὸν—τὸ δὲ μαχητικὸν] Perhaps there is here the germ of the fine thought which is more fully expressed in Legg. 5. 731 a: ἐν λόγῳ τὸ πρὸς ἀρτιθνία ἀρθρόνος. Οὐκ ἄρα τοιοῦτος τὰς πάλιας ἀβεξί, ἀμιλλώμενος μὲν αὐτὸς, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ καλοῦν διαφοράς. Cf. Crit. 109 b: Θεοὶ—ἄρασιν γὰρ—διελάγχανον, οὐ κατ᾽ ἑνων.


12. λόγοις πρὸς λόγους] Sc. γιγνομένῳ.

18. Καθ’ ὅσον μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ not only answers the question, but, in doing so, gives a reason for the previous statement.

19. περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκα] These words apply also to the next division.
Το δ' εν ιδίως αὐτοί καὶ κατακεκερματισμένοι ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μοῶν εἰδίσμεθα καλεῖν ἀλλο πλῆν ἀντιλογικῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕδεν.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ 5 ἐμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἄτέχνους περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταύτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διεγνωκέν ὁς ἐτέρων ὑπὸ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπονυμίας οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐτυχεν οὔτε νῦν υφ' ἵμων τυχεὶν ἀξίων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ' κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λιαν καὶ παιντοδαπὰ διήρηται.

Τοῦ δὲ γε ἡμών, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλών ὅλων ἀμφισβητητῶν, ἃρ' οὐκ ἐρωτικων αὐτ' λέγειν εἰδίσμεθα:

1. κατακεκερματισμένων—ἀποκρίσεις]. The construction follows μήκεσι πρὸς ἐνναίτα μήκη λόγων, by a sort of zeugma, since the dative (of the manner) is more natural with γιγνόμενων than κατακεκερματισμένων.

5. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ—διήρηται] "Now of controversy that which consists of disputes about contracts, conducted in a random artless way, must indeed be distinguished as a separate kind, since our dialectic perceives in it a determinate character, but, as it has never yet been named, so it is not worth while for us now to name it."

"True; the fragments into which it is divided are too small and heterogeneous for this." παιντοδαι is not exactly in construction with λιαν, but is an expansion of σμικρᾶ.

6. ἄτέχνους] Bodl. ἄτεχνος. 7. πράττεται is impersonal. 8. ἐπονυμίας] Modern political economy has supplied the missing term, viz. "higgling in the market," except that the word ἐμβόλαια extends to other contracts besides those of commerce, including every private matter of dispute, however trifling.

13. καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλών ὅλων] Compare Theat. 175 b: ὅταν—ἐβλήσῃ—ἐκβήναι οὐ τοῦ τι ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδίκω ἡ τι συ ἐμὲ εἰς σκέψεις αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας,

Of disputes and controversies, one kind is nameless, and does not deserve a name, when men higgled over contracts. Another and more systematic form of the same thing is when
men argue "secundem artem" on general principles of right. This is Eristic, which may either waste the talker's substance and the hearers' patience, when it is mere loquacity, or may make a gain of dispute, in which case, what is its right name?

This wonderful Sophist has turned up a fourth time.

κ. τ. Λ. For ὦυς (referring to αὐτῶν = in a universal manner, opposed to κατὰ σμικρὰ καὶ παντοτά), cf. ib. 174 a: φύσιν ἐρευνομένη τῶν ἀντικών ἀλο. The Sophist's art is now described as bearing the semblance of philosophy, and as being engaged with the same class of questions.

8. τὸ γε δὲ ἡδονῆς—ἀδολεσχί-κοι] It is possible that the work of Socrates is here ironically described as 'chrematophilher,' whereas that of the Sophist is 'chrematistic.' Compare Polit. 299 c, where in the state which is jealous of the laws the true statesman or philosopher is said to be called by his fellow-citizens ἀδολεσχίς τις σοφιστής.

9. περὶ δὲ τήν ἔλεγχιν—ἀκούομεν] These words are inserted in order to indicate the derivation of ἀδολεσχίς, quasi ἀρδῆς τῇ λέξει.

15 ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει συ πειρὸ νῦν εἰπέιν.

THEAI. Καὶ τίς ἄν αὐτῶν ἔτερον οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι πλήν γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἥκειν αὐ

by his fellow-citizens ἀδολεσχίς τις σοφιστής.

ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

226. υνή τέταρτον τόν μεταδιωκόμενον υφ' ἡμῶν σο-

φιστήν.

ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἦ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὥσ

έοικεν, ἔρισικής ὀν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς

ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαγχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς,5

τῆς κτητικῆς ἐστιν, ὥσ ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε υνή, ὁ

σοφιστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον

εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ

ληπτεόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρῆ.

ΞΕ. Χρῆ γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν γε οὔτω

1 ποιητέον, τοιοῦτοι τι μεταθέωνται ἵχνος αὐτοῦ. καὶ

refers, is not absolutely ne-

cessary or certain.

1. τοῦ om. Bodl. ΔΠ. The

omission is probably due to

the ὀμοστελευτον rather than,

as Stallbaum imagined, to

conjecture: although the in-
telligibleness of the phrase τέ-
tαρτον ἦκει μεταδιωκόμενον may

have assisted the error.

3. τὸ χρηματιστικὸν] His ge-

genalogy is this time traced

backwards for the sake of va-

riety. Cf. infr. 268 c: ἄρχομενον

ἀπὸ τελευτῆς.

4. ἔρισικής ὄν τέχνης] The

insertion of pleonastic words,

such as ὄν in this place, be-

longs to the peculiar style

which Plato has chosen to

adopt.


Men. 98 b : καὶ τούτο μὲν δο-

κεῖσ αληθῆ λέγειν. Lach. 186 a:

καὶ τούτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. The

form ἀληθῆ λέγειν was so fre-

quent that the plural predicate

is retained even with a singular

subject. Cf. 1. Λεκ. 109 c: πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα—τὸ δίκαιον.

ποικίλον] Supr. 223 b, εὖ μάλα

ποικίλης.

10. τὸ θηρίον] The image of

the hunt for the Sophist, which

was cautiously introduced in

p. 218 c, is here advanced

somewhat more boldly.

οὗ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτεόν] "Not

to be caught with one hand."

This very natural expression,

and indeed the colour of the

whole passage, is destroyed by

Stallbaum, who says that οὗ τῇ

ἐτήρᾳ ληπτεόν] [14. τοιοῦτο μεταθέωνται ἵχνος

αὐτοῦ] We have tried every

path which we had opened in

searching for the angler, and

the Sophist is not yet taken.

He is not to be caught with

one hand, we must use both:
Our household servants talk, and so do we, of sifting, rinsing, scouring, straining, wringing:

Also of combing, carding, warping, and the like.

ἐπιστάμεθα. ἡ γὰρ;

Τὸ ποίον αὐτῶν πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλώσαι, παραδείγματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἥρου;

Διαφρετικὰ πον τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται ξύμπαντα.

Ναί.

Κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοῖνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα in other words, we must try another and independent track. This "new scent," however, is not wholly unconnected with those previously followed. For the notion of the Elenchus, which is the characteristic now to be set up, has been suggested by the mention of ἀντιλογική.

1. τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὄνομάτων]

Throughout these dialogues, by an exaggeration of the cynical irony of Socrates, not without a true feeling of the universality of science, the highest thoughts are illustrated by the lowest images.

5. λέγομεν] Note the introduction of a fresh verb, resuming καλοῦμεν.

6. καὶ ἀντικρίνειν† Unless ἀντικρίνειν (or ἀντικρίνειν οἱ), to "shake up," cf. Ar. Nub. 477) was used in some special technical sense, the word occurs strangely here, and awkwardly anticipates what follows. "Itaque ni, quod parum probabile, ab aliena manu asserta haec καὶ ἀντικρίνειν putentur, in verbo ἀντικρίνειν aliud videtur delitus, quod felicior aliquando conjector reperiet." Heind.

4. Διακριτικήν] Cf. Polit. 282 b: μεγάλα τωι κατά πάντα ἡμῖν ἠστήν τέχνα, ἡ συγκριτική τε καὶ διακριτική. There is here brought into distinct prominence the idea of Difference, (suggested by that of Controversy), on which the discussion in this dialogue chiefly turns.

8. ὡς ἑμοί [Cf. Rep. 536 c, d: οὐκοῦν ὡς γ' ἑμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. 'ΑΛΛ' ὡς ἑμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. Soph. Aj. 395: ἔρεβον ὡς φανερότατον, ὡς ἑμοί. For the meaning of κερκίζων, which is not clearly given in the Lexicons, see Cratyl. 388 a: κερκίζοντες δὲ τι δράμεν; ὡς τὴν κράκην καὶ τοὺς στήμους συγκεκριμένους διακρίνουν; It seems to have been a process, not merely of making fast, but of giving a regular appearance to the web by means of the comb or κερκίς. See Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities, art. Tela, p. 1101 b.

9. ἐν γε—ὁμοίοι] "In the separations above named we saw included the parting of worse from better and of like from like." The past tense implies an appeal to experience. For the limitation of the inference by means of γε, cf. Theaet. 204 c: ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι.

10. τὸ μὲν] E. g. διηθεὶν, διατάν, βράττειν.

To do this is to purify. And there are two sorts of purification.

First of bodies, whether animate or inanimate, there are purgations both internal and external.

4. ὡς εὗρ ἔγνω ["As I perceive on taking a general survey:" i. e. by a process of συναγωγή. Ὡ γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός. (Rep. 7, 537 c.)

5. καθάρσεως τίς] The thought which is here introduced, that philosophy is a purification of the soul, has an affinity with the Pythagorean doctrine, and is in harmony with the Phaedo. The same idea is applied to the science of government in the Politicus, 293 d. Cf. also Legg. 5, 735. τίς marks the introduction of a fresh notion. Cf. Polit. 299 c: εἰς δὴ τι διακρίσιμον.


12. καθάρσεως] "processes of cleansing." For the variation of the word, cf. Legg. 9, 868 c, d: καθάρσεις—καθάρμους, ib. 735 c.

14. Τὰ τῶν ζῴων—καθαίρεται] "I mean both cleansings of living bodies, including such right separations and purgations as are effected within."

15. διακρίσεως] Compare Phileb. 46 e: τὸ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακριμένα συγχεῖν. Ar. Eth. Nic. VII. 14, § 6: οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν οἷς δέονται ἰατρείας καὶ τὸ σώμα διακριμένον διατελεῖται διὰ τὴν κράσιν, where similar physiological notions are implied.

16. περὶ τάκτων] Sc. καθαρόμενα. The notion of ἐθις is not distinctly repeated with ὄσα, which is the cognate subject (in apposition to the action) of διακρίσεως καθαίρεται. l. c. ὄσα δὲ κ. = ὄσα διακρίσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοί γίγνονται.

10. καθαροὶ νῦν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρσεως εἰνὶ περιλαβεῖν ὄνοματι προσήκεισ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίᾳ καὶ τίνι;

ΞΕ. Τὰ τὸ ἄνω ζῶων, ὡσα εὔτὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἱατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τάκτων, εἰπέω μὲν φαύλα, ὡσα βαλα-
KOU SEAI. Mâla ge.

ΣΕ. Panta másai mēn ónû, ó Theâités. "Ala γâr

2. γναφευτική kai xýmpasa kosa-

[...]

227. nevstik' paréxetai' kai tōn ápsi'khon somatōn, ón

[...]

Such and such a thing, being dealt with by a

department of kosmikê, the art of making neat. This is di-

2. (This occasi-

ions the remark)
that scientific method ignores the common standards of mean and high.

1. σπογγιστικῆς] "The art of cleansing with the sponge." ἀλλὰ γὰρ implies, "But the apparent absurdity of the names is nothing to us, for," &c.

2. οὐδὲ τι μᾶλλον] Cf. Rep. 1, 339 b: οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη. From a humorous determination to be strictly impartial, it is purposely left doubtful which is to be considered the more useful art. Plato seems to have changed his opinion on the subject of pharmacy. Compare Rep. 3, 407 with Tim. 89 c, d.

4. τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν] Compare Polit. 272 c: πυθαγορέμου παρὰ πάσης φύσεως εἰ τινὶ τις ἴδιαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα ἱσθετο τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγωγὰς φρονίσεως.


7. κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα] I. ε: ἤ τοιαύτα ἐστὶν. "In respect of their resemblance,"—to which in the act of generalizing her attention is confined.

8. σεμνότερον] "More decorous or refined." Cf. Theaet. 150 a: φεύγοναι καὶ τὴν προμηθειστικὴν ἀτέ σεμνῖον οὔτε αἱ μαῖαι. Compare Parm. 130 ε: οὐθεν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις. Phileb. 58 c, Phaedr. 261 b, Polit. 266 d: δὲ τῇ τοῦδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνότερον μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μῆ. It is a true reflection, though here ironically applied, that science ignores the fastidiousness of the senses and the prejudices of a refined taste, and, as Lord Bacon says, "A pacific patina et cloacas ingregitum nec tamen pollutur." Nov. Organ. 1, 120. Compare also the defiance of ridicule in Rep. 5, 452. And see the remarks of Mr. Grote on the passage of the Parmenides above cited, Plato &c., vol. ii. p. 268.


9. θηρευτικήν] Plato seems to have been fond of the notion of a science of θηρευτική which should include war, tyranny, the chase, rhetoric, and sophistry under one head. Cf. supers. p. 222, Euthyd. 290 b,
SECONDLY, there are purifications of the mind, whereby the evil is separated from the good.
τούτο ἑπάκονε πειράμενος αὐτὸ τὸ λέγθεν διὰ τὴν ὑφήγη τείμενεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καθ’ ὁποίαν ὁμοίως ἔρει τῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν τι;

ΞΕ. Ποιησάντων ἐπεροῦν ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν καθαρμὸς ἤν τὸ λειτεῖν μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὄσον ἄν ἦ ποῦ τι φλαύρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρα καθ’ ὃσον ἄν εὐρίσκωμεν κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν οἶον νόσου ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ’ οἶον π. 15 αἰσχος ἐγγυγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅνκ έμαθον.

Now mental evils are of two kinds, corresponding to disease and ugliness in the body:


5. ἀρετῆς] Bodl. ἄρṣῆς.

8. λειτεῖν] So all the MSS.

"To leave once for all what is not evil, but continually to throw out whatever evil is found anywhere." So the difference of tense may be expressed. The action of λειτεῖν is viewed as final, that of ἐκβάλλειν as continuous. Heind. conj. λειτεῖν.

9. ποῦ] "anywhere." I. e. (in the present instance) "in any region of the soul."


12. αὐτὸν refers to ἀφαίρεσιν, but agrees in gender by attraction with καθαρμῶν.


15. Δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας] The implied apodosis, which is postponed by the explanation which follows, is δύο δὲ καθαρμῶν.

18. ἐγγυγνόμενον] So, ἐν ψυχῇ.
3. Oυδ’ αὖ] Referring to οὐκ ἔμαθον supra.
6. ἐκ τινος διαφορὰς διαφοράν] This is the MS. reading: that of Cornarius, taken from a quotation of this passage by Galen, διαφοράς διαφοράν, being supported only by a correction in Par. F. The object is to shew that sedition is a disease; and it is more natural to speak of disease as a dissolution or decay of kindred elements in consequence of some dissension amongst them, than as a

Vice is analogous to disease, and both are similar to civil war. For each is a corruption of kindred elements arising from some dissension.

II
Ignorance is a kind of deformity, and may be compared to the bodily state, in which the movements of different members are inharmonious and fail of accomplishing their end.

πὼν τινα θέμενα, πειρόμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν, καθ’ p. 2. 

5. ΠΑΣΧΕΙ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ὑμεῖν ἀκούσαν πᾶσαν πάν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

10. ΞΕ. Τὸ γε μὴν ἀγνοοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἀλῆθειαν ὁμομενῆς ψυχῆς, παραφόρου ξυνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἀλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

1. πειρόμενα] The omission of this word in the Bodleian MS. is probably due to the ὁμοιοτελευτὸν of δέμενα.

2. παράφορα αὐτοῦ] Sc. τοῦ σκόπου, “swerving from the mark.”

In Tim. 87 e (where the word παραφορότης is used) the same connexion is noticed between irregularity of action and disproportion of parts.


7. ψυχὴν γε — ἀγνοοῦσαν] This is emphatically the nature of “soul” or “mind”—according to the well-known Socratic or Platonic principle, which remains unaltered in the Laws. See Legg. 9, 860 d: οὗ οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσίν ἀκούστε κακοί.


παραφόρον συνέσεως γιγνομένης (ψυχῆς)] “And what is ignorance, but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth but swerves aside from understanding?” The gen. συνέσεως is governed by παραφόρον, which agrees with ψυχῆ. For this interpretation we are indebted to the acumen of Heindorf.
228. ΞΕ. Ψυχήν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἀμέτρου θετέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Εοικεν.

ΞΕ. "Εστί δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, το μὲν ποιηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφεῖστατα ὡν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἁγνοίαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.

c ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νῦν δὴ λέξιαν ἡμφεγυνώσα σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδίκιαν ἐξιμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἁγνοίας πάθος οἰσχος θετέον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σώματι γε περὶ δύο παθῆματε τοῦτο ὑγεία τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνε τοῦτο;

ΞΕ. Περὶ μὲν οἰσχος γυμναστικῆς, περὶ δὲ νόσου ἑττηκῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεσθον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑβρίν καὶ ἀδίκιαν καὶ

8. καλοῦσιν — οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν] Sc. οἱ πολλοὶ from τῶν πολλῶν supra.

9. ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον] I. e. When mental is not combined with bodily deformity: for the converse of which see Rep. 3, 402 e: or ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον, "only in the soul," as if that was a matter of less consequence. Stallb. interprets, "eam esse eximie (μόνον) in animo prativatem;"

(cf. Symp. 215 e) requires γίγνεσθαι. For the omission of εἶναι, cf. infr. 246 e: τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἐμφυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν.


22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ] "And in like manner."
there is chastisement for the cure of vice, and instruction to remedy the more latent evil.

5 ΞΕ. Τί δέ; περί ξύμπασαν ἀγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινα ἡ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἂν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

ΞΕ. Φέρε δή; διδασκαλικῆς δε ἀρά ἐν μόνον γένος φατέον εἰναι ἡ πλεῖον, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι b 10 μεγίστω, σκόπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπῶ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇ δε ἂν τη τάξιστα εὔρειν.

1. ἡ κολαστική—†δίκη†] The position of δίκη in the sentence may be paralleled from many similar inversions in this and other dialogues. Many of Plato's rhythmical sentences end purposely with a dissylable, which is often separated from the natural connexion. And δίκη is similarly enumerated amongst other arts, including medicine, in Gorg. 478 b, c: Χρηματιστικῇ μὲν πεινίας ἀπαλλάττει, ιατρικῇ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολογίας καὶ ἀδικίας. — τί οὖν τούτων καλιστῶν ἐστιν.—χρηματιστικῆς, ιατρικῆς, δίκης; πολὺ διαφέρει, δοκεῖ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. Ib. infr.: ιατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. The addition of κολαστικῆ in the present passage is, however, curious: for it is not clear from what other kind of justice corrective justice is here distinguished. I therefore venture to suggest the very slight correction δίκη, which is in some degree con-

firmed by the frequency of tragic expressions in these dialogues. Cf. Soph. Electr. 70: σοῦ γὰρ ἔρχομαι δίκη καθαρ-τῆς. Αντ. 94: ἐξῆρα δὲ τὸ βαν-νότι πρὸςκεῖται δίκη. And see Phaedr. 278 c: δίκη ποινη-τὴν—προσερεῖς. Polit. 310 a: ἐπὶ τούτων τούτ' εἶναι τέχνη φάρμακαν. Tim. 62 d: οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ δόξη τὸ μηθὲν προσήκον ὅνωμα λέγειν. Theaetetus' answer, ὥς γοῦν — δόξαν, is in harmony with this. It is not probable that δίκη is a marginal note, since, except in the passage of the Gorgias above quoted, the term is hardly used with the precise meaning given to κολα-στική here. The word is un-accentuated in the Boll. MS. Compare the political application of the idea of καθαρμός already noticed in Legg. 5, 735 and Polit. 293.


The meaning of pp. 226–231 may be thus stated: The Sophist professes to be an educator; and the highest form of education is that which leads men to know themselves, and liberates them from the conceit of knowledge: in other words, the elenchus, or cross-questioning method. This is distinguished from the antiquated mode of correction by direct reproof, and also from the positive instruction which is given to those who are consciously ignorant of any subject. There is grave doubt whether the Sophist deserves to be called an educator in this highest sense: but the honour is yielded to him for the present, with the feeling that he will not retain it long. The serious thought, that education is the purification of the mind through the separation of the false from the true, is approached ironically through the trivial example of household processes, and also through the following distinctions:

Separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of like from like</th>
<th>Of good from evil</th>
<th>Purification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporeal</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(and mental evils are)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πορνημία (στάσις)</td>
<td>ἀμαθία (αἰσχος)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ἄλλα μέρη ἀμαθίας)</td>
<td>(τὸ μὴ κατειδίστα)</td>
<td>(τι δοκεῖν εἰδεῖν.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence instruction is

- δημημουργικαὶ διδασκαλίαι
- παιδεία

- νουθετητικὴ
- ἔλεγχος.
able kind being stupidly, or that ignorance which the mind mistakes for knowledge.

3. 'Αγνοίας δ' οὖν [Badham: "'Αγνοίας γ' οὖν legendum: est enim respondio aligua ex parte assentiencis." So also the old editions. The words as they stand certainly take no account of the question, but continue the previous speech.


7. ἢ μὴ κατειδώτα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ] See, amongst other places where the ignorant conceit of knowledge is distinguished from conscious ign-

54

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΛΑ. Τί οὖν; καταφανές τῇ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητοῦ- p. 7

μενον;

ΞΕ. 'Αγνοίας δ' οὖν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλέ- e πὼν ἀφωρισμένον ὄραν εἶδος, πάσι τοῖς ἀλλοις αὐτῆς 5 ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.

ΘΕΛΑ. Πάνω δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὴ κατειδώτα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι; δι' οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

10

ΘΕΛΑ. 'Αληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ δῆ καὶ τοῦτο γε οἴμαι μόνον τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθία τοῦνομα προσρηθήσαναι.

ΘΕΛΑ. Πάνω γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δῆ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἀρὰ μέρει τῷ 15 τούτῳ ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;

ΘΕΛΑ. Οἴμαι μὲν οὖν, ὅ ἔστε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημ-

3. 'Αγνοίας δ' οὖν] Badham:

"'Αγνοίας γ' οὖν legendum: est enim respondio aligua ex parte assentiencis." So also the old editions. The words as they stand certainly take no account of the question, but continue the previous speech.

5. ἀντίσταθμον] "Which may be weighed against all the other parts of ignorance put together." The word belongs to tragedy. Cf. Soph. El. 561: ώς — ἄντισταθμὸν τοῦ θηρῶν ἐκθύσει τὴν αὐτοῦ κόρην. For χαλεπῶν = difficult to handle, cf. Symp. 204 a: αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμαθία.

7. Τὸ μὴ κατειδώτα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ] See, amongst other places where the ignorant conceit of knowledge is distinguished from conscious ign-

orance, Phil. 48 d, e; Legg. 9, 860d; 863 e; 10,886 b; Symp. i.e.; Phaedr. 275 b. Alc. 118 a: αὐτή ἢ ἡ ἀγνοία τῶν κακῶν αὐτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονεῖδιστος ἀμαθία. δι' οὗ πάντα—πάσιν] Because men never act without thinking they know.

8. πάντα ὅσα σφαλλόμεθα — πάντα τὰ γεγονόμενα ἢμίν σφαλ-


11. μονο[Badham conjectures μορφ, but μονο has more point.

"This alone earns the title of stupidity." Cf. Symp. 222 a: νοῦν ἔχοντας—μόνον τῶν λόγων.


16. τὸ μὲν ἄλλο—διδασκαλίας] "The part which is separated from this includes instruction in various handicrafts." A simi-

lar division is made in Phileb.
The art which removes this has the peculiarly Greek name of Nauðia—Education.

55 c : οὐκοῦν ἡμῶν τὸ μὲν — δη-
μοιραγικόν ἐστι τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθή-
ματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παι-
δείαν καὶ τροφήν; Cf. also l'rotag.
1. The idea of education in the higher sense is due to Greek philosophy: appearing first in the saying attributed to several of the early thinkers, πολυμαθείς νόον οὐ διδάσκει.

5. πᾶν] Cf. Parmen. Fr. 61: οὔ ποτ' ἐφ' οὐδ' ἐσται, ἐπεὶ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁμοὶ πᾶν, ἐν ἐνεχέσε. I. e. whether we have reached the ἀτμητὸν εἴδος.

The art which removes this has the peculiarly Greek name of Nauðia—Education.

This, like the rest, admits of being divided somewhere.” The words καὶ τούτο ἐτι are in exact keeping with ἡδι πᾶν supr. Cf. supr. 222 c. Hermann’s conjecture, κατὰ τοῦτο, is unnecessary and awkward, because anticipating the question, and because τοῦτο has no antecedent.

10. Τῆς—didaskalikēs]The one a time-honoured ancestral mode, which men used chiefly towards their sons, and many still do so when they see them fallen into some error, either speaking roughly to them, or else more softly expostulating: which varieties may be cor-
Of which there are two modes recognized: the old-fashioned admonitory system of moral training, and another which may be

rectly included in the general name of admonition."

"True."

"Now for the other method. It would seem that some had reflected with themselves that stupidity is always involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise will ever care to be a learner of those matters in which he fancies himself to be accomplished: moreover, that education in the form of admonition spends a world of labour with but small result."

"And they were right."

"Therefore they address themselves differently to the task of exorcising this conceit."

The two modes of correction may be compared with the two kinds of legislation (with and without explanation and persuasion) mentioned in the Laws, of which the former is there preferred: see esp. Legg. 4, 720 sqq. So far was Plato from reversing his judgment, as Mr. Grote (vol. iii. p. 355, note on p. 354) supposes, respecting the noucetipikov eidos tis paideias, which Protagoras advocates, Prot. 325 d; and ean men ekon peidhtai, — ei de mih, omega per xelov diestrarmenon kai

καμπτάμενον εὐθυνοσυν ἀπελάβης καὶ πλῆρας.

(14.) ἀρχαιοπρεπῆς τι πάτριον] A tragic expression; cf. Aesch. Prom. 409: μεγαλοσχήμων τ’ ἀρχαιοπρεπῇ—τίμαν, where two adjectives are similarly combined.


7. Τὸ δὲ γε] The Bodleian, in common with most of the MSS., omits ὃς (before εἰξασθε), which is not necessary, and if inserted will hardly affect the sense, for ὃς εἰξασθε ἡγησαθία is equivalent to ἡγησαντο, ὃς εἰξασθε. Cf. infr. 263 d: ὃς ἐκεί—γέγονεσθαι, and note. The introduction of a sentence with τὸ δὲ out of construction, or rather in apposition, is very frequent in Plato, and scarcely needs illustration. Compare, however, Polit. 263 c: τὸ δὲ γε, ὃ πάντων ἀνθρεώσατε, τάξι

ἀν, εἰ παῖ φρόνιμον ἔστι τὶ ξών ἑτέρων, ὅνιν δοκεῖ τὸ τῶν γεμάτων, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, κατὰ ταῖτα ἱπτο διονυμάζω. If ὃς is retained, which is perhaps better on the whole, ὃς εἰξασθε τινες ἡγήσασθαι κ.τ.λ. is equivalent to ἡγησαμένοι τινες, ὃς εἰξασθε — στέλλονται. ἠλόγον οὖν τοιοῦτοι δύντες] "On reflection." Cf. Hilt. I. 34: ο θ"
230. dōntes ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ 
μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ' ἄν ἐθέλειν τὸν οὐμένον εἶναι 
σοφῶν τούτων ὃν οἴοιτο πέρι δεινός εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ 
πολλῶν πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας 
σμικρῶν ἀνώτερων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθος γε νομίζοντες.

ΞΕ. Τῷ τοι ταύτῃ τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ
τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνι δη;' 

ΞΕ. Διερωτῶσιν ὃν ὃν οἰηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν 10 
λέγων μηδέν; ἐν' ἄτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ἰρίδιως 
ἐξετάζοντι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταύτων 
τίθεαι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύονσιν 
αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ

ἔπειθ' ἐξηγήσῃ καὶ λόγων ἑαυτῷ ἐδοκε, κατορροδήσας τῶν δεινῶν 
ἀγνω τῷ παιδὶ γυναῖκα. Soph. 
(Ed. Rex. 583 : Οὐκ, εἰ διδοίχε 
γ', ὅτα ἑγὼ, σαυτῷ λόγων.
2. οὐδέν ποτ' ἄν ἐθέλειν] So 
Bodl. ΔΠΙ., Stallbaum. Edd. 
Vet. οὐδεποτε. It deserves 
mention that Heindorf had 
at one time been led to con-
jecture οὐδὲν, because of τοῦ-
των following, but had after-
wards contented himself with 
making τούτων depend on 
πέρι.
3. σοφῶν—δεινῶν] Plato iro-
nically uses the words as syno-
nymous. Cf. Theaet. 173 b: 
δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς 
οὐκοντα. Ιb. 177 a: καὶ ἐπιτερ 
οί, ἃν μὴ ἀπαλλαγώσι τῆς δει-
nότητος κτ.λ.

μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου] This 
is the same lesson which 
experience has taught to 
schoolmasters and others with-
in our own memory. But few 
of them have found so good 
a substitute for the old-
fashioned νουθετητικὴ as the 
Socratic elenchus.

7. Τῷ τοι] Cf. Theaet. 179 
d: τῷ τοι—μᾶλλον σκέπτον. 
8. στέλλονται] "Address 
themselves." Στέλλονται is si-
mlarly used in Legg. 10, 892 : 
οἴκουν τά μετα ταύτα ἐπὶ αὐτῷ 
δὴ τοῦτο στελλόμεθα; Ιb. 893 b. 
Phileb. 50 c.
10. Διερωτῶσιν (τὶ τοῦτον) 
περὶ δὲ ἄν τις οἴητα τι λέγειν. 
11. πλανωμένων] Sc. τὸν ἀνθρώ-
πον. Cf. i Aleib. 117 a : περὶ 
tῶν δικαιῶν καὶ ἀδίκων—ἀποκρυπ-
μενός φης πλανώσατι; εἶτα οὐ 
δήλων ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι περὶ 
αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ; Lys. 
214 a.
14. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτ.λ.] Cf. 
Rep. 4, 436 e : ὡς ποτὲ τὶ τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἄν ἀμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ 
αὐτὸ τάναττι πάθου.
OAATQN02

58
Kara

of getting

ravra.

5

OL

evavTias.

opwvrts eavrols

fj.is

p. 2;

rid of this

XaAeTrcuVofo-t, Trpos 5e TOVS
Cross-ques
tioning

TOVTW

men on
(TK\r)pu)v Sot^wv

points of

which they
are assured,
they drive

them

into
coutradic-

yu&amp;gt;v

1.

SC. TO (TTI&tlKVVO-

OpWlTfjl

Theset.

1

x a ^ f7rat I/ol o t ]
e aurovr

:

utTia-

(TOVTCLl K.T.X.

2IO

OVK

aXXouf

^TTOV

:

KQI

roi9 trvfoucrt
(f)p6vo3s

TOUS

Se

2. Trpoy

to-ft

17^.]

^apvs

fj^fptartpos, crcuflbtvai o fjirj

oid/iei/oy

olvda.

Twf

3.

Which
The same
&quot;

avTOvy]

TTfpi

them.&quot;

encompass

expression might be used of a
disease, or of unwholesome hu
mours.
Perhaps avrovs should
The Bodl. (ut ssepe)
be read.

has no breathing.
4.

&amp;lt;TK\r)p)v \

bending,&quot;

Crat. 487

:

afj.fTacrTpo(f)ov,

fvr)6iKa&amp;gt;v

T)fn&amp;lt;av

o

8r)

lipparov

rv^ovaa

17

Theaet.

KOI ov
&amp;lt;ric\r)pa&amp;gt;i&amp;gt;.

Xeyas

cnc\r)puvs ye

Travatv

Tf

[T(]f)8i(TTr)v]

KCil

:

&amp;lt;a\

Ka-

ovras
^TTJCTIS

155 e

:

dvriTVTrovs

aTra\\ayS)v

uKoveiv

TheVat.alone rejects

If this is folthe second Tf.
lowedj the displacement of rt

may

be defended from Rep.

572

a,

Phsedr. 269

cogn. accus.,
5.

Legg.

ef.

Rep.

9,

For the

c.

6,

496

e.

(3f/3moTuTa ytyvofifvrjv] Cf.
KO\OI&amp;gt;
17
d\rj2, 663 e
:

K.a\ fjLOVinov.

The con
sentence is
broken off by the introduction
vofii^ovrts yap]

struction

Ka.6a.i-

of this

Rep.

etTru/iei/.

Theset. 197

3,

402

alib.

c,

The

b, c.

idea

of voju foi/res is then resumed in
the finite verb 8i(vof]6rj(rav, and
the apodosis is postponed, or
rather is absorbed into the sub
TrXei d)
ordinate clause np\vai&amp;gt; TIS
Se P.T).
By a kind of attraction

the latter part of the sentence
follows the analogy of the uxj-n-tp

For

clause.

Apol. 23 c:

duovtiv ffilonfr,
oi

cf.

vtoi

The regularity
dv6pumu&amp;gt;v.
of the sentence might be re
rairbv 8iavor]fffVTfs
stored thus

T&amp;gt;V

:

Cf.

TO o-xX^poV rt

Charm. 175 ^

XetTat.

&quot;un

&quot;Stiff,&quot;

&quot;unyielding.&quot;

d

7ra ^ 0iAe, oi

and application of the simile,
8 ern-ov
as in Phileb. 58 c
/

Cf.

&quot;

68 a

Cf. Thea-t.

7racr\ovTt /Se^atorara

&

:

ptvov.
tavTols pev

6.

rw

VQ^L^QVT^ yapi

yiyvo\Jitvr]v.

6(ia

Trepl

oiKoveiv [re] rjSicrTrjv KGU

s

/cat
7}/xe/oo9i&amp;gt;7cu,

avrovs fjLtyaAcov KOL
airaXXarrovTaL iraawv re aVraAAa-

TWV

rpoTTco

TU&amp;gt;

dr)

aAAow

fKflvot,

KaTacrTrjcravTfs,

e^fXoV-

Kadapbv dirffprjvav K.T.\.
For such, dear youth, are the
thoughts of their purifiers. Just
Tts,
&quot;

as the physicians of the body
think (vtvopiKaa-i, frequentative
perfect) that a body cannot
profit by the food received, until
the obstructing matters are cast
in like manner these
reason about the mind, that it
will never obtain benefit from
the learning which it receives,
forth,

by cross-examination,
the person cross-examined be
shame
and a riddance
;
put to

until,

being

made

which

obstruct

man

is

notions
the
purged, and thinks he
of

the

learning,

knows no more than what he
really

knows.&quot;

c


SΩΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

230. ροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ιατροὶ νεομικασὶν μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τρο- ψίς ἀπολαίειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδί- ζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταύτων καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοθήσαν εἰκώνι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ζέων τῶν ἐπιποδιμένων μαθημάτων ὑψίστων, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλέγχομεν εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοὺς μαθημάσων ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελοῦν, καθαρὸν ἀποφήμη καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἄπερ οἴδεν, εἰδέναι μόνα, πλεῖω δὲ μῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Βελτιστή γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἐξεων αὐτή.

Εὐ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἵμιν, ὦ Θεαῖης, καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἅρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριοτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐ νομίς- σέων, ἢν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὠν, τὰ ἐ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτον τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἢ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντος ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

6. προσφερομένων] The verb προσφέρων is more often applied to physic than to diet (Thucyd. II. 51, Plato Charm. 157 c, Phadr. 270 b), but is convenient here as equally applicable to food and instruction. Cf. Legg. 7, 809 ε: πότερον εἰς ἀκρί- βειαν τοῦ μαθημάτος ἵτον—ἡ τὸ παράπτων εὐδεῖ προσομιστών.

removal, and a wholesome state of intellectual humility has been restored. Thus refutation is the greatest of all purgations: and even the Great King, if he has not undergone this test, is uneducated and therefore unhappy.

6. αὐτῶς] Sc. τῶς σοφο-

7. τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα

“The modes of action which have been described (e.g. the art of controversy) bear some resemblance to this purifying method of education.”

9. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, άγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

10. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῇ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιό-

τητὰς ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρῶτατον

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ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτην χρωμένους τῇ τεχνῇ τίνας φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς p. 25 b,

φάναι.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ μείζον αὐτῶς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιοῦτο τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

ΞΕ. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρῶτατον

6. αὐτῶς] Sc. τῶς σοφο-

7. τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα

“The modes of action which have been described (e.g. the art of controversy) bear some resemblance to this purifying method of education.”

9. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος] Mr. Grote remarks on this, that Plato would have objected to the wolf being placed in the same genus with the dog. He would certainly have objected to class them together as ‘tame’ or ‘wild.’ But he here recognizes the likeness between them, on which, had it suited his purpose, he might have dwelt to the exclusion of the difference. This illustrates the unfixed and provisional nature of Plato’s classification, but nothing more. Cf. Rep. 5, 454 b, where it is shewn that differences are no less treacherous than resemblances, except to those who are able κατ’ εἰδὴ συνάγει καὶ διαμείβαι.

10. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῃ] The heed-

ful cautious man—the character described in Soph. Ed. Rex. 616 as ὁ εὐδαθευμένος ποιεῖν.

περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας] These words recall Euclides’ objection to the argument from analogy. Diog. Laert. II. 107: καὶ τὸν διὰ παραβολὴν λόγον ἀνήρει, λέγων ἦτοι εἶς ὁμοίων αὐ-

τῶν ἢ εἰς ἀνομοίων συνίστασθαι· καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς ὁμοίων, περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ὄς ὁμοία ἐστιν ἀνα-

στρέφεσθαι, εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀνομοίων, παρ-

ἐλκεῖν τὴν παράθεσιν. Cf. Phaedr. 262 b, c, 273 d. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. 3, 2: ei δεὶ ἄκριβολογεί-

σθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκλοπούεται ταῖς ὁμο-

οιοτησιν. But Euclides dwelt merely on the logical weakness of comparisons: Plato here speaks practically of the danger which attends their use. Compare the consciousness of modern times on the same point, which some one has expressed by saying that Analogy is like a broken reed, good to point with but not to lean upon.
231. γὰρ τὸ γένος. Ὑμως δὲ ἔστωσαν' οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὄρων τῇν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι. τὸτε ὦπόταν ἰκανός φυλάττωσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε εἰκὸς.

ΞΕ. Ἐστω δὴ διακριτικὴς τέχνης καθαρτικὴ, καθ-ἀρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλικῆς, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ο περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γεγομένος ἐλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λεγέσθω μὲν ἀπορῶ δὲ ἐγώγε ἣδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρῆ ποτὲ ὢς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διασχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν.

ΞΕ. Εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοι κάκεϊνον ἢγείσθαι χρῆ νῦν ἡδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐτι

1. ἔστωσαν[ Sc. σοφισται οἱ ταύτῃ χρώμενοι τῇ τέχνῃ. Cf. Men. 92 d: οὔτοι μεν γὰρ, εἰ αὖ βούλει, ἔστωσαν οἱ σοφισταὶ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὄρων] "When they begin thoroughly to guard their confines, the contest will be for no trifling boundary." 1. c. The difference is great. The name is granted to them provisionally, with the warning that they may have to defend their title hereafter against the rightful owner. Cf. Phileb. 56 d: οὐ σμικρὸς ὄρος. Logg. 11, 916 c: ἡ μείζους ἡ εἰλιτὸν ὄρος ἢ δὲ διασαφεῖν. Note the false echo in φιλακῆν—φυλάττον.] 8. δοξοσοφίαν[ The word occurs in Phileb. 49 a, d, and the adj. δοξοσοφος in Phaedr. 275 b. 9]. paraφανέντι] "which has appeared by a side wind, out of due course." This inquiry did not arise directly out of the preceding: supr. 226, a, b. Cf. Theat. 199 c: δευτέρου μὲντοι πᾶθος ἀλλὰ παραφανεῖσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. Νῦν is to be taken, ἐπερθαίνος, with the participle. 10. ἡ γένει γενναία σοφ.] Cf. Soph. Oed. Rex. 1469: ὶδ' ὀ γονῆ γενναία. Compare the tragic grandiloquence of Rep. 5, 454 a: ἡ γενναία ἡ δύναμις κ.τ.λ. It is not meant to distinguish the Sophist "of a noble stamp" from the "degenerate variety." 13. ἢς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα] "What definition of the Sophist one may assert with entire confidence." 16. ἀπορεῖ[ There is an allusion to the literal meaning = ἀνευ πόρου, "having no passage for escape."
provisionally, foreseeing that he will have to fight hard hereafter for his claim. We are embarrassed with the number of our definitions; the only comfort is that the Sophist's embarrassment must be still greater. We have surrounded him; let us now close in upon him. We have had glimpses of him as a

1. τὰς ἄπασας] Heindorf supplies λαβάς, comparing Phil. 13 d: ἀνέμα ἐς τὰς ὄρμιας. But the word diaphrēγεν, and the whole context, rather suggest the metaphor of a chase. Some such word as ὄρμας, or πεῖρας, would therefore supply the meaning better.

2. καί] "Now therefore is the very time of all others to set upon him." καί gives an emphasis to the clause in opposition to the previous doubt. Similar idiomatic uses of καί are Symp. 177 b: τούτῳ μὲν ἦτον καὶ βαθμαστὸν. Legg. 6, 752 d: τὰς μὲν ὦν ἄλλας καὶ βραχύτερον ἔργον.

5. στάντες] Like men who have been stooping and pressing forwards.
from conjecture. But ἵνα may depend on the verbal meaning of αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήμαta. "One who sells us learned wares of his own manufacture."

2. τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἀδελφής [τῆς ἀγ., is partitive; and περὶ λόγους is to be joined with ἀδελφής. "Under the head of contention he appeared as a champion in argument."


6. τὸ ἐκτὸν is nominative to ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἤν, but must be again supplied as the adverbial accusative with ἐδέμεν —ἐδέμεν, like τὸ πρώτον εὑρίσκω above. "His sixth character was open to dispute, but still we so far yielded to his claim that we described him, sixthly, as a purger of conceits which obstruct learning in the region of the mind."

7. μαθήματα] The Bodl. MS., with Δ.Ι., has μάθημαν.

10. Ἀρ’ ὦν ἐννοεῖς —προσαγορεύεις] "Do you perceive, then, that when one who receives his name from a single art seems to command various provinces, this appearance is not to be trusted, but whoever has such an impression of any science is clearly unable to discern that point of it wherein these various parts of knowledge meet, whence he gives many names instead of one to the man who knows them."

We have had various glimpses of the Sophist, but have nowhere been able to get a clear view of him. Why is this? Because we have not yet seized the leading principle of his art, if indeed there be a leading principle. When we remember that unreality is afterwards proved to be the Sophist's principle, the irony of the present passage becomes manifest.

11. τὸ φαντασμα τοῦτο] Cf.
But we are still to seek for a clear and consistent view.

Phileb. 57 e: ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἁρπαγμοῖς τειχημένοις, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μίας, πάλιν ὡς δύον ἐπανερώτα τούτων αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.
5. προσαγορεύει] ἠτέ, ὁ πάσχων αὐτῷ.
9. ἀναλάβομεν πρῶτον] “Let us begin by reviewing some of our results.” The word is used absolutely in the same technical sense in Theset. 187 c: Ἀρχήν ὑπὲρ εἰσόδου παράδειγμαν πάλιν; Phileb. 60 d: νῦν ἄστισον ἐπαναλαβόμεν ὁρθότερον εἰ-πάτω. Hence it is unnecessary to insert ἐν with Heindorf or τι with C. et corr. B. πρῶτον is used adverbially, ut suprā: πρῶτον οὖν στάτες.
18. καὶ gives emphasis to the question as raising a fresh point in connexion with the preceding. They profess to make men controversiasts. Well, on what subject? Cf. Euthyd. 272 d: ὅπε ἐδώκα, διὶ καὶ μαθησόμεθα.
19. ἐξ ἀρχῆς—τῇ δὲ παραγωγῇ “In examining this let us take a comprehensive survey, and begin as follows.” For ἐξ ἀρχῆς, cf. Theset. 180 d.
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 65

232. ἥρχης ἔστω τῇδὲ πη. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὥσ' ἀφανή τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀρ' ἰκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τούτο δραίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται [γ]οῦν δ' ἐπὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. Τι δ' ὁσα φανερᾷ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μήν ἐν γε ταῖς ἱδίαις συνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγηται τι, ἐξυσιμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντεπείν δεινοὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἀπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατοὺς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι γε.

d ΞΕ. Τι δ' αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ ἐξυπαντῶν τῶν

1. περὶ τῶν θεῶν] Cf. Rep. 10, 598 ε, where the same thing is said of the poets: καὶ τὰ γε θεία.

4. γοῦν] The MSS., with exception of Flor. i, have οὖν.

5. ὁσα φανερα] Ar. Eth. Nic. VII. 7: ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ πολλὰ διέτρεψα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατα γε εὐ οὗ ὁ κόσμος συνείστηκεν. The distinction between the visible and invisible in Divine things is perhaps the same as in Tim. 41 a: πάντες ὅσοι τε περὶ πολλοῦς φανερῶς καὶ ὁσα φαίνουται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθίλωσι θεία.

Or, possibly, the words ὅσα ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς may suggest the difference between the ordinary and the scientific perception of the heavenly motions. Cf. Ib. 39 c: τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὰς περιόδους οὐκ ἐννοοῦσι οὐδὲν, πλὴροι δὲλόγοι τῶν πολλῶν κ. τ. λ.


7. Τί γάρ;] "What, indeed?" γάρ is the usual formula of assent, confirming the previous question: = "You may well ask."

8. ἐν γε ταῖς ἱδίαις συνουσίαις] "In private conversations" —Which are the proper sphere of ἀντιλογική as distinguished from ὀπισθία, to which reference is presently made; cf. supra. 225 b. For the limitation with γε, cf. Theaet. 204 d: ταυτῶν ἄρα, ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα δ' ἀριθμοὶ ἔστι, τὸ τὲ πῶς προσαγορεύουμεν καὶ τὰ ἄπαντα.

9. περὶ γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας — λέγηται τι] "When any general statement is made respecting the world of transitional or of absolute Being."
Hedises disputes and teaches others to dispute, about things divine, mundane, metaphysical, legal, political, and on the subject matter of every branch of art. The Sophist seems to have the power of disputing about all things.

1. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄν αὐτοῖς, ὥς ἔτοσ εἰσεῖν, διελέγετο μὴ τούτο ὑπισχυομένους.

5 ΞΕ. Τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἀ δὲ πρὸς ἐκαστὸν αὐτὸν τῶν δημο-ουργῶν ἀντιπειτέων, δεδημοσιωμένα ποια δαβήζησαι γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ Πρωταγόρεια μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ πόλλων γε, ὥς μακάριε, ἐτέρων. ἀντὶ δὴ τὸ τής ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἀρ’ οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἰκανή τις δύναμις εὐοί εἶναι;

1. Ποιεῖν ἀμφ. In the sphere of law and justice the Sophist’s business is rather to enable men to dispute than himself to hold controversy.


5. Τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν] With περὶ πασῶν must be supplied ἀ δὲι λέγειν from the following clause, in which the expression becomes more definite.

6. πρὸς ἐκαστὸν] Probably neut.: sc. ἀμφισβήτημα. αὐτὸν implies, They dictate even to the masters of each craft.

7. δεδημοσιωμένα—τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν] “The mysteries of each profession are published in manuals for all to learn.”


9. Τὰ—πάλις] Diog. Laert. 9, 8, 55, mentions the treatise of Protagoras on wrestling. That on rhetoric is mentioned in the Phaedrus, 267 c: Πρωταγόρεια δὲ, καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν τοιαῦτα μείστον ἄττα; Ὀρθοδεσία γέ τις, ὥσπερ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά.


10. 66 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ πολιτικῶν, ἀρ’ οὐχ ὑπισχυοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβήτησιν- p. 232 τικόν.;

5. Τό—θαύμα] “The secret,” “mystery,” as of a juggling trick. Cf. Legg. 1, 644 δ, 645 β, δ, where man is spoken of as a puppet, or magical contrivance, of the gods. This rendering of the word in the present passage is confirmed by reference to 235 β: οὐκέτι ἐκφαίτεται—τὸ μὴ ὡς τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυμαστῶν τις εἰς.

6. οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦν] “For I do not think I comprehend (I suppose I do not comprehend) the drift of your question.” ποιοῦν is read in a few MSS., and is more pointed, but does not seem to be certainly right. The vagueness of ποιοῦν consorts well with the puzzled tone of Theaetetus.


10. Τὸ ποτὲ οὗν ἄν εἰς τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δύναμις θαύμα;
How does he raise the baseless fabric of a belief that he is all-wise; without which he could not hope for a disciple or a fee?

 minds of the youth, that they, and they alone, are in all ways the wisest of all men.”

1. Τοῦ δὲ πέρι; “About what point?” I. e. What is the point which a knowledge of his mystery would make clear?

2. Καθ’ ὅν τινα The indirect interrogative in a reply, as εἰ πάντα εἰδέναι just above. For πάντα, cf. Soph. Antig. 721: φιάναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ᾽ ἐπιστήμης πλέον.

3. δυνατὸς, like ἄξιος, seems sometimes to dispense with the verb ἐίναι, and the repetition of εἰσι is thus avoided here.


5. μήτε ἐκεῖνος ἐφαίνετο For the ellipse of the infinitive, ἀντιλέγειν ὅρθως, compare Rep. 4, 430 1: κρεῖττος δὴ αὐτοῦ φαινοται οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅντα τρόπον (sc. λέγοντες) καὶ ἄλλα ἄτα τοιάτα ὅσπερ ἤχη αὐτοῦ λέγέται. Thuc. III. 16: ἀνεχόρησαν — ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον.

6. ἐι μηδέν] Boll. εἰ μὴ μηδέν, with Δ and pr. II.

7. τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο] “To quote your own observation.”

8. τούτων αὐτῶν] Sc. τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν τε καὶ ἀμφιβασθεῖν περὶ πάντων: for which rendering cf. supr. 232 b: αὐτοῦ τούτων (sc. τοῦ ἀντιλογικὸν εἶναι) διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι. αὐτοῖς should be repeated with μαθητ. γιγν.

9. αὐτοὶ] “They appear (to the young man) to be themselves well-informed on the points on which they dispute.”

10. Δρόσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἄπαντα, φαμέν;
6. Δοξαστικήν] "Α knowledge which is in appearance only," δόξα is here opposed to ἀλήθεια, as appearance to reality. Cf. infr. 268 c: τὸ τῆς δοξαστικής μυθητικῶν. There is, however, an allusion to the other (subjective) meaning of δόξα (＝ opinion) as opposed to ἐπιστήμη (cf. Theet. 207 c, 208 e), just as the word ἀλήθεια is probably used with reference to the ἀλήθεια (or certainty) of Protagoras. Compare the confusion of the two meanings of ἀνόητος, noticed by Mr. Grote in Parm. 132 e, Phaed. 80 b. Grote’s Plato &c., ii. 272, note P.


14. προσέχων τῶν νοῶν εὕ μάλα] “Giving me your very closest attention.” For the position of εὕ μάλα, cf. Phaed. 116 e; δειπνη-σαντάς τε καὶ πιοντας εὗ μάλα. For καὶ introducing an imperative, cf. Theat. 145 d, καὶ μοι λέγε ἀλιβ.; and compare the use of καὶ μοι λέγε (οὐ ἄναγρώθη) τὸ ψήφισμα &c. by the orators.

17. λέγειν] Subaudi ἐπίστα-σθαι. The same illustration which is used here to deprecate the Sophist is applied to the poets in Iep. 10, 596 ε: 'Αλλ' ἵπτα δὴ καὶ τῶν ἓνα καλεῖς τῶν δημοφηγῶν. Τῶν ποίων; "Οσ πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσπερ εἰς ἔκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. Πάνω βαυμαστόν — λέγεις σοφιστής.
Imagine a parallel case. Suppose one to profess, not that he knows, but that he can create all things: men, animals, the sea, the heaven, the Gods.

\[\text{οὐ γὰρ ὄν.}\]

\[\text{πῶς λέγεις;}\]

\[\text{ποιήσεως φαίν.}\]

\[\text{καὶ τὰλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσεως φαίν.}\]

1. ἐξουσία — ἐξουσία
Note the variety.

4. **Τὴν ἄρχην** "The very key to my meaning is unknown to you. You do not understand what I mean by All."


10. **καὶ τὰλλα φυτὰ** The notion of φυτὰ need not include ἐμέ καὶ σέ, according to a well-known Platonic use of ἄλλος, c. g. Alc. 112 b : τοῖς τε Ἀχαίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρασίνων: with which compare Hom. Od. 2, 43. But the word is probably used here in the widest sense (= creatures); cf. Tim. 90 a: ὡς ὅποταν ἤμας φυτὸν οἰνὸν ἔγγειον ἄλλ’ οὕρανοιν. Rep. 6, 491 d: παντὸς σπέρματος περὶ ἡ φυτοῦ εἶτε τῶν ἔγγειων εἶτε τῶν ζων. Theag. 121 b.  
12. **λέγων** Sc. φαίν ἄν.  
15. **Φημί** "Yes." Cf. Phaedr. 270 c.  
καὶ γῆς These words occur only in two MSS., Ven. Ε. and Flor. i, which however belong to different families. They are not absolutely required, for the earth as well as the sun may be included in the expression καὶ θέων. But cf. Rep. 10, 596 d: καὶ πρὸς τούτων γῆν καὶ οὐρανῶν καὶ θεῶν.
2. *τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος* [*Sc. τέχνην*]. Compare Coleridge, *Friend*, vol. iii. p. 145: “For the ancients, as well as the moderns, had their machinery for the extemporaneous mintage of intellects, by means of which, off-hand, as it were, the scholar was enabled to make a figure on any and all subjects, on any and all occasions.”

4. *μῶν οὐ παραδίνα νομιστέσσαι* [*Cf. Euthyd. 278 ε: παραδίνα δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ τις ἣ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιάντα μάθει, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἀν μᾶλλον εἶδεν ἡ ἤξει, προσπάζειν δὲ οἴδας τ' ἄν εἰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.* Legg. 2, 667 ε: καὶ παραδινα γε τῆν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε ὅτε μὴν τι βλάστη μῆτε ὑφελῆ σπουδῆς ἡ λόγου ἄξιον, The contempt for the art of painting which is here expressed reappears in Legg. 6, 769 b: ἐντρυβήσις—οὐδαμῶς γέγονα τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ. —Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἐβλάσθησι. See also Polit. 277 ε: γραφῆς δὲ καὶ συμπάθης χειρουργίας λέξει καὶ λόγω δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῶον μᾶλλον πρίστε τοῖς ὄντομοις ἑπεσθαί. 6. *τεχνικότερον — χαριστερον* “More artful,” and therefore more worthy of the Sophist; “more amusing,” and therefore more deserving of the name *παραδίνα* [*Cf. Polit. 288 ε, where μημήματα καὶ ομόψυμα τῶν οὐτων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ*].

5 We should understand at once that he is a painter, and that
γραφικὴ τέχνη δυνάτος ἐσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νεῶν π. 253; παῖδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπίδεικνύς, λαυθά-
νεω, ὡς, ὃ τι περ ἀν βουληθῇ δράμ, τοῦτο ἰκανῶτατος ὃν ἀποτελεῖν ἐργο.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀρ’ οὗ προσδο-
κομὲν εἶναι τινα ἄλλην τέχνην; ἧν οὐ’ δυνάτον αὖ
τυγχάνειν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐτί πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων
τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὦτων τοῖς λόγοις
γονητεύειν, δεικνύτας εἰδώλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων,

2. παρροθεῖν — ἀφεστώτας Cf. Legg. 1, 663 b: ακοπαθώσιν δὲ
tὸ παρροθεῖν ὀρόμενον πᾶσι τῇ ὡς ἐποιεῖται καὶ δῆ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ
παρέχει. The spirit of Prot. 314 b is the same: ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νεοῖ,
ὡςτε τοσοῦτο πράγμα διελέγαται. Cf. also Rep. 1, 331 e: ὅπερ
ἡδὲ ἐγγύτερῳ ὃν τῶν ἐκεί μᾶλλον
tι κυδορῇ αὐτά.

7. τινα ἄλλην τέχνην] τοιαύτην, which Heindorf proposed to
insert before τέχνην, is found in C. H. c, and has been
added by a recent hand in two other MSS. But with
tοιαύτη following (infr. d), the common reading is more
probable.

ἡ οὐ’] The reading of most MSS., ἡ οὗ δυνατῶν αὖ
tυγχάνειν, is awkward unless τοιαύτην is added above. οὐ
may possibly have arisen from αὖ following. The translation
of Ficinus (qua seductores—adolescentulos decipere vale-
ant) points to Schleiermacher’s conjecture, ἡ δυνατῶν αὖ τυγχά-
νειν, which is also supported by a correction of the Coisli-
nian MS. (ἡ δυνατῶν,) (ἡ οὗ Π.) For τυγχάνειν with the ad-
jective, cf. Tim. 61 d, τυγχάνειν —παύσα—δυνάτα λέχθηναι,
and seven other passages quoted by Ast, Lex. 8, v. τυγχάνω.
And for the infinitive after the relative ἂ(σουαδ. προσδοκόμεν),
cf. Parn. 130 e: εἶναι εἰδή ἄτα, ἄν τάδε—τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἱσχεν.

8. τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐτί πόρρω] A similar parallel is drawn
between rhetoric and tragic poetry in Gorgias 502 d: Νῦν
ἀφα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικὴν
tινα πρῶς δῆμοι τοιούτων ὡσ παι-
δων τε ὠροι καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ἄνδρων, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθερῶν,
ὅν οὐ πάντα ἀγάμεθα, καλακικίως γὰρ
αὐτὴν (τῆς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις)
φαμεν εἶναι. See also ib. 458
ε, where the “omniscience” of the
rhetor is noticed: περὶ
πάντων (ῥητορικῶν) ὡστ’ ἐν ὠδίῳ
πιθανόν εἶναι. Ιb. 459 b: ὁ οἶκο
εἰδώλα τοῦ εὐδότος ἐν οἴκο εἰδύδοι
πιθανότερος. Compare Legg.
2, 658 e: εἰ μὲν τοῖς τὰ συμφρά-
κρίνα παῦσα, κρινοῦσιν τὸν τὰ
θαυ-
ματα ἐπίδεικνυμα.

10. εἰδώλα λεγόμενα] = τὰ ἐν
Exhibiting fictitious arguments, as the painter exhibited fictitious shapes." There is a stress on λεγόμενα as opposed to γεγραμμένα ἐπίδεικνύοντας above. Compare Theat. 150 e: ψευδή καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείων ποιηθέντων τῷ ἀληθείᾳ. For the plural διεικνύστα, to which objection has been made, cf. Theat. 172 b: ἐξελοῦσιν ὑπερρίκεισθαι. Ib. 167 b: δομάζοντας συγγενὴ ἐσωτῆς, and notes.

1. ποιεῖν—δοκεῖν] "To make them think."

5. Τοῖς πολλοῖς—παραγενομένοι] “Is it not then, Theaetetus, inevitable, that most of the auditors of such lectures in process of time, as they get older, coming into close contact with realities, and being compelled by sad experience to see and feel things as they are, will change the opinions which were then created, so that what seemed great will appear small, and what seemed easy, difficult; and the imaginations, awakened by discourse, will be completely overturned by the facts which encounter them in action.”

The Bodl. omits δ with ΔΠ.


9. ἐναργῶς] “To come into unmistakable contact with reality.”

10. σμικρὰ—τὰ μεγάλα] E. g. wealth, distinction, &c.

11. χαλεπὰ—τὰ μέδια] E. g. the government of men.

13. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράξεων ἐργῶν παραγενομένων] "The realities which have encountered them in action.” Compare the complaint of Adimantus in Rep. 6, 487 b, c. And cf. Legg. 6, 769 d: προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ τῶν δοξάστων ἐργῶν παραγενομένων.
ΤΗΕΑΙ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τὴν ἀφετηρίαν τοῦτο κρύων. ὁμιλεῖ p. 234 δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐπὶ πάροροθεν ἀφετηρίαν εἶναι.

ΤΕ. Τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἶδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρασόμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἀνευ τῶν παθημάτων τριώσαγεν. περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τὸδε μοι λέγει πότερον ἡδη τοῦτο σαφές ὅτι τῶν γούτων ἔστι τις, p. 235 μμητής ὦν τῶν ὄντων, ἡ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνάτος εἶναι, περὶ τοσοῦτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀλήθεις ἐχαίνων τυγχάνει;

10 ΤΗΕΑΙ. Καὶ τῶς ἀν, ὡς ἐδίνω; ἀλλὰ σχεδόν ἡδη σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδίας μετεχόντων ἐστὶ τις μερόν.

Πτ. 10, 888 b: ὡ παῖ, νέος εἰ, προϊόν δὲ σὲ ὧν χρώμασ παῖσει πολλὰ ὄν νῦν δοξαγίς μεταβαλόντα ἐπὶ τάνατον τίθεσθαι.

1. Ὡς ἐμοί—κρώνα = ὡς ἐμοί κριτή. Τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ ἐπίσκεψις ἀκριβῶς ἡμεῖς σε οἶδε]


ἡμεῖς οἴδε] = ἔσωθε, Θεόδωρος, Σωκράτης.

4. τῶν παθημάτων] The article refers to διὰ παθημάτων above.

5. δ' οὖν] “But, to return.”

7. μὴ expresses that an affirmative answer to the question which it introduces is regarded as possible.

12. ἐστὶ τις μερόν] Heindorf objects to μερόν on the ground that the only way of construing the words as they stand is to suppose μερόν to be governed by μετεχόντων. “That he is one of those who partake of the divisions of child’s-play.” But why may not the words be taken more simply?—“That he occupies (lit. is) one of the departments which partake of the nature of child’s-play.” The confusion of the man and his function, the juxtaposition of the masculine with the feminine and neuter, has already occurred several times in this dialogue, e. g. 225 a: τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ἐρωτικὸν ἄν τέχνης, — ἐστὶν — ὁ σοφιστής. The article in τῆς παιδίας refers to p. 234 a: παιδίαν — παιδία. Accordingly, τῶν τῆς παιδίας μετεχόντων μερῶν is equivalent to τῶν τῆς μμητικῆς μερῶν. That μμητικῆ is divided into many parts is implied supra. 234 b, εἰς εἰν πάντα ξυλλαβοῦν, and in the epithet ποικιλότατον. Cf. also infr. c: κατὰ μέρη τῆς μμητικῆς. 235 a: τῆς μμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος. ib. b: πολὺ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος κατὰ — μμητικῆ.
THEAI. Πώς γὰρ οὐ θετέοιν;
ΞΕ. "Αγε δή, νῦν ἡμέτέρον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα
μηκέτι ἀνείναι σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περειλήφαμεν ἐν
ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ
tοιαύτα ὄργανων, ὡστε οὐκέτα ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γέ.
THEAI. Τὸ ποίον;
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματο-
ποίων τίς εἰς.
THEAI. Κάμοι τοῦτό γε οὖτω περὶ αὐτοῦ ἕρωδικεί.
ΞΕ. Δεδεικταί τοίνυπ ὅ τι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τῇν

though involving only a slight change, is unmeaning and gives a wrong emphasis. The case is different below (235 b: τις εἰς), where the point is that he cannot escape being some one amongst the varieties of the genus juggler. Here παιδαίς is the emphatic word.

The next words, εἰς γόητα, admit of a similar explanation. The masculine noun is substituted for the neuter of the kind or genus. He must be referred to the genus sorcerer, and to a species of mimic. Cf. Polit. 281 c: πότερον οὖν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἔφαντικῆς λόγος — ἵκανος ἔσται διωρισμένοι, εἰν ἄρ' αὐτὴν τῶν ἐπιμελείων, ὡστάν περὶ τῆς ἔρειν ἁσθῆ, εἰς τὴν καλλιστὴν καὶ μεγαλόττερον πασῶν τιθόμεν; where, however, the Zurich editors have εἰσὶν, but see note. Legg. 9, 867 b: εἰς εὐκόνα μὲν ἄμφωθεν. Tim. 57 e: εἰς ἀνωμαλοττῆτα τιθόμεν. For a similar use of the concrete for the abstract, cf. Rep. 382 d: Ποιητῆς ἄρα σκευῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἐν.

1. γόητα] So the art of the λογατοι is described in Euthyd. 289 e: ἔστι—τής τῶν ἐποδῶν τέχνης μόροιν σμικρὸ τι ἑκείνης ὑποδεικτέρα.

4. νῦν ἡμέτερον—ἀνείναι] The near approach made in these words to an anapaestic tetrameter can hardly be accidental. And there is a tone of burlesque tragedy in the order of the words.

6. ἀμφιβληστρικὸ τινὰ] Sc. ὀργανῷ, viz. the εἰδος of μυθικῆ in which we have confined him. Cf. Euthyd. 302 b: ἡπορῶν τινα στροφὴν ἐφευγὼν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμου ἤδη, ὡσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημένου.


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ΤΕΑΙ. Λέγεις εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα ταὐτῇ ποιητέον.

ΤΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τόν παρελθησάμενον πρότον τῆς διαδρέσεως ἐγώγε μοι καὶ ύπνον μανίαν δύο καθοράν εἶδη τῆς μυμπτικῆς. τήν δὲ ἐπιτουμένην ἱδέαν, εν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ’ ἦμιν ὑδα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατός εἶται.

ΤΕΑΙ. Σῦ δ’ ἄλλ’ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ διέλε ἦμιν τίνε τῷ δύο λέγεις.

ΤΕ. Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἐστὶ δ’ αὐτὴ μάλιστα, ὡς ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν 10 παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τϊς εν μῆκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτὶ χρώματα ἀποδιδοῦσι ε τὰ προσήκουστα ἐκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζεται.

ΤΕΑΙ. Τῇ δ’; οὐ πάντες οἱ μμούμενοι τί τοῦτ’ ἑπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν;

ΤΕ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι γε τῶν μεγάλων ποῦ τι πλάτευσιν ἔργων ἡ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῦεν τὴν ing to all : at once special and general, individual and universal. Compare Phaedr. 265–273.


9. ὁρῶν] τῷ δύο λέγω is understood from the preceding sentence. The accusative is governed partly by λέγω, partly by ὁρῶν.


15. πάντες οἱ μμούμενοι τί] “All who try to imitate anything.”


17. ποὺ] “Anywhere,” “on any occasion.”
The false image is that, in which these only seem to be preserved, because of the position of the spectator.

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apparent proportions of a colossal statue. The words δύναμιν δ' εἰ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαίτα ἰκανῶς ὀρᾶν, μηδὲ εἰκός ὃς φησίν εἰκέναι, τι καλοῦμεν; ἃρ' οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μὲν, έοικε δὲ οὐ, φάντασμα;

THEAI. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκόν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦ τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ ξύμπασαν μιμητικήν;

THEAI. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ φαντάσματα ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἃρ' οὐ φανταστικὴν ὄρθοτατ' ἀν10 προσαγορεύομεν;

THEAI. Πολύ γε.

ΞΕ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν τῷ δύο ἐλεγον εἶδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιίης, εἰκαστικῆς καὶ φανταστικῆς.

Hence, there are two kinds of image-making, Likeness-making and Phantastic, of which painting is a conspicuous example.
Now in seeking to place the Sophist in one of these, we are encountered by the difficulty which has always beset the subject of appearance, seeming, and falsity.

**ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ορθώς.**

ΩΕ. "Ο δὲ γε καὶ τὸτ’ ἡμιφεγγόνων, ἐν ποτέρα τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέων, οὔδε νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλ’ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἀνήρ καὶ κατὶ-δεὶν παγχάλετος, ἐπει καὶ νῦν μάλα εὐ καὶ κομψὸς εἰς ἀπορον εἰδος διερευνησασθαί καταπέφευγεν.

**ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εοικεν.**

ΩΕ. "Αρ’ οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων ἡμύφης, ἡ σε οἶνον ρύμη τις, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειδησμένον, νῦν ἐπε-σπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ἡμύφησαι;

**ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς, καὶ πρὸς ὃ τι, τοῦτο ἑρήκας;**

ΩΕ. "Οντως, ὃ μακάριε, ἐσμέν ἐν παντάπασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δο-κεῖν, ἐναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταὐτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἢε ἐν τῷ ἑρή-

2. καὶ τοῦτ’] Supr. 235 d. βοδ. ποτέρα. "Now (this time) the argument was drawn on to make a hasty admission."

6. καταπέφευγεν] The same imagery occurs in Phileb. 64 e: ὃς ὁδίκα καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. Phed. 76 c: εἰς καλὸν καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος. The order of the words is noticeable. Διερευνησασθαί, which is introduced by an afterthought, depends immediately on ἀπορον.

8. Ἀρ’ οὖν αὐτῷ—] "Do you give your assent intelligently, or, from the habit of the argument, were you now drawn on, as by a sort of impetus, to assent at once?"

9. νῦν] This, the reading of the Bodelian and ΔΠ., is better than συνεπεσπάσατο, which has arisen out of the preceding verb. "Being accustomed by the argument to assent, you were now (this time) drawn on to make a hasty admission."

11. Πῶς] "With what meaning?"

καὶ πρὸς ὃ τι  "And with reference to what?" "What is the special difficulty, which you have in view?"

15. μεστὰ] Om. Bodl. ΔΠ. The ν of ἑστὶν was
first confused with the initial μ, and then the remaining letters ἐστα were lost.

(15.) ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὃπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρῆ συνέσεσθαι, τῷ ὑμὶν εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ ἡ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ ὑμῖν εἰσαγαγόμενον ἑναντιολογία μὴ συνέσεσθαι, παντά-


8. παντίν μὲν [ἡμῖν] οὖσιν, ἀρχάγχων μὲν καὶ διὰ τέλους] “It was in our boyhood that we heard him, but he never ceased to inculcate the same lesson.” The Stranger means to intimate that although he was young when he heard Parmenides he had good reason to remember this warning. ημῖν, omitted in most MSS., is read for μὲν in Β, C 1: Β, with the edition of Stephanus, giving also γε for δὲ. Hence Bekker reads παντίν ἁμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχάγχων τε καὶ διὰ τέλους.
1. τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο] Sc. μὴ τὸ μῆ ὧν εἶναι. "Uttered his testimony against this."
3. τοῦτο τοῦδε] The quotation occurs in the same form in the criticism of this passage by Aristotle in Met. XIII. 1089 a (ullo modo, Bessar. vers.), with the various readings δαμὴ E., δυνάμει T., μὴ δαμὴ Alex. Heindorf's conjecture, δάμε, has been adopted by the Zurich editors, and by Mullach (Fragmenta Philosoporum), who, however, expresses a doubt. Wagner, in Rhein. Museum, suggested λάργα. The conjecture φανῇ has occurred independently to the present editor and to Ueberweg, who also suggests δαμῇ. Cf. infr. 250 e: καθ' ἀπερ ἀν αὐτῶν διότερον εἴτε ἀμνοδιότερον εἴτε σιφέστερον ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ διότερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι. 258 d (where the lines are quoted again): Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε ὡς μόνον ὡς ἐστὶ τὰ μὴ ὡς ἀπεθείζαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὧς τυγχάνει ὡς τοῦ μῆ οὔτοσ ἀπεφηνέμεθα. Ἡμ. e: Μὴ τοιών ἡμὰς εἶπῃ τίς ὅτι τοιαύτα τοῦ οὕτου τὸ μὴ οὖν ἀποφαίνομεν τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἐστίν. Ἡμ. a: ἦ διότερον φύσις ἐφανή τῶν οὕτων οὕτω. Legg. 7, 818 b: οὔδ' θεὸς ἀνάγκη μὴ ποτὲ φανῇ μακρῶμεν. Rep. 7, 525 e: μὴ ποτὲ φανῇ. Karsten, followed by Stallbaum, defends the text on the ground that Parmenides is said to have given the maxim both in verse and prose. But it is puerile to imagine that he spoke verse and prose in the same breath, or that Plato would quote a conversational as part of a written utterance. It is certainly remarkable that the same corruption should be found in the copies of Plato and Aristotle.
4. διζήμενος] This is the reading of all the MSS. in this place. In the later passage, 258 d, where the words are again quoted, διζήμενος is read in C. H. and Corr. B.: ἡμεῖς Σ. has διζήμος: the rest διζήμος. The latter is probably Parmenides' word; but it is possible that Plato may have substituted the more prosaic διζήμενος for this, as in Thet. 173 e, in the quotation from Findar, φέρεται is probably substituted for πέτεται. The MS. reading is, therefore, retained in the text.
6. ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς] οὗτος Bodl. ΤΑΠ et pr. B. But see Thet. 151 a, αὐτός, and note. The variation is probably due to ὁ λόγος οὗτος above. ὁ λόγος,
Let us calmly consider this point, by analyzing the assertion—"Not-Being is."

**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.**

p. 237. 

To mēn ēmōn ōptη βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον, ἡ βέλτιστα διέξειν, σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἵθι καὶμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὀδὸν ἄγε.

**ΞΕ.** Ἄλλα χρή δρᾶν ταύτα. καὶ μοι λέγετο τὸ μῆδαμος ὅν τολμώμεν που φθέγγεσθαι;

**ΘΕΑΙ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

**ΞΕ.** Μὴ τοίνυν ἐρίδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδάς, ἀλλ’ 

ei σπουδῇ δέοι συμνοῆσαντά τινα ἀποφήμασθαι τῶν ἀκρωτῶν, ποί χρῆ τούνομ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ὄν.


7. φθέγγεσθαι] "We are not afraid to use the expression." Cf. Legg. 2, 655 d: τοῦτο—οὐδ’ ὄσον τὸ παράπον φθέγγεσθαι.

9. Μὴ τούνοι—παιδάς] Cf. Thuc. 155 a: οὐ δυσκολαίνωτες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι ἡμᾶς αὐτῶς ἐξετάζωτε. ib. 169 c: καὶ μοι πάντα τ[…] τὸ τοιῶδε, μὴ ποι παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων σοικομένου. The words here are not ironical, but mark the real importance of the inquiry. The sentence is broken by the introduction of the supposition, "Let us not put the question in a spirit of strife or mockery, but suppose one of the hearers of Parmenides had seriously to point out, after reflection, to what this name Not-Being must be given, to what object or kind of objects do we imagine he would be able himself to apply the term, and to direct the questioner to do so!" Parmenides is conceived as thus questioning one of his hearers in defence of his thesis. It is also possible to make the first clause a part of the supposition: "Suppose one of the hearers were asked, not in a spirit of strife or mockery, but in good earnest, to give his matured opinion." But the sentence when thus rendered, though more grammatical, is less conversational. Compare Philib. 44 e: δει δὴ σε, δ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δισχεραίνονσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Rep. 7, 516 e.

10. ἀποφήμασθαι] The Bodl., with corr. ΔΠ and pr. BE, has ἀποκρίνεσθαι, which is probably a corruption arising out of the κρ in ἀκρωτῶν.

M 2
1. ἐξειν [The Bodl. and Vat. have τι: six other MSS. οὔτε: Ven. P. τι ἐξειν: the other nine have ἐξειν. Stallbaum has adopted the Bodleian reading, and translates: "Quid censemus? enimam rei et qualis designando eum putamus et ipsum illud adhibiturum et quereni demonstraturum?" But he has not satisfactorily accounted for the appearance of ἐξειν, which makes perfectly good sense. For the emphatic position of εἰς τι, cf. Prot. 318 d: Ἰπποκράτης—βελτίων ἄπεισι γενόμενοι καὶ—ἐπιδώσει εἰς τι, δ Ἡρακλῆς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ: also Polit. 265 e: ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀρ ἐπιμελείαν ἐξειν φαινεται πότερα κ.τ.λ. The two next clauses present equally curious instances of inversion. Cf. also Legg. 6, 776 d: εἰς ἀλλα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέπωντας ἡμᾶς τι χρῆ ποιεῖν περὶ κτῆσεως οἰκετῶν; 2. δεικνύειν] Sc. ὥς χρῆ ἐπιφέρειν.

5. 'Αλλ' οὖν τοῦτο γε] I.e. to whatever else the term μὴ ὁν may be referred, it cannot be to any existing thing. τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τι] The reading of Ven. II. and seven other MSS. The Bodleian has ἐπὶ.

8. οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ τι φέρων] Cf. for similar examples of extreme analysis, Parm. 161 a: εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑκεῖνω καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑποκείμενοι μὴ ἐδαί τοῦ ἑκεῖνω καὶ ἄλλων πᾶσιν ἄναγκη αὐτῷ μετείναι. Theaet. 157 b, 202 a. Also Parm. 164 b: τι δὲ; τὸ ἑκεῖνω ἢ τὸ ἑκεῖνος, ἢ τὸ τι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ παράλληλον ἄναγκη αὐτῷ τηρεῖν. which, however, is rather parallel to the next ἀπορία.}

11. Καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ποιον φανερῶν] "This also is surely plain to us." and refers to τοῦτο γε δηλον above.

to τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα] This word "something." ῥῆμα seems to be thrown in by an afterthought, for the sake of explicitness; so giving τι the
force of an adjective, as in such expressions as ἡ Ἀττολίς αὐτῆς γυνῆ. Heindorf conjectures τὸ ῥῆμα, which appears in two MSS. Stallbaum renders ῥῆμα ἐπ’ ὦτι “as a predicate of being.”

15. λέγειν [μέν] [τίτ] τι, which appears in all the MSS., is not wanted, and, if genuine, is used in common parlance (cf. supr. 236 ε, λέγειν μὲν ἄτα) without reference to the preceding argument, just as the ordinary sense of εἶναι, δοκεῖν, etc., is often found within a few lines of the technical use of the same words. μὲν, which the Bodleian (not however Vat. Δ.) omits, is probably right, though the omission may be defended from Theat. 160 b: ἀἰσθανόμενον γὰρ, μηδὲνος δὲ ἀἰσθανόμενον. Ηβ.: γλυκὴ γὰρ, μηδὲνι δὲ γλυκὶ.

[μηδὲν] 1. e. μηδὲ ἐν. The argument from μὴ τοῖς may be thus resumed.—What is denoted by μὴ ἐν; No existing thing: and therefore not something: for every “something” exists: therefore, ὁ μὴ ἐν λέγων οὐ τι λέγει. But every something is some one thing: therefore, ὁ μὴ τι λέγων οὐδὲ λέγει. But (ὁ οὐδὲν λέγων) he who says nothing, does not say at all: therefore ὁ μὴ ἐν λέγων οὐδὲ λέγει. Compare Parm. 1.44 e, Theat. 189 e.

17. Τέλος γούν ἄν αἰτίας ὁ
ΞΕ. Μὴπω μέγ’ εἶπης’ ἐτι γὰρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἐστι, p. 238
καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη.
περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδα τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φησί; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνύητης.

5 ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ὄντι ποῦ προσγένοιτ’ ἀν τι τῶν ὄντων ἔτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντι δὲ τι τῶν ὄντων ἀρα προσγένεισθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ τῶν ἐξυμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰ πέρ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.

b ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν μὴ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μῆτε πλήθος μήτε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀν προσφέρειν.

λόγος ἓκω] ὃ λόγος, sc. τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι, as appears from αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ λόγου) below. “The saying must surely be thus reduced to the last stage of difficulty.”
1. Μὴπω μέγ’ εἶπης] There is a tragic tone in the expression. Cf. Legg. 1, 638 a: ὡ ἁριστε, μὴ λέγε ταῦτα.


3. τετι] Sc. ἀπορία, to be supplied from ἀπορίαν below.

3. περὶ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τῆν ἀρχήν] One which affects the very beginning of the whole matter, i.e. enters into the substance of the term itself, μὴ ὄν. Cf. supra. 233 b: τὴν ἀρχὴν—τοῦ λεγόμενος—ἀγγείως. The difficulty is this: the word μὴ ὄν or μὴ ὄντα cannot be uttered or thought without a contradiction: for μὴ ὄν has num-
ber, being singular, and μὴ ὄντα has also number, being plural: and number is existence: therefore, in uttering or thinking the word μὴ ὄν or μὴ ὄντα we attach existence to non-existence. In the former ἀπορία it was shewn that non-existence could not be an attribute. Here it is denied that non-existence can be the subject of any attribute: and yet the word cannot be uttered without implying attributes, such as unity or plurality. Cf. Parm. 164 b, quoted above, note on p. 84, l. 8.

12. Εἰ πέρ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι] I.e. That is most real of which we have the most distinct conception, and our conception of number is most distinct. This is one of the Pythagorean or later Platonic touches, which become more frequent in the Politicus.
238. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκον ἄν ὀρθῶς γε, ὡς ἐνεκέν, ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὡς φησίν ὁ λόγος.

�新 ὁ ἰ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαι ἀν τις ἦ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἦ τὸ μὴ ὄν χωρίς ἀριθμοῦ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε, πῆ;

ΕΕ. Μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἅρα οὐ πλη-κεθος ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΕΕ. Μὴ ὅν δέ, ἅρα οὐ τὸ ἐν αὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιον γε οὔτε ὀρθῶν φαμεν ὅν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμότευν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.

ΕΕ. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατοῦ ὀρθῶς οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθήναι τὸ μὴ ὄν ᾧτο καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἀδιανοητὸν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλλογον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐφευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρέων αὐτοῦ πέρι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; ἐτι μεῖζον τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἐχομεν;

ΕΕ. Τί δέ, ὥθησις; οὐκ ἐστίν αὐτοῖς τοῖς

10. μὴ ὅν δὲ] Sc. ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν.

15. Συναφεῖς] "Do you gather or collect" (as the sum of the preceding remarks).

16. ὀρθῶς] Cf. ὀρθῶν supr. That it can be uttered appears from our using the expression. Cf. supr. 237 b: τὸ μυθιστὸν ἀν τολμῶμεν ποὺ φθέγγεσθαι.

αὐτό καθ’ αὐτὸ] I. e. Not to speak of using it as a predicate or subject.

17. ἀδιανοητὸν κ.τ.λ.] “Un-thinkable, unspeakable, unutterable, and indescribable.”

20. Ἀρ’ οὖν] “Was I then wrong in saying just now that I would tell you the greatest difficulty?” I. e. A greater is behind.

24. Τί δέ, ὥθησις] I. e.
As Not-Being cannot be asserted or receive attributes, so neither can Not-Being be denied. For in saying "it is un
 speakable," &c., we attribute Being to it, and also unity: which this very word "it" implies.

"I am surprised that you do not see."

(24.) αὐτός τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν] Either the dative is governed by ἐν in ἐπιφαίνων, "Do you not see that this is implied even in what has been said?" cf. supr. 223 ε., ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται κ.τ.λ.; or (Heind. Stallb.) αὐτός τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν = καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων.

1. καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα] "Not-Being reduces its opponent, equally with its supporter, to the same straits," i. e. can neither be asserted nor denied. In the spirit of the Parmenides, Plato here points out that Not-Being neither is nor is not. Compare also Theætætus, 183 a, b. This argument has an important bearing on the whole dialogue. The impossibility of criticising Not-Being when conceived absolutely leads to the necessity of modifying the conception of Negation.

3. ἐκεῖνο] This pronoun is used for the sake of distinctness to prevent the further repetition of αὐτός with reference to a different subject.

8. ἄριστον] Supr. εἰς ἀπορίαν καθιστησί τὸ μὴ ὄν.

9. ἐπεί γὰρ τοι τὰ ἔγγρα, ὑπόθεσιν ἔτει ἀπανθετάτων. Viz. in the previous clause, τὸ μὴ ὄν δειν ἐμφανισθῆναι. This refers,
not, as Stallbaum says, to the preceding predicates generally, but to the word εἰναι in the previous sentence and ἔστιν supra.

(16.) ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν Supr. 238 a: Μὴ ὑμιν δὲ τι τῶν ὄντων ἀρὰ προσγιγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατον εἰναι; Καὶ πῶς;
2. τοῦτο προσάπτων] “In the act of applying Being to Not-Being, I addressed the latter as one,” viz. in using the singular verb ἔστιν: supr. c. εἰν is governed by διιεγόμην, not, as Stallb. says, by προσάπτων understood. “Did I not talk with it as one?” διαλεγόμαι is substituted, with a touch of liveliness, for προσαγορεύειν.

10. εἰνός γὰρ εἰδεί] So Bodl. and Δ, the rest vary between ἐν τε γὰρ εἰδεί (Γ ΑΒΔ, corr. Π. pr. EF), ἐν τε γὰρ εἰδεί (ΣΣΥΗ), and ἐν τε γὰρ ἢδη (ι? pr. Π?
edd. vett.), whence Heindorf conjectured ἐν τι γὰρ ἢδη, which Bekker has adopted. This deserves to be considered as possibly right: especially since the technical appearance of εἰδεί, when this had once crept in, might give rise to further corruption. But ωὲ seems to be required to complete the sentence as it would then stand: and the Bodleian reading is therefore here retained. It is unnecessary to add ἐν with the Zurich editors: the expression εἰνός εἰδεί προσαγορεύεσθαι = “to be spoken of under a form of unity,” is analogous to ὁνόματι or λόγῳ προσαγορεύεσθαι. Cf. Theut. 148 d: ὥσπερ ταῦτα—ἐὰν εἰδεί περιέλαβε, οὐτω καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐὰν λόγῳ προσεπείν. Πλ. 147 d: συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτι προσαγορεύεσμεν—τας δυνάμεις. Compare also Phileb. 64 ε: εἰ μὴ μακ δυνάμεθα ἰδέα τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεύσαι.

καὶ κατὰ ταῦτην τὴν πρόσρησιν] Viz. in being called αὐτό. This note, like some of the
THEAI. Παντάπασί γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε ἔτι τίς ἐὰν λέγοι; b καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἦττμένον ἐὰν εὑροί περὶ τὸν τὸν μὴ ὄντος ἐλεγχον. ὡστε εὖ ἐμοίη λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἰα δή, νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψάμεθα.

THEAI. Πῶς φήσι;

ΞΕ. ἦθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἄτε νέος ὄν, ὦ τι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν

But let the youthful might of Theaetetus preceding, would have been unnecessary, but for that of Stallbaum, who renders: "Si modo nomine aliquo designateur."

2. Τὸν ἐμέ] Cf. Theæt. 166 a, Phileb. 20 b.

τίς ἐὰν λέγοι;] "Who would any longer take account of me?" This reading is supported by nine MSS. (Bodl. εμετετεισι), and is preferable to that of the editions: τι τις ἐὰν λέγοι. But if the latter is accepted, it means not "what is to be said of me?" but "why should any one speak of," or "take account of, me?" Cf. supr. 224 a, λέγομεν, and note.


4. εὖ ἐμοίη λέγοντι—ἐν σοί] "Let us not study from my mouth the right mode of expression about Not-Being, but let us make the experiment on you." Cf. Rep. 5, 475 a: Εἰ Βούλει, ἐφη, ἐπ' ἐμού λέγειν.

5. καθάπερ εἶπον] Viz. supr.: οὐδὲν δὲι τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. Perhaps in λέγοντι there is a false echo from λέγοι.

6. εἰα δή] So ξι, with the old editions. The expression is "tragic," like Μῆπω μέγ' εἴπης, supr. 238 a; and does not appear too strong when compared with what immediately follows. The reading of most MSS., έα δη, is less spirited, and the construction έα σκεψάμεθα is questionable.

8. "ltk—αιτοῦ] "You have all the noble enthusiasm of youth. Come then, endeavour with all your might to make some right utterance about Not-Being, without attaching to it either substance or unity or plurality." "I should be possessed with a strange eagerness in making the attempt were I to try my hand when I see you in such extremity."

άτε νέος ὄν—πειράθητι] For a slightly different touch of ironical playfulness, (turning on the easiness and not, as here, on the difficulty of the question asked,) cf. Phileb. 65 b: Βλέψας εἰς τρία, νῦν καὶ ἄλλοθεν καὶ ήδονη, πολὺ ἐπιχωρίων χρόνων, ἀπόκριναι σαντικ. κ.τ.λ.

9. μήτε οὐσίαν—αιτοῦ] Com-
ΤΟΤΟΥ. 8ας εκείνοι προστιθείς τό μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὄρθων φθέγκασθαι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλῇ μὲν ἂν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἐξοι προ- c θυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθ' ὄρον πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρήσει.

Ε. Ἄλλα' εἶ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐώς ἐδραὶ δ' ἂν τινι δυναμένο φιλῶν τοῦ ἐνυγχάωμεν, μέχρι τοῦτο λέγωμεν ὅσ παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούρ- χως εἰς ἀπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέκουεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

Ε. Τοιγαρον' εἰ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἐξειν ψη- d ταστικὴν τέχνην ῥάδιος ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι ἡμῶν εἰς τοιναντίον ἀπο-

pare Parmen. 161 a: εἰ μέντοι μὴ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλον τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετείναι.

2. κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν. Cf. Theet. 171 c: ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέ- μεν τὸ ὀρθὸν. Several MSS. have κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.


8. παντὸς μᾶλλον καταδεδυκε] "has with unparalleled cunning hid himself in a very trouble- some cover." Cf. Rep. 4, 432 c: δυσβατός γε τις τὸ τόπος φα- νεται καὶ ἐπίκειος· ἐστι γοῦν σκο- τείνοι καὶ βουδαβεύνητος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἵπτεν. (mathematical) 

11. Τοιγαρον— ἀποκρυνεῖται] "Therefore when we call his art phantastic, by this method he will easily grapple with us and disarm us, asking, when we call him an image-maker, what we mean by an image generally. We must consider, then, Theetetus, what answer can be given to this question of our sinewy foe."

phantastikēn téchnēn] The main argument is here resumed from p. 236 c. 

12. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας] "A- vailing himself of this line of argument." Viz.: that just indicated, by which appearance is shewn to rest on Not-Being: and Not-Being is proved to be inconceivable. ἐκ here expresses the means.

13. ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι— λόγους] "He will grapple with us and retort our argument upon us, as it were binding our hands behind our backs." The implied metaphor in ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι— used frequently of an objector’s arguments—suggests the bolder image taken from the common expression ἀποστρέψατι τῶν τὰς
making, he will ask “What is an image?” And if we answer “a reflection, mould, or picture,” he will make as if he were blind, and ask for a definition that does not need the help of visible examples.

Στρέψει τοῦς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιῶν αὐτὸν καλῶ- p. 239 μεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ερωτῶμεν ἀποκρινείται.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὑδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδολα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τάλλα, ὃσα σου τοιαύτα ἐστὶν ἑτερά;

ΞΕ. Φανερός, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εἰ σοφιστὴν ὅν ἧω- ε 10 ρακώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Δόξει σου μὲν ἡ παντάπασιν οὖν ἐχειν ὃμματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὐτος αὐτῷ διδός, ἕαν ἐν κατόπτροις ἡ πλάσμασι λέγης τι, καταγελάσεται σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγης αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κατόπτρα οὔτε ὑδατα γεγνώ-

χείρας. Cf. Legg. 1, 626 e: πάλιν τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. Ι. e. “Let us make the converse statement.” Thetet. 191 c : πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βα-

σανίζειν. τοὺς λόγους is brought in παρά προσδοκιάν at the end of the sentence. Compare the metaphorical use of συμποδίζειν and παραποδίζειν.

1. ὅταν εἰδωλοποιῶν] For the double sentence (ei—ὅταν), cf. Thetet. 199 b : ὅταν—ὅτε. So also immediately below, where ὅταν is resumed by ἔαν.


ἐστι μὲν—τοιοῦτο τις ὁ τιμοκρα-


12. Δόξει σου μὲν] “He will seem as one who has his eyes shut.” δόκειν is used here to express an appearance volun-

tarily assumed. For μὲν, cf. Thetet. 163 e : ἢ καὶ μίνας.

16. ἡ πλάσμασι] Referring to τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα suprā.

For ἕαν resuming ὅταν, which was doubted by Heindorf, cf. Rep. 4, 445 a, b; Ib. 7, 529 b, c—where there is similar va-

riation in resuming with ἕαν.
r. 240. σκευν ούτε τὸ παράπαν όψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μένον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίον;

ΣΕ. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἄ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἥξιωσας ἐν προσεπείν ὑνόματι, φθεγξάμενος εἴ-5 δολον ἐπὶ τάσιν ὡς ἐν ὄν. λέγε οὐν καὶ ἀμύνων, μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν, τὸν ἀνδρά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δήτα, οὐ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἀν φαίμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τάληθινον ἀρωμομοιμένον ἔτερον τοιοῦτον;

1. τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων] In this, as in other respects, the Sophistic method is the caricature of that of Socrates. Cf. Theeat. 146, Meno 79. There is a strong likeness between the Sophist here described and the πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ μαθύφορος ἐν λόγοις ερώμενος, with whom Theatetus is threatened by Socrates in Theeat. 165 ε-ἐ: and there is certainly an analogy between the method now satirized and the ψιλοὶ λόγοι of which Theodorus speaks in the same dialogue (Theat. 165 a). Contrast, however, with this dialectical treatment of the difficulties attending the conception of Not-Being, the Eristic use of the same question by Euthydemus (Euthyd. 283 ε—285 a) and the retort of Socrates (ib. 286). The expression in the text perhaps indicates a certain reaction from the idea of basing knowledge on purely abstract definitions. Cf. supr. 234 ε, and compare the Euthydemus, especially p. 290. For the use of ἐκ (= What may be gathered from argument), cf. Gorg. 516 d: οὐκ ἄρ̄ ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἢν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. Οὐ σὺ γε φήσῃ. Μᾶ Δί', οὔθε γε σὺ, εἴ δὲν ὁμολογεῖς. τῶν λόγων] The word is here used in the more restricted sense of “abstract reasoning.”

4. τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων] “That which interpenetrates all these.” Cf. infr. 253 d: μίαν ἵδεν διὰ πολλὰν, ἐνὸς ἐκά-στου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντη δια-τεταμένην.

5. φθεγξάμενος—ἐν ἄν] The common term is not distinguished from the common nature.

7. τῶν ἀνδρα] The accusative is probably governed, ὑπερβάτων, by ἀμύνου, according to the inverted style of these dialogues. Heindorf, who connects ὑποχωρῶν τῶν ἀνδρα, compares Phileb. 43 a: ὑπεκτήραι τῶν λόγων ἐπιφερόμε-νον τούτον βούλωμα. But the parallel is impaired by the participle ἐπιφερόμενον.

9. πρὸς τάληθινον ἀφ.] “Fa- shioned to the resemblance of what is real.”
ΞΕ. Ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἄληθινόν, ἣ ἐπὶ p. 240.

τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐικὸς μέν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρα τὸ ἄληθινόν ὄντως ὃν λέγων;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτως.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; τὸ μὴ ἄληθινόν ἄρ' ἐναντίον ἄληθῷς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ὃν ὀντως* ὃν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐικὸς, εἶπερ

10 αὐτὸ γε μὴ ἄληθινόν ἔρεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἐστὶ γε μὴν πῶς.


6. τὸ μὴ—ἄρ' ἐναντίον] This rests on the conception of Not-Being as the opposite of Being, which it is one chief object of this dialogue to modify. Hence probably the emphasis (ἄρα, 'surely?') with which the question is put and answered (τί μὴν; 'of course'). The phrase εἰκὼν ὄντως occurs again in Legg. 2, 668 d.

9. οὐκ ὃν ὃν ὃν] The correction of the Zurich editors, which is both clearly intelligible and accounts for the variety of readings. Bekker, with most MSS., gives οὐκ ὄν; Bodl. ΔΠΙ, οὐκ ὃντως οὐκ ὄν: Ζ, οὐκ ὃντως οὐκ ὄν: Proclus, οὐκ ὃντως οὐκ ὄν. The reading of Ζ, which Hermann has adopted, is too abrupt an inference from the preceding lines, and anticipates the point which is made afterwards. αὐτὸ is unemphatic, and γε is to be taken closely with εἶπερ as modifying the whole clause. "You mean then by an image what is not really existent, if, at least, you will speak of it as unreal." Another way of correcting the passage is to read ὃντως οὐκ ὄν: "An image is of realities, but itself unreal." αὐτὸ would then be emphatic. But the former mode is simpler, and therefore better.

11. ΘΕ. Ἀλλ' ἐστὶ γε μὴν πῶς] This arrangement of the speakers is due to C. F. Hermann. The other editions and MSS. give Ἀλλ' ἐστὶ γε μὴν to the Stranger. To which Theaetetus answers πῶς; but receives no direct reply. This awkwardness is avoided by Hermann's arrangement; and Theaetetus is led to admit in so many words ὃτι ἡ εἰκὼν ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. Thus a point is covertly made towards the main argument.
It is really an unreality, though not really anything.

Thus the Sophist has forced us to admit that that which is not, is.

How then shall we consis-

For πως, cf. infr.: όμολογείν εἶναι πως, ἡ ποσ εἶναι τὰ μηδαμὴ ὄντα, εἶναι πος τὰ μὴ ὄντα.

1. Οὐκοῦν] Stallbaum reads οὐκοῦν, with nine MSS., for the vulg. οὐκ ὄν. But the answer of Theaetetus seems to require the negative οὐκοῦν.

γε, φύς] Bodl. ΔΠ, γ' ἔφην: probably from γε μὴν supra.

3. οὐκ δὲ—οὖσα] οὐκ ὄν because οὐκ ἀληθῶς, οὐκ ὄντως because οὐκ ἀληθῶς, ὄντως because εἰκών ὄντως. "What we call an image is really, without having reality, an unreal thing."

5. τοιαύτην τινα—συμπλοκήν] Cf. Legg. 9, 863 b: τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ τῶν ἐκουσιῶν τε καὶ ἀκουσιῶν ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεπόκειται.

7. ὀρᾶς γοῦν ὄντα] The Bodl. MS. gives these words only in the margin, where Gaisford reads ὀρᾶς ὄν, but the γ, though nearly lost, may be traced, where the words were blotted while the ink was still wet, on the opposite leaf. The Stranger recalls Theaetetus from merely wondering at the result to observe the point of the difficulty.

8. διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης] "Through this reciprocation of opposites."

πολυκέφαλον] I. e. "whom we have already slain in so many shapes." There is of course an allusion to the hydra. Cf. Euthyd. 297 c: τῇ—ἐδρα, σοφιστρίας οὕσα, καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνειστή, εἰ μιᾶν κεφαλῆν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμα, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μᾶς.

9. ἤνάγκασεν] So Bodl., with the nine MSS. mentioned by Bekker. Vulg. ἤνάγκασεν.
tently describe his art? Shall we say that he creates a false impression; that a false impression attributes being to non-existence, and vice versa;

ΣΕ. "Ωταν περι τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατάων p. 240. φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτὸν, τὸτε πότερον ψευδή δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχήν ἡμῶν φή-σομεν ὑπὸ τῆς εκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ’ έρομεν; 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Τούτο: τί γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο εὑταίμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πότερον μή εἰναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἢ πῶς εἰναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰναι πῶς τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεῦ-ποτὲ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἰναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο δὴ ψεῦδος; 10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ λόγος, οὔμαι, ψευδής οὔτω κατὰ ταῦτα [ταῦτα] νομισθήσεται τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μή εἰναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶσ γὰρ ἄν ἂλλοις τοιούτοις γένοιτο; 20

6. τάναντία τοῖς οὖσι] These- tetus is again made to assert the view of Not-Being as the opposite of Being, which is presently modified. See below, 258 e: Μὴ τοῦ ἡμὴς ὡς τοι το- ναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ἦν ἀποφα- νόμενον τοιμᾶμεν λέγειν ἃς ἔστιν. 14. δέ γε] So, λέγειν αὐτὴν δοξάζειν.

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ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

97

Ε. Σχεδον ουδαμος· αλλα ταυτα ο σοφιστης
ου φησει. ει τις μηχανη συγχωρεων τινα των ευ
φρονοντων, οταν αφθεγκτα και άρομα και άλογα
και αδιανοητα προδιωμολογημείαν ή τα προ τοιτων
όμολογηθεντα; μανθανομεν, η Θεατητε, ά λεγει; 5
ΘΕΑΙ. Πως γαρ ου μανθανομεν, οτι τανακια
φησει λεγειν ημας τοις υν δη, Φενωθει ηλομιστας
ειτειν ως έστιν εν δοξαις τε και κατα λογους; τω
γαρ μη οντι το δυν προσαπτειν ημας πολλακις άναγ
καζεοθαι, διομολογησαμενους υν δη που τοιτο ειναι
παντων αδιανωτατον.

Ε. 'Ορθως άπεμνημόνευσας, αλλ' ώρα δη βου
λευσθαι τι χρη δραν του σοφιστου περι' τας υπα
τηληψεις και αποριας, εαυ αυτων διερευνομεν εν τη

2. η τις μηχανη] He adopts
the tone of the Sophist.
4. προδιωμολογημεα] "When
it has been previously granted
(supr. 238 d) that the very
terms of the admissions which
have just been made are un
utterable," &c. Cf. Tim. 78 a :
προδιωμολογησαινου. Bodl. ΔΠ,
προσδιωμολογημεα : whence C.
Г. Hermann gives προδιωμо
λογημεα. But this reading is
without point.
τα προ τοιτων ομολογηθεν
τα] Heindorf observes that
Plato uses this periphrasis to
avoid the repetition of μη δυ.
The words refer to the discus
sion (of the nature of a likeness)
which precedes the mention of
dοξα and λογος, and which bris
tles with the forbidden expres
50 c : τα νυν πολλακις λεγομεν.
5. а λεγει*] Bekker, judg
ing from Gaisford's silence, re
ports λεγει as the Bodleian
reading. Unfortunately, this
MS. agrees with all the rest
except Par. F. in giving λεγει.
But the context leaves no room
for doubting that λεγει is right.
The Stranger has been speak
ing in the Sophist's person.
See φησει in the next line, and
compare the defence of Pro
tagonas in Theet. 166. For
μανθανομεν in the 1st pers. plur.,
cf. supr. 223 c, and note, also
Phileb. 51 d: άλλ' ἄρα μανθα
νομεν, το δος; ΠΡ. πειρωμαι μην,
δ σωκρατε.
8. κατα λογουν] This use of
κατα confirms the correctionκατα
dικαιοτημα in Theet. 201 d.
6, 777 e: διασφαλησει τι χρη
δραν περι απαντων των τουτων.
14. αντιληψεις "Handles for
objection." Lit. "Occasions
for laying hold," as in wrest
ling. Cf. supr. 239 d.

He will
turn upon
us and ask
how we
dare, after
what has
been said,
to utter
the word
'Not-
Being.'
τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοητῶν τέχνη τιθέντες, ὄρας ὡς p. 241 εὐποροί καὶ πολλαί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Μικρόν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, 5 οὐσῶν ὡς ἐπεὶ εἰπεὶν ἀπεράντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ [앤], ὡς έοικεν, [εἴη] τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐλείν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Τί δὴν; ἀποστροφήμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν ἔγογγε φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρὸν οὐί τῇ ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῇ τάνδρος ἐς μεν.

ΞΕ. Ἔξεσθον συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν ἔπες ἀγαπήσεις, εάν τῇ κατὰ βραχὺ παραστασάμεθα οὕτως ἵσχυρον λόγον;

6. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ] The Bodleian has τὰρ (sic), which suggests the possibility of a reading τάρ (= τοι ἄρα). But γὰρ is probably right. Cf. Theet. 190 ε.: οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα φαίνεται ψευδής εὖ ἣμιν οὐσὰ δόξα. Gorg. 454 d: Δῆλον γὰρ ἀδ ὅτι οὗ ταῖν ἐστίν. And Ἀσσ. Αγ. 218: Πανσακέμον γὰρ θυσίας παρθενίου θ' αἵματος ύρηγή περιφρόγοις ἐπίθυμεν δέμειν. Ἀνδ. 573.

[앤]—[εἴη] The former word is found in ΓΛΑΗ, and by a later hand in ΣΒ, the latter in every MS. except Ξ. Possibly Ἀδύνατον γὰρ (or τάρ'), ὡς ἔικε', ἂν εἴη may be the true reading.

11. καθάπερ νῦν εἴπες] viz. in saying εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν κ. τ. λ.
12. εάν τῇ καὶ] καὶ is probably to be taken intensively with κατὰ βραχύ; cf. supr. 240 ε.: εἴπερ πείσεσθαι ποτὲ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ. "If we should flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument." The metaphor from wrestling is continued throughout. Cf. Philib. 41 b: προστρόφωμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθλητα πρὸς τοῖτον αὐ τὸν λόγον. παραστασάμεθα] Lit. "pull ourselves aside, draw aside;" i.e. release ourselves from the contest. Cf. Soph. El. 732: ἕως παραστά τα (sc. τοὺς ἵππους) κάνακωκεῖ. The middle voice is here directly reflexive, not as in Dem. Olynth. 1, 10: μὴ παραστάσηται τι τῶν ὀλων πραγμάτων. Compare the use of ἀπόσπασθαι in Xen. Anab. 1, 5: § 2: πολλά γὰρ ἀπόσπαστο φεύγουσα. Those, however, who prefer the latter meaning here (reading εάν πῇ τί, with Badh. conj.), may compare Theet. 196 d: τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀνασχιντεῖν; For the personification, cf. ib. 148 ε.: εἰ—τοῦ ἀκμαίοντος καὶ ταχιστοῦ ἵτηθης.
THEAI. Πῶς γὰρ οὖχ ἐξώ;  
Ε. Τόδε τοίνυν ἐτι μᾶλλον παρατούμαι σε.  
THEAI. Τὸ ποίον;  
Ε. Μὴ με οίον πατραλοῦαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαι τινα.  
THEAI. Τί δή;  
Ε. Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαίον ἢμῖν ἀμύνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζομαι τὸ τε μὴ ὅν ως ἐστὶ κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὅν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ πη.  
THEAI. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.  
Ε. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν φαίνεται καί, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, τυφλῶ; τοῦτω γὰρ μήτε ἑλεγχθέντων μήτε  

8. βιάζομαι—ός] "To prove by main force that—." The idea is not that of necessary demonstration, but that of establishing something against appearances. Cf. infr. 246 b: νορτὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὶ βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθίνην οὐσίαν εἶναι. Theat. 153 c: ἀναγάκιο—ός. Symp. 202 a: μὴ τοῖνυν ἀνάγκαζε, ἀ μὴ καλὸν ἔστιν αἰχμῷ εἶναι. Cf. Legg. 8, 841 d, where βιάζομαι is used of effecting something paradoxical and difficult in practice.  

11. Φαίνεται—λόγοι] The Bodl. MS., with Δ and pr. Π., om. διαμαχητέον, which C. F. Hermann accordingly rejects, with the remaining words, retaining only φαίνεται. "Languidum additamentum totum circumscripti." But it may be retorted that, especially considering the formal style of the dialogue, φαίνεται alone in this place is abrupt and bare. Cf. also διαμαχήμενοι, infr. 256 d.  

13. καί] To be taken with τυφλῶ: the words τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο being thrust in between. Cf. supr. 218 a, καί, καθάπερ εἴπε δακρύης, πάσι κ. c. and note. See also Rep. 5, 465 d: Δήλον, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῶ.  

14. ἑλεγχθέντων] The Bodl., with ΔΠΒι, has μήτε λεχθέντων, which is weak; ἑλεγχθέντων is right. "Unless this refutation and this admission is secured." I. c. unless the saying of Parmenides is refuted and the existence of the non-existent admitted. Cf. infr. 242 b: τὸν ἑλεγχὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. In Theat. 188 d sqq., it is shewn to be impossible to think what is not, because all thought must have a real object. As Mr. Grote remarks, this and other negative arguments of the
ομολογηθέων σχολή ποτέ τις οίος τε ἦσται περὶ p. 241. λόγων πευδών λέγων ἡ δόξης, εἰτε εἰδώλων εἰτε εἰκόνων εἰτε μιμημάτων εἰτε φαντασμάτων, αὐτῶν, ἡ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὡσαί περὶ ταυτά ἐστι, μὴ κατα-5 γέλαστος εἶναι τὰ ἑναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῶ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. Διὰ ταύτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἑπιτίθεσθαι τῷ p. 242. πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἡ τὸ παράπαν ἑστέον, εἰ τοῦτο τις ἐβίβαζε δρᾶν ὅκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τούτο γε μηδὲν μηδαμὴ ἐφέξη.

ΞΕ. Τρίτον τοῖνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτή-σομαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΞΕ. Εἰπόν που νῦν δὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταυτ' ἐλεγχον ἀεί τε ἀπειρήκος ἐγὼ τυγχάνοι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶπες.

Thevetetus are not directly refuted in the Sophistæ. It is rather the negative mode of arguing generally which is criti- cized.

3. αὐτῶν, ἡ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν] "themselves, or the arts which relate to these." αὐτῶν refers to all the preceding genitives. Cf. Rep. 3, 398 a: εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφι- κότο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείκ- ἔσθαι. The other rendering, according to which αὐτῶν refers to φαντασμάτων alone as the very subject-matter of the Sophist's art, is not so good.

8. Διὰ ταύτα μέντοι] "Ob- 15 vious as this truth is, it com- pels us—"
p. 242. ΞΕ. Φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μὴ ποτὲ διὰ ταύτα σου μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβάλλων ἐμαυ- tον ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθυσόμεθα, ἐάντερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοῖνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμὴ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἀν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐλέγχον τούτον καὶ τὴν ἀπό- δείξεω τῆς, θαρρῶν ἦθι τούτον γε ἔιεκα.

ΞΕ. Φέρε δὴ; τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἄν ἀρξαίτο παρακνδωνευτίκοι λόγοι; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδ', ὅ παλ, τὴν ὀδὸν ἀναγκαιότατην ἠμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίαν δὴ;

ΞΕ. Τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψα- c σθαὶ πρῶτον, μὴ πη τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὁμεν περὶ


2. παρὰ πόδα] "At the first step," "at each step," "at every other step." The expression is used of persons in motion, as πάρ ποδὶ, in Pindar, of persons at rest. Thus Soph. Phil. 838: πολὺ παρὰ ρόδα κράτος ἄρνται. In the present passage παρὰ seems to have the additional meaning of alteration, as in παρ’ ἡμέραν.

μεταβαλλων] The tense corresponds to that of δόξω, otherwise μεταβάλλων would have seemed more natural, especially with ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Cf. Phaed. 96 b: πολλάκις ἐμαυ- τῶν ἄνω κατὰ μετέβαλλον. But in the present case only one change "to and fro" is spoken of.

3. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν] Compare the language of Socrates in the fifth book of the Republic, before advancing his theory of communism, 450 c. See also ib. 473 c. Such ex- pressions of reluctance perhaps receive some light from the passages in the Epistles, if genuine, where it is said that the philosopher will not choose to fix his thought in writing.


13. μὴ τεταραγμένον] "Lest we should have fallen into some confusion in regard to these With this view it will be necessary to examine some ideas which are thought to be clear, but may prove to be confused.
things, while glibly interchanging arguments, as if we were quite clear on the subject."

4. Εὐκόλως] "Complacently;" "with easy confidence;" "with good-humoured composure;" "in an easy-tempered way." Cf. Thect. 166 a : δ ῥαθυμότατε 

Εὐκόλας — διειλέχθαι[ Plato means what Aristotle expresses where he says that Dialectic had no place in early philosophy. οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετείχον. Αγ. Met. A. 6. 987 b. Compare the language of an article in Fraser's Magazine for February 1865: "In older theology there seems (of course with brilliant exceptions) to have prevailed this general defect—that endless controversies, and defences, and attacks, have gone round and round these sacred terms without even asking what they mean." The question of Not-Being is relative to that of Being: hence, in order to solve the difficulties which have arisen, it is necessary to examine this, the most familiar and fundamental of all ideas. This is done historically, through a criticism of the results of previous and contemporary thought, involving the unwelcome task of putting the words of Parmenides to the torture. The conjecture of Badham, οὐχ ἡλώς = ἡλῶσ οὐ, for εὐκόλως, is not convincing.

Cf. Legg. 11, 922 e: Μαλβακοὶ ἐμοι, ζ Ἀκενία, δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι νομοθετοῦντες γεγονόναι καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βλέποντες τε καὶ διανοούμενοι νομοθέτων.

"I think that Parmenides, and all who have hitherto arisen to determine the ultimate number and nature of existences, have shewn in their conversation with us a sort of easy, good-humoured composure."

"In what way?"

"They seem to me to treat us like children, and to tell us stories, each one for himself; one relating that there are Beings three, which sometimes maintain a desultory warfare, but sometimes they make peace again, and marry, and bring forth children and rear them; another speaks of Two, as Moist and Dry, or Hot and Cold, which he brings together and consorts in marriage. But the tribe of the Eleatics from our quarter, beginning with Xenophanes, or even earlier, are the authors of a different tale, and fable that what we call 'all things' are One Being. Then certain Muses of Ionia, and others of later birth in Sicily, in taking up the parable have seen that it is safer to combine both histories and to say that Being is Many and also One, held together by hate and love. For, say the Muses of firmer
tone, Being is ever sundered, ever combined: while those, who prefer a softer melody, relax the ‘ever,’ and say that All is sometimes one and friendly by Aphrodite’s power, but sometimes many and at enmity with itself by reason of a certain principle of strife.”

1. ἐπὶ κρίσιν—τοῖς—διωρίσασθαι Either “went forth to decide the question of determining”—where the pleonasm, though somewhat harsh, is not inconsistent with the style of these dialogues. For κρίσιν in this sense, cf. Euthyphr. 7 d : ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων οὐ διωκόμενοι ἀφικέσθαι—ἐπὶ ἰκανήν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν. Or, “entered the arena to contend for the honour of determining.” Cf. Legg. 12, 943 d : εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρμοστείων κρίσιν. Soph. Trach. 266: πρὸς τὸ θεόν κρίσιν. Philoct. 1050: ὅπου δικαίων κάγαθων ἀνδρῶν κρίσις. According to the latter rendering, Parmenides and the rest are supposed to bring their theories for judgment before the reason of mankind.

2. πῶσα τε καὶ πῶια] Some interpreters suppose that πῶσα refers to the earlier and πῶια only to the later theories. (infra. 245 e, sqq.) But although the former asked “Is Being One or how many,” and the latter, “Is Being corporeal or ideal,” this distinction is probably not tendered by these words. And the question of ποιημα is already involved in theories of hot and cold, moist and dry, harmony or discord, and the like.


ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία—ἐκδιδώσων] The few remaining fragments of the earliest philosophy do not enable us to say what thinkers are thus briefly indicated: probably some belonging to the earlier Ionic school. The metaphorical language seems to point to a period when philosophy still retained a considerable tinge of others who have sought to define the number and nature of existence, have not been careful to
cosmogonical mythology. Thus Pherecydes might be said to have asserted three principles, Zeus, Time, and Earth, as the basis of his cosmogony. The dualists here mentioned have been supposed to include Arche- lans, who, according to Diog. Laert. II. 16, 17, έλεγε δυό αϊτίας έναι γενέσεως, θερμόν καὶ ψυχρόν, and who, in describing the production of the animals, says that they sprang from the increasing warmth in the lower parts of the Earth, ὅπον τὸ θέρμων καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐρίσγετον. But, as Steinhart observes, (Sophist. note 22,) the dualism of heat and cold is a theory of the Universe probably older than Parmenides, who speaks of this as the philosophy of opinion. There is of course no allusion to Parmenides in these words. He is included in the 'Ελεατικὸν ἔθνος mentioned immediately afterwards.

2. γάμονσα—παρέξεται] "Are found to marry," &c.

5. τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν] I. c. εἰς 'Ελεώς. Heindorf and Stall- baum prefer ἡμῶν, which appears in C. H. Σ, a b. c, and in the quotations of Eusebius and Theodoret. But ἡμῶν is pre-

ferable both as the reading of the best MSS. and as the less obvious reading: "The school that came forth from us."

ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνονσ τε καὶ ἐτὶ πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνός ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλομένων οὗτοι διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ίάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ύστερον
Heraclitus, and his speculation is viewed by Plato as that of Heraclitus in a less exact form. See the speech of Eryximachus in the Symposium, who treats of Love in the spirit of Empedocles (187 a, b): τὸ ἐν φήσιν ('Ἡράκλειτος) διαφερόμενον αὐτῷ ἐξήφησαν, ὥστε ἀρμονίαν τὸδον τε καὶ λυράς. ἦσστε δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρμονίων φαίνει διαφερέσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφερομένων ἢτι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸδε ἐξουλετο λεγεῖν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφερομένων πρότερον τοῦ ὄξος καὶ βαρέος, ἑπετα ἑστερὸν ὀμολογήσαντον γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μονακῆς τέχνης. The words πολλὴ ἀλογία in this extract are a good comment on ἀσφαλεστάτων in the text.


4. συντονώτεραι — μαλακώτεραι] These are musical terms, as Boeckh has shown in his contribution to Heindorf's note upon this passage: "Desumpta vocabula sunt, et mel. a colore s. χρῶα in musicis generibus. Etenim ex sex illis coloribus unus in enharmonico, duo in diatonico, tres in chromatico genere sunt. In chromate est color ἡμιλοί, color τονιαῖος et μαλακὸς, s. ἡμιλοί χρῶα, τονιαῖος s. σύντονον χρῶα et χρῶα μαλακῶν. In diatono duo colores sunt διάτονον σύντονον et διάτονον μαλακῶν. Illa σύντονα sunt inventoria, μαλακὰ molliora. Euclid. Introd. Harmon. p. 10, 11. Aristox. Harm. Elem. I. p. 24 sqq. Gaudent. Harmon. Intr. p. 17: "Notandum autem illud ἐκάλασαν, quod est in musicis in μαλακῇ χρώᾳ." Encl. p. 11: μαλακῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου πυκνοῦ ὀστίτως καὶ χρῶαι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πυκνῶν χρῶα ἀνέστατα τε καὶ ἐκλύεται." Cf. also Rep. 3, 398 e: Τίνες οὖν μαλακὰ—τῶν ἀρμονῶν. Ιαστί, ἡ δ' ὁς, καὶ Λυδιστί, αἰτίως χαλαρὰ καλοῦνται, where the "soft Lydian airs" are spoken of with a metaphorical meaning. The point here is that the union of one and many was more thorough in Heraclitus than in Empedocles. A similar application of these musical expressions is made by Aristotle, Polit. IV. 3, in drawing a parallel between music and government, in both of which he says the ordinary kinds are divergences from the one or two best: παρεκθαίσεις, τάς μὲν τίς εὖ κεκραμένη ἀρμονίας, τάς δὲ τῆς ἀριστοτείς πολιτείας, ὀλγαρχικὰ μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τάς δὲ ἀνεμίνες καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικὰς.
For when they say "Many," "One," "Two," "the ad-

5. χαλεπῶν] Sc. εἰπείν, which is absorbed in what follows. 

καὶ πλημμέλες — ἐπιτιμᾶν] Compare the structure of Theat. 146 b: ὡς αἰσταίνω, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμα, οὔτε ὦν ἐθηλήσας, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νέοτέρον ἀπείθειν.


7. εἰκεῖνο] "That former thing," viz. what was implied in εὐκόλως κ.τ.λ.

9. ὑπερβάλλει] "Looking over our heads." This was the error which Dialectic, or the Socratic dialogue, was calculated to re-


14. "Οταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται "When one of them utters his saying, 'Many, one, two,' have been born, are created, or speaks of heat interpenetrating with cold, while he elsewhere postulates separations and combinations, I pray you, Theaetetus, do you at all then understand their meaning?" Note the redundant participle, as in ἐφὶ λέγων.

6. ὡς — ὑποτείνει] There is an emphasis on each of the words ἔστιν, γέγονε, γίγνεται, πολλά, ἐν, δύο, θερμῶν, ψυχρῶν, διακρίσεις, συγκρίσεις.

16. ἀλλοθ' πε] Either, "in some other part of his treatise," or "as taking place in some other region." For θερμ. ψ. συγκ., cf. Archelaus ap. Hippol.
243. καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτίθεσις, τούτων, ὦ Θεάτητε, ἐκα-  
stote σὺ τι πρὸς θεῶν ἔννεις ὁ τι λέγουσιν; [ἔγὼ  
μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἢν νεότερος, τοῦτο τε τὸ νῦν ἀπο-  
ρούμενον ὁπότε τις εἶποι, τὸ μὴ οὖν, ἀκριβῶς ἦμων  
ἔννειαν; νῦν δὲ ὅρᾶς ἦν ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς  
ἀπορίας.]

e ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρῶ.

ΞΕ. Τάχα τοῖνυν ὅσων ὦχ ἦςσον κατὰ τὸ ὄν  
ταύτων τούτῳ πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν  
tοῦτο εὔποροιν φαινέω καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ  
θέχεξθαι, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὐ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα  
ὁμοίου ἔχουσε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ΞΕ. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρήμενων  
ἡμῖν ταύτων τούτῳ εἰρήσθω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παννυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τῶν μὲν τοῖνυν πολλῶν περὶ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο  
σκεψόμεθ', ἀν δὸ γὰρ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ  
d ἀρχηγοῦ πρῶτου νῦν σκεπτέοιν.

Ref. Hær. I. 9: θερμαινομένης  
tῆς γῆς πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει,  
ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν  
ἐμίστην,

1. τούτων] Neut.
3. τοῦτο τε[τε] τε is without  
correlative: whence Herm.  
conj. γε, which has no meaning,  
Par. H. σου τότε, which cannot  
be right, but suggests the conj.  
tότε γε. But, as the Bodleian MS.  
omits τό, it seems most likely  
that τό was first corrupted into  
tε, and then again inserted.  
Hence τε is to be omitted.  
Otherwise we must suppose  
that the apodosis is absorbed  
in the words τάχα τοῖνυν ἵσως  
οὐχ ἦττον κατὰ τὸ ὄν κ.τ.λ. For  
which, cf. Phaedr. 265 d: εἰς μίαν  
tε ἰδέαν συνωρύντα ἔγειρεν κ.τ.λ.  
5. ἰνα—τῆς ἀπορίας] “What a  
point we have reached in the  
perplexity about Not-Being.”  
The article is used because the  
difficulty attaching to the  
notion of μὴ ὄν is by this time  
familiar.  
14. τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προειρήμε- 
νων] γεγονός, γένεσις, πολλά, ἐν,  
δύο, θερμῶν, ψυχρῶν, διακρίσεις,  
sυγκρίσεις.

18. τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ]  
“The mightiest and chiefest.”  
Being is spoken of with pro- 
found reverence, as in Rep. 6,
in the light of existing theories.

We first interrogate the philosophers who hold that ALL is resolvable into two ultimate existences. When they say that these two exist, what do they mean? Do they postulate existence as a third element, or identify it with one

1. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἦ δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι τὸ ὄν ϕής p. 243. πρῶτον δὲν διερευνήσασθαί, τι ποθ' οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἤγούνταί; ΞΕ. Κατὰ πόδα γε, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω 5 γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, ὅνιν αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπτυχθεῖμενον δοῦδε. Φέρε, ὅποιοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἦ τινε ὄν του ὁ πάντ' εἶναι φατε, τι ποτὲ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἐπὶ ἀμφότερον φθεγγέσθε, λέγοντες ἀμφω καὶ ἕκατερον εἶναι; τι τὸ ἐἶναι ὁ τοῦτο ὑπολάβασμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτων παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πάν, ἀλλὰ ἡ δύο ἐτὶ καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθόμεν; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τού πε γ νῦν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὃν ἀμφότερα ὤμοιος εἶναι λέγετε: σχεδὸν γὰρ ἵν ἀμφότερος ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύο εἶτιν.

15 1. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

509 b, c: οὐκ οὐσίας ὥστοι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτί ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐ- σίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερε- χωντος.


4. Κατὰ πόδα (sc. ἐπόμενος)] "At the heels." "Following my footsteps closely." (Cf. Soph. (Ed. Col. 197: ἐν—βάσει βάσιν ἀρμοσαί.) The plural κατὰ πόδας is the more usual form; but the sing. occurs again Legg. 11, 918 a: κιβὸλοιος δ' ἐπιστρεφόμεν ἐπέται κατὰ πόδα καπηλίας ἐπιτρεψάμενα.

6. αὐτῶν] Probably em- phatic, "as if the men them- selves were personally present here."

II. Ῥ δύο ἐτὶ καθ' ὑμᾶς] "And no longer two according to your theory." I. e. either, "must we give up your theory and make three principles in- stead of two?" or, "must we understand you to assert three principles instead of two?" The former way of taking the words is more pointed, but the latter is in better keeping with the context.

14. ἀμφότερος] "Both ways." I. e. either, "as Being is identi- fied with one only, and as the one term Being is predicated of both alike" (the latter part of this argument loses force when the nature of predication is clearly understood), or, perhaps better, ἀμφότερος = "Whichever of the two is identified with Being."
ΞΕ. Ἀλλ’ ἀρα τὰ ἄμφω βουλευότατα καλεῖν οὐ.
ΤΩΕΙ. Ἡ ἀριστ.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ’, ὁ φίλοι, φήσομεν, καὶ οὐτώ τὰ δύο λέγωτο ἄν σαφέστατα ἐν.
ΤΩΕΙ. Ὁρθότατα εύρηκας.

ΞΕ. Ἐπειδῆ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἦπορήκαμεν, ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ἦμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἰκανῶς, τί ποτὲ βουλευότατα σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὦν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἡμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν φόμεθα, νῦν δ’ ἦπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τούτ’ αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρ’ ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνεται πάν τῶν τούναυτιῶν.

Ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες τε καὶ ἄξιοῦντες παρὰ τε τούτον καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν, ὅσοι πλεῖον ἐνὸς λέγοντι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὡς παῖ, τι πλημμελήσομεν;
ΤΩΕΙ. Ἡ κυστά γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; παρὰ τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λέγοντων ἄρ’ οὖν πεντετέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτὲ λέγοντι τὸ ὅν;
ΤΩΕΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθωσαν. Ἔν ποῦ 20 ἦν ἀριστήρα

| p. 243 | ΞΕ. Ἀλλ’ ἀρα τὰ ἄμφω βουλευότατα καλεῖν οὐ; ΤΩΕΙ. Ἡ ἀριστ. |
| p. 244 | ΞΕ. Ἀλλ’, ὁ φίλοι, φήσομεν, καὶ οὐτώ τὰ δύο λέγωτο ἄν σαφέστατα ἐν. ΤΩΕΙ. Ὁρθότατα εύρηκας. |

The same arguments will apply to all who hold a plurality of natures.

Then let those who assert One
Being tell us what they mean.

Are Being and Unity two names for the same thing? It will puzzle them to answer this, or indeed any question. For how can there be two names, or a name at all, when there is nothing beside the One Being? Unless the

11. καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ ὧτιν] "And not only so, but in answer to any other question."
12. οὐ πάντων ῥάστων] "Not the easiest thing in the world." Cf. supr. 218 c. I venture to think that this is the true reading also in Rep. 6, 497 d, instead of οὐ πάντων ῥάστων. πάντως was the reading of Stephanus (apparently with C E) in this place, and of σὺ in 218 c. Cf. Legg. 6, 779 e: οὐ πάντων εὐκολῶςταν.
18. λόγον οὐκ ἐν ἔχων] C. F. Hermann has reverted to the reading of the old edd. λόγον οὐκ ἐν ἔχων. But it is unnecessary to alter ἔχων, which is the reading of the best MSS. The participle corresponds to the adjective καταγελαστὸν in the previous clause: and ἂν is more forcible with the participle ("is a thing which cannot square with reason") than it would have been here with the optative ("would be unreasonable"): ἐστι, not εἶπ, must be supplied. Cf. Theet. 164 a: ἐπαντῆμον τούτων γέγονεν οὐσίν ὦρων. Infr. 257 d: τοῦτον οὖν ἀνάλημα ἐρῶμεν ἢ τιν ἔχου ἡπωμενίαν; Θ. ἔχων. "This is an admission which they can never make consistently. For if the name is other than the
thing, there are two: if the same, the name either denotes nothing, or itself only. Hence if they admit that a name is anything, their One Being becomes the name of a name.”


10. Καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἐνὸς [ἐν] ὀν μόνον, καὶ τούτῳ ὀνόματος +αὐτῷ ἐν ὄντι.

The emendations hitherto made are satisfactory. The Bodl., with Δ1, has τοῦ ὀνόματος. The MSS. give αὐτῷ ἐν ὄν.

Stallb. : καὶ οὗ ποῖν ὀνόματος αὐτῷ ἐν ὄν.

(This is not dialectic but common sense.)

Herm. : ἐνὸς ἐν ὄνομα ὄν, καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος αὐτῷ ἐν ὄν.

Badham : καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἐνὸς ἐν ὄν μόνον καὶ τούτῳ ὀνόματος δ’ οὗ τὸ ἐν ὄν. But how does this help to prove that all questions are alike unanswerable on the Eleatic principle?

Steinhart: καὶ τὸ ὄν γε, ἐνὸς ὄν ὄνομα, καὶ τούτου ὄντος ὀνόματος αὐτῷ ὄν ὄνομα.


The two last mentioned attempt to resume and complete the argument from τίς ὄν—ἀπόκρισις. And it is clear that the sentence contains an application of the preceding remark to the One Being.

Perhaps the words αὐτῷ ἐν ὄν may be the remains of

name be identified with the thing, in which case it is either the name of nothing or the name of itself, that is, of a name. And Being is but the name of One, which is a name. Further, their One Being is
conceived as Totality. But if it be a whole, "Like every way unto a rounded sphere," it then has parts, viz. centre and circumference. And that which has parts may be one as partaking of unity, but cannot be the same with unity, for unity is without parts.

some marginal note (e.g. αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐνός, explaining ὄνοματος), and Plato may have written καὶ τὸ ἐν γε ἐνός ἐν ὀνομα ὡν, καί τοῦτο ὄνοματος. "And (it will result) that the One also is the one name of One, and that of a name." I.e. Not only is Being not another name for Unity, or Unity for Being, but Unity is the name only of a name." The drift of the preceding argument is the following:

"Are ἐν and ὡν two names for the same thing?"

"Are they even two names? Or can there be both name and thing?"

"Even the one name ἐν can only be the name of a name."

5. ὁλον ἐστίν] Sc. τὸ ὡν. So far unity has been attained by merging all things in the mere name ὡν. But is not τὸ ὅλον still distinct from this? I. τοῦ ἐνός ἐχειν ἐπί τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν ὀνόματος ἄποκω-ιıcıς, καί ταύτη δὴ πᾶν τε ὕν καί ὅλον ἐν ἐιναι.

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p. 245. ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἄρ' ὦκ ἄδύνατον αὐτῷ γε τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀμερές δὴ ποὺ δεὶ παντελῶς τὸ γε ἄληθῶς ἐν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρήσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεί γὰρ ὦν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὦν ὦν συμφωνήσει τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω.

ΞΕ. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχου τὸ ἄνω τοῦ ἐνος ὦτως ἐν τε ἔσται καὶ ὦλον, ἡ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὦλον εἶναι τὸ ὦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὴν προβεβλήκας αἴρεσιν.

ΞΕ. Ἀληθήσατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθὸς τε γὰρ τὸ ὦν ἐν εἶναι ποσ, ὦ τοιοῦτον ὦν τῷ ἐνὶ φαινεται, καὶ τὸν ἔστω ἐνος ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

1. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα] Compare the language of Parm. 147 c–148 c: ἐπετόθη τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τᾶλα ἐκάλων ὦτατώς, ταύτη ταῦταν ἄν πεπονθότα εἶν το τέ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τᾶλα τῷ ἐνὶ κ.τ.λ.

2. τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι] The pronoun αὐτῷ is added where the subject has been thrown back to the beginning of the sentence, as in Rep. 5, 477 d: ἐπιστήμην πότερον δίναμιν τινα φής εἶναι αὐτῷ;

10. Πότερον δὴ] Ι. ε. "Is Being one only by participation in unity, and a whole in this way, or is Being not to be thought of as a whole at all?"

τὸ ἄνω τοῦ ἐνος] The MSS. agree in giving ὦλον, but ὦν, the correction of Schleiermacher, is absolutely required. The same corruption occurs in Prot. 361 b. The Bodleian, by giving τῷ ἄνω λόγῳ just above, betrays the tendency which has produced the error. Cf. Theaet. 149 c, ἄρόκος (Bodl. ἄρόκος with ἂροπάτατος above): Ιβ. 158 c, ὑπὸ χρή (Bodleian ὑπὸ χρόνῳ χρὴ, with χρόνου below).


14. Ἀληθήσατα μέντοι λέγεις] "You are right. It is truly difficult."
and there arises a plurality of elements. And in the latter case, supposing a whole to exist, there exists something outside of Being: and moreover there is again plurality.

"If Being is not a whole through participating in unity, and the nature of the whole exists, Being then falls short of Being" (does not contain all that exists).

Is Being abstract or concrete? If abstract, Being is not a whole, or finite. If concrete, Being is separate from abstract Unity. In the latter case there are two principles. In the former, (a) if a whole exists, not only are there two principles, but something exists apart from being: and (8) if a whole does not exist, Being could never have come to be, for what has come to be is completed as a whole. This last argument is much in the spirit of the Parmenides. Compare also Phileb. 15 b: πῶς (δει υπολαμβάνειν) μιαν ἑκάστην οὕτως ἐκείνη καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὀλέθρων προσθεχε-μένην, ὡμοί εἶναι βεβαιώτατα μίαν ταύτην. The Eleatic would of course reply that he denies γένεσιν altogether. And so Plato would have reasoned at an earlier time.


16. γέγονεν ὅλον] Cf. Parm. 153 c: Καὶ μὴ μορία γε φήσο-μεν ταύτ' εἶναι πάντα τάλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 115

p. 245. οὔσιαν οὗτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τοῦ ἐν ηῇ τὸ ὠλον ἐν τοῖς οὕτως μὴ τιθέντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἐσικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὖθ' ὁποσοῦν τι δεὶ τὸ μὴ ὠλον ἐναὶ· τοσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὁπόσον ἄν η'/ τοσοῦτον ὠλον ἀναγκαῖον ἐναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῖνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ε ἐκαστὸν εἰληφὼς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὄν εἶτε δῦο τινء εἴτε ἐν μόνον ἐναι λέγοντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δηλοὶ σχέδων καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἔτερον εἴ ἄλλον, μεῖκοι καὶ χαλε-πωτέραι φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθέν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην.

ΞΕ. Τοὺς μὲν τοῖνυν διακριβολογομένους οὕτως ἐδείξατο 15

άμα τῇ τελετῇ γεγονόναι ἐν τε καὶ ὠλον. Ἴ. e. the use of the aorist γεγονόμενον implies that an action has been completed. Cf. Theaet. 155 b, c.

1. τὸ ἐν ηῇ These words are in all the MSS., but there can be little doubt that they arise either from a gloss or from some corruption of the text. Heindorf conjectured τὸ τὸ ὠλον, which is probably right.

8. ἄλλα μυρία] "You know that innumerable other points will each be found involved in endless difficulties." Cf. Theaet. 155 c, d: καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίων οὗτως ἔχει, εἰπέρ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. For an illustration of the truth of this Plato would point to the Parmenides.


15. Τοὺς μὲν τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ.] "Well then, concerning those who treat exactly of Being and Not-Being, let so much suffice, although the subject is by no means exhausted. We must now turn and look at others who speak less precisely, that we may learn from the most general survey that Being is no less troublesome to comprehend than Not-Being."

"Let us approach them, then. Proceed."

"I see them, through their dispute about the nature of Being, engaged in a warfare..."
which resembles that of the Giants and the Gods."

"What do you mean?"

"The one faction would drag everything to Earth out of the Heaven of the Unseen, literally laying their grasp on rocks and trees. For they fasten upon everything of this kind, and contend uncompromisingly that this alone exists which affords resistance and is sensible to the touch; so they define Being and Body to be the same. But they utterly despise the rest of the world, whoever asserts that a bodiless thing has being, and, on hearing this, refuse to listen to another word."

"They are indeed a fearful sort of men. I have encountered many of them myself, ere now."

"Yes, and that is why their opponents are so cautious in their defence, and fight with them from some invisible aery hold, contending in spite of all that True Being consists of certain bodiless forms, seen only by the mind: but the bodies to which the others cling, and the realities of which they speak, these little by little in their arguments disintegrate and crumble down, and describe them as not substance but a moving flux of change. Between these armies from time immemorial a battle has been joined, which continues with unabated fury."

(15) διακριμβολογούμενοι—αλός λέγουσα. In the former class are obviously contained all who have hitherto been mentioned—the Ionies, Eleatics, Heraclitus, Empedocles; and the word διακριμβολογούμενοι probably means "those who have defined precisely the number and the kinds of being." Cf. supr. 242 d: ὡστε πάσστε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ἄρμης τοῦ τά ὡστα διώρισασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποιὰ ἔστιν. It is less certain who are spoken of as διακριμβολογούμενοι. Perhaps the prohibition of Parmenides is alone referred to, perhaps Leucippus may be also intended. It does not seem probable that Gorgias, Protagoras, Antisthenes, or the Megarians (as Heindorf supposes) are included in this expression. The contemporaries of Socrates seem to be reserved, with those of Plato, for the following section (p. 246). The meaning of αλός is best inferred from that of διακριμβολογούμενοι, to which αλός λέγουσα is opposed. "Those who speak with less exactness." "Those who do not seek to determine the number or the kinds of Being." The schools which are now to be described are in truth engaged with a different problem: respecting the nature of Being or Essence, whether this be ideal or corporeal—a question with which mathematical or numerical exactness has little to do. For a similar use of αλός, cf. Hdt. V. 8: αλός γῆς κρύφατε. Crat. 425 a: ἡμᾶς δὲ δεὶς ἐπέπερ τεχνικός ἐπίστημομεθα σκοπεῖσθαι αὐτὰ πάντα, οὕτω διελογίμενοι, εἰτε κατὰ τρόπον τὰ πρῶτα οὕνου κατα ποίτων τα ὑπερα, εἰτε μὴ, οὕτω
p. 245. ἵκανος ἕξτω· τοὺς δὲ ἀλλος λέγοντας αὐθθεατέων,
"καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰδαμεν ὅτι τὸ ὅν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν
p. 246. εὑποροτερον εἰπείν ὁ τί ποτ᾿ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῖν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

ξει. Καὶ μὴν έοικὲ γε ἐν αὐτοίς οἴον γιγαντο-5

II. c. We proceed to

θεάσαι. ἀλλος δὲ συνείρειν μὴ φαίλον ἥ καὶ οὐ καθ ὤδον, ὦ φιλε Ἐρμόγενεσ, where ἀλλος = μὴ διελομένου, as here it is = μὴ δια-
κριβολογομένου, in both places with a touch of blame, which
is here satirically directed by Plato against the philosophers
who were most nearly contemporary with himself. See
also Legg. i, 635 e, where all other existing common-
wealths are distinguished from the Spartan and Cretan con-
stitutions in the words τί δια-
φέρουν ἐν τούτως ταῖς πολιτείας ἥ ταῖς τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτεομένων ἀνεύρησομεν.

(1.) πάνω μὲν οὐ διελθίσαμεν] "We most certainly have not
exhausted—," πάνω is ad-
verbial to the phrase οὐ διελ-
θίσαμεν, πάνω, which Heind-
dorf adopted from the quo-
tation of Eusebius, is less
forcible. Cf. Prot. 338 e,
πάνω μὲν οὐκ ἰθέλεν, quoted by
Stallbaum, who, notwithstanding,
rejects the MS. reading here because it is not literally true that the early philoso-
phers had been not at all dis-
cussed: "Recensuit enim non-
nullos quanquam non omnes
tetigit." But διελθ. implies
either going through them all,
or discussing them thoroughly.
Phileb. 51 c: πάνω μὲν οὐν οὐκ εἴδος δὴ ἐστὶν. — πειρατέων
μὴν. See an instructive note
on οὐ πάνοι in Mr. Cope’s Gor-
gias.

2. ἐκ πάντων] As the result
derived from all, the same
which has now been derived
from a part only. Cf. Theaet.
171 e, ἐκ ἀπάντων, and note;
Δρ. Met. VII. 998 a; and vid.
infr. 251 c: ἵνα τοῖν πρὸς ἀπαν-
tασ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἢ κτ.λ.

This notion was advanced with
some hesitation supr. 242 c: μὴ
πη τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὄμεν.
243 c: Τόχα τοῖν ἑσος κτ.λ.,
and is more decidedly enforced
infra 250 d.

5. γιγαντομαχία] Plato notices
amongst contemporary philo-
sophers a conflict between ma-
terialists and idealists, which
he compares to the war of the
Giants with the Gods: the
terrible children of the earth
are seen hurling blind defi-
ance at their opponents, who
fortify themselves securely from
this rude violence in an
invisible Heaven. In a similar
spirit, in the Politicus, p. 291 a,
the statesmen of the day are
compared to Centaurs and
Satyrs and other monstrous
forms. See Coleridge’s Friend,
vol. iii. p. 129.—The mate-
rialist has no way upwards
His “element is below.” The
idealist finds his way up, but
not down again.
Examine a different order of philosophic schools, somewhat less exact in their announcements, whose endless conflict respecting the nature of essence resembles that of the Giants with the Gods. The advocates of a bodily principle, whose touchstone is the sense of "έρχομαι; δείκνυσιν" (for the purposes of their argument).

1. περὶ τῆς οὐδείας] No longer τοῦ ἄντος. This change of terminology indicates that we are entering on a new and more abstract phase of philosophy.

2. ἔκλογοι] "Drag by main force." The word is often used to indicate perversity in argument. Cf. infr. d: τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἔκλογον βλα. οὐρανός is elsewhere identified by Plato with the visible region, e.g. Rep. 6, 509 e: ὡς ὁ διά της ὑποδομῆς δοκοῦσα σοφία περὶ τό ὄντα. Earth and Heaven are here opposed, as there the visible and intellectual worlds.

3. ἀνθρώπων πέτρας καὶ δρῦς] C. F. Hermann inserts ὡς before πέτρας. This is quite unnecessary, and takes from the liveliness of the image. The metaphor is continued, and the materialists are said, like the earth-born monsters, to lay their grasp on rocks and trees in their warfare. In Hesiod it is the hundred-handed sons of Heaven and Earth, the allies of Zeus, who throw the rocks upon the Titans. Theog. 675–715. But see Hor. Od. III. 4: evulsisque trunciis Enceladus Jaculator audax. πέτρα καὶ δρῦς are also in Homer the symbols of inanimate nature, as in the line quoted by Socrates in his Defense: οὖν γὰρ ἄπω δρῦς ἠλλοθεν υδὲν ἀπὸ πέτρας. Cf. Rep. 8, 544 e: ἢ ὁ οἷς ἐκ δρῦς πόθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολεμίας γίνεσθαι;

6. ἐφαπτόμενοι] "Fastening upon all such objects" (for the purposes of their argument).

9. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων, εἰ τίς φησι] "But, utterly despising all others, whosoever says that what has not body exists, and refusing to hear from them another word." Stephanus added τα, which is found (after τις) in C. H. re. B.

13. συχνοὶ προσέτυχοι] Cf.
of touch, drag every-thing to earth out of the hea-

ven of the Unaeen. From the- nce an army, “lapped in proof ete-

carefully defend their acry citadel of bodless forms, and by their arguments reduce to a flux of transitory production

of touch, drag every-thing to earth out of the hea-

ven of the Unaeen. From the- nce an army, “lapped in proof ete-

carefully defend their acry citadel of bodless forms, and by their arguments reduce to a flux of transitory production
The principles of either school are called in question, and Theaetetus engages to impart to the Stranger the tenor of their replies.

THEAI. Poś;

ΞΕ. Μάλιστα μέν, εἰ τῇ δυνατῇ ἢν, ἔργον βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τούτῳ μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμωτέρων αὐτοὺς ἡ νῦν ἐδέλουτας ἄν ἀποκρινασθαί. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν παρὰ βελτίων ποιοῦντος κυριωτέρων ἢ τὸ παρὰ χειρόνων ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τάληθες ἐγινόμεν.

THEAI. Ὄρθοτατα.

ΞΕ. Κέλευ σῇ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρινασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀφερμύνευε.

3. χαλεπώτερον] The difficulty of arguing with these men is different from that found with the Ephesian μέοντες, who could not be made to dwell on an idea, and arises simply from their want of dialectical refinement. Cf. Theaet. 155 e: εἰς γὰρ, δ᾽ θαῦ, μαλ᾽ ἐν ἄμονσοι.

9. νομιμωτέρων] I. e. More in accordance with the acknowledged rules of argument.

10. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν—χειρόνων] For the serious application of this principle, cf. Legg. 2, 663 c: τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν εἶναι φάομεν; πότερα τὴν τῆς χειρόνως ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίωνος; Ἀγακαίων ποι ἡ τῆς ἀμείνουσον.

12. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν] Cf. Phaedo 91 c: ἡν ἐμοὶ πειθησθείσῃ, σμικρὰ φροντισάντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀλήθειας πολὺ μᾶλλον, εάν μὲν τι δοκῶ ἀλήθες λέγειν, ἑξουμολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιένετε. Plato sometimes insists on the necessity of individual conviction, as in Protagoras 331 c (οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ οὐ δοκεῖ ἐλεγχεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἐμεῖ τε καὶ σε'), Gorg. 472 b, 474 a, b; sometimes, as here, on consistency of argument alone. The former is the Socratic, the latter the Platonic, mode of asserting the supremacy of reason.

16. παρ᾽ αὐτῶν] The preposition is introduced because of the verb ἀφερμύνευε. "Convey from them to me the tenor of their
The corporealists are the more difficult, because of their dialectical rudeness and incompetence. For the sake of argument we must imagine them capable of making a wholesome answer. They admit, then, the existence of a mortal living creature, which is a body containing a soul. Soul, then, exists: and righteous or unrighteous, wise or unwise, according as the soul has righteousness and wisdom, or thereverse. Righteousness and wisdom (i.e. virtue)
Ε. Τι δέ; τῶν τουντων μῶν σῶμα τι λέγουσιν p. 247.

ΤΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταύτα ἀποκρίνονται τῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτήν δοκεῖν σφίξει σῶμά τι κεκτηθεῖαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον ὅν ἱρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἣ μηδὲν τῶν ὀντῶν αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σῶματα δύσχυ- 

ζ. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεοτόκε, βελτίων γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες, ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἄν ἐν ἐπαίσχυν- 

βεῖν οἰ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ

1. Τι—ἰσχεῖν] Join τῶν του- 

3. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι] "They an- 

4. τήν μὲν ψυχήν] See De- 

4. σῶμα τι κεκτηθεῖαι] The 

6. τὸ τολμᾶ] The inf. has 

7. αἰτᾶ] See note on αἰτᾶ, 

II. σπαρτοι] By an accumu- 

οί αὐτῶν σπαρτοί καὶ αὐτό- 

θονεῖς] Plato has obviously 

οἱ αὐτῶν σπαρτοί καὶ αὐτό- 

χθονεῖς] Plato has obviously 

some men in his eye, probably 

the same to whom he alludes in 

Theet. 155 e. If it is true 

that Archelaus abandoned the 

ideal principle of Anaxagoras, 

and became a purely physical 

philosopher, he is perhaps in- 

cluded, as well as the contem- 

porary followers of Democri- 

tus. (See Introduction to Thee- 

tetus, p. xxx sqq.) But there 

appear to be some who, though 

holding a material principle, 

are thought capable of being 

improved into the position
which is assigned them in what follows, who by dialectical pressure can be brought to substitute force for body. Perhaps the "disciples of Protagoras," who said that "sensation was knowledge," are thus viewed as a more refined sort of materialists. If so, the irony with which, in the Theetetus, they are opposed to the uninitiate becomes manifest. Certainly the words, τὴν λεγομένην ἦν' αὐτῶν ἀλήθεια κατὰ σμικρὰ διαβρασότει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἄντ' οὕσις, are exact description of the "Megarian" treatment of Protagoras in the Theetetus, and it may be that the notion of making the men better for the sake of argument is suggested by the development of the "sensational idealism," which is attributed to him in that dialogue. It is equally possible, however, that the argument is pointed at a supposed inconsistency between the physical and ethical writings of Democritus. See the views on "the soul," "justice," "wisdom," in Democritus Fr. 1, 4, 5, 6, 35, 36, 111, 127, 128, 129, 135 (Mullach's edition).

1. πᾶν δ’ ἡ δυνατοὶ—εἰσι[ For the "pendent" constr. of πᾶν, cf. supr. 219 b: πᾶν, ὅπερ κ.τ.λ.—τὸν μὲν ἀγνότα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἁγόμενον ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιητές.


6. ἐπὶ τοῦτοι[ Cf. Theet. 185 c, supr. 243 d, e.

7. ἀμφιθεῖσας γεγονός] "Which arises as a common nature."

nature which is thus pre-
dicated of both? Lest we should have
to pause for a reply, we propose to them the
following definition of Being:

'All that is by nature capable
either of doing or suffering.'
Being is potency,

ésti dé tò protéinevthai, én poviyn
tá pléia (dei gár én dloi loghthnai
pros ó ó loghó) tò déi éiýptasthain
tó én paladá, hí gar ánairei h di-
airei.

2. Légoi déi]** "Well, here I
give it you." légoi refers to
lége, and déi uséd, deixikos,
as in koi déi.

3. eít' eis tò —φαυλοτάτου
"Either so as to affect another
thing, or to be affected by the
least thing in the most triffling
way." For this use of poviyn,
whence the technical word povi-
ntikos in later Greek philo-

5. kán ei mónon éisáptaxi] As in
the production of an individual

tíðemai gár óron — dévnamis]
Baldham conjectures tíðemai gár
óron òós éstin oúk állo tì plèn
dévnamis. Boeckh. conj. órìzov.
The construction of órìzov is
difficult. There is probably
an ellipse of déin, cf. Δèdeiktai
k.t.l. supr. 235 b. Mr. Grote,
in his criticism of this dialogue,
appears to think that Plato
intended to allow this defi-
nition to stand. But does he
not attach more importance
than Plato does to what is only
a step, though an important
step, in the dialectical progress
of the argument? Observe the
words (247 e), ísos gár an éisý-
teran hùmìn te kai tòutos òteron
an fawneí. For an application of
the same notion, cf. Phaedr.
270 d: òdei déi diwnoiáthai peri
ótopouín fóúros, próton mèn,
áploèn hí poluedèst òstìn—tpeita
dè, évnav òplon éi, oikopév tìr
dèvnamìn autòv, tína prós tì pé-
fruk eí nò tò órav íxon hí tína eí
nì tò páthein òplò toúv.

6. ós éstiv) Sc. tò ònta.

9. dékouv tòúto. In a simil-
lar spirit, in Legg. 10, 900,
Clímas answers for the ob-
jectors. Compare also the ima-
ginary youth in the Phaedrus
(p. 243 e).

10. Kalòs] "They say well."
This refers to the modification
of their assent implied in épi-
per àitoí ouk ékouv k.t.l.

ísos gár an éisýsteron —
φαυνί]. Cf. Legg. 7, 820 e:
keítho ménto kaláptor énèípxora
lúmata ek tìs álloan politeias,
évan hí tòv òntos òmáa hì kai tòvus
4. τούς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους] The word εἰδῶς indicates that the men here spoken of are Socrates, so far at least as the allusion is personal at all. Now they are certainly not Cynics (Ἄντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ ὀστὸς ἀπαίδευτοι), still less Cyrenaics, with whom the only "essence" was a succession of momentary πάθη. They are Socrates under an Eleatic or Pythagorean influence. Proclus, indeed, (Comment. in Parmen. p. 149) takes it for granted that Plato here alludes directly to the Pythagorean school, whom Aristotle includes with the Platonists amongst the advocates of a "motionless essence," τῶν τάς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας λεγόντων, Met. XIV. 4. 1091 b. But, besides the word εἰδῶς, the dialectical features and the way in which γένεια is separated from οὐσία, are inconsistent with this. Four possible suppositions remain, if we believe the dialogues to be the work of Plato. The "friends of forms" are either (1) Megarians (since Schleiermacher this has been the most general impression); or (2) Plato himself at an earlier stage; or (3) Platonists who have imperfectly understood Plato. The fourth hypothesis combines (2) and (3). The theory of Socher, who imagined the 'Sophist' to be a Megarian critique of Plato, would make the Megarians, in contradiction to the little which we know of them, to be the advocates of δύναμις, κίνησις and γένειας. In favour of the first hypothesis, according to which the Megarian philosophers are the εἰδῶν φίλοι, it may be urged that Plato, before writing these dialogues, had stood in a relation of close intimacy with Euclides and the Megarian school, and that this passage is a friendly criticism of views with which he himself had at one time strongly sympathized. The name εἰδῶς, expressing the object of definition, was a common inheritance of the Socrates, and the tendency of the Megarians to rest in sharply defined, incommunicable abstractions, appears not only in the Sophisms of Eubulides but in the objection of Euclides to comparison, of which, as Plato hints in what follows, the Antisthenean rejection of predication and definition was but the caricature. As Zeno refuted motion by the movement of thought, so they by dialectic made logic impossible. But on the other hand we have no warrant apart from this passage for supposing that they force, receptivity, in a word, power. Supposing this to be accepted for the nonce, we turn to the lovers of ideal forms.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ταύτ’ ἔσται.

ΞΕ. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΞΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι’ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν ὅντως οὐσίαν, ἢν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὀσαίτως ἔχειν φατε, γένεσιν δὲ ἀλλοτρὶ ἀλλος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φιλήμε γάρ οὖν.

10 ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὁ πάντων ἀριστο, τι

departed so far from the Eleatics as to admit a plurality of ἐιδή. Euclides said that Being, or the Good, was one, though called by many names. And several points in the description are favourable to the view to which we have seen reason to incline, which differs but slightly from those of Ueberweg and of Mr. Grote: that Plato, while developing his own theory of knowledge with greater clearness, administers a gentle reproof to some of his own followers, who held tenaciously to a conception of the ἐιδή, based on immature statements of his own, and mixed with Eleatic and Pythagorean elements. (See the Introduction to the 'Sophist.') The points which make for this conclusion are the following: —νοητὰ ἀττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδή (246 b); σώματι—δι’ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν—διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν ὅντως οὐσίαν—ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὀσαίτως ἔχειν (248 b); the words ὁ πάντων ἀριστο, which might well be aimed at friends and pupils by Plato (cf. Theaeet. 148 b: Ἀριστο γ’ ἀνθρώ- πων, ὥς παῖδες); and ἐγὼ δὲ ἰσος διὰ συνήθειαν supposing Plato to speak here as if in his own person: also ἡμερότεροι suprā.

2. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν] Cf. supr. 221 e: νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ, and note. This omission of μὲν, like many other idioms which might appear to be of late growth, is found already full-blown in Homer.

5. σώματι] Dat. of the instrument, answering to ψυχῆ in what follows.

γενέσει] Dat. after κοινω- νεῖν, answering to πρὸς—οὐσίαν.

7. γένεσιν δὲ] The end of the sentence reverts to the beginning, turning out the obverse side of the chief statement, as so often in Plato.

10. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν] The introduction of this word, which plays an important part in the sequel, should be noticed, as the emergence of a fresh element in the evolution of the thought. Cf. Gorg. 464 c. And see Rep. 6, 490 b.
The account of sensation in the Theetetus belongs to the line of thought which is here indicated: only the "power" is not there inferred from the act—since agent and patient are regarded as having no existence except in act. Theaet. 157 a: οὕτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστι τι πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἔξωκεν ὁδήγησαν, οὕτε πάσχουν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι.

7. θανάτουν] If the Stranger is speaking in his own person, these words may naturally enough point to the contemporary Eleatics, i. e. the school of Megara. But if Platonists are meant, the author must be supposed to speak from behind the mask; as happens sometimes in the Laws. Cf. Rep. 9, 583.

16. ἦτι γεν.—φασίν] "That Becoming has part in the power of doing and suffering, but that active and passive are qualities whose force is wholly inapplicable to being." The meaning of δυνάμως here is something between "power of acting" and "the power that is inherent in action."

18. τῶν δύναμιν] The word appears to be used here in a slightly different sense from full of change. Well, fair sirs, but what is this common nature of which ye too speak, under the name of 'participation'? Shall we explain this by the definition which we just now gave to your opponents, as an active or passive energy arising from some power? The Stranger's practised ear discerns that from theirsere height they reply with scorn. Becoming may have part in agency and passivity: but such language is inapplicable to Being.
The distinction between the

Without questioning the
propriety of this, we ask a fur-
ther question:
'Whether the soul
knows, and
whether Being is
known?'
On their assenting
to this, we
perceive:
'Is there
agency, or
passivity,
or both, in
knowing,
or in being
known?'
They must
of course
say, 'Neither.'
They will, however,

δυνάμεως immediately preceding,
and more akin to the
common one of "nature," "im-
6, 511 e.

8. ἢ ἀμφότερον] I.e. Are the
mind and the object of the
mind each at once active and
passive in knowledge?

Spinoza postulates the ac-
tivity of mind, cf. Eth. II. Def. 3.
Explic.: "dict potius concep-
tum quam perceptionem, quia
perceptionis nomen indicare
videtur mentem ab objecto
pati. At conceptus actionem
mentis expressim videtur."

13. For τὸ δὲ, or τὸ δὲ γε (sc.
φασίν ἄν, cf. φάτε—ἄν—λέγουεν
supr.), cf. Legg. 3, 676 e: ἀφ' ὦδ' ἀπὸ
pόλεως τ' εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ., δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε
κατανοήσαι χρόνον ἁπλῶς ὅσον ἔ-
γονεν; ὦκουν ῥάδιον γε ὡς
μετὰ τινὸς ἱεροῦ. Τὸ δὲ γε, ὥς ἀπελεύθερον τοίν 
καὶ ἀμφό-
τερον ἄν ἐνί. Ib. 1, 640: τὸ
μὲν γὰρ — ὡς ὁρθῶν — ἀρχοντα
ἐκεῖναι, μανθάνεις. Ib. 5, 735. For
the continuation of the in-
direct form, cf. also Theet.
171 d: ἡ καὶ τάυτη μάλιστα ιστα-
σθαι [sc. φάμεν] τόν λόγον.

There is some difficulty
about the arrangement of the
speakers. Rejecting the read-
ing of Stephanus and Heind-
dorf, Θ. δήλον — λέγονεν. Ξ.
Μανθάνο τὸ δὲ γε, we have
to choose between that of the
Zurich editors, Ξ. δήλον — λέ-
γονεν. Θ. Μανθάνω. Ξ. Τὸ δὲ γε — (or τὸ δὲ), where the
Stranger answers his own ques-
tion, as in Legg. 10, 894 a:
ηὕκιν ἄν τί πάθος ἢ δήλον ὡς
κ.τ.λ., and that of Stallbaum,
Θ. Δήλον—λέγονεν. Ξ. Μανθάνω
τὸ δὲ γε—, in which, before
proceeding further, he accepts
Theætetus' report of the an-
swer of the εἰδῶν φίλων. The
former is more in keeping
with Plato's later manner, and
makes the anacoluthon easier.
It has, therefore, been retained.
13. τὸ γιγανώσκειν — πάσχειν]
p. 248. τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ ἔμμβαίνει πάσησχεῖν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τούτον γιγνωσκόμενην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ’ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖται διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὁ δὲ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περί τὸ ἱρεμοῦν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Τί ἐπὶ πρὸς Δίος; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ᾠνὴν καὶ ψυχήν καὶ φρονήσιν ἢ ῥάδιος πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς οὐτὶ μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ἐξὶν αὐτὸ p. 249. μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ, σεμνῶν καὶ ἁγίων, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων, ὁ ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἰναί;

ΤΕΑΙ. Δεινον μὲν ἄν, ὁ ἔστε, λόγον συγχωροίμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔσχε, ζωὴν δὲ μὴν, φῶμεν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνότετ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔσχεν αὐτά;

active and passive verb, which probably appears here for the first time in Western literature, is used to suggest that knowledge is a movement or process of some kind. Compare the use made of the grammatical distinction of ὁμοφορα and ῥήμα below, p. 262, and of the singular and plural numbers above, p. 238.

10. σεμνῶν καὶ ἁγίων] There is an allusion to the statues of the gods. Cf. Phaedr. (of paintings): ἠστηκε μὲν ὡς ὀξώτα, ἐὼ δὲ ἀνέργη τι, σεμνῶς πάνω στῆν. Philol. 24.53 d. Tim. 30b. These words are wrongly connected by some interpreters with νοῦν. (e. g. Hegel, Cousin.) For the thought, compare a striking passage in the Laws, 967 a–e, where it is said that the deepest study of astronomy, instead of encouraging the notion of a blind necessity, leads directly to the supposition of a celestial mind or minds: ὅπως ἐπιτεύῃ τὸ νῦν ὡστάς διδοξημένον, ὅσοι τῆς ἀκριβείας αὐτῶν ἠπτότο, ὅπως μήποτ' ἀν ἄψυχα ὡστά ὡστά εἰς ἀκριβείαν βαυμάστοις λογισμοῖς ἀν ἐχέρητο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα, ὥστε the same result is reached a posteriori which is here approached a priori.

11. εῖναι] "Exists," in the emphatic sense. make this hypothetical admission, that, if to know is activity, to be known must be passivity. In which case, Being, in so far as it is the object of knowledge, is passive, and therefore in this respect, is not at rest, but in motion. And, the instant we touch on this conception, there is borne in upon us the conviction that Perfect Being cannot be in a
state of mere negative repose, a sacred form without thought, or life, or soul, or motion. For, as there is no thought without a soul, so that which has soul cannot be devoid of motion. Hence motion is inseparable from thought. But, on the other hand, thought is equally impossible without a principle of permanence and rest.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τίνα ἀν ἔτερον ἔχοι τρόπον; p. 249
ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ νοῦν μὲν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ψυχῆς, ἄκινητον μέντοι τὸ παράταν, ἔμψυχον δὲν, ἐστάναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα ἐμοίῳ ἀλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται. b
ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὑπνα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;
ΞΕ. Ἐμπιστεύσει δ' οὖν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἄκινητον τε ὑπνων νοιν μιδεὶν περὶ μιδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἰν αὖθις φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντες εἶναι συγχωρομένα, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταύτω τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνων ἔξαιρησόμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΞΕ. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὅσαῦτοι καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χαρίς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποῦ ἀν; c
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΞΕ. Τί δ' ἀνευ τούτων νοιν καθορᾶ ὑπνα ἡ γενόμενον ἀν καὶ ὑπονοῦν;

1. ἔχων] "In what other way could Being hold them?" This sense of ἔχων is determined by ἔκεισι preceding and the accusatives following.

3. ἀκινήτον—ἔμψυχον δ' οὖν] The cogency of this argument is best seen by comparing Phaedr. 245 c, Legg. 10, 895 b, c. See also Arist. Eth. Nic. Χ. 8, of the life of the gods: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει ταῦτα ἐπικλήσαμεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργείαν ἀρά' ὁ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὡσπερ τὸν θεομίσσων.
Metaph. XI. 1072 b: καὶ δεῖ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει οἱ γὰρ νοῦν ἐνέργεια διάφ.

5. συγχωρητέον ὡς ὑπνα] There appears to be a logical inver-

sion in reasoning from "Being has motion" to "Motion has Being." This, like many of Plato's arguments, had the Organon then existed, would have taken a different form. But his thoughts would have been substantially the same.

8. δ' οὖν] "It follows from this, however." Theaetetus is warned to face the consequence of his admission: and this is implied in the adversative δέ.


15. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα] "Do you think that permanent unity of condition and mode and subject could ever arise without stability?"
THEAI. "Hkistata.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὡς ἄν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῶν ἀφανίζων ἵσχυρίζηται περὶ τινος ὅπηον.

THEAI. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τῷ δὴ ψιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μίτε τῶν ἐν ἡ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη λεγόντων τὸ πῶν ἐστηκὸς ἀποδέξεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχὺ τὸ ὁν κινοῦντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παί-10

1. "Hkistata] This was one clear result of the argument of the Theocetetus. Cf. also Crat. 440.


3. ὡς ἄν—ἱσχυρίζηται] Not merely because of the value of thought and knowledge, but because such a person stultifies himself. This is implied in the form of expression. "He who putting knowledge out of sight yet dogmatizes on any point." See Theet. 161, Euthyd. 286, alib.


6. Τῷ δὴ ψιλοσόφῳ] The sentence is continued as if the verbal notion in ψιλοσόφῳ had been expressed. Cf. Theet. 168 b: ἀντὶ φιλοσόφου, μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα. Legg. 10, 886 a: θεσογιάν—γενόμενοι τε ὡς—ἀμιλησι.

7. τῶν ἐν ἡ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη λεγόντων] I. e. The older Eleatics, or their more recent followers, the friends of ideas, who have just been described.

10. κατά τὴν τῶν παίδων εἰχή] This has been variously interpreted. Heindorf, following Schleiermacher: "Secundum votum puerorum, ut immobilia moveantur, optantium." Stallbaum: "Videtur respeci ad lussum quendam puerorum in quo ludentes dicebant, ὡς ἀκίνητα, καὶ κεκυκμενα εἰῆ." But the words ὡς — κεκυκμενα would then be too abruptly introduced. Steinhart, in a note to Müller's German translation of Plato, suggests a new reading: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παιδών εἰχήν, ἔννομότερα λέγειν τὸ ὁν τε καὶ τὸ πῶν, καὶ ὡς ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκυκμενα. The passage admits of being so interpreted, by laying an emphasis on ἔννομότερα, without any change in the order of the words. "When asked whether Being or the All is at rest or in motion, we must say, like children in their wishes, 'Both.' ” We may suppose an allusion either to the vagueness and impossibility of the desires of children, who "cry for the moon" (for εἰχή in this sense,
advocates
of rest nor
of motion, but
must say with
the children, that "both are best," when he is de-
fining the nature of Being.

But he cannot rest there.

δων ειχήν οσα ακίνητα και κεκινημένα τὸ ὄν τε καὶ p. 249.
tὸ πᾶν ἐξωμοφότερα λέγειν.

ΘΕΑI. Ἀλλαθέστατα.

ΞΕ. Τῇ οὕν; ἀρ' οὐκ ἑπιεικῶς ἦδη φανόμεθα πε-

ρειληψέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Βασιά μέντ' ἄν' ἄρα, ὁ Θεαίτης, ὡς μοι

dοκούμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς

σκέψεως.

ΘΕΑI. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τὰ τοῦτ' εἴρηκας;

ΞΕ. Ω μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμὲν ἐν

ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανόμεθα δὲ τι λέ-

γειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΘΕΑI. 'Εμοι γοῦν' ὅτι δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως

ἐχοντες, οὐ πάνυ ἐξωνήμι.
Π. 249. ΞΕ. Σκοπεῖ δὴ σαφέστερον, εἰ ταῦτα νῦν ξυν- 5
p. 250. ομολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἑπερωτηθείμεν ἀπερ αὐτοὶ
tότε ἣρωτόμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν
καὶ ψυχρὸν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ποία; ὑπόμνησόν με.

ΞΕ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ πειράσομαι γε δρᾶν
tούτο ἐρωτῶν σε καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἀμα τι
καὶ προίῳμεν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως.

ΞΕ. Εἰςεν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἃρ ὦκ ἐναν- 10
tῶτατα λέγεις ἄλληλοις;

ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἶναι γε ὦμοῖος φης ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ
καὶ ἐκάτερον;

b ΤΕΑΙ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτε- 15
ρον, όταν εἶναι συγχωρῆσι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' ἐστάναι σημαινεῖς, λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότε- 20
τερα εἶναι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

For this definition is open to the same question with which we assailed the dualists in our previous argument. Motion and rest are opposites. Yet both are, and have part in Being.

Being, however, is distinct from both. For when we say, 'Both are,' we do not mean that both are in motion, or that both are at rest. Hence Being embraces both, and both partake of

1. Σκόπει—ψυχρὸν] "Consider then more completely whether in accepting this conclusion we do not now deserve to be troubled with the question which we ourselves asked of those who said that the Universe was Heat and Cold."


7. τότε] Supr. 243 c: τι τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολαθῶμεν ὑμῶν;

τότεν τρίτον κ.τ.λ.


22. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] Cf. Rep. 6, 484 c: μὴ δὲν ἐναργεῖς ἐν
Being. But Being is different from them both, and, in virtue of her own nature, neither rests nor moves.

Being, ὃς ὑπ’ ἑκείνου τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν p. 250. τηρειχομένην συλλαβάων, καὶ ἀπίθανον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσείπετε ἀμφότερα.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύομεν ὃς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομανεῖ τεύσεθαι τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγομεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ ξυναμφότερον τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ’ ἔτερον ἕτ’ τι τούτων.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐσικείνει.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὕτε ἐστηκέν οὕτε κινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. Ποί δὴ χρῆ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν ἑ ἰ ψυχῇ ἐχοντες παράδειγμα. Θεατ. 155 b : ταῦτα δὴ, οἴμαι ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται ἐν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ.

1. ὃς ὑπ’ ἑκείνου τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τηρειχομένην συλλαβάων] By deleting the comma after τηρειχομένην the syntax is improved; and the inverted order of the words is in keeping with the style of the dialogue. “So then you conceived of Being as a third and distinct kind, under which, as embraced by it, you comprehended motion and rest, and fixing your attention on their common participation in Being, you thus applied the term ‘existent’ to them both.”

5. ἀπομανεῖσθαι] I. e. This truth of reflection is implied in language. Compare Rep. 6, 505 e : ὅ δὴ διώκει πάσα ψυχῇ ἀπομανετευμενὴ τι εἶναι.

8. Οὐκ ἄρα—τούτων] “Being, then, is not motion and rest taken together, but is distinct from these.”

11. Κατὰ—κινεῖται] In the spirit of the Parmenides it is shewn that Being, which has just been said to include rest and motion, in its own nature neither rests nor moves. For the position of οὐκ, which is emphatic, cf. Theaet. 161 a : ὅς οὐκ ἂν ἔχει οὔτω ταῦτα.

The search for Being seems here to be relinquished as hopeless. The thread of argument is not dropt, however; for it is this absolute severance of Being from rest and motion, after seeming to include them, which suggests the fresh inquiry concerning the nature of difference or negation.
Now it is hard to conceive that a thing which is not at rest is not in motion, or vice versa. Here, therefore, we may take note that we have found the definition of Being not less difficult than that of Not-Being. Whence we derive a sort of despairing hope, that if a ray of light is cast on the one perplexity, it may suggest a solution for the other. And, if the worst come to the worst, we shall try to

par' ἑαυτῷ] Cf. Theet. 146 c: λαθεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἑαυτῷ, and note.
7. ἀναπέφαντα] "Has risen up before us." Cf. Theet. 155 b: ἀττὰ πόντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ.
11. "Οτι τοῦ μῆ ὄντος] These words are in construction with μέμνησαι. The thing which is "worth taking note of" is not this, but the following remark, for which this prepares the way.
12. συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορία] Supr. 237-239. Cf. Theet. 165 b, ἐν φρειάτι συνεχέμονος, where the metaphor is more distinctly kept in view.
19. διηπορημένον] "A difficulty clearly stated." The word occurs in Plato in this technical sense only in the Sophist, Politicus, and Laws.
2. *e
t
ei
t

The latter is chiefly meant, but the former is introduced in accordance with Plato's wish to omit no aspect of a case. Cf. Rep. I, 339 b: οὐτως δηλον ουδε ει μεγαλη. 5. διωσομεθα] "We shall send off our argument from both."

Steer clear of them," as between Scylla and Charybdis, or the Symplegades. (Cf. Hom. Od. 12, 219: έκτος έπερε νηα.) Compare the use of διωσεθαι in Herodotus and in Democ. Fr. Ethic. 20: και ουκ ολιγος κηπας εν τοι βιο διωσεαι, φθονοι και ζηλοι και δυσμενηις. The construction, however, is different here, and has driven the editors to conjecture — Heindorf διωσιμεθα, Stallbaum διωσωμεθα, C. F. Hermann διασομεθα. Of these Stallbaum's correction is the best, although not agreeing well with ευπρεπεσταιτα. But the construction may be defended, if we take the words to mean literally "We shall push our argument (vessel) through between them both (or, so as to avoid both at once) with such appearance as we may." The genitive άμφοις is then governed by the δια in composition. Cf. Polyb. 22, 11, 17: διαθ. τας σαριτσας δια των τρηματων.

Badham defends the text on slightly different grounds. His note deserves insertion here: "Juxta difficile esse ostendit, id quod est atque id quod non est explicare. Hinc auguratur, si quid lucis utrisvis horum alius et ulla accecat, fore etiam ut alterum discerni possit: sin ambo in tenebris maneant, quid tum? Disputationem, servabimus, disponemus, perseuerum? Imo, ita repellere, ut si quis ex ejus quod non est natura negotiationis nobis facesit, eundem in eo quod est haud minus sibi contradi centem efficiamus. Accedit quod cum hoc verbo et hanc sententiam ευπρεπεσταιτα egregie convenit, at non cum contrarii notioni, quae conjecturis suprā commemoratis inest: parum enim hospi tem Eleaticum Sophistis infensus decret speioswos disputationem promittere." It may be enough in order to defend our interpretation from this last objection to refer the student to Theas tetus 196 e, where the confession of shamelessness is immediately followed by an avowal of the determination to continue the argument, and to infr. 254 d, supr. 241 d, especially the word βιαζομαι. The unattainableness of a perfectly "reasoned" method is
continually rising up before Plato.

2. πολλοίς ὄνομασι ταύτων τούτω] This recalls the saying of Euclides, that the good was ἐν, πολλοίς ὄνομασι καλοῦμενον, and in so far confirms the impression that the Megarians have been under criticism in what precedes. In this and other expressions they had perhaps implied a “commu-
nion” of unity with variety, which was inconsistent with their logical principles. Com-
pare also the saying quoted in Republic 6, 505 c, probably from the same source, that τὸ ἄγαθον is φρόνησις ἄγαθον, whose authors failed in their attempt to isolate the concep-
tion of good.

We are now introduced to a new sort of philosophers, who serve (like the δυσχερεῖς of the Philebus) to reduce those just mentioned to the point of ab-
surdity, and by a crucial in-
stance to bring the question to a clear issue. They are the same who are ridiculed in the

Euthydemus, and amongst them Antisthenes is most pro-
bably included, whether or not the word ὄνομασι and the phrase ὅπο πενίας τ. τ. φ. κτ. are meant to convey a co-
vert allusion to him. The passage certainly reads like personal satire. Compare Phile-
abus, pp. 13, 14, where a dif-
ferent aspect of the same “child-
ish puzzle” is described, and contrasted with the dialectical One and Many; as also in Parm. 129 e, d. See also Philcb. 37 c. Cognate difficulties re-
specting Predication are noticed by Aristotle, Phys. I. 2, § 15: οἴ μὲν τὸ ἐστιν ἄθελον, ὅσπερ λυκόφρονοι οἱ δὲ τὴν λείν μετερ-
ῦθιζον, ὅτι ὃ ἄνθρωπος ὃν λευ-
κός ἐστιν, ἄλλα λειλέκωται—ὑπὸ μῆ—πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν. For ἐσπονδακόσιον ἐνθα, cf. supr. 216 b: τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπονδακόσιον.

3. τοῦτο] 1. c. “Anything which happens to be in ques-
tion.” Cf. Thevet. 199 a: μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτων οἴον ἔστω, and note.
and of certain ancient tyrants, who, from their poverty in the having of wisdom, take pride in crying out upon us that we have made the one many and the many one. They will allow us to say that good is good, and man is man: but not that man is good. Such are the refinements on which they spend a belated enthusiasm.

To omit no aspect of thought on the subject of Being, we address to these, as well as to the rest, the following question: Shall we conceive οὐποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλά καὶ πολλοῖς ὄνομασι p. 251, λέγομεν.

ἄληθῆ λέγεις.

Ἐ. "Οδεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὑψιμαθίσθι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν εὖθυς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον οὐς ἀδύνατον τὰ τε πολλά ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλά ἐστιν, καὶ δὴ πον χαῖρονσιν οὐκ ἐξους ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἀνθρωπὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρωπὸν ἀνθρωπὸν. εἰς τυγχάνεις γὰρ, ὥθεται, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσασοφον οἰομένους τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀνευρήκειαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἑ. "Ἰνα τοῖνυν πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἡ τοῦ πόστοτο περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὑποεύθετας, ἐστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἅλλους, ὅσοις ἐν ἐμπροσθεν διειλέγεμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὅσ ἐν ἔρωτησε λεξη-

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα διῇ;

Ἑ. Πότερον μὴτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτομεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἄλλι

12. πενίας—κτήσεως] Genitive of respect: “Poverty in respect of the possession of knowledge.” This tautology has been objected to, but might be paralleled from many passages in these dialogues. Some passages in the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon make it probable that these words contain a personal allusion to Antisthenes.

τῆς περὶ τῆς φρόνησιν κτή-

σεως] Cf. Polit. 281 ε': τῆς

περὶ τὰ ἀριθμείσματα γενέσεως.

13. πάσασοφον οἰομένους] Cf. Phedo 90 c: οἰονία σοφιτατοι γεγονότα τὸ καὶ καταινοετικεία

μόνον ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδένος οὔτε ὑγίες οὔτε τῶν λόγων.

p. 251. ως ἀμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλλη-λων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἡ πάντα εἰς ταῦτον ἐννάγομεν ὡς δύνατα ἐπικοινω- νεῖν ἄλληλοις; ἡ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μη; Τούτων, ὃ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ᾽ ἂν αὐτῶσ προσαρέσθαι φήσαμεν; 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπέρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνοσθαι. τί οὖν οὐ καθ᾽ ἐν ἀποκρι- μενος ἑφ᾽ ἐκάστου τὰ ἐμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω; 

ΞΕ. Καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ τιθῶμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδὲν μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κύνησίς τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμὴ μεθὲξετον οὐσίας;

p. 252.  

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; ἐσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐσται. 

ΞΕ. Ταχὺ δὴ ταύτη γε τῇ συνυμολογίᾳ πάντα

1. ἀμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον (sc. ὅ) μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλληλων] The sentence changes to the impersonal form. ἀδύνατον. Bodl. Δ Π. Cett. ἀδύνατα.  

6. Ἐγὼ μὲν — Καλῶς λέγεις] “Persones in distribuenda: Ἐγὼ μὲν—ἀποκρίνοσθαι: Τί οὖν—ἐσκέ-ψω: Καλῶς λέγεις: Καὶ τιθῶμεν γ᾽ αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ. Hic, ut ubique, respondentis partes Theometo tribuuntur: sed fraudem feeq libraris initium sermonis καὶ τιθῶμεν γε, qui abruptior illis visus est, non animadvertentibus Hospitis verba ex iis quæ supra dixerat continuari.” Bad- ham. Perhaps: but καὶ τιθῶ-μεν γε κ.τ.λ. seems too abrupt in the rejoinder, and in point of fact it is the Stranger who now proceeds to “give each answer in succession.”  

7. τί οὖν οὐ] “Suppose you say Yes to each alternative in turn, and see what follows in each several case.”  


11. εἰς μηδέν] “For any re- sult.”  

14. ἐσται πότερον αὐτῶν] “Can either of them be, without par- ticipating in Being?”  

17. Ταχὺ δὴ] Compare Theæt. 183 a, where the assertion of absolute relativity is similarly reduced to nothingness (τὸ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκεν, ἔφανῃ, εἰ πάντα κυνέαται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὧν ἄν τις ἀποκρίνεται, ὁμοίως ὁρθῇ εἶναι, ὄντω τ᾽ ἔχειν φαναι καὶ μή οὕτω), and ibid. 161 e.  

πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν]
Thus havoc is made at once of all the philosophies which attribute Being to Motion, or to Rest, whether as One or Many.

And all theories of composition or division, whether into an infinite or a fixed number of elemental forms, whether the union and partition are conceived as alternating or as ever going on together, are equally unsettled, or "swept away." "The ground is cut away from all."

1. ἀμα τε τῶν] Qu. an legend. τά?
2. ὡς ἐν ἰστάντων] Sc. τά πάντα.
καὶ εἰς ἐτερα ἑτε eis πέρας ἐχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιροῦμενοι καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τούτῳ τιθώσι γεγονόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ πάντα ταύτα λέγοιεν ἀν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἐστὶ χύμμεξι.

The very men who deny predication, with whom we are now conversing, and on whose hypothesis the present argument is built.

17. οἱ μὴν ἑώστες] "Who forbid us to call anything, be-
cause partaking of some affection from another thing, by the name of that other.” koum. pαθ. ετ. = koum. τού πάσχειν ωφ’ ετ. Cf. supr. 245 a : πάθος τοῦ ενός ἔχειν.

(18.) ἑτέρου is governed by παθματος. Similar language occurs in the passage of the Philoebus already cited, p. 13 a : ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ, ἀνόμως ὑμα, ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὑμοῖμι.

2. Τῷ τε εἶναι ποὺ Cf. Theet. 157 b, 196 e, 202 a.

3. ἄλλων] Qu. an legend. ἄλληλοι;?”

4. δὲ ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἰργασθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] δὲ is governed by εἰργασθαι, but probably also connected by attraction with ἀκρατεῖς. συν-άπτειν is used absolutely. "So that having no power to refrain from such expressions, or to banish connexion from their discourse.”

5. ἄλλα τὸ λεγόμενον] "But they always carry about their enemy, who haunts them, as the saying is, in their own house, and like the wondrous Eurycles, has a voice within them which mocks every syllable they utter.” Compare Cratyl. 428 c, where the account of self-deception is like that of self-contradiction here: ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ συμκρὼν ἀποστατῇ ἄλλ’ ἀεὶ παρη ὦ ἐξιπατήσων, πώς οὖ δεινόν; Cf. also Gorg. 482 b : οἷς σε ὑπολογύσαει Καλλικλῆς, ο Καλλικλῆς, ἄλλα διαφωνύσαι ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ βίῳ.

8. τῶν ἄτοπων Εὐρυκλέα] (See Aristoph. Vesp. 1014.) Eurycles was a ventriloquist prophet. This passage seems to imply that he made his voice sound as if from within the person consulting him; and this is also suggested by the Scholiat’s absurd gloss on ἄτοπον: Τὸν μὴ ἐδραίον ἄλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐκτοπιζοῦτα λέγει. The story told by the Scholiat, that Eurycles suffered from having given an offensive response to some one, is probably a mistaken attempt to explain the connexion between ὀσπερ — Εὐρυκλέα and οἰκὸθεν τῶν πολέ-μιων. The meaning of course is that they have their enemy and their opponent in their own breast, in the shape of a voice, which comes from within them, like the answer of Eurycles, who used to speak in those
discourse such words as "is," "apart," "from others," "by itself," and have thus an adversary within, who saves our labour by convicting them of self-contradiction out of their own mouths. But if all things are allowed to have communion, Motion will rest and Rest will move. The third case alone remains: that some things enter into combination, and some do not.


1. ὅμοιον τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ ἔννοια "Most true, your image is a very just one." Cf. Rep. 8, 579 d: Παντάπασι, ἐδή, ὁμοίωτα τῷ καὶ ἄλλητατα λέγει.

7. ἐπιμεγνυσθήσθη ἐπ', ΥΣ. Hence Bad-


The example of letters is used to symbolize the nature of the ideas, as in Theaet. 202 e (where it is shewn that the simple is known before the complex). Polit. 277, 278 (illustration of the argument from example). Rep. 3, 402 (education in μονοσκιή). Phileb. 18 (science determining the infinite). In the Theoctetus and Philebus the parallel illustration from musical notes is also adduced, as here.

In this the vowels symbolize the highest ideas, or categories, Being, Identity, and Difference. Compare Theaet. 197 d: in the image of the aviary, ενίας δὲ μόνας διὰ παῦδων ὅποι ἂν τίχωσι πετομένας—where the same thing is intimated, and equally without explanation.

Just as of the letters of the alphabet some can and others cannot be combined, and the same is true of musical notes. It is also to be observed, that the vowels are distinguished by the power which they have of entering into every combination, and being indispensable to all. And as none but

1. The example of letters is used to symbolize the nature of the ideas, as in Theaet. 202 e (where it is shewn that the simple is known before the complex). Polit. 277, 278 (illustration of the argument from example). Rep. 3, 402 (education in μονοσκιή). Phileb. 18 (science determining the infinite). In the Theoctetus and Philebus the parallel illustration from musical notes is also adduced, as here.

5. In this the vowels symbolize the highest ideas, or categories, Being, Identity, and Difference. Compare Theaet. 197 d: in the image of the aviary, ενίας δὲ μόνας διὰ παῦδων ὅποι ἂν τίχωσι πετομένας—where the same thing is intimated, and equally without explanation.


II. This expression has no distinct antecedent. But cf. Theaet. 207 d (in a similar connexion), δραώτας αὐτά, and note. The conjectural emendation, δραῦ, is therefore not absolutely required; though, if such were the true reading, it may easily have been corrupted from δραν supr. 252 e.

μένουσ τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἐξων γεγυνόσκειν μουσικός, p. 253-
ο δὲ μὴ ἐννεῖς ᾧμουσος;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΞΕ. Καί κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτέ-
5 χινῶν τοιαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἑτέρα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾿ οὖ; 

ΞΕ. Τι δ᾿; ἔπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα
κατὰ ταύτα μίξεως ἔχειν ὁμολογήκαμεν, ἢρ οὐ μετ᾿ ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύ-
1οσθαί τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξεων ποῖα ποιοῖς συμ-
φωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ
δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων οἱ συνέχοντα ταῦτα ἄστιν, ὡστε εἰ
cυμιμίγνυνθαί δυνατὰ εἶναι; καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς δια-
ρέσεσιν, εἰ δὲ ὀλον ἑτέρα τῆς διαμνέσεως ἀιτία;

15 ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ὦν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδοῦ
γε ὄσως τῆς μεγίστης;

4. τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν] "Arts and
defects of art"—which can
only be determined by refer-
ence to the standard of the
对应的art.

For the mode of expression, which arises from Plato's love
of complete statement, Heim-
dorf well compares Legg. 2,
653 c: οὐκ ἔχειν ἀπόθεν τῶν
ἐν ταῖς κυρίσεις τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀτα-
ξίων, οἷς δὴ μνῆμος ὄνομα καὶ
ἀρμονία. Cf. also infr. 262 c:
πράξειν οὐδ᾽ ἀπράξειαν.

7. τὰ γένη[ The word γένος
is used instead of ἐνδος in se-
veral places of these dialogues,
and also in the Parmenides,
Philebus, Timæus, and Laws.
This is one of several points in
which there appears a transi-
tion in these dialogues towards
the language of Aristotle. See
esp. Parm. 135 b: ὡς ἔστι γένος
τι ἐκάστων καὶ οὐσία αὐτῆ καθ᾽ αὐ-
τήν. Phileb. 12 e: γένει μὲν ἐστὶ
πᾶν ἐν, τὰ δὲ μέρη κ.τ.λ. It will
be observed that the word oc-
curs here at the opening of an
especially Platonic passage.

Cf. Rep. 5, 456 d: πῶς ἔχεις
dόξης τοῦ τοιοῦτος περί. Alib.

11. καὶ δὴ—εἶναι] "And also
whether there are any kinds
which (like the vowels), being
all-pervading, bind together
these and make them capable
of internement."

12. ταύτα] Viz. τὰ συμφωνοῦντα
tῶν γενῶν.

14. εἰ δὲ ὀλον—αἰτία] Antici-
pating the ἀταρέον φύσις which
is presently discovered, διὰ πάν-
tῶν διελθήθηναι, p. 255.
While the Stranger was not present at the conversation of yesterday, he is made to allude to the description of the philosophic life which Socrates had then given. Theod. 172, sqq. Such a failure of the dramatic element could have no place in the Charmides, Protagoras, or Phaedrus, and is rather in the manner of the Laws.

2. τὴν τῶν ἑλευθέρων] Although the Stranger was not present at the conversation of yesterday, he is made to allude to the description of the philosophic life which Socrates had then given. Theod. 172, sqq. Such a failure of the dramatic element could have no place in the Charmides, Protagoras, or Phaedrus, and is rather in the manner of the Laws.

7. μήτε ταυτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον—ταυτὸν] This closely corresponds with the account of dialectic in the Phaedrus, 265 d, e.

11. οὐκόν—ἐπίστασθαι] "Then surely he who can do this is able clearly to perceive one form pervading many such wholes, and knit together in a single unity, and many entirely sun-dered and apart. And this is to have the science of discerning in each kind wherein things admit of communion, and wherein they do not."

μίαν ἴδεαν διὰ πολλῶν] Compare Phileb. 16 d, e; Legg. 12, 965 c: ἄρ' οὖν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τ' ἐν περὶ ὅποιον ὄφραν γίγνοιτο ἢ τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἴδεαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνά-των εἶναι βλέπειν.


15. δὲ δόλων πολλῶν] These
many such general forms, and several universals, by the boundaries of definition wholly sundered from all else. This is the knowledge of the communication and incommunicableness of kinds. In this sphere the philosopher is to be sought when his turn shall come, and, like the Sophist, he is not easily dis-

wholes are the ideas just mentioned, each of which extends to many individuals. Many particulars are comprised in one universal, and many such universals again unite in one. (15) \(\text{ἐν ἐνί\]} \) Sc. ἄφι, or, absolutely, “in one.” Cf. Theaet. 157 a: \(\text{ἐπὶ ἐνός, Λέγ. 4, 718 ε: \text{ἐν ἐνί περιλαβὸνα ὅλον τιν ὑπόφ.} \) 6. καθαρὸς I.e. Without admixture of unphilosophic elements; “one who has risen into the region of pure thought.” ἰδικαῖος, i.e. neither ἀναξίως (Rep. 5, 495) nor παραψωμός (Ib. 7, 538, 9). For καθαρός, cf. Phaedo 65 ε, 67 a, b, 69 b. And for ἰδικαῖος, cf. Phaedo 83 a: ὅ ἰδι-καῖος ἕφυλαμαίνει. 10. καὶ ἑπείτα] Viz. In the “Philosopher,” about the production of which, however, some doubt is implied in the words ἐὰν ἂν ὑπομένει. Cf. infr. b: \(\text{ἄν ἔτι βουλομένοι ἡμῖν \)) From which it may perhaps be inferred that Plato deliberately relinquished the task of writing the Philosophus dialogue. 11. ἑτερον μὴν τρόπον] Sc. ἐστίν or ὤγνεται. 15. τρίβη] τρίβη (“knack,” “rule of thumb,”) is several times opposed even more strongly than ἐμπειρία to knowledge and art, and is pointedly applied in the Phaedrus and Gorgias to the sophistical rhetoric. Phaedr. 260 e: \(\text{oὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ’ ἐπε-χυς τρίβη, } \) Ib. 270 b. Gorg. 463 b: \(\text{oὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ’ ἐμ-πειρία καὶ τρίβη, } \) See also Phil. 55 e: \(\text{τὰς αἰσθήσεως κατα-μελετῶν ἐμπειρία καὶ τιν τρίβη,} \)
7TOV
= Eoikev.

ΕΕ. 'Ο δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἱδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπτετής ὀφθηναι: τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν b πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὀμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφο- 5 ρωτάντα ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ταύτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τοῦτον καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεφτό- μεθα σαφέστερον, ἀν ἐτί Βουλομένου ἥμιν ἦτε περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ποι δήλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρίν ἄν ἰκανὸς αὐτὸν θεασόμεθα.

tais tis stoicheistikis proscharo-
meneous dynamosin (which are here opposed to the essential elements of art). The word probably retains in this place something of the original sensuous meaning: the Sophist, from frequent contact, knows how to feel his way in the dark cave in which he lurks. And perhaps it is further hinted that he is the true materialist who gropes by the touch (τριβῆ προσαπτόμενοι), and is blind to the light of heaven.


3. προσκείμενοι] “Clinging to.” Cf. Rep. 6, 490 b: ἀλλ’ ἵνα καὶ οὐκ ἀπαρβλύνωνο οὐδ’ ἀπο-

λήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος κ.τ.λ. Ἱβ. 511 b: ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυπόθετον ἐπὶ τήν τοῦ παντός ἀρχίν ιῶν, ἀφάνεως αὐτῆς, πάνταν αὐτ’ ἐχομένοις τῶν ἐκεί-
νης ἐχομένων κ.τ.λ.

4. τα γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν] The image of the cave in the Republic will occur to every reader. Cf. esp. Rep. 7, 518: διτταί καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις (1 ἐπιγιγν. ταρ. ἰ) ὀμ-

μασῖν κ.τ.λ. See also the re-
markable passage in the Laws, 10, 897 d: μὴ τοίνυν εἰς ἑναίως ὡς ἤλιον ἀποβλέπους, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησό-

μεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θητοῖς ὀμμασὶν ὀφθηναι τε καὶ 

gνωσόμενοι ἰκανὸς κ.τ.λ. Com-
pare with the whole passage 

Bacon, Advancement of Learn-
ing (Ellis and Spedding’s edi-
tion), vol. iii. p. 286: “Were it not better for a man in a fair room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch candle into every corner?”

9. καὶ τάχα] For τάχα = mox, “presently,” cf. Phil. 53 e: Τάχα 8—μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προσδόν-

τος τοῦ λόγου: alib. The sub-
ject has been already proposed by Socrates, and will be ex-
amined presently, as soon as the Sophist and Statesman shall have been defined.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς ἔπες.

ΞΕ. "Οὕτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῶν τῶν γενῶν ὁμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἄλληλοισι, τὰ δὲ μη, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' όλγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ c 5 πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοιμωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο ἕνεκεν ὁμολογίας τῷ λόγῳ τὴν σχέσιν εἰρετεῖται, μη' περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδον, ἦν μὴ ταραττόμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελθόντοι τῶν μεγάλων λεγομένων ἀττα, πρώτον μὲν ποίᾳ ἐκαστά ἐστιν, το ἐπείτα κοινωνίας ἄλληλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἦν

2. "Οὕτ' οὖν—ὁμολογηταί] Οἱ κοινωνεῖν ἄλληλοις, τὰ μὲν ἐπ' όλγον, τὰ δὲ μη, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' όλγον, τὰ δ' ἐπί πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ c 5 πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοιμωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο ἕνεκεν ὁμολογίας τῷ λόγῳ τὴν σχέσιν εἰρετεῖται, μη' περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδον, ἦν μὴ ταραττόμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελθόντοι τῶν μεγάλων λεγομένων ἀττα, πρώτον μὲν ποίᾳ ἐκαστά ἐστιν, το ἐπείτα κοινωνίας ἄλληλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἦν

3. καὶ τὰ μὲν—κεκοιμωνηκέναι] This was not distinctly said, but was partly implied in what was said of the vowels, supra 253 a.

4. ἐπ' δέλογον] "To a small extent." ἐπί πολλά] "Extending communication to many things."  

6. ἕνεκεν ὁμολογίας τῷ λόγῳ] The ideas of Being, rest and motion, which are now chosen for examination, have been suggested by the preceding argument.

7. μη' περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδον] Cf. Spinoza, Eth. II. 1: Transeom jam ad explicanda que ex Dei vive entis aeterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi: non quidem omnia (infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi &c.). ἦν μη' ταραττόμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς] A similar reason is adduced for the use of the argument from Example in Polit. 278 c: ἦν ψυχῇ—τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἄμη γε πη τῶν συγκράτεων ὁρθῶς δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δὲ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μη' βαθάς συλλαβότοι τά τὰτα πάλιν ἀγαπεῖ. The contrast in the text, however, is not between the simplicity of ideas and the complexity of facts, but between the few great ideas and the multiplicity of lesser ones.


10. δυνάμεως] Gen. of respect, like μῖξεως supra. "How they stand in respect of capacity of intercommunion." ἦν τὸ τε ὅν—ἀπαλλάττειν] "That, even if we cannot grasp with perfect clearness the notions of Being and Not-Being, we may at least exhaust the argument respecting them, in so far as the method of the present inquiry permits, and try in any way we can force the point that Not-Being is really Not-Being, and take no harm."
The antecedent is found in the following words. "The most important kinds are those which we have just been considering."


19. Οὐκοῦν—ταυτῶν] Compare the very similar manipulation of ideas in Theaet. p. 185.
Tī pot' ađ vūn oútos eir'kamev tō te tautōn p. 254 kai thāteron; pōtera dū γενη τινε αυτώ, tōn mēn trown ἀλλα, εὐμμυγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνως εἴξ ἀνάγκησ ἀεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων 5 αυτῶν σκεπτέων, ἥ το τε ταύτων τοῦτο καὶ thāteron ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορέουντες λαυθάνομεν ἡμᾶς p. 255 αὐτοῖς;

THEAI. Ἰσως.

ΣΕ. 'Αλλ' οὐ τι μὴν κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ'.

THEAI. Πῶς;

ΣΕ. Ὡ τι περ ἄν κοινὴ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν οἶον τε εἶναι.

THEAI. Τί δῆ;

ΣΕ. Κίνησις τε στῆσεται καὶ στάσις αὐ—κινηθή-

1. Τί ποτ' αὐ—θάτερον] Compare the emergence of the ideas of σφάδρα, ἴρέμα and ποσόν, and their relation to each other, occasioned by the simple words καὶ σφάδρα γε, in Phileb. 24 c.

2. πότερα—αὐτῶ] Sc. λεκτέων. αὐτῶ, unemphatic, resuming ταύτων and thāteron.


5. ὡς ὄντων] For the position of ὡς, cf. ταύτων ὡς ὄντα a few lines below, and παισίν ὡς ὄσιν ἡμῖν suppl. 242 d.

5. ἥ το τε ταύτων] "Or in saying Same and Other, are we unconsciously speaking as of one of those former ideas?"

16. περὶ γὰρ—ἐναντίον] Heind. "Nam alterutrum eorum utrum-

vis (sive motus sive status) quando in utroque ineret (in motu vel statu) alterum coget in contrarium rursus suse naturre abire, quoniam hoc alterum contrarii particeps factum est." This is right, and has been wrongly criticised by Badham, who does not appear to see that the second thāteron must be correlative to the first. But Heind. and Stabb. do not seem to have observed that the case is still general, and is only applied to ταύτων and thāteron in the next sentence. The argument is this:—Rest and mo-

15 tion cannot be identified either with Same or Other. For if either rest or motion were identified with anything which is predicable of both, motion would rest and rest would move: inasmuch as that (whe-
20. Motion, and hence cannot be identified with either. For being identified with one and then predicated of the other, either of them, as the case might be, would cause Motion to be predicated of Rest, or Rest of Motion. And Being and Same-ness are not one: else in saying Motion and Rest both are, we should imply that they are both the same.

Sameness, therefore, is a fourth kind, distinct from the other three.

7. Μὴ τοίνυν] "Let us not therefore identify Same or Other with motion, nor yet with rest." Cf. Phædo 103, 4.

13. 'Αλλ' 'ει—προσερούμεν] "But if the words Being and Sameness have no difference of meaning, then again in saying that motion and rest both are we shall speak of them as being both the same."

20. εἴδος] Omitted in Boll. Δ. Π., but probably genuine. The Same is not only separate from the remaining kinds, but is itself to be recognized as a
Or can Otherness be identified with Being; else there would be an absolute Otherness, as there is an absolute Being. But the Other is always relative to an Other. And so the Other is to be recognized as a fifth kind. And it is at the same time perceived to extend to all the kinds. For each of them has now been distinguished from the distinct kind or form. 

For the gen. étérou, cf. Rep. 4, 438 e: ὅσα ἐστίν οίᾳ εἶναι τὸν, and 439 a: οὐ τῶν ἐκείνων τῶν τῶν εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστι. It is not observed that ταὐτὸν is also a relative term (πρὸς τι). But a thing may be ταὐτον in relation to itself, and so not πρὸς étérou or πρὸς ἄλληλα. Cf. Theet. 185 b.
THEAI. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Πέμπτον δ' τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν
ε τοῖς εἰδέσεις οὕτων, ἐν οἷς προαιροὺμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φύσιμεν εἶναι διεληλυθιάν· ἐν ἐκαστόν γὰρ ἔτερον εἶναι τῶν ἀλλῶν οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ιδέας τῆς θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κοιμήθη μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. ὡδὲ δὴ λέγομεν ἔπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ’ ἐν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἐστὶ παντάπασιν ἔτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτῶς.

ΞΕ. Οὐ στάσις ἃρ’ ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Ἐστὶ δὲ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὦντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστὶν.

3. ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα] Equivalent to ἀ προαιρ. ἐν is repeated by attraction from the previous clause. "Posterius in his ἐν tanquam e precedente syllabâ natum expungerem, ní obstaret ejusdem modi exemplum apud Xenoph. de Vectig. iv. 13: 'Ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν οὖν ἐγογε, ἀφ' οὖν μελλω λέγειν, οὐδὲν τι ἀξιῶ βαθμίζεσθαι ὡς δυσερετῶν τι εξευρηκός." (Heind.)

10. ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε] These five ‘chief kinds of Being’ are adopted by Plotinus, who, in forming his complex notion of the Highest Truth, prefers them, in combination with the triple οὐσία of the Philebus, to the categories of Aristotle. Ennead V, b. i, VI, b. 2. He makes a distinction, which in Plato is hardly present, between a summum genus and a constituent element of absolute Being.

11. ἀναλαμβάνοντες] “Resuming,” a technical word in Platonic discussion, cf. Theet. 187 e and note. Perhaps here used more literally, “taking them up to examine them one by one.”


14. Οὐ στάσις ἃρ’ ἐστίν] Here the Other is for the first time seen to be identical with Negation.

rest, not by reason of itself, but through participation in the Form of Otherness. Thus, first of all, Motion is Other than Rest: i.e. is not Rest. Yet Motion is, because Motion partakes of Being. Again, Motion is Other than the Same: is not the Same. Yet Motion partakes of Same-ness, and is the same Motion. We must not quarrel with this result, that Motion is the Same and not the
Same, for each expression is true, but in a different respect. Motion is the same with itself through participation in the Form of Sameness, not the Same, through partaking of the Other, whereby it is separated and becomes Other than the Form of the Same. Indeed, as we have shewn that in the nature of things there must

1. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν η κίνησις έτερον ταύτω p. 256 εστὶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. Όυ ταύτων αὖρα εστὶν.

ΤΟΙ. Όυ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. 'Αλλά μὴν αὐτή γ' ἢν ταύτων διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὑτῶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταύτων τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταύτων ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. Οὐ γὰρ ὅταν ἐπτωμεν αὐτήν ταύτων καὶ μὴ ταύτων, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν μὲν ταύτων, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταύτων πρὸς ἐαυτὴν οὔτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταύτων, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖθατέρου, δι' ἥν ἀποχωρίζο-μένη ταύτων γέγονεν οὐκ ἕκεινο ἅλλ' ἑτέρον, οὕτε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταύτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοὖν κἂν εἵ πη μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ κίνη-

1. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν] "Again."

I. e. To make a new beginning from the same point, viz. κίνησις.

7. αὑτῶν] Sc. τού ταύτων. Cf. supr. 254 d, to which ἥν refers. πάντα is therefore restricted to being, rest, and motion, as διὰ πάντων—αὐτῶν, p. 255 d, to the five "kinds." αὖ marks the opposition between the reason now given and the words ἡ κίνησις ἑτερον ταύτω εστὶν.


13. πρὸς ἑαυτῆν οὖτω λέγομεν] "We call it so (the same) in relation to itself."

ὅταν—ταύτων] "But when we speak of it as not the Same, this is because of the participation in the Other, whereby it is severed from the Same, and has become not that but an Other, so that again it is rightly spoken of as not the Same."

18. αὐτῆς κίνησις] Here, and supr. 252 d, distinguished from the πάθημα κινήσεως. It is im-
plied that motion does not partake of rest. Yet there is a tendency in this dialogue to attribute necessity or permanence to the idea of motion.


9. ἔτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου] In this argument motion appears in one and the same expression as other and not other. Cf. Theset. 165 b, c, compared with the preceding argument; and for a similar refinement on ἐτέρον, ib. 189 c, where, however, the contradiction is merely verbal, as in Enthyd. 301.

Having made this step, we are prepared to understand more easily that motion at once is and is not.

14. δὴ] To be taken, not closely with νῦν, but with the whole sentence.

16. ἄρα τῶν μὲν] ἄρ' αὐτῶν, the reading of the best MSS., is probably due to αὐτήν just below. ἄρ' οὖ, which Bekker and the Zurich editors approve, is rightly rejected by Stallbaum, who reads ἄρα with seven MSS.

18. αὐτὰ] Sc. τὰ γενή.

19. ἐν οἷς] "Within the sphere of which." ἐν, as in Theset. 152 c: ἐν τῇ θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τούτοις.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν π. 256. ἐλάττω τῶν ἀρίθμων τοῦ νῦν δὴ φανέντος.  
ΞΕ. Ἀδεὼς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἐτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὁντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγομεν;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.  
ΞΕ. Οὐκοὖν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις οὖντος οὐκ ὃν ἐστὶ καὶ οὖν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὁντος μετέχει;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφεστάτα γε.  
ΞΕ. Ἐστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὁν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ ὑπάρχουσιν φύσις ἐτερον ἀπεργαζόμενη τοῦ ὁντος ε ἐκαστον οὐκ ὃν ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐξήπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταύτα ὁντος οὐκ ὁντα ὁρθῶς ἐρωμένει, καὶ πάλιν, ὦτι μετέχει τοῦ ὁντος, εἰναι τε καὶ ὅντα.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Κινούντες.  
ΞΕ. Περὶ ἐκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁν, ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὁν.

2. φανέντος] “Which shewed itself.” It is implied that the argument has proceeded, as usual, without the will of the speakers; i.e. has not been developed arbitrarily.

4. διαμαχόμενο] The notion of violence, and of a conflict with the Sophist, implied in μετάσχει and διαμαχήσων, 242 d, is continued here.

9. Ἐστιν ἄρα] I. e. What has now been said of motion must be necessarily true of everything except the idea of Being. Constr. ἐστὶ—τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι, “It is true that that which is not, is”; “The existence of Not-Being is a fact,” “not only in the case of motion, but in every kind. For the nature of difference, extending to all, divides each thing from Being, and makes it not-Being, and so in this way we shall be right in saying that all things whatsoever are not-Being, and again because they partake in Being that they are and have being.”


17. ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὁν] The argument is tacitly carried a step in advance. It
Thea. Ἅποικεν.

Ἐ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων ἦναι λεκτέων.

Thea. Ἀνάγκη.

Ἐ. Καὶ τὸ ὅν ἀρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὅν ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ ἑστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τάλλα οὐκ ἑστιν αὐ.

Thea. Σχεδὸν οὕτως.

Ἐ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ τάυτα οὐ δυσχεραντέων, ἔπει-περ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἄλλῃς ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δὲ τις τάυτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείνασι ημῶν τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετά ταῦτα.

Thea. Δικαιώτατα εἰρήκασ.

b) Ἐ. Ἰδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε.

Thea. Τὸ ποῖον;

Ἐ. Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὅν λέγομεν, ὡς ἐοικεν, οὐκ ἑναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὕπτος, ἄλλ' ἑτέρων μόνον.

Thea. Πῶς;

is assumed that the δισεραντεῖ δισεραντεῖ δισεραντεῖ each thing not only from Being in the abstract, but from every other existing kind except itself: so that it is not each in turn.

5. ὅσον πέρ—οὐκ ἑστιν] Cf. Thes. 171 a (where Protagoras is put to silence): διπ τεινον οίς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οίς δοκεῖ, τοσοῖτοι μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἑστιν.

10. καὶ ταῦτα] "We must not quarrel with this, any more than with the former result." καὶ refers to οὐ δυσχεραντέων in p. 256 a.

12. πείνασα—τοὺς λόγους] The arguments are half-personified. For the sentiment, com-
Ε. Ὅδεν ὅταν εἴπωμεν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον p. 257 τι σοι φανόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἵσον δηλοῦν τῷ ρήματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

Ε. Οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συνχωρησόμεθα, τοσοίτου δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μηνεῖ τὸ μὴ καί τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπίοντων ὅνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ο περὶ ἄτ' ἀν κέται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ύστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὅνοματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ε. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθόμεν, εἴ καὶ σοὶ ἔγνοικεί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

2. τῶ ρήματι] "The expression." The word is used with exactness = the predicate: not ὅνόματι or λόγῳ.

5. ἀπόφασις] The word occurs only in the Soph., Craphylus, and Apology of Plato; and in this place signifies not the negative proposition, but the negative particle.


The difficulty of conceiving μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἔνοχος is parallel to that felt in the Philebus about the ἀπειρον, p. 26 d: καὶ τοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον παρέ- σχετο γένη, ὥστε ἐπισφεραγιοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναν- τίον γένει, ἐν ἐφάνη.

8. ὅνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων] The genitives are governed by τῶν ἄλλων. "The prefixes οὗ and μὴ point to something different from the words which follow them, or rather from the things which the words uttered after the negative import."

12. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθόμεν] "Let us, now, carry our minds through this matter."
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 159

ο. 257. ΞΕ. Η θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερ- 
ματισθαί καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς.

ΞΕ. Μία μὲν ἐστὶ που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ 
γεγονόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἐκαστὸν ἀφορισθέν ἐπονυμεῖ
δ' μίαν ἵσχει τῷα ἐπιτήρη ἵδιαν· διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ' 
εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμηαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκαστοῦ καὶ ἐκείνη ἐπί 
μᾶς οὐσίας ταὐτῶν πέπονθε τούτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ' ἀν' ἄλλον ὅποι δὴ λέγωμεν;

ΞΕ. "Εστὶ τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιπρο-
θέμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστίν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμου ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἐχον ἐπω-

νμιὰν;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εχον' ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκαστὸτε φθει-
γόμεθα, τοῦτο οὖν ἄλλον τινὸς ἐπερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς 
τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ΞΕ. Ἰθι νῦν, τόδε μοι λέγε.

ε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. "Ἀλλο τι τῶν ὑμῶν τινὸς [ἐνός] γένους 

1. κατακεκερματισθαί] For a similar use of this favourite 
word, cf. Parm. 144 b: (τὸ ἐπί) 
κατακεκερματίσται ἀρά ὡς οὐδὲ 
σμικρότατα (ἐπὶ ἐπὶ σμικρότατα) 
καὶ μέγαστα καὶ παντοχώρ ὑπά.

2. τοῦ δ' ἐπί τῷ γεγονόμενον] 
Cf. Rep. 6, 511 d, e, for this 
use of ἐπι with the dative.

6. ἐπιτήρη] This is omitted 
in one MS. (Par. E.), but is to 
be retained. The gender is 
πρὸς το σημαινόμενον, but helped 
by τέχναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι follow-

10. ταῦτων—τοῦτο] ἐπωνυμίαν 
ἱδιαν ἐκαστὸν ἐχει καὶ πολλὰ ἐστι.

11. ἄλλον ὅποι δὴ λέγωμεν;] "But 
shall we determine how?"

The Bodl. has ἀλλοπη sin. acc.

22. "Αλλο τι—μή καλὸν] ἐνός, 
which Hermann retains on the 
authority of the Bodleian MS., 
is omitted there as well as in 
ΔΠ. The reasoning seems to 
require that the words should

Otherness or 
Dif- 
ference has 
as many 
branches as 
Knowledge has; each 
of which is 
expressed 
by putting 
the word 
'not' be-
fore the 
name of 
one of the 
objects of 
knowledge.

Every such 
expression
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THEAI. Oútovs.

ΞΕ. Ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν [ἡ] ἀντίθεσις, ὡς έσικ',

εἶναι [τὶ] συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλὸν.

THEAI. Ὄρθοτατα.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀρα μᾶλ-

λον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἤμιν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἢττον δὲ τὸ

μὴ καλὸν:

be rendered thus: "Does not

this constitute the existence of

the Not-Beautiful?" (ἀλλὸ τι

— οὖτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ

καλὸν.) 'It is parted

off (ἀφορισθεὶς) as belonging to

a certain kind of existences

(τῶν γενός τῶν ὄντων: for the

gen., cf. Rep. 4, 438 d); 2nd,

that it is set over against

something which exists." A

simpler rendering of the words

may possibly be right if suffi-
cient stress is laid upon εἶναι.

"The Not-Beautiful, as distin-
guished from a certain kind of

existence, and again as op-
posed to an existing some-

what, has thus an existence of

its own." But the words αὐτῷ

πάλιν indicate that the τι τῶν

ἔντων is different from the

γένος. The former interpreta-
tion is confirmed by compar-
ing supra 257 c in the cor-

responding partition of know-

ledge: τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γεγραμένῳ

μέρος αὐτῆς ἐκατόν ἀφορισθεὶς—

where ἐπὶ τῷ γεγραμένῳ answers
to the genitive here. Accord-
ing to this rendering, the read-
ing ἐνός, although omitted in
the Bodleian MS., is not clearly
wrong.

4. "Ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν — μὴ

καλὸν] ἡ is omitted before

ἀντίθεσις in Bodl. ΔΠ, and

has been rejected by Stall-
baum and C. F. Hermann: τι

after εἶναι is omitted only in
Flor. c, i, but can hardly be
retained. It was omitted by
Stephanus. If ἡ and τι are
retained, the words must be
construed thus: "Then it re-
sults that the opposition of
the Not-Beautiful" (ἡ ἀντίθεσις,

τὸ μὴ καλὸν, apposition) "is one"
(lit. "something," τι) "between
beings and being." Omitting
ἡ and τι we should render "It
results then that the notion of
'not-beautiful' is an oppo-
sition of being to being."

In the use of ἀντίθεσις here,
as of ὄνος below (p. 258 b),
there is some confusion be-
 tween abstract and concrete.

ἀντίθεσις — συμβαίνει] The

Bodl. has ἀντίθεσιν and εἶναι τι.
If ἀντίθεσιν is right, συμβαίνει
is impersonal.

b: Τί δ' εἶ τις λέγοι, εἰ μέγεθος

μὴ ἐστὶν ἡ σμικρύτης μὴ ἐστὶν

ἡ τι ἀλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢρ' ἐφ'

έκαστον δὲν δηλοὶ ὅτι ἐτερὸν τι

λέγει τὸ μὴ δὲν; Η. e. that the
Thus each of the parts of Other has a real existence, and the opposition between the several parts of Being and Other is also Being.

thing denied (or negatively predicated) in each case is different.

2. Ὀμοιώς ἄρα] "Then the not-great must be said to exist equally with the great." (ἀυτὸ τὸ μέγα.)

5. τὸ δίκαιον—θετέων] "Be put in the same category with the just so far as their equally existing is concerned." For the limitation with πρὸς, cf. Phaedo 75 a: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν, ὥς Σ., πρὸς γε ὁ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος.

14. ἦ—ἀντίδεσις] The order is ἦ ἀντίδεσις μορίου τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ (μορίου) τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων. The rendering of Heindorf and Stallbaum, "oppositio nature partis alicujus," is objectionable, because the expression θατέρου φύσεως has been already appropriated to the Other in general. Besides, the argument does not lead here to the contrast of Being and all other ideas, but to that between existing things and their negations. The present is simply the generalization of the preceding argument. The meaning is, in other words, that negation is, equally with affirmation, a real determination of thought.

16. εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν] Another expression of the awe in which the idea of Being was held (on which vid. supra p. 243 c); also marking anew the reluctance with which the authority of Parmenides is impugned.
And such negative determinations are the Not-Being, of which we have been so long in search. Therefore, as Being includes all true determinations of thought, Not-Being is a kind of Being.

8. οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον] οὐσίας is not exactly a genitive of respect, but depends on ἐλλεῖπεν. In the same construction as the second genitive in such expressions as κλῶς σου φῶνης —θανάμαξα σου τῆς διονοσίας.

9. ἑβεβαίωσ] “Incontrovertibly.” ἐστι, τῆν] Edd. ἐστι τῆν. I have changed the accentuation of ἐστι, which does not seem here to be merely an auxiliary verb with ἔχων.

11. καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα] The editors have followed Boeckh in repeating μὴ μέγα and μὴ καλῶν. This is possibly right, but not necessary, for the sense is easily completed by supplying ἦν, which is the emphatic word.

12. ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι] He passes from the ἦν of reference (“We found it to be so”) to that of certainty (“It proves to be so”). ἐστι is introduced as more plainly contradicting Parmenides.


It is to be noticed here that while the notion of Not-Being is modified, there is a transition also in that of Being. Through communion with Not-Being, i. e. with the Other or Difference, both in general and particular, Being has become concrete instead of merely abstract, logical instead of purely ideal. Being is the sum of all positive existences, at the same time having an existence separate from them (Other than their’s), Socher observed this, but had not perceived the dialectical progress by which this result is approached.
We have not only disobeyed Parmenides, but have defined the Nature of that which he forbade us to name. The essence of Not-Being is the negative relation between each existing kind and that which is Other than it.

1. μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως] I. e. ἥ ἀπείπεν ἠμῶν.
2. ἡπιστήκαμεν] The use of this word immediately after ἀπιστία, in a different sense, deserves to be noted. "We have carried our disobedience to Parmenides beyond the letter of his prohibition."
3. τοῦτο φαύρι] I propose to read τοῦτο φαύρι here, as above, p. 237 a, q. v. διέχυμεν occurs here also as a various reading, but it does not seem impossible that Plato should choose to quote the words of Parmenides more exactly in one place than in another.
4. κατακεκερματισμένη] Plato is fond of this word. For a parallel use, cf. Parm. 144 c.
6. Μη — οὐκ ἔστω] "Let no man, then, say of us that we
declare Not-Being the contrary of Being, and dare to affirm that it exists. We have long ago shaken hands with the question of an opposite to being, whether one exists or not, and whether this be capable or wholly incapable of definition. But for our present account of Not-Being, let a man either refute us and persuade us that we are in error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say as we say, that there is an inter-communion of the kinds, and that Being and Difference traverse all things, and mutually inter-penetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of such participation is, yet is not that of which it partakes, but an Other; and being Other than Being, it is clearly the case, of necessity, that it is not-Being. While Being, through partaking of the Other, must be other than the remaining kinds, and as other than all, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, but itself only; so that there are infinite cases in which Being again is not, and in like manner the remaining kinds, whether taken severally or all together, in many respects are, and in many respects are not.”

Cf. Legg. 10, 899 c: “Ἡ διδα-

σκεῖν ἡμᾶς — ἦ γὰρ πειθέσθαι. Being is therefore distinguished from the sum of positive determinations. Compare the attempt towards the close of the Theaetetus to distinguish the ἴδεα τῆς συλλαβῆς from the σταχεῖα.

2. περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς] As often happens in sentences begun with περὶ, the syntax is not quite exact. “As for an opposite of Being, we have long said good-bye to that inquiry.”

11. ἐστὶ σαφέστατα ἡ ἀνάγκης ἑιναὶ] These words are repeated from 256 d. τὸ ἔτερον is the subject of ἑιναὶ, and (τὸ
Our argument has shewn the worthlessness of that easy and childish logic which relies on the exposure of contradictions, when compared with that which is at once difficult and valuable, the real criticism of...
eléγχοντ' ἑπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἔτερον ὑν πῇ 
ταῦτον εἶναι φή καὶ ὅταν ταὐτόν ὑν ἔτερον, ἐκείνη ἀ 
καὶ κατ' ἐκείνῳ ὁ φήσι τούτων πεποθεῖαι πότερον, τὸ 
δὲ ταὐτὸν ἔτερον ἀποφαίνει ἀμὴ γὲ πῇ καὶ τὸ θά-
5τερον ταῦτον καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον 
ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τάναντία ἀεί προφέροντα 
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔ τέ τις ἐλέγχος οὕτος ἀληθινὸς 
ἀρτι τέ τῶν οὕτων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογε-

νης ὁν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

—the latter is more probable.

"Letting these contradictions alone, as not inconsistent with the nature of things." (οὐκ ἄδινατα, Par. F. marg.) In support of the former (which, however, is hardly Greek), cf. Phileb. 14 d: ηὶ δεῖ τῶν του-
τῶν ἄπτεσθαι, παιδαρώθη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμ-
pόδια. The word is suspicious, and Badham conj. ἂνηπτα. It is more likely that a few letters have dropt out, e. g. ταῦτα ἐσάντα ὡς ὑναίταν μά-
λυστα.[a]

(18.) οἷον τ' ἐισα — πότερον] "To be able to apply his rea-
son to each particular point in a discussion, and to bring any 
man to the test who says that what is other in some respect 
is the same, or what is the same is other, by reasoning with 
him on that ground and of that particular relation, in 
which he says that either of these predicates is applicable."

1. eléγχοντα ἑπακολουθεῖν] Cf. Rep. 7; 534 e: ὡσπερ ἐν μίαχ διὰ 
πάντων ἐλέγχον διεξεῖ — ἐν πάσι 
tούτως ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διασα-
ρεῖται.

3. κατ' ἐκείνῳ ὃ = κ. c. καθ' ὃ] The want of this power is 
again noted as the defect of ἀντιλογική in Rep. 5, 454 c.

This passage has been curi-
ously mistranslated by Hegel: 
See Introduction to Sophist, 
sub finem.

7. οὗ τέ τις — νεογενης ὁν] "This is no real exercise of 
reason, but on the face of it 
the childish offspring of one 
who has but a recent ac-
quaintance with the true ob-
jects of thought." Cf. Rep. 7, 
539 b: οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ 
πρᾶτον λόγον γεῶσαι, ὡς παιδί 
άυτοῖς καταχράνται, ἂς ἀντι-
λογίαν χρόσαμον, καὶ μιμοῦμεν 
τοὺς εἶλέγχουσαν αὐτοῖς ἄλλους 
εἶλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὡσπερ σκυ-
λάκα τῷ ἐλκεῖν τε καὶ σπαράττε 
τῶν πλήσιων ἄτε.

8. νεογενῆς] Cf. Theet. 160 
ε: τοῦτο φῶμεν σῶν εἶναι σων 
νεογενές παιδίων. Perhaps νεο-

genēs has here the meaning 
(which Hegel gives it) = νεόν 
γένεσι. (Cf. Shakspeare's 
"the baby of a girl.") See 
the unusual meaning given to 
ναμφανής in Polit. 268 a.
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

p. 259.

ΞΕ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὃ γὰθε, τὸ γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπίχειρεῖν ἁποχορίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμελεῖς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἁμοῦσον τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφοιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;
ΞΕ. Τελευτάτη πάντων λόγων ἔστιν ἁφάνισις τὸς διαλύειν ἔκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἴδων συμπλοκῆς ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἤμιψ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

p. 260.

ΞΕ. Σκόπει τοῖς νω ἐν καιρῷ νῦν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διειμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν εἰς ἔτερον ἔτερον μίγνυσθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πρὸς δὴ τί;
ΞΕ. Πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἤμιψ τῶν ὀντῶν ἐν τί γενόν εἶναι. τοῦτον γὰρ στερηθέντες τὸ μὲν μέγι-

2. ἐπίχειρεῖν] “To go about to separate.” The word is redundant, as often in Plato: e. g. supra 235 ε. Phaedr. 265 ε.
3. ἁμοῦσον τινὸς] Because μονοσκη is conversant with λόγοι. Cf. Theaet. 156 α.
5. Τελευτάτη—πάντων] This truth is the key to the present dialogue, and gives unity to what seems unconnected. The chief characteristic of the Sophist is ἀντιλογικὴ, an art of negation; and even the Elenchus, as professed by him, has the defect of being purely negative, and is valuable only in clearing the way for positive speculation. It is by means of this controversial or negative dialectic that the Sophist eludes us when we try to fix upon him the reproach of being a pretender. And Parmenides has given occasion for this kind of reasoning, by drawing the line so sharply between being and not-being. Of the same nature was the difficulty we encountered in considering the exclusive antithesis of rest and motion. This whole class of difficulties is solved when we perceive that positive and negative are indissolubly united in the nature of things: and in particular we are enabled to transfix the Sophist by proving to him that negation is applicable to thought and speech.
14. τοῦτον γὰρ στερηθέντες] “For if compelled to relinquish this, the greatest evil would be that we must give up philosophy; but besides this, at this moment we are required to agree upon a definition of
convenience of having established this communion, for our next business is to define Discourse, whereas if forms were incommunicable, we should not have been able to discourse at all. The reason why this is necessary is that other hold onus. He does not need to have known the existence of discourse were utterly taken from us, I presume we could not then discourse at all” (much less discourse upon Discourse).

11. Τὸ μὲν δὲ—ἀναγκαῖον] Viz. The application of the notion of Other to those things from which Being, or any part of Being, is distinguished.

12. διεσπαρμένον] Supr. 255 e, 257 c.

14. ἐὰν—μισθωτοί] The way is now prepared for the continuation of the argument which was dropped p. 236 e.


20. ἐν διανοία—γιγνόμενον] “Which thus arises in the region of thought and speech.”
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ.  169

p. 260.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ε. Καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὐσίς εἰδῶλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἢ ἢ καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ε. Τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τὸ 5 ἄτομον καταπέφευγεν μὲν, ἰξαρνοῦ δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μὴ εἰναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὁν ὀντε διανοεῖσθαί τινα ὀντε λέγειν· ὥστις ὀντε ὀντε ὀντε ὀντε ὀντε εἰς ἔτην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταῦτα. Ε. Νῦν δὲ γε τούτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὀντος, ὡστε ταύτη μὲν ὄψος οὐκ ἂν μᾶχοντο ἡττ. τάχα δ' ἂν φαίνῃ τῶν εἰδῶν τα μὲν μετέχει τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τα δ' οὗ, καὶ λόγου δὴ καὶ δόξαν εϊναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων. ὡστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιίκην καὶ φανταστικῆν, ἐν ἣ φαμεν 15 καὶ τον εἰναι, διαμάχοιτ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἐκτιν ἐπειδὴ δὸξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κωνονεί τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐναι ταύτης μὴ συνυσταμένης τής κοινωνίας. δὶα ταῦτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ο τῇ 20 ποτ' ἐκτιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τήν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδότες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅν

In other words: Negation is possible, but Falsehood is not.

Hence there arises the necessity of examining speech, opinion,

15. φανταστικῆν] Distinguished from εἰκαστικῆ, the other species of εἰδωλοποιίκη, supr. p. 236 c.
16. πάλιν] I. e. As before in the case of μὴ ὅν.
18. μὴ συνυσταμένης] The communion is said to unite, instead of the elements uniting in communion, just as ἡ μάχη συνισταται is put for ὁ μαχόμενοι συνιστανται εἰς μάχην.
20. δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν] This distinction is in advance of the psychology of the Theaetetus.
21. ἵνα—κατίδωμεν] “That when we have found them, we may also observe their communion with Not-Being.”
22. τὸ ψεῦδος ὅν] “That falsehood exists.”
αποδείξαμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστήν εἰς αὐτὸ p. 261 εὐδήσωμεν, ἐπερ ἐνοχὸς ἑστιν, ἣ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες εὖ ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.

THEAI. Κομιδὴ δε γε, ὁ ζέων, ἑοκεν ἄλθης εἶναι 5 τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστήν κατ' ἀρχὰς λεξθεῖν, ὅτι δυσθή- πρέτοιν ἐν τῇ γένοι. ἐθυμεῖται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμευν, δὲν ἐπειδὰν τι προβάλη, τούτῳ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἕκεινον ἀφικέσθαι. ὥν γὰρ μόνις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὃν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθέν 10 διεπεράσαμεν, ἔτερον δὲ προβέβληται, καὶ δεὶ ἡ ψευ- δος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγου καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξαται, καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ ἵσως ἔτερον, καὶ ἐτ’ ἄλλο μετ’ ἕκεινο- καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἑοκεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

ΣΩ. Θαρρεῖν, ὁ Θεαίτης, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι 15 δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἄει προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὃ γ’ ἄθυμων ἐν τούτοις δρασεῖν ἄν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἥ μιθὲν ἐν ἕκεινοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τούτισθεν ἀπωσθεῖς; σχολή που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν λεγόμενον, ὅ γε

1. αὐτό] τὸ ψεῦδος.
2. εἰπὲρ ἐνοχὸς ἑστιν] “If he is liable to be held therein.” The word, without losing the legal association, recovers the original metaphorical sense. Cf. πρόχειρον, Theat. 198 d, and note. The same remark applies to ἀπολύσαντες, “freeing him” (at once acquitting and liberating).
5. κατ’ ἀρχὰς 218 c, 223 b, 226 a.
7. προβάλη] Referring to προβλημάτων, which partly re-
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p. 261. τοιοῦτος ἄν ποτε ἐλοι πάλιν. νῦν δ᾽ ἐπεί, ὃ γαθέ, τοῦτο ὸ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τὸ τοι μέγιστον ἥμιν τεῖχος ἤρημένον ἄν εἰη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἣδη ράω καὶ σμικρότερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΕ. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νῦν δή, λάβωμεν, ἵν ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισόμεθα*, πότερον αὐτῶν ἀπτεται τὸ μή ὃν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθὴ μὲν ἔστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεύδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτεροι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

d  ΣΕ. Φέρε δὴ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων πάλιν ὥσαύτως ἐπισκεψόμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ πη ταύτη τὸ νῦν ἔγγυμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων ὑπακούστεον;

ΣΕ. Εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλους ξυναρμόττει εἴτε μηδὲν εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὴλον τοιοῦτο γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ οὐ. 5

3. ἦρημένον] This use of the pf. pass. of αἴρεω sufficiently confirms the MS. reading ἦρημεν in Phileb. 66 b. The metaphor is suggested by σχολή—ἐλοι πάλιν above.

7. νῦν δὴ] So also the Bodl. MS. (not δὲ).

*ἀπολογισόμεθα*] MSS. ἀπολογισόμεθα. If the MS. reading were right, the following clauses would depend on λάβωμεν, and there would be a continuation of the metaphor from supr. 254 d: ἄδικοι ἀπαλλάττειν. Cf. Legg. 10, 886 e. But the correction of Heindorf, received by Bekker and succeeding editors, appears so exactly suited to the context, that it is here retained. “That we may reckon or infer more clearly.” “That we may have better data for determining.” ότοι as in ἀπεικάζειν, ἀπομαντεύ- εσθαί.

14. φαίνεται γάρ πη ταύτη] Because words are the elements of speech, as letters are of syllables, and ideas of thought.

16. Τὸ ποῖον — ὑπακούστεον] “What question must I answer about names?”

15 words which we have already answered about the letters of the alphabet and the kinds of Being:

Our first step must be to ask the same question about
To what extent do they admit of combination? Some combinations of words are significant, and some are not. For, as there are two chief parts of speech: the verb, which signifies action, and the noun, which denotes the agent, neither verbs without nouns nor nouns without verbs can be strung together so as to mean anything.

9. Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν [The distinction of noun and verb is here introduced as something wholly new. Note that ὀνόμα is used first in a generic and afterwards in a specific meaning: first for “word” (supr. d) and then for “noun.”]

11. Τὸ μὲν — ὀνόμα [“The one, which is an expression standing for actions, we call a verb: the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.”]
The most elementary sentence must contain at least one of each kind. And the simplest combination of a noun and verb, such as "Man learns," is at once significant, and this
may be taken as a type of language in the most rudimentary form. It is therefore true that of words, as of letters and sounds, only certain combinations are admissible. Every such combination is a proposition.

Moreover, every proposition, even the simplest, has a subject, and is of a certain quality.

1. ὅδε] The adverb is used, instead of τοῦτο, by a sort of attraction from πῶς.


9. τῷ πλέγματι] The same metaphor is applied in the Politicus to the practical combinations of the Statesman.

13. τὰ τῆς φωνῆς σημεία] “The vocal marks on things,” i. e. words. περὶ = “in the region of,” i. e. “amongst.”

17. σιμικρὸν τόδε] Sc. ἵδωμεν or λάθωμεν. Cf. Polit. 300 a: τὶ δὲ τόδε; Compare the similar ellipse with ὅδε in Theet. 191 c: ἄλλα ὅδε.

THEAI.  Ὑδὼς δ᾽ οὔ;  
ΞΕ.  Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.  
THEAI.  Δεὶ γούν.  
ΞΕ.  Λέξῳ τοῖνυν σοι λόγον, συνθεῖς πράγμα πράξει δὲ ὕνόματος καὶ ἰόματος’ ὅτου δὲ ἂν ὁ λόγος 5 ἦ, σύ μοι φράξειν.  
THEAI.  Ταῦτ’ ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.  
ΞΕ.  Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;  
THEAI.  Ὅνκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.  
ΞΕ.  Σῶν ἔργον δὴ φράξειν περὶ οὗ τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἁπλοῦ 10 ὅτου.  
THEAI.  Δὴλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.  
ΞΕ.  Τί δὲ ὅδ’ αὖ;  
THEAI.  Ποιῶς;  
ΞΕ.  Θεαίτητος, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.  
THEAI.  Καὶ τοῦτον οὖν ἂν εἰς ἀλλος εἴποι πλὴν ἐμὸν τ’ ἐναι καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.  
ΞΕ.  Ποιῶν δὲ γέ τινὰ φαιμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκαστὸν ἐναι τῶν λόγων.  
b  THEAI.  Ναί.  
ΞΕ.  Τοῦτων δὴ ποιῶν τινὰ ἐκάτερον φατέον ἐναι;  

4.  πράγμα — ἰόματος] The ὄνομα standing for the πράγμα and the ἰόμα for the πράξεις, ut supr.  
21.  ποιῶν τινα] “Since the time of Aristotle, the quality of a proposition has been understood to designate its being either affirmative or negative: that being formal, or belonging to its form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or false, and this is doubtless a quality, but belonging to its matter, not its form. Plato seems to have taken no account of the formal distinction, negative or affirmative.” Grote’s Plato, vol. ii. p. 448 note. See, however, supr. 262 c, πράξειν οὖν ἀπράξιον, οὐδὲν ὄντος ὄντος ὄντος ὃς ὄντος. Infr. 263 c: φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. The possibility of negation has been already proved: the question now is, whether speech or thought can properly be made

For example: “Thetætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætætα
the other true.
The true proposition determines in accordance with reality.
The false proposition also determines something, as if real, but that something is different from the reality.
Therefore, in the second of the two instances just given, Theaetetus is made the subject of an unreal determination, and of another predicate, which is treated as if it were the same as the object of negation, and described as false. In the Philebus also (37 e) by the quality of an opinion is meant truth or falsity: καὶ ἐγένετο ὡς μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα καὶ ποιά τις ἑκάτερα.

9. Ὄντων δὲ γε ὑπαρχεῖν ἐπεί γε ὑπαρχεῖν ἐπεί σοῦ] “Really being different from what really is concerning you: for we said that in regard to each thing there exists much that is and much that is not.” I. e. the proposition has a real significance, though a significance which is different from the true one.

10. ποι is to be construed ὑπερβάτως with ἔφαμεν. N. B. It is possible that in the phrase ὅσην γε τῶν μεγάλων ποῦ τι κ.τ.λ., supr. 235 e, ποι ought to have been taken ὑπερβάτως with the whole sentence: = “I presume you know.”

15. ἐνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι] Because a subject and a predicate are essential to every sentence.

19. Εἴ δὲ μὴ—οὐδένος] The object of these words, and of φ νῦν ἔγω διαλέγομαι suprà a, is to bring out the falsity of the proposition, by making it perfectly clear that Theaetetus is the subject of whom “flying”
ΣΩΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 177

p. 263.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γάρ;

ΞΕ. Μηδενὸς δὲ ὠν οὐδ’ ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν ἀπεφήναμεν γάρ ὅτι τῶν ἄδυνάτων ἂν λόγον ὅντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθοτατα.

d ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὅντα ὡς ὅντα, παντάπασιν ὡς έοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε τῶν ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὄνομάτων ὅντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος γινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεύτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δή; διάνοια τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, is predicated. If the proposition had no subject, it would not be a proposition, for it was shown that every proposition has a subject: but it belongs to no subject except Theaetetus. Therefore Theaetetus is the subject. This conclusion is resumed in the words περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα.

Mr. Grote objects that here and in Theæt. 201, Plato, who decries the "facts of sense," selects an example of which sense alone can judge. It may be replied that, in choosing the simplest examples, he naturally lights on what is obvious to the senses. But, first, even in this case the truth or falsehood is not given by sense, but by reasoning upon sense; and, secondly, Plato would have said that these "sensible analogies" (ἀισθητοὶ ὁμοιότητες, Polit. 285ε) were only symbols of the higher truths of which he spoke.

3. ἴνα] The past tense is used not only because of the norist ἀπεφήναμεν, but also to express that which is unalterable.

6. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ] Compare the similar "ad hominem" illustration at the end of the Theaetetus, p. 209 b: θέσ γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστω ὁ εἶτος Θεαίτετος κ.τ.λ.

Περὶ δὴ — μέντοι δάτερα] The position of μέντοι has caused suspicion as to the soundness of the text, but may be accounted for by the emphasis on σοῦ. Cf. ποτον supr. b, and note.


same, except that thought is inward and silent, while speech gives voice to thought. Now in speech there is affirmation and denial: and the corresponding determination when taking place in thought, is called Opinion. And Opinion, when arising in a medium of sensation, is called Imagining.

4. λάβης, τί] αὐτὰ, which some editors insert between these two words, is omitted by the Bodleian, with most other MSS.

6. Δίδου μόνον] The metaphor implied in λάβης is continued.

7. Οὐκοῦν—ταύτων] Cf. Theet. 189 ε: Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἃρ ὁπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; Τί καλῶν; Δόγγοι, ὅν αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ δὲν ὁν σκοτῆ. In the present passage, as also in Phileb. 38 d, (in the account of δόξα), the distinction, as well as the likeness, between inward and outward language, is marked out.


15. αὐτό] For αὐτὰ, anticipating the correlative word, though less distinctly than here, cf. Theet. 207 d: εἶτα ἀμηνομοῖς εἰς τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει καὶ ἀρχαὶ σαυτῶν τα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρώντας αὐτά; Ὁ Ἀρα λέγεις κ.τ.λ. Σ. Ταύτα λέγω. Herm. unnecessarily conj. αὐτοί: Wagner αὐ τῶ. See also supr. 243 a, ἐκεῖνο, and 256 d, where the antecedent of αὐτὰ had not been distinctly expressed; and cf. Polit. 262 a: τούτῳ γε—NE. Τὸ ποίον;

6. μὴ καθ' αὐτήν] Sc. τῇ ψυχῇ. The distinction here brought out underlies much of the later portion of the Theetetus. The imagination of an absent object, which is omitted here, is described in Phileb. 38.

7. aį'] This word is to be taken by an hyperbaton with the whole clause.


11. τοῦτων] Viz. the mental processes.

12. δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεῖται] This is vividly expressed in the passage of the Theetetus above quoted, p. 190 a: ὅταν δὲ (ἡ ψυχὴ) ὀρίζει, εἶτε βραδύτερον, εἰτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαιξάσα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἱδών φη καὶ μὴ διατάξῃ, δόξαν τάτην τίθεμεν αὐτής.

13. φαίνεται δὲ ὁ λέγομεν] "What we speak of as Imagining." The same form of expression occurs in Theet. 164 b: τὸ δὲ γε ὧν ῥᾷ ὧν ἐπισταται ἐστιν, εἶπεν καὶ τὸ ῥᾷ ἐπισταται.

14. τὸ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων] This has been shown in the preceding sentences. αὐτῶν is pleonastic. It is probably implied that mere αἰσθήσεις is neither true nor false.

15. valve — εἶναι] This is shown by an independent proof in the case of δόξα in the passage of the Philebus above quoted (38 d).
The search for falsehood has ended sooner than we expected: and we may return with better courage to what remains of our original task.
After distinguishing likeness-making into image-making and phantastic, we doubted in which compartment to place the Sophist, when there arose the more important doubt, which we have just resolved.
We are now at liberty to continue our series of divisions, which began with the distinction of creative and acquisitive art. Our previous definitions were obtained by following the sections of acquisitive art. But as he now appears as an imitator, we must divide creative art, of which the making of imitations is obviously a branch.

1. ἢρχόμεθα—καὶ ἔξιστον] “We began by dividing.”

5. ἐφαντάζεθεν ἤμιν] Sic Bodl. “We had glimpses of him.”

9. δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν σοφικὴν] “The very art of making,” of which image-making is a part. We have here an example of the mental initiative by which the one idea is found which is afterwards divided, according to Phileb. 16 c.


22. φυτὰ, ὡς τ’—ἄμαστα] The notion of φυτὰ is expanded by an afterthought.
Creative art is, 1st, divine and human. For to God, working by reason, and not to any mere spontaneity of nature, is to be referred the origin of animals, vegetables and minerals.

1. τηκτα και ἀτηκτα] I. e. Metals and other minerals.
4. χρώμενοι] Sc. φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι.
The following passage contains the same religious spirit which is more fully expressed in the Timaeus and in the 10th book of the Laws; cf. esp. Legg. 10, 889–892. Also Phil. 28 d, e.
11. κατὰ γε θεών] “At least in accordance with the nature of God.”
13. Καλός γε, ὡ Θεαίτητε.] With similar warmth in Thetet. 185 c there is welcomed the assertion of the independent activity of the mind: Καλὸς γάρ εἰ, ὡ θ.,—ὁ γὰρ καλὸς λέγων,
kalos to kalathos.
15. ὁδιαξότων] “Of that class of persons who in later life think otherwise.” The present participle has almost become a noun, and has lost the temporal meaning.
μετὰ πειθοῦ ἀναγκαίας] This “demonstrative persuasion” is advanced in the 10th book of the Laws, where it is shown that Mind is prior to the elements of Nature, and that the best mind rules. Cf. esp. pp. 888 e sqq., 891 c, 892 b, 896 c, 897 c. See also ib. 12, 967 c. Tim. 46 e.
πειθοῦ ἀναγκαίας] “The persuasion of demonstration.”
θεία, τά δ' έκ τούτων ύπ' ανθρώπων ξινιστάμενα
ανθρωπίνη, καὶ κατὰ τούτου δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιή-
στικῆς γένης, τὸ μὲν ανθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θείον.
ΤΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς.
ΕΞΕ. Τέμνε δὴ δυσών οὕτων διὰ ἐκατέραν αὖθις.
ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΕΞΕ. Οἶον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τῇ ποι-
ητικῆς πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος.
ΤΕΑΙ. Τετμῆσθω.
ΕΞΕ. Τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη
γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δ' αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεία.
15 ΤΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.
ΕΞΕ. Τὰ δὲ γ' ὡς ἐτέρως αὖ διηρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἐν ἀφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικῶν, τῶ δ' ὑπολοίπων σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἀν λεγοίσθην εἶδωλο-
ποικῶ. καὶ κατὰ ταύτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῆ
διαιρεῖται.
ΤΕΑΙ. Λέγε ὅπη ἐκατέρα αὖθις.

Compare Phaedr. 266 a, already quoted.

1. χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοντ' ἂν] "For to do other-
wise would be to supersede the work of Time."
2. τὰ—φύσει] Either φύσει has almost the force of an adj.,
as in Rep. 6, 501 b (τὰ φύσει δικαίον κ.τ.λ.); and λεγόμενα
is added pleonastically, like the participle in δεινότητας δοκοῦ-
σαι, Theet. 176 d: or, perhaps better, the infinitive ποι-
εῖσθαι is to be repeated with λεγόμενα.
9. κατὰ πλάτος — κατὰ μῆκος]
1. εξ δὲ τὰ] The same use of the article occurs in a similar connexion in Protag. 320 c: καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γάρ κεράν
νται.
7. παρέπτεται—infra. c, para-
kolouthein] So parakolouthein in Theat. 158 c, of dreams answering to realities.
11. φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ] Natural images, opposed to artificial ones, such as those of the painter.
σκιὰ μὲν—infra. dἐπλοῦν δὲ] The latter word is not forthcoming in Rep. 6, 510 a: λέγω δὲ τάς εἰκόνας πρώτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς,
ἐπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑδαίοις φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανά συνύστηκε. For other observations on optical
reflexion, cf. Theat. 193 c, Tim. 43.
12. The words φῶς οἰκεῖον καὶ
divine-nominal likenesses are, for instance, those which appear in dreams,
SΩΦΙΣΤΗΣ.

266. ΞΕ. Ἡμεῖς μὲν ποι καὶ ταλλα ὡς καὶ εξ ὧν τὰ
περγάτηρ’ ἐστὶ, πῦρ καὶ ὑδάρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἄδελφα,
θεὸν γεννήματα πάντα ὅσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα
ἐκαστα’ ἢ πῶς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτῶς.
ΞΕ. Τούτων δὲ γε ἐκάστων εἴδωλα, ἄλλ’ οὐκ
αὐτὰ, παρέπτεται, δαμονία καὶ ταύτα μηχανή γεγο-
νότα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;
ΞΕ. Τὰ τε ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς καὶ ὅσα μεθ’ ἡμέραν
φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ
ἐπὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνεται, διπλῶν δὲ ἵνικ’ ἀν φῶς
οἰκείοι τε καὶ ἀλλότριοι περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς

12. The words φῶς οἰκείον καὶ
and, in the day-time, shadows and reflections.

And, as a house is a humanly-made reality, so the picture of a house is a sort of humanly-created waking dream.

6. ἡμετέραν ] I. e. ἀνθρωπίνην. ἄνθρωπος is to be supplied from what follows.

αὐτὴν — οὖν] "A real house." Not the ideal house, as in Rep. 10, 597 e: αὐτὴν—

ὁ ἐστὶ κάλις.

8. ὅν ἄνθρωπον] I. e. As dreams are a kind of divine pictures, so a picture may be described as a human dream.

ἐγγραφορόσιν] "For those who are awake."


12. τὸ—αὐτὸ ] "The thing itself." The grammar seems to require αὐτουργικὴς—ἐιδολοποιικής. But there may be a change of construction from ἔργα (ἔστι) τῆς ποιητικῆς to αὐ-

tουργικὴ (ἐστὶ ποιεῖσα) τὸ αὐτὸ. Compare the transition immediately below, from ποιητική to γέννημα, from the art to the work.

14. δύο διχή] "Two in two ways: i.e. (a) divine, human;

(b) reality, shadow.

15. ἡθεία μὲν καὶ ἄνθρωπινη] Probably θείαν μ. κ. ἀνθρωπίνην, as Heind. observes.

16. αὐτῶν] "Of things themselves." Although the fourfold division, in Rep. 6 sub fin., of the intelligible and visible is different and has a different object, it is prompted by a fancy very similar to that which rules in the present passage.

17. γέννημα] For this use of the neuter word where the
feminine was rather to be expected, cf. infr. 267 c, μίμησις, Polit. 289 b, ὑπάρχω. As the act sometimes becomes the object of the verb (in the construction known as cognate accusative), so the noun expressive of the object is sometimes put for the act. See General Introduction.

2. ἐμπελλεῖν] P. 236 d, e.
7. αὐτῷ] Sc. εἰκαστικὴ καὶ φανταστική.
16. ὃταν—ποιῇ] In this sentence προσώποιον φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ is equivalent to ἐφομοιώταται:

Next follows the distinction, which was before provisionally made, between Image-making and Phantastic; the creation of a real and an apparent likeness of a thing. Of these phantastic may be again divided. And one kind is called impersonation or mimicry.
Mimicry is sometimes with knowledge, sometimes without.

There are those, for

1. μαλακισθέντες] "Shrinking from further effort." Cf. supr. 241 a: ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλακισθέντες;


13. μιμήμα] The result is again substituted for the act, as in γένημα supr. 267 a.

17. τὸ σχῆμα] Governed by μιμοῦται implied in what follows.

18. ἄρ’ οὐκ—μιμοῦμενοι;[4] "Is it not notorious that many, who have no knowledge but an opinion of some kind about these things, use all their might to make it appear that they have in them that which answers to their own opinion, impersonating this in actions and words as far as they can?"

instance, who personate their own notion of justice, without knowing what justice really is. For this branch of mimicry, through the remissness of the first name-givers, it is difficult to find a name. "Notion-mimicry" is the nearest we can find. This also may be either innocent, when the mimic is unconscious of his ignorance, or dissembling. Of the dissembling notion-mimic there are two kinds: one, which

about physical qualities.


18. οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἤ] P. 233 d.

ἀλλ' ἐν—δή] "But he does appear amongst the class of imitators."
σίδηρου, εἰτε ύψης εἰτε διπλόνη εἰτ ἐχων τινά ἐστιν p. 267 ἐν εὐαγρό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπῶμεν.

Ε. Ἐχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ 5 εὐφήσις αὐτῶν ἐστίν, οἱ οἴμενοι εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἂ δοξάζει: p. 268 τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίν-
δησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἂ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδῶς ἐσχημάτισται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκατέρου γένους ὁν 10 εἰρήκας.

Ε. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἄπλοῦν μιμητὴν των, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

Ε. Τούτων δ' αὖ τὸ γένος ἐν ἡ δύο φῶμεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡρα σὺ.

Ε. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι διττὸ καταφάνεωσθον των 15 τῶν μὲν δημοσίας καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος
dυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδία τε, καὶ

1. εἰτε διπλόνη] Various figures are employed to give greater vividness to the notion of division. Cf. supra. 229 b. 


εικοσάν ἐν τούτῳ. Phaedr. 268 a.: εἰ ἄρα καὶ οὐ φαίνεται διεστήκος αὐτῶν τὸ ἱτρίον ὅστε ἐμοὶ.

5. αὐτῶν] τῶν δοξομαζόντων.

6. τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα—ἐσχη-

μάτισται] “But it is part of the form in which the other appears that from the constant practice of discussion he cannot but suspect and fear that he is ignorant of the things which he wears the appearance before other men of knowing.” “There is in his attitude an unmistakable air of misgiving and fear.”

κυλίνθησιν] Cf. Theaet. 172 c.: αἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦ-

τοῖς ἐκ νέων κυλίνθομεν.

9. ἐστιν—εἰρήκας] “There certainly is a character belonging to each of the two kinds you have described.” Or ὁ δοξομι. ἐστιν ἐκατέρου γένους.

12. εἰρωνικόν] “Hollow, in-
sincere, designing.” εἰρωνικὸς occurs again (and again in a bad sense) in Legg. 10, 908 e.

18. ἰδία τε] Sc. εἰρωνεύεσθαι
dυνατόν.
2. ἑναντιολογεῖν] It now appears how much of the claim advanced in p. 231 a is granted to the Sophist. He is allowed to possess that portion of the Eristic art which is not based on knowledge, but on the practice of argument. Cf. also p. 225 d, e.

9. *Τὸ*] MSS. τὸν. Stephanus, followed by the other editors, corrected this into τὸ, with great probability.

11. παρονύμων] The vagueness of this derivation renders it more correct than Hegel's from the imaginary σοφίς, "to make wise," or Bentham's, who took σοφιστής for a superlative.

12. μεμάθηκα] "I now clearly understand that this is he whom I must address as the very man of whom we are in search, the unmistakeably real and genuine Sophist."

*Ποι*] There is again a transition from the name to the thing.


By the process of division the Sophist is thrust down into the lowest sphere of imitative (i.e. unreal) art, much in the same way in which pleasure finds the lowest place in the Philebus; and poetry, in Rep. 10, is thrice removed from truth (597 e), where there is also the same division of divine and human art. So the actual Politicians are found low down amongst the class of
whose genealogy is now complete.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΕ. Τὸν δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μμητικῶν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θείον ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπον κυρίας φανταστικοῦ μόρου, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἴματος ὅσ᾽ ἄν φη τὸν ὄντως σοφιστήν εἶναι, τάληθεστατα, ὡς έουκεν, ἑρεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

servants (Polit. 289 d), and in the series of transmigrations given in the Phaedrus, 248 e, the eighth place (between the artificer and the tyrant) is assigned to the life of the Sophist or the public man.

2. τὸν δὴ] I have ventured to retain τὸν against Schleiermacher, who reads τό, and to give ἀφωρισμένον a middle signification. "The artist of the contradiction-causing, conscious section of unknowing mimicry, who has taken for his own the word-juggling portion of human, not divine, creation, in the phantastie species of likeness-making, such undeniably is the lineage of the true Sophist."

Cf. supr. 267 b, ἀπονεμώμεθα.

4. ἄνθρωποικῶν, though hardly occurring elsewhere in Plato, may be regarded as probably genuine, because of the affection of variety and novelty of diction which pervades the dialogue.

5. The Bodl. MS. has θαυμαστοποιηκῶν, not θαυματοποιητικῶν, as Gaisford asserts.

6. ταύτης τῆς—αἴματος] The words of Glaucus. Il. Ζ. 211: ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἴματος εὑχομαι εἶναι. The derivation of kind from kind by διαίρεσις is compared to a genealogy. Compare the modern idea of the genealogical derivation of species from a single type, and cf. Rep. 8, 547 a: ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς χρῆ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν.
INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN.

The contrast between the Sophist and the Philosopher is paralleled by that between the ideal and actual Statesman. The one of these is the philosopher under a different aspect, surveying from above and yet guiding the life of states: the other, in Plato's view, is the most sophistical of all sophists (τὸν πάντων σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόντα καὶ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμ-πειρώτατον). But in the present inquiry, although this thought may be detected from the first (see 258 b and note, compared with 292 b), it is ironically kept back, and instead of starting from the known characteristics of a class of persons, the speakers begin by forming an a priori conception of what the Statesman ought to be. In fact, this dialogue, in a different subject-matter, combines the problem of the Sophistes with that of the Philosophus, and seeks to determine, not only an existing counterfeit, but an ideal reality. At the same time it is shewn that the true Statesman and Governor cannot be defined without reference to the actual, mixed conditions of human things. The whole is intended by the author to be a study in scientific method.

Further remarks on the dialogue will be better understood if they are prefaced with a brief outline of the dialogue itself.

§ 1. It is assumed that the Statesman is master of a science: and that not a mere handicraft in which the thought cannot be separated from the work, but a theory, which however, as a theory of government, has an immediate reference to practice. This theory must be essentially the same whether applied to a state or a household, and whether he who holds it be invested with authority or not. Further, the commands of the Statesman are not derivative, but issue from himself. These
INTRODUCTION

. commands aim at controlling a work which affects living creatures in the aggregate. But what living creatures? The respondent inclines to say "man" at once. But he is warned to be cautious, lest he be making "a distinction without a difference." For what ground is there for supposing that the distinction between man and the brutes is more rational than that between Greek and Barbarian, or that man has more right than any other thinking animal, such as the crane, to set himself over against all other creatures? By gradual subdivisions, much as in the game called "Animal, vegetable, and mineral," the human race is at last determined to be the sphere of statesmanship: mankind being in the last place distinguished by a merely mathematical and physical difference from the pig, or, as bipes implume, from the kouφωνων φόλα ὄρνιθων. (258 b—267 c.)

§ 2. The King, then, has been defined as the herdsman, the nurturer or nourisher of men. But there now appears this difference between the king and other herdsmen, that, while the cowherd is everything to his own cattle, there are many others who, equally with the king, may claim to be the shepherds of the human flock. The merchant, husbandman, baker, gymnast, physician, have all a share in their nurture. In order to perceive the reason of this difference we must call to our assistance an ancient tale.

There has been, and will be again, a time when the king is the shepherd of his people, but not in the present cycle of the world's life. For there are alternate cycles, during one of which the universe is guided by the Divine hand, and then again, through many ages, the vast round fabric is left to revolve alone. Of the former time we have a dim tradition in the fables of the golden age and of the earth-born seed: and in the latter we and our fathers have been living. Of this "reverse of doom" a trace remains in the story that Zeus once made the sun and the stars to return from their setting to their rising. The gifts of Triptolemus and Demeter, Prometheus, Hephestus and Athēne, were rendered necessary by the naked and helpless state of man, when first left, with the whole universe, to his own guidance. For in that former state he lived under the care of a Divine shepherd, who was all-sufficient for his flock: happy if they used their golden hours
in the improvement of their reason: otherwise, less happy than we may be. How great, then, was our error, when we mistook the Statesman, who is a man of like nurture and education with his citizens, for the Deity who ruled and tended mankind under the perfect conditions of that former cycle, when all things, including man himself, sprang of themselves from the Earth, and hence there was no property nor any possession of wives and children. And there is another error of less moment which the tale makes clear. Our definition is at once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because including more than the Statesman; too narrow, because not including him at all. He is not the feeder of his people, though he has the care of them. The word "care" would have included him also. But the general name "care of herds" must be divided until the King or Statesman is separated from all rivals and left quite alone.

First, he is distinguished from the shepherd of the theocracy; next, from the tyrant, who rules by force. The King or Statesman has the care of willing bipeds. (267 e—276 e.)

§ 3. Still, even with the help of our tale, which grew upon our hands, we have made an unfinished work. This description is a mere colourless sketch, which must be filled up by further argument. And for this purpose we must have recourse to an example. For as children in learning to read are taught to recognize the letters of words which they know not, by being shewn the same letters in words which they know, so the mind is taught the principles of things, which having seen in one form she fails to recognise in others more strange and complicated. This will be illustrated by the example which is now to be chosen.

The art of weaving woollen cloth is one of the simplest we could name. Yet we might describe it by a long series of divisions, distinguishing it from the making of other fabrics and coverings, without, after all, separating it from those arts to which it is most nearly related. For suppose we had thus defined it as "the art of working in wool." Is there not the process of carding, which is the opposite of weaving together, and those of spinning and fulling and of darning, all of which answer to the definition but are none of them included in the weaver's art? Then there is the making of the loom and
shuttle and other implements of weaving, which are adminicular to the art but different from the art itself.

We distinguish, then, arts instrumental from arts operative. And of arts operative in wool-working there is a further distinction, also depending on a universal division of the arts into combining and discriminating. Discriminating processes in wool-working are carding and one part of the use of the comb. But wool is combined, (1) By twisting: either hard with the spindle, to make the warp, or softly with the hand, to make the woof. (2) By the crossing and intertexture of the warp and woof, which is weaving. (277 a—283 a.)

§ 3 b. Now it may be said that "this is too long;" and that we might have arrived at the definition without the intermediate steps.

This leads us into a digression on Excess and Defect. For want of dialectic, men are apt to confuse that which is more with that which is too much. Whereas there are two ways of measuring size and number; one, simply by comparison of greater and less, the other, by reference to the standard of what is meet or proper. Without such a standard there could be no art or science. This is the real meaning of the saying that the science of measurement embraces all things.

So lamentable are the results of an unphilosophic method. And this suggests the further reflection, that as each reading lesson is learnt, not for its own sake, but for the sake of learning to read, so our present inquiry is not so much on account of the Statesman as for our improvement in dialectic and in the alphabet of the ideal world.

From all which we gather that the length of our discussion is to be judged, not by comparison, but by its meetness or fitness: and this not with a view to pleasure, nor chiefly to the ease or rapidity with which the object of search is found, but by its meetness or fitness to improve men in dialectic and awaken in them the faculty of invention. (283 b—287 a.)

§ 3 c. We now endeavour to apply our example to the discovery of the King. His art is to be separated from those, adminicular and operative, which, like his own, are necessary to the life of the city.

The productions of these are divided into seven kinds, viz. instruments, vessels, seats, shelters, sports, nourishments, and
materials: in none of which is the king’s work discoverable. Next in the order of possessions come tame animals of every kind, the art of herding which, including men, has been already distinguished from that of the king. Lastly, there is the class of slaves and other servants, amongst whom, strangely, appears the first glimpse of a character rivalling the king. Not amongst the slaves, of course, nor amongst tradesmen (though there is a political science of trade), nor heralds and other ministers of state. But first the prophet, herald of the Gods, and the priest who mediates between earth and heaven, have a kingly air. In Egypt the king must be a priest, and the Archon-Basileus at Athens performs sacred rites.

At last our eye has caught the stragglers of a tumultuous throng, who presently sweep into full view—the actual rivals of the King. (287 b—290 e.)

§ 4. A motley crew, and monstrous to the philosopher’s eye. Some fierce and cruel as centaurs, some weak but cunning. These greatest impostors of all sophists do the business of the state: but, though hard the task, they must be separated from the true Statesman and King. For of the three forms of government ordinarily recognized, Monarchy, Democracy, Oligarchy, with the additional branches of Tyranny and Aristocracy, can it be said that any one is determined by Reason? How can the difference of many, few or one, of poor or rich, or even that which we have recognized between persuasion and force, distinguish the knowing from the ignorant ruler? True, many cannot have this knowledge, nor can that rude multitude who call themselves the wealthy or the few. Those who are indeed the few, whether poor or rich, whether they rule by force or by persuasion, whether with or without law, and by whatever means, so long as they rule with knowledge for the good of the state, are the true rulers, and theirs is the true form of government. Those forms to which the name is given are imitations, better or worse, of this one form. (291 a —293 e.)

§ 4 b. The Greek mind is shocked by the suggestion that the true government may be without law. But the sovereignty of law is not a perfect substitute for that of a wise and living will. For general rules, which are in their nature simple, cannot embrace every contingency which may
arise in the infinite complexity of human things. The law, like Creon,

\[ \textit{év ἱσος μούνον ἐν αὐτῷ φορεῖ} \\
\textit{ὡς φησιν αὐτός, κοῦδέν ἄλλο, τούτ' ὅρθως ἔχειν.} \]

Laws are necessary (like rules in the gymnasium), because the ruler is not able at every moment to be prescribing for individual cases: and also because the lawgiver will not always be with his people. But suppose a physician going into a far country, and writing memoranda for his patients to observe until his return: should he come back and find that from some change of climate his prescriptions are no longer suitable, must he be bound by what he has once written? And if the true legislator, or one like him, were to come again on earth, must he be bound by the letter of the old precepts? It is commonly said, 'Let a man persuade his city, and so let him improve the laws.' But and if he forces a better law upon his countrymen, will he be any the less a good lawgiver? The truth is, that, whether poor or rich, whether with or without law, whether by persuasion or force, the true statesman is he who governs wisely, who does what is expedient, and preserves and makes better those committed to his care. (293 e—297 b.)

§ 4 c. It was said above, that of the imitations of the true government some were better, others worse. Here the distinction finds place which we before rejected, between the observation and neglect of law. In the absence of the true sovereign, it is best for every state to preserve its laws, which it may be presumed that the first lawgiver made after his conception of the ideal pattern. This is illustrated by an imaginary case (with evident allusion to Athens). Suppose that men, from their experience of the wickedness of physicians and pilots, determined to bind them by edicts, which they passed in their assembly or in their senate, at the suggestion of any unprofessional adviser who chose to speak, and regulated thereby the use of drugs and surgical instruments and the build and navigation of ships in peace and war. Suppose these edicts engraved on lasting marble, and on the no less lasting monuments of custom and tradition. Suppose, further, that our medical practitioners and naval captains were chosen annually in the same assembly, and were liable to be
indicted publicly by any citizen so soon as their annual term expired. A further sanction would be necessary. Were any found searching into the truth of navigation and medicine beyond what was written, he must first be set down by public opinion as a babbling, star-gazing sophist, and then accused in court of corrupting the youth: and if convicted of persuading any man to sail or to be healed contrary to the customs, he must suffer the last penalty: seeing that no man must be wiser than the laws, which he who runs may read.

The result would be the hopeless extinction of these arts, and of any others to which this plan should be applied. Yet is a worse case conceivable: if, when the laws of any art had been thus laid down, those elected by suffrage or by lot were to despise the laws and act in defiance of them, not from the knowledge of any principle, but for the sake of gain or favour. For though the arts were destroyed, there was in the former case a certain ground of experience or probability, which is thus annihilated.

Hence in the absence of the true lawgiver, the best course (though only a second best) is to maintain the laws.

This distinction, between constitutional and unconstitutional government, was previously applied to monarchy and oligarchy, and is now extended to democracy. Whence there are now seven so-called forms of government, of which one only deserves the name:—scientific monarchy, constitutional monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, constitutional democracy, unconstitutional democracy. When we contemplate the six last named, the wonder is that cities should exist at all. Constitutional monarchy is better than aristocracy, and this is better than constitutional democracy. Of the remaining three, unconstitutional democracy, or anarchy, is the least bad, and tyranny is the worst of all.

But all are to be rejected, as not answering to the object of our search. The heads of these false governments are not statesmen but partisans; they are mere phantasm, like the constitutions which they administer; the most egregious imitators, impostors, and sophists. (297 c—303 b.)

§ 5. The actual statesmen being thus disposed of, the way is still further cleared towards the unveiling of the true king. Yet all that we have hitherto gained is negative, except that
he rules men wisely, according to true principles. Like refiners of gold, we have purged away baser minerals, but have not yet eliminated those precious metals which have the strongest affinity for the gold. In other words, our definition would apply equally to the general, the judge, the wise and eloquent orator, as to the king.

But the art of statecraft has this distinguishing note, that it directs the functions of the rest, and has a universal working. The orator knows how to persuade, the judge how incorruptibly to administer the law, the general how to conduct war successfully: but none except the king or statesman can determine where persuasion is to be used instead of force, what the law ought to be, whether war is to be levied, or peace preserved. Thus statecraft is, as was before anticipated, the commanding science, not herself acting, but directing those who have the power to act. And while each of the rest has a particular sphere, the office of the king embraces every function of the common life. (303 c—305 e.)

We have now separated the king or statesman from all who were likely to be confounded with him. It remains, in accordance with our example, to describe the manner of his work. What are the warp and woof of the royal fabric? and how is it woven?

First, we must note that there are two opposite qualities which merit praise, courage and gentleness, or, in other words, quickness and slowness: which, however, if they remain apart run to excess, and equally become blameable and even destructive. Next, that every art of combination, even the humblest, seeks to bring together elements which have first been separated from what is worthless. Hence as the art of carding ministered to weaving, so the kingly art makes use of education and other tests for purging the good from the bad. The worst are cast forth by exile or death. The mean and ignorant are enslaved. Of the rest, the brave and gentle, that is the hard warp and soft woof, are combined: the eternal part being compacted with a divine, the mortal with a human, bond. The divine bond is right opinion confirmed by reason, and this is implanted in the mind—the divinæ partícula auræ—thus imparting gentleness to the rugged and prudence to the smooth and yielding nature.
This is the most important and difficult branch of the ruling science. The human bonds are easily imposed where the divine exist. They are the regulations concerning marriage, whereby the brave and gentle races are physically as well as mentally crossed and interwoven: though flesh and blood may find this saying hard.

This having been effected, the offices of state are to be distributed amongst both kinds: the two natures being in each case either united in a single person, or equally represented where more than one officer is required: that the state may act at once with energy and discretion.

And so there is wrought the perfect web, whereby the true Statesman holds the whole city together in concord and amity, and secures for his subjects the happiest life which is possible for a society of men. (305 e—311.)

REMARKS.

I. Dialectical Aspects. Relation to the Sophist.

Amongst many differences of treatment which might be expected from the change of subject and the fertility of Plato's invention, the thoughts on method and the nature of knowledge, which were thrown out in the Sophist, are not forgotten, but indirectly receive further development.

a. The process of divisions has acquired new significance. The problem is explained to be, "to distinguish one kind of art from all others, and by stamping these with a single negative form, learn to conceive of all science under two heads, namely, statecraft, and that science which is not statecraft." (258 c.) This is clearly an application of the view of Not-Being which had just been given. But it soon appears that the mere abstract notion of Difference may be capriciously applied. To distinguish man from other animals, for example, or Greek from Barbarian, is a merely arbitrary procedure, unless we have found a rational ground for the distinction, which can only be done by a method of successive exclusions, each of which implies a certain knowledge of that which is excluded, as well as of that which is retained. Even so meagre a definition of man as that he is a featherless biped implies the

*c 2
knowledge of at least two positive qualities of the class of birds. This thought is not worked out further at the time, but in the later stages of the argument the complexity of all real knowledge, implied already in the "communion of ideas," is more fully recognised than elsewhere in Plato. The definition of the Sun which Socrates on the previous day had thought sufficient, "that he is the brightest orb that rolls in Heaven about the earth," ὃτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐντῶν περὶ γῆν (Theat. 208 d), would not now satisfy the requirements of the Stranger. "It is not enough to describe wool-weaving as the greatest and fairest of all ministries that wait on the working of wool: the other attendant arts must be carefully stripped from round it."

(281 c.) That is, each of these must be so far defined as to exclude weaving. The boundary line must be clearly drawn from either side. And thus the definition of the Statesman involves a certain account of the general, the judge, the orator, as well as a description of the no-constitutions of existing states. Here is an approach, though a very partial one, to the ideal of science which is made a test of the happiness or misery of the children of earth in Saturn's reign: "learning from every nature, what each by its proper faculty had perceived differently from others and could contribute to the treasury of knowledge." (272 c.)

So much has been gained from perceiving the correlation of the positive and negative elements of knowledge. Closely akin to this was the reaction, which the "Sophist" justified, from a merely negative and analytical method of knowledge. This also is continued in the Statesman. In their zeal for the method of divisions, the Stranger and his respondent fall into a natural error. In seeking to be definite they forget to be comprehensive, and omit a needful generalization. They divide the science of feeding; whereas the king in this present cycle is not a feeder, although he has the care of a flock. This error is duly exposed and rectified; and it is further shewn that the distinctions hitherto made have only brought out a colourless outline of the King. It is from this point that the more serious portion of the inquiry begins.

a Τελευτάτη πάντων λόγων ὑστιν ἀφάνεις τὸ διαχωρίζειν ἐκαστὸν ἀπὸ πάντων. Soph. 259 e.
b. The generalizing or combining process\(^b\), the defect of which had been just noticed, here resumes its proper importance. The ideas on which the definition of the Statesman mainly turns are drawn from the not very obvious example of cloth-weaving; and an example is explained to mean the illustration of some great or unfamiliar truth by the exhibition of the leading principles of that truth in a simple and familiar case. We are again reminded of the complexity of the world of which philosophy speaks to us, and how combinations which in the abstract are sufficiently understood, become lost when we endeavour to follow the concrete development of things. (278 c, d.) We are told that it is only by dialectic (not by any sensible mean) that the similitude of the highest truths can be displayed. And as the definition of the weaver is symbolical of that of the Statesman; so the chief value of this whole discussion is to shadow forth still higher truths than those with which it is concerned. (285 d, e.)

What then are the principles suggested by the present example? First, we are taught the inadequacy of the method of dichotomies as hitherto pursued. If the view of this method already stated\(^c\) is correct, we can easily imagine that Young Socrates, or let us rather say a pupil of the Academy at this time, was not prepared for the elaborateness of the discussion. In fact we have seen him beguiled by the Stranger into thinking that the journey was ended, when it was not yet well begun. (265 b.) Plato here shews that the real work of distinction and comparison, which deserves the name of dialectic, is a more subtle process and goes deeper than the boyish exercise with which he had as it were broken ground for the inquiry: though even through this many valuable hints had been conveyed, seria mista jocis. The difference in this respect between the earlier and later portions of the dialogue will be evident to any one who compares the abstract notion of statesmanship as a commanding theory in p. 260 a, with the view given in pp. 305, 306 of the relation of the kingly art to those of the orator, judge, and field-officer. Those

\(^b\) συναγωγή. Cf. 278 c, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ διηστασμένῳ, δοξαζόμενον ὅρθως καὶ συναχθέν.

\(^c\) See General Introduction. Compare Bacon's saying, "The strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old man's faggot, in the bond."
who make this comparison will not think that the author of this dialogue believed his definition of *bipes implume* to be a serious contribution to the science of human nature. As the dialogue proceeds the earlier divisions seem to be forgotten, or to be neglected as a mere scaffolding\(^d\), else the analogy just noticed between p. 260 a and 305 d (οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν, ἀλλ’ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν) could hardly have been overlooked by the speakers themselves.

The imperfection of mere external classifications being thus recognized, there follows the remark, already quoted, on the necessity of finding the mutual boundary between the object of search and all kindred species. (281 c.)

In applying this to weaving we obtain two fresh thoughts, which are found valuable for the main argument: the distinction of *αἱτία* and *ἐφαινία*, of operative and adminicular arts; and the universality of the two great sciences of composition and division.

The former affords the hint for the elimination from the work of the king of various arts, without which civil life could not proceed: the latter is the key-note of the final passage, in which the last touches are given to the image of the King. For by help of our example we are enabled to proceed further, even after all possible distinctions have been drawn: and when all rival arts have been stripped away we see in the royal function the twofold process of division and composition: division, by which, practically, good citizens are selected, and theoretically the brave and gentle elements are distinguished: composition, by which the diverse materials thus cleansed and prepared are combined in a smooth and perfect web. These two are the counterpart of the twofold process of dialectic, by which the objects of thought are distinguished and combined according to truth. This process is incidentally described in a passage of the *Politicus* already quoted (285 a, b), in which the complex determinations of real knowledge are contrasted with the off-hand generalizations and distinctions of sciolism; and which is in fact an application and development of the conception of scientific method expressed in Soph. 259 d.

c. These are the chief points of that instruction in dialectic, which is commended to us by the Eleatic Stranger as the most valuable result of the dialogue. We may gather from them that Plato was at this time striving after a philosophy of the concrete, and endeavouring to substitute real and fruitful inquiry for the barren logical exercitiation, the sweeping generalizations and verbal distinctions of his contemporaries, perhaps of his own scholars. The aim constantly held before the mind is the attainment of greater definiteness and fulness.

"This is true, but not explicit or complete" (ἀληθὲς μὲν οὖ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλευ) is the repeated complaint. Since it has been proved in the Sophist that different ideas may have communion or correlation with each other, it becomes the task of philosophy to discern the threads which connect them. And nowhere, except in the Philebus and Parmenides, has Plato buckled to this task more earnestly. In the latter part of the Phaedrus indeed there is a conception of an art of rhetoric, which should be based on a complete science of psychology, the realization of which would far exceed in definiteness and completeness this somewhat desultory sketch. But it is one thing to imagine a science, and quite another thing to attempt, however imperfectly, to work it out. The "splendid ideal" of the Phaedrus, like other intuitions of that dialogue, is an anticipation rather than an embodiment of method: not necessarily an early anticipation, for if wildness of imagination marks a jugendschrift, what is to be said of the mythus in the Statesman? In the sixth book of the Republic there is expressed a more general conception of the ladder of hypotheses by which science climbs to the ideal world, whence she descends without the aid of the ladder by the chain of ideas. But this notion, though implying a connexion of ideas, is still vague, and gives less promise of the reality of science than the method employed in the Politicus.

The Republic professes to be intelligible rather than exact, and to proceed by popular methods. Even the order of the sciences is not worked out as a dialectical problem, though the seventh book contains passages of great subtlety and depth. What is wanting in demonstration is "evened o'er" by the abundance of imagination. But Socrates hints more than once to Glaucon that there is a "longer way," which the dialectical
student must learn to tread. It is possible that we have a sample of this in the present dialogue, which contains an elaborate defence of lengthened argument, and in which Young Socrates is taken further afield than he had any thought of going.

This struggle towards definiteness and reality is pro tanto an approach on Plato's part to the later philosophy of Aristotle. But there still remains between them an ineffaceable difference of character. Plato when most concrete retains an undiminished hold of the universal: ὁθραυ̂σ ἐστί̂ μκτο κάρη καὶ ἔπὶ χδον ᾶβανει. The idealizing spirit may be exorcised, "tamen usque recurrit." Gliscit intellectus altior. The true king, when adapting himself to the particular circumstances of his state, inflicting exile or death on some, uniting others in marriage, is still the perfectly wise philosopher with his eye fixed on the pattern in the heavens. Contemplation and action are not sundered: the knowledge of the universal truth is not supposed to hinder the individual application.

II. Socratic and Pythagorean Elements.

a. Continuance of the Socratic Spirit. The question here treated by the Stranger, after being proposed by Socrates, is almost identical with some of those with which, according to Xenophon, the real Socrates was most engaged: τί πόλις; τί πολιτικός; τί ἀρχή ἀνθρώπων; τί ἀρχικός ἀνθρώπων; And though his method of search on these topics, as recorded in the Memorabilia, is much simpler than that here used, it is evident that Plato has in many instances only followed up the hints given by his master.

There is, first, the postulate on which the whole dialogue proceeds, that statesmanship is a science, that knowledge ought to govern. You would not doubt, says Socrates, whether to place a skilful or unskilful pilot at the helm (I. 1, 9): nor would you choose a pilot, or a carpenter, or a flute-player, as you do your rulers, by casting lots (I. 2, 9). (Cf. Polit. 258 b, 290 e, 292 b, 298.)

e "And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, though in them only a speculation, that all things by a scale did ascend to Unity."—Bacon.
2. The image of a herdsman, under which the king is at first conceived, common enough certainly in poetry, was one which Socrates delighted to use. "It is a bad herdsman (βοῶν ἄγελης νομεύος) who makes the number of the cattle less," was his well-known censure of the thirty tyrants (I. 2, 32). The coincidence of language here is enough to justify the supposition that there is some connexion of thought: although Plato evidently thinks that there are cases where taking the heads of citizens may be a purgation of the common weal. (261 d alib., 293 d.)

3. The distinction of the king and tyrant in Mem. IV. 6, 12, is nearly the same with that which Plato accepts provisionally at one stage of the dialogue (277 d); and the same passage of Xenophon's expresses what Plato speaks of as the commonly received mode of characterizing the several forms of government (291 e). The thought however is here so obvious that it would not be safe to lay much stress on this coincidence, if taken alone.

4. The general and the judge (στρατηγικός, δικαστικός) are named by Socrates as next in dignity to the statesman (πολιτικός). Mem. II. 6, 38. Cf. Polit. 305.

But the chief traces of the historical Socrates in this dialogue, as in the Sophistes, are the method of definition by exclusions, and the use of common examples to suggest hypotheses: both much extended, and if not systematized, yet made the objects of reflection and theory; but in their enlarged features bearing unmistakeably the marks of their first origin. (See Sophist. sub. init., note on Σωκράτης.)

Turning from the Socrates of Xenophon to the Platonic Socrates, we find a passage of the Euthydemus, in which the
question here solved by the Stranger is raised, but, Socratico more, is left unanswered. Some of the elements of the inquiry are, however, the same as here, and the passage has nearly the same relation to this dialogue which the opening chapters of the Protagoras have to the Sophist. (Euthyd. 289—291.)

"An art is required which can both make and enable us to use rightly what is made. The art of speech-making is not this, because the speech-maker is often different from the speaker. Nor generalship, for that is a kind of hunting: and the huntsman often does not use what he catches, but delivers them to others, and so the general yields up his prey to the statesman. Let us try then the art of the statesman, or the king. Here we fall into a labyrinth of inquiry (οὐσπτρ έις λαβόμενοι ἐμπεσόντες, οἴδομεν ήδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὀσπέρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς εἰτήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες, καὶ τοῦ ἱσον δετίνων, ὄσοντερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν). For when it is admitted that all the other arts yield over their productions to the political or royal art (which are the same), and that this art, by determining the use of everything, is the pilot and saviour of the state, the question rises, what is her peculiar work?

"According to a previous agreement, this must be knowledge of some kind, and this excludes wealth, freedom, peace, and the like. Say, then, she makes the citizens wise. In what knowledge does she make them wise, and what use will they make of their wisdom? Thus the original question returns in a new form."

The thing sought for here is the same which the Politicus professes to find, an absolute principle of life: a speculative truth which is also the consummation of practical good: a commanding theory. It was this which Socrates spent his life in seeking: of which he confessed his ignorance, while he declared life to be intolerable if it were not known. The political problem is only a particular instance of the eternal question, what is true and good?

There is also considerable likeness in the manner of search. And here it may be remarked that the specializing or individualizing effort described in the previous section is a genuine continuation of the work of Socrates, whose pertinacity in sticking like a gad-fly to his respondent is most conspicuous,
where he forces men by a fresh question from some generality in which they would gladly rest (ἀρχουσα—τι ἀπεργάζεται;—τώνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρησάμεθα;)

The chief difference is that the Eleatic Stranger works out an answer to the question, which Socrates asked of Euthydemus and his brother in vain: not however to the final question, which Socrates, if true to his vocation, would have still pressed upon the Stranger, though the problem in the present case was more limited than in the former. But this difficulty, like that about the nature of virtue, is evaded rather than solved by the more complex notion of the state, whose members have not all the same office.

As in the Republic there is found a place for a virtue in harmony with reason although lower than reason, so here a place is found for political happiness (καθ' ὅσον εὐδαίμονε πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι πόλει). All free citizens are to be trained so as to think correctly of what is noble, just, and good, and to give a reason of their opinion (μετὰ βεβαιώσεως). But with the rulers or law-givers alone exists that perfect consciousness which is the fountain of right action for the state, and whose will determines in accordance with reason the use to be made of all possessions (ὅσα ἔχεται κτήσεως). Other parallels might be drawn (e.g. from Gorg. 517), shewing that the spirit of Socrates is still working under the Eleatic mask: and if the Socratic humour no longer makes perpetual skirmishes, it lurks in ambush to take the reader by surprise, and is occasionally transformed by the intensity of Plato’s mood into an almost savage irony. The writer knew well how laughable was his picture of all things growing backwards in the golden age; nor could Swift have wished for more than to demonstrate the close relationship between mankind and the pig.

There is the very genius of satire in the picture of the self-exaltation of the crane, who looks on man as an inferior animal; and in the lofty scorn with which the philosopher professes ignorance of the motley throng of satyrs and centaurs, who are in fact no other than the princes and potentates of this world.

Briefly, the object which Socrates set before himself and others, Plato, when he wrote this dialogue, believed himself partially to have attained—the science of truth and good: to

*d 2
Socrates an ideal only, dwarfing to nothing all actual knowledge; to Plato an ideal ever in process of realization through the activity of reason, when awakened by dialectic to perceive the existence and follow the relations of ideas.

b. Pythagorean influence. Wherever Plato, especially in his later dialogues, affirms anything respecting the order of nature, the destiny of the soul, or the fabric of the state, there is reason to suspect the influence, more or less controlled by dialectic, of Pythagorean notions. To a great extent he used these merely as forms of imagination through which he could give more lively expression to his thoughts, but there can be no doubt that this scientific mysticism had an increasing charm for his mind, and had a still greater ascendancy over his immediate followers. It is less generally admitted that his dialectic also had a Pythagorean element, and yet it seems far from improbable that, as he strengthened his belief in the flux of phenomena by the study of Heraclitus and Protagoras, and learnt from Parmenides to trust in the fixity of ideas, so in the "struggle towards the concrete," of which the argument of the Politicus is an important step, he may have been assisted by reading in Philolaus of the eternal Harmony, whereby the Limit was impressed on the Unlimited, to the production of a beautiful world. It was seen, in commenting on the Theætetus (p. 201), that the philosophers who said there was no knowledge of the Simple, but only of the Complex, were probably Pythagorean. The word κοινωνία, by which the correlation of ideas is expressed in the Sophist, occurs in a place of the Gorgias where the Pythagorean colouring is evident (Gorg. 527 e—528 a). The μεθέξις of the Parmenides is the μίμασις of the Pythagoreans. And in the Philebus the κόσμος τε ἀσώματος (πέρας, ἀπειρον, μικτόν, αἰτία, μέτρον), which forms the spring and framework of the dialogue, is of a no less unmistakeable character.

In the present dialogue there occurs a direct criticism of Pythagorean doctrine which affords a good illustration of Plato's manner of dealing with the philosophies which most influenced him. The Stranger is led incidentally to defend the tediousness of the "longer way," whose object is not to give pleasure, or to obtain a speedy result, but to enlighten the reason. He does so by distinguishing that which is too
much from that which is more; a distinction which had escaped even those philosophers who averred that the science of measurement embraces all things. They led the way to a great truth, which for want of dialectic they could not work out. It is true that without measure all arts would be destroyed, but there are two kinds of measure, one simply relative, another, which is the secret of production, having reference to the standard of what is meet. Here the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers is brought into contact with the Socratic ethical idea. Aristotle would have said that certain thinkers acknowledged the formal, but ignored the final cause. In this passage, as perhaps in the Philebus, 44 c, the Pythagoreans are employed as “diviners” to point the way to the spring which Plato himself must open.

We pass from this manifest allusion to some less certain indications that Plato was at this time playing with the weapons of this school. There need hardly be mentioned the ludicrous mathematical definition of man as a biped; or the doctrine of metempsychosis, or the astronomy passing into cosmology. We may confine our attention to points less obvious than these.

The Pythagoreans were the only pre-Socratic school who set themselves to raise human life towards an ideal standard. It can hardly be doubted that they had moral and political doctrines in the fourth century B.C. But the few fragments of Philolaus which remain are of a metaphysical and cosmical turn. We know from Herodotus and Xenophanes that Pythagoras taught the immortality and transmigration of the soul; from Plato that his followers observed a certain rule of life; and the language of Philolaus, always full of religious fervour, appears to recognize the Unity of the Supreme Being. The Pythagorean fragments even of the age immediately succeeding Plato are of doubtful authority, and are so tinged with Platonism, that, even if genuine, their value is diminished for

1 Compare a saying of Socrates himself in the Memorabilia advising μετρήσας in the study of λογισμοί, and cf. Legg. 4, 719 6, σοί δ’ οὖς αὐτῶν ἡγησόμαι ὅσ νῦν εἶπες το μέτρων εἴπαν, ἀλλὰ τί το μέτρων καὶ ἐπάσαν ἡγησόμαι.

2 They coincided with Socrates in two points, which both appear in this dialogue—in the mode of teaching by parable (δι’ ὁμοιωμάτων) and in religious mysticism.

1 οὐτὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀγεμένος καὶ ἀρχων ἀπαντῶν θεὸς εἶς ἰδι ἔως, μόνιμοι, ἀκινάτοι, αὐτός αὐτῷ δμοίος, ἄτερος τῶν ἀλλῶν.
our present purpose. But it seems probable on the whole that the school at the earlier period of which we speak combined a ceremonial asceticism with a noble and elevating morality.

We know that such was the ethical teaching of Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean in this respect, and who at one time cries,

\[ \text{Où pėletai tois mêv thēmatôn tode, tois ȳ' àdēmystouv' allà tò mêv pàntωn nómmou diá τ' eúrwmédonous aiðéros ἱνεκέως τέταται, diá τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς,} \]

and presently, with still greater vehemence,

\[ \Deltaειλοί, πανδειλοί, κυάμων ἀπο χείρας ἐξεσθε! \]

1. The idea of an infinite past, and of great cycles of time, which took such hold of Plato's imagination, and which he himself refers to an Egyptian source, was probably common to him with the Pythagoreans, and if not derived from them, must have been strengthened by their teaching. According to Porphyry (V. Pyth. 19), "Pythagoras" taught that all events took place in cycles and there was nothing new: οτί κατὰ περιόδους των τὰ γιγνόμενα ποτε πάλιν γέγενται, νέον ὅ' οὐδὲν ἀπλάως ἐστι. The bearing of this on the "great mythe" is sufficiently evident.

2. Plato also held in common with them, and may have partly received from them, a strong sense of the inevitable prevalence of evil in the world. It is not likely that he derived this from Socrates, who complained not of evil but of ignorance, and who refrained from cosmical speculation: and this vein of reflection is deepest in his latest works.

Theophrastus (Met. 9. Ritter and Preller, 110) speaks of Plato and the Pythagoreans as being at one on this subject. "The nature of the whole, they say, would be impossible without the existence of an absolute formlessness and indefiniteness and disorder (cf. Polit. 273 d, εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρον δόντα τόπου δύνη), which they oppose to the combination of the indefinite dyad and the One. This disorder has as it
were an equal share with the other nature, or even exceeds it. Hence even God cannot be supposed able to bring all things to perfection; but, if he be the cause of things, this is only so far as nature admits. And perhaps he would not choose to do so, since there must follow an annihilation of Being, which is composed of opposites."

This passage, although probably describing at second-hand a theory not clearly understood, sufficiently proves that the prevalence of imperfection was a difficulty much discussed by the semi-Pythagoreans of the Academy; and it is this difficulty which suggests to Plato’s imagination the occasional dereliction of the world by God. He modifies Pythagorean optimism, by bringing into prominence another side of their theory. The disorder out of which the whole was brought into the present order, the breaking out again of this disorder so as almost to bring Chaos back again, the fear that but for Divine interposition the world might founder in the “infinite abyss of dissimilitude,” are touches vividly recalling this doctrine.

The Politicus contains another trace of this ἀμορφός φόσις, which it would appear trifling to notice, did not the dialogue itself warn us that the commonest things may be examples of great ideas. This is the mention of raw material amongst the seven kinds of possessions (288, 9), with the remarkable appellation τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἶδος: (compare the πρωτογένεια of the Orphic Hymns). This, and the well-known passage of the Timæus, are the chief anticipations in Plato of the Aristotelian material cause.

3. The doctrine of transmigration was naturally connected with the prohibition of animal food and a higher than the ordinary estimate of the relation of the lower animals to man. In the passage of Porphyry already quoted, it is said that “Pythagoras taught” that all animal life is kindred: δὲι πάντα τὰ γαγνωμενα ἐμφύσα διμοσεινῇ δεὶ νομίζειν. It is true that every later testimony on this subject, when philosophy had been leavened by the direct influence of Egypt and the East, must be received with caution; but if this doctrine

☑ The often-quoted lines of Xenophon, about Pythagoras and the dog, shew, however, something of a similar tendency. And Empedocles comes still nearer (364, 5): ἐνθ’ ἡσιν κτλα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώποις προσεπη φήρής τ’ οἷον τε, φιλοφροσύνη τε δεδήει.
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existed, Plato has used it (1) to point his irony, by telling us not hastily to distinguish man from the beasts, some of whom perhaps regard him with the same contempt with which he looks on them; and (2) to adorn his tale by the circumstance of man confabulating with the other creatures, when "there was nothing wild."

That abstinence from the flesh of animals was not unknown in Greece, at least in the way of tradition and theory, is certain from a remark of Plato’s on the "Orphic" way of life (Legg. 6, 782 e), and from the lines in which Empedocles vehemently condemns the opposite practice, on the ground that so men are devouring their own flesh and blood. (Compare Aristoph. Ran. 1032 p.) And it is probable that Plato alludes to this when he says that the creatures did not eat each other in the golden age (οὐκ ἦν ἄγρων οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἄλληλων ἐδώδαι). Another prohibition, having evidently the same origin, and ascribed by Herodotus to the Pythagoreans in common with the Orphic mystics and the Egyptians, was that against burying in wool.

Closely allied to these Orphic notions is the idea of purification (καθαρμός), of which there are several applications in this dialogue and in the Sophist. (Soph. 226 d; Polit. 293 d, 303 d, 308 e, d. Compare the Phaedo.) Thus the idea of division or separation as well as that of combination (διάκρισις as well as σύγκρισις) had a root in the speculations of this school.

4. It remains to notice the most important, but unfortunately the most doubtful, of the points at which this dialogue touches on Pythagoreanism. The fancies hitherto mentioned belong to morals and religion. Must not a school which aimed at influencing states have had a political theory, however simple?

* Μορφήν δ’ ἄλλαξαι πατήρ φίλον νίν δέλφας
σφάξει ἐπενχώμενοι, μέγα νῆπιος" δ’ δὲ πορεύται
λισαόμενος θόντις· δ’ ἀπευφοίτησεν ὠμολέουν
σφάξας δ’ ἐν μεγάροις κακὴν ἀλεγνατό δαίτα.
ὡς δ’ αὕτως πατήρ’ νίδα ἐλόω καὶ μητέρα παίδες,
θυμὸν ἀπορρόαιατε, φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἐδοσών

* * * * *

Οὐ πάντεσοι̂ν δύοντίς; οὐκ ἐσφόρατε
"Ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκμαίησι νόοιο;"—Εμπ. Καθαρμόι.

Ρ’ Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετᾷ θ’ ἥμιν κατέδειξε̄ φῶνῃ τ’ ἀπέχεσθαι.
Stobæus has preserved three fragments from a work of Ecphantus of Syracuse on Royalty (περὶ βασιλείας) containing an ideal picture of the true king. Very similar fragments are quoted by him from works on the same subject by Diotogenes the Pythagorean and Sthenidas the Locrian. These are all later than Plato, and betray the influence of his teaching; but they display with great consistency a phase of Pythagoreanism which is at least interesting in connexion with the present dialogue. The true king is pictured as a kind of God on earth: having the same relation to his subjects which the Supreme Being has to the Cosmos, surveying them from above with an eye of wisdom (cf. Soph. 216 d), having for them the same affection which a father has towards his son, or a shepherd towards his flock, and being revered by them as the law is revered by those who use it. The city "imitates" the world and the king imitates the ruler of the world.

"Εξει δὲ ός θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμου βασιλεὺς ποτὶ πόλιν, καὶ ώς πόλις ποτὶ κόσμου βασιλεὺς ποτὶ θεῶν. Ἀ μὲν γὰρ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφέροντων συναρμοσθέντα κόσμῳ σύνταξι καὶ ἀρμονίαν μεμιμητε, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀρχᾶν ἔχων ἀνυπέθυνου καὶ αὐτῶν ὁν νόμος ἔμψυχος, θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπου παρεσχημάτισται. — Θεόμμον ἐντι πράγμα βασιλεία. (Diotog. περὶ βασιλείας. Mullach. Fragm. PP. 534-5.)

Χρή τοῦ βασιλέα σοφὸν ἢμεν ὦτῳ γὰρ ἐσείται ἀντίτιμος καὶ ἔχοντ ἔν τῷ πράτῳ θεῶ. Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ φύσι ἐντι καὶ πράτος βασιλεὺς τε καὶ δυνάσται, ὁ δὲ γενεσί καὶ μιμᾶτι καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν ὠ τῶν παντὶ καὶ ὠλῳ, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ γᾶς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα διοικεῖ τε καὶ ἕως αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῶ κεκταμένος τὴν σοφίαν, ὁ δ’ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐπιστάμαν. (Sthenidas Locrus, περὶ βασιλείας. Ibid. P. 536.)

'Εκ τούτων κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐναρμοστία τις καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοφωνία μετὰ πειθοὺς συναδοίτας. Ὁ κατ’ ἀρετῶν ἐξαρχῶν καλενταὶ τε βασιλεὺς καὶ ἐντι, ταῦτα ἔχων φιλίαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν ποτὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐταυτῶν, ἀντερ ὁ θεὸς ποτὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. "Ολον δὲ τῶν εὐσεβῶν χρὴ παρασκευαζεσθαι πράτων μὲν παρὰ τῶν βασιλεῶς ἐς τῶς βασιλεομένως, δεύτερον δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀπέραντων ἀπειληθον, ἀποπτείρα τῆς ἐλπίδας θείων." ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς πλησίασθαι πρῶτον, οὕτως ἐν τῷ βασιλεύοντι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ, τοῖς δὲ τοιαύτας παρασκευαζόμεθα πρῶτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθείαν. "Ως γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεταφρασθείσῳ παρὰ τῷ Θείῳ λόγῳ τοῦ Πράγματος ἐν τῇ περιβαλλόμενῃ κατ' ἀρετῶν ὁμοφωνίᾳ μετὰ πειθοὺς συναδοίτας, ὁ κατ' ἀρετῶν ἐξαρχῶν καλενταὶ τε βασιλεὺς καὶ ἐντι, ταῦτα ἔχων φιλίαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν ποτὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐταυτῶν, ἀντερ ὁ θεὸς ποτὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. "Ολον δὲ τῶν εὐσεβῶν χρὴ παρασκευαζεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ τῶν βασιλεῶς ἐς τῶς βασιλεομένως, δεύτερον δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀπέραντων. Compare with this the θεοὶ λόγος of the Phaedo, 85 d: also the Parmenides, 134 c.
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ἐς τὸν βασιλέα, ὧποια γεννάτορος ποτὲ νιέα καὶ ποτὶ πολὺν νομέως καὶ νόμω ποτὶ χρωμέως αὐτῷ. (Ecphantus, περὶ βασιλείας. Ibid. p. 537.)

Ὠ μὲν θεός ὡτε διακόνως ἔχων ὡτε ὑπαρέτας ὡτε αὐτῷ προστάξει τυλὶ χρώμενος οὐδὲ στεφανῶν ἢ ἀναγορεύουν τὸς πειθομένος ἢ ἀτιμάζον τὸς ἀπειθέοντας—ἄρχει—ἀλλ' οἷς παρέχων ἄξιομί-

ματον ἔωστον ζαλὸν εὐτίθηι πάσι τῆς αὐτῶ φύσιοι... Ὡ τ' ἐπέγρος παρ' ἀμὴν βασιλεύς τὸς οὐχ ὁμοίως αὐταρκὴς; ἀπεικάζουν τε γὰρ αὐτόν, ἐνὶ ἄν ἀπεικάζει τῷ κρατίστῳ, καὶ πάντες ἑαυτῶς πειρώμενοι τοῦτο ὁμοίων βασιλικοὶ ἔστοιν: τὰ δ' ὁσα βιας καὶ ἀνάγκας ἐντ' τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, ἐνοτε ἑκάστῳ τῶν περὶ τῶν μίμαστον προβημένον ἀφαιρέται: χωρὶς εὐνοίας γὰρ ἀμάχανον ἐξο-

μοωθίηνα, ἀ μᾶλλα πάντων ἀφαινεῖτι τὸ φοβερόν. Ὡς εἴθε ἦν τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας φύσιοι δυνατόν ἄφελεν τὸ καὶ πειθοὺς τινας δέεσθαι... ἐπειδιὴτερ πειθώ ἔγρον τί ἐντ' παροικεῖαι ἀνάγκας: πράτα γὰρ ἀφ' αὐτάς αὐτὰ κατεργάζεται τάπερ ἐκείνων διεφυγαν. "Ὡσα δ' αὐτοφύως τῷ καλῷ χρήται, τούτοις οὐδεμα πειθοὺς αἰῶνως:

ἐπειδιὴτερ ὡτε φοβος ἀνάγκας. Ἐνεργάσατο δ' ἂν μόνος ὁ βασιλεύς ἀνθρώπων φύσει καὶ τόδε τὸ ἁγαθόν, ὃς διὰ μίμασιν αὐτῷ τῷ κρέσσωνοι ποτὶ τὸ δέον ἐπεσθαφ. (Ibid. p. 538.) There is much more to the same purport.

Now are we to suppose that this somewhat crude representation of what ought to be (resembling perhaps suspiciously in some features the Stoical wise man) is merely a caricature of Plato's philosopher-king, or had both pictures an antecedent in Pythagorean teaching? However this may be, there is no mistaking the strong likeness between the ideal herein absolutely set forth, and that which Plato in the Politicus, according to his manner of treating contemporary views, first states, then gently sets aside, and in the sequel utilizes in a modified form. "In speaking of the king as the shepherd of his people, we borrowed the image of majesty from a theo-

cratic time. Yet the true statesman is he who rules with knowledge, and harmonizes the state, bringing together the diverse elements of good, and rejecting the bad. He who does this not merely imitates but reproduces the divine image."

On the above data, imperfect as they are, I hazard the following conjecture: That the idea of the rightful sovereignty
of wisdom existed in the Pythagorean school before Plato. That Plato's Republic, partly inspired by this, had given a fresh impulse to the same line of thought amongst the Pythagorizing students of the Academy; and that Plato, having in the Sophistes criticized the speculative idealism of these friends of his, being himself perhaps somewhat désillusionné, proceeds to call in question their equally premature idealism in politics: shewing, first, that a "paternal government" does not secure happiness unless it rouse intelligence; and, secondly, that you must "first catch" your ideal king before you can apply your theory to practice.

Even if this conjecture should prove baseless, it will hardly be questioned that the analogy which is more than hinted between the Cosmos and the State (ὁ ἔμμοιμένοι καὶ συνεπόμενοι κ.τ.λ.—274 d), the "purification" of the body politic, and the harmony of divers elements in the web of social life, are notions having a near affinity to Pythagorean teaching. Nor would it be rash to affirm the same of the theory of opposite virtues, which is certainly not Socratic, and is introduced as an unusual saying (οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον οὐδαμῶς—306 b).

Speaking generally, the most obvious affinities to Pythagoreanism in Plato's later writings are, 1. An increasingly religious spirit. 2. Intense interest in all scientific inquiries, to which the name φιλοσοφία is now applied. 3. The treatment of ethical questions (as in the Philebus) from a cosmical point of view. 4. The prevalence of the ideas of harmony, rhythm, and the like, especially in their application to morals and politics.

But the Socratic spirit, or rather the mind of Plato awakened long since by Socrates, shines through the cloud of Pythagorean fancies (not that these were without intelligence), and reduces them to just proportions by the dry light of reason, while his imagination turns all that it touches into gold. If we could compare the Politicus with an entire writing of Philolaus, Eudoxus, or Speusippus, the probability is that we should find the difference immense: νοῦν ἔχοντας ἐνδον τούτους μόνους εὐρήσεις τῶν λόγων.

* Tim. 88 c: μουσικὴ καὶ πάση φιλοσοφία. Thæt. 143 d: γεωμετρικὴν ἢ τιμα ἀλλην φιλοσοφίαν.
We now turn from these preliminaries to examine Plato's thoughts as they are presented to us in this dialogue. And here there are three topics which chiefly call for remark: the fable of Cronos; the description of existing constitutions, and, in connexion with this, the theory of legislation.

III. The Myth.

This is not the place for discussing, except incidentally, the nature of Plato's myths as a general feature of his writings. But the solution of several questions which are suggested by this particular tale may perhaps throw some light on the wider problem.

(1) What is the motive for interrupting the argument with this narrative? (2) In how far, or in what sense, does Plato believe in the truth of his own story? (3) Is there any humour mingled with the apparent solemnity of tone? (4) What are the precise ideas to whose working this imaginative creation is due? (5) Can these ideas be reconciled with those which Plato has elsewhere expressed? (6) What effect has the narration in determining the course of argument which is pursued in the remainder of the dialogue?

(1.) The chief motive of the fable is to recall the mind from resting in a merely abstract ideal. "We are not living in the golden age:" that is, in forming our conception of true statesmanship we must take account of the imperfect conditions of the actual world. In order to impress this lesson, the simple notion of one who should feed his flock like a shepherd is drawn out at length, embodied in a tale, and associated with a state of innocence and ease, before man eat bread by the sweat of his brow, when all creatures lived in harmony. And still further to point the contrast between the ideal and actual, the gates of this Eden are closed by the story of a change or fall, not caused by any antecedent sin or curse, but by the necessity inherent in created things. An air of probability and even of historic truth is given to this strange fiction, by finding in it an explanation of several fragments of early mythological tradition.

The Stranger admits that he has allowed himself to extend his fable beyond what was necessary for the argu-
ment. Hence there is no reason why every detail should be made to square with the main design. Plato, as is his wont, passes at once from the immediate question to the more general one, of which it is a part; from the imperfect conditions of human government to the origin and necessity of evil; so that the cosnical features of the myth grow out of proportion to the political. But the language with which the myth is introduced and the after-comment leave no doubt as to the purpose for which it is inserted. "The king, unlike other herdsmen, has many rivals, who likewise feed the flock." "The reason of this difficulty is that our definition confounds the king with the Divine shepherd, whereas the statesman of our age cannot in any sense be a nourisher of his people."

As the tale proceeds, there is developed a further lesson: namely, that the simple ideal of a state of innocence is not only impracticable but incomplete; that a βίος τέλειος, a life under perfect conditions, is not necessarily the happiest life. The question is how the life is used: the philosophic spirit is the one essential of true happiness: even one whose choice of a life has been restricted, may, if he use opportunity with all his might, have a tolerable existence (καὶ τελευταῖός ἐπιώντι, ἔννυ ὑπὸ ἔλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίοι ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός—Rep. 10, 619 b); though if the children of Cronos used their golden time rightly, no doubt they were far happier than we can be. (Cf. Rep. 6, 497 a: Ἐλλά τοι, ἥ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἄν διαπραζόμενος ἀπαλλάττετο. Οὐδέ γε, εἴποι, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχῶν πολιτείας προσηκουσίας ἐν γὰρ τῇ προσηκουσίᾳ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἴδων τὰ κοινὰ σάσει.)

Plato has shewn in two other passages that an ideal formed by abstracting from existing evils is no sufficient help towards the conception of political or moral excellence; that virtue is not to be sought in the unconscious innocence of childhood;—once in describing the simple or primitive state in the Republic, Glaucon's "city of pigs," where "man's life is cheap as beast's," and again in the endeavour to conceive the origin of society at the opening of the third book of the Laws. But in the former description man needs defence against the inclemency of winter, is not exempt from work, and answers to the definition of a cooking animal, though his cooking is of the simplest. In the latter the mountain shepherds whom the
flood of Deucalion spared to be a sort of germ of future humanity, living peacefully together because they had few companions and there was enough for all, when there were neither poor nor rich, nor insolence, nor injustice, nor envy, but simplicity and good faith, are not set forth as an ideal, though they are said to be better than men after them, but are pictured in order to assist the conception of the origin of law, by imagining a previous state of "patriarchal" government in which the habits and traditions of each family were supreme. Legislation became necessary when these clashed in the early life of cities*.

Here, on the other hand, Plato has given his fancy free scope to revel in the details of a spontaneous universal life: where there is no unsatisfied longing, no effort, no pangs of birth, no crying of the infant "that he is come to this great stage of fools"; no old age, no flesh that sees corruption: the more unlike his picture is to present realities, the better he attains his end, by enforcing the necessity (however unwelcome, Legg. 803 b, ἐστι δὴ τοῖς τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπούδης οὐκ ἀξία, ἀναγκαῖον γε μὴν σπουδάζεις, τούτο δὲ οὐκ εἰναιξε) of adapting inquiry as well as practical effort to the actual lot of man. And by adding a few extravagant or even grotesque touches, he gives play to his humour, and gently ridicules those who were content to rest in the simple unapplied conception of a paternal king.

The substance of the myth is therefore very similar to the remark in the Lysis: "Supposing evil to be done away, would there be no more hunger or thirst or anything of the kind; or would there be hunger, as inseparable from animal life, but no longer hurtful; and thirst and other desires, but without bringing harm; or is it absurd to ask what would happen or not happen then, for who can tell? But one thing we know, that, in our present state, hunger and other desires are sometimes productive of evil, but may sometimes be a means of good."

(2.) A recent writer on the Myths of Plato† says not only

* A nearer parallel from the Laws will be quoted presently.
† Compare with this of Shakspeare the fragment of Empedocles, l. 13.
Κλαυσά τε καὶ κάκυσα, ἵδιν ἄσωπη-θέα χάρον.
Mr. Westcott in the Contemporary Review for June, 1866.
TO THE STATESMAN.

that "Plato claims that his myths are above all true in spirit;" and that "the central idea of the myth is affirmed absolutely;" but also that "in some cases the whole story is distinctly asserted to be historical." "He" (Plato) "dis-

claims in fact the title Myth in a disparaging sense for the stories to which we now apply it. They are," he says, "real

narratives (λόγοι) and not myths*, and where he does use the

word, he still maintains the existence of a substantial basis of

fact for such myths as admit of an historical test." The

same writer adduces in proof of this the care with which

Plato in the Republic apologizes for his "Phoenician lie." Mr.

Grote in a somewhat different tone, but to the same effect,
says of the Critias, "Plato wishes us to believe that the trans-

action is historical. As to particular narratives the line

between truth and fiction was obscurely drawn in his mind." These remarks are quoted merely to shew that it is not an

idle question to ask, How far did Plato believe in the literal

truth of the present narration?

The answer may partly be deduced from two places of the

Republic in which Plato's own conception of the nature of a

myth is expressed.

a. "There are two kinds of oral instruction, one false, one

true; and the false must precede the true. For a fable is a

falsehood containing truths." He then lays down the rule

for instructive fictions, that they must convey true and just

notions about Divine things and about human life. (Rep. 2,

377.)

b. And one of these true notions about Divine things is,

that God cannot lie: amongst other reasons, because he has

perfect knowledge, and need not have recourse to fables which

he knows to be false, in order to gain an approximate concep-
tion of antiquity, as men are compelled to do (ἐν ταῖς μυθολογίαις

dιὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδεναι ὅτι τάλαθες ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀφομοιοῦντες


2, 382 d).

A myth therefore, in the Platonic sense, is a fictitious narra-
tive, (a) conveying true ideas, and (b) in reference to occurrences

* "See Timæus, 20 d, 21 a, d, 26 c.
And so Critias invokes Memory to help him in relating the whole story." x "Gorgias, 523 a. Compare pp.
526 d, 527 a; Meno, 81 d, e."

y "Politicus, 268 e, 269 a, b."
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beyond the range of actual knowledge, supplying imagined probabilities for ascertained facts. The latter is Plato’s version of the ordinary function of mythology (Critias, p. 110 a, μνημο-λογία γὰρ ἀνατάξησις τε τῶν παλαιῶν μετὰ σχολῆς ἀπ’ ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐρχεσθοῦν); the former is the special condition or limit which he imposes on its use.

In practice this conception of the myth is further modified, by the dramatic and poetic form in which Plato’s philosophy is cast. The myth in the Protagoras, for example, though closely parallel in some of the details to that in the Politicus, is meant to convey an idea which Socrates combats and which Plato evidently does not fully accept. So also the elaborate myth of Aristophanes in the Symposium contains a phase of thought about the origin of Love, which is afterwards glanced at as an hypothesis of little value (Symp. 205 e). And as the myth is coloured to suit the particular speaker, so it partakes of the peculiar spirit of the particular dialogue. We hear nothing in the Phaedrus about the judgment of the dead, nor in the Republic about the wings of the soul, nor in the Symposium about her previous existence and future life; nor in the Gorgias about the edict of Lachesis. And if there is not perfect consistency in these greater matters, there is of course still more variety in the minor incidents with which Plato’s fertile imagination when once set to work gives all the distinctness of reality (ἐνάργειαν) to each separate picture. The harmonist of Plato’s myths would have a task only less difficult than the rationalist of the old mythology (ὅτε ἀγροικῷ τινι σοφὶ χρώμευος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει).

But Plato, like every poet, delights in making his fiction as like life as possible, and amongst other artifices is the asseveration of the truth of what is said. When Critias calls Mnemosyne to his aid, or when Socrates in the boldest part of the Phaedrus says, “We must speak the truth, especially since truth is our theme,” is it possible not to detect a covert smile? And when the speaker in the Timeus so carefully traces every link in the chain of tradition by which the tale of Atlantis had come through Egypt to Solon, and from Solon to the aged Critias, are we not at once reminded of the words

2 It is of this part that Socrates is somewhat abated, ἔοικε... τὰ μὲν says afterwards, when his fine frenzy ἐλλα παιδια πεπαισθαι.
of Phædrus (which by the way have reference to an equally circumstantial tale), "O Socrates, you can make Egyptian stories or any others with equal ease”? The words of Socrates to Callicles, “You will call this a story, but I call it a true account,” must be interpreted by the remark which follows: “You will despise this as an old wives’ fable, and indeed it would be natural to despise my words, if we could find anything better or truer, but in all our inquiries this one principle remains firm, that we must fly from doing more than from suffering wrong;” where Socrates insists on the truth, not of the myth itself, but of the lesson which the myth conveys.

It is probably from the same artistic instinct and with the same purpose of giving an air of probability to his inventions, that he founds them, as it is indeed natural he should do, upon the traditions already familiar to his countrymen. These formed the common medium through which he could communicate his ideas. He moulds them, indeed, with great ingenuity to his purposes. Poets had always dealt freely with mythology. But by appealing to the story of Atreus, or Deucalion, or Prometheus, for confirmation of some part of his recital, he seemed to bridge the gulf between the known and unknown.

This practice, as well as the groundwork of Pythagorean beliefs, with which Plato had, no doubt, strong personal sympathy, gives a degree of consistency to the body of the Platonic myths which they would not have otherwise. And he assumes such an air of simple truthfulness in telling his story, that by this art concealing art, a certain probability is given to the wildest imaginations. "Uncertainties now crown themselves assured."

It is chiefly in the latest dialogues that the myth is seriously applied by Plato to the second of the two purposes which he acknowledges in the Republic, the reproduction of prehistoric events. There seems to be a transition, or growth, on the imaginative side of his philosophy corresponding to that already noticed on the dialectical side: from the abstract to the concrete, from vague fancies instinct with speculative ideas, like the procession in the Phædrus, to supposed facts, like the war of Athens with Atlantis. He seeks to apply his metaphysical philosophy, which by this time acknowledged a principle of change and production, to the interpretation of the actual world, and he supplies the defects of experience and
observation by the help of imagination. And he claims for his tales the same degree of truth which he assigns to poetry (Legg. 3, 682 a): θείων γὰρ ὄνων ὅ ἡ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεωρητικὸν ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν ἡμάθειαν γεγομένων ξύν τινι Χάριν καὶ Μούσας ἑφάπτεται ἐκάστοτε. This tendency may be illustrated by comparing the Republic, Timæus, and Laws, of which the order of sequence is undoubted. The city founded in the Republic has no local habitation on earth, unless in some unknown and distant land, “far enough out of our ken,” though perhaps such a state may have existed at some period in the infinite succession of past time. In the Timæus and Critias this state is discovered, not far away in place, but remote in time, the Athens of a forgotten age contending successfully against a nation who were all that historical Athens desired to be. The state for which the Athenian Stranger legislates in the Laws, is a new Cretan settlement, imaginary of course, but imagined under the conditions of Plato’s own time.

To return now to the Statesman and to apply some of the preceding remarks to the myth before us. The main incident, the change on which all other change depends, is mentioned nowhere else by Plato. The artistic completeness and unity of the Great Myth is very striking. Though it differs from other Platonic myths, it may be said to comprehend them from a greater imaginative height. He speaks in the Timæus of periodic destructions of life upon the earth by earthquake, fire or flood, and in the Laws the same thing is assumed. But the reverse movement of the whole universe, the relinquishment of the helm of the great vessel, and the consequent gradual deterioration of all things, is a conception occurring nowhere else. It is adopted for the occasion, for the enforcement of a particular lesson. The old fable of the autochthones is one which Plato delights in using. It appears in the Protagoras, Symposium, Republic, Sophist, Timæus, Critias, and elsewhere. But it is nowhere else imagined that men coming fullgrown from the earth, go backwards through the stages of manhood, boyhood, infancy, and so pass away. There is a picture of a theocracy, founded on the reign of Cronos, in the Critias and Laws as well as here. But here only the other animals are placed under Divine superintendence as well
as man, and a reason is given for the cessation of this form of government. Again, while here and in the Laws the Divine guidance is immediate, in the Critias, Hephæstus and Athena act by creating good men as legislators. These discrepancies are not greater than those previously mentioned, and therefore cause no suspicion of spuriousness, but they suffice to shew how little wisdom there would be in taking Plato's meaning literally; or in attributing the care which is taken to provide a channel through which the tradition may have been preserved, or the solemn air with which disbelief is deprecated, to anything but the anxiety of a Defoe or Swift to make the illusion as complete as possible.

(3.) This leads us to the third question proposed above—Is there an element of humour in the fable or in the manner of telling it? If on other grounds we believe Plato to be the author of the Politicus, we can hardly doubt that there is. He must have felt the humorousness of making the respondent answer so promptly to the first statement of the astounding fact, "All that you say seems extremely probable;" and he must have shared the amusement of his reader in contemplating the dwindling forms of the earth-born race: just as Empedocles (however firmly he believed it) must have smiled, if he had any humour, at his own invention of the κόρσαί ἀναίχειν, the βραχίωνες εὐνίδες ὄμων, the βουγευὴν ἀνθρώπωρα, and ἀνθρωφοφυὴ βούκρανα. Having again alluded to this singular passage (Polit. 270 d, e), it may be well to take the opportunity of explaining the motives which seem to have suggested the addition of this peculiar feature. It has the twofold effect of giving greater consistency and completeness to the story, and of pointing the contrast between the two alternate cycles. A link was needed to combine the change in the heavenly motion with the production of mankind from earth, which Plato chose, for a purpose of his own, to associate with the spontaneous generation of all things in the reign of Saturn. A hint for this appeared in the description of Hesiod: "They had no old age: their death was like a sleep." Now if, like the heroes of Cadmus, they rose full-grown from the ground, and saw not grey hairs, since their age could not stand still, it must go backwards. And this would be only in accordance with the change in the universal motion,
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a change of κίνησις followed by a change of γένεσις. But the more naturally the result follows from the premises, the more effectively it strikes the imagination with the greatness of the supposed revolution. Hence it is put in the foreground of the picture, μέγιστον δὲ πόσι κ.τ.λ. And here there peeps out a deeper vein of ironical humour from beneath the matter-of-course gravity of the narration. "If ever there is a beneficent paternal government on earth," Plato seems to say, "it will be when iron swims and rivers run back to their fountains." But it need not be assumed that he has no sympathy with the ideal at which he smiles, as being εὔνοιῶν τοῦ δέοντος. Compare Theext. 200 b, γελοιῶν περιστερέωσιν, Rep. 7, 536 b, γελοιον δ' έγογκε καλ ἐν τῷ παρώντι έοικα παθεϊν, where Plato openly laughs at his own enthusiasm.

(4.) But if the myth is poetry and not history, and is even tinged with humour, what are the serious thoughts which this strange medium is chosen to convey? There is, first, the main purpose which has been already described, to lift the imagination to the conception of a theocracy, and so to remove by a sort of "homeopathic" remedy the crudities of a shallow optimism. Very similar means are used in the Laws to show that unlimited monarchy is unsuitable for the present state of man. But when this principal thought is once admitted, other reflections crowd in. They are such as the following.

In our present state, evil is inextricably mixed with good: and is indeed so predominant, that God would seem to have left the world to itself. For in all that is created, evil is the necessary consequence of freedom. The practical lesson for man is that he too is made the guardian of his own life, and in conjunction with necessity, the builder of his own destiny. And as the universe and the animal kingdom follow, so far as they can recall it, the pattern of the Divine cycle, so man should track out everywhere the vestiges of the Divine wisdom which still remain: believing, that although the Creator has

a The notion of "a life which is a gradual disrobing of the spirit from its earthly dress," which one interpreter finds here, is well imagined, but is surely inconsistent with the words, "εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς πατίδος φόσιν ἄπει, κατά τε τὴν ψυχήν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄφωμοσμενα." For the child is not Plato’s type of the unclouded reason, the "best philosopher, seer blest" of Wordsworth.

b δοὺν εὖ ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἐνεστὶ, τούτῃ πειθομένους. Legg. 4, 713 e.
entered on His Sabbath of contemplation, His eye is still upon the world and all things in it, and that, being good, He will not forsake the work of His hands, but will restore His creature to the fulness of life and immortality in due time.

Meanwhile we may be consoled by the reflection, that a life under perfect conditions is not a happy life, unless it is spent in philosophy, and that the philosophic spirit in whatever conditions is the earnest of happiness here and hereafter.

Subordinate to this main argument are several incidental thoughts:—1. God is not the author of evil. He cannot contradict His own nature. 2. By parity of reasoning, there cannot be opposite Divine Powers of evil and good. (Is there here an allusion to Zoroastrianism?) 3. God permits evil, as the inevitable concomitant of a bodily nature. 4. God is the only source of life and immortality. 5. In a theocracy there would be no laws but the Divine Will, no marrying or giving in marriage, for each new being would be the immediate work of the Divine Hand. 6. Philosophy is the interrogation of all natures. 7. Man in his primitive state is weak and defenseless: he receives from Heaven only such gifts and such instruction as are indispensable in order that he may improve these by the exercise of his own invention under the stimulus of necessity. 8. The idea of transmigration and of the soul forgetting every thing at birth is assumed as a matter of course. It need hardly be said that all these thoughts are "plastic" here; i.e. they are not first thought out and then figuratively expressed, but emerge together with their symbols in the united play of reason and imagination.

(5.) Several difficulties occur, even on the above shewing, in comparing the myth with other utterances of Plato. (a) Can this picture of the permission of evil be reconciled with the goodness of the Creator as represented in the Timæus? (b) Is the relegation of the principle of communism to the golden age consistent with the fifth book of the Republic, or the disparagement of the education of perfect circumstances with the ideal of μουσική in the second book? The answer must be that these views are not perfectly consistent, but that a probable reason can be given for each discrepancy.

Ο εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπήν ἀπέστη.
a. The Deity of the Timæus effects all without moving from his place, and when his commands are given "continues in the same stay." The Deity of the Politicus is said in a figure to leave the helm of the universe and retire to his speculative height. The Deity of the Timæus confers an absolute immortality on the stars; the Deity of the Politicus suffers the whole visible universe to totter on the verge of dissolution. The universe in the Timæus, though not exempt from evils, as a whole is "very good." The universe in the Politicus copies the pattern of the Divine movement so clumsily that at length the good is almost overwhelmed by the evil. That the same writer could be possessed at different times with views so divergent, is a fact which may be classed with other "contrasts of prophecy." It may be partly explained by the peculiar bitterness with which the author, at the time of writing this dialogue, seems to have looked upon the world. But there are other reasons. The motive of the piece is in the one case cosmological, in the other ethical: that is, the Universe is held up as a mirror to exhibit on a large scale the condition of man. In the Timæus therefore the ills which flesh is heir to have a subordinate place, in the Politicus they are seen in the greatest prominence; and while in the one account human action is determined by physical constitution, in the other, man, with the Universe, is left to the guidance of his own will. Further, the direct object of this fable is to contrast the actual with the ideal, whereas the purpose of the Timæus is to exhibit the production of the Cosmos in accordance with the idea of good.

The music of the Timæus is more highly strung, for there the movements of the Same and Other are combined in the formation of the mundane soul, whereas here the opposite movements take place alternately. This difference is like that which Plato notices between Heraclitus and Empedocles; of whom the latter resolved the movements which the former united. (Symp. 187 a, Soph. 242 e.) At least equally discordant with the Timæus is the assumption in the Laws that there are two kinds of soul, one essentially evil, the other good: and

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* Tim. 42 e. Compare the fine saying of Xenophanes, ἄλλα ἀπάνευθε πόνοιον νόειν φρενὶ πάντα κραδαλεῖν.
* Tim. 87 sqq.
* οὐντονωτέρα.
* συντονωτέρα.
the distance between man and God is even more emphatically stated in many passages of this, Plato’s latest writing.

Having noticed the difference, it is right to point out the resemblance between the two myths. In both, God brings the Universe in the beginning out of disorder into order, so far as this is possible for a being which has a bodily frame, though animated by a soul, both in the form of reason and desire. He is the father, the composer, the artificer, the source of immortality, the author of all excellence and beauty in His creature. And because He is good, He will not see the dissolution of that which He has made. Yet constrained by necessity, he permits periodical destructions of living creatures from the face of the world.

b. The children of Cronos, like the guardians in the Republic, have no possession of wives and children. Here is a point of coincidence, and yet of discrepancy: for that which in the Republic is planned as a scheme possible though difficult, is here removed into cloud-land. In the Laws also it is reiterated that the community of wives and children is the condition of the perfect state; but in that dialogue the laws of marriage are similar to those sketched out at the conclusion of this, providing for the intermixture as far as possible of courageous and gentle breeds. On this point I can only suggest a conjecture. Is it possible that Plato had once hoped to see something like his ideal polity realized, and that his hopes (by the fall of Dion or otherwise) had been frustrated? This would account not only for the difference in this particular, but also for the contrast between the hopefulness of the Republic and the almost despair of human nature visible in the Statesman. But this is a speculation to which we shall have occasion to return. A reason which may be assigned with greater safety (while not inconsistent with the foregoing) is the more vivid realization in this dialogue of the actual conditions of human things: and this will also account for the remaining discrepancy, viz. that while in the Republic great virtue is assigned to the “surroundings” of childhood and youth as a means of education, it is left doubtful here whether the children of the golden age profited by their opportunities or not. It is true that the two passages do not directly conflict with each other, but the one shews a higher estimate of
the value of ideal circumstances than the other. (Note especially the words ἰν’ ὀσπερ ἐν ὑγεωμον τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νεόν ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕφελῶνται, ὁπὸθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἡ πρὸς ὡς ἡ πρὸς ἀκοῆν τι προσβάλῃ, ὀσπερ αὐρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρη- στῶν τόπων ὕγειεαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παλῶν λαυβάνη εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῇ καὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ ἐξυμφωνίᾳ τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἀγωνίᾳ—Rep. 3, 401 c.)

(6.) Plato often allows a theory which he has formally rejected to influence the after-course of the discussion. Thus in commenting on the Theætetus it was observed that the theory of “impressions” although discarded is afterwards applied (209 c, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σμάτης σωτή διάφορον τι μυθικόν παρ’ ἐμοι ἐνονηματενή κατάθηται): and in the Republic the ideal of a simple life, which Socrates rejects in order to humour Glaucon, and to account for the existence of a warrior caste, insensibly returns. It might be thought that when the tale was ended, and the error of “too great simplicity” corrected, we had done with the Divine Shepherd. But the idealizing impulse is too strong. We have turned our faces resolutely to look for the Statesman amongst mankind. But the light which accompanies the search is from a higher world. And when in comparison with the vision which our eyes have seen, the actual statesmen of the earth appear contemptible or monstrous, there still rises before us, in addition to the six forms of government which experience recognizes, a seventh form, which is no other than the Divine image. The scenery of the myth, the alternate cycles, the periodic destructions from physical causes, the earth-born race, are as though they had not been, but the ideal of true sovereignty still fits before the eye of the mind. This ideal, however, is now connected with the postulate, that Statesmanship is a science, with which the dialogue began: and it is sought to realize this with some reference to the existing conditions of human society.

First, the actual forms of government are shewn not to be based on any principle of reason; yet it is assumed that, so far as they are constitutional, they are unconsciously imitating,
though with decreasing accuracy (here the influence of the myth appears again), that Divine pattern of which the sovereignty of knowledge would be a conscious and perfect imitation. Now a perfect imitation is no longer an imitation, but the thing itself: and thus we return to our ideal image. But this ideal is no longer merely abstract. The king as a commanding artist is seen purging the community of incurably bad elements, subduing the refractory, and ordering aright the diversities of excellence which exist amongst his noblest subjects. His function is defined relatively to that of the general, the judge, the orator; and the result of his rule is not described as perfect happiness, but such happiness as is possible for a community. The separation of Divine and human which the myth suggests, is for the first time carried out consistently in the Laws, where the acknowledgment reluctantly muttered out in the Politicus is fully made, namely, that a paternal despotism has only once been realized, viz., in the golden age when man lived under a theocracy; but that human nature under existing conditions is too weak to bear the temptations incident to absolute power.

IV. The Seven Forms of Government.

The subject of political constitutions is treated differently by Plato in the Republic and the Laws. In the Republic the ordinary threefold distinction of oligarchy, democracy, and despotism is put into the mouth of Thrasymachus, who argues from this that the strongest govern for their own ends. Plato himself appends to his picture of the perfect state an ideal picture of four successive forms of gradual deterioration from this type, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny; each lower than the former, and arising out of it through a natural development of evil. The ruling principle of the first is honour, of the second wealth, of the third individual freedom, of the last passion. This arrangement is no doubt partly determined by the analogy of the individual, which, in accordance with the plan of the dialogue, is throughout kept promi-

k Polit. 273 b, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλυ-

τερον.

1 4, 713. The sense of the distance of man from God so frequently ex-

pressed in the Laws is the religious counterpart of the severance of the ideal from the actual which is so strongly felt in the Politicus.
nently in view. In the timocracy, which nearly corresponds to the Laconian ideal, the spirited element gains predominance, and is emancipated from the control of the reason. In the other three forms, Desire, first, of wealth, secondly, of unrestrained action, thirdly, of gratifying the ruling passion, has the upper hand.

Three distinct arrangements are adopted in different places of the Laws, all different from that just mentioned:

   a. Single families, without written laws. Θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς παιδὸς ἤδ' ἀλὸχῳ οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἄλεγοντον.
   b. Patriarchal Government. Βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοποίησιν.
   c. The early life of cities, in which opposite customs are harmonized by legislation.
   d. Maritime cities are built; the beginning of commerce, war, sedition.
   e. Return of the Heraclids. Laconian and Cretan constitutions.

2. Two prime forms, democracy and monarchy, representing the tendencies of the West and East. The best constitution must have an admixture of both, so as to secure order and liberty. The Laconian and Cretan settlements had this good fortune. Legg. 3, 691.

3. For the above-named reason, these alone of existing governments deserve the name of πολιτεία. The four commonly named, royalty, aristocracy, democracy, and tyranny, are not constitutions, but factious coteries (στασιωτείαι), which govern, not for the interest of the state, but, as Thrasymachus said, for the maintenance of the existing authority. The only true constitution is that in which, instead of one part of the city being in subjection to another part, all are together subject to the rule of reason in the form of law.

In the Politicus we have first an enumeration of the forms of government according to common notions: then a criticism of these, followed by a fresh enumeration.

Common opinion is said to acknowledge five forms instead of the three vaunted by Thrasymachus in Rep. bk. 1. Instead
of his "tyranny" we have the higher generalization of monarchy (the word μοναρχία occurs only in the Politicus and the Laws). This is subdivided into royalty and tyranny, according as the subjects are willing or unwilling. Instead of his "aristocracy" we have the more general μοναρχία (the word μοναρχία occurs only in the Politicus and the Laws). This is subdivided into royalty and tyranny, according as the subjects are willing or unwilling. Instead of his "aristocracy" we have the more general μοναρχία (cf. Legg. 710 e, μοναρχία τίνι τού ποιούτον, i. e. τοῦ νομοθετοῦ, γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύνατ' ἄν προσδέξασθαι πλείστου γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίγνονται) : which is divided, according to the principle of wealth on the one hand, and constitutionalism on the other, into oligarchy and aristocracy "of fair name" (τῆς εὐόψυλλη). The fifth is democracy, which, whether ruling by gentleness or violence, and whether constitutional or not, has the same name.

But when tried by the standard of scientific government, not one of these is found to be based on principle: they are seen not to be forms of government at all (οὐ πολιτείαι), but only imitations more or less remote of the one true form; and the men who head them are not statesmen, but partisans, the phantom-guardians of phantom-states.

Of the imitations however, some are better, some are worse. And here a principle is admitted which had no place in the perfect state. The better or worse of the bad states are distinguished by the observance or defiance of law. All else is accident, except the original wisdom of the Laws, and the degree in which they are obeyed. Hence the original classification is thus modified. First, the scientific state is alone allowed the name, so that the five are swallowed up in one (τὰ πέντε ὄνοματα τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐν μόνοις γέγονεν). But of the false states there are now

1. Monarchy with law, called βασιλεία.
2. Monarchy without law, τυραννίς.
3. The dynasty of a few observing the laws = ἀριστοκρατία.
4. The dynasty of a few defying the laws = διλιγαρχία.
5. Democracy with law.
6. Democracy without law.

The true state being kept apart, ὅσπερ θέως ἐκ ἄνθρωπων, the following is the order of excellence, or rather of comparative badness amongst the other six:—
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1. βασιλεία (1).
2. δημοκρατία (3).
3. δημοκρατία μετὰ νόμων (5).
4. δημοκρατία ἄνευ νόμων (6).
5. ὀλυγαρχία (4).
6. τυραννίς (2).

Now this order differs at the first glance in two important respects from that given in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic. These are, first, the addition of βασιλεία as one of the lower forms, and, secondly, the depression of ὀλυγαρχία below δημοκρατία. 'Αριστοκρατία may be allowed to correspond to the τυραννίς of the Republic. But it so happens that on both these points there is a corresponding difference between the Republic and the Laws. For in that dialogue, as we have seen, βασιλεία (a sort of eastern monarchy is probably intended) is one of the four forms commonly received to which the Athenian Stranger denies the name of constitution. And democracy, as one of the two "mother polities" of which monarchy is the other, is throughout placed before oligarchy, against which Plato seems latterly to have conceived an increased enmity. (Even in the Republic he calls it συχνῶν γέμονσα κακῶν πολιτεία.)

When we add to these two points the coincidences of language above mentioned (μοναρχία, δυναστεία), a presumption is raised that the doctrine of the Politicus on this subject is nearer to the Laws than to the Republic.

And on coming a little closer, we see that in the Republic these distinctions are thought to depend on essential differences of form (4, 445 d, εἰδὴ ἔχουσε; 8, 544 d, ἣ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεί τινι κεῖται), and to have a natural order of sequence of which a reason can be given. But in the Politicus they are seen to be distinguished by no principle, the only real difference between states being first enlightenment or ignorance in the ruler, and next the maintenance or the neglect of law. And not far removed from this view, though more adapted to a legislative treatise, is the assertion in the Laws that the constitutions commonly so called are not constitutions at all, and that the only true state is that where reason rules in the form of law. Once more, when in the Politicus the
statesmen of existing states are said to be not what they profess, but partisans (οὗ πολιτικοὶ ἄλλα στασιστικοὶ), this comes very near the remark in the Laws that the radical vice of all the received forms of government except the Spartan and Cretan is that one part rules the rest for its own advantage. They are not constitutions but coteries (οὗ πολιτείας, ἄλλα στασιστικαὶ).

V. Theory of Legislation.

The presumption thus raised is further confirmed when we examine the very curious piece of mingled satire and inquiry in which the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional government is illustrated. "If the true sovereign and law-giver, or a second like him, were on earth," we are told, "he would be above law; which is only an imperfect substitute for the universal and immediate superintendence of the Perfect Will." The physician is not bound to follow his old prescriptions under altered circumstances. But now he is "gone into a far country," or, as the myth would say, Providence has left us to ourselves: and men have despaired of finding their natural ruler, whom, when once found, they would follow like a swarm of bees. Therefore there is nothing left to them but to preserve their country's laws, which, it may be presumed, were made at first after the Divine pattern, so far as those who framed them knew. What a poor business this is at best is shewn by the case of an imaginary state, in which the arts of navigation and medicine or any others should be practised according to ancient laws enacted in popular or oligarchical assemblies at the advice of chance persons. But when the wretchedness of such a condition has been fully exhibited, a lower deep is opened, by imagining a state, whether democratical, oligarchical, or tyrannical, in which such laws, however imperfect, should be over-borne, not by higher knowledge, but by private gain or favour. Hence it is concluded that in the absence of a philosophic ruler, the best course possible (as a δεύτερος πλοῦς) is a strict observance of the laws. Now in the Republic, the sanguine founders of that city in the heavens deliberately dispense with a minute
code of laws. These are thought unnecessary because in the greatest thing, viz. education, the whole community will be spontaneously obedient to the philosopher-king, and in little things those who have been thus educated will be a law to themselves; or in any case will be only what education makes them. The pages in which this thought is expressed (4, 423 c—427 a), had they not been found in an earlier writing, might have been taken for a criticism of the Leges. It is indeed granted, in words which should acquit Plato of Utopianism (5, 472 b—473 b), that practice can never attain to the perfection of theory, but the idea of lowering the sails of theory, in order to try a second course, when the first is hopeless, does not occur to Socrates, and certainly would be very far from acceptable to the impetuous Glaucon.

The necessity of this humbler course is somewhat sadly admitted by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws. He prefaces the introduction of the very class of regulations (those which are over and above the rules for nurture and education), against which Socrates protests in the passage above quoted (9, 875 a), with the remark that laws are necessary, because no human being has at once the wisdom to see, and also the power and the will to do, at every moment what is for the universal interest, and to make his own interest always secondary. "Could one be found theoretically convinced that whatever was for the public good was on the whole good for him, yet, if placed in a position of absolute and irresponsible authority, he would be too weak to apply his theory consistently through a long life. His mortal nature shrinking from pain and desiring pleasure would darken his judgment of what is just and good. But if Providence were to send on earth such a nonpareil, whose nature was sufficient for this work, he would not need to place himself under the control of law. (Compare Polit. 295 b, σχολή ἀν ἑαυτῷ θείτ ἐμποδίσα-ματα γράφων τοὺς λεχθέντας τούτους νόμους.) It is because Nature has been so niggardly in this particular (/vnd δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐδαμόν οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἕ κατὰ βραχύ) that we are forced to adopt a course which is only second-best, in enacting laws, whose application is general only, not universal."

The reflection which prompts these words, viz. that practical rules must be accommodated to our experience of human
weakness, pervades the whole dialogue, and should always be present to the reader of the Laws. It does not follow that Plato has relinquished his ideal of life, because in recommending a second-best polity to those who have refused his best, he admits some details which he had once rejected with scorn. The feeling with which he does so could not be more clearly expressed than in the words with which he defends the admission within certain limits of election by lot: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιείκες καὶ ξύγγυνωμοι τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἔστι παρατεθραμένων, ὅταν γίγνηται.

This procedure follows naturally as a practical result from the reasoning in the Politicus. If, seeing that the philosopher-king cannot always be with his people, the only wise course for states is to maintain their laws, which have an imperfect and remote reflection of principles of divine government: suppose an occasion to arise for founding a new state, or some rare opportunity for remodelling an old one, what are the laws which, as the best possible substitute for the continual presence of an enlightened will, the true law-giver would actually impose? and what are their reasons and their sanctions? This is the problem which the Stranger in the Politicus implicitly suggests, but apparently despairs of answering: for the sketch with which the dialogue ends represents the highest statesmanship working without the instrumentality of law, though in a more practical way than in the Republic.

m See esp. Legg. 5, 739 b: τὸ δ᾽ ἢστιν ὀρθότατα, εἰσὶν μὲν τὴν ἀριστὴν πολιτεῖαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην, διὰ δὲ εἰσίν τα ἄρεσιν ἐκάστη τῷ τῆς συνοικίας εὐφή.

n Another admission to which he confesses himself almost driven (4, 708 ε) is, that “constitutions are not made, but grow” (ὡς οὖν ποιεῖ αὐθρόποις οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τόχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραί παντοίαι πίστουσαν παντοῖο νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῶν). A noticeable passage, in which human art occupies only the third place with Providence and chance. There is an approach to a similar feeling in Polit. 302 a, where the longevity of many states built on foundations which reason pronounces ruinous, provokes the reflection “what strength and tenacity there is in the very nature of a state” (ὡς ἵσχυρόν τι πόλις ἐστιν φύσει).

o This in the Laws is not the rise of a philosopher-king, but the concurrence of a well-disposed and intelligent despot with a wise law-giver. It should be observed that a provision is made in Legg. 6, 769, 770 (cf. 12, 951), though by no means an adequate provision, for the constitutional amendment of the law. This is a step in advance of the political doctrine of the Statesman.
An instructive parallel to the teaching of the Politicus on this subject appears in the Critias, in which three phases of political life are described, which nearly exemplify the Eleatic Stranger’s theory. First the people of pre-historic Athens, whose autochthon founders, created by Hephaestus and Athena, had been inspired by them to order their state (as we learn from the opening of the Timæus) in accordance with the provisions of the Republic. Next the kings of the race of Poseidon, each of whom had power of life and death in his own city, but was bound in his intercourse with the rest to obey the injunctions of their progenitor, as these had been recorded by the first of their race. These had remained unaltered as they were written in the beginning on a tablet of orichalcum—a now fabulous metal which abounded in that realm. On this tablet was added a great curse pronounced on those who disobeyed: and a great oath, confirmed by the blood of a bull poured over the tablet, was renewed every five years: at which time also, in solemn nocturnal conclave, they condemned those who were convicted of ruling contrary to the laws. For many generations, so long as they observed these laws, and while the heroic blood remained in them, they lived happily enough, and perceiving that virtue is the true road even to earthly welfare, they bore up against the load of their material prosperity. But a time came when the human element prevailed and they were overcome by ambition and the pride of power. Then they seemed outwardly most fortunate, but presented a pitiable spectacle to those who had an eye for deformity of soul. The fragment of the Critias ends with the resolve of Zeus to chasten them, but had the tale proceeded, we should have had placed before us the third companion picture, that of the misery of a state which, in the absence of a philosophic ruler, has a code of laws but is disobedient to them. These three conditions, set forth in the Critias, correspond nearly to the forms which the Politicus recognizes as alone essential: the Republic is ignorant of the distinction between the second and third: which, again, are brought into almost exclusive prominence in the Laws.

p Critias, 109 d.  q Compare the ἱππεῖς of Polit. I. c.
VI. Relation of the Politicus to the Leges.

1. The description of the "Royal web" in the concluding passage of this dialogue is a mere outline; yet if the sketch is anywhere finished this is not done in the Republic, but in the Laws. These both contain the idea of binding together and harmonizing the gentle and fierce elements in human nature: and the presence of this thought in the Politicus is, in so far, only a reason for grouping it with these two great works rather than with the Protagoras or any of the more Socratic dialogues, in which all virtue is simply referred to knowledge. But a more definite hypothesis is justified by a closer inspection. For, while the "divine bond" of knowledge is a description so vague as to be equally applicable to either of the two imaginary schemes of education, the provisions respecting marriage which constitute the "human bonds" have no counterpart in the Republic, while they are repeated almost without modification in the Laws. They imply in fact an accommodation to the existing condition of mankind which is more in accordance with the spirit of the latter than of the former dialogue. For what need was there of uniting by mutual pledges those who never spoke of "I" or "mine," and who felt every grief of every member of the state with an individual sorrow? What need of qualifying opposite tendencies by intermarriage, when each individual, according to the principle on which he was selected and trained, had by nature and education the harmony of gentleness and courage within his own breast? This ideal polity is still acknowledged by the speaker in the Laws to be the one and only pattern. His object is to propound a second polity, i.e. a polity only once removed from the former, the closest imitation of the perfect government that is likely to be maintained without the presence of a succession of Divine kings. And his procedure, with the reasons for it, has several striking points of resemblance to that suggested at the conclusion of the present dialogue.

He observes that the purpose of the early legislators was not war, but peace as the reward of virtue: that in the early
life of cities it became necessary to bring together the opposite qualities of gentleness and fierceness, which, during the patriarchal period, had become embodied in the traditions of the different clans. (3, 681 b, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμιώτερα, καὶ ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικότερα. Cf. ib. 691 e, of the Spartan constitution. Compare Polit. 310 c.) And in beginning his own legislation he compares the work he has to do (almost in the words of our dialogue) to a web composed of a warp and woof, of which the warp is stronger and so far better, having a certain firmness of disposition, but the woof is softer and has "a certain temperance which gives it smoothness." (Cf. Polit. 282 c, 309 b. In the Laws the highest rule is given to the stronger element.) But there is an earlier process to be gone through before this is begun. The state must be purged of all bad elements. Plato thinks worse of human nature than when he hoped that all children under ten years old with a few exceptions would receive the print of the new laws. (Rep. 7, sub. fin.) The purgation of the flock from tainted members must precede all else. If the legislator have supreme power, human kindness need not prevent him from taking the nearest way. Otherwise he may have recourse to the more "euphemious" plan of emigration. (5, 735. Compare with this Polit. 293 d, e, 308 b–d.)

Once more, in applying the ideal which annihilates individual choice to the matter of marriage, this exhortation is made to precede the law. "The man must choose a partner not superior to himself in wealth: and, moreover, he who is conscious of a quick and forward spirit (ἱπαμότερον ἄμα καὶ θάντον τοῦ δέοντος πρὸς πάσας τὰς πράξεις φερόμενον) should seek alliance with a family of gentle blood (κοσμίων πατέρων γένεσθαι κηδεστήμ): and he of the opposite temper should take the opposite course. For each should choose that marriage, not which is most pleasant to him, but which is most expedient for the common weal. Now natural inclination carries men to mate with their likes: the result of which is to accumulate differences both of fortune and character, to the manifest harm of cities. The motive of our injunction is that the state may be like a well-tempered bowl, in which the wine sparkles with maddening heat, but is chastened into smooth mellowness by the sober influence of a different power."
(6, 773.) It would be superfluous to draw out at length the many close resemblances between this passage and p. 310 of the Politicus.

2. The affinities of thought and doctrine, as well as of language, which we have found existing between this dialogue and the Laws, make it probable that the times of their composition were not very far apart: and Socher's objection, that the Politicus agrees neither with the Republic nor with earlier dialogues, is met by the hypothesis that this dialogue is intermediate between the Republic and the Laws. To this, however, it may be again objected, that while the Politicus and its immediate predecessor, the Sophistæs, are amongst the most dialectical of the whole series, the very notion of dialectic in the Platonic sense is absent from the work on which the last years of Plato's life were spent. Nor is this peculiarity of his latest dialogue wholly to be accounted for by the nature of the subject. Although the method of the Republic is less exact than that of the Sophist or Philebus, yet the ideal theory which it contains is professedly made the groundwork of the political fabric, and Dialectic, as the science of ideas, and as the roof and crown of the sciences, which are themselves viewed in their ideal aspect, is described as the indispensable completion of the education of the ruler. Nor yet will this further explanation suffice, that the Laws profess to take a lower ground and starting-point, and to provide only for what is second-best: and that hence, in the education of the νομοφόιλακες, the principles of the highest method are economically withheld. For no one can read the tenth book or the latter part of the seventh book of the Laws without perceiving that here at least the law-giver is enunciating what he conceives to be the highest truths. Yet, while much is said of geometry and astronomy, and of the supremacy of mind, no hint is given, either here or in the previous reference to the Republic and the communion of goods, of any "doctrine of ideas." Notions of astronomy and psychology, more or less definite, asserted with religious warmth, appear to have taken the place of metaphysical inquiry. The exoteric form of the discussion, implying a wish to reconcile philosophy to Greek feeling, is inseparable from the phase of thought which prompted this desire.
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But while nothing is said of the ideas as objects of knowledge, there remain frequent traces of the method of division and combination (διάφρασις, συναγωγή) as pursued in these dialogues. The duty of dividing according to the natural kinds is enforced in the following, amongst other passages: 2, 658 a, μὴ ταχὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον κρίσουμεν, ἀλλὰ διαιροῦσθε αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη σκοπῶμεθα: 6, 751 a, δύο εἶδη ταῦτα περὶ πολιτείας κόσμου γιγνόμενα τυγχάνει: 7, 814 c, δύο μὲν αὐτῆς εἶδη χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι .... καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἔτερα: 10, 895 d, ἔστι που δίχα διαιροῦμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ: 12, 944 b, σχεδὸν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὑπερβολικοῖς ἔχει τινὰ τομὴν ή τούτων τῶν ὑμωμάτων ἑπιφορᾶ, where the phraseology of the Sophists is repeated. Instances of the converse process, by which things apparently diverse are brought under one conception, are 7, 824 a, the description of the various kinds of θηρετική, which has several points of resemblance to these dialogues: 8, 841 c, ἐν γένοις ὅν, περιλαβόν τὰ τρία γένη: 10, 894 b, ὡς ἐν εἴδεσι λαβέων: 12, 944 c, καὶ ὅποι ἁυδέσως νεώς ἡ ἑκὸν τινος, οὕτως ἑντόν τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεόρων ἑπιτόνους, μᾶν ὀξυράς φύσιν διεισπαρμένην, πολλακοὶ πολλοὶ ὀνομάσαι προς-αγορεύονσιν. Much also of the terminology which arose out of the definitions of these dialogues is assumed in various places of the Laws, as has been sufficiently shewn in the General Introduction.

The anomaly which we are considering will appear less wonderful, if we review the course which dialectical inquiry has taken in our two dialogues. The chief result of the Sophists was the transition from a somewhat fanciful ontology to a true psychology, from a transcendental to a logical conception of Being; first as the sum of positive determinations, then as the sum or ideal of true determinations, whether affirmative or negative. We have seen that this conception finds legitimate development in the Politicus in more complex views of knowledge and of the objects of knowledge, which must be seen in various aspects and relations before they are fully known. The true affinities and discrepancies of things are perceived by the higher faculty of the mind, not after a cursory glance at phenomena, but through a laborious process only made possible after long training. Science is the comprehension of these deeper resemblances
and differences: and scientific inquiry is the interrogation of all nature in order to discover what each kind can contribute to the store of universal knowledge. The only passages which remind us of the ontological or transcendental theory of the ideas are the μετριόν φύσις in p. 284, and the contrast between sensible and logical analogies in p. 286 a. Now the former of these is the exact expression of the philosophy which seeks to combine the absolute with the relative, as Plato seeks to combine these in the Philebus; and the latter belongs to the antithesis between the things of mind and of sense, which is nowhere more strongly asserted than in the tenth book of the Laws. Even the ideal standard of τὸ μέτριον is hardly conceived as existing apart from production (284 d, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετριοῦ γένεσιν). Indeed, throughout the dialogue (see also Soph. 245 d) the Eleatic opposition between Being and Becoming, and also between Knowledge and Opinion, appears to be softened, and even here and there obliterated.

There is a sense, therefore, in which it may be truly said that, in these dialogues, metaphysical inquiry has been engaged in "getting rid of metaphysics," i.e. of transcendental ontology. The idea of scientific method takes the place of the mere enthusiastic exaltation of the ideas. That method is still held to be the privilege of a mind fitted by nature and training to discern ideas; to discern them, however, not merely in themselves, but amidst the manifold complexities of the real world.

Hence we need not wonder that in a dialogue later than the Politicus, the notion of an intellectual region, wholly separated from that of appearance and opinion, which stands out so prominently in the Republic, does not reappear.

It is true that the chief interest in the Politicus is dialectical, in the Laws ethical and religious. But this, at all events, may be traced partly to the difference between a speculative and a practical treatise. As Plato himself says of his ideal state, φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἠπτον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι. There is an analogous contrast between the Phaedrus and the Republic. In the infancy of the sciences, the development of a perfect method, and its application to a particular subject-matter, were achievements equally impossible. Practice and theory could not go hand in hand. As the method was necessarily immature
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(though rich in anticipative insight), so it was destined to remain unrealized. Plato often betrays his consciousness of this. He fails to seize “waking” the form which he had pursued “in a dream.” At the same time it is not contended that the Politicus may not have been produced many years before the Leges were begun. In that last dialogue the method of inquiry which, theoretically at least, still rules in the Statesman and Sophist, has given place to what is virtually a method of exposition; and the author’s mind seems in both cases to be wholly possessed by the impulse which is dominant for the time. It is hardly credible that two such different modes of handling the same subject should have reigned simultaneously, and therefore it is best to suppose an interval. But this supposition does not weaken the force of the cumulative arguments by which it has been now sought to determine approximately the relative position of this dialogue amongst the writings of Plato. And in the occasional abruptness and absence of connexion in the Politicus there are not wanting symptoms of the approaching loss of dialectical as well as of artistic freshness and power.

VII. References to the Politicus in Aristotle.

μὲν τοῖνυν . . . . ἀρχεύν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι (cf. Polit. 301 d). It is true that, considering the common atmosphere of philosophical debate which surrounded both writers, these resemblances do not amount to proof; but they render it probable that Aristotle had read the dialogue and was familiar with some of its contents. Hence it is the more strange that in the one place in which he appears to refer directly to the Politicus, he not only omits the author’s name (this would be no new phenomenon), but gives him the vague designation τις τῶν πρῶτων, “one of those who have preceded me.” The passage occurs in the second chapter of Book IV, where the question is raised, which of the declensions (παρεκβάσεις) from the true forms of government is the least bad? and is as follows: μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. Ἡδή μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρῶτων οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταῦτα βλέψας ἥμων ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρυον, πασῶν μὲν οὖσών ἐπεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρότερη δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἄριστην. The superficial relevancy of this to Polit. 303 a, b is sufficiently obvious. We may notice, however, that, as usual with him in quoting Plato, Aristotle has forgotten the connexion. Plato condemns as strongly as Aristotle all the forms of government here mentioned. With him also it is a question not of good and bad, but of degrees of badness: τις—τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἢκιστα χαλεπῆ συζην, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὖσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη;—and it may be that Aristotle’s three “right forms” would have fared no better at his hands. The word ἐπεικῶν, which Aristotle attributes to him, is not used at all; the nearest approach to such an expression is κοσμίων, which is explained by νομίμων, and is probably used, as μετριωτάτην is used by Aristotle, in order to avoid a word implying positive excellence. For when monarchy is said to be ἄριστη τῶν ἔξι, and democracy παρανόμων βελτίστη, this is only in the same relative sense in which Aristotle uses the words φαύλων ἄριστην. Indeed, were Aristotle’s representation true, the two philosophers would be more nearly at accord: for democracy would then be described by Plato as the least bad of three bad forms, each of which is (in this case) the declension from a species of right government. This kind of inaccuracy is too common to afford any ground for the conjecture that Aristotle is not referring to the Politicus, but
to some other writing or utterance of a previous thinker, but it lessens the wonder which is naturally excited by the careless vagueness of the expression "some one in former time."

When we consider how much more Aristotle seems to have relied on the living tradition of Plato's school than on his writings for the opinions of Plato; how lax he is in quotation generally, attributing to Circe the words of Ulysses to his pilot, and the like; how impersonal he is; how seldom he names Plato, though often alluding to him; when we remember that in all his writings there is no distinct reference to such a noticeable work as the Parmenides, we need hardly be surprised if, at the moment of writing these lines, he was not clearly aware which of all the previous speculators on the subject of politics had pronounced this opinion. It would be easy to indulge in further conjecture, but it is needless. The anomaly remains. The fact is singular, though not unaccountable. But, if what has been said in these pages has any force, this would indeed be slender evidence on which to question the genuineness of the Statesman. This dialogue is fastened by too many threads of contrast, as well as of resemblance, to the place which has been now assigned it in the Platonic canon, to be dropped from thence by the mere negligence of Plato's younger contemporary.

VIII. The "Philosopher" dialogue.

The "Statesman" contains a sketch of the real as well of the counterfeit ruler. The "Sophist" was mainly occupied in proving the existence of a counterfeit of the philosopher. The last and (according to the "geometrical" proportion indicated in Polit. sub. init.) by far the greatest part of the Stranger's

This view is, however, worth considering, and is somewhat favoured by the expression τίς τῶν πρωτέρων. In this case, Plato might be included in ἡμῶν, and Aristotle might, as in so many other instances, be merely repeating a doctrine of his master's.

I cannot think that Ueberweg has made out the theory which he advances in connexion with this question, viz., that when in a quotation of Plato Aristotle uses the past tense he always alludes to a spoken utterance.
task remains: viz. the definition of the true philosopher. That Plato intended to complete this series with a dialogue in which the Eleatic Stranger and Theætetus should be the interlocutors and Socrates the listener appears from the opening sentences of the "Statesman" compared with Soph. 217 a, 231 a(?), 253 e, 254 b: although in the two last-named passages it is possible after the fact to detect a tone of hesitation (ἐὰν ἐτῶμεν, ἀν ἐτι βουλομένως ἡμῶν ἃ). No such dialogue, however, and no mention of such a dialogue is extant, and it is next to impossible that a picture of the ideal philosopher, drawn by Plato's hand, should never have received a passing notice in all literature. But it has been supposed that although not literally fulfilled, the intention here expressed may have been carried out by Plato in a different way. It was the opinion of Schleiermacher that in the Symposium and Phædo the promised portrait of the philosopher is given to us in the person of Socrates. It is unnecessary to refute at length a supposition so gratuitous. The reader of the preceding pages will perhaps be satisfied with the remark, that even were the withdrawal of the person of Socrates of no significance, and could the artistic freshness of Plato's literary prime be recalled at will, we cannot suppose that after writing the Sophists, he would have returned to the phase of the ideal theory which is implied in Symp. 211 e, d, or in Phædo 75, 100. More plausible but not less baseless is the opinion of Stallbaum, who finds the missing dialogue in the Parmenides. If it were necessary to make the hypothesis at all, there is no dialogue which could more fitly be drawn into this group. It contains a criticism and modification of Eleatic doctrine which presents many analogies to the Sophists, and if, as the Politicus teaches, human things are only worth studying for the sake of dialectical improvement, no better training than that given in the Parmenides could be desired. Yet this is regarded by the speaker as a preparatory exercise, and the result is negative merely. The Parmenides is destructive in the same sense in which the Theætetus is destructive. Now it is very improbable that after giving a definition of the Sophist and the Statesman with which the speakers appear satisfied, Plato would have added to these a sceptical solution of the problem, "What is the philosopher?" Some
glimpses of a positive answer to this question are in fact afforded us in Soph. 230, 253-4. I am inclined to think, as has been hinted in the Introduction to the Sophist, that the most natural place for the Parmenides is between the Theætetus and the Sophistes: and, at all events, that the difficulties respecting the coexistence of the ideas with phenomena, of the One with the Many, probably preceded the solutions of these and cognate difficulties in the Philebus and Sophist.

It may therefore be concluded that Plato's "Philosopher," like Bacon's sixth book of his Instauratio, was never written. It is idle to conjecture what, if written, it would have contained. But we may be sure that a truer conception of its intended scope may be gathered from the few brief hints given in these dialogues than from the Symposium, Phædo, or Parmenides.

The chief problem which these hints suggest to us is the nature of Being, conceived as the true combination and separation of ideas (Soph. 254). Plato perhaps intended to draw out at length the notion of dialectic, as he has briefly sketched this in Soph. 253 d, 259 c, d, Polit. 285 a-c. He clearly implies that it would be necessary in order to this end to establish an idea of order or fitness (τὸ μέτρον). And other metaphysical conceptions would doubtless have emerged in the attempt to determine that, which Plato felt to have so often escaped him, a perfect method (πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰκριβῆς ἐπιθεῖσθι—Polit. 284 e). That this endeavour would have occupied the main portion of the dialogue there can be little doubt, and perhaps as little that the arid wastes of abstract discussion would have been relieved by passages of luxuriant beauty, in which the glory of the Philosopher (now finally distinguished from the Sophist and Statesman, in whose likeness he had often appeared) would have been fully declared, and the life which surveys from on high the lives of men (Soph. 216), conversing with every creature to learn what each has to tell of wisdom (Polit. 272 e), would have been stripped of all ironical disguise and revealed in true proportions to the discerning spirit.

Even these scanty indications of the intended scope of the Philosopher perhaps betray one cause why such a dialogue was
never written. To elaborate a perfect method of knowledge
in the infancy of science was impossible, and it may be that
Plato felt it to be impossible. Nor does it seem as if in any
age the mind of Plato could have found completeness or repose.
The ideal of science

... "is an arch, wherethro' 
Gleams the untravelled world, whose margin fades
For ever."

And if our hypothesis of the comparatively late origin of
these dialogues is correct, the non-appearance of the Philo-
sopher coincides with and renders more significant the aban-
donment of metaphysical inquiry in the Laws.

s "Res et supra vires et ulter spes nostras collocata."—Bacon.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΞΕΝΟΣ,
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ Ο ΝΕΩΤΕΡΟΣ.

257. Ἡ πολλὴν χάριν ὅφείλω σοι τῆς Θεατήτου γνωρί-5
σεως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου.

ΘΕΟ. Τάχα δὲ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅφειλήσεις ταύ-
της τριπλασίαν, ἐπειδὰν τὸν τε πολιτικὸν ἀπεργά-
σουταί σοι καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον.

ΣΩ. Εἶνεν οὖτω τούτο, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, φήσομεν 10
ἀκηκόατες εἶναι τοῦ περὶ λογισμούς καὶ τὰ γεωμε-
τρικὰ κρατίστου;

5. Ἡ—ξένου] "I owe you a thousand thanks, Theodorus, both for the acquaintance I have made with Theaetetus and with the Stranger," τῆς Θεατή-
του ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

5. ἡ—ξένου] "I owe you a thousand thanks, Theodorus, both for the acquaintance I have made with Theaetetus and with the Stranger," τῆς Θεατή-
tου ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

7. Ἡ—ξένου] "I owe you a thousand thanks, Theodorus, both for the acquaintance I have made with Theaetetus and with the Stranger," τῆς Θεατή-
tου ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

7. Ἡ—ξένου] "I owe you a thousand thanks, Theodorus, both for the acquaintance I have made with Theaetetus and with the Stranger," τῆς Θεατή-
tου ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

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tου ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

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tου ἵμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. Theæt. 145 c, d, Soph. 216.

Only a third part of our task is done: nay, not a third, for the States-
man rises above the Sophist in value and into the calculation. This helps
to confirm the hypothesis that there was a considerable inter-
val between the composition of
the Theaetetus and that of the
Sophist. But perhaps it is
only natural that the speakers
should not refer immediately
to the conversation of the pre-
vious day. Cf. infr. 258 a.

11. ἀκηκόατες εἶναι] The more
frequent use of the auxiliary
verb has been already noticed
as a peculiarity of Plato's later
style.
the Philosopher above the Statesman in more than a geometrical ratio.

2. Τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἕκαστον *θέντοις τῆς ἕσης ᾑξίας, οἳ τῇ τιμῇ πλέον ᾧ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν τῆς ύμετέρας τέχνης.

5 ΘΕΟ. Εἴδε γε νῇ τὸν ἡμέτερον θεόν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν Ἁμμωνα, καὶ δικαίως, καὶ πάνυ μὲν οὖν μημονικῶς ἐπέπληξας μοι τὸ περὶ τούς λογισμοὺς ἀμάρτημα. καὶ σὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τούτων εἰσώθης μέτειμι· σὺ δ' ἡμῖν, ὁ Ἑένε, μηδαμῶς ἀποκάμης χαριζόμενος, ἀλλ' ἑξῆς, ἐίτε τὸν πολιτικὸν ἀνδρα πρότερον εἴτε τὸν εἰς ἐν κυτλόσφον προαιρεῖ, προελομένως διέξελθε. ἘΕ. Ταὐτ', ὁ Θεόδωρος, ποιητέων ἐπείτερ ἀπαξ γε ἐγκεχειρήκαμεν, οὐκ ἀποστατέων πρίν ἄν αὐτῶν

 contribute to the discussion of the text with a clear and readable format.
It is time that Theactetus should be relieved; and his companion, the younger Socrates, who has hitherto been a silent listener, is now encouraged by his elder namesake to converse with the Stranger.

use of αὐτὰ without a distinct antecedent in Thucydides.

4. Διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτῶν] “Shall we relieve him for awhile, by taking his comrade Socrates here instead?” Either Theactetus was to be the respondent in the “Philosophus,” which is probable enough, or else here receives something of the meaning which it has in διαδέχομαι, “in turn.”

5. Συγγνώμαστήρι] Theact. 144 e: ἄν δ’ ἀρα τι τοιούτον γένηται (sc. τῷ μὴ κινεῖ πονῶν ἄχθωμα) καὶ τότε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τῶν Σωκράτων μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτατη καὶ συγγνώμαστήρι, ᾧ συγνώμαστιν μετ’ ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄδησε. The word here, like πάντα πόνον below, implies mental as well as bodily labour. Cf. Rep. 6, 498 b: προϊόνοις δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐν ᾗ ἡ φυσική τελειοθεία ἀρχετα, ἐπιπεινεῖ τὰ ἐκεῖνη γυμνάσια.

7. νέο γὰρ ὅπτε] We perceive in Theodorus something of the consciousness of the contrast between youth and age, which appears also in the Eleatic and in the Athenian Stranger in the Laws. Cf. Theact. 146 b, 162 b.

9. ποθὲν] “From some cause or other,” “in some respect.”

10. τῶν μὲν γε — οἰκείοτητα] There is a sort of humour in the conscious technicality of the language, (φύσιν—φαίνεσθαι —κλήσις—ὁμώνυμος—πρόσφροσις —οἰκείοτητα,) which also reminds us that we are engaged in dialectic.

11. ὁμώνιον ἐμοὶ] Theact. 143 e.

12. ἡμῖν] The plural gives a more courteous turn to the expression. The dative, although governed by ὁμώνυμος—οἰκείοτητα, has something of an ethical force. Cf. Soph. 216 e.

14. διὰ λόγων] “By means of
πρέων. Θεατήτωρ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς τε συνέμεμφα χθές p. 257,
dιὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα ἀποκριναμένου, Σωκράτους
dὲ οὖν δέτερα: δεὶ δὲ σκέψασθαι καὶ τούτον. ἐμοὶ μὲν
οὖν εἰσαύθις, σοὶ δὲ νῦν ἀποκρινέσθω.

5 ΞΕ. Ταύτ' ἔσται. Ἡ Σώκρατες, ἀκούεις δὴ
Σωκράτους;

ΝΕΟΣ ΣΩ. Ναὶ.

ΞΕ. Συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

10 ΞΕ. Οὐ τὰ σὰ κωλύειν φαίνεται, δεὶ δὲ ἵσως ἔτι
ηττον τάμα διακωλύειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μετὰ τὸν σοφι-
στὴν ἀναγκαίον, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν πολιτικὸν
ἀνδρὰ διαξύγειν νῦν. καὶ μοι λέγε, πότερον τῶν
ἐπιστημόνων τῶν ἢμῖν καὶ τούτον θετέον, ἡ πῶς;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀρὰ διαληπτέον, ὡσπερ ἤνικα
tῶν πρότερον ἐσκοποίμεν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν.

ΞΕ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ κατὰ ταυτὸν γε, ὁ Σώκρατες,

φαίνεται μοι τμῆμα.

The latter
at once re-
sumes the
leadership
of the dis-
cussion, and
prescribes
the States-
man rather
than the
Philoso-
pher for
the next
subject of
definition.

The States-
man, also,
like the
Sophist, is
a man of
art, and the
arts and
sciences
must be
again di-
vided.

argument," i.e. as to their men-
Socrates here shews the same
urbanity as in the opening of
the Theetetus and Sophist.
Compare with the structure of
the sentence and the introd-
cution of the minor premiss with
δὴ (δεὶ δὴ) Theet. 143 d: σοὶ
δὴ οὖκ ἔλεγοντοι πλησιάζουνι—
ei δὴ οὖν—ᾗδεισ ὲν πνεούμην.
And for γε, resuming what has
been already said, cf. infr. 260 ε, λεπτά

12. τῶν πολιτικῶν] Bodl. Δ, pr.
Π, πολιτικῶν τῶν. This illustrates
a frequent source of corrup-
tion in MSS., the inversion of
the order of words.

14. The requirement that the
king shall be ἐπιστήμων τινὸς,
the possessor of a perfect
science, is upheld throughout
the dialogue, and hence the
definition of the king excludes
all the actual rulers of existing
communities. The question in
the text is asked not without
ironical allusion to this "crowd
of satyrs and centaurs" (infr.
303 c), whose art, like that of
the Sophist, proves to be a
mere sham.

καὶ τούτον] "As well as
the angler (Soph. 219 a) and the Sophist (lb. 221 e)."
1. Τί μήν] "What then?"
This less frequent signification of τί μήν probably contains the explanation of the general use to signify assent. "What else?"
2. = "surely." Cf. Parm. 139 d: "Оτι ούκ επειδήν ταύτων γενήται τό τι, ἐν γίγνεται. 'Αλλά τί μήν; κ.τ.λ. Theet. 142 a : ποῦ μήν; 4. ἀρταποῦν] The Stranger recurs to the metaphor which he employed in Soph. 222 a. This appears clearly from the word ἐκτροπαίας, which recalls ἐκτρέψεων (l.c.) Compare Phaedo 63b: Κινούντει τω ὁπερ ἀρταπός τις ἡμᾶς ἑκάστων ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The art is identified with the method of finding the art.
7. ταίς ἄλλαις ἐκτροπαίαι — ποίησαι] This is an application of the lesson learnt in the previous dialogue, that for every positive conception there is a corresponding negative expression not signifying the opposite, but including all that is other than the positive notion. See esp. Soph. 257 e : ἀλλ’ τι τῶν ὠντων τωδ’ γένους ἀφομισθεὶν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὠντων πάλιν ἀντιτεθέν οὕτω συμβαίνει εἶναι τι τὸ μή καλὸν; The mind is here viewed as giving her impress to objects, and not as receiving impressions from them (contrast with this the image of the waxen block in the Theaetetus). Similar language occurs in Phaedo 75 d : περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφυραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὁ ἐστίν. Cf. also Soph. 253 d.
8. ὡς σύσας διὸ εἰδῆ] As constituting two classes or kinds.
12. καὶ σῶν] I. e, You must make the distinction your own, go through the process for yourself. In his more systematic dialogues Plato still insists on the importance of the learner’s following every step of an inquiry.
stamping them with a single negative form. The theory of numbers is an example of a class of sciences, in which knowledge is wholly separable from action. Whereas in carpentry and other handicrafts, knowledge is bound up with

2. ἄριθμητική μὲν — ἐνοῦν] This in modern language is the distinction between science and art. Cf. Phileb. 56, 57.

3. ψιλαὶ τῶν πράξεων] "Disengaged from practice," i.e. abstract. The same word is used, infr. 299 ε, to distinguish "pure arithmetic" from geometry and astronomy. ἄριθμητική (the theory of numbers, not arithmetic in the modern sense, which more nearly answers to λογιστική) is always spoken of by Greek philosophers as the most abstract of the mathematical sciences. E.g. Ar. Met. I. 2: αἱ ἐκ ἐλατών — τῶν ἐκ προσβέσεως, ὡσπερ ἄριθμητική γεωμετρία. Again, in Theaet. 165 a Dialectics are opposed, as ψιλοὶ λόγοι, "mere abstraction," to mathematics generally.


6. Ἀι δὲ γε — κέκτηται] "But in the case of carpentry and the sister arts, and of every handicraft, the knowledge is as it were merged or inherent in the operations; and they assist in perfecting the structures which result from them." Note the expression αἱ (τέχναι) ἐπιστήμην κέκτηται. By a fusion of abstract and concrete common in these dialogues, the attributes of the artist are attached to the art. Cf. Phileb. 41 ε: εἰ τὸ βούλημα — βούλεται.

8. συναπτολογίσεις] Sc. σὺν ταῖς πράξεωι. ὑπ' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν πράξεων.

9. γεγονόμενα — προτέρου ὅκι ὄντα] Whereas the objects of the abstract sciences are never produced, but exist always.

12. τὴν μὲν] Sc. ἐπιστήμην, i.e. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴδος. This helps the transition to the singular ἐπιστήμης in what follows.
3. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] This question is closely connected with the one in hand. If government is an abstract science, then the conditions under which it is exercised cannot alter the principles of government: and, conversely, if the principles are thus altered, it is not an abstract science.

4. καί ἐτ' οἰκονόμον] ἐτι marks that this is an extreme step.

5. δήσομεν — προσαγορεύοντες] The participle, although required to balance the clause after the introduction of πάντα ταύτα, is redundant, as in ἐφη λέγον.

6. Μᾶλλον δὲ μοι δεύρῳ ἔτουν] This is a natural touch. The Stranger feels that the question has been put too abstrusely for his young respondent.


10. ἀρ' οὐκ] "Is it not inevitable that he should have the same professional designation with the man whom he advises?" τοῦτο μα ρὲς τῆς τέχνης (cogn. accus. after προσαγορευόνται) is added for the sake of greater precision. It appears from the Gorgias, p. 455 b, compared with Xen. Mem. IV. 2, 5, that certain public medical officers were appointed by the ecclesia of Athens. Stallbaum thinks that these are meant by the δημοσιευόντες and immediately assists production. Science, then, is either practical or theoretical. To which branch does the Statesman belong? Or, let us first ask, Are Statesman, King, Master, Householder, the same or different in respect of science? One who is competent
to advise a physician deserves the name of Physician, whether he practises or not. So one who can advise a king, though he may hold a private station, is a king in knowledge. Hence the Statesman is a king.

imairov, but it seems more probable that the distinction meant here and in Gorg. 514 d is simply that between one who practises and one who does not practise as a physician — the professional and the amateur. This is quite sufficient for the requirements of the argument. For the form of expression, cf. Gorg. 474 e: τί δὲ δῆ αἰσχρόν; πότερον κ.τ.λ.

5. ἦ γε] Sc, ἐπιστήμη.

8. Τάυτην δὲ ὁ κεκτημένος] Note the emphatic position of τάυτην.

9. τυγχάνῃ is emphatic: "Whether it be his fortune to rule or to enjoy a private station."

κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτῆς] Compare the distinction in Republic B. I, between the ruler so-called, and the essential ruler: esp. 1, 345 c.

10. βασιλικός] "Fit for sovereignty," whether actually sovereign or not.

14. μεγάλης—διοίκησε] The Politics of Aristotle (I. 1.) open with a criticism of this saying, in which it may be observed that the limitation expressed in the words πρὸς ἀρχὴν is overlooked. The difference of view, however, is real and characteristic. As in defining the Good in the Republic, Plato refers all to a single principle, while Aristotle holds that the idea of Good is different in different things; so in the present case, while Plato asserts that the idea of Government must be the same in the case of a house and a city, Aristotle contends that a house is essentially different from a city, because composed of different elements (the in-
dividual being the unit of the family, and the family of the state), and hence the science of the management of each must be different also. They may be compared analogically, but must be carefully distinguished. The point is illustrative of the difference between the Platonistic and the Aristotelian oίσια,—the former tending towards an abstract unity, the latter towards concrete definiteness and reality. Cf. Ar. Pol. III. 9. The Platonic view had a germ in Socrates. See Xen. Mem. III. 4, 12: ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἑπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. Cf. Logg. 3, 681: μίαν οἰκίαν κοίνην καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελούτες. Pth. 1, 626 ε, 690 α; [Erast. 138 ε.] Memo 73 α; Rep. 9, 578 d.

And he who rules his own house well has the same art of government which the Statesman has. Therefore these forms of art or science differ only in name. And it is clear, at all events, that the royal function is a work of mind. Kingcraft, or Statecraft, then, is a theoretical science.
NE. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Τὴν ἄρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικῶν εἰς ταύταν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐξωθίσομεν;

5 NE. ΞΩ. Δῆλον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν πορευόμεθ' ἀν ἐξῆς, εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν γνωστικὴν διοριζόμεθα;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Πρόσεχε δή τὸν νοῦν, ἂν ἄρα ἐν αὐτῇ τινὰ διαφύνη κατανοῆσομεν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φράζε ποιάν.

ΞΕ. Τοιάνδε. λογιστικὴ ποὺ τις ἡμῖν ἴν τέχυν. ε

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναὶ.

ΞΕ. Τῶν γνωστικῶν γε, οἴμαι, παντάπασι τε...

Now theoretical science is not one entire and perfect chrysolite, but divides into Critical and Commanding.

2. Τὴν ἄρα—ἐξωθίσομεν] Because kingcraft depends entirely on knowledge (supra c, ἄλλα μήν — ρώμην), and, in point of the knowledge required, these arts have been shewn to be the same, supra a, b. There is a slight inexactness in πάντα ταῦτα being used for two things (πολιτική and βασιλική). This is perhaps due to the same phrase having occurred above, where more than two arts were enumerated, p. 258 e.

10. διαφύνη] “Any natural parting or cleft.” The word is used literally in Phaedo 98 c for the ligaments between the bones of the human body: τὰ δόστα ἑκεί διαφύναι χωρίς ἂν ἀλλιώλων. Every conceivable image is employed to express the “lines and veins” of nature, which are the ground of true logical distinctions. Cf. Soph. 229 b, τομῆν: ib. 268 e, δι-πλούν. The present image corresponds with the language of Phaedr. 265 e: τέμνειν — κατ’ ἄρθρα κ. τ. λ. See also ibid. 268 a: έι καί σοι φαίνεται διεστηκός αὐτῶν τὸ ἱτριον, ὅσπερ ἐμοὶ. Most MSS. have δια-φυνην.

12. ἦν] The past tense implies no reference to any former passage, but is only the common form of allusion to a familiar fact. λογιστική is instanced instead of ἀριθμητική for the sake of variety. The distinction here introduced by Plato is applied in Ar. Eth. VI. 10, § 2, where wisdom is distinguished from intelligence: ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρό-νησις ἐπιστατική ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ σύν-εσις κριτικὴ μόνον.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

ο. 259.  ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;  
ΞΕ. Γνωσθῇ δὲ λογιστικῇ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς διαφορὰν μῶν τι πλέον ἔργον δώσομεν ἢ τὰ γνωσθέντα κρίναι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;
ΞΕ. Καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικὸς, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Παρεχόμενός γε ποι γνῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὔτος.

ο. 260.  ΞΕ. Δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν ἄν λέγοιτο τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐπιστήμης.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τούτῳ δὲ γε, οἷμαι, προσήκει κρίναντι μή 15 τέλος ἔχειν μηδ' ἀπηλλάχθαι, καθάπερ ὁ λογιστὴς ἀπῆλλακτο, προστάτευν δὲ ἐκάστους τῶν ἐργατῶν τὸ γε πρόσφορον, ἐως ἄν ἀπεργάσωμαι τὸ προσταχθεῖν.

2. Γνωσθῇ δὲ λογιστικῇ] "But when arithmetic has discerned the differences amongst numbers, shall we give her any further office than to judge of that which she has discerned?"

Ανς. "How should we?" (τί μήν;)  

6. Καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς κ.τ.λ.] τί μήν expresses surprise that the question should have been asked. An example which justifies the question is, therefore, introduced with γὰρ. "I asked because there are branches of theoretical knowledge which do not end in theory." There may seem at first sight to be a confusion in classing the master-carpenter under γνωστικῆ, when carpentry has been placed amongst the practical sciences. But this helps to shew that the "commanding sciences," although independent of practice, yet have an immediate relation to the practical.

18. το γε πρόσφορον] He is not wholly engaged in directing his workmen, nor does he impart all his knowledge to each of them, but he must direct each in so far as is required for the particular work appointed them. This limitation is expressed by γε.

* C 2

Arithmetic, for instance, is purely critical: the Master Builder, on the other hand, while his business is theory and not practice, must superintend the application of his theory.
NE. ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς.
ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν γνωστικὰ μὲν αὐτὲς τοιαύτα ἔμπασαι καὶ ὑπόσαι ἤνεπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἄλληλοιν τούτῳ τῷ b 5 γένεσθαι;
NE. ΣΩ. Φαίνεσθαι.
ΞΕ. 'Αρ' οὖν συμπάθης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαφοροῦμεν προ- σεῖτομεν, ἐμμελῶς ἀν φαίμεν διηρήσθαι;
10 NE. ΣΩ. Κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.
ΞΕ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῖς γε κοινῇ τι πράττονσιν ἀγα- πητὸν ὅμοιον. 
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 
ΞΕ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν μέχριτερ ἄν αὐτοὶ κοινω- νόμεν, ἐπέτειν τά γε τῶν ἄλλων δοξάσματα χαίρειν.
NE. ΣΩ. Τί μὴν; 
ΞΕ. Φέρε δ' ἡ, ταύται ταῖν τέχναι ἡμῖν τῶν βαι- σιλικῶν ἐν ποτέρα θετέοι; ἃρ' ἐν τῇ κριτικῇ, καθα-
5. γένεις] The open form is probably retained to distin-
guish the dual from the plural 
7. τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, 
tὸ δὲ κριτικόν] Ar. Pol. IV. 12 : 
Μάλιστα δὲ, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰς ἔνα, 
ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσοι ἀπο-
δέδοται βουλεύσασθαι τε περὶ τε-
νόν καὶ κέρναν καὶ ἐπιτάξει καὶ 
mάλιστα τούτο, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττων 
ἀρχικώτερον ἑστίν. Πτλ. VII. 5 : 
ἀρχαίον τ' ἐπιτάξει καὶ κρίσις ἑστίν.
11. Ἀλλὰ μὴν—χαίρειν] The 
maxim is appropriately bor-
rowed from political science 
(for ὁμόνοια is πολιτικὴ φιλία) 
in order to assert the indepen-
dence of the dialectical reason. 
The same thing is meant as in 
Gorgias 472 b, Protag. 331 c, 
348 a. 
19. καθάπερ τωδὲ ἑστῆν] Plato 
recurs to the image of the 
theatre, which he employed in 
Theet. 173 c : οὐδὲ ἑστῆς, ὅσ-
περ ποιησάς. 
The notion of ἐπιτακτικὴ 
may be compared with Kant's 
imperative of the reason: an 
ideal which has immediate re-
ference to life. In Socrates, 
philosophy becomes practical 
without losing anything of the 
speculative impulse.
260. Περ τινὰ θεατὴν; ἦ μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς ὄντα αὐτῶν τέχνης θήσομεν, δεισπόζοντά γε;  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον;  
ΞΕ. Τὴν ἐπιτακτικὴν δὴ τέχνην πάλιν ἢν εἰηθεατέον εἰ πη διέστηκε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τηδέ πη, καθα-  
περ ἡ τῶν κατῆλων τέχνη τῆς τῶν αὐτοπωλῶν διώ-  
δι τοῦ τῶν κηρύκων γένος ἐνεκεν ἀπὸ  
τοῦ τῶν κηρύκων γένους ἀφωρίσθαι.  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;  
ΞΕ. Πωληθέντα ποιν πρότερον ἔργα ἀλλότρια παραδεχόμενοι δεύτερον πωλοῦσι πάλιν οἱ κάπηλοι.  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνι μὲν οὖν.  
ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ κηρυκίων φύλου ἐπιταχθὲν ἀλλότρια νόμματα παραδεχόμενον αὐτὸ δεύτερον ἐπι-  
tάττει πάλιν ἐτέροις.  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.  
ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; εἰς ταῦτὰ μᾶζομεν βασιλικὴν ἐρμη-  
evutikή, κελευστική, μαντική, κηρυκική καὶ πολλαῖς  
2. δεισπόζοντά γε] As the word ruler implies. Cf. Soph.  
221 ἃ ὁ παντὸς δει τοιούτον εἰναι το γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων.  
5. τηδέ πη] Sc. διεστηκέναι.  
The clause καθάπερ—ὑφορίσθαι is in apposition with (or explains) τηδέ πη διεστηκέναι, and the notion of δοκεῖ is resumed in δοκεῖν.  
6. αὐτοπώλων] 9 MSS. have αὐτοπώλων.  
13. Οὐκοῦν — ἐτέροις] The change from ἐπιταχθὲν ταλλότρια to ἐπιταχθὲν ἀλλότρια is so slight and so necessary as hardly to deserve notice were not the former received by Bekker and defended by Stall- 
baum. The plural ἐπιταχθὲντα and the absence of the article are both required by the parallelism to πωληθέντα—ἀλλότρια in the previous sentence. αὐτὸ is not pleonastic but emphatic. "The heralds themselves give orders in their turn."  
17. μῆζομεν] Bodl. ΔΠ. Φ. Bekk. Τυρ. μῆζομεν. The other MSS. and edd. have μῆζομεν. The point can hardly be determined, and the change either way is extremely slight. With Stallbaum, I am inclined to prefer μῆζομεν, as more distinctly pointing to a negative answer.
king from
the herald,
the inter-
preter, the
prophet,
and others
whose duty
it may
often be to
issue com-
mands.

The order is
rivals

The phraseology
reappears in
Legg. 11, 944 b: ἐχει τινα τομήν ἢ
toútwv tóv ómòtwv évπηικούσαν

The order is
rivals

Since

Either “to divide,
if we can find a line of
section:” or, perhaps better, “to
divide, and see whether we
can find a line of section.”

This

Cf. Supr. p. 259

Cf. Soph. 267 b, Prot. 336 c.

Cf. Tim. 62 b:

Cf. Supr. p. 259

Cf. Tim. 62 b:
"ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν φανώμεθα ἐχεἰν ἀλλ’ ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμεν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πη; 
ΕΕ. Πάντας ὁπόσους ἂν ἀρχοντας διανοηθῶμεν ἐπιτάξει προσχωμένους, ἃρ’ οὕχ εὐρήσομεν γενέσεως 5 

τινος ἐνεκα προστάττοντας;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῆ; 
ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε γιγνόμενα πάντα δίχα δια- 

λαβεῖν οὐ παντάπασι χαλέπον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Τοῦτοις δὲ γε αὐτοῖς τὸ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ μέρους 

ἐπιτακτικὸν ὄν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα τέμνειν, τεμοῦμεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κατὰ τί;

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄψυχων γενέσεσιν αὖ- 

c τοῦ τάσσοντες, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐμψυχών. καὶ πάν 

οὕτως Ἰδὴ διαιρήσεται δίχα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γε.

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν αὐτῶν παραλίπωμεν, τὸ δ’ 

ἀναλάβομεν, ἀναλάβοντες δὲ μερισώμεθα ἐἰς δύο τὸ 

σύμπαν.

1. ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμεν] “Follow and divide with me.” Cf. Soph. 228 c.

5. γενέσεως τινος ἐνεκα] “For the sake of some production.” The word γίνεσις in Plato’s later dialogues acquires a wide generality of meaning. Compare the following passages: Soph. 235 e; Polit. 282 d, 283 d, 284 c; Phileb. 26 d, 27 a; Tim. 29 d; Legg. 10, 889 a, 892 c, 11, 920 c.


17. Τὸ μὲν—αὐτοῦ] “The one segment of it” (τοῦ τῆς γνω- 

στικῆς μέρους ἐπιτακτικοῦ).

18. ταῖς τῶν ἐμψυχῶν] Sc. γε- 

νέσεσι. “The processes which affect living creatures.”

22. τὸ σύμπαν] Epexegetic in apposition with τὸ δέ.
NE. ΣΩ. Δέγεις δ' αὐτῶν ἀναληπτέων εἶναι πό- p. 26 τέρον;

ΞΕ. Πάντως ποι犯 τό περὶ τὰ ζώα ἐπιτακτικὸν. οὖ γάρ δὴ τὸ γε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ ποτε 5τῶν ἄρχικων ἐπιστατοῦν, οἶνον ἀρχιτεκτονικὸν, ἀλλὰ γενναῖότερον, ἐν τοῖς ζώοις καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὴν δύναμιν ἀεὶ κεκτημένον.

NE. ΣΩ. 'Ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Τὴν γε μὴ τῶν ζώων γένεσιν καὶ τροφῆν 10τὴν μὲν τις ἄν ἰδοι μονοτροφίαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κοινὴν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄγελαις θρεμμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν.

NE. ΣΩ. 'Ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' οὖ μὴ τῶν γε πολιτικῶν εὐρήσωμεν ἰδιοτρόφον, ὄσπερ βοηλάτην ἥ τινα ἱπποκόμον, ἀλλ' 15ἰπποφορβῶ τε καὶ βουφορβῷ μᾶλλον προσεικοτά.

NE. ΣΩ. Φαινεῖται γε δὴ ῥηθὲν νῦν.

ΞΕ. Πότερον οὖν τῆς ἡωτροφίας τὴν τῶν ξυμ-επόλλων κοινὴν τροφῆν ἄγελαυτροφίαν ἣ κοινοτροφι-κὴν τινα ὁνομάζωμεν;

NE. ΣΩ. 'Οπότερον ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμβαίνῃ.

ΞΕ. Καλὸς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες: κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ 20μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ

9. γένεσιν καὶ τροφῆν] The ambiguity of the word γένεσιν helps to conceal the error of confusing the king with the shepherd, which affords so much matter for discussion in what follows.

14. βοηλάτην] One who drives an ox: as, for instance, in ploughing.


21. τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι] Plato frequently dwells on the danger of being imposed on in philosophy by words; and alludes to the vitiating effect which a love of verbal distinction had on his contemporaries. Cf. e.g. Theat. 166 b, 177 e, 184 e; Soph. 218 e; Rep. 5, 454 a.

22. πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆς] Unlike the ὀψιμαθεῖς of Soph.
261. γήρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μέν, καθάπερ διακελεύει, ποιήτεοι τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν ἄρ’ ἐννοεῖς τῇ τις διδύμου ἀποφήμα τὸ ξητούμενον. 262. νοῦν ἐν διπλασίοις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Προβυμήσομαι. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὐθηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.

ΞΕ. Παντάπασι’ γε προβυμότατα καὶ ἀνθρείότατα δηύρησαι. μή μέντοι τούτῳ γε εἰσαύθησι κατὰ δύναμιν πάσχωμεν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἐν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἀμα εἴδος ἐχέτω. κάλλιστον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ξητούμενον, ἐν ὅρθως 251 b, who are perhaps thought of here. Cf. Phaedr. sub. fin.: πλοῦσιον δὲ νομίζομι τὸν σοφόν.

2. ἀγελαιοτροφικη ὢ. He again varies the word in accordance with the preceding remark. “Do you perceive a way in which, by shewing the art of herding to be twofold, one may cause what is now sought amongst twice the number of things to be then sought amongst half that number?” τοῖς ἡμ. the half, i. e. of the double number.

4. διπλασίοις ὢ. So H. Most MSS. have διπλασίοις ὢ (Bodl. ὡ). The Ionic form of the dative plural (which occurs again infra. 304 e) is one of the many coincidences in point of language between this dialogue and the Laws.

* D

14. τὸ μέρος ἀμα εἴδος ἐχέτω] The spirit of this passage may be compared with Phaedr. 265 e: κατ’ εἴδος τέμνειν,—καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγρύννα μέρος μηδὲν: Phileb. 14 e: τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἀμα μέρη διελὼν τὸ λόγῳ. Rep. 4. 445 d: ὅσοι—πολιτείων τρόπιοι εἴδος ἐχοντες: The true dialectician is he who hits upon the real divisions of things: and the real divisions are those which a true dialectician would make. It is difficult to say in how far the “form” here spoken of is objective, and how far subjective. As we should say, “do not divide without a principle of division.”

16. ὃν ὅρθος ἐχεῖ] “If your division proves to be the right one.” Young Socrates is allowed
as we can in half, and making sure that we can assign a rational principle for each distinction.

Thus our countrymen make a great assumption when they to fall into a natural error, for the sake of illustrating the difference between the right and the wrong method.

1. καθάπερ—έχειν] Sc. ὁρθῶς.
2. ἐπίστευσα—παρευμένον] "You hastened the steps of the inquiry when you saw them directed towards mankind."
3. "The Argument" is still personified.
5. λεπτοργεῖν] "To make short work." "To cut off too small a piece."
6. τούτο δὲ διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν] Here, as in the latter part of the Phaedrus, the Idea is the true form, not separated from the matter, but discerned by dialectic amongst particulars: the objective element in each determination of thought.
7. εἴνοια τῆς σής φύσεως, δ' ἑκατόνοι] Cf. Theet. 185; Soph. 266; Parm. 130: where the capacity of the hearer is likewise made the measure of the enunciation of some great truth. In Rep. 7, 529 e, on the contrary, "dear Glaucon" is not thought capable of following the most abstract account of dialectic. In the present passage also Plato breaks off abruptly: "It is impossible to explain it perfectly at this present juncture." εν τῷ παραστηκτῷ τὰ νῦν. Perhaps all such discussions were reserved for the "Philosophus;" and this may be one reason why that dialogue was never written.

12. Ποῦν] Governed by οὐκ ὁρθῶς—δρᾶν, "What mistake do you say we have just made in our divisions?"
τὸ μὲν—προσοδοκοῦσι] These words are explanatory of διανεμοῦσι. Hence, as elsewhere explained, the absence of a connecting particle, or relative. Or perhaps it is better to suppose a return from the participle to the indicative in προσοδοκῶσι.
5. γένεσιν—προσεπάντες αὐτῷ] There is a change of construction: that at first intended being ἀρβάραρον ἐν ὁνόμα θέμενοι, or something of the kind, αὐτῷ, which resumes συμπ. τ. α. γεν. is suggested by the accusative ἀρβάραρον. The grammar may, of course, be saved by omitting αὐτό. But this is unnecessary: πάλιν γὰρ ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τῶν τοιούτων.
αὐτίκοις καὶ ἀσυμφόροις] “Neither holding any intercourse (or intermarrying, vid. inf. 265 e) nor understanding one another’s speech.”
13. μᾶλλον—δίχα] Compare the stress which is laid on the διαίωσιν, if possible, of each kind, in Philcb. 16 d: μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἰ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν. Cf. suppl. 262 a: τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίωσι ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς ἡμισάνει εἰς τὰτε τοῖσει ζητεῖσθαι: an injunction which suggested the rule which the answer has violated. There is here the same love of proportion and equality which appears in Aristotle’s account of Justice. See especially his etymology of δικαστής, quasi διχαστής.
introduce such accidental differences as Lydian or Phrygian (not to say Greek), until he were at a loss for a distinction which had a rational ground.

But, it may be asked, how can we tell when a division is accidental and when real? This question is reserved: and we return to the distinction of young Socrates, between man and the brutes. Which is just as if that rational and politic animal the

tò δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἀρρενὶ καὶ θήλει, p. 265.

Lydovòs δὲ Ἡ Φρύγας ἦ τινας ἐτέρους πρὸς ἀπαντας τάτων ἀποσχίζω τότε, ἥμικα ἀποροὶ γένος ἀμα καὶ μέρος εὐρίσκειν ἐκάτερον τῶν σχημάτων.

p. 265.

5 NE. ΣΩ. Ὁρθότατα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτό, ὥ ἐξεν, τῶς ἂν τίς γένος καὶ μέρος ἐναργέστερον γνώη, ὡς οὐ ταῦτον ἐστον ἀλλ' ἐτερον ἀλλήλου;

ΞΕ. Ὡ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, οὐ φαίλον προστάτευσι, Σώκρατες. ἥμεισ μὲν καὶ νῦν μακροτέραν τοῦ δέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ προτεθέντος λόγου πεπλανήμεθα, σὺ δὲ ἐτὶ πλέον ἡμᾶς κελεύεις πλανηθῆναι. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὦστερ εἰκὸς, ἑπανωμεν πάλιν ταύτα δὲ εἰσαύθησι κατὰ σχο- λήν, καθάπερ ἰχνεύνουτε, μετίμενεμ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἴ

γε αὐτ παντάταισ φύλαξεμι, μὴ ποτὲ παρέ ἐμοῦ δόξης.

15 αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διαφευγμένον ἀκηκοέναι.

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Εἰδὸς τε καὶ μέρος ἐτερον ἀλλήλων εἶναι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Ὁσ εἰδός μὲν ὅταν ἦ του, καὶ μέρος αὐτὸ

20 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος ὀτουτερ ἀν εἰδος

2. Ἀνδρῶς δὲ Ἡ Φρύγας ἦ τινας ἐτέρους] There is deep irony in the substitution of these despised names (Eur. Alc. 675: ὡ παῖ, τίν' αὐχεῖν, πότερα Λυδῶν Ἡ Φρύγα κακώς ἐλαύνειν ἀργυρό- νυτον σέδειν) for that of Ἑλλήνως as opposed to Βάρβαροι: and the same view is continued presently, where, to show the nature of the distinction between men and beasts, cranes are put in the place of men, whom they are supposed in turn to include amongst the beasts.

5. τοῦτο αὐτῷ] Sc. λέγει or φράζε implied in the question.


14. μὴ ποτε—δόξης αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ is again used with a more distinct reference to what follows than to what precedes.

17. ἐτερον] By attraction for ἔτερα.

19. Ὁσ εἰδός μὲν—ἀναγκή] Cf. Prot. 350 e, where the non-convertibility of a universal affirmative is similarly noticed as a new thought. See also
The text in the image is in Greek and contains a discussion by Plato about the nature of parts and wholes, particularly in the context of biological classification. Here is a literal representation of the passage:

263. λέγηται μέρος δέ εἴδος οὐδεμιὰ ἀνάγκη. ταύτη μὲ η 'κείνη μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ φαθὶ λέγειν.
NE. ΣΩ. Ταύτ' ἔσται.

c ΞΕ. Φράσον δὴ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.
NE. ΣΩ. Ποίον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως ὁπόθεν ἦμας δεύρ ἦγαγεν. οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα, ὅθεν ἐρωτηθεὶς σὺ τὴν ἀγελαιοπροφίαν ὡτὶ διαιρέτεον εἴπες μᾶλα προθύμως δὖ ἐἶναι ζώων γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον, ἔτερον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξυπαντῶν θηρίων ἐν.

NE. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ ἐμοίγε δὴ τὸτ' ἑφάνης μέρος ἀφαιρέων ἡγείσθαι καταλιπεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν αὖ πάντων γένος ἐν, ὅτι πᾶσι ταύτων ἐπονομαζεῖν ἐσχές ὄνομα, θηρία καλέσας.

d ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε, ὅ πάντων ἄνδρειότατε, τάχ' ἄν,

ib. 329 d: πότερων—ὅσπερ προσώπων τὰ μῦρα — στόμα τε καὶ μῖς κτ.λ. ἢ ὅσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μῦρο κ.τ.λ.
1. μέρος δὲ εἰδος οὐδεμιὰ ἀνάγκη] At whatever point division is made, that which is cut off is equally a part. But each eidos, besides being part of a whole, has a natural unity and a character distinct from that of every other part.
7. ὅθεν] By attraction for  ἐκείδεν οὐ.
8. μᾶλα προθύμως] Suprà 262 a: Προθυμότατα διψήσαμεν.
12. τὸτ'] Bodl. ΔΠ. τοῦτ': which would seem plausible but for the absence of the article. μέρος is used emphatically as opp. to γένος: a part, but not necessarily a kind.
13. καταλιπεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν αὖ πάντων γένος ἐν ] "That you had left in what remained, one class including all."
14. ἐπονομάζειν — καλέσας] Note the redundancy.
17. ἄν. "Whereas in truth." Cf. (amongst many instances) Legg. 1, 630 d: τὸ δὲ πῶς χρη ἦμας λέγειν;
3. πάντων ἀνδρειότατα] So also Legg. 10, 905 c.

This passage has a real, though remote, bearing on two questions which have been associated also in recent inquiry—the reality of species, and the relation of man to the lower animals. Plato,
while believing firmly in the existence of lines of demarcation in Nature corresponding to the distinctions of science (not to those of common language and opinion), appears, so far as he has a serious meaning under the mask of irony, to recognize the possibility of a closer relationship between the human species and other animal forms than is readily acknowledged by man. The object of the whole passage, however, from p. 262 a, is, probably, to correct a misapprehension to which the reasoning of the Sophist might give rise. The antithesis of Being and Not-Being is in the abstract exhaustive, and the purely abstract notion of τὸ μὴ ὄν is perfectly definite. But in particular inquiries, such as the present, it is not enough to distinguish logically, a priori, between "this" and "all that is not this." My conception of "this," gains nothing from being opposed to a wholly indefinite idea in which there is no unity, and which is therefore not an idea. If the process of division is to add anything to knowledge, the conceptions which exclude each other must both be clearly seen, and so must the boundary which divides them. In other words, there must be a reasonable and clearly understood ground or principle for each dichotomy. The positive as well as the negative element of the conception which is rejected must be recognized, in order that the negative as well as the positive content of the selected notion may be apprehended. For instance, the comparative study of Natural History, Anatomy, and Physiology gives a far more complete notion of man's physical nature than is arrived at through the observation of man himself, or through the mere distinction at first hand between man and the brutes.

I. φρόνμον—τὸ τῶν γεράνων] The migratory habits of the crane gave him an important place in ancient fable. (Hom. Π. 1. 3-7.) Aristotle suggests the following reasons for supposing the existence of reason in the crane. De Anim. Η. ix. 11: Φρόνμα δὲ πολλά καὶ περὶ τῶν γεράνων δοκεῖ συμβαίνει. ἐκτοπίζονται γὰρ μακρὰν, καὶ εἰς ὑψος πέτουν πρῶς τὸ καθορμὸν τὰ πόρρως καὶ ἐὰν ἴδωσι νέφη καὶ χειμέρα, καταπτάσαι ἡσυχίους. Ἡτα δὲ τὸ ἡχεί ἡχεμόνα ταῦτα ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐπισφυτώμας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιχαίτως, διότι κατακόψεισαι τὴν φωνήν. Ἔοτα δὲ καθέζονται, αἱ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπὸ τὴν πτερύγια τὴν κεφαλὴν ἤχουσα καθεύδουσιν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ποδὸς ἐναλλάξ, ὅ ἐδὲ ἡγεμόν γυμνὴν ἤχοι τῆν κεφαλὴν προοίμη, καὶ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸτά τι σημαίνει βοῶν.


2. * κατὰ ταῦτα] MSS. δ κατὰ ταῦτα. δ, which the Zurich editors reject and Bekker and Hermann include in brackets, is indefensible because inter-
rupting the sense between ἄν and διονομάζοι, where the opt. is required by προσείτοι infr. διονομάζοι = distinguish in words. Note the return to the more direct constr. in προσείτοι.


4. προσείτοι] There is a return from the participial to the more direct construction.

5. ἔξευλαβείσθαι — τοιαῦτα] “Keep ourselves quite free from any such error.”

Where the use of compounds is so frequent, it is unsafe to lay too much stress on the meaning of prefixes. Hence in Soph. 231 c (where see note) perhaps ἐξαντιστασάμεν means simply “to recover breath,” as in Phaedr. 274 c.

7. Μὴ πάν τὸ τῶν ζῴων διασπ.] “By not making the whole animal kingdom the object of our (final) division.” I. c. By first subdividing it so as to deal with a part only.


9. οὐδέν γὰρ δεῖ] Either “Indeed we must not:” or, if οὐδέν refers to ήττον, “We must avoid it altogether—be (not less liable but) not at all liable to this mistake.” The former is more idiomatic.

10. καὶ τότε] Also in a former division: viz. 261 d, where we distinguished ἡ τῶν ἀγελαίων ζῶων ἐπιτακτική. All animals, whether gregarious or otherwise, should have been first distinguished into wild and tame.

12. ὅσον — μέρος] Sub. ἦν from next clause.

13. ἀγελαίων μὴν ζῶων] Cf. Legg. 3, 694 e (Cyrus is spoken of): ὃ δὲ γε πατὴρ αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς ποίμνα μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολ-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.

Διήρητο τοίνυν ἥδη καὶ τότε ξύμπαν τὸ ξόων τῷ τιθασῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα π. 26 τιθασεύεσθαι φύσιν ἥμερα προσείρηται, τὰ δὲ μὴ 5 ἔχοντα ἁγρία.

ΣΕ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς.

Ἡν δὲ γε θηρεύομεν ἐπιστήμην, ἐν τοῖς ἡμέροις ἦν τε καὶ ἑστιν, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγελαῖοι μὲν ἐγκητεὶα θέμασιν.

ΣΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.

Μὴ τοίνυν διαιρόμεθα ὡσπερ τότε, πρὸς ἀπαντα ἀποβλέψαντες, μηδὲ σπεύσαντες, ἦν δὴ ταχὺ γενώμεθα πρὸς τῇ πολιτικῇ. πεποίηκε γὰρ ἡ ἡμᾶς καὶ νῦν παθέων τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάθος.

ΣΕ. ΣΩ. Ποίον;

Οὐκ ἥσυχοις εὖ διαιροῦντας ἥνυκέναι βραδύτερον.

ΣΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὁ ἐγε, πεποίηκεν.

ΣΕ. Ταῦτ' ἐστώ. πάλιν δ' οὖν ἐξ ἄρχης 20 τὴν κοινοτροφικὴν πειρώμεθα διαιρέων ὅσως γὰρ καὶ τούτο, ὁ σὺ προθυμεῖ, διαπεραινόμενος ὁ λάς ἐκτάτο. Ἱβ. 5, 735: πάσαν ἀγέλην τοιμὴν καὶ βαϊκόλου τροφεῖς τε ὅποι ἄλλος μήποτε ἐπιχειρήσῃ θεραπέειν.

3. ἔχοντα—φύσιν ["Whose nature admitted of domestication."

8. ἢν] Cf. 263 ε.

μὲν introduces a qualification, which would be expressed in English by an emphasis on the adjective.

12. ἢν δὴ Cf. Theat. 183 α.: ἢν δὴ—ἀρβήθα φανῆ.

16. Οὐχ ἥσυχοις—βραδύτερον] The proverb (= "More haste, worse speed") seems to be given verbatim, except that διαιροῖτας is substituted for some more general word.

d'] "Carefully."

18. Καὶ καλῶς γε] I. e. "We have reason to be glad of the delay:"

21. τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὁ σὺ προθυμεῖ] I. e. the definition of man, as the object of the statesman's art. Supr. 262 b: ἰδὼν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους παρενώμενον.

διαπεραινόμενος—μηνύσει] Cf.
264. λόγος αὐτὸς σοι κάλλιον μηνύσει. καὶ μοι φράξε.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποίον δή; 
ΞΕ. Τόδε, εἰ τινὸς πολλάκις ἁρα διακήκοας· οὐ γὰρ δή προστυχήσῃ γε αὐτὸς οἴδ᾽ ὅτι γέγονα ταῖς εἰς τῷ Νεῖλῳ τιθασείας τῶν ἴχθυών καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς βασιλικαῖς λίμναις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ κρίναις τἀχ᾽ ἂν ὅσως εἰς ἀσθημένος.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα τεθέαμας καὶ κακείνα πολλῶν ἀκήκοα.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν χνησσοτίας γε καὶ γερανοβωτίας,

4. Τόδε, εἰ τινὸς] "This, whether you have perhaps heard of it." Cf. Theat. 158 c: τῷ ποιον; ὡς πολλάκις σε οἴμαι διακινοῦν ἐρωτῶντων κ.τ.λ. It does not seem certain whether πολλάκις is here "perhaps" (cf. Laches 194 a, Protag. 361 c, Polit. infr. 283 b) or "often" (cf. πολλῶν infr. c. But the former is more probable.
5. προστυχήσῃ] This word occurs again in the Laws and Epinomis, and nowhere else in Plato, or indeed in Greek.
6. τιθασείας] This word, an abstract noun formed from τιθασέω, occurs nowhere else in classical Greek. The plural of the abstract noun is used to express the concrete.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς β. λίμναις] Sc. ἴχθυών. As if the former phrase had been ταῖς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἑ. τιθασείας. "I know you have never had an opportunity of seeing how tame fish are kept in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great King."

II. γερανοβωτίας] The flocks of cranes are probably suggested by the previous mention of the crane. The crane is classed with man by Aristotle as not only ἀγελαίον but πολιτικόν ἵκον, the form of his constitution being a monarchy. De Anim. Hist. I. 1. § 11: πολιτικὰ δ᾽ ἐστίν ὄν ἐν τὶ καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ τὰ ἄγελαια. Ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀνθρωπος, μέλιττα, σφῆς, μυρμήξ, γέρανος. καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνα ἐστὶ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀναρχα, οἶον γέρανος μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιτῶν γένος ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνα, μυρμήξες δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἀναρχα. Compare Plat. Phaedo 82 b: πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ἱμερον γένος, ἦ ποιου μελιτῶν, ἦ σφῆς, ἦ μυρμήκων—ἡ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον.

* E.
Hence the art of heralding may be divided into subaqueous and terrestrial. And of the terrestrial creatures, one kind are fleged. Statecraft is occupied with the walking terrestrial animals: and for dividing these, reason points out a longer and a shorter way. The former is more in accordance with the principles above laid down, but, as we have leisure, we may try both—of course in turn: taking the longer way first, whilst we are fresh.


5. (ἐφροσυνικῶν τ.) The words ἐνυδρὸν and ἐφροσυνικῶν are applied to birds by Aristotle, in the only other place where the latter word occurs in classical Greek. Π. Δ. vi. 2. § i (ubi vulgo ἐφροσυνικῶν).

14. Καὶ μὴν καὶ—παντὶ] "If we divide thus, we shall also be saved the trouble of asking to which art the kingly function belongs: for this will be evident to all." οὗτος = τοῦτο ποιήσατε.

23. *ὁς περὶ τὸ πεζὸν] Stallbaum is wrong in saying that Bekker took his reading ἐν περὶ from the majority of MSS. The following are the variations, as quoted by him:—ei perei; δισπερ Ε; ἐν δισπερ C et
264. ξητητέον; ἡ οὐκ οἴει καὶ τὸν ἀφρονέστατον ὡς ἔπος εἰστεῖν δοξάζειν οὕτως;
NE. ΣΩ. Ἐγώγε.
ΞΕ. Τὴν δὲ πεζονομικὴν, καθάπερ ἄρτιον ἁριθμὸν, δεῖ τεμνομένην δίχα ἀποφαίνειν.
NE. ΣΩ. Δῆλον.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐφ' ὅ γε μέρος ὀρμηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δύο τινὲς καθοράν ὁδῷ τεταμένα φαίνεται, τὴν μὲν βάττων, πρὸς μέγα μέρος σμικρὸν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι δεὶ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μᾶλιστα, τούτ' ἔχουσαν μᾶλ-
265. λον, μακροτέραν γε μὴν. ἡξεστιν οὖν, ὅποτέραν ἀν βουληθῶμεν, ταύτην πορευθήμαι.

con F; ἡ ὁσπερ H; ὁσπερ * ἀ (i.e. the rest with Stephanus' ed.) Bekker's reading, εἰ περὶ τ. π., ξητητέον, would be more plausible if καὶ μὴν—οὖν ξητή-

sὸμεν were immediately pre-

ceding. Heindorf's, ἡ περὶ τ. π. ἂ., is not improbable in itself, but has weak MS. confirma-

tion.

If ἡς περὶ is right, this had probably been corrupted into ὁσπερεί, and hence, through transposition, the variety. This reading involves a consider-

able ellipse, viz. of ἡ καὶ τοῦτο δήλον; or the like words. Cf. Soph. 248 d: ὅ δὲ, ὡς, κ.τ.λ., and note.

4. καθάπερ ἄρτιον ἁριθμῶν] Stellar has adopted Ast's conj., καθάπερ ἄρτι τὸν ἄ., but such a reference would be superfluous and without point. The Stran-

ger, as presently appears more clearly, does not forget the stu-

dies in which young Socrates has been imbued by Theodorus, and uses 'even number' as a familiar example of that which can be halved: the object being still to divide each class as nearly as possible in the middle (μεσοτομεῖν infr., ἐν ἡμίσει — ξητεῖοδα supra.). Comp. Legg. 10, 895 e, cited by the Zurich editors, who are curiously mis-

understood by Stallbaum. The definition of even number is there said to be ὁ δίχα διαιρο-

μενος. There is probably no distinct allusion to the former mention of ἁρτιον καὶ περι-

tῶν.

7. ἀρµηκεν] Cf. supr. 262 b: ἐπ' ἀνδρόπους πορευόμενον.


11. μεσοτομεῖν] The same love of 'measure' appears as an ethical notion in Legg. 7, 793 α: τῶν λόγων τε καὶ ἱδονῆς ἁκρα-

tων Βίου φείγειν δεῖν πάντας, μέσον δὲ τινά τέμνειν αἰεi.
Gregarious tame animals that walk the earth either have or have not horns. This distinction is sufficiently intelligible without inventing a name.

2. ὡς θαυμαστεῖ] “What a thing to ask!” This expression throws some light on the common use of ὡς θαυμάσιον.

4. ἀμφοτέρας] πορευθήσαναι is probably to be supplied.

6. ἐπειδὴ—βραχὺ] The poor youth is deceived into thinking that he is near the end of his journey: τῷ δὲ ἦν ἀρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προσίμων.

κατʼ ἀρχὰς] This is one of the expressions which occur frequently in the Politicus and Laws.


15. τὴν γένεσιν] “Their growth or mode of existence.” γένεσις here almost = φύσις. “In that some are produced without horns and others with them.”

18. ἀπόδος] Sc. τὸ προσήκον, or τὴν πρόσφρασιν, which would be generally ὅνομα, but here λόγον. Compare Antisthenes’ sneer, that definition is only a roundabout way of naming.

20. περιπεπλεγμένοι] E. g. κεραφόρονομετική, κολοβοκερατονομική. “Using description,
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

265. NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν χρῆ λέγειν;
ΞΕ. Ὄδε τῆς πεζονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης δίχα διαρεθείσης τὸ μόριον βάτερον ἐπὶ τῷ κεροφόρῳ μέρει τῷ τῆς ἄγελης ἐπιτετάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς ἀκεράτου.

NE. ΣΩ. Ταύτ' ἐστώ ταύτη λεχθέντα' πάντως d γὰρ ἰκανῶς δεδήλωται.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μήν ὦ γε βασιλεὺς ἦμιν αὕτα καταφανὴς ὅτι κολοβῶν ἄγέλην τινὰ κεράτων νομεύει.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ δῆλος;
ΞΕ. Ταύτην τοίνυν καταθραύσαντες, τὸ γιγνόμενον αὕτῳ πειρόμεθα ἀποδοῦναι.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Πότερον οὖν βοῦλει τῷ σχιστῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐκατερόμενῳ μῶνυχι διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν ἡ τῇ κοινογονίᾳ τε καὶ ἱδιογονίᾳ; μανθάνεις γὰρ ποιν.

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΞΕ. Ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν ὑπόνων καὶ ὑὼν πέφυκεν ἔξι ἀλλήλων γενεάν.

e NE. ΣΩ. Ναὶ.

for should you attempt to name them, the result would be too complicated.” The caution would apply still more pointedly to what follows.

4. τῷ τῆς ἀκεράτου] Sc. μέρει. The genitive of apposition is used (instead of τῷ ἀκεράτῳ) by attraction from ἄγελης preceding.


15. τῷ καλουμένῳ μῶνυχι] This expression indicates the fact that μῶνυχι was a rare word out of Homer. The characteristic of having solid hoofs is found to be coincident with that of making hybrids.

The king is the keeper of a hornless herd. But hornless cattle are again divided by a double distinction: into those which mix the breed and divide not the hoof, and those which divide the foot and do not mix their breed.
The latter description includes only two kinds. For dogs, though sociable, are not gregarious. The ground of distinction between these two should be obvious to a friend of Thetetetus and ageo.

**NE. ΣΩ.** Δήλον ὁτι τῆς ἀμύκτων.

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**ΞΕ.** Τὸ δὲ γε λοιπὸν ἐτι τῆς λείας ἀγέλης τῶν p. 20 ἡμέρων ἀμίγες γένει πρὸς ἀλληλα.

**ΝΕ. ΣΩ.** Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 

**ΞΕ.** Τί δ’; ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀρ’ ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κοινογενοῦς φύσεως η’ τινος ἱδιο-

γενοῦς;

**ΝΕ. ΣΩ.** Δήλον ὁτι τῆς ἀμύκτων.

**ΞΕ.** Ταύτην δὴ δεῖ καθάπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἡμᾶς δίχα διαστέλλειν.

**ΝΕ. ΣΩ.** Δεί γὰρ οὖν. 

**ΞΕ.** Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἱδίων, ὅσον ἠμέρον καὶ ἀγεᵰ- p. 21 λαῖνον, σχεδὸν πλὴν γενοῦ δυὸν πᾶν ἡ’δη κατακεκερ-

μάτισται. τὸ γὰρ τῶν κυνῶν οὐκ ἐπάξιον κατ-

αρθμεῖν γένος ὡς ἐν ἀγελάιοις θέρμασιν.

**ΝΕ. ΣΩ.** Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλὰ τίνι δὴ τὸ ὁὔ 

διαιροῦμεν;

**ΞΕ.** Ὡμετερ καὶ δίκαιων γε Θεαίτητον τε καὶ σὲ 

dιανέμειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γεωμετριᾶς ἀπτεσθοῦν.

**ΝΕ. ΣΩ.** Τῷ;

**ΞΕ.** Τῇ διαμέτρῳ δήπον καὶ πάλιν τῇ τῆς δια-

μέτρου διαμέτρῳ.

1. τής] When the horse and ass are taken from the hornless cattle.

λείας] I. e. κολοβοκεράτου.

2. ἀμίγες γένει] “Do not mix their breed.” Dat. of the mode, like φύσει.

4. ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀρ’] For the late position of the interrogative πότερα in the sentence, compare Soph. 237 c : ἔχειν δο-

κοιμέμεν ἄν εἰς τί, and note. Supr. 261 c : Λέγεις δὲ—πότερον. Rep. 9, 571 c : Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας;

17. δίκαιον] “It is to be ex-

pected of you.” Cf. Meno 85 c: 

dίκαιος γάρ εἶ εἰδέναι.

20. Τῇ διαμέτρῳ δήπον] The diameter of the unit square was the subject of some of the ear-

liest lessons in that geometrical arithmetic through which alone numbers had hitherto been stu-

died: and it had been observed that this diameter is equal to the square-root of two. Hence, a foot being always the unit, this line was known both as η 

dιάμετρος and as η διάμετρος η ὀνάμει δίπον: and it is the
abbreviated form of the latter expression, viz. δίπους δύναμες, which gives occasion to the Stranger's somewhat laborious pleasantry.

The incommensurability of this diameter with the side of the square (of \( \sqrt{2} \) with 1) was one of the most familiar lessons of this early geometry. Hence, possibly, the omission of 2 amongst the προμήκες ἄρισμοι in the demonstration of Theodorus (Theaet. 147 d: τίς τε τρί-ποδός πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος κ.τ.λ.), it being taken for granted, without proof, that the δίπους δύναμες was μήκει οὗ διάμετρος τῇ ποδαίᾳ.

While these were still recent discoveries, philosophers were led to see fanciful analogies to them in other departments of knowledge. Plato here satirizes a tendency from which he was not at this time himself wholly free. The smile is already on his face which presently breaks into a laugh.

Our view has been restricted to tame gregarious animals: to tame animals that tread the ground, that cannot fly, that have no horns, that divide the foot: thus oxen, horses, asses are excluded; dogs are not gregarious. What remain? What but swine and men? Human progression is measured by the power of two feet, that of swine, the only remaining animal, by the power of four. This interpretation has been well supported by Dr. Badham in the 'Epistola' prefixed to his edition of the Euthydemus and Laches.

1. Πῶς εἶπες;] "What did you say?" Expressing a not very unnatural surprise.

6. ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ἀν ζή 


\[ \alpha \beta \] square foot; \( cd \) diameter of \( \alpha \beta \), and side of 2 ft. square \( de \); \( de \) diameter of 2 ft. square; \( df \) square on \( de: = 4 \) square feet.

a As suggested by a favourable critic in the National Review.
Thus man is differentiated from the pig.

This is ludicrous enough. But it is still better jest that this grandly careless creature should be left as man’s sole

5. ἐτέρον αὐτοῖς Those who have found in these words a new division, and would introduce here some fresh kind,—as geese or other domestic fowls (Ast, Stallbaum), which were cut off, suppl. 264 e, or apes (Winkelmann), which as tame animals are hardly ἄγελαθα θρήματα, unless M. Winkelmann can find the prototype of Beatrice and her apes in classic story,—were right in supposing that a distinct step in the argument must be here indicated. Man has been distinguished in terms of mathematical progression from the only remaining quadruped, the pig. But it remains to be shewn of which kind the king is herdsman. It has been determined what two kinds are still in competition. But the result of their competition remains to be decided.

τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα εἰδοκιμησάντων αὐτῶν “Which might have become celebrated as a joke.”

“‘May have won us a fellowship in a cry’ of humourists.”

πρὸς γέλωτα λίτ. “In respect of the purpose of creating laughter.”

9. ήμῶν Qu. an leg. ήμών, cf. Soph. 217 ε, where the same doubt occurs. “That it should be the lot of our human family to run a heat with the grandest, and at the same time the least fastidious, of all creatures.”

ξυνελημέρους “Having been appointed by lot to run with.”


10. γενναιοτάτου is ironical. Cf. Rep. 7, 529 B: οὐκ ἀγεννυός μοι δοκεῖς—τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀνέστι. But there is perhaps a humorous allusion (as Badham supposes) to the unwieldy bulk of the creature.

11. εὐχερεστάτου] Whereas man, as it was said in the Theetetus, is δύσκολον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν ζωῶν. Schleiermacher well quotes Rep. 7, 535 ε: εὐχερώς, ὥσπερ θηριόν υπευ—ἐν ἄμαθι μολίστην. The conjecture γενναώτατου is quite un-
NE. ΣΩ. Καθορῶ καὶ μᾶλ' ἀτόπως ξυμβαίνον.

ΞΕ. Τί δ' οὖκ εἰκὸς ὤστατα ἄφικνείσθαι τὰ βραδύτατα;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸδε δὲ οὖκ ἐννοοῦμεν, ὡς ἐτι γελοιοῦτερος ὁ βασιλεῦς φαίνεται μετὰ τῆς ἀγέλης ξυνιδιαθέων καὶ ξύνθρωμα πεπορευμένος τῷ τῶν ἄνδρῶν αὖ πρὸς τὸν εὐχερὴ βίων ἄριστα γεγυμνασμένον;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Νῦν γὰρ, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶ κατα—

οῖόνος μᾶλλον τῷ ῥηθὲν τὸτ' ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῆς ὡ̄ητήσει.

called for. There is no real difficulty in the coordination of γενναστάτῳ with εὐχερεστάτῳ, and the echo in γένει γενν. is clearly intentional, as in ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική. The two are thrown together by lot; they run a race together: which is left behind? Clearly the slower animal, the pig. But the race between men and pigs involved a still more ridiculous race between two sorts of men, the king and the swineherd. Thus his majesty is found contending for sovereignty with one of his flock (a phenomenon which will be repeated presently, cf. 267 e), and with one who has been most perfectly trained to lead a life of careless ease: Ulysses with that ἄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν Ευμένου.


That man should be the congener of the pig is in keeping with the humour of Theæt. 161 ε: ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἐστίν ἡ κ.τ.λ. And the race between the king and the swineherd recalls another touch of satire in the same dialogue, (174 d): βασιλεά ἐγκωμιαζόμενον—οἶνον συβότην.

7. αὖ] I. e. As the pig was εὐχερεστάτων τῶν θηρίων.

πρ. τ. ε. β. γεγυμ. is an oxymoron. For γεγυμνασμένον πρὸς, cf. Legg. 1, 626 b : καλὸς γε ὣξιν, ἰκαίνει μοι γεγυμνασθαι πρὸς τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμαμα.

Compare with the preceding classification the fourfold division of living creatures according to the four elements in Tim. 40 a: μία μὲν οὐρανίων θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτερόν καὶ ἀεροπάρον, τρίτη δὲ ἐνυδρόν εἶδος, πέτων δὲ καὶ χερσαίων τέταρτον.

10. Νῦν γὰρ] A collateral inference is sometimes stated as a cause, e. g. Gorg. 454 d: Δῆλον γὰρ αὐτὶ οὐ τοιοῦτον ἑστὶν. Badham would read γε ἁρὰ in all such cases.

11. ἐν τῇ — ὡητήσει] Soph.
most completely trained to a life of careless ease. Certainly, as was said this morning, Dialectic prefers truth to dignity.

Now for the shorter way.

227 b, where the spirit of scientific method and that of satire interpenetrate as they do here, so that it can be hardly known which of them is made the vehicle of the other.

11. τὸτε εὐθὺς τὸ πεζὸν] It is impossible to explain this passage so as to acquit the Stranger of inexactness. Either he has forgotten that the class of winged creatures was cut off (264 c), or he purposely begins the shorter path from an earlier point than where he gave notice of the existence of the two ways. Perhaps the words τὸτε εὐθὺς may imply this (cf. supr. 263 c). In any case the word πεζὸν is used in a different sense from that in which it occurs above, where it was opposed to the same πτημά which it here includes. πεζὸν is therefore ἐνυδροματικόν, and opposed to ἐνυδρον, “on land,” not “on the ground,” by an ambiguity like that which belongs to the same word when applied to an armament. Cf. infra. 267 b: πεζοματικοῖς. This ambiguity probably gives rise to the inexact reference. Compare Rep. 1, 354: ἐμπεσώστος αὐτὸν ὁστερον λόγου—where the theory spoken of, although discussed later, had been introduced before the other. Soph. 223 d, 224 c: μεταβλητής. Such slight inaccuracies perhaps do not arise from mere neglect: they are caused by Plato’s instinctive avoidance of an over-exactness, which would be unnatural in conversation.
1. **οἶον—ἐνατήσαντα**] For the two participles, cf. Protag. 328 c: ἐλθὼν εἰς ιερόν, ὑμόσας, ὅσον ἂν φῆ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

2. **παραδοῦναι — ἐπιστήμησ**] “To give into his hands the reins of the state, believing that they are his, and that this art belongs to him.” (ταύτης sc. τῆς ἀνδραπονιμίης.)


8. **τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὄνοματος**] “The definition of the name.” The words are emphatically repeated in order to familiarize the distinction between λόγος and ὄνομα. Cf. Soph. 218 c: δεὶ δὲ δεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἡ τοῦνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χαρές λόγου.

to the reins of government. The argument, having been amplified by this addition, is recapitulated.

4. ἀγελαιοτροφικοῦ δὲ αὖ πεζονομίκων] Vid. suppl. 264 c. The gregarious were first divided into land and water animals, and then land animals into fledged and unfledged, to which latter the word πεζὼν was applied. These two steps are here remembered as one only: the second of the two distinctions being dropped, and the word πεζὼν being understood to mean "on land." This confirms what has been said above in the note on p. 266 d.

6. οὖν ἐλαττὸν τριπλωδόν] This is the reading of ten MSS., including the best, and is represented in the version of Ficinus, who probably joined τὸ μέρος οὖν ἐλαττὸν (ὑ) ("partem nequaquam minorem." Cf. suppl. οὖ οὖν σμικρότατον τῶν γενῶν), which, however, is inconsistent with the context, and hardly grammatical. It seems most probable that we have here an unusual construction, of which another instance occurs in Legg. 12, 956 e: ύφην δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γνωκός μιᾶς ἐμμον, where there is no difference of reading. Cf. suppl. 265 c. Three MSS., ΣΣΥ, have τριπλωδό, which Stallbaum adopts.

8. For γενέσεως, cf. suppl. 261 d, infr. 271 a.

MSS. μικτοῦ νομευτικῆς. The correction is due to Boeckh and Heindorf.

10. ἐπὶ ποίμνη δύσοδι] This is the point where the two ways meet. "The art of man-herding being the only portion left which has to do with bipeds."

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

46

πάλιν αὐτεπιτακτικῆς οὐ τὸ σμικρότατον τῶν γενῶν ἀπεσυγίζετο καὶ ἦτο εἶδος ἀγελαιοτροφικῶν, ἀγελαιοτροφικὸ δὲ αὖ πεζονομίκων. τοῦ δὲ πεζονομίκου μάλιστα ἀπετέμνετο τέχνη τῆς ἀκέρατου φύσεως θρησκεία. ταύτης δὲ αὐτὸ πέρος οὖν ἐλαττὸν τριπλωδον συμπλέκειν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀν εἰς ἐν τις αὐτῷ ὄνομα ἐξωγαγαεῖν βουληθῆ, γενέσεως ἀμίκτου νομευτικῆ* ἐπιστήμην προσαγορεύων. τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτο ἀντιμῆμα, ἐπὶ ποίμνη δύσοδι μέρος ἀνθρωπονομικῶν ἐτί εἰ λειψθὲν μόνον, τοῦτ' αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἧδη τὸ ἤτηθεν, ἀμα βασιλικῶν ταῦτο κληθὲν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

NE. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρα γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς ἦμιν τοῦτο,
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

.267. καθάπερ σ’ νῦν εἰρήκας, οὔτως ἐστὶ καὶ πεπραγμένον;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ παντάπασιν ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθαι τὸ προτεθέν. ἢ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ ζῆτησις ἐλλείπει, τὸ τὸν λόγον εἰρήσθαι μὲν πως, οὐ μὴν παντάπασι γε τελεσάς ἀπειράγθαι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἔπτεσ;  

ΞΕ. Ἐγὼ νῦν πειράσομαι τοῦτ’ αὐτό, ὁ διανοοῦμαι νῦν ἐτί μᾶλλον δηλῶσαι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγοις ἂν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν νομεντικῶν ἡμῖν πολλῶν φανερῶν ἀρτὶ τεχνῶν μία τις ἢν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ μίᾶς τινὸς ἁγέλης ἐπιμέλεια;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Ταύτην δὲ γε διώριξεν ὁ λόγος οὗ ἵππων εἶναι τροφὸν οὐδ’ ἄλλων θηρίων, ἄλλ’ ἀνθρώπων κωνοτροφικὴν ἑπιστήμην.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὔτως.

1. καθάπερ σ’ νῦν εἰρήκας] Sc. παντάπασι. Cf. Soph. 218 a. "Have we really (καὶ) done as you say?"


5. ἢ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ—ἀπειράγθαι] "Or is it in this very respect that our inquiry is especially defective, that the definition has in a way been given, but still has not entirely received final completion?" Cf. infr. 277 b: ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁπερέξοι—ἡμ—ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφθέναι πω.

9. νῦν] Dialectic makes the subject of inquiry clearer to both the minds which are engaged.

πειράσομαι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ] "I will endeavour to do this very thing, to make my meaning at this moment clearer for us both." I. e. I will endeavour to give my present thought, what I desiderate for the main argument, a complete expression.

17. οὐδ’ ἄλλων θηρίων] He falls back into the common parlance for want of a collective word to express "animals other than man." There is less danger in this, now that the requisite distinctions have been made.

But it is not really at an end.

For, when the king is designated as the Man-
is unlike other herdsmen in this, that he is not alone in feeding or in tending his flock, but has many competitors, such as the merchant, husbandman, baker, gymnast, physician.

1. Το δή των νομέων Πάντων διάφορον καὶ τὸ p. 265 e τῶν βασιλεῶν θεασώμεθα.

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Εἰ τις τῶν ἄλλων τῷ, τέχνης ἄλλης ὄνομα 5 ἔχων, κοινῆ τῆς ἀγέλης ἄντρωφος εἶναι φησὶ καὶ προσποιεῖται.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΞΕ. Οἶνον οἱ ἐμποροὶ καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ σιτουργοὶ πάντες, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γυμνασταὶ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱματρῶν γένος, οἷοθε ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων νομεῦσιν, οὕς πολιτικοὺς ἐκαλέσαμεν, παντάπασι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοντ' ἀν οὕτω σύμμαντες, ὡς σφεῖς p. 265 NE.

He probably means that the king, unlike other artists (it should be "herdsmen"), is not distinguishable in some respects when thus defined from individuals amongst his flock (the physician, gymnast, etc.). He runs a race with them, as he did with the swine-herd. But this is an extremely vague way of putting what is presently explained. Whereas the above reading makes all clear. "I mean, whether in the case of any of the other herdsmen there be any one, bearing the name of a different art, who professes and pretends to share in common with him the tending of the herd."

5. ἄντρωφος is to be taken actively, as appears from τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιμελεύστα καθάρισμα below, and συννομή infr. 268 c. Cf. Legg. 8, 845 d: οὗτος γὰρ γῆν οὗτος ἡμῶν οὗτος πνεύματα, τοῖς ἑαυτῷ σύντροφον τῶν ἐκ γῆς ἀναβλασταν- 

12. τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοντ' ἀν]
Not so the ox-herd, who is sufficient in all things for his cattle, to supply their wants, to heal their sicknesses, to attend them in the hour of marriage and of childbirth. He provides also for their amusement by rustic melodies,

"Would contend in argument." Cf. Theaet. 160 e and note; and see λέγουσα infra.

(12.) οὗτος αὐτοπαντες] Pleonastic resumption.

2. ἀγελαίων] Cf. suppl. 260 c.


9. τῶν γιγνομένων] "The offspring from time to time." Cf. Theaet. 160 e: μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὗκ ἄξιον ὑπὸ τροφῆς τὸ γιγνομένων. 10. ἐτὶ τοίνυν] "Nay, even beyond the sphere of the arts which were mentioned as competing with the king."

παιδίας καὶ μουσικῆς] Music and the arts generally are ironeically spoken of as a kind of child's-play. Cf. Soph. 224 a, 234 a, b. The genitives are suggested by ἐπιστήμων, but as the sentence proceeds are understood to be governed by μετεληφη. 11. αὐτοῦ τὰ θρέματα] "The objects of his care." θρέματα has the common meaning of "creatures" with an etymological association from the verbal meaning, as the cattle are viewed in relation to the herdsman.

13. μετὰ τὸ ὅργανον καὶ ψιλὸ τῷ στόματι] The meaning of ψιλὸ depends on that to which it is opposed or correlative. In Legg. 2, 669 d, instrumental music without the voice is spoken of as ψιλῆ καθάρισε τε καὶ αὐλήσει, and is strongly objected to: while λόγοι ψιλοί in the same passage are words without metre, or prose.

15. τῶν ἄλλων περὶ νομέων]
sung or whistled, or "attempted to the oaten flute." And thus do all herdsmen except the king of men: who cannot therefore be adequately defined until we have parted off from him this crowd of rivals, and set him forth alone and clear. For

Either peri is pleonastic (ut sepe) or the genitive is to be repeated with τρόποι.


9. σχῆμα βασιλικὸν—δι' ἀκριβείας τῶν πολιτικῶν] "The form we described was indeed royal, but did not accurately correspond with that of the Statesman." It appears presently that we have been imagining the Divine Shepherd of the people as he existed in the golden age.

10. περικεφαλῆς] "Crowding in upon him." Compare the description in the Gorgias, p. 452 a, of the physician, the gymnast, and the moneymaker disputing the claim of the rhetor to be the agent of the greatest good for man. 

11. τῆς συννομῆς αὐτῷ ἀντιποιούμενοι] αὐτῷ is partly the ethical dative, and partly governed by συν: "claiming to share with him the task of tending the herd."

2. etsi μή μέλλομεν] "Unless we were to—as we feared we should if we neglected this." The optative may be defended by supposing an attraction from the preceding optatives: the past tense being continued in thought. But it is equally possible that this attraction (from τυγχάνομεν) may have influenced the seribes. Ast and Stallb. conj. μέλλομεν.

5. εἰ ἀλλὰ ἀρχῆς—καθ' ἐτέρων ὄρων] “From a fresh starting-point, and by another road,” i.e. approaching the subject from a different side. The myth which follows, like the digression in the Theetetus, affords a rest after the thorny path which has been trodden, and also presents a deeper and more religious aspect of the question. Cf. Prot. 317 εἰ: ἡ αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν—ἡπερ ἀρχή. Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. 1, §1: ἂλλην πουραμεύνον αρχήν.

8. εὐχρηματίζει δὲ τοῦ μεγάλου μύθου προσχρήσεις. "We must call in aid a large portion of a great cycle of mythology." The fables quoted are viewed as fragments of a larger whole, some part of which is narrated, and part of what is narrated is applied to the purpose of the dialogue. Cf. Legg. 4, 713 a: Ἀρ' οὖν μέμφη σαμκρά γ' ἐπὶ προσχρήσεις, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐμελῶσαι ποι ἀναλήψαι τὸ νῦν ἐπιστήσεισ; 10. μέρος—ἡμετέρων] Compare Bacon, Nov. Org. II. 16: "Tum vero post rejectionem et exclusivam debitis modis factam, secundo loco, tanquam in fundo, manebit—forma affirmitativa, solida, et vera, et bene terminata."

11. εἰ ἄκρων ἀφικνεύσθαι τὸ ζ.] "To arrive at the object of our search, as it were to the summit of a steep ascent." Cf. Rep. 7, 515 ο: διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάβασας. The mountain-path (ἄπασο) is kept with difficulty.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΞΕ. 'Αλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάννι πρόσεχε τὸν ποιήσας οἱ παιδεῖς· πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδίας ἐτη.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

5 Ἡν τοίνυν καὶ ἐτί ἐσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέν-των πολλὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θέστου λεχθέσαν ἐρν φάσμα. ἀκήκοας γάρ που καὶ ἀπομημονεῖς ὁ φασὶ γενέσθαι τότε.


2. πάντως—ἐτη] "You are not many years escaped from play." Cf. supr. d, παιδίαν. Stephanus (anticipated by a few MSS.) raised a doubt about the accent, and read παιδία: in defence of which, cf. Legg. 9. 864 d: ἡ παιδία χρῆμαν, οὔδὲ πο ὑπο τοιοῦτοι διαφέρον. He has been followed by some editors, who translate παιδία ἐτη "years of childhood." Stallbaum justly replies that "years of child's-play" would only be a more graceful way of saying the same thing. But he errs with the rest in joining παιδία with ἐτη, although he sees that with this rendering πολλὰ is required instead of πολλά. The present is only one of numberless instances of hyperbaton which occur in these dialogues. Cf. Soph. 235 a: ἐτι τῶν τῆς παιδίας μετέχόντων ἐστὶ τις μερόν. The genitive in the MS. reading, παιδίας, is, however, ambiguous, and I have ventured to intro-duce the plural παιδίας, which exactly suits the context, and occurs several times in the Laws. Cf. Ar. Pol. VIII. 2: ἄλο τούτο δει παιδία εἰςάγεσθαι καιροφυλακώντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ὁ προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν ἀνείτις γάρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἤδοναν ἀναποσισ. The word (in common with many others) has no accent in the Bodleian MS.

5. Ἡν τοίνυν καὶ ἐτί ἐσται] Cf. Timæyd. I. 22: τῶν γενομένων —καὶ—μελλόντων ποτὲ ἄδει ἐσοθα. "There really happened, and shall hereafter happen again, like many other things of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent which appeared in connexion with the legendary strife of Atreus with Thystes." The word ἐτι, like "once upon a time," marks the beginning of a tale. (Phaedr. 237 a.) Cf. Tim. p. 22 c: πολλαὶ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθόραι γεγονόσαι καὶ ἐτι ἐσοθαι.

The form of the story to which Plato alludes appears to be the same which is given in one of the scholia on Eurip. Or. 988:

"Hermes revenged the death of Myrtillus, his son, upon the Pelopidae, by causing a golden-fleeced lamb to be born amongst the flocks of Atreus. When his claim to the succession was disputed, Atreus promised to display the prodigy in proof that the gods favoured his right. Thyesthes persuaded Aerope, the wife of Atreus, to give him the lamb: whence Atreus was in danger of losing the kingdom, had not Zeus, who upheld his claim, made the sun and the Pleiads to return from their setting towards their rising. It is clear from this in what sense the lamb is called a "sign" or "token" (σημείον): and how the greater portent was given by the god "in bearing witness to Atreus" (μαρτυρήσας ὁ θεὸς Ατρεί). The notion that "the sun in horror turned his face from the scene" (also mentioned in the Scholia to Euripides, and frequently alluded to in the tragedies of Seneca: see also Hygin. Fab. 88, 258), although the most commonly received, appears to be one of several rationalizing interpretations of the fable. The lines of Euripides should be quoted here:—

ἐγένετο τίρας ὁλον ὁλον
λόχευμα σωμάτωσιν
'Ατρέως ἵπποβοτα'

ἀδεν ἐμὸς τὸ τε πτεροτόν
ἀλὼν μετέβαλεν ἄρμα
τῶν πρὸς ἐσπεραν κέλευθον
οὐρανοῦ μεθαρμόσασα
μονόσωλον ἐς ὦν,

ἐπιταύρων τε δρόμημα Πλειάδος
ἐς ὁδὸν ἄλλων Ζεὺς μεταβάλει.

See also ejusd. El. 734, where the truth of the same legend is questioned. The "golden lamb" seems to have been known, with variations, to the author of the cyclic poem Alcaeusius and to Pherecydes (Schol. in Eur. loc. cit.), but it is difficult not to connect the other portent, as well as the revolution imagined by Plato, with the tale told to Herodotus by the Egyptian priests, "that in the course of the 11,340 years during which Egypt had been a monarchy, there had been no god in human shape; but the sun had reversed his course four times, and that without any convulsions of nature in the land of Egypt. To which they added, that before the 11,340 years gods had ruled in Egypt, one of whom had been at each time supreme: of whom Orus, the son of Osiris, was the last." Hdt. II. cc. 142, 144. There is no ground, however, for supposing, as Boeckh (Philol. p. 118) at one time imagined, that the Egyptians had anticipated (through the study of their own monuments) the scientific theory of the precession of
Theaetetus three different theories, so here three distinct fables are woven together.

You have heard also of the "Saturnia regna?"

the equinoxes. The reason advanced by Plato himself may possibly have given rise to the fancy in the first instance. "All that is visible must suffer change." Compare Seneca, Ep. 71. § 11: "Quid enim mutationis periculo exceptum? Non terra, non coelum, non totus hic rerum omnium contextus, quamvis Deo agente ducatur. Non semper tenebit hunc ordinem, sed illum ex hoc cursu aliquis dies dejectum."

2. τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν. The Pleiades are mentioned in the story.

3. ὡς ἄρα—τὸ νῦν σχῆμα] Plato here improves upon the original legend, in which the sun only changed his course for a single day.

5. αὐτῷ] The rising and setting of the sun and stars considered as one phenomenon.

8. Καί μὴν αὕ] As in the

NE. ΣΩ. Δέγεται γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τούτο.

NE. ΣΩ. Πλείστων μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τί δε; τὸ τοῦτο ἐμπροσθεν φύσθαι γηγενεῖς καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἀλλῆλων γεννᾶσθαι;
NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πάλαι λεχθέντων.

ΞΕ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐστὶ μὲν ἐνμπαντα ἐκ ταύτων πάθους, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄτερα μυρία καὶ τούτων ἐτὶ ὑμνομστότερα, διὰ δὲ χρόνου πλῆθος τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέσβηκε, τὰ δὲ διεσπαρμένα εἰρηται χωρίς ἕκαστας ἐν ἀλλήλων. ὃ δ' ἐστὶ πᾶσι τούτοις αὑτοῖν τὸ πάθος, οὐδεὶς εἰρηκέ, νῦν δὲ δὴ λεκτέων· εἰς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βασιλείου ἀπόδειξεν πρέπει ῥηθέν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κάλλωτε ἑῖπες, καὶ λέγε μηδέν ἐλλείπων.

ΞΕ. Ἀκούοις ἄν. τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἕμποδηγεὶ πορευομένον καὶ συγκυκλεί, τοτὲ δὲ γενεῖς] "That the earlier race of men had their generation from Earth." Plato is fond of this notion, which, as usual, he colours variously with his own imagination. Cf. Symp. 190 b, 191 c; Rep. 3, 414; Soph. 248 c; Prot. 320 c; Tim. 23 e; Critias 109 e. The fable spoke simply of earth-born men. Plato finds in this a hint for his "Phoenician" tale of an earlier and more perfect mode of generation. He seems to blend together Hesiod's children of the earth and the army of Cadmus. See also Ar. Pol. Ι. 5: τῶν πρῶτων, εἰτε γενεῖς ᾦσαν, εἰτε ἐκ φθοράς τινς ἐσώθησαν.

2. ἐκ ταύτων πάθους] "These all arise out of one and the same occurrence" (viz. the reversal of the motion of the Cosmos).

4. διὰ δὲ χρόνου πλῆθος] Compare the way in which probability is given to the myth of Atlantis in Tim. 21 d: διὰ δὲ χρόνου καὶ φθοράν τῶν ἐργασμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεύτερο ὁ λόγος.

5. διεσπαρμένα] As in the case of the three or four fables to which allusion is made.

and, once more, how there were giants in old days, the offspring of the Earth.

These scattered fragments of tradition arise from one and the same circumstance. The universe is at one time turned by
God, but at certain periods is relinquished by him, and turns itself in the opposite direction.

For none but the most Divine things are without change. But the universe, being visible, is of a lower grado.

rected and impelled by God. Cf. the interpretation of Heraclitus by Α.Ν. Gaz. (quoted by Lassalle, L 124): ἔστει κἀμάτος αὐτή (τῇ ψυχῇ) τῷ δημιουργῷ συνέπεσθαι καὶ ἀνω μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τόδε τὸ πᾶν συμπερισσεῖν καὶ υπ’ ἐκείνου τετάχθαι καὶ ἀρχίσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο τῇ τοῦ ἥμερων ἐπιθείμα καὶ ἀρχῆς ἑλπίδι κατ’ ἄρα αὐτῇ τὴν ψυχὴν πέφρεσθαι.

1. αὐτής] The poetical aorist, used because a point of time is spoken of. Cf. Theet. 150 c: μανέσθαι μὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκαζέ, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκάλυπτων.

ὅταν — χρόνον] “When the number of revolutions which make up the time appointed for the world have now reached their consummation.” Note the hyperbaton of χρόνον, and compare the “number of the state” in Rep. 8, 546, esp. the words ὅταν περὶ τροποὶ ἐκάστους κύκλους περιφορὰς ἐξυπάρκως.

2. τῷ δὲ] Sc. τὸ πᾶν τόδε.

3. ἦν ὑπ’] This is added to explain αὐτόματον. Compare Tim. 30 b: νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχή, ἐπιστήμην δὲ ἐν σώματι ἐξωτικὸ τὸ πᾶν ἐυφυτευκάστερο — οὕτως ὁ πᾶς ὁ δὲ — δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ἐπέμενεν τῇ ἁλη-θείᾳ διὰ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.


ουράνιον καὶ κόσμον] Cf. Phaedr. 245 e: πάντα τε οὐράνιον πάσαι τε γένεσιν.

12. πάρα τοῦ γενεβάστος] Cf. Tim. 37 c: ὁ γενεβαστὸς πατὴρ. ἀτίθαν — σώματος] In the Timeaeus also the body is the source of all imperfection, 86 b: τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς (εἰσόμασι) διὰ σώματος ἐξιν τοιάδε. 13. καὶ σώματος] Cf. Tim. 32 c: σωμάτωσικαὶ δὲ δῆ — δεῖ τὸ γενέμενον εἰναι.
1. κατὰ δύναμιν γε μὴν—κυνεῖται] Compare Laws 7, 821 c, d, where it is said to be impious to attribute an inconstant motion to the sun, moon, and planets. So in the Timeaeus (p. 37) Time is created in order to bring the creature as near as possible to the Eternal archetype.

3. διὸ—παράλλαξιν] Only the most Divine things can be always alike. The Universe, having a body, must suffer change. It moves as nearly as possible always in the same way (but cannot attain perfectly even to this): “Wherefore it hath allotted to it a reverse revolution, as the least possible alteration of its motion.” The reasoning would be more complete if for αὐτῶν we might read ταύτων. Cf. Tim. 36 d, 39 b, c. ἀνακύκλισιν = τὸ ἀνάπτυξιν ἑναῖ super. This meaning is required by the context here and in Rep. 10, 617 b, ἑπανακυκλώμενον: Tim. 40 c, ἑπανακυκλώμενος: I. b. 37 a, ἀνακυκλώμενη, in all which places a retrograde motion is in question. The force of the preposition seems to have been lost in the use of the word by later writers. A homely illustration of Plato’s meaning may be taken from the game of cup and ball: in which, in order to ensure a steady mo-

tion, the ball is spun from right to left, and the player waits until it has begun to re-volve in the opposite direction. The resilience of the string, which is the cause of this, would correspond to the blind impulse (ἀὐτῆς ἐπίθυμω) which makes the universe rebound.

6. τῶν κυριόμενων αὖ πάνων ἡγούμενω] The language of Plato respecting the relation of the individual to the universal soul is not consistent. In the Timeaeus the former is a “particle” taken from the latter. In the Republic and Phaedrus, and less clearly in the Phaedo, the individual personality of each soul is recog-nized. Yet in the passage of the Phaedrus there are some expressions in which the nature of the soul is generalized. Cf. also Legg. 10, 894 c: τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κυρίσεως τίν’ ἀν προκρίναμεν ὁρθότατα πασῶν ἔρρωμενονται τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως; Μυ-ρίῳ ἀνάγκῃ ποιοῦσαν τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν δυναμενὴν κινεῖν. I. b. 12, 966 c: ὁ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πρεσβύτατον τοι καὶ θείοτάτον ἐστὶ πάνων ἄν κύρισεις γένεσιν παραλαβοῦσα ἀνέναιον υἱ-σίαν ἐπόρισεν.

αὖ implies a contrast between the divinest of all things grade. Yet it has the least possible change of motion, when the direction of its rota-

versed. Now it can-
and the leader of all that is in motion. As the former alone can remain always the same, so the latter alone can revolve spontaneously for ever.

The phraseology recalls Phaedr. 245 c, where there is a similar appearance of demonstration. See esp. the words ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σοι κεντὶ τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κανόνων.

A comparison of the above passages leaves little doubt that by the Leader of Motion here is meant Pure Soul in general, of which the Deity, who sustains the universe, is a particular example. The doctrine of the multiplicity of independent souls (Rep. 10, 611 a) is here left out of view. The argument may be thus stated. All that is bodily must suffer change. The Universe suffers the least possible change (or "diverges least from the motion of the same") in revolving on an axis in one plane opposite ways alternately. But the Universe cannot always be the cause of its own motion: only Pure Soul moves spontaneously for ever. Nor can Soul be the cause of diverse and opposite motions. Hence the mighty fabric is not self-moving always, nor always moved by God: nor by two Gods alternately, for, as before stated, spirit cannot be opposed to spirit. There remains only the case which has been given.

7. τὸ ζήν πάλιν ἐπικτόμενον] "Receiving a new influx of life."

8. λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπισκευαστὴν ] The world renews her immortality, which she receives afresh from her Creator’s hand. ἐπισκευαστὴν = repaired, refitted. The word is omitted in Ast’s Lexicon (edition of 1835). Cf. Legg. 5, 738 b: οὔτ’ ἂν κανὴν ἐκ ἀρχῆς τις τοῦτο οὔτ’ ἂν παλαιῶν διεφθαρμένην ἐπισκευάσθηται (πολὺ). The World grown old, like Milton’s hermit-soul, now “Prunes her feathers and lets go her wings,” which, in following her own blind will, “Were all to ruffled and sometimes impaired.”

ἀθανασία] Not merely exemption from death, but goodness, the one immortal thing. Cf. Legg. 4, 713 e: οὔτοι ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἐνεστὶ, τούτῳ πειθομένους.

ἀθανασία — παρὰ τοῦ δημι-
οὐργοῦ]. Here, as in Tim. 41 a, the universe is entirely de-
dependent upon the Creator for immortality. The word δημι-
ουργός in Plato is equivalent to ὁ ἕφναστας, ὁ ἐξαρμάσας, ὁ γεν-
νάσας, and has only the faintest trace of the mystic solemnity
with which it was afterwards invested.

2. δι' ἑαυτῶν] Ensebius has ἑαυτῶι, and the reading of the
Bodleian (with ΔΠ), δι' ἑαυτῶν ἑαυτῶν (sic Boll.), perhaps indi-
cates some confusion. But δι' ἑαυτῶν, signifying that the world
at such a time is the ultimate cause of his own motion, is not
certainly wrong. Cf. Legg. 10, 903 ε.: μεταβαλλεῖ—δι' ἑαυτὴν ἡ
δι' ἑτέρων γνώριμη.

κατὰ καίρον ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦ-
tον] “Being let go at such a
 favourable moment.” It is
ture that supposing the motion
equable, every moment
would be, mechanically speak-
ing, alike. But then other
causes, besides those merely
mechanical, are imagined. The
σύμφωνος ἐπαύθμημα is not a me-
chanical cause. Compare the
“opposite powers” of motion
attributed in the Timaeus (38 d)
to the circle of Mercury and
Venus and that of the Sun.
Two conditions, then, contrib-
ute to make possible the
length of the succeeding period
—the state of the innate im-
pulse at the time at which the

“engine is reversed,” and the
shape and position of the
whole mass. The redundant
form of the sentence in which
both these conditions are ex-
pressed is characteristic of the
later manner of Plato. Stall-
baum has not chosen to ex-
plain his objection to this way
of taking the words.

3. πολλὰς περιόδους μυριάδας]
“Many times ten thousand re-
volutions,” i.e. days, since the
diurnal revolution is the one
most naturally attributed to
the whole Heaven. Cf. Theaet.
153 c: ἐδώς μὲν ἄν ἡ περίφορὰ
ἵνα κυκλήσῃ καὶ ὁ ἀτόμος. Tim.
39 ε.: νῦν μὲν οὐν ἡμέρα τε γέ-
γονεν—ἡ τῆς μίας καὶ φρονιμω-
tάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος.

4. ἵσορροπώτατον] Because it
is the most perfect sphere.

ἐπὶ συμκροτάτου βαίνων πο-
dον] Moving on the smallest
pivot—in fact, a mathemati-
cal point—in modern lan-
guage, the celestial south pole.
Like the Indian tortoise, the
Universe has no surface on
which to rest. The image of
the top, used for another pur-
pose in Rep. 4, 436 d (ὅταν ἐν
τῷ ὁπλῇ πίθανες τὸ κέντρον
περιφέροντα), has probably sug-
gested this expression. The Uni-
verse is like a great humming-
top when “sleeping.” Cf.
Legg. 10, 803 d: καὶ τότε μὲν
ἐστιν ὅτε βάινων ἐνὸς κεκτημένα
τοῖς κέντρον.

self-moved; nor moved
opposite
ways, either by
one Deity
or more
than one,
for mind

* II
NE. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται γ’ οὖν δὴ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως p. 27ον εἰρήσθαι πάντ’ ὅσα διελήλυθασ.

ΞΕ. Λογισάμενοι δὴ ξυννοήσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεχθέντων, ὥστε πάντων ἐφαμεν εἶναι τῶν θαν-μαστῶν αἴτιον. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν δὴ τοῦτ’ αυτό.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν τοτὲ μὲν ἐφ’ ἄ νῦν κυκλεῖται φέρεσθαι, τοτὲ δ’ ἐπὶ τάνατα.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΞΕ. Ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν ἤγεισθαι δεὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν γεγομένων τροπῶν πασῶν εἶναι με- γάστην καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπήν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἐοικε γοῦν.

1. μάλα εἰκότως] The Stranger has indeed spoken with an appearance of artless simplicity well calculated to impose on the imagination of youth.

3. Λογισάμενοι δὴ] “Let us, reasoning on what has now been said, try to comprehend, in all its bearings, the fact which we described as the cause of all the phenomena that have excited our wonder.”


9. Πῶς δὴ;] Badh. “Hac omnia adeo lucida explicata sunt, ut mireris cur Socrates etiamnum hæret, et per illa πῶς δὴ respondeat. Neque vero Hospes dubitantem do- cere dignatur, sed uterius pergit.” One point, however, was not made clear, namely, how the change of the direction of revolution was the cause of the other two tradi-
tions: and it is this which the Stranger (though beginning ἄνωθεν ποθὲν ἀπ’ ἀρχής) proceeds to explain.

10. τῶν περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν γεγο-μένων τροπῶν] The ἀρχή ἡλίου, or solstice, is the change in the apparent motion of the sun’s place on the horizon at rising and setting. Hom. Od. 0, 404 ; Plat. Legg. 12, 945 d. The word ἀρχή is here gene-
ralized and extended so as to include every cardinal change in the celestial motions: in the same lofty spirit in which the Great Year (τέλεος ἐναντός) is spoken of in the Timeus, or as we speak of the year of Saturn or Uranus. The word seems to be used in the same general sense in Tim. 39 d : τῶν ἄστρων ὧν δὲ οὐρανοῦ πο-
ρευμένα ἐπ’ ἄρχῃ τροπᾶς. Compare also Ar. de Celo II. 14, § 1, who says that if the Earth has a double motion there must be τροπαί also of the fixed stars.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

p. 270. ΞΕ. Μεγάλτας τοίνυν καὶ μεταβολὰς χρῆ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι τότε τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν αὐτῶ.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκός.

ΞΕ. Μεταβολὰς δὲ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς καὶ παντοῖας συμφερομένας ἄρ’ οὐκ ἴσιμεν τήν τῶν ζωῶν φύσιν ὦτι χαλεπῶς ἀνέχεται;

d ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὗ;

ΞΕ. Θεραί τοῖνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τότε μέγισται ἐνμβαίνουσι τῶν τε ἄλλων ζωῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὀλίγοι τι περιλείπεται. περὶ δὲ τούτους ἀλλα τα παθήματα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστά καὶ κακὰ ἐμπίπτειν, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε καὶ ἐννέπομενον τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνελίξει, τότε ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν καθεστηκιά ἐναντία γίγνηται τροπῆ.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

2. τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν οἰκούσιν αὐτοῖς] This is one of the inversions or alternations of words with which these dialogues abound.


10. τούτους] Sc. τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων περιλειπόμενοις. γένος om. pr. Π.


12. ἐμπίπτειν “Coincide.” The meaning of ἐξω is prominent, as in ἐξαφανώσεως.

ἐννέπομενον] Following the analogy of the world’s untwisting. Consentaneous with the rebound and reverse motion of the Great Whole.

13. ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν—τροπῆ] τῆς νῦν καθεστηκιά, sc. τροπῆ, which, like the plural τροπαῖς below, 271 c, signifies not only the “turn,” but the cycle of movement which follows. The double meaning of the English word “revolution” nearly corresponds to this ambiguity of τροπῆ. “When there occurs the transition to the cycle opposite to that in which we live.”

* Η 2

by itself, like a huge and perfectly-balanced top, revolving on the finest peg. This change is, as it were, the solstice of the great year. And this crowning change involves many lesser changes, destructive to the animal economy. Hence many creatures perish, and of mankind also but
The page contains a passage from Plato's dialogue, discussing the concept of youth and aging. The text is a philosophical exploration of the physical and mental changes that occur as life progresses. The dialogue reflects on the appearance and characteristics of youth, contrasted with the aged, and touches on the discontinuity of time and life. The text is rich with philosophical reflections on the nature of change and the inevitability of aging. The discussion is interwoven with references to other Greek philosophers and writers, such as Aristotle, who explored similar themes in their writings.
270. Λευνομέναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν παρελθοῦσαν ὄραν ἐκα-
στον καθίστασαν, τῶν δὲ ἡβούντων τὰ σώματα λευ-
νόμενα καὶ σμικρότερα καθ’ ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ἐκ-
ἀστην γιγνόμενα πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς παιδὸς
φύσιν ἀπῆλθε, κατὰ τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
ἀφομοιόμενα: τὸ δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη μαρανόμενα κο-
μιδῇ τὸ πάμπαν ἐξηφανίζετο. τῶν δ’ αὐτίκως
tελευτώτων ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τὸ τοῦ νεκροῦ [σῶμα],
tαύτα ταῦτα πάσχον παθήματα διὰ τάχους, ἀδηλοῦ ἐν
ὄλιγαις ἡμέραις διεφθείρετο.

NE. Σ.Ω. Γένεσις δὲ δὴ τὶς τὸτ’ ἡν, ὥς ἀνευ, ὡςών;
καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐγεννώντο;
ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων
οὐκ ἦν ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, τὸ δὲ ὅν γγε-
νεῖς εἶναι ποτε γένος λεξθεῖν, τοῦτ’ ἦν τὸ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον

φθορὰ, which follows the great
trophi, has now been described,
and we are next informed as
to the mode in which the
Earth replenishes herself. The
existing generation being thus
"compounded with dust," the
Earth, which had previously
lain fallow, began to produce
her crop of heroes.
6. ἀφομοιόμενα] Badham
ingeniously conjectures ἄπο-
μειοίμενα. But the ellipse is
easily borne.
7. τῶν τελευτώτων—τὸ τοῦ
νεκροῦ [σῶμα] For the re-
dundant genitive with the change
of number, cf. Phædo 62 a: oὐδὲ ποτὲ τυχίσαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
—ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ ὧς, where much
needless difficulty has arisen.
The notion of the backward
current being communicated
to the process of animal life
illuminates the ancient concep-
tion of motion as including
change. σῶμα om. Bodl. ΔΠ.
13. τὸ—ἐξ ἀλλήλων—γεννώ-
μενον] Sc. γενός, or perhaps,
as sometimes happens, the ac-
tion of the verb is made the
subject of the passive voice.
For this, cf. Soph. 221 a: τὸ
—ἀναστάμενον. In that case
the concrete is put for the
abstract—τὸ γεννώμενον for τὸ
γεννάσθαι.
14. ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει] "Had
no place in the course of na-
ture which then obtained."
For a similar use of φύσις, cf.
Phædo 103 b: τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
τὸ — γγνεῖς εἶναι ποτὲ γενός
λεξθεῖν] "The earth-born
race, of whose former existence we
have heard."
15. τοὺρ’ ἦν] "Was this, was
that which we have just hinted
at and are now to describe." I.e.
τὸ ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον.
The bodies which Earth has absorbed she gives forth again to be the habitations of other souls. It appears certain from infr. 273 (however strange the conception) that the γαίεσι are born like the army of Cadmus, in full maturity, and then follow the stages which are here described: first attaining to early manhood, then to youthful prime, and then to childhood, and so disappearing from the Earth: old age being literally unknown, as in the description of Hesiod.

3. ρεμφόρα] Not "period" but "revolution" = the time during which the Universe revolved in the former way. Cf. supr. a, τῇ τότε φύσει: infr. 274 c, τὸν ἐκ τῆς νῦν ρεμφόρας καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα.

4. ἐγειτόνου] "Were neighbours to"—i.e. next in point of time. Our first ancestors lived in the times immediately succeeding the end of the former motion. ἔτι νεωτί τοῦ Δίως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἠχοιντος, Gorg. 523 b.

5. τῶν χρόνων ἐκ γῆς πάλιν ἀναστρεφόμενον, ἀπεμη—p. 271 monovετο δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων τῶν πρώτων, οἱ τελευτώσι μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιφορᾷ τῶν ἐξῆς χρόνων ἐγειτόνους, τῆς φέρετ' ἀρχας ἐφόντο τῷ τούτων γὰρ οὕτω κήρυκες ἐγένοντ' ἦµῖν τῶν λόγων, οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται. τὸ γὰρ ἐντεύθεν, ὃμαί, χρὴ ἐξυνοφεῖν. ἔχομενον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ τῶν πρεσβύτατας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἑναὶ φύσιν, ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὐ, κειμένου δὲ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν which is taken, in Tim. 22, 23, to account for the preservation in Egypt of the legend of Atlantis, and the disappearance of the same in Greece.


7. ἔχομενον γὰρ ἐστι τῷ] The dative after ἔχομενον is curious, but ἔχομενον ἐστι is not quite the same as ἐχότα; and the change of τῷ into τοῦ (if a change were required) would be easier and also better than Stallbaum's conjecture of ἐπομένου for ἔχομενον. "For it is of a piece with (hangs together with) the aged men's returning to the nature of infancy that from the dead also," &c.

8. ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων—φυσικοὶ] The irregularity of the construction is caused by a feeling that the dead persons are not the same with those who rise. This does not, however, prevent the sentence from continuing as if τῶν τετελευτ-
ηπότας were the subject. Cf. Thucet. 182 b; ἀλλ' ε' ἄμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγενομένων τάς αισθήσεις καὶ τά αἴσθητα ἀποτικτοῦντα τά μὲν ποιὰ ἀπτὰ γένεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα—where see note. So that the γρηγενεῖς are composed of the elements which have been restored to Earth from the life of the former cycle. The word γρηγενεῖς is a "tertiary predicate." "Being born by generation from the Earth."

1. ἀναβιωσκομένους] "Coming to life again." This, as afterwards appears, is the quickening of a soul which has been "sown" into the earth, infr. 272 e.

ἐπεσθαί, which is commonly inserted before τῇ τροπῇ, is omitted in Boll. ΔΠ. The word is unnecessary, and is very likely to have been added, from conjecture, by some one who thought the apodosis too long deferred.

2. συνανακυκλομένης] Stallbaum, following a hint of Schleiermacher, writes συνανακυκλομένους, which he finds in one MS. (Zittay). But this only increases the obscurity, for the phrase εἰς τάναντα τῆς γενεσίᾳ is hardly intelligible. Γένεσις is here used in the widest and most abstract sense for the general process of Nature, the current of which is reversed with the motion of the Sphere (τῇ τροπῇ = the change of motion), whence the old grow young, and the buried rise from earth again: diminution taking the place of growth, and generation of decay. See, for a parallel notion in modern poetry, "The thoughts of men are widened with the process of the Suns," and cf. infr. 273 c: τὰν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν γένεσιν οὖν, 274 e: τῆς νῦν περιφορᾶς καὶ γενεσίων. Also Phaedr. 245 e: πάντα τα οἴρανων πάσαν τέ γένεσιν. See also Tim. 82 c: ὅταν ἀνασαλῆ ἡ γένεσις τούτων πορεύσαι, τότε ταύτα διαφθείρεται. Badham, rejecting ἐπεσθαί, conj. ἤκειν for ἐκεῖ. But cf. Prot. 320 d: τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ θυτὰ γένη) θεοὶ γῆς ἐνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίζαντες κ.τ.λ.


δόσου μὴ—ἐκόμισεν] Who they were that were thus exempted from the cycle of nature may be gathered from Phaedo 82 c: εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσατε καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶς ἀπτέντι ὄν δέμιος ἀδεινείθαί τις ἂν τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. Cf. Phaedr. 249 a.

5. αὐτῶν] Ι. ε. of those who should have been born. The elements which should have been united with the soul are identified in the language with the soul herself.
NE. ΣΩ. Κομιδή μὲν οὖν τοῦτο γε ἐπεταί τοῖς p. 271, ἐµπροσθεν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου φῆς εἶναι δυνάµεως, πότερον ἐν ἐκείναις ἢν ταῖς τροπαῖς ἡ ἐν ταῖς ἀστρον ή τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ τῶν ἑλίου μεταβολήν δὴλον ὡς ἐν ἐκάτεραις ἐξυπηρετεί ταις τροπαῖς γίγνεσθαι.

ΞΕ. Καλῶς τῷ λόγῳ ἰδιαρηκολούθηκας. ὁ δ’ ἤρων περὶ τοῦ πάντα αὐτοίματα γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἄν- ιθρόποις, ἦκιστά τῆς νῦν ἐστὶ καθεστηκίας φορᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἦν καὶ τούτο τῆς ἐµπροσθεν. τότε γὰρ αὐτῆς πρῶτον τῆς κυκλῆσεως ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος ὅλης ὁ θεός,-† ὑσ τῶν  νυν] κατὰ τόπους ταύτων τούτο, ὑπὸ θεῶν

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν βίων] The fable of the γγγενείς has been applied: the application of the story of Atreus is evident: it only now remains to find a place for the legend of the golden age: when κάρπων ᾔφερε ξέδωρος ἀρνοῦρα αὐτομάτη. In that former cycle the spontaneous productiveness of the Earth was as apparent in the vegetable as in the animal kingdom.

3. ταῖς τροπαῖς] The plural marks the concrete form of expression, as in μέσαι νύστες.

10. αὐτῆς—κυκλῆσεως] “For first the whole revolution was itself guided by the Divine care,” αὐτῆς gives emphasis to κυκλῆσεως as opposed to τὰ ζωά. I. e. The universal movement which involves all else.

11. ἐπιμελούμενος] It is perhaps implied that he acts only through the inferior deities.

12. † ὑσ τῶν νυν—διελημένα] The general meaning of this appears from infr. 272 c: ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους συνάρχοντες τῷ μεγίστῳ διάµοι θεόι. But the exact construction is not obvious, Stallbaum proposes to read ὃς δὲ νῦν—πάντ’ ἢν—διελημένα. The words as they stand, however, will afford the same sense without any torture, by supposing μέρη to be, like τον κολοφώνα in Theod. 153 c, or δόο μέρη infr. 283 e, a cognate accusative in apposition, expressing the mode of the action of ἦρχεν. “The parts of the universe every way being divided under the rule of deities, just as is now the case in certain parts.” (ὡς τῶν κατὰ τόπους ταύτων τούτῳ sc. γίγνεται.) This last idea, though hardly consistent with the general spirit of the myth, receives some illustration from Legg. 5. 747 e, where the superiority of the inhabitants of particular regions is attributed to a Divine influence: ὥς οἷς θεία τις ἐπιπνοι καὶ λαμψάνων λῆξεσ εἶν. Compare Milton, Comus, 18—29.

Plaedo 111 c: καὶ δὴ θεῶν ἐδή—ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς
Deities, each of whom was all-sufficient for his own flock in all things. Then was nothing wild: no devouring one another: no war or discord of any kind. All
same belief in a past theocracy is expressed in the Laws, with a similar allusion to the Saturnia regna, and is used to point the same lesson,—that a paternal government, as mankind are now constituted, is a visionary dream, and that the rule of Law, devised by reason, which is all which remains to us of Divine guidance, is the best available substitute; 4, 713 c: οἷς νῦν ἡμεῖς δρόμεν τοῖς πομπίσσοι καὶ ὅσοι ἡμεροί εἰσιν ἄγελας ὧν βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ ἀγές αἰγῶν ἁρχοντα ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖς τιμᾶ, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν διεστόμεν, ἁμεῖν ἐκείνων γένους. ταύτων δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὑπὲρ τῶν γένεων ἁμεῖν ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς βαστάσθην ψυλλῆς δ' ἡμῖν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ἡμῶν, εἰρήνη τε καὶ αἰῶνα καὶ εὐφυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμεναι ἀστάσσεται καὶ εὐδαιμονία τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν ἄπειρος γένος.

2. 3. πολιτεία] Forms of government are rendered superfluous by the presence of a Supreme Will.

7. The apodosis is broken off through the expansion of this clause by an afterthought, and is resumed in κάρποις δὲ infr. Compare with this passage the description in the Protagoras, p. 321, of the state of man before the introduction of the arts of life; and Glaucon's ὅν τολμάς in the Republic, 2, 372. The absence of property and marriage in the perfect state is again mentioned in the well-known passage of the Laws, 5, 739.

4. ἀνεβιώσκων] Rising from the dust of former generations. Cf. supr. 271 b.

5. οὐδὲν μεμημένοι] Having been steeped in the river of forgetfulness, Rep. 10, 621 e: and therefore ignorant of all previous relationships.


9. ἐνύμονον] "Lived under their shepherd's care."
272. μοντοτ: το γάρ των ὄρων αυτῶν ἄλυπον ἐκέκρατο, μαλακάς δὲ εὐνάς εἶχον ἀναφυμενής ἐκ γῆς πόδας ἃ ἁφθόνου. τῶν δὲ βίων, Ὑ Σῶκρατες, ἀκώιεις μὲν τῶν τῶν ἀπὶ Κρόνου τόνυ 

νόω, ὅν μόλος ἐπὶ Δίως εἶναι, τῶν νῦν παρὼν αὐτὸς ἤγαθησαι. κρύιαι δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἂρ ἃν δύναί τε καὶ ἐθελήσειας;

NE. ΣΩ. Οὐδάμως.

ΞΕ. Βούλει δήτα ἐγώ σοι τρόπων τινὰ διακρίνω;

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν ὄν. Ὡν.

ΞΕ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνων οἱ τρόφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου, πα-10


3. ἀκώιεις μὲν] Subaud. ἤγαθησαι δὲ οὖ ("although you have not seen").

4. ὃν μόλος — εἰμὶ] ὅν ὡς CH ῥε B ὡς et. C. This probably implies the same feeling of half-courage or solemn respect towards the popular religion which appears in Tim. 40 d. To Plato the mythology of his countrymen was but a rumour, an echo from the past.

5. παρὼν] "As an eye-witness." So the word is frequently used (pleonastically as here) by Sophocles, e.g. Οἰδ. Col. 1587.

κρύιαι δὲ—τῶν εὐδαιμονέστερον] Compare the judgment between the just and unjust life in Rep. 2, 360 d, and between pleasure and knowledge in Phileb. 52 e.

8. τρόπων τινὰ] I. e. hypothetically.

10. Εἰ μὲν—χρείας] Compare with the doubt here expressed as to the happiness of the golden age, the rejection in the Republic (2, 372) of the simple or primitive state as a basis for the definition of justice. The picture of an earthly paradise has been purposely heightened, in order to enforce the remark that this is not the chief good of man. Cf. Euthyd. 289 b: οὐδὲ γε εἰ τις ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὡστε ἀδικάτως ποιεῖν ἀνεύ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀδικασίᾳ χρήσασθαι, οὐδὲ τοιἀσθ ἐκεῖν ὀβέλος οὐδείς. See also Lys. 221 e: Ποτέρων, ὃν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς Δίως, ἐὰν τὸ κακόν ἄπλοσθαι, οὐδὲ πειρήμι ἐτὶ ἐστιν οὐδὲ δυψὺν, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιῶν κ.τ.λ. The identification of the king with the shepherd, and the notion of a theocracy, to which Plato here inclines, but which he rejects as unsuited to the present state of man, seem to be of Pythagorean origin. Cf. Pythagor. Fr. § 2. (Mullach p. 533): "Ἐχεῖ δὲ καὶ ὃς θεῖς πολίν βασιλεῖς πρὸς πόλιν, καὶ ὃς πόλις πολίν κόσμον, βασιλεῖς πρὸς βασιλεῖν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφερόντων συναρμοσθείσα κόσμῳ συντάξαν καὶ ἄρμονιαν μεμίμαται, ὃ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀρχιν ἔχων ἀνυπεύθυνον, καὶ αὐτῶς ὃν νόμος ἐλπίσχει, βεῖς..."
The flock or charge (lit. 'nurslings') of Krónos." The name is peculiarly applicable in the present case, where the Deity in charge not only governs, but attends to all the varied wants of those whom he governs, αὐτάρκης ὅλος οὖσα αὐτός νέμει. So also in Rep. and Laws, those for whose education the speakers are providing are spoken of by the same affectionate name. Rep. 7, 520 d: 'Απεισθήσαναν ἦμιν οἱ τρόφιμοι; Legg. 7, 804 a: ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους τροφίμους δεῖ.

2. ἀλλὰ καὶ θερίων] The traces of this in the regular mythology were few. (Cf. however, the stories of Procris, Philomela, and the like.) But the Fables of Ἑσώπ, and the cycle to which they belonged — partly invented to please the childish imagination, but probably not without suggestions from Egypt and the East — were sufficient to suggest the idea to Plato. See also Porphyry. V. Pythag. 19: (Πυθαγόρας φιλεῖ) ὅτι πάντα τὰ γεγονότα ἐκ νουτείς ἀναγεννησάται τοῖς φυσώσαι τινά τις ἑδύναμις ἠγαθότο τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγωμὸν φρονήσεως,
The same conception of inquiry, as a conversation with the object of study, appears in Legg. 3, 689 c: πάσας ὥς ἐποι εἰπείν διηρήτηκα τὰς κοινωνίας. “Inquiring from every nature, to see if one having some peculiar power had perceived something different from the rest which might be gathered into wisdom’s treasury.”


3. οἶα] Flor. b. Ven. Ξ. ὀι. In either case μεθοῦ is to be supplied as the subject of λέγοντα. 6. ὃ οὖν] But to resume.

7. ποτέρως] The clause depends on the verbal notion in μηνυτῆς.

9. τὸν μύθον ἤγείραμεν] “We have waked from long slumber a ghost which seems unwilling to be laid.” Cf. Rep. 5, 346 a: ὅσον λόγον πάλιν κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας!—οἷς ἔστε ὅσον ἐσμένι λόγων ἐπεγείρετε.


11. πάντων τούτων χρόνος] “The time required for all that has been described.”


13. πάσας — ἀποδεδωκυνάς] “Having completed her pro-

...
per cycle of births." For Plato's doctrine of transmigration, see Phaedo 82, 113, 114; Rep. 10, 618–620; Phaedr. 248, 249; Tim. 42. According to the Phaedrus (248 c), the period here spoken of must be at least 10,000 years. Empe-docles and Pindar speak of 30,000. 'Τρίς μὲν μυράς ὄρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλληλοῦθαι.

1. ὅσα—πεσούσης] "Having fallen in so many sowings into the earth as it was appointed unto each (to fall):" i.e. having been sown in earth so many times. These words have occasioned some difficulty. Cornarius, followed as usual by Stephanus, read καί ὅσα, but the clause is explanatory of the preceding, and hence the asyndeton. (Modestus cautusque quum alias tum in Platonite criticus Stephanus, interdum tamen, ubi Ficinum Cornariumve tenerè sequitur, adècò sui est dissimilis vix ut virum agnoscas. Heindorf.) Most MSS. have προσατεθίνετος αὐτά. Badh. conj. ὅσα ἐν ἐκάστῃ τὰ προσατεθίνετα, τοσαύτα εἰς γήνα σπέρματα ἐσιρώσης. And the Zurich editors, adopting a conjecture of Sauppe's, read γῆς σπέρματα ("having fallen into so many germs of earth"). But the clod cannot be called a germ until united with a soul. The soul is rather the seed implanted in the earth. Stallbaum suggests two renderings, making τοσαύτα σπέρματα equivalent either to κατὰ τοσαύτα σπέρματα, or to ὡς τοσαύτα σπέρματα, the accusative in the latter case being put for the genitive by attraction from ὅσα. The latter alternative is to be rejected, not only because of the harshness of this attraction, but because no one who wished to say "a soul must be born so many times from the earth," would think of expressing himself thus, "a soul must fall into the earth as so many seeds." In the former Stallbaum has perhaps (for he speaks obscurely) indicated the true rendering: according to which σπέρματα retains more than usual of a verbal signification (cf. the unusual meaning of θρέμα, inf. 289 b), and is in the accusative cognate after πεσούσης, while εἰς γῆν depends partly on πεσούσης, but directly and chiefly on σπέρματα. The sense becomes clear when σπαρεῖσης is substituted in thought for πεσούσης. If Plato had written τοσαύτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα σπαρεῖσης (or πτώματα πεσούσης, cf. Æsch. Prom. 921), there could have been no doubt as to his meaning. Cf. Legg. 8, 841 d: ἀνθιά δὲ παλλακῶν σπέρματα μὴ σπείρων, μηδὲ ἄγωνα ἀρρένων παρὰ φυσιν: and compare Tim. 41 e: δέν δὲ σπαρεῖσης αὐτάς (τὰς ψυχὰς) εἰς τὰ πρωθύκατα ἐκάσταις ἐκάστα ἄργανα χρῶνον φῶνα ξώνων τὸ θεοεξίστατον. Ιb. 42 d: ἔσπειρε τοὺς μὲν εἰς γῆν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς σελήνην, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τάλλα ὅσα ἄργανα χρῶνον, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τῶν σπόρον τοὺς νέος παρέδωκε θεὸς σῶματα πλάτεων θυρεό τ.υ.λ. Thus the souls are sown into the earth and there a body is given to each. The verbal meaning of σπέρμα (= the act of sowing, not the seed,) occurs in Hes.
Op. et D. 779, σπέρματος ἄφρος,

and Soph. Ed. Tyr. 1246, μνήμεν παλαιῶν σπερμάτων ἔχουσα. See Passow's Lex. s. v. Although the imagery is different, the word πεσοῦσης recals not only the passage of the Timæus just quoted (41 c), but the prime calamity of the soul described in the Phædrus. The above rendering is also given by C. F. Hermann. This additional reason for the termination of the cycle gives fresh plausibility to the story.

1. τοῦ παντός ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης τοῦ παντός heads the sentence, displacing μὲν, because the Universe is the real subject of all that follows.

2. πηδαλίων οἴκακος] “The tiller of the helm.” The οἶκας was the part of the steering apparatus next the steersman’s hand (Pollux, I. 89; cf. Aesch. Ag. 649, οἴκακος ἔγωγ). The prevention of this function by the πηδαλίων οἴκακος is only a moralizing device.

3. εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπῆν ἀπίστη] “Retired to his own pinnacle of contemplation.” Cf. Hom. II. Η. 8, 23, 451; Od. κ. 146. The conception of the Timæus is more elevated (42 e): καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἀπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἰθα. Though the idea of place is almost entirely absent here, it may be remembered that the central fire of the Pythagoreans was called Δίως φιλακῆ; and we may recall the νότων τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which is the vantage-ground of speculation in the Phædrus.

4. εἰμαρμένη] Cf. ἐδει above, and the necessity pointed out in p. 269 d, e. Cf. Tim. 47 c, sqq.: μεμερμένη γὰρ ὦν ἢ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ αὐτοῦς τε καὶ τοῦ συντάσσεσθαι ἐγεννήτη. σύμφωνος ἐπιθυμή] This “in- nate proclivity” may be compared with the blind principle of spontaneous motion alluded to in Tim. 30 a: πᾶν οὖν ἢν ὀρατῶν παραλοξον οὐχ ἑνικινθάν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινουμένων πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀπάνως. It is to be observed that this has a direction opposite to the will of God.

5. οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους—θεοὶ] It is evident from this that the government of the several regions was not wholly committed to the subordinate deities. The Divine operation, immediate on the whole, was at once immediate and mediate in every part. If the text of 251 e is sound, there is a false echo in κατὰ τοὺς τόπους—since κατὰ τόπους, in the former passage as it now stands expresses the partial nature of the Divine superintendence in the present, and not its distribution in the former, cycle. The language resembles Phædr. 246 e: τοῦ δ’ ἐπεται στρατιά δεόν τε καὶ δαιμόνων κατὰ ἐνθέκα μέρη κεκοσμη-
memory served, his father's instruction. But he forgot this by degrees, from being enclosed in a "muddy venture of decay," which clung to him from the chaos out of which he was at first first


1. τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμων θεοί] Badham conjectures τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονες θεός. Cf. supra. 271 d, in infr. 274 b, Legg. 8, 848 c: θεόν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπώμενων θεοῖς διαμόσων. Ib. 7, 821 a: τῶν μεγίστων θεῶν καὶ ὅλων τῶν κύσμων. See however supra. 271 d, e, where δαίμων and θεοί are interchanged.

4. ἀρχής τε καὶ τελ. — ὀρμηθέας] "Having received an impulse opposite, both in respect of beginning and end,"—the πόθεν and the παῖ. This of course happens when a circular motion is reversed: and aggravates the violence of the immediate shock. Had the world "gone off at a tangent," the beginning would have been the former end, but the end not the former beginning.

5. ἡλιοω αὐθοφόρων] Supr. 270 c.

8. εἰς τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον] The vibrations are supposed to cause a temporary perturbation or nutation of the circular motion, as in a top that is not "asleep."

The notion of vast cycles is assumed in the Laws. Cf. 3, 680 a, where the first survivors of the flood are called οἱ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς περιούχη γεγονότες. Ib. 6, 782 a: πόλεων συντάκτων καὶ φθοράς καὶ ἐπιτηδείως παντοτό θαξίωσε τε καὶ ἀταξίας καὶ βρώσεσ καὶ παράκατων έμι καὶ βρομάτων ἐπιθυμήματα παντοδαπά πάντως καὶ περὶ πάσαν τῆς γῆς ἄρ ὁ οἶκος γεγονείαι καὶ στροφὰς ὀρῶν παντοτός, εὖ αίς τὰ ζώα μεταβάλλων αὐτῶν παμπληθές μεταβολᾶς εἰκὼς; εἰς τε —κατακοσμημένον] "Settling down into his accustomed course." Cf. Rep. 8, 560 a: αἰδοίς τοιού ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ μέσου ψυχῆ—κατακοσμήθη πάλιν. Supr. 271 c. Qu. an. omittend. τε?
273. τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομημονεῦσών διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν. κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αὐτίον, τὸ τῆς πάλας ποτὲ φύσεως ἔντροφον, ὅτι τολλῆς ἢν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικείται. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέτος πάντα τὰ καλὰ κέκτηται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἐμπροσθεν ἔξεως, ὅσα καὶ ἀδικα εὔν ὑπαραγό γίγνεται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτῶ τε ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ζωόις ἐναπεργάζεται. μετὰ 10 μὲν οὖν τοῦ κυβερνήτου τὰ ζωὰ τρέφων εὐ αὐτῶ σμικρὰ μὲν φλαῦρα, μεγάλα δὲ ἐνέτικτεν ἀγαθά· χωρίζομεν δὲ ἐκείνου τῶν ἐγγύτατα χρόνον οὐλ τὴς

1. πατρὸς] Cf. Tim. 28 e, 37 d. The word is used here for the sake of the metaphor, "Calling to mind his father's instruction;" as in Tim. 42 ε: νοῦσαντες οἱ παιδεῖ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διάταξιν, μιμούμενοι τῶν σφέτερον δημιουργον.

3. ἀμβλύτερον] "With less sharpness and precision," as if making an inferior copy of some masterpiece of sculpture or painting, or, "with diminished powers," "with less insight," "with less keenness of vision." The latter is more probable.

4. τούτων δὲ — ἀφικέσθαι] "Now this falling off comes to the world from the bodily element of her composition, which was inherent in her primal nature, since this partook of much disorder, before attaining the present organised form." Cf. Tim. 30 a: πάν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατῶν παραλαβῶν οὐχ ἡπτυχίων ἄγου ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμέλως καὶ ἀπάτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ὑγαγον ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. ὡς—ἀφικέσθαι is epexegetic of the previous clause. For the identity of the ὁρατόν and σωματοειδές, cf. Phaedo 80 c: τὸ ὁρατὸν αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. Several MSS., including ΔΠ, have μέτοχον.

8. παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἐμπροσθεν ἔξεως] Thus a time is imagined before the alternate cycles began. Compare the thought in Rep. 10, 613, of the just man: ὅσα γε ἀπὸ δεόν γένεται, πάντα γέμεθαι ὡς οἷον τε ἀριστα, εἰ μὴ τὶ ἄναγκαιον αὑτῷ κακῶν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπήρξειν.

παρὰ δὲ — ἔξεως, ἐς ἐκείνης] The expression at first corresponds to παρὰ μὲν—τοῦ συνθέτου, but when resumed for the sake of emphasis in a pronominal form, is more strictly adapted to the immediate context.

13. τῶν ἐγγύτατα χρόνον ἄξιον brought by his Creator: from whom he derives all that he has of good: and in conjunction with whom, in that former cycle, the evil within him is reduced to a minimum. But that guiding hand being withdrawn, as forgetfulness increases the ancient

* K
The influence of the old habit of disorder also gains a greater ascendancy." Plato's use of πάδος, as of γένεσις, is often difficult to render from its generality. Cf. Theat. 193 d.

4. ἐξανθεῖν] "Breaks out into full bloom." Sc. τὸ τῆς ἀναρμοστίας πάδος. Cf. infr. 310 d: τελευτῶσα δὲ ἐξανθεῖν παντάπασι μανίας. Aesch. Pers. 821: οὕρις γὰρ ἐξανθεῖν ἐκάρπισαν σταχίνων ἄτρη. So Stallb. and Passow s.v. In what follows, the sentence returns to the general subject, ὁ κόσμος. The other rendering, however, deserves notice; in which ὁ κόσμος is the subject of ἐξανθεῖν, which is explained to mean "leaves blossoming," "ceases to produce anything good."

5. πολλὴν—ἐπεγκερανύμενον] "Administering evil to itself in large measure." ἐπεγκερανύμενον, lit. "pouring into itself additionally." The world is a great vessel, in which different elements are mixed: and during this cycle is itself the author of the mixture. (κράσιν, abstract for concrete). Or perhaps the participle is passive, "Receiving large admixture of evil." (The passive of a verb which governs the dative in the active voice appears in Rep. 1, 337 a, and Legg. 11, 925 e, 926 a, 937 b.) For the image, cf. Rep. 8, 562 c: πόλις ελευθερίας διψήφασα κακῶν οἰνοχόον προστατοῦντων τύχη κ.τ.λ. For the force of the prefix in ἐπεγκερανύμενον, cf. ἐπεγχέω, e. g. Ἑσchin. Ag. 1137.

6. διαφθοράς] This word, if alone, would have been passive, but by the addition of the genitives is turned to an active meaning.

8. κηδόμενοι [ίνα μὴ] "In care for the world that it may not" &c. A similar feeling appears in Legg. 2, 653 c: θεοὶ δὲ οἰκείοικες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώ- πων ἐπισονοῦ πεφυκὼν γένος — Μοῦσας Ἀθηναίων τε μουσηγήτριν καὶ Διώνυσον ἑυνεοτραπέζα ἔδωσαν, ὡς ἐπανορθῶντας τὰς τροφὰς γενο- μενάς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιταῖς μετὰ θεῶν.

9. [ίνα μὴ — δὴν] "Lest being tossed with tempest it might be shaken in pieces and
founder in the abyss of dissimilitude.” For a glimpse of the darkening path towards this limbo of “chaos come again,” see Parm. 165; Tim. 48 e–52 d. In the chaos of Anaxagoras, the ὠμομορφεία were at least latent; but to this new and worse chaos even this degree of consistency is denied. The words ἀπειρον ἄντα recall Pythagorean associations.

1. τόπον has been objected to. Stallbaum would read πότον, and M. Wagner, in the Rheinishe Museum, has suggested τυπόν, which is too abstract for the context (καθεμασθεὶς—δύν). Stallbaum’s objection (Displicet istud τόπον, quo metaphorae elegantia persumdatur) forgets the difference between metaphor and allegory. The vagueness of τόπος in Plato’s use (= “region”) exactly suits the passage. Cf. Theet. 176 a; Phaedr. 247 c, 274 d; Soph. 254 a; Rep. 6, 508 c, 7, 516 b, 532 d, 10, 614 c.

πάλιν—γεγομένου] “Again presiding at the helm.” ἐφεδρος not = “successor,” (Ast. Lex. s. v.,) but according to the tragic use with the genitive, “seated on or at.”

3. ἐν τῇ—περιώδῃ] “In the former circuit which the world made by himself.” καθ’ ἐαυτὸν depends on the verbal notion in περιώδῃ.

4. στρέφας] “Having reversed.” Not only arresting decay, but causing growth: τῇ τροπῇ συνανακυκλομένης εἰς τὰναντία τῆς γενέσεως, as before.

5. τέλος ἀπάντων εἰρήτα ς] Our account of each recurring cycle is complete. “The wheel is brought full circle.”

7. ἵκανον] Subaud. ἧμιν λέγειν.

ἐκ τοῦ πρὸσθεν ἄπτομένου τοῦ λόγου] “Taking hold of the story by the previous part.” I. e. attaching what we have to say to an earlier point in the fable, viz. the φθορά mentioned in 273 a, as ensuing on the change from the obedient to the self-directed movement of the world.

καὶ νὰ τὰναντία ἀπεδίδου τοὺς τότε. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ 273
σμικρὸτερὸς ὁλὸγον δέοντα ἡφανύσθαι τῶν ἵων ἁξάνετο, τὰ δὲ ἐκ γῆς νεογενῆ σώματα πολλὰ φύντα
πάλιν ἀποθηνύσκοντα εἰς γῆν κατῆκε. καὶ τὰλλά τε
5 πάντα μετέβαλλεν, ἀπομιμοῦμενα καὶ ξύνακολον— τοῦ 274
θοῦντα τῷ τοῦ παντὸς παθήματι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς
κυψέως καὶ γεννήσεως καὶ τροφῆς μύμης συνείπτετο
tοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης. οὐ γὰρ ἔξεν ἔτ’ ἐν γῇ δὲ
ἐτέρων συνιστάντων φύσει σὺνων, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ
τὸ κόσμῳ προσετέκατο αὐτοκράτορα εἶναι τῆς αὐτοῦ
πορείας, οὕτω δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦς
d’ αὐτῶν, καθ’ ὅσον οἶν μ’ ἕν, φνευν τε καὶ γεννάν
καὶ τρέφειν προσετάττετο ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς.
of δὲ ένεκα ὁ λόγος ὀρμηκε πᾶς, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ νῦν ἐσμέν b

1. καὶ νὰ—τοτε] “Made an
opposite inversion of the phe-
nomena.”

2. τὰ μὲν γὰρ—κατῆκε] Those
who according to the previous
order had risen from earth in
full maturity, and had passed
through the stages of youth
and childhood, and were on
the point of disappearing from
the earth, returned to child-
hood, youth, and manhood;
while those who had been
lately born, and were there-
fore in full maturity, instead of
becoming more youthful,
passed into old age and died
and went below the ground—
so preparing the soil for
the next crop of earth-born men.

3. νεογενῆ] It is to be re-
membered that they are al-
ready full-grown.

πολλὰ φύντα ] “Having
grown grey.” The aorist re-
tains the temporal significa-
tion.

6. τὸ—μύμημα] I. e. τὸ τῆς
—τροφῆς μεμιμημένον συνείπτετο.
d’ ετέρων συνιστάντων] Sc. theōv.
Cf. Tim. 43 a ; Protag. 320 d.

9. φύσει σὺνων] Bodl. ΔΠΥ
ζῶν.

13. ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς] By
a similar entrainement, by an
eddy from the same current.

d’ ἀγωγῆς γεγομένας ἐν τῷ ἀν-
θρώπῳ. As the world is moved,
so human beings are brought
together, by destiny and innate
desire (εἰμαρμένη καὶ σύμφυςον ἐπιθυμία): οὗ γεωμετρικῶς ἀλλ’
ερωτικῶς ἀνάγκαις. (Rep. 5, 458 d.)

5, 473 c : ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (v. l. αὐτῷ)
dὴ εἰμ’ ὁ τῶν μεγάλων προσεταξά-
μεν κύματι. 1b. 7, 532 c : ἐπ’
The opposite of tractable: fierce and unmanageable. Cf. Soph. Οδ. Ρεξ. 1168: πρὸς αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ διὸ τῶν ἡρώων πολλὰ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ διεξελθεῖν γίγνοιτο, εξ ὧν ἐκαστα καὶ ὃς αἰτίας μεταβέβληκε· περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων βραχύτερα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκοντα. τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμουντο ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμε-5 λείας, τῶν πολλῶν αὐ τῆρων, ὡσα χάλεπα τὰς φύ- σεις ἦν, ἀπαγρωμέντων, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες, δημτράζοντο ὡπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐτ' ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἀτεχνοὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους ἦσαν χρόνους, ἀτε τῆς μὲν αὐτομάτης τροφῆς ἐπιλεο-πνείας, πορίζεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοί πω διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν αὐτοὺς χρείαν πρὸτερον ἀναγκάζειν. ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἀπορίαις ἦσαν. ὅθεν δὴ τὰ πᾶλα λεχθέντα παρὰ θεῶν ὡδρα ἡμῖν διδώρηται μετ' ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς καὶ παιδεύσεως, πῦρ μὲν παρὰ Προμηθέως, τέχναι δὲ παρ' Ἡφαίστου καὶ τῆς

αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοστοῦ τέ- λει. Soph. Οδ. Ρεξ. 1168: πρὸς αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ διὸ τῶν ἡρώων πολλὰ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ διεξελθεῖν γίγνοιτο, εξ ὧν ἐκαστα καὶ ὃς αἰτίας μεταβέβληκε· περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων βραχύτερα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκοντα. τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμουντο ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμε-5


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12. The Deity "left not himself without witness." The parts of the Universe were left to guide themselves as far as was possible (εἰς δύναμιν, ἐπιμε-5

ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς] The myth at this point touches closely on that of Protagoras. Prot. 321 c: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνῶν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητων καὶ ἀντρωτῶν καὶ ἀστροτῶν καὶ ἀπόλλων. The whole passage, giving an account of the origin of the arts of life, should be carefully compared with this.

13. διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν — ἀναγκάζειν. "Because no previous necessity had driven them to


15. μετ' ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς] The Deity "left not himself without witness." The parts of the Universe were left to guide themselves as far as was possible (εἰς δύναμιν, ἐπιμε-5

διδαχῆς] The myth at this point touches closely on that of Protagoras. Prot. 321 c: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνῶν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητων καὶ ἀντρωτῶν καὶ ἀστροτῶν καὶ ἀπόλλων. The whole passage, giving an account of the origin of the arts of life, should be carefully compared with this.

16. καὶ τῆς συντέχουσας] Cf. Prot. 321 c: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνῶν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητων καὶ ἀντρωτῶν καὶ ἀστροτῶν καὶ ἀπόλλων. The whole passage, giving an account of the origin of the arts of life, should be carefully compared with this.

17. 40. ὡδρα ἡμῖν διδώρηται μετ' ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς] The Deity "left not himself without witness." The parts of the Universe were left to guide themselves as far as was possible (εἰς δύναμιν, ἐπιμε-5

18. καὶ τῆς συντέχουσας] Cf. Prot. 321 c: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνῶν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητων καὶ ἀντρωτῶν καὶ ἀστροτῶν καὶ ἀπόλλων. The whole passage, giving an account of the origin of the arts of life, should be carefully compared with this.

19. καὶ τῆς συντέχουσας] Cf. Prot. 321 c: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνῶν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητων καὶ ἀντρωτῶν καὶ ἀστροτῶν καὶ ἀπόλλων. The whole passage, giving an account of the origin of the arts of life, should be carefully compared with this.
the olive, the sustaining corn, accompanied with such instruction as was indispen-
sable: and thereafter left them to themselves. Such is the fable which we must now apply.

The myth has brought to light the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ</th>
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<tr>
<td>συντέχνου, σπέρματα δὲ αὐτω παρ’ ἄλλων’ p. 279 a</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| καὶ πάντ’ ὁπόσα τοῦ ἀνθρώπων βίον συγκατα-
| σκεύακεν, ἐκ τούτων γέγονεν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θεῶν, |
| ὅπερ ἔρρηθ᾽ ὑπὸ δὴ, τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐπέλειπεν ἀνθρώ-
| πούς, δὲ ἐαυτῶν δὲ ἐδει τὴν τε διαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν |
| ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦ ἐχειν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος, ὃ ἐξιμιμοῦμενοι τὸν ἀεὶ |
| χρόνον ὑπὸ μὲν οὔτω, τότε δὲ Εἰκίως ζωμέν τε καὶ |
| φύμεθα. καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ τοῦ μύθου τέλος ἐκέτο, ε |
| χρήσιμον δὲ αὐτῶν ποιησόμεθα πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν |
| ὅσον ἡμάρτωμεν ἀποφηνάμενοι τὸν βασιλικὸς τε καὶ |
| πολιτικὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθε λόγῳ. |

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν καὶ πόσον ἀμάρτημα φύσι εἶναι |
| γεγονὸς ἡμῖν; |

ΞΕ. Τῇ μὲν βραχύτερον, τῇ δὲ μάλα γεννανοῦ |
| καὶ πολλῷ μείζον καὶ πλεῦν ἡ τότε. |

| 3. τὸ—ἐκ θεῶν—τῆς ἐπι-
| μελείας | Double constr. with the article, τῆς ἐπιμελείας being added epexegetically. Cf. supr. 271 c: τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁρεθὲν αὐ-
| τομάτων περὶ βίον, |
| 7. ὃ ἐξιμιμοῦμενοι καὶ ἐνέ-
| πόμενοι | Cf. supr. 273 e: ἀπο-
| μιμοῦμενα καὶ ἐφαινολουθοῦντα— |
| μύμα συνεπέστο. ἐξιμ. appears to be added by a sort of a-
| traction from ἐφαιν., by which the dative is in the first in-
| stance governed. It may per-
| haps occur to the student to |
| render ἐξιμιμοῦμενοι “helping |
| the Universe to imitate (the |
| movement of the Divine |
| Hand).” comparing supr. 273 |
| a: τὴν τοῦ δημοσίου καὶ πα-
| τρός ἀπομιμοῦμενον διδαχὴν εἰς χώμαμ, and infr. 293 c, 297 c. |
| And this sense would not be |
| unsuitable to this expression |
| taken singly, and to τὸ τῆς— |
| τροφῆς μὴμα. But these words |
| cannot be interpreted apart |
| from the previous phrase, μετε-
| βαλλεν ἀπομιμοῦμενα καὶ ἐφαι-
| νολουθοῦντα τὸ τοῦ παντὸς παθήματι, |
| which can only be rendered in |
| one way. |
| 9. τέλος ἐκέτο | Cf. Phaedo |
| 77 c; Legg. 4, 717 e. |
| 11. ὅσον ἡμάρτομεν | Cf. 268 |
| b, c: πῶς ἄν οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἄρθροι φανείται καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὁ περὶ 
| τοῦ βασιλείου κ.τ.λ. |
| 15. Τῇ μὲν βραχύτερον | “Our
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. "Ότι μὲν ἐρωτάμενοι τὸν ἐκ τῆς νῦν περι-

φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα καὶ πολιτικών τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας περιόδου ποιμένα τῆς τότε ἀνθρωπίνης

275. ἀγέλης εἴπομεν, καὶ ταῦτα θεὸν ἄντι θυτοῦ, ταῦτα 5

μὲν πάμπολυ παρηνήχθημεν ὅτι δὲ ἐξιμπάσης τῆς

πόλεως ἀρχοντα αὐτῶν ἀπεφήναμεν, ὄντινα δὲ τρόπον

mistake in one way is less im-

portant” (than in another of which we are now to speak —not βρ. ἦ τότε).

(15.) μᾶλα γενναίοιν] “We have erred on a grand scale, and

our error is much more serious and important than I then af-

firmed it to be.” Cf. Phaedr. 257 c: συγχών διαμαρτάνεις. γεν-

ναῖος is often used with reference to size, cf. Rep. 2, 372 b. Our

object was not only to shew that the king has many rivals

amongst his flock, but also to see an image of the “king in

his beauty,” and to establish his sole authority above other

artists. The image is found, however, to transcend the re-

ality of the office in the present order of the world, in which

the statesmen are not Gods but men, whose natures and

training are not far different from those whom they seek to

rule.

(16.) τότε] Sc. ἐφην. In speaking of the king as the

herdsman of men we erred in two ways—first, while truly as-

serting that his rule extended to the whole state, we did not

sufficiently define the man-

ner of his rule; so that our

definition included some func-
tions which belong to other

craftsmen: and secondly, which is of more importance, we con-
fused the Statesman of this

present cycle with the Divine

shepherd of the golden age.

2. τῶν ἐκ τῆς νῦν—γενέσεως

βασιλέα] Cf. Legg. 5, 740 a, where the community of goods

is said to be μείζων ἥ κατὰ τήν

νῦν γίνεσιν καὶ τραφήν καὶ

παιδείαν. Πb. 9, 853 c: ἐπειδὴ δὲ

οὐ, καθάπερ οί παλαιοὶ νομοθέται

θεῶν παιτὶ νομοθετούμενοι τοῖς

ἥρωισιν, ὡς ἄ νυν λόγος, αὐτοὶ τ' ἐκ

θεῶν ὄντες ἀλλοι τε ἐκ τοιοῦ-

των γεγονόσιν ἐνομοθέτουν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωποὶ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων σπέ-

ρμασι νομοθετοῦμεν τὰ νῦν, ἀνεμε-

σπητον δὴ φρο disabilities. k.l.

The same thought is present

also in Legg. 10, 906 : τὰς τῶν

φυλάκων ψυχὰς—κυνῶν ἦ τὰς τῶν

νομείων ἥ—τὰς τῶν παντάπασαν

ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν. Compare

also Parm. 134 d : ὅικαν εἰ

παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἡ ἀκρι-

βεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀκρι-

βεστάτη ἐπιστήμη κ.λ. Arist.

Pol. III. 8 : ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐν ἀν-

θρώποις εἰκός εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον

(τῶν διαφέρουσα κατ' ἀρέτης ὑπερ-

βολή).}

6. παρηνήχθημεν] “Went

astray.” Cf. Phileb. 60 d : el dé

γε παρηνήχθημεν τί τότε, νῦν

ὄστισσοι ἐπαναλαβοῦν ὀρθότερον

εἰπότω.
have confused the modern Statesman with the Divine Shepherd.

The myth was introduced that we might see in a clearer light the image of the king.

1. ταύτη δὲ αὐτῷ δὲ repeated in the apodosis.

2. τὸ μὲν— ἀληθὲς] This was said previously, p. 268 c: οὐ μεντοι ἀπειραγμένοι γε εἰμέν πω δὴ ἀκριβείας κ.τ.λ.

3. τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πόλεως] "Of his rule over the city." In what follows, it is shewn that, although distinguished from others, his function is still supreme.


5. ι. ταύτη δὲ αὐτῷ] The structure of the sentence is slightly altered by the change of subject.

6. τῷ χρυσομένῳ τῶν] I. e. τῷ πολιτικῷ. For a similar formal allusion to the subject of inquiry, cf. Soph. 223 c: οὐ γὰρ τι φαύλης μέτοχών ἔστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν χρυσομένων, ἄλλα εὖ μᾶλλα ποικίλης. Phileb. 50 b: τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. Cf. Gorg. 451 e: οὐδὲν τῶν σαφές. Tim. 49 a: εἰρήται μὲν τάλαβθε, δει δ’ ἐναργεύστερον εἰπεῖν περιάπτου. ΙΙ. ὅπροκήκει, μόνον—προσρήματος] "To whom it belongs, having, in accordance with our image, alone of shepherds and herdsmen the care of human nurture, alone to be thought worthy of this title." The order of the words is peculiar, as is the case frequently throughout these dialogues.
275. μεῖκον ἥ κατὰ βασιλεά εἶναι τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τοῦ θείου e νομεύος, τοὺς δὲ ἐνθάδε νῦν οὖν τοὺς πολιτικοὺς τοῖς ἀρχιμένοις ὁμοίους τε εἶναι μᾶλλον πολὺ τὰς φύσεις καὶ παραπλησιαίτερον παίδειας μετειληφέναι καὶ τροφῆς.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάντως ποι.;

ΞΕ. Ζητήτειοι γε μήν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴησαν οὐθ' ἤπτου οὔτε μᾶλλον, εἰδ' οὖτως εἰτ' ἐκεῖνος περίκας.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΞΕ. Τῆς δὲ πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἢν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ἀυτεπιστακτικὴν μὲν εἶναι [téchn] ἐπὶ ζώους, οὖ μὴν ἀδιὰ γε ἄλλα κοινῆ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχουσαν, καὶ προσεπομεν δὴ τότε εὔθως ἁγελαιοτροφικὴν,—με-μυστεῖα δὲ γὰρ;

NE. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Ταύτης τοίνυν πη διημαρτάνομεν. τὸν γὰρ πολιτικὸν οὐδαμοῦ συνελάβομεν οὐδ' ὄνομάσαμεν, ἀλλ' ήμᾶς ἔλαβε κατὰ τὴν ὄνομασίαν ἐκφυγόν.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τοῦ τὰς ἁγέλας ἐκάστας τρέφεις τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις που πᾶσι μέστη νομεύσι, τῷ πολιτικῷ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον πολὺ] So all the MSS. except Ven. Ξ., which, with the old editions, has πολὺ μᾶλλον. The inversion is perfectly in keeping with the general style. For τῆς, supr., most MSS. have τὸν. And the Bodl. has ἐπιμελείας, with ΔΠ.

7. Ζητήτειο—περίκας] According to the principle laid down in Soph. 227 b, and repeated supr. 266 d, that de minimis aequè ac de maximis curat scientia.

11. ἐπανέλθωμεν] “Let us retrace our steps.”

14. ἁγελαιοτροφική] Supr. 262 e.

17. Ταύτης — διημαρτάνομεν] “Our error lay somewhere in this.” The genitive is governed by πη, and not by the verb.

19. κατὰ τὴν ὄνομασίαν] The verbal noun ὄνομος occurs here for the first time in Greek literature.

* L
We should have spoken more generally of an art of tending.

And then by following the same series of divisions we before employed,

4. ἢν—ἐξῆν—ἐσήμαινεν] The imperfect is used because we are imagining what might have been done.
6. θεραπευτικὴν—ἐπιμελητικὴν] The prefix ἄγελαος- is to be resumed in thought with each of these words.
8. ὡς κατὰ πάντων] “For the general expression”—“for the generic name.”
δεῖν om. Bodl. ΔΠ.
12. ἐγίγνετ'] Bodl. ἐγίγνετ'.
13. Κατὰ ταύτα—τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Note the resumption.
15. ἀμίκτους τε καὶ ἀκεράτους] Thus the twofold distinction is resumed. Supr. 265 d.
τοῖς αὐτοῖς—ἐν τῷ λόγῳ] “Dividing by means of these same differences the care of herds also, we should have comprehended in the terms of our definition alike the present kingship (τὴν νῦν βασιλείαν) and the royal dignity which existed in the time of Kronos.” Although the former term excluded one of these, that now employed includes them both.
16. ἄγελαιοκομικῇ ἢς] A various reading in both places is -νομικ-. The word ἄγελαιοκομική is of course invented for the occasion. ἄγελαιοκομίς would be derived, like ἰπποκόμος (v. supr. 261 d), from κομίς or κοιμίς, in the sense of “tending.”
"If the name had been thus expressed under the form of tendance, we clearly should not
276. τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλείαν περιείληφότες ἂν ήμεν ὁμοίως εὖ τῷ λόγῳ.

NE. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται: ζητῶ δὲ αὐτὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτο; ΞΕ. Δὴ λογον ὧτι λεγήσασσος οὐτω τοῦ τῆς ἁγελαίων κομίκης ὀνόματος οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἐγένεθ' ἡμῖν τὸ τινας ἄμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐδ' ἐπιμέλεια τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ τότε δικαίως ἡμισυμβάσισθη μηδεμίαν εἶναι τέχνην εἰ ἡμῖν ἀξίαν τούτου τοῦ θρητικοῦ προσφήματος: εἰ δ' οὖν τις εἰπ' πολλοί πρότερον αὐτῆς καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἡ τινί τῶν βασιλέων.

NE. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Ἐπιμέλεια δὲ γε ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσης κοι-νονίας οὐδεμία ἂν ἐθελήσειν ἐτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ προτέρα* τῆς βασιλικῆς φάναι καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἄνθρωποι ἀρχῆς εἶναι τέχνη.

NE. ΣΩ. Λέγεις ὁρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Μετὰ ταύτα δὲ γε, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἄρ' ἐννο- ούμεν ὧτι πρὸς αὐτῷ δὴ τῷ τέλει συχνὸν αὐτὶ διημαρ-τάνετο;

have been troubled with the objection that there was no sort of care of men, as it was then fairly objected that we had no art amongst us which merited this attribute of nurture, and, moreover, if there was, there were many who might claim a share in such an art more easily than a king.

5. ἔγενθ') So the Bodleian as well as the Coislinian MS.

12. Ἐπιμέλεια δὲ γε—τέχνη] MSS. προσέρα: in the Bodl. without any accent. "But there is none" (i.e. no art: τέχνη is understood from what precedes and follows) "which rather and sooner than king-craft, would claim to be a mode of tendance of human society as a whole, and to be an art of sovereignty over-taking all men." προτέρα for προσέρα would be almost re-quired by the context (πρότερον—καὶ μᾶλλον, supr.) even if any good meaning could be given to the latter word. Stallbaum makes the last word, τέχνη, the subject, and joins ἐπιμέλεια ἀρ- χῆς—but ἐπιμέλεια and ἀρχῆ are co-ordinate, and not interde-pendent.

18. πρὸς αὐτῷ—τῷ τέλει] The former error has been detected in an early stage of the process

* L 2
But we made the further error of neglecting to divide this.

of division: that now to be named is an omission with which we were chargeable at the close. Supr. 267 c. (18.) συνεκ διαμαρτάνετο "We erred largely." Cf. Phaedr. 257 c: συνεκ διαμαρτάνεις.

2. Τόδε — προσαγορεϋειν "This was our mistake, that it might be said (ἀρι) that however clear we were as to the existence of a nurturing art, we were not therefore justified in at once calling this by the names of 'kingcraft' and 'statecraft,' as if perfectly defined."

7. Τί μήν;] Sc. ἐδει; "Why, what ought we to have done?" See note on τί μήν; supr. 258 b.


*metaσκευορήσασθαι*] Sc. ἐδει. "We ought first, as we are now saying, to have remodelled the name." The word is ἀπας λέγομεν, and it is a little difficult to catch the exact shade of association which suggested it. The literal meaning is "to rearrange furniture:" and the word is perhaps chosen because this step is preparatory to the real business in hand, since names are the furniture or utensils (σκεῦη) of thought. Cf. Rep. 7, 540 e; δια- σκευορήσασθαι τὴν ἐαντών πᾶλιν.

9. ἐπιμέλειαν] The word is used technically by Aristotle, Pol. VII. 14: σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέ- λειαν.

10. ταύτην] Sc. τὴν οὗτο μετο- νομασμένην (ἐπιμελητικὴν) τέχνην.
We should have distinguished, first, the Divine Shepherd from the human ruler, and then, the king of a willing people from the tyrant of unwilling subjects, than which no difference can be greater.
ance of animals in herds whose principle is voluntary and whose subjects are bipeds having free will."


11. πλείω καὶ μειῶ is governed by ἐπέμβ., and does not agree with ἐκάστα τῶν ἑργῶν, which is governed by βραδύνουσι.

12. ἐκάστα τῶν ἑργῶν] Badh. conj. τῷ ἐργῷ. But there is no need of change if the words are taken alternately, as often in these dialogues, and βραδύν. be transitive:—βραδύνουσιν ἐκ-στα τῶν ἑργῶν ἐπεμβάλλομενοι μειῶ καὶ πλέον τοῦ δέοντος. If this is thought harsh, I should prefer to read ἐκάσταν. ἐπεμβάλλομενοι] "Throwing in additional material." Cf. Tim. 51 d: οὐτ' ἐπὶ λόγον μήκει πάρεργον ἄλλο μήκος ἐπεμβαθέντως. The middle voice signifies "into their own work."

13. ἵνα πρὸς τῷ ταχύ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς] "That not only with speed but with magnificence." πρὸς τῷ ταχύ οὐκ ἐνεδόσασα. πρὸς τῷ ταχεῖ would be a more usual expression, but the adverb is suggested by the succeeding adverb.

1. ἑαυτοίνιον ὄγκον—τοῦ μῶθου] "Taking up in the fable, as it were, a monstrous lump, we have been obliged to use more of it than was good for our purpose." The image of the statuary (or modeller) is continued. But there is also in ὄγκον ἀράμενοι an association from the other meaning of ὄγκον ἀρέμεν, to assume a lofty vein. Cf. Soph. Aj. 129: μηδ' ὄγκον ἀρρη μηδεν'.

2. τοῦ μῶθου is a genitive of apposition or of respect. Cf. Protag. 329 a: δολιχόν κατατέιναι τοῦ λόγου.

4. πάντως] "With all," like the Homeric ἐμπι. 

6. ὦστερ ὑδως] "Like a picture" of some living thing. The illustration passes from statuary to painting.

7. τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων] "Harmony of colour." Cf. Legg. 6, 768 c: ὁ θεῖον περιγραφῇ τις ἔσθεν περιγραμμαμένη τὰ μὲν εἰρήκε, τὰ δ' ἀπολείπει σχεδόν. Ἰβ. δ: τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ ἀκριβές περὶ ἑνὸς τε καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καὶ πολιτικήν πάσαν δοικήσεων οὐκ ἐστὶ γενέσθαι σαφές, πρὶν ἂν ἦ διόξος ἀπ' ἀρχής τὰ τε δεύτερα καὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ πάντα μέρη τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἀπολαμβάνεται πρὸς τέλος ἀνίκητα. Ἰβ. 769 b: καθάπερ ζωγράφου οὐδὲν πέρας ἔχειν ἢ περαγματεία δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκατὸν τῶν ζωῶν, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ χραίνειν ἢ ἀποχράινειν, ἢ δ' τι δή καλοῦσι τὸ τοιούτον οἱ ζωγράφοι παίδες, οὐκ ἂν ποτε μαί δοκεῖ πανσάφεις κοσμοῦντα, ὡς' ἐπίδοσιν μηκέτ' ἔχειν εἰς τὸ καλ- λίω τε καὶ φανεράτερα γίγνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα. The question, How far is the requirement of artistic proportion applicable to philosophical discourse? is partly suggested here, and is fully discussed in the sequel.


8. ἐναργεῖον] "Distinctness." Here, as in Theet. 203 b, the Bodl., with ΔΠ, has ἐνεργ. — the more familiar word. The word expresses the way in which the parts come out in relief (ὁπότε ζωοὶ βρασοι) as the last touches are added to a painting.

Aristotle uses the same combination of metaphors to describe the necessary imper-
fection of an Ethical discourse: μην διαμόρφωσαι τοις δυ νμενοις ενδεικνυοηαι τι των μείζων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκαστος οἷον οὖν εἰδὰς ἀπαντᾷ ἀπὸ πάλιν ὅσπερ ὑπάρ ἁγγοεῖν.


2. λέξει καὶ λόγῳ λέξεις is introduced because λόγος does not sufficiently express a process.

πᾶν [ὡς] And therefore human society, which is a living organism.


τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις διὰ χειρουργίων] "To the other sort the creatures may be shewn through works of art." This is a good illustration of Plato's manner of displaying both sides, even when a subject is mentioned by the way, and when one side only is required for his purpose. Cf. Rep. 7, 520 e, Legg. 1, 632 d: τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ καταφαίη.

7. Χαλεπών—τι τῶν μείζων] This remark is preparatory to the example of the art of weaving: which, however, is not introduced till p. 279, a digression on the nature of Example being put between. The thought is one of frequent occurrence. Phadr. 262 c: ὅσιν γε ψιλὸς ποσί λέγομεν, οὐχ ἔχουσε παράδειγμα. Soph. 218 c–e: ὅσι δ' αὖ τὸν μεγάλου δείπνουσί διὰ πρότερον εἷν σμικρῶν—δεῖν μελετῶν. βοῦλει δὴ ταῖς των γαίων μετίστερες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτῷ δίσχας τοῦ μείζων; In the Laws the use of Example is recognized as a necessary preliminary to discourse. 1, 632 e: ὅπως δ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διεξάχθωμεν, πειρασμέθεα αὐτῷ παράδειγμα θέμενοι καὶ τὰλα οὖν διαμυθολογοῦσε παραμύθια ποιῆσαι τῆς ὕδω.

9. οὖν οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀπαντά] Compare Lys. 218 c: κυριντοῦμεν οὐκ επελουθηκέναι. Theat. 208 b: ὅπως δὴ—ἐπελουθήσημεν ("In sleep a king, in waking, no such matter"). A similar feeling appears in Philbul. 16 b: οὐ μὴν ἦσαν καλλίων ὤν ἄν γένοιο, ἂς ἤγερε ἐραστὴς μὲν εἰμι δεῖ, πολλὰκι δὲ μὴ ἴδῃ διαφυγοῦσα ἡμῖν τε καὶ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

277. NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς τοῦτ' εἶπες;
ΞΕ. Καὶ μᾶλ' ἀπότομος ἐσικά γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι κυνήγασ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν.
NE. ΣΩ. Τί δή;
ΞΕ. Παραδείγματος, ὥς μακάριε, αὕ μοι καὶ τὸ 5 παράδειγμα αὐτὸ δεδέχεσθε.
κε NE. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; λέγε μηδὲν ἐμοῦ γε ἑνεκα ἀποκνων.
ΞΕ. Λεκτέον, ἐπειδῆ καὶ σύ γε ἑτοιμὸς ἀκολούθειν.

τούς γὰρ ποὺ πάθον ἦσμεν, ὡταν ἄρτι γραμμάτων 10 ἐμπειροι γίγνονται—
NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΞΕ. Ὄτι τῶν στοιχείων ἐκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυ-

tάταις καὶ ράσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανὸς διαισθά-

νουται, καὶ τάληθεν φράζεων περὶ ἑκεῖνα δυνάται; 15

278. γίγνονται.
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ὁπορον κατέστησεν: with which compare Legg. 2, 654 e: ei δε

tauud' ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήστηται. Phaedo 89 b, c: είν περ γε ἡμῖν

ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναζωσαθαι.

3. τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πά-

θος] Cf. τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος, Theet. 193 d. “After a strange

fashion, it would seem, I have

now touched upon the expe-

rience of our minds in regard
to knowledge.” For the par-


VI. 3, 10 (Passow, Lex. s. v.

ἐσικά), and for κυνήγασ, cf. infr.

297 c: κυνήγασ τις τούτων τῶν

λόγων. Theet. 163 a: τὰ πολλὰ
cαι ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἑκυνήγασεν.

5. Παραδείγματος] The illus-

tration to be drawn presently

from boys learning their let-
ters is an example of what is

meant by Example.

7. μηδὲν — ἀποκνών] I. e.

Don't be afraid of seeming
tedious to me.

9. σὺ γε] So also the Bodl.

MS., where the omission of γε,

noted by Gaisford, is after ἐμοῦ

in the previous line, perhaps

cau sed by λέγε preceding.

13. εἰν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ

ράσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν] See

the same illustration more

fully drawn out in Rep. 3, 402

c, where however the notion of

syllables is not distinctly

present; Theet. 206 a, 207,

208; Phil. 17.

* M

of example, it would seem, is no exception to this rule.
Η αλλαίονική εμφάνιση ισ. 358
πάλιν δόξη τε ψεύδονται καὶ λόγῳ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ὦδε ῥάστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἕπα-5 γεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτω γιγνωσκόμενα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;
ΞΕ. Ἀνάγειν πρῶτον ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ταῦτα ὁρθῶς ἐδόξαζον, ἀναγαγόντας δὲ τιθέιν παρὰ τὰ μῆτω γιγνωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβάλλοντας ἐνδεκα-10 νόμαι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἀμφοτέραις οὐς ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχριτε ἀν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγνο-ουμένοις τὰ δόξαζομενα ἀληθῶς παρατιθέμενα δειχθη, δειχθέντα δὲ, παραδείγμαθ' οὕτω γιγνόμενα, ποιησὴ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων ἐκαστὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συλ-15 λαβαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἐτέρον ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων οὖν, τὸ δὲ ταῦτον ὡς ταῦτων ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ προσα- ε γορεύεσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1. Ταὐτὰ δὲ γε ταῦτα] Cf. Theat. 207 e: ὅταν—Θεατήτου

γράφων τις ἔστα καὶ εἰ—γράψῃ, καὶ αὐθενδαυρὸν ἐπιεχερῶν γράφειν ταὐ καὶ εἰ—γράψῃ.

2. δόξη τε ψεύδονται καὶ λόγῳ] The possibility of which two-fold phenomenon has been proved with some difficulty this morning. Soph. 262-264.


τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα = ὁμοίων τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας πάθους.

ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς συμπλο-καισ] The same letter in two different combinations or syllables (i.e. the same idea or law in two widely different things). Cf. Soph. 253, 261.

11. μέχριτε—δειχθη] "Until the things of which they think truly (supr. ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ταῦτα ὁρθῶς ἐδόξαζον) have been shewn in comparison with all the things which they do not know." There is a slight al- lusion to the etymology of παρὰ—δείγμα.

2. ὅποταν—ἀποτελῇ] "When that which is the same in another separate thing, and which is rightly conceived, is brought into comparison, and so effects one true opinion about each of the two things which are thus regarded in one view."


5. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἵκανος συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματος γ' ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὅποταν ὅν ταύτων, ἐν ἑπτά διεστασμένων δοξαζόμενον ὅρθως καὶ συναχθεῖν, περὶ ἐκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ;

NE. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. Θαυμάζομεν ἃν οὖν εἰ ταύτων τοῦτο ἵμαυν ἢ

οπίσων ἡ ὑμᾶς

opinion of some things here and there even in the combinations;" but when they are transferred to the long and difficult (syllables) complexities of real life, is unable to recognize the same?" For συν-ισταται—φέρεται, cf. the account of opinion in Tim. 37 a, 43; 44; and Phedr. 265 c: ἵσως μὲν ἄληθες τινος ἐφαπτόμε-νοι, τάχα δ' ἄν καὶ ἄλλοις παρα-φερόμενοι. Ib. 262 a.

Compare the language of Bacon in recommending a different kind of inquiry. Advancement of Learning (quoted by Mr. Ellis in General Preface to the Philosophical Works, p. 26): "The forms of sub- stances, I say, as they are now by compounding and trans-planting multiplied, are so perplexed as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to pur- pose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But on the other side to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible, and being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words which con-
ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεία πεπονθεῖα p. 278

tote mév ὑπ’ ἀληθείας περὶ ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐν τοῖς συνιστάται, tote ἰδεί περὶ ἀπαντά ἐν ἑτέροις αὐτὸν, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἁμὴ γε τὴ τῶν συγκράσεων ὀρθῶς δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δ’ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥαδίους συλλαβᾶς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγνοεῖ;

NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ θαυμαστόν γε οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Πῶς ἀγρί, ὃς φίλε, δύναι’ ἂν τις ἀρχό-10 μεν ὑπὸ δόξης ψευδόθει, ἐπ’ τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;

NE. ΣΩ. Σχεδόν οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοίν ταῦτα εἰ ταύτῃ πέφυκεν, οὐδεν δὴ πλημμελοῦμεν ἂν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ πρότον μὲν ἑπιχεὶ-15 ρήσαντες ὅλου παραδείγματος ἵδειν τὴν φύσιν ἐν σμικρῷ κατὰ μέρος ἄλλῳ παραδείγματι, μετά δὲ

sist and are compounded of them. In the same manner, to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold—nay, of water, of air—is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenacity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which like an alphabet are not many, and of which the essences upheld by matter of all creatures do consist,—to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysique which I now define of.”

1. τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχείᾳ] "The alphabet of things," i. e. the ideas. Cf. Theaet. 201 sqq.

9. Πῶς ἀγρί] Stallbaum is probably right in conj. πῶς ἀρ’—.

15. ἄλογο] The "whole" is often put by Plato for the universal, to which κατὰ μέρος is here opposed as the particular. Cf. Rep. 6, 491 c: λαβόν τούνν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἄλον αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς. Theaet. 178 a: εἶ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἴδους ἕρωτά ὁ κ.τ.λ. 1b. 182 b: κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουσ.

16. ἄλογο] Other, as the particular is other than the general.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτα μέλλοντες—] "Intending, however, afterwards to bring the same na-
278. ταύτα μέλλοντες, ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως μέγιστον ὑν ταῦταν εἴδως ἀπ' ἐλαστὸνοιν φέροντες ποθεν, διὰ παραδείγματος ἐπιχειρεῖν αὖ τὴν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν θεραπείαν τέχνη γυνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὄνειρατος ἥμιν γίγνηται;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὑρθώς.

279. ΞΕ. Πάλιν δὴ τὸν ἐμπροσθεν λόγων ἀναληπτέον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ τῷ βασιλικῷ γένει τῆς περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμελείας ἀμφισβητοῦσι μυρίοι, δεῖ δὴ πάντας ἀποχωρίζειν τούτους καὶ μόνον ἑκεῖνον λεπτεῖν. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ παραδείγματος ἐφαμεν δεῖν τινὸς ἥμιν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΞΕ. Τῷ δήτα παραδειγμάτι τις ἂν, ἔχων τὴν αὐτὴν τιμολογίαν, σμικρότατον παραθέμενον ἑκάκον ἂν εὐροὶ τὸ ζητούμενον; βούλει πρὸς Διὸς, ὥς Σάκρατες, εἰ μὴ τι πρόχειρον ἔτερον ἔχομεν, ἀλλ' οὖν τὴν γε ὑφαντικὴν προελώμεθα; καὶ ταύτην, εἰ δοκεῖ, μὴ τάσαν; ἀποχρήσει γὰρ ἵσως ἡ περὶ τὰ ἔκ τῶν ἔρων ὑφάσματα: τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς μαρτυρῆσει προαίρεθεν ὃ βουλόμεθα.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τῇ γὰρ οὖν;

ture from some lesser subject to bear on the most important nature of the king, and to endeavour—". The construction is determined by a sort of attraction from the previous participle.

4. ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὄνειρατος] Cf. supr. 277 d.
14. *τιμολογίας*] MSS. τιμολογί-κήν. The correction occurred also to Ast and Stallbaum.
20. μαρτυρῆσει προαίρεθεν] The participle, as in πρέπει ῥηθὲν, supr. 269 c, and the like.

Illustrate for us this point of method, and prepare the way for a more enlightened view of the Statesman's office. Reverting then to what has previously said, that we must try to clear away from the King the crowd of rival artists, we select as an example the art of weaving woollen cloth.
As we have already done in the case of statecraft, let us divide the arts and sciences until we come in sight of what we seek. We do this briefly, so as to bring the question to the same point at which we have left the parallel inquiry. Of productions and possessions, some are for action, some for protection.


10. δημιουργούμεν καὶ κτόμεθα] ποιητική καὶ κτητική (Soph. 219) are thus combined.

13. ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεία καὶ ἀνθρώπινα] Preventives divine and human—in the form of talismans or of drugs.

14. τῶν δὲ—συνδετά] “Defences from the weather are housing and body-shelter: of the latter sort are mats and envelopments; which of one piece or of several. Those of several pieces are stitched or otherwise compacted, of vegetable fibre or of hair or wool: and of these some are felted together with the help of water and earth, while some are compacted of themselves.”

16. παραπετάσματα] “Curtains—to shut out the view.” Hesych. : παραπετάσματα, παρακάλυμμα. Cf. Prot. 316 e : ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσματος ἐξήρισατο. The word is used also by Herodotus of the Persian hangings found in the tent of Mardonius at Plataea.
7. The genitive πυτών depends on διότι, which is to be supplied, but at the same time defines more particularly the idea of νεύρων, "of fibres, from plants."

9. τοιτοσι] Several MSS. have τοιτοι: but this is a case where the durius lectio is preferable.


15. ὅσον] This can hardly mean "Inasmuch as." In Rep. 1, 328 d, which Ast compares (Lex. s. v.), ὅσον is distinctly an accusative of measure, and is answered by τοσοῦτον, which could not be introduced here without destroying the sense. And if so rendered, the words must be understood to anticipate what is brought out afterwards, that weaving is only a part of the making of clothes. This should be kept in the background here. The word alludes to what is said above and explained immediately below, that only a part of the art of weaving is concerned with making woollen garments. 279 b: καὶ ταυτήν, εἶ δοκεῖ, μὴ πάσαν κ.τ.λ. This is confirmed by ὣν. "At least that very large portion of this art which we saw to be for the making of clothes." ὅσον therefore limits the subject of διαφέρειν.

13] As in Gorg. 463 c: τέταρτα ταύτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέταρτων πράγμασιν, alib.


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πλὴν ὀνόματι ταῦτης τῆς ἱματιουργίκης, καθάπερ π. 286, κάκει τότε τὴν βασιλικὴν τῆς πολιτικῆς.

NE. ΣΩ. Ὀρθότατά γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ συλλογισώμεθα, ὅτι τὴν ἰματιῶν ὑφαντικὴν οὖτω ρήθεισάν τις τάχ’ ἀν ἴκανῶς εἰρήσαθα δόξει, μὴ δυνάμενος ἤξυνοεῖν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐγγὺς ἤξυνεργῶν οὖτω διώρισται, πολλῶν δὲ ἐτέρων ἤξυγγενῶν ἀπεμερίσθη.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποίων, εἰπέ, ἤξυγγενῶν;

ΞΕ. Ὁν’ ἔσποτο τοῖς λεχθεῖσι, ὡς φαίνει θάλνων ὀὖν ἡ έοικἐν ἑπανιτέων ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τελευτῆς. εἰ γάρ ἤξυνοεῖς τὴν οἰκείοτητα, τὴν μὲν διετέμομεν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς νῦν δὴ, τὴν τῶν στρωμάτων σύνθεσιν, περιβολὴ χωρίζουσαι καὶ ὑποβολὴ.

NE. ΣΩ. Μανθάνοι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὴν ἐκ τῶν λίνων καὶ στπάρτων καὶ ε

2. κάκει τότε] 259 b, c. See also 274 e.

4. συλλογισώμεθα] “Let us reflect.” “Let us think, putting together what has been said.” Or, perhaps, “Comparing this argument with the preceding.” As the definition of the king seemed to be complete, at the end of the first series of divisions, so might the definition of the weaver at this point. Yet neither has been distinguished from his greatest rivals.

10. πάλιν εὖν ἡ έοικἐν ἑπανιτέων] Either ὡς έοικἐν or ἑπανιτέων εἰσαι seems to be required.

11. ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τελευτῆς] “Beginning from the end.” As in resuming the “genealogy” of the Sophist, 226 a, ib. 268. This order is not strictly followed, however, unless the “end” includes all from καὶ τῶν σκεπασμάτων downwards.

12. τὴν μὲν διετέμομεν] μὲν is answered by καὶ μὴν.

τὴν μὲν — ὑποβολῆ] “We just now cut off from the weaving of garments that of bed clothes, distinguishing them by the one being put under us and the other round.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

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280. πάντων, ὑπόσα φυτῶν ἄρτι νεῦρα κατὰ λόγον εἴπο-
μεν, δημιουργίαν πᾶσαν ἀφείλομεν· τὴν τ' ἀν πιλη-
τικὴν ἀφωρισμέθα καὶ τὴν τῇ τρήσει καὶ βαφῇ
χρωμένην σύνθεσιν, ζη ἡ πλεύστη σκυτοτομίκη.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῖνυν τὴν τῶν ὀλοσχότων σκεπασμά-
των θεραπείαν, δερματουργίαν, καὶ τὰς τῶν στεγασ-
μάτων, ὅσα τε ἐν οἰκοδομίκῃ καὶ ὅλη τεκτονικῇ καὶ
ἐν ἄλλαις τέχναις ῥεμάτων στεκτικά γίγνονται,
συμπᾶσας ἀφείλομεν, ὅσα τε περὶ τῶν κλοπῶν καὶ
tὸς βίᾳ πράξεως διακολυτικὰ ἔργα παρέχονται τέχναι
φραγμάτων, περὶ τε γένεσιν ἐπιθηματουργίας ὅσα
καὶ τὰς τῶν υθρωμάτων πτέζεις, γομφωτικῆς ἀπονεμ-

1. φυτῶν νεῦρα—εἴπομεν] Viz. in saying νεῦραν φυτῶν supr.
κατὰ λόγον] Following ana-

logy.
8. ὅσα τε—γίγνονται] I. e. ὅσα τὲ ἐν οἰκοδ. κ. ἀλ. τεκτον. στε-
κτικὰ (ὑπ' στεγαστικὰ) γίγνονται,
καὶ ὅσα ἐν ἄλλαις τεχν. ῥεμάτων
στεκτ. γίγν.
9. ῥεμάτων στεκτικά] "Hous-
ing" is not an adequate transla-
tion of στεγαστική, as this
includes the damming of rivers
and the like: "the art of
making wind-and-water-tight."
Many of the words in this
passage are quoted, with others
from the Politicus, by Pollux,
Onomasticion 7, 208–10, who
adds: εἶτε ὀπονδαίαν ἔρημο τοῖς
ὄνυμασιν, εἶτε καὶ μὴ—λέγω δὲ,
dia τὸ ἐν ἔνωσι τῶν ὑμαμάτων βιω-
ότερον χρῆσθαι.
10. ὅσα τε—τέχνης] "And all
the arts which produce pre-
ventive barriers, as against
theft and violence, such as are
the process of lid-making and the
fixing of doors, being separate
portions of the art of joining."
The order is ὅσα τέχναι παρέ-
χονται—διακολυτικὰ ἔργα φραγμα-
τῶν. The genitive of apposi-
tion again recalls the language
of tragedy. This class was not
strictly included in the παραπε-
τάσματα of the previous enum-
eration.

I 3. γομφωτικῆς ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν
μὴρα τέχνης] Either "set apart
as portions of the joiner's art,"
or "having had assigned to
them several portions of the
joiner's art." For the latter,
cf. infr. 281 e: μεγάλα δὲ (μέρη)
καὶ σφίσιν αὐτάς ἀπονέμοναί
κε. The use of the passive would
then be analogous to πιστε-
ομαί τι, "I am entrusted with
something"—a trace of which
occurs as early as Plat. Ep. I.
309 a: διοικών τὴν ἔμετραν ἄρ-
χην πεπιστευμένοι πάντων μά-
λιστα. Other instances in
which a noun which would
have followed the active verb
differed, in name only. But
though the definition is spec-
cious, we see on reflec-
tion that the art has still
to be dis-
tinguished from those
most akin
to it. Se-
veral kind-
dred arts
have
indeed
been
parted off,
such as the
making of
beclothes,
of skins, or
linen cloth,
The dative case is made the subject of the passive verb, are Legg. 11, 925 e: τοῖς ἐπι-
πατομένοις. Ἰβ. 926 a: τοῖς νομο-
θετομένοις (masc.). Ἰβ. 937: ἐὰν ἐπισκήφθη, Ἱβ. 1, 337 a: ἐλεεί-
σθαι—μᾶλλον—ἤχαλαπαινεῖσθαι.

For a generalization similar to those in the present pas-
sage, cf. Legg. 12, 944 c: κα-
ροὶ—Λύσεως—νέως ἡ ἐφού τινος, ὁὔτων τῷ ἐντόνου τε καὶ ὑποξόματα καὶ 
νεύρων ἐπιτόνους μίναν ὦταν φύ-
σιν διεσπαρμένην, πολλαχοῦ πολ-
λοίος ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύεισθαι.

3. μαγευτικήν] The word μαγεία and the almost equally 
rare word ἀλεξιφάρμακον occur in Ἡ. I. 122 a, 132 b.

There is a slight inaccuracy in reference in putting toge-
ther the ὀλόγχαστα σκεπάσματα and the στεγάσματα, the former 
of which came after, while the latter preceded, the mention of 
στροφάτα.

7. λειχάσαν] The participle is added, as in tragic poetry,
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Το δέ γε τῶν συνεστώτων καὶ συμπεπιλημένων διαλυτική.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιόν δή;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τῆς τοῦ ξαίνοντος τέχνης ἔργου. ἢ τῆν ἤ ἤξαντικήν τολμήσομεν ὑφαντικὴν καὶ τὸν ἤξαντινό ως οὔτα ὑφάντην καλεῖν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὴν γε αὖ στήμονος ἐργαστικὴν καὶ κρόκης εἰ τις ὑφαντικὴν προσαγορεύει, παράδοξον τε 

ν) καὶ ψεύδος ὁνομα λέγει.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὖ;

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; κανειφυτικήν σύμπασαν καὶ τὴν ἀκεστικήν πότερα μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν μηδέ τινα θεραπείαν ἐσθήτος θῶμεν, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα πάσας ὡς ὑφαντικὰς λέξομεν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῆς γε θεραπείας ἀμφισβητήσουσιν αὕται ξύμπασαν καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς τῶν ἰματίων τῇ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς δυνάμει, μέγιστον μὲν 

μέρος ἐκείνη διδούσαι, μεγάλα δὲ καὶ σφύσιν αὕταις ἀπονέμουσαι.

c) ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

2. Τὸ δὲ γε—διαλυτική] Sc. τὸ δὲ γε ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τῶν ἱμάτων ἐργασιας δρόμων ἐστὶ πράξεις διαλυτική.


16. ὑφαντικάς ] Cf. Gorg. 450 b: τί δὴ ποτὲ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικάς καλείς, οὕτως περὶ λόγους, ἐπεὶ ταυτὴν ῥητο-

ρικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἣν ἣ περὶ λόγους;

17. Οὐδαμῶς] Sc. ὑφαντικάς. Only the latter half of the question is answered: hence Sozrates calls attention to the former part, with ἀλλὰ μὴν—

γε—.

18. τῆς — θεραπείας ] For the construction without peri, cf. infr. 275 b, 279 a, Phileb. 22 c : τῶν νικητρίων οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ἐπειρ νου.

* N 2
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΞΕ. Πρὸς τοῖςν ταύταις ἑτὶ τὰς τῶν ἐργαλείων p. 281
dημιουργοὺς τέχνας, δι’ ὧν ἀποτελεῖται τὰ τῆς ὕφης ἔργα, δοκεῖν χρὴ τὸ γε συναιτιάς εἶναι προσποίη-
σαθαι παντὸς ὕφασματος.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.

ΞΕ. Πότερον οὖν ἦμιν ὃ περὶ τῆς ὕφαντικῆς λό-
γος, οὐ προειλομέθα μέρους, ἰκανῶς ἔσται διωρισ-
μένοι, ἐὰν ἂρι ἀυτὴν τῶν ἐπιμελείων, ὅποιας περὶ
tὴν ἔρειν ἔσθητα, εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην

2. δι’ δὲν] Sc. ἐργαλεῖων.
3. τὸ γε — προσποίησαθα] “Lay claim to be at least co-
operative causes!” cf. ἀμφι-
βητήσασιν supra.
7. οὐ προειλομέθα μέρους] An
explanatory limitation. “The
art of weaving, that part of it
which we selected:” supra. 279
b: τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς—προαι-
ρεθέν. The second noun limits
the first, with which it is in
apposition: as in such expres-
sions as οἱ Ἀθηναίοι—οἱ στρατη-
γοὶ in Thucydides.
8. ὅποια — τιθομέν] The
reading of most MSS., εἰς τὴν
καλλίστην, is sufficiently de-
fended by Soph. 235 a (where
see note); Tim. 57 ε: κινήσιων
δὲ εἰς ἀνωμαλίστητα ἄτι τιθομέν.
Legg. 867 b: εἰς εἰκόνα που
θομέν. For the omission of the
substantive verb after ὅποιος, which frequently hap-
pens, cf. infr. 285 a: πάνθε
ὁποίον ἔντεχνα. The Zurich
editors read εἰσὶ, which is
found in Flor. i. The Bodl.,
with Δ, has εἰς γῆν.
9. εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίσ-
tὴν πασῶν] This recals the
example by which the last
hypothesis concerning know-
ledge in the Theaetetus is il-
lustrated (p. 207 d): τὸ ἔρχειν τι
σημείον εἰς ὧν τῶν ἀπάντων
dιαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτήμαν—οἴου—
ἠλίου περὶ ἰκανῶν αἰμαῖ σοι εἶναι ἀποδείξαται ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον
ἔστι τῶν κατὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπόθων
περὶ γῆν. Since that definition
was given, the argument of the
"Sophist" has intervened. We
now see that it is not enough
to describe the sun as different
in brightness from other hea-
venly bodies. These other
bodies, which are not the sun,
have a nature of their own,
which is defined by and de-
fines their difference from the
sun. I do not know the sun,
or any other thing, therefore,
until I have determined the
exact limit between each of thes
other natures and the
one in question. Comp. Legg.
6, 768 d: τὸ δὲ ὄλων καὶ ἀκρίβες
περὶ ἑνὸς τε καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ
πόλιν καὶ πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἔστι γί-
νεσθαι σαφῆς κ. τ. λ. Parm.
136 b, c: περὶ ὧν ὁν ὡς ἄνευ
ἔντος καὶ οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὠντος
ἀλλο πάσος πάσχοντος, δεί σκο-
pεῖν τὰ ἔξωβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ
kαὶ πρῶς ἐν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἄλλων,
ὅ τι ἐν προεδρῇ κ. τ. λ.
'Ο λέγομεν μὲν ἃν τι ἀληθὲς, οὐ μὴν σαφὲς γε οὐδὲ τέλεον, πρὶν αὐτὰς αὐτής πάσας περιέλωμεν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὄρθως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα ποιητέον ὁ λέγομεν, ἵνα εὖ ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἦ; ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΞΕ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν δύο τέχνας οὐσίας περὶ πάντα τὰ δρόμηνα θεασόμεθα.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνας; ΞΕ. Τήν μὲν τής γενέσεως οὐσίαν ἔνναιτιον, την δ' αὐτήν αἰτίαν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ὅσα μὲν τὸ πράγμα αὑτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ε ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὀργανα παρασκευάζουσιν, ὥν μὴ παραγενομένων οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐργασθεὶ τὸ προστεταγμένων ἕκαστη τῶν τεχνῶν, ταῦτας μὲν ἔνναιτίους, τὰς δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ πράγμα ἀπεραγαζομένας αἰτίας.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἐξεί γοῦν λόγον.

ΞΕ. Μετὰ τούτο δὴ τάς μὲν περὶ τε ἀτράκτους καὶ κερκίδας καὶ ὀπόσα ἀλλα ὀργανα τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀμφιέσματα γενέσεως κοινωνεῖ, πάσας ἔνναιτίους πλεον until all these have been parted off. We must not be contended with saying that it is the noblest of the industries which have to do with woollen cloth. First, then, we may draw a universal distinction between productive and admimicular arts; and then apply this distinction to the case in point. Washing, mending, and other furnishing of clothes, carding, spinning, and the other employments operose Minervæ included underwool.
eworking, are productive arts.

εὐπομεν, τὰς δὲ αὐτὰ θεραπευούσας καὶ δημιουργοῦσα αἰτίας;

NE. ΣΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΞΕ. Τῶν αἰτίων δὴ πλυντικὴν μὲν καὶ ἀκεστικὴν p. 282 a 5 καὶ πάσαν τὴν περὶ ταύτα θεραπευτικὴν, πολλῆς οὕσης τῆς κοσμητικῆς τούτων οὕτης μόριων, εἰκὸς μᾶλιστα περιλαμβάνειν ὄνομαξότας πᾶν τῇ τέχνῃ τῇ καταφυτικῇ.

NE. ΣΩ. Καλῶς.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν *ἐαντική* γε καὶ *νηστική* καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ περὶ τὴν ποίησιν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐσθήτου ἢς λέγομεν μέρη, μία τίς ἐστι τέχνη τῶν ὑπὸ πάντων λεγομένων, ἡ ταλασιουργική.

1. aitá] Sc. τὰ ἀμφιέματα.

4. Τῶν αἰτίων — πλυντικήν] The partitive genitive, as in τῆς γυνωστικῆς ὑστόν ἑσπερικοῦν, supr. 263 c; τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἴμιρων, supr. 265 b.

5. πολλῆς — μόριων] Apposition. The genitive is not absolute, but is resumed in αὐτῆς because of the intervention of the participle. See Theret. 155 e, and note.

7. περιλαμβάνειν—καταφυτική] The dative is governed by περιλαμβάνειν, which δομαξότας explains. Cf. Soph. 225 a: τὸ—σώματι πρὸς σώματα γυνομενῷ—όνομα λέγει τι τουκούτον τιθέμενον οἰνον βασιτικόν. Phadr. 273 e; Theret. 148 e; Soph. 226 e. The accusative πᾶν depends on the participle and the infinitive taken together.

πᾶν] Agreeing with μόριων, and of course including πλυντικὴν, ἀκεστικὴν κ.τ.λ.

10. *ἐαντική* *νηστική*] MSS. ἐαντικήν—νηστικήν. The correction is due to Stephanus.

11. ἢς λέγομεν] Sc. τῆς ἑρῴας.

12. μία τίς ἐστι τέχνη] “Form a single art which is one of those universally acknowledged, that of working in wool.” Cf. Legg. 7, 805 e: κερκίδων ἄρχειν καὶ πᾶσης ταλασιουργίας. ἐστὶ follows the number of the nearest word, and is also assisted by the nearer plural μέρη. Cf. infr. b, πᾶν τούτο, and 284 e, 288 d: Χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ πᾶντι ὁπόσα μετάλειται κ.τ.λ.—καὶ ἐτί φλουστικὴ—καὶ ὅσα—εἰς τέχναι’ ἐν δὲ αὐτῶ προσαγορέουμεν πᾶν. Where αὐτὰ, referring to all the preceding nominatives, is made singular by ἐν.

τῶν — λεγομένων ] “Used in common parlance,” so that it is needless to invent a technical name. Cf. Soph. 220 d: ὅπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν
Now of wool-working there are two chief kinds, each falling under one of the two great categories of division and composition. Carding and one use of the comb belong to wool-work-

6. the use of the *kerēs* or "comb" was partly to drive the threads of the woof close together, but partly also (as appears from Cratyl. 388 a) to keep the threads of the warp and woof (here especially the warp, infr. στήμος) distinct. This latter "half" of the use of the comb belongs to *diakritikē*, "divisive art."

9. *megālā tivē — diakritikē ]* The course of the sentence is interrupted by the introduction of this clause. The words should have run, ἡ τῆς τε ταλασσιουργίας αὐτῆς ἐστὶ που, καὶ μεγάλα τινὲς κατὰ πάντα ἢμιν ἡστήν τέχνα, ἡ συγκριτική τε καὶ διακριτική—

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

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b ΞΕ. Τῆς δὴ ταλασσιουργικῆς δύο τμῆματὰ ἐστον, καὶ τούτων ἐκάτερον ἀμα δυοῖν πεφύκατον τέχναν μέρη.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ξαντικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς κερκιστικῆς ἡμισυ καὶ ὁσα τὰ ἤγκειμενα ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἀφίστησιν, παῦν τοῦτο ὡς ἐν φράξει τῆς τε ταλασσιουργίας αὐτῆς ἐστί που, καὶ μεγάλα τινὲς κατὰ πάντα ἢμιν ἡστήν τέχνα, ἡ συγκριτική τε καὶ διακριτική—

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.

θήμαι πυρενικῆς ῥηθῆνας συμβεβήκεν. The Stranger loves to parade the commonness of his examples. For the genitive, cf. Rep. 10, 615 d: ἐθεσσώμεθα —καὶ τούτῳ τῶν δείων θεαμάτων. An art acknowledged by all men is distinguished from one for which a name has to be invented, such as δοξομαμική in the Sophist.

3. τούτων ἐκάτερον —πεφύκατον] The dual verb is used because τούτων ἐκάτερον = τούτω ἐκάτερον, which is rather suggested by the plural μέρη. Cf. infr. 284 e: διαφέρον ἀλλήλων. "And these are parts, each of them of two arts at once:" viz. the one of *talaššiourgikē* and *syngkritikē*, the other of *talaś* and *diakritik*.

6. τὸ τῆς κερκιστικῆς ἡμισὺ] The use of the *kerēs* or "comb" was partly to drive the threads of the woof close together, but partly also (as appears from Cratyl. 388 a) to keep the threads of the warp and woof (here especially the warp, infr. στήμος) distinct. This latter "half" of the use of the comb belongs to *diakritikē*, "divisive art."

9. *megālā tivē — diakritikē ]* The course of the sentence is interrupted by the introduction of this clause. The words should have run, τῆς τε ταλασσιουργίας αὐτῆς ἐστὶ που καὶ τῆς διακριτικῆς. But the last word required explanation, which is conversationally interposed.


9. ἡστήν] "There are two comprehensive arts of universal application, with which we are familiar." Cf. Soph. 228 e: ἑγενόσθην. Ηβ. 258 e: ἦν τε καὶ ἡστή. Compare the frequent use of the perfect: e.g. *neνόμικα* Soph. 227 a, 228 a, 265 d, infr. 293 b.
ing and division. But our concern is with that part of wool-working which is a part of composition: of which one kind twists and the other interlaces.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Αὕτη δὴ πάλιν συγκριτικὴς μόριον ἀμα καὶ ταλασιουργίας ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον λάβωμεν· ὅσα δὲ τῆς διακριτικῆς ἢν αὐτόθι, *μεθίωμεν* ἐξύπαντα, δίχα ἑοτέμνουτες τῆς ταλασιουργίαν διακριτικῇ τε καὶ συγκριτικῷ τμῆματι.

NE. ΣΩ. Διηρήσθω.

ΞΕ. Τὸ συγκριτικοῦ τοῖνυν αὐ̂ σοι καὶ ταλασι-
282. ουργικὸν ἀμα μόριον, ὥ Σώκρατος, διαιρετέον, εἴπερ
d ἴκανος μέλλομεν τὴν προρρηθεῖσαν ὑφαντικὴν αἴ-
ρήσεων.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.

ΞΕ. Χρὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ λέγωμεν γε αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν 5
eῖναι στρεπτικῶν, τὸ δὲ συμπλεκτικῶν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν μανθάνω; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι τὸ
περὶ τὴν τοῦ στήμονος ἐργασίαν λέγειν στρεπτικῶν.

ΞΕ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἄλλα καὶ κρόκης. ἦ γένεσιν
ἀστροφοῖν τινα αὐτῆς εὐρήσομεν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Διόρισαι δὴ καὶ τούτων ἐκάτερον, ἵσως γὰρ
ε ὁ διορισμὸς ἐγκαιρὸς ἄν σοι γένοιτο.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῆ; 

ΞΕ. Τῇ δὲ. τῶν περὶ ξαντικὴν ἐργων μηκυνθέν τε 15
cαι σχὸν πλάτος λέγομεν εἶναι καταγμά τι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τούτων δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀτράκτῳ τε στραφεῖν καὶ
στερεῶν νῆμα γενόμενον στήμονα μὲν φάθι τὸ νῆμα,

8. τοῦ στήμονος] The woof has not yet been mentioned. Cf. supr.: ἐν στήμοσι.
9. ἄλλα καὶ κρόκης] The woof was more loosely spun: hence, as well as for the reason just given, (that no mention had been made of the woof,) Young Socrates’ oversight is more excusable.

γένεσιν—εὐρήσομεν:] "Shall we find any mode of producing it without twisting?"

15. τῶν περὶ ξαντικῆν ἐργῶν] τι is to be supplied from below. It often happens in these dialogues that a word is contrived to "pay a double debt." Cf. infr. 226 b: τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι κ.τ.λ.

16. σχὸν πλάτος] Cf. supr. c, note on ἐγκαίνη.
καταγμά] The word is used by Sophocles, Trach. 695, and the corresponding verb κατάγειν occurs in Soph. 226 c: ξαίνειν, κατάγειν, κερκίζειν.

18. ἀτράκτῳ] It would appear from this that the woof was spun by the hand without the use of the spindle.

19. στερεῶν νῆμα] Probably hinting at a derivation for στήμων, quasi στερρομη.- 
στήμονα—στημονοντικῆ] The sentence becomes irregular from expansion. The Bodl. has στη-
μονοντικήν with ΔΣΠΕΥ.

* O
to the other with a view to the final result.

NE. ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς.

ΞΕ. "Οσα δὲ γε αὖ τὴν μὲν συστροφὴν χαῦνην 5 λαμβάνει, τῇ δὲ τοῦ στημονοσ ἐμπλέξει πρὸς τὴν τῆς γνάψεως ὀλκήν ἐμμέτρωσ τὴν μαλακότητα ἰσχεί, ταῦτ' ἀρα κρόκην μὲν τὰ νηθέντα, τῇ δὲ ἐπιτεταγμένην αὐτοῖς εἶναι τέχνην *τινὰ* κροκονητικὴν φῶμεν. p. 28

NE. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.

These distinctions bring the art of wool-


5. τῇ δὲ τοῦ—ἰσχεί] "But have a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the wool, with a view to the degree of force to be used in dressing the cloth." So the gentle and brave natures are combined with a view to their profiting by the rubs which give the finishing touches to a state. Cf. infr. 310. The reading of Ξ, τοῦ κναφέως, deserves consideration.


10. μέρος δε πρ.] Sc. τὸ τῆς ἔρεας ἐσθήτος υφαντικὸν.

11. τὸ γὰρ—ὑφαντικῆν] "For when one part of the composition contained in wool-working creates a fabric by the direct intertexture of warp and woof, we call the whole result woolen cloth, and the art which presides over this we call weaving." Lit. "That portion of the combining branch of wool-working (which finds place) when" &c. Cf. supr. 282 c. Or, perhaps, "When the branch of the art of combination which is contained in wool-working creates" &c. In the latter case the genitive is either (1) gen. of apposition, like τυὸς γένος in Soph. 257 e: or (2) τῆς is genitive by attraction to συγκριτικῆς for τὸ, "the part of composition included in wool-working:" or (3) there may be a transition from the former to the latter meaning: i.e. συγκριτικῆς is at first partitive, but as resumed with τῆς, is the genitive of apposition. But the meaning given above is the most natural, and is not
283. τῆς ἐν ταλασσιοργίᾳ μόριον ὅταν εὐθυπλοκία κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ἀπεργάζηται πλέγμα, τὸ μὲν πλεκθὲν ἐξίμπαν ἑσθῆτα ἔρεαν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τέχνην οὐδαμῶς προσαγορεύουμεν ὕφαντικῶν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΞΕ. Εἴεν τι δὴ ποτε οὐν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεκρινάμεθα β πλεκτικὴν εἶναι κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ὑφαντικῆς, ἀλλὰ περιήλθομεν ἐν κύκλῳ πάμπολλα διορίύμενοι μάτην;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοιν ἐμοιγε, ὡ ἔγεν, μάτην οὐδὲν τῶν ἐρημεύτων ἐδοξὲ ῥηθήναι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ θαυμαστῶν γε οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τάχ᾽ ἂν, ὡ μακάρει, δόξειε. πρὸς δὴ τὸ νόσημα τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἂν ἄρα πολλάκις ὑστερον ἐπίθη—θαυμαστὸν γὰρ οὐδέν—, λόγον ἀκούσον τινα προσήκοντα περὶ πάντων τῶν τῶν τοιούτων ῥηθήναι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΞΕ. Πρῶτον τῶν ἦδωμεν πᾶσαν τὴν τε συρροβολήν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἵνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπανώμεν καὶ ψέγωμεν τὰ μακρότερα τὸν δέοντος ἐκάστοτε λεγόμενα καὶ τάναντια περὶ τὰς τοιάσδε διατριβᾶς.

the less probable for being somewhat involved. ἦ ἐν ταλασσιοργίᾳ συγκριτική must in this case be supplied as the subject of ἀπεργάζηται.

6. τι δὴ ποτε This raises the whole question of the utility of the present method, for which see General Introduction. Cf. also Gorg. 453, 454.

13. τὸ νόσημα τὸ τ.] Se. τὸ δόξαν ὅταν μάτην ῥηθήναι.

14. πολλάκις] “Haply, as it very likely may.” Cf. Phaedr. 238 e: ἕαν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσθῃς.

21. τάναντιά I. e. βραχύτερα τοῦ δέοντος.

περὶ τάς τοιάσδε διατριβᾶς These words depend on ἐπανώμεν καὶ ψέγωμεν as well as on λεγόμενα. “That with reference to such interviews as this we may apportion praise and blame reasonably to the arguments used in them.” Cf. Phaedr. 234 e: Τι δὲ; καὶ weaving into clearer light: as that part of the composition included in wool-working in which a web is made by the direct intertexture of warp and woof. But why could we not say at once that weaving was the intertexture of warp and woof? Lest some one should think our labour vain, let us examine the whole question of length and brevity.
NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

5 ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ τούτων αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἦμιν, οἶμαι,

γιγνόμενος ὁρθῶς ἀν γίγνοιτο.

NE. ΣΩ. Τίνων;

10 ΞΕ. Μήκους τε περὶ καὶ βραχύτητας καὶ πάσης

ὑπεροχῆς τε καὶ ἐλλείψεως. ἡ γὰρ ποὺ μετρητικὴ ἀ

περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

NE. ΣΩ. Ναί.

 footwear

There are
two kinds
of excess:
one merely
relative,
the other
having
tάυτη δεὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τῶν
λόγων ἐπαυσθήραι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα
εἰρηκότας τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἐκείνη μόνων, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογ-
γυλά κ.τ.λ.

5. Μήκους τε περὶ—ἐλλείψεως

For an application of the following idea, cf. Legg. 4, 719 d : 

οὕσας γὰρ ταφῆς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβε-

βλημένης τῆς δὲ ἐλλειπούσης τῆς

δὲ μετρίας. Ἰβ. 722 a : τὰ γὰρ

βελτιστὰ, ἀλλ’ οὗ τὰ βραχύτατα

οὐδὲ τὰ μίκρα τιμητῶν. Τίν. 82

a : τὸ τῶν νόσων δὲν ἔμνισθεν,

ὅδηλον ποῦ καὶ παντὶ—γῆς πυρὸς

ὕδατος τε καὶ ἄρεως, τούτων ἡ

παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἐνδεία.

Thetet. 172 c : καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἡ

βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἀν

μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄρος.

6. ἡ γὰρ ποὺ] So the Bodl.,

with ΓΞ : cett. ἂ.

μετρητικὴ] Cf. Phileb. sub

fin. The first mention of με-

τρητικὴ is in the Protagoras,

where it has not been suffi-

ciently observed that the ‘utili-

tarian’ hypothesis is only used

as a means to bring Protagoras

to acknowledge that virtue is

science. Thus expediency is

the point of transition from

the arbitrary to the just, as in

Thetet. 178 τὸ ὄφελμον is the

point of transition from the

apparent to the real good.

9. δὸν μέρη] For the accus.,

cf. Hdt. VI. 100 : ἐφράνεων δι-

φασις ἰδέαις.

10. πρὸς ὅ] Ι. c. πρὸς τοῦτο δ.

Cf. Thetet. 177 e : τοῦτο δὲ ποὺ

σκόμα ἀν εἰπ̄ πρὸς δ ἔλγομεν.


Soph. Οἰ. Ἑδ. Τύρ. 926, Α. 103,

874.

12. The words τὴν πρὸς ἀλ-

ληλα μεγέθους καὶ συμμερουσι

κοινωνίαν are not free from

doubt. For they may mean

either “the mutual communion

of greatness and littleness,”

(where the article seems to be

required,) or “the participa-

tion (of things) in greatness

and littleness relatively to one

another.” The latter is right ;

although the former meaning

may not unnaturally suggest
itself to a reader of the Sophist, where the koivwvia chiefly spoken of is the mutual communion of ideas. Compare with this whole passage Phedo 100, 101. Note that τὸ μεῖζον = τὸ μεγάλους κοινώνου πρὸς τὸ ἐλάττων. And τὸ ἐλάττων = τὸ συμκρότητος κοινώνου πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον.

1. τὸ δὲ — οὐσίαν] These words are meant to be enigmatical, like the definition of rhetoric as πολιτικῆς μορίων ἔδωκαν in Gorg. 463 d, or as τῆς τῶν ἐπιθέμων τίχνης μάριν in Enthyd. 289 e. (ἄναπαυλα γὰρ τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐν οἷς ἡ παιδία, Phileb. 30 e.) But they are less clearly explained in what follows. They seem to be connected with the assertion that a standard is necessary to the existence of the production of art (infrr. 284 a, b), and may probably be rendered "according to the otherwise impossible existence of production." ἀναγκαῖαν is then used in the same sense as in Rep. 2, 369 e: τίν δὲ ἢ ἀναγκαιωτάτη πόλις ἢ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἄνδρων. "A city could not possibly consist of less than four or five men." And γένεσις is a general word for the operations of all the arts. Cf. Soph. 235 e, Phileb. 27 a. Compare Legg. 10, 903 d: μεῖζον, την τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. I. e. "So far as it was possible that both should be combined." Translate, therefore — "I divide the art of measuring in the following way. One part is determined by the fact that things partake of greatness and smallness relatively to each other: the other by this, that without it the existence of production would be impossible." A similar verbal use of the word οὐσία occurs immediately below (ἐ, οὐσίας) and in p. 285 b: γένους τινὸς οὐσία. The meaning of this passage will appear more clearly on comparing Phileb. 25 d, 26 e.

9. Τί δὲ;—ἀγαθοὶ.] "But, again, shall we not say that there is really found that which exceeds or is exceeded by the nature of the Meet, in words, or, if so be, in deeds, and that herein consists the
chief mark of difference between bad men and good?"

Compare Rep. 1, 349, where it is shewn that the good and wise man does not aim at "more" but at "what is meet."

"When workmen strive to do better than well
They do confound their skill in covetousness."

6. Διττάς ἀρα—βετένον] "We must therefore assume that great and small exist and are discerned in these two ways, instead of following what we just now said, that one must only judge or speak of them (δέν sc. κρίσεις implied in κρίσεις, or perhaps λέγειν from supr. d) relatively to each other:

instead of this we must speak rather in accordance with what has just fallen from us, of one mode of their existence which is mutually relative, and of another which is relative to an ideal standard." The minuteness of the antithesis, ἀλλὰ—οίχα—ἀλλὰ, and the explicit resumption of the first clause with the second ἀλλὰ, make the sentence rather tortuous, but the meaning is clear. In the words ἀλλὰ—δέν the chief predicate is absorbed, as frequently happens, in the relative clause. Cf. Phileb. 54 d : ἐπερ—εἰπον—δέν.

10. ὅτι οὐκ] Plato's dialectical subtleties have generally an end beyond themselves. Here the end is the vindication of the Arts, in order to establish an Art of Rule. Cf. Theet. 184 d : τοῦ δέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριθοῖαι.
84. ΞΕ. Εί πρὸς μηδὲν ἔτερον τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ἐάσει τις φύσει ἡ πρὸς τούλαττον, οὐκ ἔσται ποτὲ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον. ἡ γάρ;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὔτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς τέχνας τε αὐτὰς καὶ τάργα αὐ-5 τὸν ἐξύπμαντα διολοῦμεν τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἔρμομένην ὑπὸν πολιτικὴν καὶ τὴν ῥήθεισαν ὑφαντικὴν ἀφαινοῦμεν; ἀπασά γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦν, τὸ τὸν μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἕλαττον οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὄν ἅλλ' ὡς ὑπὸ χαλεπῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις παραφυλάτ-10 τούτοις, καὶ τοῦτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ μέτρου σωκόσουσι πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀφαινόμεν, ἀπο-

1. εάσει] "Will admit." Sc. εἶναι, to be supplied from έσται infra., for which ellipse cf. Thet. 195 d: ἀμφότεροι γε κυ-

dευτεί τὸ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει (sc. εἶναι or ἀφείσθαι).

5. τὰς τέχνας τε] te is an-

swered by καὶ δὴ καὶ: αὐτὰς καὶ

tάργα αὐτῶν ἐξύπμαντα is erec-

getic of τέχνας.

6. * διολοῦμεν *] MSS. δι-

λοῦμεν. The correction is due to

Bekker.


Eth. Nic. V. 4, 12: ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τέχνων τούτων ἀν-

προῖτον γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ποιῶν καὶ

ὁσὸν καὶ ὁ οἱκικ. τ.λ.

10. ὡς ὑπὸ χαλεπῶν] "As being

baneful." Badham objects to

χαλεπῶν on the ground that

this adj. placed absolutely can

only mean "difficult to ob-

tain," and conjectures χαλεπῶ-

— παραφυλάττουσι. But cf.

Symp. 176 d: ὅτι χαλεπῶν τοῖς

ἀνθρώποις ἡ μεθή ἐστίν. Ib. 204 :

ἀυτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία. Infr. 308 a: Ἑλεπῶν εἰτες καὶ
dεινῶν πάθος. For παραφ., cf.

Legg. 4, 715 a.

The distinction between the

two kinds of μετρητικὴ is not

present in Protagoras, p. 357.

ὡς ὑπὸ χαλεπῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις

παραφυλάττουσι] περὶ τὰς πράξ.

has a double reference to χαλ.

and παραφ., like περὶ τὰς—dia-

truba supra. 283 e. Cf. Prot.

313 d: ὃ τι—πονηρῶν περὶ τὸ

σῶμα.

12. πάντα — ἀπεργάζονται] Compare the rhythm of Rep. 8,

546 e: πάντα προσήγαρα καὶ μῆτα

πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέθαναν, and for

the expression, Legg. 4, 7, 11 d,

6, 780 e: πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἀπερ-

gάζεται. Ib. 783 e. Tim. 50 e.


249 c: ὡς ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ ἀφαι-

ζων ἵσχυρηθηκαί περὶ τινος ὑπή-

οῦν.
Shall we then, as in defining the Sophist, we forced the point that Not-Being has Being, now demonstrate that excess is not merely relative, but has sometimes reference to a standard? Without this the art of statesmanship must perish with all the other arts. And yet

4. \( \text{ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ} \) “In treating of the Sophist.” A form of reference like \( \text{ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ} \) τῶν θεων, Phileb. 33 b: \( \text{ἐν τῷ σκίτστρου τῇ παραδοσείᾳ} \). Thuc. I. 10.

5. \( \text{ἐπειδὴ—λόγος} \) “Because at this point the question eluded our grasp.”

8. \( \text{πρὸς—πρὸς} \) There is a slight variation in the meaning of \( \text{πρὸς} \). “Not only in comparison with each other, but with a view to the production of that which is meet.” Τὸ μέτριον is the result of the application of μέτριον to production.

9. \( \text{γένεσιν} \) Cf. supr. 283 d. The frequent use of the word \( \text{γένεσις} \), in the most general sense, is one of the characteristic points of diction which connect this dialogue with Philebus, Timeus, and Laws.

οὐδεν αὐτοῦ τῶν περὶ τῶν πράξεως ἐπιστήμων ἀναμφισβητώς γεγονέναι τούτου μὴ ἔυνομολογηθέντως.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν ὃ ἐντὸς κρίτη ταὐτοῦ ποιεῖν.

ΞΕ. Πλέων, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐτὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν ἑκὼν: καὶ τοῦ κάκεινον γε μεμνημέθα τὸ μῆκος ὁς οὖν ἦν. ἀλλ' ὑποτίθεσθαι μὲν τὰ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μάλα δίκαιον.

4. \( \text{ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ} \) “In treating of the Sophist.” A form of reference like \( \text{ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ} \) τῶν βίων, Phileb. 33 b: \( \text{ἐν τῷ σκίτστρου τῇ παραδοσίᾳ} \). Thuc. I. 10.

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2. "Ως ποτε δεήσει — ἐστιν ποτε [It has been thought that this passage is seriously corrupt: but when δ τι (or δ) is rendered as a pronoun, and either καὶ introduced before μεῖζων, with six MSS., or τε read for τι (or τε τι, with Hermann), the words as they stand give a better meaning, and one more suited to the context, than any which it has been proposed to substitute. "That some day there will be need of that which has now been mentioned" (the proof that "more" and "less" are relative to a standard of right measure as well as to each other, supr. b) "for the demonstration of the highest problem of all." (ἀετὸς τάκριβετι is that absolute principle which is essential to and identical with perfection of method. Cf. 1 Alc. 130 d: αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό, "But (to dwell only on) what is fairly and sufficiently shewn for our present purpose, this argument, I think, comes grandly to our aid, that we must alike believe in the existence of the arts, and at the same time (αὐτα), in a greater and less being measured, not only in relation to each other, but with a view to the production of the mean. For if the latter is true the former is true (for ἐκεῖνα, cf. Theaet. 207 d, αὐτὰ, and note), and if the former exist, the latter is the case; and if either is not, neither will ever be." This explanation is substantially the same as Stallbaum's.

It appears from the Philebus that the absolute standard (μέτρον) was closely allied in Plato's mind with Reason and the Idea of Good. The demonstration of the "very exactness of truth" is probably reserved for the "Philosophus." Even in the dialectical dialogues Plato complains of an imperfect method. For δ τι almost = δ Γ, a thing which," cf. Gorg. 508 d: δ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς, ὡστις πολλάκις μὲν ἢδον ἐφίηται οὐδὲν δὲ καλέσαι καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι αὐτοφήμι κ.τ.λ. The indefinite relative is used because the antecedent is only determined as the sentence proceeds. "But as for that which," &c. And for the clause in apposition, cf. Theaet. 158 b: ὁ πολλάκις, infr. 293 a. A similar looseness of construction occurs in Gorg. 454 c: ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ διαμαίνησις — ὁπερ γὰρ λέγω κ.τ.λ. For the notion of ἀκριβεία, cf. Rep. 4, 435 c—c, 504. Comp. esp. with πρὸς τὰ νῦν, 435 d: τῶν τε προκειμένων ἄξιως. 504 b: τῶν — ἦμπροσθεν ἐπιμεικὰς ἀποδείξεις. For περὶ αὐτὸ τάκριβετι, cf. Rep. 7, 525 a: ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις. The Bodleian has δείκνυα, with most other MSS.

The distinction here brought out obviously resembles and may have suggested that drawn by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. II. between the absolute and relative mean. But what is absolute in Aristotle is relative in Plato. Aristotle's πλεον, ἐλαττων, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ
περὶ αὐτὸ τὰ κρίσεις ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ τι δὲ πρὸς τὰ νῦν p. 28
καλὸς καὶ ἴκανὸς δείκνυται,—δοκεῖ μοι βοηθεῖν με-
γαλοπρεπῶς ἡμῖν οὕτος ὁ λόγος, ὅσ ἄρα ἡγητέον
όμοιος τᾶς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι [καὶ] μείζον τι ἅμα
καὶ ἐλαττῶν μετερείσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἀλληλα μόνον ἅλλα
καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν. τοῦτο τε γὰρ
ὄντος ἐκεῖνα ἐστὶ κάκεινων οὐσῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο,
μὴ δὲ ὄντος ποτέρου τούτων οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐσται
ποτε.

10 NE. ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν ὅρθως· ἄλλα τί δὴ τὸ μετὰ ε
τοῦτο;

ΞΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι διαφορὲς ἂν τὴν μετρητικὴν,
καθάπερ ἐρρήθη, ταύτη δίχα τέμνουτε, ἐν μὲν τι-
θέντες αὐτῆς μόριον ξυμπάσας τέχνας, ὑπὸσαι τὸν

πράγμα are here viewed as
πρὸς ἀλληλα μόνον. Aristotle’s
πρὸς ἡμᾶς is Plato’s πρὸς τὴν
τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν, where the
appeal is to an absolute stand-
ard. This difference strikes
deeply into the character of
each philosophy. Vid. supr.
ote on 259 b. It should be
noticed that Plato does not
speak of a mean in the former
case, but only of excess and
defect, and that Aristotle’s
subjective mean is connected
with his distinction between
virtue and the arts, which
must be regarded as a forward
step in ethical inquiry. Com-
pare Legg. 5, 757 a (where we
seem to find the point of tran-
sition from the Platonic to the
Aristotelian μεσότης): τοῖς γὰρ
αἵτως τὰ ἐστὶ ἄνω ἡγεῖτι
ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυχαῖον τοῦ μέτρου.

2. βοηθεῖν μεγαλοπρεπῶς] Cf. Thet. 168 c: μεγαλειώτερον ἄν
tois autoi éboithsenv.

4. ὁμοίως — γένεσιν ] Cf. Phaedo 76 b: εἰς καλὸν γε κατα-
φεύγει δ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἰνα
τὴν τε ψυχῆν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι
ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἂν δὴ σὺ νῦν
λέγεις. A direct proof of
the existence of such a standard is
still to seek. But it is enough
for our purpose that no art
can exist without it.

μείζον τι ἅμα καὶ ἐλαττων
"There is a greater and less
whose measure is not merely
relative." I. e. This is one
kind of "greater" and "less."
But perhaps καὶ should be re-
jected and τε read for τι. Cf.
Theat. 195 e: λιθωδές τε.
MSS. τι.

8. ποτέρου] "Either," "one
or other."

13. ἐν μὲν μόριον — τὸ δ ἐτερον] According to the reasoning
of this passage, the former are
clearly subordinate to the latter.
284. ἀριθμὸν καὶ μῆκον καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχύτητας πρὸς τούναντίον μετροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἐτερον, ὅποσα πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπώκισθη τῶν ἐσχάτων.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ μέγα γ' ἐκάτερον τμῆμα ἐίπες, καὶ πολὺ διαφέρον ἀλλήλους.

ΣΕ. Ὁ γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ὦ Σώκρατε, οἰόμενοι δὴ τι 285. σοφὸν φράζει πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν, ὡς ἀρκετὴν περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ὑν τυχόνει. μετρήσεως μὲν γὰρ δὴ τινα τρόπον πάνθ' ὁπόσα ἐντελεῖ μετείληψε διὰ

1. ταχύτητας] The Bodleian, with ΞΠΣ, has παχύτητας, ef. infr. 299 c, where the introduction of παχύνω would be more intelligible than of παχύτητας here, but the MS. authority is slight. The transition from solid quantity to speed is less obvious and more Platonic and philosophical than that from depth and breadth to thickness: and density (which Stallbaum speaks of) can hardly be in question. See the connexion between solid geometry and astronomy (ὡς φορὰν ὡςαν βάθους) in Rep. 7, 528 foll. See esp. 529 d: τῶν δ' ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεικνύοντες ὡς τὸ ὅν τάξιν καὶ ἡ ὄσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς σχῆμασι φορᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλα φιλέται καὶ τὰ ἐνώστα φέρει. Where the distinction of the two kinds of astronomy is essentially analogous to that suggested here. Also Legg. 7, 820 seq., 10, 896 d: μῆκον συμμᾶτον καὶ πλάτων καὶ βάθους καὶ φώμης.

4. ἀπωκίσθη] “Have removed their abode” —as to a safe distance from evil. The word seems to have been adopted by the Pythagoreans. See Mullach, Pyth. Fr. p. 537: οὐ μακρὰν οὐδ' ἀπωκισμένως. (Ephrantus ap. Stob.)


11. τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν] That there could be no γένεσι παρὰ τό μέτρου, which is the first embodiment of τὸ μέτρον, ef. Philib. sub. fin. and 55 c.

12. διὰ δὲ τὸ μῆ—περιβάλλωσι] “But from never having been habituated to distinguish every subject of inquiry according to real forms, they not only jumble indiscriminately, from a notion that they resemble each other, these widely different things, the size and number of objects in relation to each other, and one of those which measure with reference to a mean or standard. This is the truth which underlies the doctrine that “all is measure-ment.”
de to μη κατ’ ειδη συνειδήσθαι σκοτειν διαμορφέμενος p. 28
ταύτα τε τοσούτων διαφέροντα ευμβάλλουσαν ειθύς
eis ταυτόν όμως νομίζοντες, καὶ τούναντίον αὐτό του-
των δρῶσιν, ἔτερα οὐ κατὰ μέρη διαιρόντες, δέον,
οἵταν μὲν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἰσθήται b
κοινώνιαν, μὴ προσφάσασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς
diaφορὰς ὑδὴ πάσας, ὁπόσαπερ ἐν εἴδει κεῖται, τὰς
dὲ αὐτοποιηθὲν ἁνομοιότητας, ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν
ὁθώσι, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσῳστόμενον παύσιμόν,
πρὶν ἂν ἔμυπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μᾶς ὁμοιότητος
ἔρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίας περιβάλλεται. ταύτα μὲν
οὖν ἰκανῶς περὶ τοῦτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐλλείψεων

but fall into the converse error of distinguishing other things
not according to their real di-
visions: whereas the right way
is, when one has first perceived
a common nature running
through a great variety of
things, not to desist till one
has seen all the differences
which subsist within that na-
ture, and which constitute dis-
tinct kinds, and on the other
hand, not to be able to look
contentedly upon the endless
diversity which has been seen
in a multitude of objects, until
one has brought all kindred
objects within the pale of a
single resemblance, and invest-
ated them with the real nature
of a single kind.”

5, 454 a, Phaedr. 265 e.
2. ὅταν τις τῶν πολλῶν—
κοινώνιαν] This “divinatio
seems always to be assumed as
the first step in a dialectical
inquiry. Cf. Phileb. 16 d: μᾶλ
ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκάστοτε θεμέ-
νους ἐγένεσθαι εὐρήσειν ὡς ἐνοῦσαν.
7. ὁπόσαπερ] This is the
same thing which is expressed
in the Philebus (16 d, e) in the
words μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ’ ἄρχας
ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὅπερ
ἐστι μόνον ᾑδὴ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα,
8, 544 d: ὅτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει δια-
φάνει τινι κεῖται.
8. ἐν πλήθεσιν] “Numbers,”
or “multitudes,” he cannot say
classes because they are not
yet classified. Cf. Theet. 157 c:
ὁ δὲ ἄδροισματι ἄνθρωπον τε τι-
βενται καὶ λίθων κ.τ.λ., and the
δηκον of the Parmenides, 164, 5.
This process corresponds to
that described in Phileb.18 a-d.
9. δυσωστοῡμενον] “Looking
upon with discomfort or dis-
like.” Cf. infr. 291 b, c.
11. γένος τινὸς οὐσία] “With
the reality (dasein) of a genus,”
oυσία is used in nearly the
same sense as supra 284 bis.
= τῷ γένοις τι εἶναι.
The latter half of this de-
scription (from τάς δὲ αὐτ’) is the
opposite of the second error
mentioned above.
οικικός.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Μεμνημόθεμα.

ΞΕ. Μετά τούτον δὴ τῶν λόγων ἔτερον προσδέ-5
ξώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τε τῶν ζητουμένων καὶ περὶ πά-
σης τῆς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις διατριβῆς.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Εἰ τις ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς τὴν περὶ γράμματα
συνουσίαν τῶν μαθηανώντων, ὁπόταν τις ὁπιοῦν10
όνομα ἐρωτηθῇ τίνων ἐστὶ γραμμάτων, πότερον αὐτῷ
δά τότε φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν ἐνὸς ἕνεκα μᾶλλον
tοῦ προβληθέντος ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα τὰ προβαλλό-
μενα γραμματικώτερα γίγνεσθαι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ ἄπαντα.

ΞΕ. Τί δ' αὖ νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ
ζήτησις; ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτον προβέβληται μᾶλ-

1. φυλάττωμεν] Let us fix this in our minds. Cf. infr. 297 a: μεχρίσης ὑν ἐν μέγα φυ-
λάττωσιν κ.τ.λ.

9. Εἰ τις—γίγνεσθαι;] “Were one to ask us of the intercourse of students in grammar (with
their teacher), when one of them is asked to spell a word, whether shall we say that the
inquiry in which he then en-
gages is for the sake of the
single problem thus set before
him, or for the sake of be-
coming more expert in all
orthographical problems?”

The question which is the
object of ἀνέροιτο is to be
sought in πότερον φῶμεν κ.τ.λ.,
which is the apodosis of the
sentence: just as when part
of a relative clause becomes
absorbed in the antecedent.
“If we were asked of the
intercourse of learners with their
teachers about their letters, when one of them is asked of
what letters any noun is com-
posed, whether shall we say
that his study at such a time
is for the sake of the parti-
cular question, or for the sake
of his becoming more expert
in such subjects generally?”

Compare the structure of Soph.
237 b: εἰ σπουδῇ δέοι κ.τ.λ.

10. συνουσίαν is used in some-
thing of a technical sense.

16. Τί δ' αὖ] For the punc-
tuation, cf. Phadr. 234 d: τί
σοι φαίνεται—ὁ λόγος; οἷς ὑπε-
φύς—εἰρήσθαι;
λον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνε- p. 28 σθαι;

NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ τούτο δήλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα.

ΞΕ. Ἡ που τῶν τῆς ύφαιντικής γε λόγων αὐτῆς
ταύτης ἕνεκα θηρεύειν οὔδεις ἀν ἐδελύττε οὖν ἔχων.
ἀλλ’, ὅμως, τοῖς πλείστοις λέληθεν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν
ὀντων ραδίως καταμαθεῖν *αἰσθηταί* τινες ομοίωτητες εν
πεφύκασιν, ἂς οὔδεν χαλεπῶν δηλοῦν, ὅταν αὐτῶν τις
βουληθῇ τῷ λόγῳ αἰτούντι περὶ τοῦ μὴ μετὰ πρα-
γμάτων ἀλλὰ χωρίς λόγου ραδίως ἐνδείξασθαι τοῖς
ὁ αὖ μεγίστοις οὕτι καὶ τιμιοτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδώ-
λοιν οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, p. 28
οὗ δειχθέντος τὴν τοῦ πυμβανομένου ψυχῆν ὁ βουλό-
μενος ἀποπληρώσαι, πρὸς τῶν αἰσθητοῖς των προσ-

4. Ἡ που] This is not really inconsistent with Soph. 227 a: τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογματικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὖδέν ἦττον οὔδὲ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον. In both cases it is the method alone which gives importance to the particular subject.

6. ἄλλ’, ὅμως, — λεγόμενα] “But I think that it has escaped most men, that, while some things are endued with resemblances which are sensible, and therefore easily known, which there is no difficulty in shewing, when one wishes to point out any of them (τι οὔντων) to any one who asks about it, with no trouble, but easily, without argument,—there are also things, and those the greatest, and of priceless worth, which have no image wrought so as to strike human perceptions, by pointing to which he who would content the mind of an inquirer, shall fully satisfy him by imprinting this on some one of his senses. Wherefore one ought to study to be able to give and receive a rational account of everything, for things bodiless, which are the fairest and the greatest things, for the sake of which all that is now said is spoken, are made clearly manifest by reason alone.” Cf. suppl. 277 c.

7. MSS. αἰσθητικαί.

10. ραδίως καταμαθεῖν] Perhaps ραδίως should be read, with Hermann and Badham. Badham further conjectures ἡς οὖν χαλεπὸν δὲ τι ἄν αὐτῶν τις βουληθῇ τῷ λ. a.—ἐνδείξασθαι. But the whole sentence is laboured and pleonastic, so that there is little cause for omitting an inconvenient word.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

286. αρμόττων, ικανῶς πληρώσει. διό δει μελετάν λόγον ἐκάστου δυνατον εἶναι δοιναι καὶ δέξασθαι τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ούτα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲν σαφῶς δεῖκνυται, τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα. ῥάων δ’ εν τοῖς ἑλάτ-5

b τοσιν ἡ μελετὴ παντὸς πέρι μᾶλλον ἡ περὶ τὰ μεῖζο.

NE. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ’ εἶπες.
ΞΕ. Ὑν τοίνυχαρίν ἀπανθ’ ἡμῖν ταῦτ’ ἐρήμη

perc toütων, μνησθὼμεν.

NE. ΣΩ. Τίνων;
ΞΕ. Ταύτης τε οὐχ ἡκίστα αὐτής ἕνεκα τῆς

δυσχερείας, ἢν †περὶ † τῆν μακρολογίαν τὴν περὶ
tῆν ύφαντικὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς, καὶ τὴν περὶ

οίνου—μᾶλλον ἡ] Cf. Pro-
tag. 317 ε : καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην

οίμαι βελτίω ἐκείνην εἶναι, τὸ ἁρμο-

λογίων μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξωρον εἶναι.
12. Ταύτης τε—λέγομεν] The

construction is obscured by the

attraction of the latter part of the

sentence into the relative clause.

Strict syntax would require ταύτης τε—καὶ
tῆς (δυσχερείας) περὶ τῆν (μακρο-

λογίαν) περὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κ.τ.λ.:

instead of which the latter

clause, with what follows, is

made to depend on ἀπεδεξάμεθα
dυσχερῶς, with which the re-

minder of the sentence, ἐννοοῦ-
tες—καὶ—ἐπελήξαμεν κ.τ.λ., is

also connected.
13. ἢν †περὶ † τῆν μακρο-

λογίαν] Hermann suggests ἤπερ.

Wagner, Rheinische Museum,
vol. xii. (1857) p. 309, prefers ἤπερ.

This avoids the collo-
nication of the two accusatives,

which is the objection to ἤπερ.

But ἢν is unobjectionable. Cf.

Soph. 264 b : τὴν προσθοκίαν ἢν

ἐφοβηθήμεν, and note. Gorg.

509 ε : ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσ-

χάστην βόθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βο-

θεῖν. Also Legg. 2, 666 b :
tὴν—παιδίαν, ἢν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
eπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γῆρας ἀυστρό-

πτητὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρ-

μακον. And περὶ also may be

defended if we suppose ἀπε-

dεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς (sc. τὴν μακ-

ρολογίαν) to be substituted for
dυσχεράμενεν. Such a change

in the form of a sentence will

not astonish the attentive stu-
dent of these dialogues.

Plato here seems determined
to "bestow all his tediousness"

on his critics, whoever they

were.

μακρολογίαν] "Lengthiness

in argument," not in speech, as

in Gorg. 461 d, alib.
14. ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς (sc.
tὴν μακρολογίαν) is unexpectedly

Let us recall the

10 motive of

this digres-
sion. It

was chiefly
to calm the
disquiet

which we

felt at the

length to

which our

analogies

which can

only be ex-

pressed in

argument.
remarks on weaving, as well as the myth which preceded, and the discussion on the nature of the Sophist, had been spun: by shewing that length was not lengthiness unless exceeding what is meet.

τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀνείλιξε καὶ τὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ  p. 286 τέρι τῆς τοῦ μη ὄντος οὕσιας, ἐννοοῦντες ὡς ἐσχε μῆκος πλέον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄν τὰ ἐπεπλήξαμεν ἥμιν αὐτοῖς, δεῖσαντες μὴ περίφραγμα ἁμα καὶ μακρὰ c 5 λέγομεν. ἵνα ὅσον εἰσαύθηζη μηδὲν πάσχωμεν τοιοῦτον, τούτων ἔνεκα πάντων τὰ πρόσθεν νῦν εἰρήσθαι φάθι.

NE. ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἑσται. λέγε ἐξής μόνον.

ΞΕ. Λέγω τοῖνυν ὅτι χρή δὴ μεμημένους ἐμὲ καὶ τοῖς τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων τῶν τε ψόγον ἐκάστοτε καὶ ἔπαινον ποιεῖσθαι βραχύτητος ἁμα καὶ μῆκος ὅν ἂν αἰεὶ πέρι λέγομεν, μὴ πρὸς ἀλληλα τὰ μήκη κρίνοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος, ὅ τότε ἐφαμεν δεῖν μεμημῆσθαι, πρὸς τὸ πρότον.

NE. ΣΩ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Οὐ τοῖνυν οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο πάντα. οὔτε γὰρ

substituted for ἐνυσχεράναμεν: hence the introduction of περὶ.

1. ἀνείλιξεν  Supr. 269 e. τῆς (sc. μακρολογίαν).

tοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ  It is better to take περὶ thus with τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, in which case it can easily be resumed with the explanatory words τῆς τοῦ μῆκος οὕσιας. Otherwise the preceding dialogue would be referred to as ὁ σοφιστής, a form of reference which has no parallel in Plato. Cf. supr. 284 b: ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ, and note.

6. τοίνυν—πάντων] "The above-mentioned and all similar arguments."


14. μεμημῆσθαι] One is at first sight inclined to read μετρῆσθαι, after the conjecture of Schleiermacher, and to suppose that an error has grown out of μημημένους, μεμημένους above. But the text is seen to be perfectly sound when a comma is placed after μεμημῆσθαι, and πρὸς τὸ πρότον is thus joined with τὰ μῆκη κρίνοντες. The opening of the next speech favours this view. And in support of μεμημῆσθαι, cf. supr. 284 c: ὑποτίθεσθαι ὡς ποτε διήνε σι ὅν λεχθέντος. 285 b: φιλάτωμεν—ὅτι δόσε γένη τῆς μετρητικῆς—καὶ ἃ φαμεν αὖτας ἐναι μεμαρμέθαι. Ν.Σ. μεμημῆσθαι. μεθα.

16. Οὐ τοῖνυν οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο πάντα] "Not, however, even with a view to this in all things. The standard by which arguments are to be measured
is that which is becoming or suitable, not with a view to pleasure, or persuasion, or gracefulness, but to the awakening of reason and the furtherance of truth." Cf. Legg. 2, 655 c: λέγοντι γε οἱ πλείστοι μουσικής ὁμοθήτα εἶναι τὴν ἴδιον ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρίζωσιν δύναμιν ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτών οὔτε ὅσον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι. We might be disposed to conjecture πάντη, but πάντα is used elsewhere adverbially. Soph. 233 a: ὥς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοῖς σοφώτατοι.

(16.) οὔτε γὰρ—λόγον] "For first we shall have no need of a length that is suitable for pleasure, unless merely by the way: and our argument further enjoins that we esteem only as of secondary importance that which helps investigation and facilitates and hastens discovery, but that we should prize by far most highly, and in the first place, the method itself and the power of dividing according to the real species, and feel an interest in that discourse which makes the hearer more inventive, whether it be brief or interminable alike: moreover, that the man who blames lengthliness (ἀδολεσχίαν) in this kind of intercourse, and is intolerant of circuitous digressions, ought not so quickly and all at once to have done when he has blamed the discourse as long, but should consider that it is his duty to shew further that a shorter one would have made those conversing better reasoners, and would have improved their power of finding a mode of declaring realities by speech; all other blames and praises, made with reference to any other standard, our argument bids us disregard and to seem deaf to any such remarks."


2. πλὴν εἰ μή] See Lobeck ad Phrynieh. p. 459, who adduces Ar. de An. I. 3: πλὴν εἰ μή κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The greater frequency of the expression in later Greek throws some doubt on the few instances of it in Attic Greek which, like the present, have full MS. authority.

to τε] Sc. μήκος ἁρμόστον.

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τὸν ἀκούσαντα εὐρετικότερον ἀπεργάζητα, τοῦτον ἤπειρον σπουδάζειν καὶ τῷ μὴκε μηδὲν ἀγανακτεῖν, ἀν τ᾽ αὖ βραχύτερος, ὡσαύτως· ἔτι δ᾽ αὖ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν περὶ τὰς τοιάσδε συννούσια ψέγοντα λόγων μήκη 5 καὶ τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ περιόδους οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενον, ὅτι χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ πάνυ ταχὺ μηδ᾽ εὐθὺς οὔτω μεθέναι ψέξαντα μόνον ὅσ μακρὰ τὰ λειχθέντα, ἄλλα καὶ προσαποφαίνειν οἰεσθαί δεῖν ὅσ βραχύτερα ἀν γενόμενα τοὺς συνώντας ἀπεργάζετο διαλεκτικότε- 10 ρος καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλόσεως εὐρετικότε- ρος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων καὶ πρὸς ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα ψόγων καὶ ἑπαίων μηδὲν φροντίζειν μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν δοκεῖ τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων. Καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄλις, εἰ καὶ σοι ταύτῃ ἔξυνδοκεί πρὸς δὲ δὴ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἰδίων τὰ λάλην, τῆς προρρηθείσης ὑφαντικῆς αὐτῷ φέ- 15 rontes τὸ παράδειγμα.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ γε τῶν πολλῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅσαι

1. τοῦτον σπουδάζειν] This construction appears in Gorg. 500 c: ὁ τι ἄν μᾶλλον σπουδά- σιει τε, as well as in Soph. 251 c, 259 c. Compare Legg. 7, 792 c: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔμως δὴ λόγος οὐθ᾽ ἡδονάς φησι δὲν διάκειν τῶν ὀρθῶν βιών οὔτ᾽ αὖ τὸ παράπαν φεύγειν τὰς ὀπίσω, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀπαίσιεθαι τὰ μέσον, ὁ νῦν δὴ προσείποι ὃς ἠκούν ὀνομάσασ.

2. ἂν τ᾽ αὖ βραχύτερος] Se. λεξεῖς.


5. ὦτ᾽ χρῆ τῶν τοιοῦτων] These words depend immediately on ὁ λόγος παραγγέλλει.


7. μεθέναι] Cf. Philcb. 16 c: εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον μεθένατα χαίρειν ἕν. 10. τῆς—δηλόσεως] This is probably a genitive of respect. λόγῳ depends on the verbal meaning in δηλόσεως.

12. φροντίζειν again depends on παραγγέλλει.

15. αὐτῷ φέροντες τὸ παράδειγμα] “Applying to him (= ἐπιφέροντες) our example.” Cf. supr. 278 e. The dative is probably dative commodi, "Bringing for his benefit." Hence there is perhaps a touch of liveliness in the omission of the preposition.

"That occupy part of the same field," with a slight etymological allusion to νομεντική. The comparison of infr. 289 b shews, however, that the word is not to be taken actively or accented ξυνώμοι.

7. τὸ δ' αἰτίον—καταφανὲς] The enumeration itself (αὐτὴ ἡ διέξοδος) will shew that the analysis cannot be carried further.


tο. οὖν ἦν ἐπειρεῖτον κατα
gινόμαι μὲν ἴδην κακόν μαγεῖρων
tρόπῳ χρώμαισιν. The same image occurs in Emped. Fr. l. 86: γρώθι διατμήθητος ἐνι σπλαγ-
Ν. Σ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ χαλεπῶν ἐπιχειρούμεν δρᾶν ἀποχωρίζοντες τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ γένος: ὁ τι γάρ οὐν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν ὦς ἔνος 
τίνως ὄργανον εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εἰρηκέναι τι πιθανόν. ὅμως δὲ ἔτερον αὖ τῶν ἐν πόλει κτημάτων εἰπόμενον τόδε.

ΝΕ. Σ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Ὅσι οὖκ ἔστι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἐχον. οὐ

4. τούτων δ' αὖ — δήσομεν] "Nor, again, shall we rank any one of these things as a function of the regal art."

9. δ' τι γάρ οὖν — πιθανόν] The words as they stand in the MSS. (ὡς ἔστιν ἔνος γε τίνως ὄργανον) give no construction to δοκεῖν. Stephanus read ἔστι for δ', which cannot be spared. Ast supplied δεί; Stallbaum, ἄνακῃ; Hermann omits ὦς; Wagner, in Rheinsch. Mus. vol. xii. (1857) p. 307, reads δοκεῖ. The comparison of Legg. 4, 709 b—τῷ δ' ἔστι περὶ τε ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ λατρευτικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν πάντα ταύτ' εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εὐ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως καὶ τόδε ἐστὶ λέγοντα εὐ λέγειν—leaves no doubt that Hermann's (which is nearly that of Stephanus) is the right method. But ὦς is to be retained by being placed after ἔστιν. Cf. Legg. 6, 768 c: ἀ δὴ φαμέν ὦθ' ὡς ἀρχίσαι ὦθ' ὡς μὴ μάθων εἰπόντα ἀναμφισβήτητος εἰρηκέναι. Crat. 404 b: Διημέρη φαίνειν — ὡς μητηρ κεκληθαί, and supr. ἔτειμεν ὡς συναιτός, infr. 289 c, 291 a, supr. 281 a, b, Phaedo 99 b. For the position of ἔστι, cf. Legg. 6, 769 c: οὖς τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται φανδρίων ποιεῖν ἕπειδιδώναι. Boll. MS. ὦς ἔστι without accent.

11. εἰπόμενον τὸδε] "Let us say what follows regarding another of the possessions that are in a city." "Say what?" "That it has not this power" (i.e. is not political). Cf. infr.: καὶ τῇ ἐγκώμῃ πεξ προσηκον οὐδὲν ἄτεχνως ἐπιστήμης. "For it is not compacted with a view to being employed in production, as was the case with the genus instrumentum, but for the preservation or retention of what has been made."
1. ἐπὶ γενέσεως αἰτίας "Productionis causā," ἐπὶ as in ἐπὶ τῆς μανθανεῖν, αἰτία as in ὅν δὴ ὑπὲρ αἰτίων ἔχεις διαφέρειν. I. e. With the view of having production referred to them.

4. Τοῦτο — προσφθεγόμεθα]
The place also appears easily remediable by rejecting the second ὅ δὴ, which is either a gloss or a clerical error. Stalib. is wrong in saying that two arts must be developed here. (How would he distinguish ἔργαλευτὸν from ὁργανόν;) The ὁργανὸν has been already distinguished, though with difficulty, as a separate kind, being lightly passed over because already spoken of under ὑφαστική, and that here named (ἀγγείον) has been previously spoken of as ἐτερον, "a second." The next is therefore properly introduced as τρίτον.

[καὶ ἔμπνευσι καὶ ἀπήρων] For things prepared by fire and not so prepared. Thus caldrons and pitchers are both included. In Legg. 3, 679 a, σκεύων ἐμπῦρων τε καὶ ἀπήρων, the distinction is made between pottery and wickerwork, the former of which is baked and will bear heat.

9. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;] Sc. εἰπομεν ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν ταύτην τήν δύναμιν ἐχον. This form of assent to a negative proposition has been questioned, and πῶς γὰρ, πῶς γὰρ οὖν, πῶς γὰρ οὖν, suggested. But for a similar inexactness in reply, if this be inexactness, cf. Gorg. 467 e: "Ἄρ' οὖν ἐστι τι τῶν ὄντων; ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἄγαθον γ' ἐστίν ἣ κακίν ἢ μεταξύ τούτων, οὔτε ἄγαθον οὔτε κακόν; Π. πολλῆ ἀνάγκη, ὡ Σ. (sc. μή εἶναι τι τῶν ὄντων οὖν ὅτε.)

10. Τοῦτων δὴ — γεγονόμενων] "And there is a third kind of possessions, different from these and very extensive, which we must desecry, on land and on water, perambulatory and stationary, honourable and dishonoured, to which one name is given, because it is always intended to be sat upon, and is a seat for some one."
πλανὲς καὶ ἀπλανὲς καὶ τίμιον καὶ ἀτιμον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ποιῶν, διότι πᾶν ἐνεκά τινος ἐφέδρας ἐστὶ, θάκος ἀεὶ τινι γιγνόμενον.

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιῶν;

5 ΞΕ. ὁχήμα αὐτὸ ποὺ λέγομεν, οὐ πάνυ πολιτικῆς ἔργον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολὺ τεκτονικῆς καὶ κεραμικῆς καὶ χαλκοτυπικῆς.

NE. ΣΩ. Μανθάνων.

Fourthly, defences;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ τέταρτον; ἢρ ἐτερον εἶναι τούτων ἃ λεκτέων, ἐν ὧ τὰ πλείστα ἐστὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥηθέντων, ἐσθής τε ἐξυμπασά καὶ τῶν ὅπλων τὸ πολὺ καὶ τείχη πάντα θ' ὡσα γήνα περιβλήματα καὶ λίθων, καὶ μυρία ἐτερά; προσβολῆς δὲ ἕνεκα ἐξυμπάντων αὐτῶν εἰργασμένων δικαίως ἀν ὅλον προσαγορεύοιτο πρό-

βλήμα, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τέχνης οἰκοδομικῆς ἔργον καὶ ύφαντικῆς τὸ πλείστον νομίζωτ' ἄν ὀρθότερον ἡ πολιτικῆς.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Fifthly, sports;

ΞΕ. Πέμπτων δὲ ἄρ' ἂν ἐθέλοιμεν τὸ περὶ τῶν κόσμων καὶ γραφικῆς θεών καὶ ὡσα ταύτη προσχρώμενα καὶ μουσικῆς μμήματα τελείται, πρὸς τὰς ἱδονὰς


6. μᾶλλον πολὺ] Cf. supr. 275 c, and note.

κεραμικῆς] The exact bearing of this would be more evident if we knew more of the details of Greek life.

7. χαλκοτυπικῆς] By which chariots, for example, are made.


10. τῶν πάλαι ῥηθέντων] Supr. 279, 280.


16. τὸ πλαίστον] "Most," not "all." Not ὀπλοσοικίη, for example.

ὁρθότερον pleonastically resumes πολὺ μᾶλλον, as suiting better with νομίζωτ' ἄν.
4. Παίγνιον ποὺ τι ["There is such a word in use as 'child's-play.'"] Cf. Soph. 226 b: λίγομεν. We have here the larger kind, of which μιμητική is part. Cf. Soph. 234 b: παιδίας δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικότερον ἢ καὶ χαριστέρον εἴδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν;

10. Τὸ δὲ πάσα τούτως σῶμα τα παρέχον] This (if earlier than the Timaeus) is probably a nearer approach than philosophy had hitherto made to the distinction of matter and form, of which the doctrine of elements in the earlier Greek philosophy was the anticipation. The ἀπειρόν of the Philo- lebus (see esp. 25 c) is a more abstract mode of the same conception, taken from Pythagorean philosophy (cf. ib. 54 c: γενεσίως μὲν ἕνεκα φύσικά τε καὶ πάντα ὅργανα καὶ πάσαιν ὕλην παραπληθεῖσα πάσων); and the notion of formless matter oc-
curs once again in the Timaeus, in a passage of which the germ may be found in the text, 49 a: δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐσχάς εἰς ἀναγκαζέων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἄμυδρον εἴδος ἐπεξερευέν ὁ λόγος ἐρμαφοῦς. τόν δὲ ἔχον ἰδίας καὶ φύσεως αὐτὸ ἰππολητέον; τοιοῦτο μάλα, πάσης εἶναι γενεσίως ὑποδοξήν οὕτω, οἷς ταύτης ν.τ.λ. Cf. Ar. Pol. I. 3 (8): καὶ, εἶ ὑπηρετικῆς, πάτερον ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποιικῇ τῇ ύφαινετικῆς, ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικῇ τῇ υλοδραυμοποιίᾳ ὡς γὰρ ὀσάυτως ὑπηρετοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν ὄργανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην. λέγω δὲ ἡ λ ὁ ὑποκείμενον, εἶ οὐ τι ἀποτελεῖσθαι ἐργον, οἷον ὑφαντή μὲν ἐρα, ἀνάραμποιοὶ δὲ χαλκῶν.

11. ἐν οἷς] Matter is that in which art works as well as out of which art produces. Cf. Phil. 59 d: καθάπερ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν, εἶ δὲ ἡ ὑπὸ τοῦ οἷος δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακείσανθα.

12. πολλῶν ἐτέρων τεχνῶν ἐκ-
γονον ὑν] Hence it appears...
that matter is a relative notion: for which thought, see also Tim. 49 b, c.

2. Χρυσὸν — γενόν] " I mean gold and silver and all mineral productions, and all that wood-cutting and every sort of cutting provides for the arts of carpentry and plaiting; and all wherein the process of barking, stripping off the cuticle of plants, and the carver's art, denuding animals of theirs, and the other arts connected with such produce, that manufacture corks and papyrus and fastenings, provide for the manufacture of composite species from simple kinds." Note the rhythm of the concluding words.

The structure resembles Soph. 227 a: καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων (καθάρσεως), δὲ γναθευτικὴ καὶ έξυπμασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμελείαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρά, πολλὰ καὶ γελοία δοκούσα ὀνύματα ἐσχέν. So here: καὶ φλοιωτικὴ — περαιροῦσα κ.τ.λ. παρέσχον. The words from καὶ downwards are part of the relative clause, though not to be construed strictly with ὅσα. Compare the order of words in Legg. 6, 779 d: πάντα ὅσα διδασκαλεῖα κατασκευασμένα περιμένει τοῖς φωτηταίς καὶ θεαταῖς θέασα. Ib. 873 d: ἐν τοῖς τῶν δώδεκα ὅριοις μερῶν.

3. κοινά] E. g. the cutting of osiers and brushwood, the mowing of grass and reaping of straw, the cropping of horses' and camels' hair, the shearing of sheep.

7. δεσμῶν] Such as glue and thread.

10. τὸ πρωτογενὲς ἀνθρώπως κτήμα] The first-born of human possessions, because necessary to the production of all else. The word is a rare one, and occurs in the Orphic verses, where also Nature (φύσις) is called πρωτογενεία. It seems probable that Plato had this, in common with other terms employed in these dialogues, from a Pythagorean source.
3. ἑαυτῶν μέρεσι] The position of ἑαυτῶν μέρεσι, which is for the sake of emphasis, determines the order of the following words. The whole is a periphrasis for φάρμακα.

μέρη σώματος εἰς τὸ θεραπεύσα τίνα δύναμιν εἰλημε. σκόπει δὲ· ἦν γὰρ δικαίοτα μὲν ἀν τεθὲν b κατ’ ἀρχὰς τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἰδος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ὀρ- γανόν, ἁγγεῖον, ὄχημα, πρόβλημα, παίγνιον, θρέμα. 15 παραλεῖπομεν δὲ εἰ τι μὴ μέγα λεληθὲν εἰς τι τού-

7. γυμναστική] Because the trainer prescribes a certain diet.


13. ἦν γὰρ] “For we had, what would rightly have been placed first, the primitival kind.”

15. θρέμα] “Nourishment.”

This meaning is not noticed in the Lexicons, but Stallbaum well compares the use of γίν- νημα in Soph. 266 d. Both uses originate in the “cognate” object of the active becoming the subject of the passive voice. θρέμα retains a verbal signification also in Legg. 7, 789 b: τρέφουσιν — ὀρνιθῶν θρέματα.

16. παραλεῖπομεν—συμφωνήσει] “But we pass over whatever insignificant kind may have escaped us, which may possibly be made to fit into one of these, for instance, the nature of coins, seals, and stamps of all sorts.” [μέγα], which Bodl. Vat. Ven. II omit, is retained, not as genuine, but as possibly preserving the trace of a lost reading, perhaps of μύρις, suggested by Stallbaum.

SEVENTHLY, nourishment.

Into these seven kinds all possessions except living creatures can, by hook or by crook, be distributed.
Animate possessions, with the exception of slaves, were previously included in the art of tending herds. There remains therefore the class of servants, amongst whom to look for the nearest rivals of the king. But slaves, who are servants in

tων \[\text{μεγάς} \] δυνατών ἀρμόττειν, ὃν ἡ τοῦ νομί- p. 286

σματος ἰδέα καὶ σφραγίδων καὶ παντὸς χαρακτήρος.

γένος τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ούδὲν ἔχει μέγα ξύν- νομον, ἀλλά τὰ μὲν εἰς κόσμον, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὅργανα

5 βία μὲν, ὃμοι δὲ πάντως ἐλκύμενα συμφωνήσει.

τὰ δὲ περὶ ζώων κτήσιν τῶν ἰμέρων, πλὴν δούλων, ἡ πρότερον ἀγελαιοτροφικὴ διαμερισθείσα πάντα εἰληφθεὶν ἀναφαίνεται.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δοῦλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λοιπῶν, ἐν οἷς ποι καὶ μαντεύομαι τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πλέγμα ἀμφισβητοῦντας τῷ βασιλεί καταφαίνεις γενήσεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς ὑφάνταις τότε τοὺς περὶ τὸ νίθεν τε

3. γένος—συμφωνῆσει] "For these, while they have not in them the nature of any extensive kind which can be classed along with them, yet can, by hook or by crook, be made to harmonize, though not without some violence, either with the ornaments or the instruments of life."

τε γὰρ — ἀλλὰ] δὲ and even μέντοι and ἀλλὰ may sometimes follow τε, when the opposition between two parallel clauses is thought of as the sentence proceeds. Cf. Phaedo 63 c: παρὰ ἄνδρας τε— ὃτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοῖς, where however μέν is interposed, and Theae. 143 c: περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ἡ αὖ περὶ τὸν ἀποκρυμμένον. The two clauses here answer to μὴ μέγα and δυνατόν ἀρμόττειν supr.

4. εἰς κόσμον] Which is a department of παῖγμα τοῖς παῖγμα: 288 c.

5. βία μὲν—ὁμοί δὲ] Cf. Rep. 10, 607 ε: βία μὲν, ὃμοι δὲ ἀπέχουσα, and Soph. Ant. 1116: οὐμοί μόλις μὲν, καρδίας δὲ εξίσταται τὸ δράμ. τε is used because their not being referrible to an important class is one of the two reasons for omitting them.

7. ἡ πρότερον ἀγελαιοτροφικὴ διαμερισθείσα ] Note the inverted order. 11. εἰς οἷς ποι.] "Somewhere amongst whom."

τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πλέγμα] He refers to the difficulty about the king in the language of the example of weaving: i.e. those who dispute with the king about the fabric of the web itself and not only about the instruments of the manufacture. Cf. 268, 281; and vid. infr. 305 ε: πάντα ἔργον, ἅρβαίνουσαν ἵπποτα— τὴν δὴ βασιλείᾳ συμπλοκὴν.

9. megistous—ōs ēn乙烯de idein] “The greatest—as seen from where we now stand.” I. e. the greatest servants, because most essentially such, this being the only measure which our method allows. Cf. infr. 303 c, for the same use of megistos. Also Phileb. 45 a: μέγιστοι τῶν ἥδων. Legg. 1, 630 a: τοὺς ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ πολέμῳ γίγνομενοι ἄριστοις διαφανῶς. The contempt here implied for διακονία may be contrasted with a striking passage of the Laws, where the power of ministering to themselves and others is made essential to the officers of state, 6, 762 c: καλλωπίζεσθαι χρῆ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι. Ἰb. 763 a: αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν διανοηθέτωσαν ὡς βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦτές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι ἐαυτοῖς.

10. οἶν] = ἐκείνοις ἃ. Plural, because of the two antecedents, ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ πάθος.


17. τοὺς νῦν ἡ ρήθεισιν εἰς ὑπηρετικάν] Qu. an legend. ὑπηρεσίαν! See, however, Euthyphr. 13 d. “To the task of ministering to those just now mentioned” (the artificers of the seven kinds of possessions). All trade, especially in money, is viewed by the Greek philosophers as essenti-

The statesmen are viewed as διακόνοι in the Gorgias, p. 517. Cf. Theat. 175 ε: τορόν τε καὶ δέκεως διακοίνων. Legg. 8, 831 ε (of the influence of commerce): ἐμπόροι τοι καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ διακόνους πάντως τῶν φόντοι κομίσουσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπεργαζομένη.

1. τὰ τε — διαμείβοντες] "Bringing over to each other and equalizing the work of the husbandman and of the other artificers (ἐπ’ ἄλληλους, sc. τῶν γεωργῶν, &c.) some in the market-place and some transferring them from city to city by sea and land, exchanging money for other commodities, and these for money.”

3. ἀνασυνότες] This seems to point to a doctrine of exchange approaching to that of Aristotle in Eth. Nic. V.

4. πόλις — ἀνασυνότες] Cf. Soph. 224 b, and note. The words are usually taken to mean “going from city to city;” for which cf. Theaet. 181 d: χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβιβάζων.

9. τῆς γε τῶν ἐμπορευτικῶν (sc. πολιτικῆς) “The science of directing commercial intercourse.” The merchant may profess political economy, but not statesmanship or political science.

10. καὶ δῆτας] Cf. Euthyphr. 4 c.
πολιτικός.

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ημίν ἐκάστοτε;

Τά ποία εἰπες καὶ τίνας;

ματα σοφοὶ γίγνονται πολλάκις ὑπηρετήσαντες,

οἱ τε περὶ γράμματος σοφοὶ γίγνονται πολλάκις ὑπηρετήσαντες,

καὶ πόλλα ἀττα ἐτερα περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαπονεώθαι
tινὲς ἑτέρων πάντεινοι, τι τούτων αὐτές λέξομεν;

οἱ τε ποίας πόλεσιν ἀρχοντας.

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pret the will of heaven, assume an imposing attitude. In Egypt the king must always be a priest, and the Archon-Basileus at Athens performs the most ancient sacrifices. At last, then, we have hit upon a trace of those whom we seek. These archon-kins, elected by lot, belong with their ministers to a certain motley and shifting throng: some of

art,” viz. of that of the interpreter, who is a species of servant.

2. ὡς τὸ νόμιμον φησὶ] The irony of this appears from Legg. 10, 906, Rep. 2, 364 e.

4. κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις] Cf. Soph. Ἐδ. Col. 1768: κατὰ νοῦν κεῖνα, where the expression conveys a similar reverential feeling.


10. τὸ γὰρ—γένος] “For we see that the priest and prophet assume an attitude of proud importance, and have impressed mankind with awe, on account of the greatness of their undertakings, so that in Egypt it is not lawful for a king to reign without the priesthood, but if it should so happen that he has previously forced his way to the throne from some other caste, it is necessary that he be afterwards initiated into this.”

18. τὰ μέγιστα—θύματα] “The most important sacrifices connected with such things,” viz. with propitiation. Qu. an legend. θύματαν ἡ
who, like lions and Centaurs, are fierce and strong; others weak and cunning, like Satyrs. Yet their strangeness is only the ignorance of an unfamiliar vision. The monsters just described are no other than the band who manage the affairs of states.

2. τῆδε] "Here in Athens." Cf. the Rex Sacrificulus at Rome. He might have instanced Agamemnon in Homer and Theseus in Greek tragedy.

τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μᾶλλα πάτρια]* He presided at the Lenean or older Dionysia: superintended the mysteries and games called λαμπαδηφορίαι, and had to offer up sacrifices and prayers in the Eleusinum, both at Athens and Eleusis, (Smith's Dict. of Ant., s. v. Archon.)

5. κληρωτοῖς] Following up the notion of λαχώτι. In mentioning the ἄρχοντας βασιλεῖς we have at last hit upon one of the real pretenders to political power.


ταῖ διόπερ πάντας οὐτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας οὐτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέον, οίον τοὺς ἰερεῖς πρῶτον.

ὑπηρέτας αὐτῶν] The λα-

gygrαφοι are perhaps included, who furnished public speakers with arguments.

9. Τίνας—καὶ] Cf. Theaet. 160 e: ὃ τι δῆσαν καὶ τῦν-

χάνει δὴν. Euthyd. 271 a: Ὀπό-

τερον καὶ ἐρωτάς, ὃ Κρίτων;


"Some strong and fierce, some weak and cunning." Compare Bacon, Adv. of Learning, Ellis' ed., p. 394. "And although we have said that the use of this doctrine (of Elenchus) is for redargution, yet it is mani-

fest the degenerate and cor-

rupt use is for caption and contradiction: which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advant-

age: though the difference be good which was made between
This is Arch-Sophist, the orators and sophists, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath the advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage to the weaker creature." And cf. Legg. 6, 781 a: to bêlē épikloponôron dial to ástheni.

4. kai méntoi—ándras] "And come, I do think I now this moment have perceived the nature of the men."


The principle of election by lot, which Plato ridicules here, is admitted within very narrow limits in the Laws. Cf. Legg. 3, 690 d: ðeðâfêll ðê' ge kai eðâfêll tîna lægôntes êbômyn âr- chîn (compare the seven forms of government and seven categories of possession in the Politiciens) eîs klihón tî distribution of the seven forms of government and seven categories of property in the Politicus).


10. autôs touto êpâthos] "I myself fell into this snare," viz. of thinking strange what was only strange to me. The Stranger is like the philosopher as described in the Theaetetus, who knows nothing of public assemblies or the details of civic life. For pásôchi in this sense, cf. Soph. 232 a, Ar. Pol. IV. 7: touto pàschoion oî lægôntes dial tî Pâmikhau kalòs.

11. êxaïphnês belongs by an hyperbaton to kataîdôn.

14. Tôv—yônta] Cf. Soph. 235 a: eîs yônta mêin ðê kai mi-
291. καὶ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειροτάτων· ὦν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ὄντων πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καίνερ παγχάλεπτων ὄντα ἀφαίρεῖν ἀφαίρετόν, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰδεῖν ἐναργώς τὸ ἥττούμενον.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀνετέον. 5
ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμίν. καὶ μοι φραξέ τόδε.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΞΕ. Ἀρ’ οὐ μοναρχία τῶν πολιτικῶν ἡμῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶ μία;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν εἶποι τις ἂν, οἴμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὅλιγων δυναστείαν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς ὦν;
ΞΕ. Τρίτων δὲ σχῆμα πολιτείας οὐχ ἢ τοῦ πλῆθος ὅν ἀρχῆ, δημοκρατία τούνομα κληθεῖσα;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τρεῖς δ’ οὖσα μῶν οὐ πέντε τρόπων τινά γίγνονται, δύο ἐξ εὐτῶν ἄλλα πρὸς αὐταῖς ὑνόματα τίκτουσαι;

μητὴν ἀφα βετέον τινα. The singular after χάρων is curious, but this is only one more instance of the transition from the class to the ideal individual, which we have had frequent occasion to notice.

2. Ἀλλὰ μὴν] “Well, we must not relax our efforts in regard to this.”
5. κατά γε τὴν ἐμίν] Cf. supr. 277 a.
8. δύο—τίκτουσαι] So the three categories of the Sophist, Being, Rest, and Motion, became five through generating, “by their own dialectic,” the categories of Sameness and Difference.
and of oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy. The same distinctions no doubt arise in democracy, but without changing the name. Thus the common way of thinking recognizes five forms. But is any one of these based on a real principle? For we have assumed from the first that there is a science of government.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποία δῆ;
ΞΕ. Πρὸς τὸ βιαίον τοὺς καὶ ἐκούσιον ἀποσκοπεῖν ποῦντες νῦν, καὶ πενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ νόμου καὶ ἀνομίαν, ἐν αὐταῖς γεγονόμενα, διπλὴν ἐκατέραν τοὺν δυὸ διαφοροῦντες μοναρχίαν μὲν προσαγορεύουσιν ὡς δύο παρεχομένην εἰδὴ δυὸν ὀνόμασι, τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῆ.

NE. ΣΩ. Τί μῆν;
ΞΕ. Τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ ὀλίγον γε ἐκάστοτε κρατηθεῖσαν τὸ πόλεμον ἀριστοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.

NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Δημοκρατίας γε μῆν, ἐὰν τ᾿ οὖν βιαίως εὰν τῇ ἐκούσιος τῶν τὸς ὑσίας ἐχόντων τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ἅρχη, καὶ εὰν τῷ τούς νόμους ἀκριβῶς φυλάττον εἰᾶν τῇ μῆ, πάντως τοῦν ὁδόν όδεὶς αὐτῆς εἰσθε μεταλλάττειν.

NE. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; οἰόμεθα τινα τούτων τῶν πολιτείων


In Rep. 8, 9, we have the picture of four imperfect states, Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny, nearly corresponding to the four which are distinguished from Kingly Monarchy here. But the estimate of each, and the mode in which their relation to the ideal government is conceived, are very different in the two passages. Plato is avowedly speaking here according to the common opinion. The acknowledgment that, after all, democracy, under legal conditions, is the least bad, is a point of approximation to the Laws. See the Introduction to the Statesman.

τενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον] Wealth being the mark of the tyrant and oligarch, as distinguished from the king and the aristocrat, as well as from the people.


10. ἀρ. καὶ ὄλγ.] Sc. διαιρόσισιν.

15. αὕτης] Resuming δημοκρατίας, which is placed at the beginning for emphasis.
292. ὡρθῆν εἶναι τούτοις τοῖς ὀροίς ὀρισθέσαν, ἕν καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ πολλοὺς, καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ πενήντῃ, καὶ τῶν βιαίων καὶ ἐκουσίων, καὶ μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἄνευ νόμων ξυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι;

NE. ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ κωλύει;

b ΞΕ. Σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον, τῇδε ἐπόμενος.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Τῷ ῥηθέντι κατὰ πρώτας πότερον ἐμμενοῦμεν ἡ διαφωνήσουμεν;

NE. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ποίῳ λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναι τινὰ ἐφαμεν, οἴμαι.

NE. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τούτων γε οὐχ ἀπασόν, ἀλλὰ κριτικὰν δῆτον τινὰ καὶ ἐπιστατικὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων προειλόμεθα.


3. καὶ—γίγνεσθαι] Plato reverses to the main construction (here participial) instead of adding another dependent clause. The words μετὰ—γραμμάτων—γίγνεσθαι stand in apposition to τούτοις—ὁρισθέσαν.

μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἄνευ νόμων] Note the variety of expression. The laws are spoken of with some contempt as mere γράμματα, and are thus compared to written rules of art. Compare Phædr. 258 a, Gorg. 451 b: οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφθέντες. Legg. 9. 858 e: γράμματα μὲν τοῦ καὶ ἐν γράμματι λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰσὶ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι.

Ib. 957 c. The expression is often used also by Aristotle in the Politics.

8. κατὰ πρῶτας] Α parallel idiom to κατὰ μόνας. κατὰ as in κατὰ ἀρχάς. Some such word as ὑποθέσεις may be here supplied. 11. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰναι τινα] Supr. 258 b.

14. κριτικὴν τινα καὶ ἐπιστατικὴν] "One which is at once critical and commanding." This appears from 260 a, where, however, κριτικὴν, or rather γνωστικήν, and ἐπιστατική, are the terms opposed. Compare supr. 275 c, Soph. 223 b, 224 d, where there is a similar verbal inexactness of reference.
NE. ΣΩ. Ναι.

ΞΕ. Κακό τής ἐπιστατικῆς τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ ἀψύχους ἔργοις, τήν δὲ ἔπι ζώοις. καὶ κατὰ τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰ τρόπον μερίζοντες δεδρ' αἰὲ προελημυθαμεν, ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἐπιλανθανόμενοι, τὸ δ' ἦτις οὐχ ἱκανῶς πω δυνάμενοι διακριβώσασθαι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγεις ὀρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Τούτ' αὐτῷ τοίνυν ἀρ' ἐννοοῦμεν, ὅτι τὸν ὀρὸν οὐκ ὀλίγους οὔδε πολλοὺς, οὔδε τὸ ἐκούστων οὔδὲ τὸ ἀκούστων, οὔδε πενίαν οὔδε πλοῦτον γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν χρεόν, ἀλλὰ τίνα ἐπιστήμην; εἰπὲρ ἄκολουθίσομεν τοὺς πρόσθεν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἀδύνατον μὴ ἁ ποιεῖν.

15 ΞΕ. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὴ ᾗν τοῦτο οὕτω σκεπτέων, ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμη ἐξειβάινε γίγνεσθαι περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἁρχῆς, σχεδοῦ τῆς χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγάτης κτήσασθαι. δεὶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν αὐτήν, ἵνα θεασόμεθα τίνας ἀφαιρετέον ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου βασι-

But scientific government is not secured by the rulers being many, few or one, rich or poor, or by their rule being compulsory or voluntary. We have still, then, to discover under which of these forms there is contained

2. τὴν μὲν—τὴν δὲ] προελημυθαμεν cannot be repeated here, but some notion contained in this verb, such as ἐδέμεθα, must be supplied.
5. τὸ δ' ἦτις] Cf. Aesch. Prom. 765: τί δ' ὅντων;
8. τὸν ὄρον] "The distinguishing principle of the state."
16. ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων] For the irony of this, compare the Search for Justice in the State, Rep. 2, 368 c: "Ἰσως τούτων πλείων ἄν δικαιούν ἐν τῷ μείζον ἐνείπ καὶ μέκος καταμαθεῖ. Ἰβ. 373 c.
17. ἀνθρώπων, τῆς χαλεπωτάτης—κτήσασθαι] There is a strong emphasis on ἀνθρώπων.
Cf. Theet. 174 d: δυσκολότερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῴων καὶ ἐπιθυμότερον ποιμαινεῖν τε καὶ βιβλήλην νομίζει αὐτῶν. See also Xen. Cyrop. I. i.
292. λέως, ὦ προσποιούνται μὲν εἶναι πολιτικοὶ καὶ πείθοντα πολλοὺς, εἰσὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δεὶ γάρ δὴ ποιεῖν τούτο, ὡς ὁ λόγος ε ἡμῖν προείρηκεν.

ΞΕ. Μῶν οὖν δοκεῖ πλῆθος γε ἐν πόλει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι κτήσασθαι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐν χιλιάνδρῳ πόλει δυνατὸν ἐκατό τόν τινας ἢ καὶ πεντήκοντα αὐτὴν ἰκανῶς κτήσασθαι;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ῥάστη μέντ' ἄν οὕτω γ' ἐν πασί τῶν τεχνῶν ἰσμεν γὰρ ὅτι χιλιῶν ἄνδρων ἄκροι πεπεπω- ταὶ τοσοῦτοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλληστὶν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ποτὲ, μή τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε. δεὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸν γε τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐχοντα ἐπιστήμην, ἂν τ' ἄρχην καὶ έαν μή, κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθε λόγον ὁμοὶ βασι- λικὸν προσαγορεύσθαι.

ΞΕ. Καλὸς ἀπεμψμόνευσας. ἐπόμενον δὲ οἴμαι τούτῳ τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἄρχην περὶ ἑνα τινὰ καὶ δύο

5. πλῆθος γε ["The people at least.""] I. e. "Whoever else has wisdom, do you think the masses have it?"

Cf. Rep. 6, 494 a: φιλάσωφον μὲν ἄρα—πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

13. τοσοῦτοι Sc. ἐκατον ἣ πεν- τήκοντα.

πρὸς—"Ἐλληστὶν" ["First-rate as compared with those in the rest of Greece." Even these few are still judged, therefore, by a relative standard.


18. ἐπόμενον—τούτῳ ["These words are in apposition.

19. τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἄρχην] The context shews that ἄρχην is used here generally of all authority.


περὶ ἑνα τινὰ καὶ δύο] Cf. the hardest of all ac- quisitions, the art of governing men, be- fore we can clear away the rival impostors from the true king. The multi- tude cannot have this science. Nor can fifty in a thousand be found possessed of it.
one, must needs be very few. And whether they be rich or poor, whether their subjects be willing or unwilling, whether they govern with or without law, we must esteem them as such, so long as they rule according to the principles of their art,

καὶ παντάπασιν ὀλέγοις δεί ξητεῖν, ὅταν ὀρθῇ γί- p. 26 γνηταί.

NE. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Τουτούς δὲ γε, εάν τε ἐκόντων εάν τε ἀκόν-

των ἀρχεσσιν, εάν τε κατὰ γραμματα εάν τε ἀνευ

γραμμάτων, καὶ εάν πλουτοῦντες ἢ πενύμενοι, νομι-

στέον, ὀσπερ νῦν ἥγουμεθα, κατὰ τέχνην ἡμινων

ἀρχὴν ἀρχοντας. τοὺς ιατροὺς δὲ ὅλος ἰδιωτα νεομύ-

καμεν, εάν τε ἐκόντας εάν τε ἀκόντας ἤμας ἵωνται,

τέμυντες ἡ καίοντες ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἀληθον προσ-

ἀπτοντες, καὶ εάν κατὰ γραμματα ἡ χωρὶς γραμμά-

των, καὶ εάν πένητες ὄντες ἡ πλούσιοι, πάντως οὐδεν

ἠττον ἰατροὺς φαμεν, ἐωσπερ ἀν ἐπιστατουντες τέχνην,

Phileb. 66 b : περὶ μέτρων καὶ τὸ 

μέτρων καὶ ὅστα χρή τιμάσαι νομίζειν τὴν αἰδον ἡμέραν νῦν. 

6. πλουτοῦντες ἢ πενύμενοι] 

Cf. i Alc. 107 ε : ἄν τε πένη ἄν 

τε πλούσιος ἢ ὁ παραμών οὐδὲν 

dioiste' ἀθρόνασι ὅταν—βουλεύον-

ται πός ἂν ἐγκαίνιοψ, ἀλλ' ἐρτου-

σιν ιατρῶν είται τὸν σύμβολον. 

νομιστέοι—ἀρχοντας] ἀρχοντας 

is to be taken twice in construing. "They must be es-

teemed as rulers, whatever rule it be which they conduct ac-

cording to art."

8. νεομύκαμεν] The verb is 

resumed in φάμεν below. Cf. 

Soph. 230 c, d : νομίζοντες γὰρ 

ἢ παῖ—πλείω δὲ μη, and note. 

ιατροῖς is to be repeated in 

thought after νεομύκαμεν : or the 

verb is perhaps used absolutely, as in νομίζειν διὸς. 

Cf. Rep. 5, 

476 c, Gorg. 466 b. "And 

physicians more especially we 

allow to rank as such, whether 

they heal us with or against 

our will, by incision or cautery, 

or by the application of any 

other pain," (these words τέμυν-

τες—προσάπτοντες are explana-

tory of ἀκόντας," with or with-

out written precepts, in po-

verty or wealth,—in every case 

we call them equally physi-

cians, so long as those who 

minister preside according to 

art over that to which they 

minister, and preserve the 

same by purging and reducing, 

or by adding flesh, if only they 

do this for the good of the 

bodies which they make better 

from being worse." (Perhaps 

however the sentence was at 

first intended to run νεομύκα-

μεν—φάμαι = "We are ac cus-

tomed—to speak," &c.) The 

meaning is further perplexed 

by the redundancy of ἄν μόνον in 

the same construction as ἐωσ-

περ ἂν with σώζωμεν. Compare 

Rep. 7, 529 b : ἔγω γὰρ ἂν— 

μανθάνῃ.
293. καθαίροντες είτε ἄλλως ἰσχυαίνοντες είτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες, ἃν μόνον ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ τῷ τῶν σωμάτων, βελτίω ε ποιούντες έκ χειρόνων, σώζοντι οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἐκα- στοι τὰ θεραπεύόμενα. ταύτη θήσομεν, ώς οίμαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη, τούτων ὄρον ὅρθόν εἶναι μόνον ἰατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἴστινοσυνῶν ἀρχῆς.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κοιμήθη μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀναγκαίον δὴ καὶ πολιτείων, ώς έοικε, ταύ- την ὁρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, εν ἤ τις ἀν εὐρίσκαι τοὺς ἀρχούντας ἁληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας ποικίλας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, εάν τε κατὰ νόμους εάν τε ἄνευ νόμων ἀρχωσί, καὶ ἐκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων, ἣ πε- νὸμεν ἢ πλοῦτούντες τούτων ὑπολογιστέον οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς εἶναι κατ’ οὐδεμίαν ὀρθότητα.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς.

ΞΕ. Καὶ εάν τε γε ἀποκτινοῦντες τυνάς ἢ καὶ ἐκβάλλουντες καθαίροσιν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ τὴν πόλιν, είτε καὶ ἀποκιάσας οἴων σμήνης μελιττῶν ἐκπέμποντες ποι.
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have recourse to banishment, or emigration, or the importation of fresh citizens. Young Socrates is scandalized by the proposition that there may be good government without law. He is answered, that although legislation is certainly a function of the king, yet the best conceivable government would be the supremacy of the laws, not of the laws, σμικροτέραν ποιώσων, ἢ τινας ἐπευσαγόμενοι ποθὲν p. 24. άλλως ἔξωθεν, πολίταις ποιώντες, αὐτὴν αὐξόσων, ἐωσπερ ἀν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ δικαίω προσχρόμενοι, σώζοντες, ἐκ χείρονος βελτίω ποιώσι κατὰ δύναμιν, ταύτην τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὤρους ἡμῶς ε μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν ἐναι ρήτεον. ὅσας δὲ άλλας λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὕτως οὕτας οὐσιν λεκτέον, άλλα μεμιμημένας ταύτην, ἀσ μὲν ὡς ευνόμους λέγομεν, ἐπὶ τά καλλίω, τὰς δὲ άλλας ἐπὶ τά αἰσχύνα με- io μιμήθοια.

NE. ΣΩ. Τά μὲν άλλα, ὁ ξένε, μετρίως έοικεν εἰρήσθαι, το δὲ καὶ ἀνευ νόμων δεῖν ἀρχευν χαλε- πότερον ἀκούειν ἐρρήθη.

ΞΕ. Σμικρόν γε ἐφθης με ἐρόμενος, ὁ Σῶκρατες. 15 ἐμελλον γάρ σε διερωτήσεις ταύτα πότερον ἀποδέχει p. 29 πάντα, ἢ τι καὶ δυσχεραινεῖς τῶν λεχθέντων νῦν δὲ ἦδη φαινείν ὅτι τούτο βουλησόμεθα τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνευ νόμων ἀρχόντων ὀρθότητος διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς.

1. σμικροτέραν ποιώσων] This answers to ἐγκαλύντες above.
3. ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ δικαίω] Which in regard to politics are the same. Cf. Theaet. 150 a: άλλα διὰ τὴν άδικον τε καὶ άτεχνον ἐνθαγογὴν κ.τ.λ.
7. λέγομεν] Se. πολιτείας.
μεμιμήθοια] There is a return from the participial to the direct construction. In the above sentences there is assumed the same analogy between the individual and the state, the body natural and the body politic, which is largely applied in the Republic. The notion of “the physician increasing the body” is obviously suggested by the parallel of the state.
12. το δὲ—ἐρρήθη] The formal courtesy of these words, like much else in this dialogue, approaches the style of the Laws. 17.βουλησόμεθα—διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς The first person being used for the second (cf. Theaet. sub fin., κνιμεν. Supr. 283 e: ἄρ’ ἀν βουλοῖμεθα), the subject of βου- λησόμεθα is not the same as that of διελθεῖν, hence the accus. ἡμᾶς. 18. τὸς—ὀρθότητος] “The right-
NESS OF RULES WITHOUT LAWS."
1. c. How it can ever be right to
govern without laws?
2. μὲν τα] "Certainly." Giving
assent to something which qualifies the foregoing assersion;
as in Soph. 245 b: ἀληθεύοντα μὲντο λέγεις. Symp.
176 b: τοιτο μὲντο εὐ λέγεις.
4. ἀλλ' άνδρα — βασιλικόν
"But the man who, having
wisdom, is capable of sovereign
rule."
5. δὴ] Sc. ἀριστόν ἐστιν.
Arist. Pol. III. 10: 'Αρχή δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἡγίασεως αὐτatég oístetiharos ṃ̃aallah ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριστοῦ
άνδρος βασιλεύεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀριστών νόμων. Δοκεῖ δ' τοῖς
νομίζοντες συμφέρεις βασιλεύεσθαι
to καθόλου μόνον ὁ νόμος λέγειν,
ἀλλ' οὑ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα
ἐπιτάττειν ὅστ' ἐν ὁποιοδήποτε τέχνη
to κατὰ γράμματα ἠρχεῖν ἡλίθων.
Καὶ εἴναυ ὁλοστροφζ μετὰ τὴν τητρή-
μερον κυκλίν ἔζεσθι τοῖς ἰατροῖς:
ἦν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ
κινδύνῳ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν κάκειναν δεὶ
ὑπάρχειν τῶν λόγων τῶν καθόλου
tοὺς ἠρχεῖν: κρέπτον δ' ἵ ν μὴ
πρίσσεται τὸ παθητικὸν ὀδος, ἢ ἱ
συμφένει. Τῶν μὲν οὖν νόμων τούτου
οὐχ ὑπάρχειν, ψυχήν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην
ἀνάγκη τούτων ἔχειν πάσαν. 'Αλλ' ἵ
σως ἰν φαί τοις ὁντὶ τούτων
βουλεύεσται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα
κάλλων. Aristotle concludes
that there must be a lawgiver
and laws: which, however,
must not be absolute where
they do not rightly apply. And
there must obviously be an au-
thority to determine cases not
provided for by the laws. Should
this authority be many,
few, or one? The many are
more difficult to corrupt—as
much water is less easily fouled
than little—but are less likely
to care for the preservation of
existing laws. One is better
than a few, because the few
are liable to division. See
Plat. Legg. 9, 875.
7. τὸ τῆς ἀριστοῦ — ἐπιτάττειν]
The dative πάσαν depends
equally on περιλαβοῦ και
ἐπιτάττειν. Having comprehended
exactly what is noblest and
most righteous for all, at once
to appoint what is best for all.
9. αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες ἡντι-
νοιν] "For the dissimilarities
both of men and actions, and
what may be termed the abso-
lute unrest of human things,
Law is like a stupid and willful man, who insists at all hazards, in spite of circumstances, on obedience to his commands.

Where arises, then, the necessity of making laws? This is shewn by an example.

(join μηδέν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων,) suffer no art whatever to lay down in any matter any simple rule which shall be applicable to all cases for all time." Cf. Theet. 180 a.

7. ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τοῦτο] Sc. τὸ ἀπλοῦν τι ἀποφήμαθαι περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.

8. ὁσπερ k.t.l.] E. g. the Creon of Sophocles. Cf. Antig. 705-723.

10. μηδ’ ἀν τι — ἐπέταξεν] "Not even if some fresh thing, different from the terms of his enactment, should happen to be better for some individual." For συμβαίνη βελτίων, cf. infr. 295 e: συμβαίνωσι τῶν ἀλλων βελτίων τοῖς κἀκεῖνοιν.


22. Ὀυκοῖν καὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν εἰσί τινες, οὐαὶ καὶ ἐν
294. ἀλλαίς πόλεσιν, ἀθρόων ἀνθρώπων ἀσκήσεις, εἴτε πρὸς δρόμον εἴτε πρὸς ἄλλο τι, φιλονεικίας ἕνεκα;

NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ πάνω γε πολλαί.

ΞΕ. Φέρε νῦν ἀναλάβωμεν πάλιν μνήμη τὰς τῶν τέχνης γυμνακζώντων ἐπιτάξεις εἰν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀρ-5 χαῖς.

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. "Οτι λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἐγχορεῖν ἤγονται καθ' ε ἕνα ἐκαστὸν, τῷ σώματι τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ προσ-τάττοντες, ἀλλὰ παχύτερον οἴονται δεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 1ο

miss the dramatic liveliness of Plato's earlier style. The scene of these dialogues is a palaestra. But this can hardly have been present to the author's mind when these words were written. Unless the Stranger is supposed, like the philosophers in the Theaetetus, to be wholly ignorant of what is going on around him.

1. ἀθρόων — ἀσκήσεις] Cf. Legg. 12, 942 e: ἀθρόων ἄι καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοινών τῶν βίων δ' τι μίλιστα πᾶσι πάντων γίγνεσθαι.

2. ἀσκήσεις] The abstract word is used, as supr. 264 b: τιθα-σεισίας τῶν ἰχθυῶν — χρησμώτιας —γερανοθλώτιας.


5. Τὸ ποίον;] “In what respect?”

8. λεπτουργεῖν] “To work in minute detail.” The word is used above, 262 b, of dividing too minutely at the beginning of an inquiry. The only other passage where the word occurs in classical Greek is Eur. Hippol. 923, where it is applied to subtlety in discourse. Another coincidence between the language of these dialogues and that of the tragedians.


polu ka ei pollois tiv tov lusitelounos tois p. 294
sormasi poieisvai tagein.

NE. Sigma. Kalwos.

XE. Diou dhi ge ka ious povous wuvin didwntes
5 athrois ama mev exorphoiwv, ama de ka katalapwousi
drwmoi kai palhs kai pantos tov kath ta sormata
povon.

NE. Sigma. 'Eston taita.

XE. Kai tov nomothetun toivn hywmeba, tov taiei-
10siv agelais epistatismoanta tov dikaiov peri kai tov
pros allhlos xwrbolaiwv, m' poth ikanov genvi- p. 295
sebhai paws wthrhois proostattonta akribwos eini
ekastwv to prosochon apodidwvai.

NE. Sigma. To goven eikos.

X
e. 'Allla to tois pollois ge, oimi, kai wv epi
to polo kai pws ouvsoi paxvteros ekastois tov
vomov thstei, kai ev grammav sin apodidovs kai ev
agrammatovs, patrivos de ethesi nomobetwn.

NE. Sigma. 'Orbdos.

15 XE. 'Orbdos mevtoi. pows gar an tis ikanov ge-
voi an poto, o Sigmares, oiste dia biou awei para-
kathtmenos ekastwv de akribias proostatevw to proso-
1h ykon; epei tovtes an dvnatos wv, wv oimi, tov tiv

1. tiv — tagein] "To pre-
scribe what is profitable for the
body."

4. wv] "As the matter
stands." Cf. supra. 291 e.

9. taiau agelaios] The Ionic
form of the dat. plur. occurs
four times in this dialogue
(supra. 261 e, eplpsoiws : 291 a,
toioetoias : infr. 304 e, epome-
novas), and often in the Timaeus
and Laws.

12. paws] The dative de-
pends partly on ikanon and
partly on proostattonta apodido-

15. to tois pollois ge] Sc.
prosochiwv.

16. ekastov] "To each na-
tion."

17. apodidovs] "Exhibiting;
proscribing." Cf. supra. apodi-
dwvai.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 141

295. βασιλικὴν ὁστισοὺν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότων, σχολὴ ποτ' ἂν ἐαυτὸ θεῖτ' ἐπιποδόσματα γράφων τοὺς λεξέντας τούτοις νόμοις.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τῶν νῦν γοῦν, ὃ ξένε, εἰρημένων.

ΞΕ. Μάλλον δὲ γε, ὃ βέλτιστε, ἐκ τῶν μελλόν-5 τῶν ἰσημέσθαι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνων δή;

ΞΕ. Τῶν τοιούτων. εἴπωμεν γὰρ δή πρὸς γε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἰατρὸν μέλλουτα ἢ καὶ τινα γυμναστικὸν ἀποδημεῖν καὶ ἀπέσευσθαι τῶν θεραπευμένων συχνῶν, ὥσ τοῖοι, χρόνοι, μὴ μυθομονέσειν οἰγήθεντα τὰ προστα-χέντα τοὺς γυμναζόμενους ἢ τους κάμυντας, ὑπο-μνήματα γράφειν ἢ ἐθέλειν αὐτοῖς, ἤ πῶς;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὔτως.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; εἰ παρὰ δόξαν ἐλάπτω χρόνον ἀπο- δημίσας ἑλθοι πάλιν, ἀρ' οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἐκείνα τὰ γράμματα τολμήσειν ἄλλα ὑποθέσθαι, ἐξυμβαινό-νυν τῶν ἄλλων βελτίων τοῖς κάμυντις διὰ πνεύματα ἣν τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐκ Διὸς ἐτέρως

3. τοὺς λεξέντας τούτους νό- μους] Cf. infr. 299 c: εἰς δὴ τα δικαστήριον, where there is the same distant way of speaking of what is familiarly known.


9. ἀποδημεῖν] The passage recalls the expression of Scripture: “Going into a far country.” The case of Solon is probably in Plato’s mind.


13. ἔδειξαι] Governed by εἴπωμεν, which must be repeated in thought.

15. Τί δέ; εἰ] Bodl. τί δη.

16. πορ' ἐκείνα—ὑποθέσθαι] “To suggest other things not contemplated in his former prescriptions.”

18. διὰ πνεύματα—γενόμενα] “On account of winds or other heavenly influences which have come unexpectedly out of the usual course.” Note the alter- nation of words.
...some other circumstance made a different course expedient for his patients?

And were the law-giver, or another like him, to come again on earth, shall he not be

1. καρτερόν—νομοθετημάτων;]
   “But would think it right, both for himself and the sick man, stubbornly to avoid transgressing the ancient laws once given, he giving no new commandment, and his patient not daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, accounting this the medicinal and wholesome course, any deviation from which is inartistic and unwholesome: or would every such proceeding in the case of a science or genuine art, in any circumstances involve such lawgiving in the most utter ridicule?”

2. τὰ ἀρχαῖα νομοθετήματα]
   I. c. τὰ ἀρχαῖος νομοθετήματα. The participles, as in Soph. Trach. 1: ἀρχαῖος φανείς.

6. ἡ πάν το τοιοῦτον—τέχνη] What is at first expressed...
The current saying is specious enough: "Let a man win over his state to accept new laws, and then let him impose them."

But suppose he force them on her acceptance, what shall be said?
If a physician forced a patient to do contrary to prescription, and the treatment so forced were best, would it be called unwholesome treatment?

No more should the proceeding of one who forces a state to do a great right contrary to the laws be called unrighteous. Nor does it make any

1. "Αν τις ἀρα μὴ πείθων τὸν ιατρεύομενον, p. 298

ΞΕ. Ἀν τις ἀρα μὴ πείθων τὸν ιατρεύομενον, p. 298.

Εἰ όν δὲ ὑρθώς τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν παῖδα ἥ τινα ἄνδρα ἥ καὶ γυναῖκα, τί τούνομα τῆς βίας ἐσται ταύτης; ἂρ' οὖν ἐπαν μᾶλλον ἥ τὸ παρὰ τὰ τέχνην λεγόμενον ἀμάρτημα τὸ νοσόδες; καὶ πάντα ὑρθώς εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ κρότερον τῷ βιασθέντι περὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆν ὧτι νοσόδη καὶ ἀτεχνα πέπονθεν ὑπὸ τῶν βιασμένων ἱατρῶν;

10 ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ ἡμῖν δή τὸ παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἀμάρτημα λεγόμενον ἐστιν; ἂρ' οὖν τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἄδικον;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι ἥ γε.

ΞΕ. Τῶν δὴ βιασθέντων παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα

15

1. "Αν τις ἀρα μὴ πείθων τὸν ιατρεύομενον] Cf. Legg. 3, 684 c: Καὶ μὴν τούτῳ γε οἱ πολλοὶ προστάτουσι τοῖς νομοθέταις, ὅπως τοιούτους δήσουσι τοὺς νόμους οὐδὲ ἔκουσε οἱ δήμοι καὶ τὰ πλῆθυ δέξονται, καθάπερ ἐν εἰ τις γνωστάτα τῇ ἱατρῷ προστάτου μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς θεραπεύει τε καὶ λάσθαι τὰ θεραπεύομενα σῶματα,

ἀρα] "According to the theory we are considering."

5. πᾶν—νοσώδες] "Anything rather than the error which is spoken of as a violation of the art, namely unwholesome treatment."

6. καὶ πάστα—ἱατρῶν] "And the man who has been compelled in such a case has a right to say anything sooner than that he has suffered unwholesome and unscientific treatment from the physicians who compelled him."

11. Τί δὲ—ἐστιν] "But what is the error which is named as a violation of the political art?"

15. Τῶν δὴ—βιασμένων] A redundant and irregular sentence. The first genitive is resumed in τῶν τοιοῦτων governed by ψόγον, which is an accusative without an explicit construction, but governed by εἰτε implied in φέρε. The words μέλει, καταγελαστῶς, αὑτῷ, in what follows, are to be referred to ψόγον, which the pronoun αὑτῷ resumes in a more definite construction. "Now in the case of those who are compelled to do contrary to written and hereditary laws, other things more just and better and nobler than their former doings, say again of the exclainer of
such men about such violence,
dependent on Areo's delayed
meat, this to avoid being
in Areo. Perhaps rightly:

must not this, to avoid being
utterly absurd, say everything,
but cf. infra. Most
law prescribes his art for his
his own mind his art for his
board ship as in like manner on

"Herein consists the rule of right
wise and good man will order the
rule of right

the pilot ever watching
the condition of the ship's
subjects, not getting from
Sohp. 250 c. guard, for traces
of a similar process of cor-

As the pilot ever watching
his crew, but not having down

13 exv 55°-22° Athen.

so he rules

the ruler.
That cannot be gainsaid.

should be able to govern thus, and should bring to the work a power in their art superior to the laws.” For περὶ ταύτα, cf. Theaet. 176 ε.: ubi fors. Legend. περὶ τούτο. 5. οὕτω—γίγνοιτ’ ἂν πολιτεία] The clause was at first meant to be in apposition with ὅρων εἰσιν, but in γίγνοιτ’ ἂν there is a return to the direct form. 8. καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι—δυσκότων] “And the wise governors, whatever they do, can do no wrong so long as they fulfil one great condition,—so long as by dispensing to the citizens justice enlightened by reason and knowledge, they are able to preserve them, and, so far as that is possible, to make them better.”

297. NE. ΖΩ. Τα ποιά εἶπες;

ΞΕ. 'Ως οὐκ ἂν ποτε πλήθος οὔδ' ὁπτινονοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην λαβον ἐπιστήμην οἶον τ' ἂν γένοιτο μετὰ ινó διοικεῖν πόλειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρόν τι καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ ζητητεόν τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν ἢ τὴν ὀρθήν, τὰς δὲ ἅλλας μιμήματα θετέον, ὅσπερ καὶ ὀλίγων πρότερον ἑρήθη, τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίονα, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχῶ μιμομένας ταύτην.

NE. ΖΩ. Πώς; τι τοῦτ' εἰρήκας; οὔδε γὰρ ἄρτι δήθεν κατέμαθον τὸ περὶ τῶν μιμημάτων.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὐ φαύλον γε, ἂν κινήσας τις τοῦτον τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καταβάλῃ καὶ μὴ διελθον ἐνδεῖ- 

ξῆται τὸ νῦν γιγνόμενον ἁμάρτημα περὶ αὐτό.

2. οὐδ' ὁπτινονοῦν] I. c. Whether rich or poor.

7. τὰς μέν—μιμομένας ταύτην] An exegetical or redundant clause.

9. Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἰρήκας] Cf. Legg. 12, 968 c: πῶς τὸ τοῦτο εἰρήσαθα φάμεν αὐ; which the Zurich editors have pointed differently, putting a mark of interrogation after πῶς. If this is right, it should be applied consistently to all such expressions, e. g. πῶς; τί τοῦτ' εἰπες; which is of frequent occurrence.

ἄρτι] P. 293 e.

10. δήθεν] "I suppose." He had accepted the former statement, but is now forced to confess that he had not understood it. That δήθεν is not always ironical appears from Herod. VI. 138: τι δὴ ἀνδρωθέντες δήθεν ποιήσουσι; and similar uses of it are more frequent in later Greek. Schol. Apoll. Rh. (quoted in the Paris Stephanus): τὸ δήθεν ποτὲ μὲν πληρωματικόν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ δηλαδὴ ἢ ὡς δὴ. Compare the use of δησοδεν, Philoeb. 62 e, Ion 534 a. Badham, who objects to the word, very plausibly conjectures ῥηθὲν.

11. Καὶ μὴν—περὶ αὐτοῦ] "And yet it were a remark of no little weight, even if one merely threw it out and left it, without discussing and making plain the error which men now commit in this matter."

ἀν κινήσας — αὐτοῦ καταβάλῃ] "If, having started this question, one should leave it where he took it up." For αὐτοῦ used metaphorically as here, cf. Gorg. 490: Ἐξε δὴ αὐτοῦ.

13. τὸ νῦν—ἀμάρτημα] I. c. The capricious defiance of law, which is worse even than the maintenance of imperfect laws. See infr. 300 a, b.
when followed into its applications: whereby may be revealed the error into which politicians now-a-days are fallen. Their best course is to follow the traces of the perfect state which have been preserved in laws; although the maintenance of law is only a second-best course, and not ideally the best. This appears, if we consider the origin of law, as we may do under a familiar image.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποίον δή;

ΕΕ. Τοπόντοι τι δει γε ζητεῖν, ού πάνυ ξύνηθες οὐδὲ ρόδιον ἵδειν ὁμοί πειρώμεθα λαβεῖν αὐτό. θέρε γάρ ὁρθὸς ἧμῶν μόνης οὐσίας ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας, ἂν εἰρήκαμεν, οίκοθ' ὅτι τὰς ἄλλας δεῖ τοῖς ταύτης συγγάμμασι χρωμένας οὐτῷ σώζεσθαι, δρόσασ τὸ νῦν ἐπαινοῦμενον, καίτερ οὐκ ὀρθότατον ὑπὲρ;

NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΕΕ. Τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους μηδὲν μηδένα τολμῶν ποιεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τῶν τολμῶντα δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. καὶ τοῦτ̱' ἐστιν ε ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστ' ἔχων, ὃς δεύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τὸ πρῶτον τις μεταβη τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν. ὃ δὲ τρόπω

15 γεγονός ἐστι τούτο ὃ δὴ δεύτερον ἐφήσαμεν, διαπερανόμεθα. ὡς γάρ;

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Εἰς δὴ τὰς οἰκόνας ἐπανίομεν πάλιν, αἰς ἀναγκαίου ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τούς βασιλικοὺς ἄρ-20 ΧΟΥΤΑΣ.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποίας;

2. δεὶ γε ζητεῖν] "We must certainly examine—with what success we may."

5. ἧν εἰρήκαμεν] P. 293, viz. That which is guided by the consciousness of what is best, in which, according to the language of the Republic, philosophers are kings.

7. οὐκ ὀρθότατον] Cf. supra. 294 ὃ: ἐπειδὴν̣ ὁφοὶ ὀρθότατον ὁ νόμος.


ἐπειδὰν — ῥηθέν] "When one has withdrawn from the first and best principle, which we described just now."

15. διαπερανόμεθα. ἡ γάρ;] Cf. Theet. 173 e: λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἡθικέν—.

18. ἐπανίομεν πάλιν] The image of the physician was employed above, p. 293. But the γενναῖος κυβερνητής seems to be an echo of Rep. 6, 488 a. Cf. also Legg. 12, 963 b, and Arist. Pol. III. 2, where the virtue of a citizen is inferred from that of a sailor.
2. τι σχῆμα πλασάμενον] This expression also recalls the passage of the Republic just cited: δει ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ ἐνναγαγέν εἰκάζοντα.

The unchangeableness of institutions is less absolutely fixed in the Laws, where room is left for partial changes and adaptations by constitutional means. Logg. 6, 769: ἐπεὶ τις ἐπινόησε γράφα τε ὡς καλλίστον ἐσοφ καὶ τοῦτ οὐ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ τὸ φαύλοτερον ἄλλη ἐπὶ τὸ βλάτιον ἴσχευ τοῦ ἐπιτόκου ἀχρόνες, ἔννουες ὅτι ἐνήθη ὁιν, ἡ μὲ τινα καταλείψει διδάχον — οὐ τοιοῦτο τὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου — πρῶτον μὲν γράψα τοὺς νόμους —ἐπιτα — ἤρ οὐτα — ὅγονες ὅτι πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπειν τοιαύτα, δ ἐδει τινα ἑυπε- πόμουν ἔπανορθῆσιν;
3. ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς] ἐν of the material in which one works; as supr. 288 c: ἔξ ὅν καὶ ἐν ὃις.
5. οἷον εἰ] The apodosis is deferred by the explanation of this clause, and the sense is resumed and continued in ἐ δή κ.τ.λ., infrā.

of unprofessional persons might often be preferred, and by those making decrees for the regulation of the practice of navigation and medicine, which should be binding on those professions for all time.

1. tois δ' ἀλλοις] The physician's fee is glanced at also in Rep. 1, 341 c: ὁ τῷ ἀκριβείᾳ λάγῳ ἱστρὸς—πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστιν ἢ τῶν καμινῶν θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τοῦ τῷ ὀντι ἱστρῶν ὄντα.


7. ἐκβάλλουσών] Note the return from the participle to the indicative.


11. μήτ' οὖν δούλων μήτ' ἐλευθέρων] "No, not over slaves, still less freemen." See the picture of the slave physician of slaves in Legg. 4, 720.


καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν] "Other," i.e. than physicians and pilots. Cf. Protag. 319 c, d.

15. καθ' ὁ τι χρή—ἔτερα του-αὐτα] "What is to be the method of using drugs and surgical instruments in our treatment of the sick, and vessels also, and the tackling of vessels in navigation, and in encountering dangers, whether those incident to the voyage in the shape of winds and waves, or in encountering an affray with pirates, or perhaps the necessity of fighting at sea with old-fashioned galleys against an armada of the like build." The words πρὸς τας—τουαῖτα, though in point of meaning explanatory of περὶ τῶν κωδώνων, return to the construction with καθ' ὁτι χρή—χρήσθαι—τοῖς πλοῖοις.
The present is of course a wholly imaginary case. The ἰατρῶν ἀφετισ alluded to in the Gorgias, 455 b, is not the decision of the question who are to be physicians, but the selection of certain physicians for some public duty connected with their profession. Cf. Λρ. Pol. Ι.Π. 6: ὁπερ οὖν ἰατρῶν δει διδόναι τὰς εἴθωνας ἐν ἰατρίοις, οὔτω τοὺς ἀλλούς ἐν τοῖς ὑμείοις.

6. μακρός πλοῖος] The most antiquated kind of fighting vessel, of which Plato speaks as an English writer of the present day might of the old three-decker. He imagines the effect of perpetuating such a mode of warfare in written laws, like those of "the Medes and Persians, which alter not."

In the same spirit he recalls the old word εἰρήση just below.

Then suppose them to elect annually, either by
vote or lot, those to whom authority in each department should be given. Who, when their term of office had expired, might be summoned before an unprofessional court, and perhaps condemned and punished for breaking the written regulations in their art. Not content with this, suppose them to enact, that whoever is found inquiring

οὐταίς ἀρχοντας ἀρχεῖν κατὰ τὰ γράμματα κυβερ- p. 29 νότας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τοὺς κάμμοντας ἰωμένους.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ταῦτ’ ἐτι χαλεπώτερα.

ΞΕ. Θεῷ δὴ καὶ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπόμενον. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐκάστους ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἐξέλθη, δεῖσι δικαστήρια καθίσαντας ἀνδρῶν, ἢ τῶν πλουσίων ἐκ προκρίσεως ἢ ἐξύπαντος αὐτοῦ δήμου τούς p. 296 λαχόντας, εἰς τοὺς εἰσάγειν τοὺς ἀρξάντας καὶ εὐθύνει, κατηγορεῖν δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκβιβήσῃ τὰς ναῦς οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰ παλαιά τῶν προγόνων ἐδή: τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν τοὺς κάμμοντας ἰωμένων. ὃν δ’ ἀν καταψηφισθῇ, τιμῶν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτῶν τινὰς ἢ ἀποτίνειν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ γ’ ἑδέλων καὶ ἐκὼν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀρχεῖν δικαίοτατ’ ἄν ὁτιοῦν πάσχοι καὶ b ἀποτίνοι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοίνυν ἐτὶ δείσει θέσθαι νόμον ἐπὶ πᾶσι

art in Legg. 9, 857 d. The “slave” says to the true physician: ὁ μῶρο, οὐκ ἁτρεύεις τῶν νοσοῦντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν παιδεύεις, ὡς ἵπτρόν ἀλλ’ οἷς ὡς ἵπτρον γίγνεσθαι.

10. ἐκβιβήσῃ] He passes from the general enactment to the form of indictment in a particular ease.


13. τιμῶν — ἀποτίνων] Cf. Legg. 8, 843 b, 9, 875 d, alib.

15. καὶ ἐκὼν] “To hold office amongst such people, at least when he has the choice.” Compare the representation in the Republic (1, 347, 7, 521) of the unwillingness of good men to rule. καὶ implies that there are cases in which a good man may be compelled to rule.

18. Καὶ τοίνυν ἐτι] “Well, further still.”

Καὶ τοίνυν—δείσει] Cf. Legg. 1, 634 d, e (the Athenian is addressing the Cretan and Spartan): ὑμῖν μὲν γὰρ—εἰς τῶν καλλιστῶν ἃν εἰς νόμον μὴ ἤτεῖν τῶν νέων μηδὲν ἐὰν ποιά καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μὴ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἕνωστάς σωμάτως πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται δεῖντως θεῶν κ.τ.λ. And for the expression, Legg. 5, 741 e: πρὸς τούτοις δ’ ἐτὶ νόμος ἐπεται πᾶσι τοῖς.
299. τούτοις, ἂν τες κυβερνητικὴν καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγιεῖνον καὶ ἰατρικὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ πνεύματα τε καὶ θερμα καὶ ψυχρα ἕτοιμον φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ σοφιζόμενος ὁμοίων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρότον μὲν μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὄνομάζειν ἀλλὰ μετεπολογόν, ἀδολέσχην τινα σοφιστὴν, εἰδίως διαφθείροντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους καὶ ἀναπείθωντα ε ἐπιτίθεσθαι κυβερνητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλὰ αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν τῶν πλοίων καὶ τῶν ναυ- σούντων, γραψάμενοι εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον, οἷς ἔξεστιν, εἰς δὴ τι δικαστήριον. ἀν δὲ παρὰ τῶν νόμων καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα δόζῃ πείθειν εἴτε νέους εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. οὖν δὲν γὰρ

In both clauses there is perhaps an allusion to the death of Socrates. Cf. also Soph. 225 e.

7. ὡς διαφθείροντα] This depends on γραψάμενον.


ἄρχειν depends immediately on πείθειν, and is coordinate with ἐπιτίθεσθαι, though ἀλλὰ strictly requires some construction dependent on ἐπιτ., e. g. the participle ἀρχοντας.

10. τῶν βουλόμενων, εἰς ἔξεστιν] "Whoever will of those who have the legal power."


12. γεγραμμένα] Sc. γράμματα περὶ τούτων.

13. οὖν δὲν γὰρ δεῖν] "For no
to these sciences in a manner contrary to the laws. Lastly, if he be found guilty his punishment shall be extreme. For no one needs be wiser than the laws, which he who runs may read, both on the public monuments, and in the voice of custom.

dein tōn nómoν eînai soφóteron' oudéna gar ἀγνοεῖν p. 29'
tō te iatrīkōn kai to ἁγιεων υοίδε to κυβερνητικόν kai ναυτικόν' εξείναι γαρ τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἐθν κείμενα. ταύτα δὴ περί ἃ
ste taūtαs tās ἑπιστήμας ei γίνοντο οὔτως ὡς λέγο-
meν, ὥ Σώκρατες, καὶ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἐμπάσης ἱστιωσοῦν θηρευτικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς ἡ ἐμπάσης μέρος ὧτιον μμιτικῆς καὶ τεκτοικῆς καὶ ἐμπάσης ὧτιον ἑκονουργίας ἢ καὶ γεωργίας καὶ τῆς περὶ
tā φυτα ἐμπάσης τέχνης, ἢ καὶ τινα ἱπποφορβίαν ἢ
catā συγγράμμασθα θεοσάμεθα γεγομενήν ἢ ἐμ-
paśan ἄγελαιοκομικῆν ἢ μαντικῆν ἢ πᾶν ὄ τι μέρος

one need be wiser than the laws,” oudein is adverbial. The inevitableness of the philoso-
pher’s fate is again stated in the Gorgias, p. 521.

4. καὶ πάρμα ἐθη] These are described in Legg. 7, 793 c.

taútα δὴ περί—κατὰ τέχνην;] “If such were the pro-
cedure, Socrates, about these sciences, and about generalship
and the other kinds of hunt-
ing, or painting and every
department of imitative art,
or carpentry and every handi-
craft, or husbandry and all
vegetable culture, or were we
to see an art of horsebreeding,
or the tending of any herd
conducted according to written
rules, or soothsaying, or any
other ministerial function, or
draught-playing, or any other
science conversant with num-
bers, whether simple, or square,
or cube, or comprising motion
—what aspect would be pre-
sented by a world in which
everything was done in this
way, in which written pre-
scriptions took the place of
scientific principles?”

The Stranger takes every
opportunity to exercise his
pupil in recognizing the
“kindred” between divers
arts. Many threads of pre-
vious discussion are here
taken up.

6. στρατηγικῆς καὶ — θηρευ-
tικῆς ] Cf. Soph. 222 c,
227 b.

7. γραφικῆς ἢ—μέρος ὧτιον] He reverts to the accusative
after περί (tautas tās ἑπιστήμας
supr.) in order to avoid the
confusion of a double genitive.
For the μέρη τῆς μμιτικῆς, cf.
Soph. 235 c.


γεωργία] Ibid.

10. ἱπποφοβ.—ἀγελαιοκομ.] Su-
prā 261 d, 276 a.

12. μαντικῆν—δικαον.] Suprā
290 c.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δὴλον ὃτι πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι παντελῶς ἀν ἀπόλουθ' ἦμῖν, καὶ οὐδὲ εἰσαύθεις γένουτ' ἂν ποτὲ διὰ τὸν ἀποκολύουσα τοῦτον ᾿ήτειν νόμον' ὅστε ὁ βίος, ὦν καὶ νῦν χαλεπός, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἑκείνων ᾧβίαν οὕτω γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν.

2. εἰτ' ἐν βάθεσιν εἰτ' ἐν τάχεισιν] ἄναρσιν Par. E; πάσχεισιν Par. H. Cf. supr. 284 e, ταχύτητας, and note: 294 d, παχύτερον: ubi Par. F, ταχύτερον. Arithmetica here includes mathematics, pure and mixed. Cf. Legg. 5, 746 e: ἔρημοσιν πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησίμως τὰς τῶν ἀρίθμων διανομὰς καὶ ποκίλεσις, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν έαυτοὶ ποικιλοῦνται καὶ ὅσα ἐν μίκεσι καὶ ἐν βαθείς ποκίλματα, καὶ δή ἐν φθόνοις καὶ κινήσεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν εὐθυποίραν τῆς ᾿ϊνω κατ' ᾿ιδοῦς φοράς καὶ τῆς κύκλω περιφοράς, (The last clause affords a further comment on ταχείσιν.)


4. κατὰ συγγράμματα γιγνόμενα] Contrast with this the praise of the Egyptian conventionality in art, Legg. 2, 656 e: ἈΘ. παρὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἐξῆν ὅτι ἐξ ζωγράφους ὅστε ἀλλοι ὅσοι σχῆμα καὶ ὅποι' ἀττα ἀπερχάοιτο κανονιώμενοι ὄντω ἐποίησι πολλ' ᾿αττα ᾿η τὰ πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἐξεστιν, οὕτως ἐν τούτοις ὅστε ἐν μονοτοπία ἐξημασία, σκοτών δ' εὐφέρησις αὐτοῦ τὸ μυρο- στόν ἐτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα, οὐχ ὁ δὲ ἐποίησι πολυποτοστωμένοι ὄντως, τῶν νῦν διεξέγογοι γέγονεν οὕτως τι καὶ καλλίστας οὕτως ἀῖσχος, τὴν αὐτοῦ δὲ τέχνην ἀπειρασίαν ἱκλάτουν. 

ΚΑ. Θανατοῦς τεγείς. ΑΘ. Νομοθετικῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικῶν ὑπερ- βαλλόμενα.

6. Δήλον—τὸ παράπαν, infr. ἀρα οὖ — κακῶς, ἀμαρτήματος — ἐξουσιασμῶν] Note the tragic cadence of these clauses.
But things would fall into still greater confusion, if the men appointed under such enactments disregarded them, not in the interest of science, but of their own private wishes. For the laws have at least some basis of experience and of plausible counsel. Hence if laws are made, it is best, though only second best, that they should be enforced.

10. ΞΕ. Παρὰ γὰρ οἴμαι τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ἐκ πείρας θεμελιών καὶ τινῶν ξυμβούλων ἐκαστα χαριέντως ξυμβουλευσάντων καὶ πεισάντων θέσαι τὸ πλῆθος, ὁ παρὰ ταῦτα τολμῶν δρᾶν, ἀμαρτήματος ἀμάρτημα πολλαπλάσιον ἀπεργαζόμενος, ἀνατρέποι τὰς ἐν πρᾶξιν ἔτι μείζονες τῶν ξυγγραμμάτων.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς ὁ οὖ μελλεῖ;

ΞΕ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς περὶ ὀτιοῦν νόμους καὶ ξυγγραμμάτα τιθεμένους δεύτερος πλοῦς τὸ παρὰ εἰ ταῦτα μὴτ ἔνα μὴτ πλῆθος μηδὲν μηδέποτε ἐὰν ὁ δρᾶν μηδὸ ὀτιοῦν.

11. ΞΕ. Παρὰ γὰρ οἴμαι] The sentence begins with an understood subject, viz. οὗτος supr, but as the prósis lengthens this is forgotten, and hence, in resuming, the article is introduced: ὁ παρὰ ταῦτα τοιμῶν δρᾶν.


13. δεύτερος πλοῦς] Cf. Phædo 99 b; Phileb. 19 e, 59 c; Ar. Eth. Nic. V. 2, 9; Pol. VIII. 2, 6. After failing to make one course, we tack and try another.

14. πλῆθος μηδὲν] None, whether rich or poor. Cf. infr. 300 e: τὸ τῶν πλουσίων πλῆθος. Note the emphatic accumulation of negatives.
300. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὅρθως.
ΞΕ. Οὐκόνοι μιμήματα μὲν ἀν ἐκάστων ταῦτα εὖ τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι γεγραμμένα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὸν γε εἰδότα ἐφαμεν, τὸν ὄντως πολιτικόν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, ποιήσειν τῇ τέχνῃ πολλὰ εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ πράξειν τῶν γραμμάτων οὐδὲν φρον- 
δίξοντα, ὅποταν ἀλλ' αὐτῷ βολτώ δόξη παρὰ τὰ γε- 
γραμμένα ύφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπεσταλμένα ἀπούσι τισιν. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ᾠ ἑφαμεν γάρ.
ΞΕ. Οὐκόνοι ἀνήρ ὀστισοῦν εἰς ἡ πλῆθος ὅτιον, 
οἷς ἂν νόμοι κείμενον τυγχάνωσι, παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ τι ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι ποιεῖν ὅσ βέλτιον ἔτερον ὅν, ταῦτον 
δρόσι κατὰ δύναμιν ὑπὲρ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐκεῖνος;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ μὲν ἄνεπιστήμονες ὄντες τὸ τοι- 
οῦτον δρόμων, μιμεῖσθαι μὲν ἂν ἐπιχειροῖεν τὸ ἀληθές,

2. μιμήματα — τῆς ἀληθείας] Compare the account in Rep. 6, 500, 501, of the procedure of the politeión ἵππαρκος. The word γεγραμμένα here contains associations both from writing (cf. γράμματα above and ἐπε- 
σταλμένα below) and painting, as appears from the word 
μιμήματα.

ἐκάστων—τῆς ἀληθείας] For the structure of this, cf. 
Phaedo 65 d: τῶν ἄλλων... ἀπάντων τῆς ὑποτιάς.

3. παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων] From the lips of those who know: 
i.e. dictated by them. Cf. Soph. 
Oed. Tyr. 285: παρ' οὖ τις ἄν 
σκοπῶν. Sc. τῶν χαράντων ἐμ- 
βουλευσάντων ὑπὲρ. Cf. infr.

305 ε: παρὰ νομοθέτου βασι- 
λέως.

εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι] Like 
tὸ νῦν εἶναι, Rep. 6, 506 e. 
Protag. 317 a. Crat. 396 e: 
tὸ μὲν τῇμερον εἶναι.

10. ἀπούσι τισιν] I. e. For 
men from whom he should be 
absent. The present is used by 
anticipation for the future, as 
in Soph. 265 d: τῶν εἰς τὸν 
ἐπείτα χρόνον ἄλλος πως δοξα- 
ζόντων. Or, perhaps, because 
the injunctions continued in 
force during his absence.

13. παρὰ ταῦτα—ἂν] "When- 
ever they do contrary to what 
is written in their laws, in the 
belief that another course is 
better."
function of the law-giver. Only we have seen that no mass of men, either poor or rich, is competent to do this. And if an individual do this, he can be no other than the law-giver in person. Hence the nearest approach which can be made to right government by states, as such, is the strict observance of the laws and customs of their forefathers. When the rich do so, it is aristocracy; when they neglect the laws, it is oligarchy. When one rules according to law, it is royalty; when in spite of law, falsely

μημούντι ἄν μέντοι πάν κακῶς εἰ δ' ἐντεχνοί, τοῦτο ἡ ἐκείνο;

NE. ΣΩ. Πάντως ποι.

5 . ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐμπροσθε γε ὁμολογημένοι ἡμῖν κεῖται μηδὲν πλήθος μηδ' ἤμπινούν δυνατον εἶναι λα-βεῖν τέχνη.

NE. ΣΩ. Κεῖται γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκών εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ βασιλικὴ τις τέχνη, τὸ τῶν πλουσίων πλῆθος καὶ ο ἤμπις δῆμος οὐκ ἂν τοτε λάβοι τὴν πολιτικὴν τάυτην ἐπιστήμην.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΞΕ. Δεὶ δὴ τὰς τοιαύτας γε, οὐς οὖκε, πολιτείας, εἰ μέλλουσι καλῶς τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἐκείνην τὴν τοῦ ἐνος μετὰ τέχνης ἀρχοντος πολιτείαν εἰς δύναμιν μμῆσα—p. 301 σβαθαι, μηδὲποτε κειμένοι αὐτοῖς τῶν νόμων μηδὲν τοιεῖν παρὰ τα γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἔθη.

NE. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἴρηκας.

ΞΕ. Ὅταν ἀρα οἱ πλουσίοι ταύτην μιμῶνται, τότε ἀριστοκρατίαν καλοῦμεν τὴν τοιαύτην πολι-τείαν, ὁπόταν δὲ τῶν νόμων μην προντίζωσιν, ὀλι-γαρχίαν.

NE. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὁπόταν ἦν *τις* εἰς ἀρχὴ κατὰ νό-μους, μιμούμενοι τὸν ἐπιστήμονα, βασιλέα καλοῦ-μεν, οὐ διορίζοντες ὁνόματι τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡ b δόξης κατὰ νόμους μοναρχοῦντα.


26. ἡ δόξης κατὰ νόμους] The
words κατὰ νόμους are a limitation of μετὰ δόξης—μονορχόντα, not of ἐπιστήμης, and distinguish the constitutional monarch from the tyrant.

4. δὲ ἀδὴ—γέγονεν] "Wherefore we have found that the five names of the constitutions, of which men now speak, are resolved into one only."

Badham corrects Δ (i.e. τέταρτα) δή τὰ πέντε ὀνόματα τῶν λεγομένων πολιτείων μόνον γέγονε. But how can the five have become four, when the fifth kind immediately reappears; and all five are enumerated just below? It is true that the distinction of knowledge or ignorance (or of the better and worse imitation of knowledge) is substituted for the distinction between persuasion and force. But this applies in a measure to ἀριστοκρατία and διληγσία as well as to βασιλεία and τέρανως. The true βασιλεία is only introduced here in order to define the tyrant who affects to act the same part; and the words δὲ ἀδὴ—γέγονεν recall the assertion of supr. 293 c, that the government of knowledge was the only government (διαφερόντως ὁρθῶν καὶ μάλιν πολιτείων), and the rest not governments but imitations of government, some better and some worse. Cf. also suppl. 300 e: τὴν ἀληθινήν ἐκείνην, τὴν τοῦ ἔνδος. μετὰ τέχνης ἀρχων. infr.: τῶν ἑνα ἑκάστων μόνοις. 302 c: τὴν ὀρθὴν ἕτερον τούτο τὸ τέμμα ὅλη τὴν ἕρημον. Πολλά, cf. 291 e: πρὸς τὸ βιοῦν ποι ἄριστον ἀποσκοποῦντες νῦν—προσαγορεύοντες. Legg. 4, 714 b: πολιτείων—ἀρτι διαληθισμένον ὅσα λέγοντον οἱ πολιεῖαι.


9. τὸ γε βέλτιστον] I. e. Although in all else the laws be observed.

10. ἐπιστήμα τὲ καὶ ἄρσουα— ἐγγυημένη] Cf. Rep. 8, 554 b: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἔτης μάλιστα. Compare also the picture of affecting wisdom, tyranny. And when one rules by wisdom, and is superior to the laws, this too is royalty, but in a sense which annihilates the other so-called governments.
The reason of these forms is, that the true monarch is nowhere to be found: and men, despairing of his advent, have had recourse to convention and law.

NE. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Οὗτῳ δὴ τύραννός τε γέγονε, φαμέν, καὶ βασιλεύει καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δυσχερανάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἕνα ἐκεῖνον μόναρχον, καὶ ἀπιστησάντων μηδένα τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀξίου ἄν γενέσθαι ποτέ, ὥστε θέλειν καὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι μετὰ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀρχοῦντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὤσια διανέμειν ὅρθος πάσιν, λοββάσθαι δὲ καὶ ἀποκτινύναι καὶ κακοῦν ὅν ἄν βουληθῇ ἐκάστοτε ἡμῶν ἐπεὶ γενομένον ἡ ἄν οἶνον λέγομεν, ἀγαπᾶσθαι τε ἄν καὶ οἰκεῖν διακυβερνῶντα εὐδαιμόνως ὅρθην ἀκριβῶς μόνον πολιτείαιν.

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖν;

ΞΕ. Νῦν δὲ γε ὅποτε οὐκ ἐστὶ γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος εἰς σμήνεσιν ἐμφυτεῖαι, τὸ τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ἕιχνη διαφέρουν εἰς

the individual in a state of "tyranny" in book 9, esp. 572 e, sqq.

4. καὶ βασιλεῖν] In the former of the two senses mentioned above.


14. μόνον] Masculine. Note the inverted order and tragic rhythm.

16. ὅποτε οὐκ ἐστι γιγνόμενος] "Since there does not arise a king in states as in hives (at least so we think), one unmistakeably surpassing both in body and mind, it follows that we are obliged to meet and make enactments." For this meaning of ὅποτε = quoniam, cf. Euthyd. 297 d, and compare Ar. Pol. III. 8.

18. τὸ τε σῶμα εὐθὺς] I. e. At the first glance, before his
mental qualities can be known. Cf. Ar. Pol. VII. 13: Εἰ μὲν τοῖς

ΤΩΝ ἔχουσι τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς

καὶ τοὺς ἦρωας ἢγούμεθα ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐδοὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ

σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχουσε ἑπερβολὴν, εἰτὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡστε ἁπαρ-καισιοθέτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν υπερχοῦν τῶν ἀρχιμόνων τῶν τῶν ἀρχιτῶν, δὴν ὅτι βέλτιον ἢι

τοὺς αὐτούς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπασας· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτον ὦν Ράδαος λαβέων, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν 'Ἰνδοὶς φρατὶ Σκύλας εἶναι τοὺς βασιλείας τοσοῦτον διαφέρον-

τας τῶν ἀρχιμόνων, φανερὸν, κ.τ.λ.

2. μεταθέτοισιν — ἵπτη] Cf. Soph. 226 a: τοιοῦτοι τι μεταθέ-

τοντας ἰχρὸς αὐτοῦ. Perhaps there is a slight allusion to the Homeric μετ' ἵπτη βαίνει θεόο. Cf. Phaedr. 266 b.

7. τής κρηπίδος—τής—πρατ-

toισθής] Viz. a responsible executive.

9. ἐτέρα] Sc. ἀρχή, or τέχνη, which is naturally suggested by the preceding argument.

προσχρομένη] Sc. τοιαῦτα κρηπίδι. Stephanus conjectured ἧ from the version of Ficinus: quo si alia quaedam gubernatio vel civitas utatur. But for the asyndeton, which is as-

sisted by παντὶ κατάδηλος as a kind of particle, cf. the usage with πάντως, e. g. supr. 268 e. Badh. conj. πραττούσης, ἧ πρᾶξις ἐτέρα.


11. ὡς ἰσχυρὸν τὶ πόλις ἐστὶ

φόσοι] Compare Legg. 4, 708 e: ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδέποτε ἄνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ἐυμφοραὶ παντοῖα πιστοῦ-

σαι παντοῖως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἤμιν.


Legg. 3, 686 a, b.

* Y And do we wonder that many evils should arise in states thus based on ignorant custom? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the social bond which can endure this strain? For there are still
...cities of men which have exist-ed from unknown time, though many from age to age are seen to founder, like ships at sea, through the preten-tious ignorance of their pilots and mariners. Now let us ask which of these bad go-vernments

1. pollai _μὴν_ — _εἰληφέναι_  ]
“Many however also from time to time are seen to founder like ships at sea, and thus are perishing, have perished, and shall hereafter perish, because of the wiliness of their pilots and crews; men guilty of the greatest ignorance on the greatest subject; who, having absolutely no inkling of political science, believe themselves at all points above all other sciences to have master-ed this.” Compare the de-scription of the “ship’s crew” in Rep. 6, 488.

_kabáter ploía_  ] Cf. Legg. 6, 758 a: ναῦς τε ἐν ἐκλάσῃ πλέοντα—πόλεις ὡσαύτων ἐν κλάσις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων.

2. διόλλυνται — _διαλύουνται_  ] Cf. supr. 268 c; Tim. 22 c; Legg. 3, 676 b; 688 d. Hdt. I. 5.

3. τὰ μέγιστα_  ] Sc. τὰ πολιτικά. Cf. Legg. 3, 688 c:

tῇ λοίπῃ τε πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεσθραμένα, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἁμαθία. Rep. 6, 504 c: τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίσται ἰδίον ἐναὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας.


5. _κατ’ ὀδὸν_  ] Opposed to κατὰ πάντα.


NE. ΣΩ. Δει' πώς δ' οὖ;  

ΞΕ. Τήν αὐτήν τούνων φα'θι τριῶν οὖσών χαλεπῶς διαφερόντως γίγνεσθαι καὶ ῥάστην.  

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς φης;  

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄλλως, πλὴν μοναρχίαν φημὶ καὶ ὀλίγων ἀρχὴν καὶ πολλῶν, εἶναι τρεῖς ταύτας ἠμῖν λεγομένας τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ' ἀρχάς.  

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ησαν γὰρ οὖν.  

ΞΕ. Ταύτας τούνων δ' ἧδα τέμνοντες μιᾶν ἑκάστην ἐξ' ποιώμεν, τὴν ὀρθὴν χωρίς ἀποκρίναντες τούτων ἐβδόμην.  

δ ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;  

ΞΕ. Ἐκ μὲν τῆς μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς καὶ τυραννικῆς, ἐκ δ' αὐ τῶν μὴ πολλῶν τήν τε εὐώνυμον ἐφαμεν εἶναι ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐκ δ' αὖ τῶν πολλῶν τότε μὲν ἀπλὴν ἐπονομάζοντες ἐτέθημεν δημοκρατίαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ καὶ ταύτην ἠμῖν θετέων ἐστὶν διπλῆν.  

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίνι διαρκοῦντες ταύτην;  

ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν διαφέροντι τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτ' εἰ τοῦτον νῦν ἐπελθόντως ἠμῖν μέθον.  


1.4. εὐώνυμον] "Of auspicious name." Compare the turn of the sentence in Rep. 8, 544 d: καὶ ἡ γενεαὶ δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα.  

20. Οὐδὲν διαφέροντι] By the same mark as in the other cases. Lit. "By a mark in nowise different from the rest."  

οὔτ' εἰ τούτῳ—ταύτης] If we translate, "Even though
the same distinction enters into democracy: although in this case both parts are called by the one name. There is one democracy which observes, and another which neglects, the laws. Now of these six, constitutional monarchy is the best and tyranny is the worst. Oligarchy and aristocracy are supplied to put up with. Compare ἀναγκαίως, e.g. Rep. 7, 527 a: λέγονσι — γελοῖοι τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως.

11. ἐν γράμμασιν ἀγαθοῖς "Subject to a yoke of good prescriptions."

15. ὅσπερ ἐνος καὶ πλῆθους τὸ
There is a Pythagorean tone in these words, similar to that which is observable in the Politics of Aristotle.

4. διὰ τὸ τὰς ἄρχας—εἰς πολιτείαν The remarks of Aristotle, that much water is less easily fouled than little, and that bad influences in a democracy are neutralized by admixture with wholesome elements, as in the case of food, have an analogy with this observation of Plato.

8. καὶ ἀκολαστὸν μὲν—βιωτέον This opinion is quoted by Aristotle as that of one of those who had gone before him. Pol. IV. 2: τὴν τυραννίδα χειριστὴν οὕτω, πλέιστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας. Δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διήστηκε ὑπὸ ταῦτα πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας: μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. "Ἡδὴ μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πράτερον ὀφέλον, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταῦτα βλέψας ἤμων ἔκεινοι μὲν γὰρ ἔρινε, παῖς μὲν οὖσῶν ἐπεικῶς, οἷος ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν χειριστὴν δημοκρατίαν, τῶν δὲ φαίλων ἀρίστην. 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταῦτα ἐξημαρτημενα ἔναι φαίλην' καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἤτοι δὲ φαίλην. See also ib. c. 4. It will be observed that the last words exactly express the doctrine of the Politicus: so that if Aristotle is alluding to this dialogue he has misunderstood the author's meaning. This does not prove that he does not refer to this passage, but it does tend to shew that he is quoting loosely without thinking of the context, and perhaps without distinctly remembering the author from whom he quotes. τις τῶν πράτερον is certainly a curious expression for him to use, if he remembered that he was quoting Plato. But the saying may perhaps be older than either of them. See Introduction to the Statesman. For the infinitive, as subject of νικά, cf. Soph. (Ed. Col. 1225: μὴ φίάσαι τὸν ἀπαντα νικά λόγον.
is no comparison between even constitutional royalty and the ideal state.

None of these forms deserve the name of government: and their upholders are not statesmen, but factious partisans.

We have done, then, with this "crew of Centaurs"

1. οἶον θεῶν ἕξ ἄνθρώπων | Compare Aristotle, Pol. III. 8: εἶ δὲ τις ἐστὶν εἰς τοὐτὸν διαφέρων καὶ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν — ὡσπέρ ἄρα θεῶν ἐν ἄνθρωποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ τοιοῦτον.

7. οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικὸς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικὸς] Cf. Legg. 8, 832 b: τὰς οὐ πολιτείας ἔσωσε αὐτὰς εἶναι φημὶ ἂς πολλάκις ἐίρηκα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις, δοκιμασίων καὶ διαγραφῶν καὶ τυραννίας. τοῖς γὰρ δὲ πολιτείᾳ μὲν οὐδεμίᾳ, στασιαστικαὶ δὲ πᾶσα λέγοντ’ ἀν ὀρθότατα.

στασιαστικοὶ] This is the salient point also in the allegory of the ship: Rep. 6, 488.


11. Κινδυνεύει—ὁρθότατα] So above, 291 c, the same character is described as τῶν πάντων τῶν σοφίστῶν μέγιστον γόρτα καὶ τάσις τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειροτάτων, in both places with direct reference to the argument of the Sophist, in which the false politician (not πολιτικός but δημολογικός) is distinguished from the Sophist last of all (Soph. sub. fin.). Cf. Gorg. 465 c: φύρωναί ἐν τῷ ἀτόφο καὶ περί ταύτα σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες. Ib. 520 a: ταύτων ὁ μακάριε, ἐστὶ σοφιστὰς καὶ ρήτωρ.

12. περιεστράφθαι probably alludes to the windings of the argument in the Sophist. “After so much turning and twisting, the word has at last fixed itself on them.”

13. τοῦτο μὲν — ἐξαρίσθη | τοῦτο has no verb, because the end of the sentence is altered to agree with the middle: thus ἐξαρίσθη is substituted for ἐπεράθη, or some such word. The clause καθάπερ—
καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νῦν δὴ Κενταυρικὸν ὀρῶσθαι καὶ
Σατυρικὸν τινα θίασον, ὃν δὴ χεριστέου ἀπὸ πολιτι-
d κῆς εἰς τέχνης, νῦν οὕτω πάνυ μόνις ἔχωρίσθη.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτον δὲ γ' ἔτερον ἐτὶ χαλεπότερον λεί-5
πεται τῷ ἔσω γενέσει τοῦ ὁμοῦ εἶναι μᾶλλον τῷ βασιλικῷ
gένει καὶ δυσκαταμαθητότερον. καὶ μοὶ φαινόμεθα
tois τῶν χρυσῶν καθαίρουσι πάθος ὁμοίων πεπον-
θέναι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Γῆν πον καὶ λίθους καὶ πόλλ' ἄττα ἔτερα
ἀποκρύνουσι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι πρότερον οὐ δημιουργοὶ· μετὰ
e δὲ ταῦτα λείπεται ἕξυμμεμγιμένα τὰ ἔξωγενη τοῦ
χρυσοῦ τίμια καὶ πυρὶ μονὸν ἀφαιρετά, χαλκὸς καὶ
ἄργυρος, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ ἀδάμας, *[α]* μετὰ βασάνων
ταῖς ἐψήσετο μόγις ἀφαιρεθέντα τῶν λεγόμενον
ἀκήρατον χρυσὸν ἔισαεν ἡμᾶς ἱδεῖν αὐτὸν μονὸν ἐφ'
ἐαυτοῦ.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα οὕτω γίγ-
νεσθαι.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον ἐοίκε καὶ νῦν
ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἔτερα καὶ ὑπόσα ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰ μὴ
φίλα πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀποκεχωρίσθαι, λείπεσθαι
dὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ ἔξωγενή. τοῦτων δ' ἐστὶ πον στρα-

This page is a continuation of the previous page. It contains the text of a fragment from a Greek manuscript, translated into English. The text discusses the differences between the Greek and Roman approaches to justice, mentioning the fusion of platinum and its more striking image. See this described in Faraday's Chemistry of a Candle, pp. 184-204.

In the edition of the manuscript, the following notes are included:

15. *[Α]*. So Stephanus and Ficinus. MSS. om.
17. αὐτῶν μονὸς ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ] Cf. supr. 268 c: χεριστέου ἀπ' ἐκείνων καθαρῶν μονὸν αὐτῶν ἀπο-
φήνωμεν.
and that nobler rhetoric which is the ally of good government. We must do our best to part these off from the supreme science. Take music and the mechanical arts. There can be no doubt that they must yield precedence to the art which determines which of them is to be learnt.

1. καὶ δὴ — πράξεις] Such a higher rhetoric is hinted at in the Phaedrus and Gorgias, but more ironically than here. Cf. Gorg. 480 c, e; Phedr. 271 d, e. The word φροτεία is peculiar to this place. Perhaps, as Stallbaum thinks, it conveys a nobler idea than φροτεία. The admission of rhetoric into the state is a return to nature similar to the adoption of paid teachers which accompanies it in the Laws. Cf. Legg. 4, 711 d, e: ἦ τὴν Νέατορος — φύσιν, ὑν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν μόριμα φασί πάντων διενεγκόματα ἀνθρώπων πλίον ἔτι τῷ σωφρονεῖν διαφόρειν κ.π.λ. The προοίμα or νουθετητικοί λόγοι of that dialogue are an example of the kind of rhetoric here meant. Compare also the re-admission of the practical sciences in the Philebus.

3. *τίνι * τρόπῳ βόστα] I have ventured to accent τίνι and to add the mark of interrogation, as the superlative seems to be otherwise without meaning; and the answer of Young Socrates is at least equally apposite when the words are thus taken. Cf. Soph. 241 e; Legg. 6, 779 e: ἦ δὴ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ ἢν νύμφιον καὶ νυμφήν; A similar change has still to be made in the text of Phileb. 26 e: τέταρτον τι τότε ἐφαμέν εἰναί γένος σκεπτέων: ubi legend. τέταρτον τι τοτε. See Mr. Poste’s translation.

14. Τί δὲ; τὸ δ’ αὐ] Ast’s conj., τί δὲ τόδ’ αὐ; has been adopted by the Zurich editors.

304. μανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἴτε μή, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμην ἂν καὶ ταύτην εἶναι τινα περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

NE. ΣΩ. Οὔτως, εἶναι φήσομεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτεραν ὁμολογήσομεν ἐκεῖνων εἶναι ταύτην;

NE. ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πότερα δ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲμίαν ἀρχεῖν δεῖν ἄλλην κ' ἄλλη, ἢ ἐκεῖνας ταύτης, ἢ ταύτην δεῖν ἐπιτροπέον- σαν ἀρχεῖν ἔμμεσον τῶν ἄλλων;

NE. ΣΩ. Ταύτην ἐκεῖνων.

ΞΕ. [Τὴν] εἰ δὲι μανθάνειν ἢ μὴ τῆς μανθανο- μένης καὶ διδασκούσης ἁρὰ σὺ γ' ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἡμῖν ἀρχεῖν;

NE. ΣΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὴν εἰ δὲι πείδευν ἁρὰ ἢ μὴ τῆς δυνα- μένης πείδευν;

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Ἐπει' τινι τὸ πειστικὸν οὖν ἀποδώσομεν ἐπι- δοστήμη πλήθους τε καὶ οὐχ οὖν διὰ μυθολογίας ἄλλα μὴ διὰ διδασχῆς;

NE. ΣΩ. Φανερῶν, οἴμαι, καὶ τοῦτο ρητορικὴ δυ- τέων ὅν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δ' εἴτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἴτε καὶ διὰ τινὸς βιάς

12, 963: νοῦν γὰρ ἡ κυβερνη- τικῶν μὲν καὶ λατρείας εἰπομεν— τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ἐλέγχοντες ἐν- ταῦθ' ἐσμὲν νῦν.

11. [Τὴν] εἰ δὲι μανθάνειν ἢ μὴ] The old editors, supported by few MSS., insert τὴν before εἰ, which Stallbaum has retained. The Zurich editors read ταύτην ἐκείνων, εἰ δὲι μανθάνειν ἢ μὴ. Ξ. τῆς μ. κ.τ.λ. But the tenor of the argument makes the retention of τὴν almost imperative. Compare similar spec- imens of analogical reasoning in the Gorgias.

18. πειστικὸν] This word is used again in Legg. 4, 723 a.

παράττειν πρός τινας ὁπιοῦν ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν πρὸς τινας ὁπιοῦν ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν 

1. ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν τῇ ἔχειν

Schleiermacher conjectured ἔχειν (cf. Soph. 242 a: τὸ παράπαν ἐπιστήμη). And ἔχειν may perhaps have been mistaken for a contraction of ἔχειν); Stallbaum ἔχειν = to refrain—supposing ἀν to be absorbed in παράπαν. (ἀπέχειν sc. τοῦ πράττειν.) Herm. conj. ἔχειν. Badh. λέγειν, with a view to λεκτικὴς ἐνθ. But λεκτικὴς is only an expansion of πειστικῆς. The conjecture of Hermann is the best.

9. μὴ ἡμὲν is thus used in qualifying an assertion supr. 263 e: ἀγελαῖον μὴν ζωῶν. So μεντοῖ in Rep. 1, 334 b: ἔν' ὀφελεία μέντοι τῶν φίλων κ.τ.λ.


15. ἡ] Interrogative, depending on διανοητέον.

17. ἡν] “Why it is the function on which generalship and all warlike action is employed.” Cf. Protag. 322 b: πολιτικὴν—ἡς μέρος πολεμική.

19. ἡν ἔτε ὡς] Bodl. τὴν ἔτε. π. with ΔΠ.

20. οίαν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμων] “Able through knowledge.”
304. σασθαι, ταύτης ἐτέραν ὑπολάβωμεν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην;  
NE. ΣΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπομένουσιν ἐτέραν.

305. ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρχοῦσαν ταύτης αὐτὴν ἀποφανοῦ-μεθα, εἶπερ τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν γε ὑποληψόμεθα ὁμοίως;  
NE. ΣΩ. Φημί.

ΞΕ. Τίν’ οὖν ποτὲ καὶ ἐπιχειρήσομεν οὔτω δεινῆς καὶ μεγάλης τέχνης ἐξυπαύσης τῆς πολεμικῆς δε-σπότων ἀποφαίνεσθαι πλῆν γε δὴ τὴν οὕτως οὖσαν τοῖς βασιλικῖς;

NE. ΣΩ. Οὐδεμίαν ἀλλήν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἀρα πολιτικῆν γε θέσομεν, ὑπηρετικὴν οὖσαν, τὴν τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιστήμην.

NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκ εἰκός.

b ΞΕ. Ἡθὶ δὴ, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν τῶν ὀρθῶν δικαζόμενον θεασάμεθα δύναμιν.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐποίηματα τῆς ἕλεσθαι καὶ ἐπικράτειας τῆς ἐν μοναρχίᾳ τῆς τεκνίας τουτεύον ἡ τριτεύον.

8. οὕτω—πολεμικῆς] “What science shall we go about to make supreme over the whole of strategy, a power so formidable and so mighty!”

10. τὴν οὕτως οὖσαν βασιλικῆ] So the argument is strengthened by an appeal to language in Soph. 221 c: ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν. Supr. 260 c: δεσπόζοματα γε.


19. Ἀρ’ οὖν—διαφείνειν;] “Can the judicial art do anything more than, on questions of contract, to determine what is legally just and unjust by reference to those fixed laws which she receives from the lawgiving king; while she brings to the performance of this office her own peculiar virtue, that of being incapable of yielding to bribes or intimidation or the appeal to pity, or to any other feeling, whether of enmity or favor, so as to be willing to determine suits between parties otherwise than as the lawgiver has appointed?”
ξυμβόλαια, πάνθ' ὀπόσα κείται νόμιμα παρὰ νομο- p. 305
θέτου βασιλέως παραλαβοῦσα, κρίνειν εἰς ἐκείνα σκοπούσα τά τε δίκαια ταχθέντα εἶναι καὶ ἄδικα, τῆν αὐτῆς ἴδιαν ἀρετὴν παρεχομένη τοῦ μῆθ' ὑπὸ 5 τινος δόρων μηθ' ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οὐκέτων μηθ' ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλης ἐξήρας μηδὲ φιλίας ἦττηθείσα παρὰ εἰς τήν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν ἐθέλειν ἀν νὰ ἄλληλων ἐγκλήματα διαρεῖν; NE. ΣΩ. Ὀὐκ, ἀλλὰ σχέδου ὴσον εἰρηκας, ταύτης ἐστὶ ἡ δυνάμεως ἐγγον.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τήν τῶν δικαστῶν ἀρὰ ρόμην ἀνευρισκομένου οὐ βασιλικὴν ὄσαν ἄλλα νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρετίων ἐκεῖνης.

NE. ΣΩ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΞΕ. Τόδε δὴ κατανοητέου ἴδοντι συναπάσας τάς ἐπιστήμας ἀλλ' ἐφηνταῖ, ὦτι πολιτικῆ γε αὐτῶν οὐδεμία ἀνεφάνη, τήν γὰρ ὄντως οὔσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δὲ ἐπὶ πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμείων πράττειν, γεγνώσκουσαν τήν ἄρχήν τε καὶ ὀρμήν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαρίας, τάς δ' ἄλλας τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾶν.

NE. ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

5. μήθ' ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλης ἐχθρ.[] “No, nor yet hatred;” according to the well-known Platonic idiom. Cf. supr. 298 d: ἐὰν τινῶν λατρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν εἰς ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν.

9. σχέδου — ἐργον] “You have fairly expressed the limits within which this power is exercised.”

17. οὐκ αὐτὴν δὲ πράττειν, ἄλλ' ἄρχειν] Cf. supr. 259 c.

19. γεγνώσκουσαν — πολέσιν] “Understanding, as regards fitness and unfitness of times, the beginning and first impulse of what is most important in states.” Cf. Rep. 4, 424 a: πολιτεία ἐὰν ἀπὸ ὀρμήσῃ εὖ.

20. τῆς δ' ἄλλας] Supr. 277 d: τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις διὰ χειρουργείων. So, very frequently, the obverse of a proposition is stated at the close of a sentence.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ.

305. ΞΕ. Διὰ ταύτα ἄρα, ἃς μὲν ἄρτι διεληλυθαμεν, οὔτε ἀλλήλων οἷον αὐτῶν ἄρχουσαι, περὶ δὲ τινα ἱδίων αὑτῆς οὐσα ἐκάστη πράξειν, κατὰ τὴν ἱδιότητα τῶν πράξεων τούν τούνομα δικαίως εἰληφεν ἵδιον.  

5 NE. ΣΩ. Εἰξασι γοῦν.  
ΞΕ. Τὴν δὲ πασῶν το οὐτῶν ἄρχουσαι καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ ξυμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ πάντα ἔσων ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχοντες, τοῦ κοινοῦ τῇ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, προσαγορεύόμεν δικαίωτα' ἀν, ὡς οὖκε, πολιτικῆς.  
NE. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.  
ΞΕ. Ὁυκοὺν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς παραδειγμα βουλομέθη ἄν ἐπεξελθέων αὐτὴν υἱόν, ὅτε καὶ πάντα τὰ γένη τὰ κατὰ πόλιν δῆλα ἡμῖν γέγονοι;  
NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.  
ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ βασιλείκην συμπλοκῆν, ὡς οὖκε, λεκτέων ποίᾳ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ποιὼ τρόπῳ συμπλέκουσα ποιον ἡμῖν ὑφασμα ἀποδίδωσιν.  
NE. ΣΩ. Δῆλον.  
ΞΕ. ᾿Η χαλεπῶν ἐνδείξασθαι πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται.  
NE. ΣΩ. Πάντως γε μὴν ῥητέον.  
ΞΕ. Τὸ γὰρ ἁρετῆς μέρος ἁρετῆς εἰδει διάφορων

8. ἔσων ἄνθρωπος[ This word prepares the way for the return to the example of weaving in what follows. ]

τοῦ κοινοῦ τῇ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς] “Characterizing the function of this art by the name of that which it shares with the rest,” viz. that they are for the good of the state.  
Sc. πολιτικῆς, ὅτε ἐπιμελουμένην ἀπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν. For περιλαβεῖν. cf. Theaet. 148 d; ταύτας πολλὰς ὁσσα ἐν εἰδεῖ περιλαβεῖς.  
23. τὸ γὰρ — διὸς] “That one part of virtue is in some occasions, and of the first beginnings of great issues. The rest have each a particular function and name: the working of statesmanship is universal: and hence this science bears the general name of government. Having now distinguished it from other forms of civic life, let us view it in itself by the light of our example. What is the nature of the web in which this sover reign art inveaves all other arts?"
The answer to this involves a difficult question. The parts of virtue are generally supposed to be in unison. We must now examine whether courage and temperance are not rather opposed.

way different from another kind of virtue is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants who appeal to common opinion."

(23.) "An opposed attitude:"
or perhaps, staivn enantion eis tevve, "holding opposite sides." For ekbpa the MSS. and Edd. have ekbpa: exeute C.H.: cett. exeute. Cf. Phaedr. 238 a: duo tine esto idia arxoute kai agoute. 15. "An opposed attitude:"

The present is certainly a modification of the view taken by Socrates in the Protagoras, where he upholds the simple unity of virtue.
any such thing as quickness and speed, etc.?" The construction is changed as the sentence proceeds, the accusative in ὕστερον being partly due to ἄνευ, and τῶν to the previous genitives.

εἴτε — ὕσθεναι.] The first two pairs of εἴτεs are hypothetical, and the third is interrogative. "Whether you have either yourself spoken or heard others speak in commendation of any of these things— quickness and speed, whether in body, or mind, or movement of sound, whether real, or in such shadowy forms as music, and even painting, afford by imitation."

νέης εἶτε αὐτὸς πώποτε γέγονας εἶτε ἄλλου παρὼν ἔπαινοῦντος ὡςθησαί;  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;  
ΞΕ. 'Ἡ καὶ μνήμην ἔχεις ὄντων τρόπον αὐτὸ ἐξάστοις τούτων;  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.  
ΞΕ. 'Αρ' οὖν δύνατος αὐτὸ ἀν γενοῖμην, ὦστερ καὶ διανοοῦμαι, ὀνόλογον ἐνδείξασθαί σοι;  
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;  

5. ἐν ἑκάσταις τούτων] "In the case of body, mind, voice, or imitative art."  
11. ἐν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις γένεσι] "In the kinds where the opposition appears." Supr. c: ἑναντία —εἰδ. Qy. τοῖς ὑπεναντίαις γενέσεις; Cf. infr.: ἡμειαίς αὐ γενέσεως. 310 d: πολλαῖς γενέσεως, where some MSS. have πολλοῖς γένεσιν.  

τῶν γὰρ δὴ—ἀνδρείας] "For there are many actions in which, and that repeatedly, we praise speed and vehemence and quickness, mental and bodily; and on each occasion" (ἑκάστη) "express our praise of the quality which we admire by the one appellation of 'bravery.'"  

12. ἐν πολλαῖς καὶ πολλάκις] Cf. Soph. 264 b: ἐνα καὶ ἐνίοτε— with which should have been compared Phileb. 32 d: ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐνα—ἐστιν ὦτε—.  
NE. ΣΩ. Ναι.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; το τῆς ἠρεμίας αὐ γενέσεως εἰδος ἀρ.

307. οὐ πολλάκις ἐπηνεκαμεν ἐν πολλαὶς τῶν πράξεων;

NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Μῶν οὖν οὐ τάναντία λέγοντες ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖ-ν

νον τοῦτο φθεγγόμεθα;

NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ὡς ἠσυχία ποῦ φαμεν ἐκάστοτε καὶ σω-φρονικά, περὶ τε διάνοιαν πραττόμενα ἀγαθόντες καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐ βραδέα καὶ μαλακά, καὶ έτιο-περὶ φονᾶς γεγονόμενα λεία καὶ βαρέα, καὶ πάσαν ῥυθμικὴν κίνησιν καὶ ὀλην μοῦσαν εν καιρῷ βραδυ-πῆς προσχρομομένην, οὐ τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς κοσμομήτης ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν αὐτοῖς ἠχύμασιν.

NE. ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὅποταν αὐ γε ἀμφότερα γίγνεται ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἀκαίρα, μεταβάλλοντες ἐκάτερα αὐτῶν ψε-γομεν ἐπὶ τάναντια πᾶλιν ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.

Again, we often praise gentleness and quietness of demeanour and movement, and here we use the very different epithet of 'modest.' On the other hand, both boldness and gentleness are often blamed, as rash and cowardly. But rashness and cowardice are not found together, and bravery and modesty have not a natu-

2. γενέσεως] The word is used in the same sense as supr. 283 d, 287 c, to express the operation of any art, or, more generally, the act of doing anything.

8. 'Ως ἠσυχία — ἠχύμασιν] "In saying 'quiet and moderate' on each occasion, as you know we do (ποιο), when we admire what is done slowly and softly either in thought or action, or, again, what is sounded smoothly and gravely, and all rhythmical movement, and every liberal exercise which applies slowness at the proper time. To all these we attribute not bravery but sobriety, as a fitting epithet." For

ποιος; answered by ὅς, cf. Rep. 6, 510 b: πῦ — ἢ το μέν αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. Theatr. 172 d. For the asyndeton, cf. supr. 293 b, where κενομίκαμεν is resumed in φαμεν, as φαμεν in ἐπιφέ-ρομεν here.


17. ἀκαίρο] This reading is found as a correction in E, otherwise the MSS. unite in giving ἀκέφαλα.

18. ἐπὶ τάναντια πᾶλιν ἀπονέ-μοντες τοῖς ὀνόμασιν] "Assigning
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. 'Οξύτερα μὲν αὐτὰ γιγνόμενα τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ θάττω καὶ σκληρότερα φαινόμενα [καὶ] υβριστικά καὶ μανικά λέγουτε, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερα καὶ μαλακότερα καὶ δειλὰ καὶ βλακικά. καὶ σχεδὸν όσ τὸ πολὺ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν σώφρονα φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τὴν τῶν ἑναντίων, οἶνον ἀντελέσθησας στάσιν ἰδέας, οὔτ' ἀλλήλαις μιγνυμένας ἐφευράκομεν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰ τοῖα πράξεσιν, ἐτι τε τούς ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῶς ἢχοντας διαφερομένους ἀλλήλους ὑφόμεθα, ἐὰν μεταδιάκομεν.

NE. ΣΩ. Ποῦ δὴ λέγεις;

ΞΕ. 'Εν πᾶσι τε δὴ τούτοις οἷς νῦν ἐπομεν, ὅσ

them to the opposite quarters again in our nomenclature."

3. [καὶ] υβριστικά] So all the MSS. except Ven. Σ. καὶ υβρ. καὶ μαν. = "Not only violent, but mad."


καὶ σχεδὸν — μεταδιάκομεν] "And so it is for the most part that we find these (the harsh and effeminate), and also the temperance and manliness of the characters opposed to them, as ideas diametrically antagonistic, not mingling with each other in the actions concerned with such things; and, moreover, we find, if we follow up the quest so far, that the men also of whose minds they are attributes are at variance with each other." ἀνδρείαν is probably a substantive.

7. οἴνον—ἰδέας] The words as they stand must be construed "As hostile forms having taken different sides in a quarrel." (διαλ. στ.) But I would venture to read πολεμίας, and translate "Forms which as it were have severally been put in a hostile attitude." Compare στάσιν ἑναντίων ἐχοντες supr. 306 b. Alberti's interpretation, who would join τὴν τῶν ἑναντίων διαλαχουσάς στάσιν, οἶνον πολεμίας ἰδίας, = "participating, as hostile forms, in the war of opposites," will hardly commend itself to scholars. He is right, however, in adducing Legg. 8, 836 d: τὸ τῆς σώφρονος ἰδίας γένος.
For the lovers of a quiet life, if they have their way, by enervating themselves and the youth, will often bring their country into slavery.


4. πολλῶν καὶ πολλῶν πέρυ] Cf. ἐν πολλῶς καὶ πολλάκις supra. 306 e.


11. Περὶ δικῆ~διδόλαι] "Embracing, as might be anticipated, the whole arrangement of life. For we know that those who excel in modesty are always ready to lead a quiet life, doing their own business by themselves alone, and while they live peaceably with all at home, they are likewise ready at all points to be in a manner at peace with foreign cities. And from being thus in love with quietness, a love not suited to their occasions, they unconsciously become unfit for war, and create the same defect in their young men, and are in the power of the first aggressor, whence ere many years have passed, themselves, their children and their whole community have often, ere they were aware, been reduced from freedom to slavery."

τως ἐτοιμαὶ πάντα ὄντες τρόπον τινὰ ἄγειν εἰρήνην. p. 307
καὶ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα δὴ τούτοις ἀκαρότερον ὄντα ἡ χρή, ὅταν ἄ βούλουται πράττειν, ἐλαθοῦν αὐτοὶ τε ἀπο-
λέμωσι ἀσχοντες καὶ τους νέους ὁσαύτος διατιθέντες
5 ὄντες τε ἀεὶ τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς
ἐτεσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ παιδεῖς καὶ ἕμποτας ἡ πόλις ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων πολλάκις ἐλαθοῦν αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι δοῦλοι. p 308

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Χαλεπῶν εἴπες καὶ δείων πάθος.

ΞΕ. Τί δ' οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον ῥέποντες;

ιο ἄρ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἂεὶ τινὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐπιτείνοντες
πόλεις διὰ τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου βίου σφοδρότεραν τοῦ
dεόντως ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰς ἔχθραν πολλοῖς καὶ δυνατοῖς
καταστάντες, ἡ πάμπαν διώλεσαν ἡ δούλας αὖ καὶ
ὑποχειρίως τοὺς ἔχθροις ὑπέθεσαν τὰς αὐτῶν πα-

15 τρίδας;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Εστι καὶ ταύτα.

ΞΕ. Πῶς οὖν μὴ φῶμεν ἐν τούτοις ἀμφότερα
tαύτα τὰ γένη πολλὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἂεὶ καὶ τὴν

μεγίστην ἴσχειν ἔχθραν καὶ στάσιν;

20 ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμώς ὡς οὐ φήσομεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκών ὅπερ ἐπεσκοποῦμεν κατ' ἀρχάς,
ἀνευρήκαμεν, ὅτι μόρια ἄρτησι οὐ σμικρὰ ἄλληλοις
dιαφέρεσθον φύτει καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἴσχοντας ὁδράτον
τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;

1. πάντα] Adverbial.
7. πολλάκις—δοῦλοι] Note the rhythm. The style of this
passage is closely similar to
that of the Laws.
9, 590 b: ὅταν τὸ λεοντάδες—
συντείνητα ἀναρμόστως.
13. καταστάντες] Qy. καταστή-
santè ?
306 b. The writer seems to
pass almost unconsciously from
the one meaning of στάσις to
the other.
20. Οὐδαμώς ὡς οὐ] The
adverbial form of οὐδεῖς ὁσ-
tis οὖ.
23. ὁδάτον τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Sc.
pouwion διαφέρειν.
Now let us ask whether any art of combination will not first select good elements to be combined, and cast the bad away. And will not the political science, then, combine good elements, whether like or unlike?

There cannot be a good combination of good and bad.

And as the weaver presides over
the preparatory processes of carding and spinning, so this science will deliver those whom she selects to educators, over whose work she will herself preside. Those incapable of moral training she will reject and suppress. Those of an ignorant and abject nature she will ennoble. The rest, who are capable of being moulded to a noble type and drawn into harmony, she tάλλα προπαρασκευάζουσιν ὡσα πρὸς τὴν πλέξιν π. 30 αὐτῆς, ἐξυμπαρακολουθοῦσα προστάττει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ, τοιαύτα ἑκάστους ἐνδεικνύσα τὰ ἔργα ἀποτε- λεῖν, οία ἂν ἐπιτίθεια ἱγήται πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς εἶναι 5 ἐξιμπλοκῆν.

NE. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ταύτων δὴ μοι τούθ’ ἡ βασιλικὴ φαίνεται τᾶς τοῖς κατὰ νόμον παιδευταῖς καὶ προφεύσι, τὴν τῆς ἐπιστατικῆς αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἰχουσα, ὡν ἐπιτρέψειν 10 ἀσκεῖν ὁ τι μῆ τις πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς ἔγκρασιν ἀπεργαζόμενος ἥδος τι πρέπον ἀποτελεῖ, ταύτα δὲ μόνα παρακελεύσθαι παιδεῦν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν ἥδους ἀνδρεῖου καὶ σωφρόνου ὁσα τε ἅλλα ἔστι τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀθεό-

15 τητα καὶ ὑβριν καὶ ἀδίκιαν ὑπὸ κακῆς βίας φύσεως π. 30 *ἀποῳδούμενος *θανάτους τε ἐκβάλλει καὶ φυγαῖς καὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις κολάζουσα ἀτιμίας.

NE. ΣΩ. Λέγεται γονόν πῶς οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἀμαθία τ’ αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι

7. Ταύτων δὴ τοῦθ’ "Precisely in the same manner it appears to me that the kingly art, keeping the presidential office in her own hands, will not permit those who are educating and rearing the young under the law to practise them in aught but that which being wrought with a view to her process of commingling, creates a disposition suitable thereto, but in these things only she exhorts them to educate the young."

Ταύτων—τούτα ] Cogn. ace. in apposition with what follows. Cf. Legg. 2, 660 a:

ταύτων δὴ καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ὃ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.

15. ὑπὸ κακῆς βίας φύσεως] Note the inverted order.

16. *ἀποῳδούμενον *] Par.H. ἀπωδούμενος : cett. ἀπωδούμενα. The correction is Stallbaum’s. The MS. reading requires ἀλλ’ ὀσα. I. e. δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν τούτων ὁσα. But the neuter may be defended by supplying ἥδη, as implied in τοὺς δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν ἥδους.

17. κολάζουσα ] There is a sort of zeugma here. Only a part of the sense of ἐκβάλλει is to be repeated with the participle.
I will weave together in the following way, taking the brave natures for the warp and the gentle for the softer wool.

As nature directs, she will bind the immortal part in them by a divine bond, and the animal part by human ties. Right opinion of what is noble, just, and good, when confirmed by reason in the mind, is a divine principle in a godlike form.

The good lawgiver will weave together in the following way, taking the brave natures for the warp and the gentle for the softer wool.

As nature directs, she will bind the immortal part in them by a divine bond, and the animal part by human ties. Right opinion of what is noble, just, and good, when confirmed by reason in the mind, is a divine principle in a godlike form.

The good lawgiver
θῶν καὶ τῶν τούτων εναντίον ὄντως ὦταν ἀληθῆ p. 30
δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὅποταν εἰς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίνη-
tαι, θείαν φημὶ εἰν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει.
NE. ΣΩ. Πρέπει γοῦν οὕτως.
5 ΞΕ. Τὸν δὴ πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἁγαθὸν νομο-
θέτην ἄρ' ἵσμεν ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνάτων
εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μοῦσῃ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν
τοῖς ὀρθῶς μεταλαβοῦσι παιδείας, οὐς ἔλεγομεν
νῦν δῇ;
10 NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός.
ΞΕ. Ἐν δὲ ἄν δράν γε, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἀδυνατῇ τὸ
tουτοῦν, μηδὲποτε τοῖς νῦν ζητουμένοις ὄνομασιν
αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν.
NE. ΣΩ. Ὅρθοτατα.
15 ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; ἀνδρεία ψυχὴ λαμβανομένη τῆς
τοιαῦτης ἀληθείας ἄρ' ὦν ἡμεροῦται καὶ τῶν δικαίων
μάλιστα οὕτω κοινοίν ἄν ἐθελήσεις, μὴ μεταλα-
βούσα δὲ ἀποκλίνει μᾶλλον πρὸς θηριώδη τινὰ
φύσιν;
20 NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; τὸ τῆς κοσμίας φύσεως ἄρ' οὐ τοῦ-
tων μὲν μεταλαβόν τῶν δοξῶν ὄντως σῶφρον καὶ

1. ὄντως—βεβαιώσεως] "Real
tue opinion with confirma-
tion:" i. e. knowledge, as
defined in Theaet. sub. fin. and
Meno 98 a, b.; Phaedo 76;
Tim. 51 d, e.; Legg. 2, 653 b.
3. δαιμονίῳ γένει] Sc. το-
tῶν ψυχῶν: which is at least
Heaven-born, if not Divine.
Cf. κατὰ τὸ συγγενεῖς supr.
Legg. 1, 644 b: ὧς πρῶτον τῶν
καλλιστῶν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀν-
δραίσα παραγεγρήμενον. Ib. 11,
913 e: κτήμα ἀντὶ κτήματος ἄμε-
νον ἐν ἀμείνοι κτησάμενος, δίκερ
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πλούτου προτιμή-
σας.
7. μουσῆ] Cf. Rep. 6, 499
d: αὐτὴ ἡ μοῦσα. This use is
frequent in the Laws.
12. τοῖς νῦν ζητουμένοις ὄνομα-
σιν] πολιτικός, βασιλικός, βα-
σιλεύς.
3, 410, 411.
1. ὡς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ] In which it is not possible fully to embody the highest wisdom. Cf. Rep. 4, 430 c: πολιτείαν γε (ἰσότρειαν).


5. τούτων, sc. τὸν πολιτικὸν] "Must we not then say that the social bond can never become lasting either amongst bad men or between the bad and the good: nor would any science ever seriously make use of such a bond in relation to such materials as these?"

Qu. an leg. τοιοῦτον?

toῖς μὲν κακοῖς — ἁγαθοῖς]
The datives depend on γίγνε-σθαι μόνοιμον.

11. Τοῖς δ’ εὐγενεσί—φερομένων] Sc. φῶμεν. "But in those characters which are at once

noble in their first origin, and have been reared accordingly, in these alone this harmony grows up when fostered by the laws, and this medicine is scientifically destined for them; and, as we have said, this is the diviner bond, uniting parts of virtue by nature dissimilar, and diversely bent."

τε] MSS. γε.

13. τούτων] The Bodl. MS. has τούτων with ΔΠ.

14. θείωτατον] So the Bodl. MS., with ΔΣΠΣΥ. Vulg. —τερον.

15. *φύσει*] The conj. of Stephanus for the MS. reading φύσεως. The expression ἀρετῆς —φύσεως, though at first sight resembling Soph. 258 b (θατέ-ρου μορίου φύσεως), is less de-
sensible. Virtue was too familiar an abstraction to be thus paraphrased. And the reading φύσεως may easily have slipped in from supr. κοσμίας φύσεως. Cf. supr. 308 b: μέρις ἀρκτής οὐ σιμικρὰ ἀλλήλους διαφέρον τοις φύσει.

6. ἐπιγαμίων — κοινωνήσεων ] "Intermarriages, and giving and taking of children in marriage between states." The κοινωνία τῶν παιδῶν is not to be thought of here. The transition from wealth to birth is so natural, that Plato here applies the latter notion metaphorically, which is so much the easier as the bold and gentle characters are spoken of as γένη, and as the argument requires them to be viewed as hereditary. "People at present are too insensible in their alliances: the brave seeks union with the brave, the gentle with the gentle race." Cf. supr. a: τοῖς εἰ ἐγενέσθαι γενομένοις. And infra: τοῖς τὴν ἀνδρείαν γένος—ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη. Also Legg. 3, οὗτος τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθαίρετος ῥώμη. This idea does not seem to be present in Tim. 18 e: ὅτως οἱ κακοὶ χωρὶς οἱ τ' ἄγαθοι ταῖς ὀμοίαις ἐκάτεροι εξιλιποῦνται. But then in the Re-
Thus the sober intermarry with the sober, the bold with the bold. But they ought not.

This mixture of natures, however, is required in the other citizens, Legg. 6, 773 c: ταύτα δ' διά λόγου μεν νόμων προστάτευες μη γαμεῖν πλοίον πλούσιον πλούσιον μηδέ πολλά δυνάμενον πράττεν άλλου τούτου, βάπτουσι δὲ ἂθετε πρὸς βραδυτέρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς ὄστιες ἀναγίαζεν τῇ τῶν γάμων κοινωνία πορεύεσθαι, πρὸς τῷ γελοῖο εἶναι διόμενον ἀν ἐγείρας πολλοίς' οὐ γὰρ βάδισιν ἐνδοει ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεί δίκαιον κρατήρος κεκρυμένης, οὐ μανοῦσες μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, καλαξιέμονες δὲ ὑπὸ ἄρποντος ἐτέρου θεοῦ καλήν κοινωνίαν λαβῶν ἀγαθῶν ποίμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπερμακέσθαι. Compare also the combination of qualities required for the guardian in Rep. 2, and for the philosopher in Rep. 6 and the Theaetetus.

5. τὴν — στέργειν] There is a change of construction from the participial form to the dative of the manner.

7. πλείστουν — ἀπονέμωντες] “Giving far more importance to their dislike than to any other consideration.”
rather to seek connexion with their opposites. For the bold race, unmixed, is vigorous at first, but tends to madness in the end. And the gentle breed, unmixed with the brave, has a feeble offspring. The arrangements for avoiding this are easily made, if both races are impressed with the same view.

5. σώφρονι φύσει ἂμμυκτος is to be joined by hyperbaton to σώφρονι φύσει.


14. Τούτου τῇ — ἐπιτρέπειν] "It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both the kinds were first impressed with one opinion respecting what is honourable and good. Yes, this is the single work in which the whole process of the royal weaving is comprised, never to allow temperate natures to keep aloof from the brave, but, warping them together by common sentiments, by honours, by reputation, and by interchange of pledges, to form of both a smooth and closely-woven web, and then to give into their hands the offices of state." Cf. supr. 310 a, b. Rep. 4, 429 c: διὰ πάντος δὲ ἐλεγον αὐτήν σωτηρίαν τὸ — διασώζεσθαι αὐτήν κ.τ.λ.

15. ἐκείνων ὑπ.] Bodl. ἐκατον, not ἐκατον ἐκατον. (Stallb.)

310. τούτο γὰρ ἐν καὶ ὁλον ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας ἐνθρόνων, μηδέποτε ἐὰν ἀφίστασθαι σῷφρονα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων ὑθῆν, ἐγγυκρικῶντα δὲ ὁμοδοξίας καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ δόξας καὶ ὄμηρεών ἐκδόσεις εἰς ἀλλήλους, 311. λείων καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον εὑρήριον ὕφασμα ἐξανάγουτας εἰς αὐτῶν, τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχὰς αἱ κοινῆ τοῦτοι ἐπιτρέπειν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Οὖ μὲν ἄν ἐνός ἄρχοντος χρεία ἐγκυβαίνῃ, τὸν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐχουντα αἰροῦμενον ἐπιστάτην, οὐ δ' ἂν πλείόνων, τούτων μέρος ἐκατέρων ἐγκυβαίνυντα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ σωφρόνων ἄρχοντων ἡθη σφόδρα μὲν εὐλαβὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ σωτηρία, δρμιύττωσι δὲ καὶ τινος ἱταμότητος ὦξειας καὶ πρακτικῆς ἐνδεικταί.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δοκεὶ γοῦν ὅτι καὶ τάδε.

b ΞΕ. Τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία γε αὖ πρὸς μὲν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ εὐλαβὴς ἐκείνων ἐπιδεέστερα, τὸ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν τὸ μὲν διαφερόντως ἵσχει. πάντα δὲ καλῶς γίγνε- of truth and right. Combining these two kinds by every available influence of opinion and custom, the kingly art will delegate all offices of state to their joint rule, where one officer is needed, taking care that he combines both natures, and where there are more, selecting equally from both, that the state may act with energy and good heed.

5. εὐπήριον] “Of an even or close texture.” The opposite is implied in Phaedr. 268 a: εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διετήσεις αὐτῶν τὸ ἥρων ὀσπερ ἔμοι.
12. τὰ μὲν γὰρ — ἐνδεικταί] “For the character of a temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is lacking in thoroughness, and in a certain prompt and active determination.”
14. ἱταμότητος] The abstract noun occurs only here. For ἱταμὸς cf. Legg. 6, 773 b, and for ἱτης Prot. 349 c.
19. τὸ μὲν] “This, as opposed to the former.” Cf. Soph. 252 δ: τοῦτο μὲν οἶος τε κύψω διαλύειν, τὸ μὲν 5c. τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἅθος. The change from plural to singular is noticeable, but seems to be required by ἀμφαίν.
following. The words are rejected by Ast, who conjectured ἵπταν, and Stallb., who here, as elsewhere, unnecessarily suspects a gloss. Qv. τοὺς? Cf. Tim. 61 e.

4. Τούτο δὴ—ἐπιστάτη] "This, then, according to our view, is the perfection of the web of political action, directly woven —the brave and temperate in human character, when the kingly science has drawn the lives of such men into communion by unanimity and kind- ness, and having thus completed the most glorious and noble of all webs that are of a public nature, and enveloping therewith all other denizens of cities, whether slaves or free, binds them by this contexture into one, and leaving out no point of a city's happiness, in as far as it belongs to a city to attain to happiness, so governs and presides." For εὐθυπλοκία, here metaphorically applied, cf. supr. 283 a.

ἐξυμπλακέν] Bodl. ΔΠ, ἐξυμπλέκειν, Τ. ἐξυμπλάκειν. ἐξυμπλακεῖν is in keeping with the tragic diction of much else in the dialogue. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1171: ὁρκος, πήγα σεννάινα παγέν. 9. *ὡς γ' * εἶαι κοινόν] MSS. ὡς. Cf. supr., ὡς γε εν πολι- τεία. It seems to be implied that, although this is the best common life, a higher life is reserved for the individual. For the inf., cf. Rep. 4, 430 d. But perhaps the words are a gloss on κοινόν suprā, as Stall- baum thinks.

11. ἀμφίσχονσα] Here the Bodleian has ἀμφίσχονσα (sic) with ΔΠ.

Some editors have adopted Ställb.'s conjecture, and have attributed these words to the philosopher Socrates. But it is not likely that he would interpose without giving Young Socrates time to assent to the last proposition. The present expression is merely an expanded and more courteous form of assent, marking the conclusion of the argument. It has been already noticed, that the dramatic is subordinated to the dialectical interest of this dialogue. Hence there is less motive for introducing the elder Socrates again. Compare the end of the Parmenides. Those, however, who think that the praise is more becoming in the mouth of the philosopher, may suppose that the answer of the younger Socrates has dropped out, e.g. Ἀληθεστατά γε. Cf. Soph. ad fin.

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