ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.
THE

PARMENIDES OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES,

BY

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The following edition is intended chiefly for the Metaphysician. That reading, accordingly, has always been preferred which makes the argument more plain.

I am indebted to Professor Davies, of the Queen's College, Galway, for his careful revision of the proofs.

Trinity College,

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EXISTENCE is an aspect of thought. All existence is thought—thought either actual or possible. That is to say, every mode of existence, when grasped by cognition, would be found to be a mode of thought. Such is the position of the Idealist.

2. The Idealist thinks his case made out, because all such notions as Matter and Things in themselves, when examined, prove to be figments—figments made up of elements so incompatible, that to affirm the one is to deny the other. So Berkeley disposes of Matter, by the bare statement that what is inactive is not causal, and *vice versa*. The Idealist rejects a monster whose sole function is to fill a gap, where there is no gap.

3. The rejection of a zero, made up of incompatibilities which cancel one another, has nothing to do with the position of Plato and Hegel, that Existence, when analysed, yields opposite moments. This brings us to the question—What is Philosophy?
4. Philosophy makes explicit to thought what is implicitly contained in thought. Berkeley showed that Sensible Qualities are modes of consciousness. Kant showed that consciousness contained a Necessary and Universal element, meaning by necessary what is construed to thought as not possibly otherwise than it is; and by universal what is thought as exceptionless. These characteristics, Necessity and Universality, Hegel extended to the object, and so to the universe. Philosophy is thus the explicitness of universal thought.

5. The other day, G. H. Lewes, while showing that Physiology could not supersede Psychology, pointed out that while Force could be translated into Feeling, Feeling could not be expressed in Force. Thus the most advanced Empiricism is idealistic.

6. It may be said that Science will in time express Feeling in terms of Force—that it will translate Psychosis into Neurosis. Granted: it is nothing to the point: Neurosis is the antecedent, and so can never be the consequent. Psychosis—thought—will keep its coin of vantage.

7. According to the Idealist, thought is the only object of thought—thought is the sole instrument of thought; and the product of thought is thought.

8. The instrument of thought is thought only;
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that is to say, we analyse a synthesis and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more; yet this process condemns as impossible the prevalent opinion that Psychology is Philosophy.

9. In the Timaeus, the Demiurge mixes various ingredients in a bowl. Everyone sees that this is Allegory. But when a Psychologist talks of the interaction of Subject and Object—of the action of the Object on the Subject, he is unconsciously allegorical.

10. The older hypothesis was that of Impulse, e.g. Locke's. Yet impulse implies weight, and weight, or gravity, is the result of the whole universe, and, so, cannot account for it. A billiard player may assume that the weight is in the ball; but a thinker ought to see that weight, or any property of a part, must be the result of the whole, and, so, cannot be prior to it. So of Force: it is another word for Movement, and cannot, therefore, originate.

11. So of Chemical Action: chemical action is only possible, because it is the result of certain conditions, and, therefore, cannot cause them. It is easy to say, let Oxygen represent the Subject, Hydrogen the Object, and Water—the result—Consciousness. But the chemist can retranslate: and the weight of the new product is that of the
old elements. Dewar has shown that old elements will form that new substance which is attended by the greatest evolution of heat. On the other hand, in the mental product the old constituents survive, and so the analogy breaks down on every point.

12. So, Psychology starts with a Subject and an Object; and by bringing the two into combination, and by feigning some reciprocal action—either mechanical or chemical—generates the Universe of Consciousness. As before, Subject and Object are results of consciousness at a certain stage, and, therefore, cannot generate it.

13. Des Cartes assumes an Ego, isolated from the rest of the Universe. It is obvious that the Ego is in contrast to the non-Ego; to evolve the non-Ego from the Ego is to offer a proof of that which the proof pre-supposes, and without which the proof would be unmeaning.

14. Locke's Essay is of value as a reply to the Psychology of Des Cartes. As a piece of philosophy, it assumes that there is a Mind on one side, and a set of Things on the other. It is mere Psychology.

15. Natural Realism is not Philosophy. Natural Realism tells us "that along with the presentation of the Object there is always a simultaneous presentation of the Subject, the two being mutually
related to each other."* True; but this postulates Subject and Object: that is, a Universe, and that Universe cut in two. It is mere Psychology.

16. Atomic theories cannot be Philosophy: they assume Space and Quantity; that is, from an aspect of the Universe they explain the whole.

17. Molecular theories cannot be Philosophy. To the assumptions of Atomism they add the assumption of Quality, and of Difference of Quality. Quality, like quantity and space, must be a result of the Universe. Clerk Maxwell considers that the family likeness of the molecules is an argument that they are not original.

18. Sir John Lubbock has calculated, on the authority of Loschmidt, Stoney, and Sir W. Thomson, that the molecules of gases are not more than the fifty-millionth part of an inch in diameter. It is obvious that any one of these molecules involves the whole problem of Natural Realism, and of the relation of Psychology to Philosophy. Sorby is of opinion that in a length of 1-80,000 of an inch there would probably be from 500 to 2000 molecules—500, for instance, in albumen, and 2000 in water. The nameless fraction of an inch presents us with space and its contents as surely as the field of the

* Monck’s Hamilton, p. 83, n.
seventy-five millions of worlds, of one of which our earth is but a fraction.

19. Movement in the line of Least Resistance assumes Space, and a System of Pressures. Granting that Space and Motion are Metaphysical Ultima, Philosophy asks why Space and Motion are found in combination. How did the Atom acquire its tenure of Space, and why did Space tolerate the intrusion?

20. Evolution is not Philosophy. If a thing is evolved from within, the process is more than the mere accretion with which the doctrine starts. If the thing gathers material from without, like a rolling snowball, then the process belongs to Mechanics or to Chemistry.

21. "Life," as Virchow expresses it, "is the sum of the joint action of all parts, of the higher or vital ones as of the lower or inferior. There is no one seat of life, but every truly elementary part, especially every cell, is a seat of life." Granting that this statement gives us the results of Physiology, the philosopher must ask, "What brings 'the parts' into juxtaposition? Is it merely a case of juxtaposition, or how otherwise? What is a part? What is higher? What is lower? What is joint action?" Socrates would not have had much trouble with a man who described Life as the action of vital parts.
22. Huxley enunciates the hypothesis of Evolution thus:—"The successive species of animals and plants have arisen, the later by the gradual modification of the earlier." As before, if the modification be from within, the fact explodes the theory: if from without, modification is accretion.

23. Sir John Lubbock tells us that "an astonishing variety of most beautiful contrivances have been observed and described by many botanists, especially Hooker, Axel, Delpino, Hildebrand, Bennett, Fritz Müller, and above all Herman Müller and Darwin himself. The general result is, that to insects, and especially to bees, we owe the beauty of our gardens, the sweetness of our fields. To their beneficent, though unconscious action, flowers owe their scent and colour, their honey—nay, in many cases, their form. Their present shape and varied arrangements, their brilliant colours, their honey, and their sweet scent are all due to the selection exercised by insects. In these cases the relation between plants and insects is one of mutual advantage." A Platonist might put it thus: "Insects select flowers by selection." That is, the idea dominates the process, not vice versa. At all events, the process implies prior capacity, and therefore reserves for discussion What is Capacity, What is Relation. That is, Physical Science, as always, owes its existence to notions which its professors discard.
24. Professor Huxley, in referring to the nervous system as "that which co-ordinates and regulates Physiological units into an organic whole," uses more metaphysical terms than Virchow. That is, both use terms borrowed from thought to explain that which, according to them, is the explanation of thought. Neurosis is explained by Psychosis, while Neurosis is the only scientific explanation of Psychosis.

25. Spontaneous generation throws no light on Philosophy. Waiving the decisive objection that it would describe a process which takes place in Time, what does the doctrine amount to, if established? That a mixture of turnip-juice and cheese is, under certain conditions, an antecedent to life. The doctrine is invested with importance by the ignorant, who persist in obtruding on Science the notion Cause, which Science affects to discard.

26. The Scientist, to set aside Metaphysics, reduces Causation to Sequence. If Causation be Sequence only, Thought is not caused by Neurosis. But, in order to degrade Thought, he invests Neurosis with causal power, so that the destruction of Neurosis involves the destruction of Thought. Thought is the Whole of which Causation and Sequence in time are parts—very small parts, indeed.

27. Professor Williamson, in his opening address, gives a sketch of the theories which guided Chemis-
try fifty years ago, and of the changes wrought in them by fifty years' work. Chemical explanation has got rid of predisposing affinities. "Our present explanation" (of a certain phenomenon) "is a simple statement of the fact that under the conditions described, zinc displaces hydrogen from its sulphate." The statement is anything but simple, as it amounts to this: — zinc — one set of relations — displaces hydrogen — a second set of relations — from its sulphate — a third set of relations. A Hegelian would not ask for a more idealistic position than Professor Williamson's simple statement of the fact.

28. Physical Science is not Philosophy, for it requires antecedence and consequence only as an explicit basis. As an explicit basis, for the analysis of antecedence and consequence may lead to a great deal more. In fact, it led to the Idealism of Kant.

29. That Science is apparently content with antecedence and consequence is seen in Professor Burdon-Sanderson's address: "Science can hardly be said to begin until we have by experiment acquired such a knowledge of the relation between events and their antecedents, between processes and their products, that in our own sphere we are able to forecast the operations of Nature, even when they lie beyond the reach of desired observation." That is, we predict consequents, because they are caused.
30. Clifford and Lewes hold that the Uniformity of Nature ought to be expressed as the Law of the Collocations of Changes. That is, they merely postulate Simultaneity, Succession, and Fixed Order. What more could an Idealist require?

31. Herbert Spencer's Heredity may account for Necessity as a fact. It does not explain what the Idealist contends for—not merely that a notion is what it is, but that it is explicitly thought as not possibly otherwise—the Necessity of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel.

32. Mr. Whittaker, in the interest of Empiricism, reconciles Empiricism with Idealism: "in the final statement of Empiricism, 'relations' are just as fundamental as 'feelings.' All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between 'feelings.'"* Feelings are capable of primitive relations, simply because both presuppose one intelligible whole—the position of the Idealist.

33. Taking a portion of the Universe, in order to account for the Universe, is as idle as to suppose that a square on a chess-board is the cause of the board. There can be no fraction outside the whole, and the business of Philosophy must be analysis.

* Mind, No. 24, p. 507.
34. Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato, in the Parmenides, analyses the Universe into \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \) and \( \tau \alpha \lambda \alpha \ \tau \circ \nu \ \nu \nu \circ \); the position of \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \) explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.

35. Positing \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \), the Universe, as conceived by Plato, may be best described in the words of Hegel:* "Free and infinite Form, as a Totality, involves the principle of Matter in itself"—taking Form in his sense of Complete Whole of Characteristics. Without \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \), we may have provisionally an Empiricism like that of Hume and Mill, Parm. 164 b; but this, when examined, will end in Nihilism, Parm. 165 e.

36. The intelligible element, vindicated by Kant and elaborated by Hegel, is variously termed Ideas and Numbers. The Ideas and Numbers are substantially identical, but Idea denotes the intelligible in relation to the sensibility, while the Numbers are the movements of the pure, intelligible process.

37. \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \) brings the Parmenides into close relation with the notices of Platonic doctrine preserved in Aristotle and his Scholiasts, as \( \tau \circ \怎么看 \) is the formative element in the Idea, and the spring from which the Numbers flow.

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* Logie, p. 204, Wallace's translation.
38. Xenocrates has given a hypothetic genesis of the Ideas. It is only to assist apprehension, as γένεσις implies evolution in time, which of course does not apply to the Ideas. ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑνὸς ἱσασθέντων ἐγένοντο ἂν, εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτὰς ἦν γενέσθαι.—Schol. 828 a, 1, 2.

39. Τὸ ἔν is neither Number nor Idea, although without it we should have neither Number nor Idea. Number—ἀριθμὸς—is, according to Greek arithmeticians, σύστημα μονάδων.—Theon Smyrn. 23. Τὸ ἔν is the ἀρχὴ of Numerables.

40. As τὸ ἔν has for its contre-coup τὸ ἀπειρον—indefinite plasticity—the first Number is the Dyad, αὐτοδύας. That is, The One and τὸ ἀπειρον, as two items, constitute the System of Two Monads—ἡ αὐτοδύας—the Prime Dyad.—Arist. Met. B. iii. The Dyad has for its Material τὸ ἀπειρον, and for its Form τὸ ἔν: αἱ πρῶτοι γεγονόται δύο μονάδες ὡς ἐξ ὑλῆς μὲν τῆς Ἀριστοτέλει τύχος, εἰδοὺς δὲ τοῦ Ὁρκυνοῦ Ἑνὸς—τοῦ Ἀὐτοενὸς δηλονότι—αὕται πεποιηκασί τὴν πρώτην Δυάδα.—Syrianus ap. Schol. 818 b, 46–9.

41. As the Indefinite Dyad is Majus and Minus—τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρὸν—each moiety is a monad. These two monads, with τὸ ἔν as unifier and equator, constitute the System of Three Monads—the Prime Triad—ἡ αὐτοτριάς: αἱ δὲ πάλιν δευτέρως γεγονόται τρεῖς μονάδες, ὡς ἐξ ὑλῆς μὲν καὶ αὕται
42. Lastly, the Indefinite Dyad as plastic, taking on itself the Prime Dyad as formal, constitutes the System of Four Monads—the Prime Tetrad—ἡ αὐτοτετράς: ἐκ τῆς Αὐτοδιάδος καὶ τῆς Ἀρχικοῦ Δυάδος ἢν Ἀορίστον καλεῖ Δυάδα, ἀπετέλουν τὴν Τετράδα: οὐ συντιθέντες αὐτὰς (ἐκ τὰς διάδας) οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὐξοντες, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος διπλασιάζος τὴν Αὐτοδιάδα, καὶ οὕτως ἀποτεκούσης τὴν Τετράδα.—Syr. ib. 819a, 26–31.

43. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δύας—is no blank infinite. It is plasticity, ἀνεκλειπτὸς, Syr. ib. 907a, 25. Its virtues are best given in the words of Syrianus: κινητικὴν οὖσαν ἀρχὴν πάντα τὰ εἴδη γονίμου πληροῦν δυνάμεως καὶ προάγει εἰς ἀπογέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἀύλων εἴδων.—Syr. ib. 906b, 30–32. Δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἀύλων εἴδων are the squares and cubes of the Prime Numbers.

44. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δύας—is the link between Plato’s Physics and Metaphysics. It is Movement both logical and mechanical. All mechanical movement, whether purely mechanical or chemical, is in reality a brief description of relation between two moments. All qualities are relations in disguise. Analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.

45. The two components of all things, τὸ ἐν...
and τὸ ἀπειρον, are thus Metaphysical Ultima discovered by analysis, and not agents in the mechanical, chemical, or so-called psychological sense.

46. Why did Plato use such barren terms as τὸ ἕν—The One, and τὰλλα—All the rest of it? Τὸ ἕν is the geometrical unit, and Geometry is the medium between Sense and Intellect. Aristotle's usual term for Mathematics, as Plato viewed them, is τὰ μεταξύ.

47. Previous to Plato, the notion The One had been so far developed:—

a. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion Moral Perfection, making Unity a predicate of Essence:

b. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence:

c. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity:

d. Zeno defended Unity by proving plurality impossible.

48. In Aristotle's hands the notion Unity became Substance, and in that shape was transmitted by the schoolmen to modern thought. It is obvious that the modern atom is a Lilliputian substance.

49. The One being positive, τὰλλα τοῦ ἕνὸς is thrown off as its contre-coup, by the process which Hegel elaborated.
50. Anti-Platonists, from Aristotle to Jowett, ask—Where are the Ideas? Would a Kantian entertain the question—Where are the Categories, and Ideas, and Forms?

51. According to Hegel, evolution is Specification: according to Haeckel, specification is Evolution. That the road up is the road down must be seen in time.
THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.
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THE philosophical portion of the Dialogue is divided into two parts: the first extends from 127d to 135; and the second from 135 to the end, 166. The first part deals with the question of the relation of the Ideas to sensible things; the second with the relation of the head-Idea—The One—to everything else. The first part discusses generally the relation between the supersensible and the sensible; the second elaborates the relations of the paramount metaphysical entity—The One—to all its subordinates, including sensible things. The second part is thus a particular application of the first; but, as The One is the paramount entity, its relations are all-pervading.

With regard to the first portion, we are told by Mr. Jowett that Plato has anticipated the criticism of all future ages on his Ideas. Mr. Grote declares that there are no dialogues in which the Parmenidean objections to the doctrine of Ideas are elucidated or even recited. But surely all the objections which are urged in the Parmenides are
based on an assumption with which the sound doctrine of Ideas has nothing to do.

(1). The Idea is spaceless and timeless. This disposes of the objections illustrated by the day and by the sail: 130e–b 1e, par. 6.

(2). The Idea must either admit of finiteness or proceed to infinity. This disposes of the objections urged in 132a b, and in 132d–133a, pars. 7 and 9.

(3). The Idea cannot depend for its cognition and existence on man. Its essence cannot be concepi: B. 2, b–d, par. 8. This to Plato would be a truism.

(4). The Idea cannot exist in total aloofness from man; for this would deprive man on the one hand of all objective knowledge, and God on the other of all knowledge of human knowledge. The obvious conclusions are, that we have a knowledge of the Idea, and that God has so too. These conclusions are quite in accordance with the other Dialogues. It is curious that what Mr. Jowett regards as the true theory of Ideas—that they exist only in the mind—is deliberately rejected by Plato in this Dialogue. If the paramount One does not exist, the result is Phenomenalism and Nihilism. In the same way, Mr. Green, in his introduction to Hume, shows that without Identity and Causation the sensualism of Hume and the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill are impossible, and with them untrue.

To moderns, the difficulty is to conceive that the Idea, while timeless and spaceless, is likewise objectively existing. That Plato held the Idea to
be timeless is evident from numberless passages, from the authoritative passage in the Timaeus, and the express statement of Aristotle that Plato was the only philosopher who held Time to be the result of what we may call creation. The Idea is likewise à fortiori spaceless. Space, according to Plato, is the creature of an illicit process of reasoning, and it is not an object of the senses nor of natural belief. Its double function is to express the apparent but unreal identity of phenomena in a state of flux, and their dependence on the higher essence of the Idea. Aristotle's testimony is conclusive on the point. He asks why Plato does not locate the Idea in space.—Phys. iv. ii. 5.

If the Idea be not in time or in space, how does it exist? In the mind, says Mr. Jowett. In what mind? If mind means the human mind, qua human, then we are reduced to individualism. I may infer, or I may not, that there may be some other being with a mind like mine, more or less. If we say in the Divine mind, or in the Universal mind, then the Idea will only be an accident of the higher consciousness. But if we mean by Idea, as Plato did—the Form which perfectly and completely dominates pure thought, and which dominates ours to a smaller extent—then it is true to say that the Idea is not only logically but substantially prior to thought and volition, Divine as well as human, and is therefore independent of both. Surely in a narrower sphere, where a man has consciously grasped the Law of Identity or the
Law of Contradiction, he sees at once that these Laws are something more than the facts of his own brain—something more than actual clearness or passing confusion. But, first, as human thought is dominated consciously or unconsciously by the Laws of thinking, so the Divine Thinking is dominated by the Ideas. To say that Ideas exist in the mind is much the same as saying that the Law of Gravity exists in a man's watch.

The relation of the Idea to sensible things, and of God to both, is somewhat as follows: The Idea consists of two elements, the One and the Indefinite. The Indefinite is pure Passivity. Neither of these elements is created. They are co-eternal with God. God is good. As Aristotle explains it, Goodness is the matter, and One, the form, of the highest Ens. God is also Cause, the notion which brings the One and Goodness into communion. Goodness works through Causality, according to the type set by the Idea of Good. Consequently, the Law which dominates Goodness in its Causal Energy is logically prior to that Energy. On what does the Summum Ens work? On the Indefinite, or the passive element in the Idea, the space, or rather place, of the Timaeus. The first causal act of Summum Ens imposes the Law of mere sequence on Passivity. The result is, a chaos of unpredictable sequences, a notion grasped by Milton. The second causal act of Summum Ens is to impose on Chaotic sequence predictable sequence or physical Law, and the result is, the Sensible World. The God of
Plato thus creates nothing, he organises Passivity. Aristotle's question, Why the Idea is not in space, if pressed home, comes to this: Why is the whole Idea, with all its Form and Matter, not in a small fractional result of its Matter misconceived, namely, Place? That Space is not an independent Entity can be proved by other considerations. The non-existence of a Vacuum inside the world is stated positively in the *Timaeus*, where its existence would seem necessary, in the case of one moving body displacing another. This phenomenon Plato explains by the hypothesis of circular motion, a motion which may be exemplified by moving a set of balls round the edge of a "solitaire" board. He has been charged with inconsistency in allowing the structural solids, the Tetrahedron, the Octahedron, and the Icosahedron, to combine in different proportions, all the while he denies the existence of Vacuum. He may easily be defended by the consideration that the complement of the interstices is furnished by τὸ ἀπειρον—the element of Passivity or Receptivity in the Idea.

What then is the Sensible Thing, the Sensible Idea of Locke and Berkeley? Relatively to us, it is strictly τὸ φανόμενον, τὸ γνώμενον, that which is in course of presentation, and which, therefore, *ex vi termini*, is passing away. Objectively, it is the causal action of God, working through the Idea, on the senses. Logically, and chronologically, it is distinct from the Idea. In essence, it is the contrary of the Idea, as the one is ever abiding and
the other is momentary; and finally, with regard to theories of perception, the sensible thing bears to its Idea—or rather congeries of Ideas—the relation only of a sign to the thing signified.

"Mind," says Shelley, "cannot create, it can only perceive." This is the popular view. It is the usual confounding of Brain and Thought. In the individual, Sensation precedes Thought; Neurosis precedes Psychosis; but Neurosis—Brain—presupposes Space, Time, and all the constituents of Intelligibility.

Everybody agrees that what is in consciousness may be safely dealt with. But the question arises: Is there anything outside consciousness? In the language of the Dialogue, if τὸ ἐν is the formative element, what is τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός? In other words, What is τὸ ἄπειρον, which Aristotle represents as the second element in the Idea? It is food for Form—τὸ πέρας. To alter Clifford's term, it may be called Form-stuff. And this Form-stuff, at a certain stage of development, is the χώρα or space of the Timaeus—the only passage in Plato's writings which Aristotle finds at variance with the official statements in Plato's lectures.—Phys. iv. ii. 5.

To make Space an ultimium in the Platonic Genesis is as preposterous as to make Hegel a Hamiltonian because he allows Richtigkeit to the pabulum of the senses. Τὸ ἄπειρον is not outside consciousness. It is part of consciousness: it is there as τὸ ἄπειρον. The chemical metaphor has taken such hold, that when we talk of an element
of consciousness, we almost eo ipso assert that it is not to be found in the mature consciousness, except in a totally different shape. But, in Plato, the original aspect of the element reappears in the compound: τὸ ἀπειρόν is ἀπειρόν, and will not be anything else. Plato is thus a thorough-going Idealist: τὸ ἀπειρόν is part of the domain of thought.

In applying the terms of modern speculation to Plato, it is not meant that he had before him modern problems in their present shape. But the best teaching of our time is the importance of history as a basis of criticism, and this teaching shatters the doctrine that we must read a philosopher by what went before and not by what comes after him.

Hegel allows Richtigkeit, but not Wahrheit, to the sensible element. Plato is more idealistic; for while in the Phaedo he combats the notion that the sensible element is delusive, in the Republic he argues that the same volume of raw material may and does admit of opposite relations.

The most striking passage in the Dialogue is where Parmenides rebukes Socrates for withholding ideas from mean objects. This is not really at variance with the passage in the Timaeus, 66 d–67 a. There he states that Smells are the result of air and water affecting the organs, and that they are distinguished merely as pleasant or the reverse. In the Philebus, Smells are not preceded by any craving, and so far are higher than the plea-
sures of repletion. In our day a great poet has written:

Flower in the crannied wall,  
I pluck you out of the crannies;  
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,  
Little flower—but if I could understand  
What you are, root and all, and all in all,  
I should know what God and man is.

This is genuine Idealism. What we call a single thing is the concourse of all relations—the complexus of all Ideas—all in all.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.
Characters in the Introduction.

Characters in the Main Discussion.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

Introduction.
1. Cephalius relates his introduction to Antipho.

St. III. p. 126.

Ἔπειδη Ἀθήναζε οὐκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἄφικό-μεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι καὶ μον λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδει-μαντος, χαῖρ', ἐφη, ὁ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἰ τοι δέει τῶν τηδε, ὃν ἴμεις δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ἐπον ἐγώ, πάρειμι γε ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν. λέγοις ἀν, ἐφη, τὴν δέησιν. καὶ ἐγώ ἐπον, τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δὲ που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεδήμησα δεύρῳ ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν πολὺς δὲ ἧδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρὶ, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα. πάνω γε, ἐφη' αὐτῷ δὲ γε 'Ἀντιφῶ. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυθάνει; οἶδ', ἐπον ἐγώ, πολῖται μοι εἰσί, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασι τε ὅτι οὕτος ὁ ὉἈντιφῶν Πυθιδώρῳ των Ζήνωνος ἑταίρῳ πολλά ἐντετυχήκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὕς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθιδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει. ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. τοὺτων τοῦν, ἐπον, δεόμεθα δια-κούσαι. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπῶν, ἐφη' μειράκιων γὰρ ὃν αὐτοὺς εὗ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἔπει νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἑπτικῆ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεϊ, ἱμαῖν παρ' αὐτῶν' ἄρτι
γὰρ ἐνθένδε οίκας δε ἦχεται, οἰκεὶ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτη. ταύτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν p. 127. τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἰκοί, χαλινῶν τινα χαλκῆι ἐκδίδοντα σκενᾶσαι ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἀπηλλάγη οἳ τε ἀδελ- φοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῶ δὲ ἦνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισε τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ με ἥσσπάξετο, καὶ δεόμενον ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁκνεῖ: πολυ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἔργον εἶναι ἐπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο.

ἐφ’ δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ότι ἀφίκοντό ποτε εἰς Παναθῆναια τὰ μεγάλα Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν ὅν Παρμενί- δην εὐ μάλα δὴ προσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολίων, καλῶν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὃπιν, περὶ ἐτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα. Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τετα- ράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὑμήκὴ δὲ καὶ χαρίειντα ίδειν καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικά τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγο- νέαι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐφ’ παρὰ τῷ Πυθόδωρῳ ἐκτὸς τεῖχος ἐν Κεραμεικῷ οἳ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι εἰς τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ’ αὐτοῦ πολλοὺς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ’ ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι. Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον, ἀναγεγυμνάσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχέων ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἐτὶ λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγεγυμνασμένων, ἣνικα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἐφ’ ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἐξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀρισ- τοτελὴ τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ’ ἀττά ἐτι ἐπακούσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνώρισαι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσας, πῶς, φάναι, ὥς Ζήνων, τούτον λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ άντι, ὡς ἄρα δεὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοία τε εἶναι καὶ ἄνομοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον: οὐτε γὰρ τὰ ἁνόμοια ὁμοία οὐτε τὰ ἁμοῖα ἁνόμοια οἶον τε εἶναι; οὔχ οὖν λέγεις; οὐτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἁνόμοια ὁμοία εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοῖα ἁνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλά εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἰην, πάσχοι ἄν τὰ ἁδύνατα; ἄρα τούτῳ ἐστι δ' ἑΒούλονται σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἀλλο τι ἡ διαμάχησθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτοις αὐτοῖς οἰεὶ σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἐκαστὸν τῶν λόγων, ὡστε καὶ ἰγεὶ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσους περ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ πολλά; οὐτω λέγεις, ἦ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὄρθως καταμανθᾶνω; οὐκ, ἄλλα, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται. μανθᾶνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ Παρμενίδη, ὃτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σοι φιλώ βούλεται ψκείωσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ τῷ συγ- γράμματι. ταῦτων γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπων τινα ὀπερ σῦ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἐτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν b ἐν φής εἶναι Τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλὰ φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέ- χεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν, ὡστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρήκεναι δοκεῖν σχέδον τι λέγοντας ταύτα, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ύμῖν τὰ εἰρήμενα.

First part of the dialogue: preliminary discussion, the relation of Τὰ Εἰδη to sensible things.

3. Socrates criticizes Zeno, and wishes to know if he is right in the view he takes. Zeno says he is. "Then you, Zeno," says Socrates, "agree with Parmenides, but you put your views in the negative form, that Existence is non-plural, while Parmenides puts his in the affirmative, that Existence is one." Zeno explains that his thesis is a **reductio ad absurdum** of the antagonistic thesis, i.e., greater absurdities follow from supposing Existence
eirhthai. na, fainai ton Zhnwma, de Sówkrates. su ' de oiv tiv alhtheiav tov gràmmatos ou pante- xhov 'hsthmai' kaitoi oisper ge ai Laksanai o skulakes ed metadeis te kai ictuevis ta lechenta: alla prouton men se touto lanhanei, oti ou panta- tasvin ouw semvunetai to gràmma, wsste apser su legveis diaanothèn grafihamai, touto anbropous de epikruptomeun ou ki mega diaprapattomeun: alla su men eisves ton symbevskotwn ti, esti de to ge alhthes boethiav tis tauta ta gràmmata tv Parmenidov logw pros touto epixeirountau auton kwmodein, ws ei en esti, polla kai geloia sym- d betaivei paschein tiv logw kai enantia autw. anti- leghei dh ouv touto to gràmma pros touto tâ pollla legontas, kai antapodiwsai tauta kai pleiw, touto boulomevnon dhlou, ws eti geloio- tera paschol au auton h upothesis, ei polla estin, h h touto en einai, ei tis ikanwv epexiou. dia toiauthn de filoneikivn upo vevou ontos emov egrafh, kai tis autou eklepe grafev, wsste ovd boulenevasthai egegenveto, eit' eixoistovn autov eis o to fws eisite mh. taunti' y ouv se lanhanei, de Sówkrates, oti ouv upo vevou filoneikiai oiei autov geografh, alli upo presbuterov filotimias' epie, apser y eispon, ou kakwv apeikasas.

4. Socrates sets forth his theory of Generali- zation, that the things denoted by general words may participate in opposite
καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς Ὁμοιοτῆτος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὁμοια
gύγεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὤσον ἂν
μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀνομοιοτῆτος ἀνόμοια,
tὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἐστι
b τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφότῳ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ
αὐτῶς, τί θαυμαστῶν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοία
tίς ἀπέφαυεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοία, 
τέρας ἂν, οἴμαι, ἢν εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέ-
χοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα,
οὐδὲν ἐμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδὲ
γε εἰ ἐν ἄπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τῷ
Ἐνὸς καὶ ταῦτα ταύτα πολλά τῷ Πλῆθος αὐτῷ
μετέχειν ἀλλ’ εἰ δ’ ἐστιν Ἐν αὐτὸ τούτο πολλὰ
c ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐ τὰ Πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τοῦτο ἡδὴ
θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὁσαύ-
tως’ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἰδὴ ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάναντα ταύτα πάθη πάσχοντα,
ἀξίων θαυμάζειν’ εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα
καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστῶν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βού-
ληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἔτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ
δεξιά μοῦ ἔστων, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ ἀριστερά, καὶ
ἔτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἔτερα δὲ τὰ ὑπόσθεν, καὶ
ἀνω καὶ κάτω ὁσαύτως’ Πλῆθος γάρ, οἴμαι,
d μετέχων ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς
ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὅστε
ἀληθὴ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα
ἐπιχειρῆ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταὐτὰ ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους
καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτῶν πολλὰ
καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὗ τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ
Πολλὰ ἐν,’ οὐδὲ τῷ θαυμαστῶν λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἄπερ
καὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν· έὰν δὲ τις, ὃν υἱὸν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρήται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον Ὀμοιότητα τε καὶ Ἀνοικότητα καὶ Πλήθος καὶ τῷ Εὖν καὶ Στάσιν καὶ Κίνησι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, έἴτα ἐν έαυτοῖς ταύτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίη, ἀγαίνην ἄν ἐγώγ’, ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὃ Ζήνων. ταύτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάντα ἥγουμαι πεπραγματεύσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ’ ἀν οἷς μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἰ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτήν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοτοπῶς πλεκομένην, ἄστερ, ἐν τοῖς ὁρμωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξεια.

λέγοντος δή, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταύτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἴεσθαι ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτὸ πρόσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμά εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδίαν ὅς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἀξίως εἰ ἀγασθαι τῆς ὁμής τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἀττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τοὐτῶν αὖ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ Ὀμοιότητας χωρὶς ἦς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἔν δή καὶ Πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὁσα νῦν δή Ζήνωνος ἡκους; ἐμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον Δικαίου τι εἴδος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ Καλοῦ καὶ Ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; ναί, φάναι. τί δ’, ἀνθρώποι εἴδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ε.
οἵοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμένεν πάντων, αὐτὸ τι ἔδος Ἀνθρώπου ἡ Πυρὸς ἢ καὶ Ἠθάτος; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δὴ, ὁ Παρμενίδης, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρῆ φάναι ὁστερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶν δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ᾧ καὶ γελοία δόξειν ἄν εἶναι, οἴον Ὄρις καὶ Πηλὸς καὶ Ὄρυτος ἢ ἄλλο ὁ τι ἀτυμότατόν τε καὶ φαινότατον, ἀπορείς εἰτε χρῆ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς. ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἃν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα; εἰτε καὶ μῇ; ὀνδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἄλλα ταύτα μὲν γε, ἄτερ ὀρὼμεν, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δὲ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθήναι εἶναι μῇ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἦδη μέντοι ποτὲ με καὶ ἐθραξεῖ μῇ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταύτων· ἐπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεῦγων οἴχομαι; δείσας μῇ ποτε εἰς τῶν ἁβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσῶν διαφθαρὼ· ἐκεῖσθε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἰδὴ ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω. νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτη, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντεῖληπται φιλοσοφία, ὥς ἔτι ἀντιλήπται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὔδεν αὐτῶν ἀτυμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

τόδε οὖν μοι εἰπὲ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φήσῃς, εἶναι εἰδὴ ἄττα, ἢν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνουτα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἵσχεν, οἴον Ὄμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὁμοία, Μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, Κάλλους τε καὶ Δικαιοσύνης δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι, πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι οἷον τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἐκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνων μεταλαμβάνει; ἡ ἄλλη τις ἢν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἰπεν. τότερον οὖν

human way of thinking, and that nothing is really vile.

6. Parmenides discusses the rationale of Participation; he shows that particular things cannot participate with the éidos by any mode of Extension, either by way of
δοκεί σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὑ, ἢ πώς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Ἀρκάτην, ὁ Πάρμενις, ἔνειν; ἐν ἄρα ὁν καὶ ἢ ταύτων ἐν πολλοῖς χωρίς οὕσω ὅλον ἀμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὔτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρίς ἄν εἰη, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἴον ἡ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή οὕσα πολλαχοῦ ἄμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὔδεν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὔτω καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πάσιν ἀμα ταύτων εἰη; ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὁ Ὀρκατης, ἐν ταύτων ἀμα πολλαχοῦ ποιείς, οἴον εἰ ιστὶ καταπετάσας πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἡ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔγει εἰς λέγειν; ἦσως, φάναι. ἡ οὖν ὅλον ἕφ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ ἤστιν εἰη ἄν, ἡ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλως· μέρος. μειροτὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὁ Ὀρκατης, ἐστω αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἃν μετέχοι, καὶ οὔκετι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἄν εἰη. φαίνεται οὔτω γε. ἡ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὁ Ὀρκατης, φάναι τὸ Ἐν εἰδὸς ἡμῶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἐσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπείν. ὅρα γὰρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει ὁ σμικρότερψ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μεγέθους μέγα ἐσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανείται; πάνυ γ', ἡφη. τί δέ; τοῦ Ἰσον μέρος ἐκαστὸν σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει φ' ἐλάττων ὁντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσον τὸ ἔχον Ἰσον τῷ ἐσται; ἀδύνατον. ἅλλα τοῦ σμικρὸν μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεζον ἐσται ἀτε μέρους εαυτοῦ ὅντος, καὶ οὔτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεζον ἐσται· φί δ' ἄν προστῆθη τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἐσται ἅλλ' οὐ μεζον ἡ
πρὶν. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τούτο γε. τίν' οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὁλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκολὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τὸδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποιοῦν; οἶμαι 7. The origin of the theory of the unique εἴδος: if the εἴδος be absolutely distinct from the sum of particulars, εἴδος in quantity is infinite, which is an absurdity; it is therefore unique.

132 σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἑκαστὸν εἴδος οὐσθαί εἶναι· ὅταν πόλετ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἑσώς δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδοντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ Μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὔχι ἐν τι αὐτὸν μέγα φανεῖται, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἐοικεν. ἀλλ' ἄρα εἴδος μεγέθους ἀνα- φανήσεται, παρ' αὐτὸ τε τὸ Μέγεθος γεγονός καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτως αὖ πᾶσιν ἔτερον, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἠσταί καὶ οὐκέτι δῆ ἐν ἑκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἠσταί, ἀλλ' ἀπειρα τὸ πλήθος.

ἀλλά, φάναι, ὁ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μή τῶν εἰδῶν ἑκαστὸν ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγύνεσθαι ἀλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἐν γε ἑκαστὸν ἑι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐτι πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἠστὶ τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ἀλλὰ τινός; ναὶ. οὖντος ἢ οὐκ οὖντος; ὄντως. οὐχ ἐνός τινος, δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὐσίαν ἰδέαν; ναὶ. εἰτα οὐκ εἴδος ἠσταί τούτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὅν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ
9. *eidos* may perhaps exist objectively as Types to which sensible things conform; but this hypothesis would involve an infinite series of mediating *eidos*, which is absurd: for the *eidos* is unique.

10. If the *eidos* exist absolutely, we cannot know...
δή; εἰπεῖν. πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἰ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὕτα γίγνει· νώσκεσθαι οντα τοιαῦτα οία φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἰδη, τῶν ταύτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξα- σθαι ὅτι θεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἐμπειροῦν ὃν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἄφυη, ἔθελοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἰῇ ὁ ἀγνωστὰ ἀναγκάζων αὕτα εἶναι. πὴ δὴ, ὁ Παρμενίδης; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅτι, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἴμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλου, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἢμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἰῇ; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα τῶν ἱδεῶν πρὸς ἄλληλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσὶν, αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰς δ' τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἢμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅτι δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, δὲν ἢμείς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἐκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἢμῖν ταύτα, ὁμώνυμα ὅντα ἐκείνους, αὐτὰ αὐ ἐρός αὐτὰ ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἰδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὐ ὁνομάζεται οὕτως. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οἴον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἰ τις ἢμῶν τοῦ δεσπότης ἢ δούλος ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ Δεσπότου δὴ που, ὁ ἐστὶ Δεσπό- της, ἐκείνου δούλος ἐστιν, οὔδε αὐτοῦ Δούλου, ὁ ἐστὶ Δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὃν ἄνθρωπον ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἐστιν· αὐτὴ δὲ Δεσποτεία αὐτῆς Δουλείας ἐστὶν ὁ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡς αὐτῶς, αὐτὴ Δουλεία αὐτῆς Δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἡμίν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὔδε ἐκεῖνα them, since an absolute object implies as its correlative a faculty of absolute knowledge; and, conversely, Deity, as possessing absolute knowledge, could not have less than absolute knowledge, that is, could not have our knowledge, and therefore would be without some knowledge, which is absurd.
πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τε ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἐαυτῷ. ἦ οὐ μανθάνεις ὁ λέγω; Πάνω γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω. οὐκούν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτῇ μὲν ὃ ἐστιν Ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἐστιν Ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἄν ἐκείνης εἰς ἐπιστήμην; πάνω γε. ἐκάστη δὲ αὐ τὸν ἐπιστημῶν, ἦ ἐστὶν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἐστιν, εἰς ἄν ἐπιστήμην ἦ οὐ; ναὶ. ἦ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἄν ἄλληθειας εἰς, καὶ αὕτη ἐκάστη ἤ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἄν ἐπιστήμην συμβαίνοι ἐστι; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλά μὴν αὐτὰ γε τὰ εἰδη, ὡς ὀμολογεῖσ, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἴνον τε εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. γιγνώσκεται δὲ γέ ποιν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἰδούς τοῦ τῆς Ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ὃ ἐστιν ἐκαστα; ναὶ. ὃ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν. οὐ γὰρ. οὐκ ἅρᾳ ὑπὸ γε ἡμῶν γιγ- νώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμην οὐ μετέχομεν. οὐκ ἔστην. ἄγνωστον ἅρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Καλὸν ὃ ἐστι καὶ τὸ Ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ὁ δὴ ὡς ιδέας αὐτὰς οὐ σάς ὑπολαμβάνομεν. κινδυνεύει. ὥρα δὴ ἐτί τούτου δεινότερον τόδε. τὸ ποιόν; φαίης ἂν ἦ οὖ, εἴπερ ἐστιν αὐτό τι γένος Ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἥ την παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ Κάλλος καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως; ναὶ. οὐκούν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἦ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν οἴος τε αὐτ' ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἃ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν Ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὁμολογήται ἡμῖν, ὃ Σω-
κρατεῖ, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἴδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἦμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἂν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἦμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα. ἀρμολογηταί γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη Δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη Ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ Δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἦμῶν ποτέ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ 'Ἐπιστήμη ἡ μᾶς γνοίη οὐδὲ τι ἀλλο τῶν παρ' ἦμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἀρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἦμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδέν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοι τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐτε δεσπόται ἦμῶν εἰσὶν οὐτε γιγνώσκοντο τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἐφη, θαυμαστῶς ὁ λόγος ἂ, εἰ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερῆσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

ταύτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατεσ, ἐφη ὁ Παρμενίδης.

καὶ ἐτι ἀλλα πρὸς τούτους πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὕται αἰ ἱδέας τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖται τις αὐτὸ τι ἐκαστὸν εἴδος· ὡστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐτε ἐστι ταύτα, εἰτε ὁ τι μάλιστα εἰ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὕτα ἔναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀγνώστα· καὶ ταύτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τῇ λέγειν καὶ, ὁ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἴναι· καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησμόμενου μαθεῖν ὡς ἐστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὕτη καθ'

αὐτὴν, ἐτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσεσθας καὶ ἀλλου δυνησμόμενου διδάξαι ταύτα πάντα ἰκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον. συγχωρῶ σοι, ἐφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νόον λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἰπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἰ γε

11. Without εἴδη, there can be no philosophy.
12. Parmenides expounds the Method of philosophizing: every hypothesis should be argued affirmatively, i.e. supposing it to be true, and negatively, i.e. supposing it to be not true, and the consequences negative and positive should be compared. Socrates, continues Parmenides, had rightly conceived that the difficulties arising from incompatibilities lay in the region of ἑσθήν, and not in the region of τις δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτὴν ἔστιν, ἐν γε τῷ πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ τι ὀρίεται εἰδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὁποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξι, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ὄντως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιοῦτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἁσθήσθαι. ἀλήθει λέγεις, φάναι.

tί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποὺ τρέψει ἁγνοομένων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθοράν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι. πρὶν γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς. Καλὸν τε τί καὶ Δίκαιον καὶ Ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνενοήσα γὰρ καὶ πρόην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου δὲ ἀριστοτέλει τῶδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὔ ἴσθι, ἡ ὀρμῆ, ἡ ὀρμάς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. ἐλκυσοῦν δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἐξὸς ἐτί νέος εἰ: εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύγεται ή ἀλήθεια. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὃ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἰπεῖν, ὁνπερ ἡκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τούτο γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τούτον ἡγάσθην εἰπόντως, ὅτι οὐκ εἰς ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀ μάλιστα τις ἀν ἐν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἀν ἡγήσατο εἶναι. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἐφῆ, ταύτη γε οὖδὲν χαλέπων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἀλλο ὄτιον τὰ ὀντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. καὶ καλῶς γ', ἐφῆ. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐτί πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν ὑποτιθεμένου σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 136
αλλά καὶ εἰ μή ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι. οὖν, ἐφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἥν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἔστι, τί χρή ξυμ-βαίνειν καὶ αὐτῶς τοῖς Πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἕν καὶ τῷ Ἕνι πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Πολλά· καὶ αὐ εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ Ἕνι καὶ τοῖς Πολλοῖς καὶ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὐ ἑάν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστων Ὄμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ᾽ ἐκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὑτῶς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἴναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ Εἴναι καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἄν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτιον ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ τι ἄν προέλη, καὶ πρὸς πλεῖω καὶ πρὸς ἐξυμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τάλλα αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι ἄν προαρχῇ ἀεὶ, ἐάν τε ὡς ὅν ὑποθῇ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο, ἕαν τε ὡς μὴ ὅν, εἰ μέλλεις τελεύως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἄληθὲς. ἀμήχανον, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὃ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μαν-θάνω· ἄλλα μοι τί οὐ διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος ὁ τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, προστάτεις ὡς τηλικόδε. ἀλλὰ σὺ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἢμῖν; καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὃ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαίλον

sensible things. Parmenides exemplifies his method by supposing Zeno’s thesis εἰ πολλά ἔστι applied to τὸ Ἕν and τὰ πολλά, and the counter thesis εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά applied to τὸ Ἕν and τὰ πολλά, both by themselves and in combination.

C
13. Parmenides consents to argue the question, as to the existence of Unity, affirmatively and negatively: he takes Aristotle, afterwards one of the Thirty, as his assistant.

η ὁ λέγει. ἡ οὖν ὅρας ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεϊσθαι ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικοῦτῳ ἄγνοον γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεὶν νοῦν ἔχειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἐνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἐφη ὁ Ἀντίφων φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρ-μενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὁ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην, ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καὶ τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἱπποῦ πεποιθέναι, 137 ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὁντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑπ' ἀρματι μέλλοντι ἄγωνεισθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἐαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὖν προσβύτης ὅν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἄναγκάζεσθαι ἴεναι· κάγω μοι δοκῶ μεμημένους μάλα φοβει-σθαι, πῶς χρή τηλικόνδε ὅντα διανεύσαι τοιούτων τε καὶ τοσούτων πλήθος λόγων· ὅμως δὲ—δεὶ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ, ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τὶ πρῶτον ὑποθεσό-μεθα; ἡ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώθη παιδίαν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἀρξώμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ Τοῦ Ἐνδος αὐτοῦ ὑποθέ-μενος, εἴτε ἐν ἔστω εἴτε μὴ ἐν, τι χρῆ ἔμβαϊνεν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. τίς οὖν, εἴπειν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἡ ὁ νεώτατος; ἡκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοί, καὶ ὃ οἴεται μάλιστ' ἂν ἀποκρί-νοιτο· καὶ ἄμα ἔμοι ἀνάπαυλ ἀν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνων ἀπό-
The affirmative argument:

(A) The affirmative argument:

1. The First Hypothesis: 
   ei Tò Ἐν εἰσίν ἐν, if the One exist, and
   B. The negative, if the One do not exist.

   (1) Plurality;
   (2) Part;
   (3) Whole;
   (4) Beginning, Middle, End; and
   is therefore αὐτὸν;
   (5) has no Figure, either curvilineral or rectilinear;
   (6) is not localized either relatively to itself or to anything else;

   138 ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει. ὅρθως.
   (6) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦ-
   τὸν γε ὅν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἰπ. οὐτὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ οὕτως ἔν ἐαυτῷ εἰπ. τῶς δὴ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλῳ
   ποὺ ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ὅ ἐνεῖν, καὶ
πολλαχοῦ ἄν αὐτοῦ ἀπτοτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἀπτεσθαι. ἀδύνατον. ἄλλα μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὃν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἰη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἦ αὐτό, εἰπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰη· ἐν τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκοῦν ἐτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἰη αὐτό τὸ περιέχον, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἁμφώ ταυτῶν ἁμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὐτω Τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἐτὶ ἐν ἄλλα δῦ. οὐ γὰρ οὐν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν που Τὸ Ἐν, μῆτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μῆτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν. οὐκ ἐστιν. (7) ορα δή, οὐτως ἔχουν εἰ οἴδον τε ἐστιν ἐστάναι ἡ κωνήσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὡστι κωνούμενον γε ἡ φέροιτο ἡ ἀλλοιώτο ἄν αὐταγ γὰρ μόναι κωνήσεις. ναί. ἀλλοιώμενον δὲ ε Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατον που ἐν ἐτι εἰναί. ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα κατ’ ἀλλοώσων γε κωνεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄλλ’ ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἰσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄν περισέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοὖν κύκλῳ μὲν περισέρομεν εἰπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τά περὶ τό μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ἦ δὲ μῆτε μέσου μῆτε ἀ μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανή τούτῳ κύκλῳ ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἄλλα δὴ χώραν ἁμεῖβον ἀλλοτ’ ἁλλοθί γίγνεται καὶ οὐτω κωνεῖται; εἰπερ γε δή. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν που ἐν τιν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἑφάνη; ναί. ἃρ’ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἐτι ἀδύνατώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπη. εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μῆτε πω ἐν ἐκείνω εἶναι ἐτὶ ἐγγυγνόμενον, μῆτ’ ἐτὶ ἐξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἰπερ δὴ
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ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄρα τι ʿαλλο πείστει
tοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἀν μόνον πάσχου οὐ μέρη εἰῆ· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἦδη ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἑξὼ εἰῆ
ἀμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχων μέρη ὦν οἶν τε ποὺ ἐσταὶ
tρόπῳ οὐδεὶ ὦλον ἂμα μῆτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μῆτε
ἑξὼ. ἀληθῆ. οὐ δὲ μῆτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ᾽ ὦλον
tυγχάνει ὡν, οὐ πολὺ ἐτί ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί
ποὺ, μῆτε κατὰ μέρη μῆτε κατὰ ὦλον ἐγγυγόμενον;

φαίνεται. οὔτ' ἄρα ποι ἓν καὶ ἐν τῷ γηγόμενον
χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον,
οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον. οὐκ ἔοικεν. κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
κίνησιν Ἐν ἄκινητον. ἀκίνητον. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ
eιναί γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. φαμὲν γάρ.
oὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. τί δη; ὃτι ἦδη ἂν
ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ εἶ ἐν ὁ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἀλλῷ οἴον τε ἢ ἁὐτῷ
ἐνείναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ Ἐν

b ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γε μηδέποτε
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὃν οὐθ' ἢσυχιὰν ἀγεὶ οὐθ' ἔστηκεν.
oὐ γὰρ οἴον τε. Ἐν ἄρα, ὃς ἔοικεν, οὐθ' ἔστηκεν οὔτε ὑπενήσαι. οὐκοὺν δὴ φαίνεται γε.

(8) οὔδε μὴν ταυτὸν γε οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ
ἐσται, οὔδ' αὖ ἐτέρον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου
ἀν εἰῆ. τί δη; ἐτέρον μὲν ποὺ ἑαυτοῦ ὃν ἐνῶς
ἐτέρον ἄν εἰῆ καὶ οὐκ ἄν εἰῆ ἐν. ἀληθῆ. καὶ
μὴν ταυτὸν γε ἐτέρῳ ὃν ἐκεῖνῳ ἄν εἰῆ, αὐτὸ
c δ' οὐκ ἄν εἰῆ· ωστε οὐδ' ἄν οὔτως εἰῆ ὑπερ
ἐστιν, ἐν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρον ἐνός. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ταυτὸν
μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρῳ ἦ ἐτέρον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐσται. οὐ
gὰρ. ἐτέρον δὲ γε ἐτέρου οὐκ ἐσται, ἔως ἂν ἃν ἃ
ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἄλλα
μόνον ἑτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. ὅρθως. τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἐσται ἑτέρον' ἕξ ὦει; οὐ δῆτα. ἀν δὲ μὴν εἰ μὴ τοῦτῳ, οὐχ ἐαυτῷ ἐσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδε αὐτῷ. αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὅπως ἑτερον οὐδενὸς ἐσται ἑτερον. ὅρθως. οὐδε μὴν ταύτων ἑαυτῷ ἐσται. πῶς δ' οὖ; οὐχ ἢτερ Τοῦ Ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήτου καὶ Τοῦ Ταύτου. τῇ δῇ; ὅτι οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταύτων γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τι μὴν; Τοὺς Πολλοὺς ταύτων γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν. ἀληθη. ἀλλ' εἰ Τὸ Ἑν καὶ Τὸ Ταύτον μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι ταύτων ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅποτε ἐν, ταύτων. πάνυ γε. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἑν ἑαυτῷ ταύτων ε ἐσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐσται· καὶ οὗτως ἐν ὅν οὐχ ἐν ἑσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἀδύνατον' ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ Τῷ ἙνΗ ἐτέρου ἑτερον εἶναι ἡ ἑαυτῷ ταύτων. ἀδύνατον. οὗτω δὴ ἑτερὸν γε ἡ ταύτων Τὸ Ἑν οὔτ' ἀν αὐτῷ οὔτ' ἀν ἑτέρῳ εἰη. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίων τινι ἐσται οὔδε ἀνόμουν οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ. τῇ δῇ; ὅτι τὸ ταύτων που πεπονθὸς ὁμοίων. ναί. Τοῦ δὲ γε Ἑνὸς χωρίς ἐφάνη την φύσιν Τὸ Ταύτων. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἀλλὰ 140 μὴν εἰ τι πέπονθε χωρίς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἑν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθου ἢ ἐν' τοῦτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί. οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ἄρα ταύτων πεπονθὸς εἰναι Τὸ Ἑν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὁμοίων ἂρα δυνάτον αὐτῷ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἑτερόν γε πεπονθεν εἶναι Τὸ Ἑν καὶ γὰρ οὗτο πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἡ ἐν. πλείω γάρ. τὸ γε μὴν ἑτερον πεπονθὸς ἡ ἑαυτοῦ ἡ ἄλλου ἀνόμουν ἂν εἰη ἡ ἑαυτῷ ἡ ἅλλω, εἰπερ τὸ ταύτων ἢ
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πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ὡρθῶς. Τὸ δὲ γε Ἐν, ὡς ἔσκεν, οὐδαμῶς ἔτερων πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἄνομοιον ἐστὶν οὐθ’ ἐαυτῷ οὐθ’ ἐτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἄνομοιον οὐθ’ ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ἀν εἰη Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. (9) καὶ μὴν τουτὸν γε δὲν οὔτε ἵσον οὔτε ἀνίσον ἐσται οὔτε ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. τῇ; ἵσον μὲν δὲν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἐσται ἐκεῖνῳ ὃ ἀν ὤσον ἧ. ναί. μείζον δὲ που ἡ ἐλαττῶν ὄν, οἷς c μὲν ἂν ἐξύμετρον ἥ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείως μέτρα ἐξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δ’ ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν συμμετέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἐσται. πώς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκοιν ἄδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἡ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἡ ἄλλως ἄντιγνωσθοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἄδυνατον. ἵσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ’ ἂν ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν. οὐκοιν φαίνεται γε. ἄλλα μὴν πλείωνων γε μέτρων ὄν ἡ ἐλαττόνων, d ὃσουνπερ μέτρων, τοσοῦτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἰη’ καὶ οὔτως αὕ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐσται, ἄλλα τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὡρθῶς. εἰ δὲ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἶη, ἵσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ δὲ ἄδυνατον ἐφάνη, ἵσον τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι. ἐφάνη γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἐουκεν, ἐσται ἵσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὖδ’ αὐ μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττῶν οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὐθ’ ἐτέρου. παντάπασι μὲν e οὐν οὗτως. (10) τι δὲ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν Τὸ Ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατῶν εἶναι; τὶ δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, δὲν ἐλέγωμεν οὐ μετεῖναι Τῷ (9) no mode of Quantity, either Equality, or Inequality, or Excess; therefore no Defect;

(10) no mode of Time;
'Ενί, οὖθ᾽ ὁμοιότητος οὐτε ἦσοτήτος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁτι ἁνομοιότητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, πῶς οὖν οἷον τε ἔσται τινὸς ἡ πρεσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερον εἶναι, ἡ τήν αὐτὴν ἥλικιάν ἔχειν τω, τοιοῦτον οὖν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂρ' ἂν εἰ ἡ νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τήν αὐτὴν ἥλικιάν ἔχον Τὸ "Εν οὐτε αὐτῷ οὕτε ἄλλῳ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἂρ' οὖν οὖδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύνατ᾽ ἂν εἴναι Τὸ "Εν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἰθ᾽; ἡ οὖκ ἀνάγκη, εάν τι ή ἐν χρόνῳ, ἂεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε πρεσβύτερον αἰε νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον; τί μὴν; τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἐαυτοῦ ἀμα γίγνεται, εἰπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. πῶς λέγεις; ὡδὲ διάφορον ἐτέρον οὖθ᾽ ἐν διάφοροις ὑποθέτησις νεώτερον ἔστι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἐστὶ γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμα ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἐστι γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμα ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἐστι γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμα ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἐστι γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμα ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἐστι γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἀμα ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι.
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γιγνεσθαι. κινδυνεύει. ἄλλα μὴν Τἀ γε Ἔνι τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετήν. οὐ γὰρ μετήν. οὔδε ἂρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὔδ' ἐστιν ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ. οὐκοιν δή, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἴρει. (11) τι οὖν; τὸ ἢν καὶ τὸ γέγονο καὶ τὸ ἐγγύνετο οὖ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαινεῖν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; καὶ μάλα. τί δὲ; τὸ ἐστι καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γεννήθησεται οὐ τοῦ ἐπειτὰ ποι μέλλοντος; ναὶ. τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἂρα Τὸ "Εν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γεγόνει οὔτ' ἐγγύνετο οὔτ' ἢν ποτὲ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἐστιν, οὔτ' ἐπειτὰ γενήσεται οὔτε γεννήθησεται οὔτ' ἐστι. ἀληθέστατα. ἐστὶν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἐστιν. οὐδαμῶς ἂρα Τὸ "Εν οὐσίας μετέχει. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῶς ἂρα ἐστὶ Τὸ "Εν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ἂρα οὔτως ἐστιν οὔστε ἐν εἶναι ἐἰη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὴ ὅν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ "Εν οὔτε ἐν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τούτῳ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. κυν- 

142 δυνεύει. (12) δὲ μὴ ἐστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ οὔντι εἰη ἄν τι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδ' ἂρα ὄνομα ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὔδε λόγος οὔδετι τις ἐπιστήμη οὔδε αἰσθήσεις οὔδε δόξα. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ὀνομάζε- 

tai ἂρα οὔδε λέγεται οὔδε δοξάζεται οὔδε γιγνό- 

σκεται, οὔδε τὶ τῶν οὔτων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἡ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ Τὸ "Εν ταῦθ' οὔτως ἐχειν; οὐκοῦν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. 

b Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἡς ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, εάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιθύμων ἀλλοίου φανῇ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν Βούλομαι. οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ ἐστι,
φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῦ ποτε
τυγχάνει οὖντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα: οὐχ οὕτως;
ναὶ. ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἐστίν, ἄρα οἷόν τε
αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὕσιας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; οὐχ οἷόν
τε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἰῆ ἂν, οὐ ταῦτον
οὕςα Τῷ Ἐν.; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνῃ ἢ ἐκείνου οὐσία,
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐκεῖνο Τὸ Ἐν ἐκεῖνης μετείχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀμοίον
ἀν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ ε
αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαί-
νειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν οὐχ οὐτως; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνον τὸ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν;
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὃτι οὐσίας μετέχει Τὸ
Ἐν, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἰη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὰν τις συλ-
λήβδην εἰπῇ ὃτι ἐν ἐστὶν; πάνυ γε.

Πάλιν (1) δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἐστὶν, τί συμβήσεται.
σκόπητι οὖν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
tοιοῦτον ὅπειραν τὸ Ἐν σημαίνειν, οὐθὸς μέρη ἔχειν;
πῶς; ὡδε. εἰ τὸ ἐστὶ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὐντος λέγεται καὶ ἔ
ἔν τοῦ οὖντος ἐνός, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ Ὡ ἆ
τὴν οὐσία καὶ Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκεῖνον, οὐ ὑπεθέ-
μεθα, τοῦ ἐνός οὐντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον
ἐν ὃν εἶναι αὐτό, τοῦτον δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια Τὸ τε
Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ἐιναί; ἀνάγκη. πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον
τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ
τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τὸ γε μόριον προσρητέου; τοῦ
ὅλου. καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστὶν ὅ ἂν ἐν ἒ, καὶ μόριον
ἐχει. πάνυ γε. τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον
τούτων τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὐντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν, ἄρα ε
ἀπολείπεσθαι ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Ἐιναί μόριον ἢ Τὸ Ὄν
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μορίου; οὐκ ἂν εἰη. πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν
μορίων ἐκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἰσχει καὶ τὸ ὅν, καὶ
γίγνεται τὸ ἑλάχιστον ἐκ δυνῶν αὖ μορίων τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐτως ἀεί, ὃ τί περ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τοῦτω τῷ μορίῳ ἀεί ὑσχεί. Τὸ τε γὰρ Ἐν Τὸ ὅν ἀεὶ ὑσχεὶ καὶ Τὸ ὅν Ἐν. "Εν τὸ ὅν εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἀπειρον ἂν τὸ πλήθος οὐτως Εν ὅν εἰη; ἐοικεν. (2) ἢ δὴ καὶ τῇ ἐπὶ τῇ; οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν Ἐν, διὸ ἔστων; ναὶ. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ Ἐν ὅν πολλὰ ἐφάνη. οὐτως. τί δὲ; αὐτὸ Ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμὲν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνων καὶ αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἀνεν τούτου οὐ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἃρα γε ἐν μόνῳ φανησεται ἥ καὶ πολλά τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἐν, οἷμαι ἐγώγη. ὑδωμέν δὴ ἄλλο τι ἔτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη την οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἔτερον δὲ αὐτὸ; ἢ ἐτερ μὴ Ὑσία Εν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχεν. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἔτερον μὲν Ἡ Οὐσία, ἔτερον δὲ Ἐν, οὔτε τῷ Ἐν ὅν ζῆ Οὐσίας ἔτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι Ἡ Οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀλλο, ἀλλὰ Τῷ Ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ Ἀλλω ἔτερα ἄλληλων. πάνω μὲν οὖν. ὡστε οὔ ταῦτον ἔστων οὔτε Τῷ Ἐνὶ οὔτε Τῇ Οὐσία Τῷ Ἐτερον. πῶς γὰρ; τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἰτε βουλεῖ Τῇ Οὐσίαν καὶ Τῷ Ἐτερον εἰτε Τῇ Οὐσίαν καὶ Τῷ Ἐν εἰτε Τῷ Ἐν καὶ Τῷ Ἐτερον, ἃρ' οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθα τινὲς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἄμφοτέρω; πῶς; ὡς ἡ ἔστων οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; ἔστων. καὶ αὕτης εἰπεῖν ἐν; καὶ τοῦτο. ἃρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἰρηται; ναὶ. τί δ' ὅταν εἰπὼν οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν, ἃρα οὐκ ἄμφοτέρω; πάνω γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἔτερον ἢ ἔτερον τε καὶ ἐν, καὶ οὔτω

(2) If the One participated in Existence, Number must exist.
πανταχῶς ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἀμφώ λέγω; ναὶ. ὃ δ’ ἄν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἄρα οἶον τε ἀμφὼ μὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μῆ; οὐχ οἶον τε. ὃ δ’ ἄν δύο ήτον, ἐστὶ τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία. τούτων ἁρα ἐπείπερ σύνδοι ἐκαστα ξυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἂν εἰ ἐκαστὸν. φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὀποιονοῦν ἢττινον συζυγία οὐ τρία γύνεται τὰ πάντα; ναὶ. τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ’ οὐ; τί δὲ; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τρῖῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἰπερ ε ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρίᾳ τὸ τρῖς ἐν; ἀνάγκη. δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐ τρία τρῖς εἶναι; πῶς δ’ οὐ; τί δὲ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δίς ὄντων, καὶ δυοίν ὄντων καὶ τρὶς ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τρίᾳ δῖς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρῖς; πολλῆ γε. ἄρτια τε ἁρα ἄρτιάκαι ἂν εἰ ἂν περιττὰ περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἄρτιάκις. ἐστὶν 144 οὕτως. εἰ οὐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἰει τινὰ ἄριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὅν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὕδαμᾶς γε. εἰ ἂρα ἐστὶν ἂν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἄριθμὸν εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμὸν γε ὄντος πόλλ’ ἂν εἰ ἂν καὶ πλήθος ἀπειρον τῶν ὄντων’ ἢ οὐκ ἀπειρον ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γύνεται; καὶ πᾶν γε. οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἐκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς; ναὶ. ἐπὶ πάντα ἁρα πολλὰ ὄντα Ἁ Οὐσία b νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὐτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἡ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἑρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν

(3) If Number participate in Existence, Existence is distributable to Infinity.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

(4) Ουτών τοῦ ἀποστατοῦ; οὐδαμῶς. κατακεκερμάτισται ἂρα ὡς ὁ ἄν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς οὔτα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα,

καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα Τῆς Ὀυσίας. ἔχει οὕτως. πλείστα ἂρα ἔστι τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. πλείστα μέντοι.

(4) τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν, ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος Τῆς Ὀυσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τοιοῦτο γένοιτο; ἀλλ’ εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἄεί, ἔωσπερ ἄν ἦ, ἐν γε τι εἴναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη. πρὸς ἀπαντὶ ἂρα ἐκάστῳ τῷ Τῆς Ὀυσίας μέρει πρόσεστι Τὸ Ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς.

οὕτως. ἂρα οὖν ἐν δυν πολλαχοῦ ἀμα ὅλον ἔστι; τοῦτο άθρει. ἀλλ’ άθρα, καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον. μεμερισμένον ἂρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον’ ἄλλως γάρ ποὺ οὐδαμῶς ἀμα ἀπασί τοῖς Τῆς Ὀυσίας μέρεσι παρέσται, ἤ μεμερισμένον. ναι. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὄσαπερ μέρη. ἀνάγκη. οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὃς πλείστα μέρη Ἡ Ὀυσία νενεμημένη εἰη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλεῖς.

(5) Τοῦ Ἐνὸς νενεμηταί, ἀλλ’ ἵσα, ὡς ἔοικε, Τῷ Ἐν’ οὔτε γὰρ Τῷ ὘ν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀπολειπέται οὔτε Τῷ Ἐν Τοῦ Ὀντὸς, ἀλλ’ ἐξισούσθον δῦ’ οὔτε ἄει παρὰ πάντα. παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται. Τῷ Ἐν ἄρ’ αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ Τῆς Ὀυσίας πολλὰ τε καὶ ἀπείρα τὸ πλῆθος ἔστιν. φαίνεται. οὐ μονὸν ἂρα τὸ δῦ ἐν πολλά ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ Τῷ Ἐν ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ὀντὸς διανεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. (5) καὶ μὴν ὃτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένοι ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον Τῷ Ἐν’ ἰ’ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;
ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἶη. πῶς δ' οὐ; Ὁ Ἑν ἄρα ὅν ἐν τέ ἔστι που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπειρον πλήθει. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἑπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχουν; ἀνάγκη. τί δ'; ὅλον ὅν οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἄν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἣ οἶνον τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τρὶῶν τούτων; καὶ τοῦ ἐν ὅτιοιν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἑθελήσει ἐτί ὅλον εἶναι; οὐκ ἑθελήσει. καὶ ἀρχὴν δῇ, ὥς έοικε, καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἀν Ὁ Ἑν. ἔχου. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὅ μέσον ἵσον τῶν ἔσχατων ἀπέχει; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλως μέσον εἰη. οὐ γάρ. καὶ σχῆματος δῇ τινος, ὡς έοικε, τουούτον οὐ μετέχοι ἄν Ὁ Ἑν, ήτοι εὐθέος ἡ στρογγύλου ἡ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφῳ. μετέχοι γάρ ἄν. ἄρ' οὖν οὖτως ἔχουν οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς; τῶν μερῶν που ἐκαστὸν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου. οὖτως. πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται; ναί. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτῶ τὸ Ὁ Ἑν ἔστι, καὶ οὔτε τὶ πλέον οὔτε ἐλαττὸν ἡ πάντα. οὐ γάρ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον Ὁ Ἑν ἔστιν; πῶς δ' οὐ; εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει οὖτα, ἐστι δὲ τὰ τε πάντα Ὁ Ἑν καὶ αὐτὸ Ὁ Ὁ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ Ὁ ὅλον τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ Ὁ Ἑνος ἃν περιέχοιτο Ὁ Ὁ Ἑν, καὶ οὖτως ἃν ἡδη Ὁ Ὁ Ἑν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰη. φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γάρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν δὲ τινι γὰρ ένι μὴ οὖν οὐκ ἄν έτι που δύνατο ἐν γε ἀπασιν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τούτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ ἐνι, πῶς έτι ἐν γε τοῖς
πάσων ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἶ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰή, τὸ πλέον ἀν ἐν τῷ ἑλάττονι εἰή, ὃ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. μὴ δὲν ὅ εἰ ἐν πλείοσι μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ μηδὲ ἐν ἀπασὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι, ἣ μηδαμοῦ ἐτὶ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοὶ μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὅν οὐδὲν ἄν εἰη, ὅλον δὲ ὅν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἀλλῷ εἶναι; πάνυ γε. ἢ μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἀλλῷ ἐστὶν. ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκός Τὸ Ἐν ἀρὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κωείσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; πη; ἐστηκε μὲν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ δὲν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄν εἰη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἐστὶ γάρ. τὸ δὲ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ δὲν ἐστὸς δήπον ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. τί δὲ; τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἀεὶ δὲν οὐ τὸ ἑναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ δὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κωείσθαι; οὕτως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ δὲν καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κωείσθαι τε καὶ ἑστάναι. φαίνεται. (6) καὶ μὴν ταῦτον γε δὲι εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτερον

b ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ Τοὺς Ἀλλοις ὁσαύτως ταύτων τε καὶ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν. πῶς; πάν που πρὸς ἀπαν ὅδε ἔχει τῇ ταύτων ἐστιν ἔτερον ἢ ἔαν μὴ ταύτων ἢ μηδέ ἑτερον, μέρος ἄν εἰη τούτου, πρὸς δ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ώς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἄν εἰη. φαίνεται. ἀρὸ οὖν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστὶν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδ' ἄρα ως πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἄν εἰη, πρὸς ἑαυτῷ μέρος ὅν. οὐ

(6) The One must exhibit Identity and Diversity with regard to—(α) itself, and (β) Τέλλος, everything else besides Τὸ Ἐν.
γὰρ οὗν τε. ἀλλ' ἀρα ἐτερον ἐστιν ἐνὸς Τὸ Ἐν; οὐ δήτα. οὐδ' ἀρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἐτερον ἄν εἴη. οὐ φέρον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἐτερον μήθ' ὄλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἣδη ταύτον εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη. τί δὲ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὃν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐτερον εἶναι, εἴτερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἑσται; ἐμούγε δοκεῖ. οὔτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὖν ἄμα καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἐτερον ἄρα, ὡς οὐκεῖν, εἴῃ ταύτῃ ἄν ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν. οὐκεῖν. τί οὖν; εἰ τού τι ἐτερον ἐστιν, οὐχ ἐτερον ἄν ὄντος ἐτερον ἑσται; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἐστιν, ἀπανθ' ἐτερα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, καὶ Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἐτερον ἄρα ἄν εἴη Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλών. ἐτερον. ὃρα δή' αὐτὸ τε Ταύτων καὶ Τὸ Ἑτερον ἄρ' οὐκ ἑαυτία ἀλλήλους; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσει Ταύτων ἐν Τῷ Ἑτέρῳ ἢ Τὸ Ἑτερον ἐν Ταύτῳ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἑτερον ἐν Ταύτῳ μηδέποτ' ἑσταί, οὐδὲν ἑστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐν φ' ἑστὶ Τὸ Ἑτερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γάρ ὄντων οὐ εἰς ἐν τῷ, ἐκεῖνον ἄν τὸν χρόνον ἐν Ταύτῳ εἰς Τὸ Ἑτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. ἐπειδή δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑστὶν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἄν εἰς Τὸ Ἑτερον. ἀλλήλη. οὕτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἑνείῃ ἄν Τὸ Ἑτερον. οὐ γάρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα Τῷ Ἑτέρῳ γ' ἄν εἴη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὔδε τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἑτερα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἐτερ' ἄν εἴῃ ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχουτα Τοῦ Ἑτέρου. πῶς γάρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς 147 ἑτερά ἑστὶ μήτε Τῷ Ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντη ἣδη ἄν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἑτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι.
αιλλὰ μὴν οὔδε Τοῦ 'Ενός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν, οὐ γὰρ ἄν μὴ ἐν ἂν, ἀλλὰ πη ἄν ἐν ἂν. Ἀληθῆ. οὐδὲ ἄν ἀριθμὸς εἰη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν οὔδε γὰρ ἄν οὐτῳ μὴ ἐν ἂν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμοῖ γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τὶ δέ; τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ 'Ενός ἄρα μόρια ἔστων; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετείχε Τοῦ 'Ενός τὰ μὴ ἐν; μετείχεν.

b εἰ ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὐτ' ἄν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν Τὸ 'Εν εἰη οὐθ' ὅλον ός μορίων' οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ 'Ενός μόρια, οὖθ' ὅλα ός μορίῳ Τῷ 'Ἐν. οὐ γὰρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐφαμεν τὰ μῆτε μόρια μηθ' ὕλα μηθ' ἔτερα ἀλλήλων ταύτα ἔσσομαι ἀλλήλως. ἐφαμεν γὰρ. φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ Τὸ 'Εν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς; φῶμεν. Τὸ 'Εν ἄρα, ός οὐκευ, ἔτερον τε Τῶν 'Ἀλλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἕαυτῳ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑκεῖνοις τε καὶ ἕαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει: φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίων τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς 'Ἀλλοῖς; ἵσως. ἐπειδῆ γοῦν ἔτερον Τῶν 'Ἀλλων ἐφάνης, καὶ Τάλλα ποὺ ἔτερ' ἀν ἑκείνου εἰη. τὶ μῆν; οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἔτερον Τῶν 'Ἀλλων, ὅστερ καὶ Τάλλα ἑκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὖθ' ὦττον; τί γὰρ ἄν; εἰ ἄρα μῆτε μᾶλλον μηθ' ὦττον, ὁμοίως. ναι. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἔτερον εἴναι πέπονθε Τῶν 'Ἀλλων, καὶ Τάλλα ἑκείνου ὁσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἀν πεπονθότα
d εἰπεν Τὸ τε 'Ἐν Τοῖς 'Ἀλλοῖς καὶ Τάλλα Τῷ 'Ἐν. πῶς λέγεις; ὅδε ἐκαστὸν τῶν οὐνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τὶ οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ οἴνομα εἴποις ἀν πλεονάκις ἢ ἄπαξ; ἔγωγε. πῦτερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἄπαξ εἴπης, ἑκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπέρ ἐστὶ τούτομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἑκεῖνο; ἢ ἐὰν τε ἄπαξ ἐὰν τε πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ οἴνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ.
πλατωνός

άνάγκη σε τό αὐτὸ καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; τί μὴν; οὐκοῦν καὶ τό ἐτερὸν ὅνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινί; πάνυ γε. ὅταν ἀρα αὐτὸ φθέγγη, εάν τε ἀπαξ εάν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ ε ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὁνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὔπερ ἢν ὅνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἐτερον μὲν Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνόσ, ἐτερον δὲ Τὸ Ἑν Τῶν Ἀλλων, δίς τὸ ἐτερον εἰπόντες οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ ἄλλῃ ἐπὶ ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν, ἥσσερ ἢν τούνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἢ ἄρα ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων Τὸ Ἑν καὶ Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνόσ, κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐτερὸν 148 πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἄλλα τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἰη Τὸ Ἑν Τοῖς Ἀλλως· τὸ δὲ πον ταὐτῶν πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον’ οὐχὶ; ναί. ἢ δὴ Τὸ Ἑν ἐτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων πεπονθεῖν εἰναι, κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀπαν ἀπασιων ὁμοιον ἀν εἰη’ ἀπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἐτερον ἑστιν. εἰοικεν. ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γε ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον. ναἰ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον τῷ αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ’ ἐφανή, ὡς ἄρα Τὸ Ἑν Τοῖς Ἀλλως ταὐτῶν. ἐφανή γάρ. τοιναντίον δὲ γε πάθος ἑστὶ ἢ τὸ εἰναι ταῦτῳ Τοῖς Ἀλλως τῷ ἐτερον εἰναι Τῶν Ἀλλων. πάνυ γε. ἢ γε μὴν ἐτερον, ὁμοιον ἐφανή. ναί. ἢ ἄρα ταῦτον, ἀνόμοιον ἑσται κατὰ τοιναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὁμοίον δὲ πον τὸ ἐτερον; ναί. ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα ταῦτον, ἢ οὐκ ἑναντίον ἑσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ. ἐιοικεν. ὁμοίον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑσται Τὸ Ἑν Τοῖς Ἀλλως, ἢ μὲν ἐτερον, ο ὁμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταῦτον, ἀνόμοιον. ἐχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἐιοικε, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγου. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἐχει. τόνα; ἢ ταῦτον πεπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὁμοίον εἰναι’ ἢ δ’ ἄλλο πεπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ
νὸν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ταύτῳν τε ἄρα ὑν
Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις καὶ ὃτι ἐτερόν ἔστι, κατ’ ἀμφό-
tερα καὶ καθ’ ἐκάτερον, ὀμοιόν τε ἄν εἰη καὶ
ἀνόμοιον τοῖς Ἀλλοις. πάντως, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ
ωςαύτως, ἐπειπερ ἐτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταύτῳν ἑαυτῷ
ἐφάνη, κατ’ ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον ὀμοιόν τε καὶ
ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ἀνάγκη. (7) τὶ δὲ δὴ; περὶ
tοῦ ἀπτεσθαί Τὸ Ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ
τοῦ μῆ ἀπτεσθαί πέρι, πῶς ἔχει; σκόπει. σκοπῶ.
αὐτὸ γὰρ ποὺ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ Τὸ Ἐν ἑφάνη ὄν.
ὁρθῶς. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις τὸ ἐν; ναί. ἂρ

(7) The One must be in communion with itself and with ὄλλα, everything else; and the One must be out of communion with itself and ὄλλα, everything else.
τῶν δυνῶν ὅρων τρίτων προσγενήται ἡξῆς, αὕτα μὲν ἐ 
τρία ἦσται, αἱ δὲ ἀψεῖς δύο. ναί. καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἂει, ἐνὸς προσγεγομένου, μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἀψεῖς τῶν πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾶ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ὃ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἑπλεονεκ-
τήσε τῶν ἀψεῶν εἰς τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἢ 
tὰς ἀψεῖς, τῷ ἱσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐπείτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς 
pασῶν τῶν ἀψεὼν πλεονεκτεῖ. ἦδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν 
άμα ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ἦ 
tαῖς ἀψεῖσιν. ὀρθῶς. ὅσα ἁρὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ὀντα τῶν 
ἀριθμῶν, ἀἐν μιᾶς αἱ ἀψεῖς ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν. 
ἄληθῆ, εἰ δὲ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστὶ, δυᾶς δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν, 
ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἰῃ. πῶς γὰρ; οὐκοῦν, φαμείν, Ἄλλα 
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἑστὶν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ 
ἄλλα ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ. οὐκ ἁρὰ ἐνεστὶν ἀριθμὸς ἐν 
Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γὰρ; 
οὔτ' ἁρὰ ἐν ἑστὶ Ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλον ἀριθμὸ 
ἔχουτα ὀνόμα οὐδέν. οὐ. Τὸ Ἐν ἁρὰ μόνον ἐστὶν ἄ 
ἐν, καὶ δυᾶς οὐκ ἂν εἰῃ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄψις ἁρὰ 
οὐκ ἐστίν, δυᾶς μὴ οὔτων. οὐκ ἐστίν. οὔτ' ἁρὰ 
Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλῶν ἀπτεται οὔτε Ῥᾶ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, 
ἐπείπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτω δὴ κατὰ 
πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν τε Ἀλλῶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτε-
tαι τε καὶ οὐχ ἀπτεται. ἔοικεν. (8) ἀρ' οὖν καὶ 
ἰσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς; πῶς; 
e μείζων εἰη Τὸ Ἐν ἦ Ἄλλα ἦ ἔλαττον, ἄρ' οὖ 
το μὲν ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλά Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω 
οὔτε τι ἔλαττῳ ἂν εἰη ἄλληλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις 
tαῖς οὐσίαις; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ τοιαύτ' εἶναι 
ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἵσα ἂν εἰη πρὸς ἄλληλα.
e1 dè tâ mév mégebôs, tò dè smïkrôtêta, ἕ καὶ mégebôs mév Tô Ἕnu, smïkrôtêta dè Tâllâ, ὀποτέρῳ mév tò eîdei mégebôs proseîh, meîzôn ân eîh. Ὁ dè smïkrôtês, ëlattôv; ânâgkê. oukoud ëstôn gê tûn toûtôw eî̇h. Tô te Mègêbôs kai Ἡ Smïkrôtês; ou gâr ân pou, µῆ ònte ge, ènântîw te ållhîlou eî̇thn kai èn toîs ouîsw ëngyynoîsthôn. πâs gâr ân; eî âra èn Tô Ἕnu smïkrôtês ëngyînvetai, ñtoî èn òlwr ân ἕ èn méreî aútôi ëneîh. ânâgkê. tî dê eî èn òlwr ëngyynoito; ouîçi ἕ ἕξ ísou ân Tô Ἕnu dî òllou aútôi tetamènê eîh ἕ perieîchousa aútô; ðhllon ðh. ἀρ' ouî ouî ἕξ ísou mév ouîsa Ἡ Smïkrôtês Tô Ἕnu ísîh ân aútôi eîh, perieîchousa dè meîzôn; pôs d' ou; ðnuatôn ouî Smïkrôtêta ísîn tîr eînai ἕ meîzôn tîwos, kai prâttee ge tâ Mègêbous te kai Ἰσôthtôs, ållâ b µῆ tâ ëautês; âdûnaton. èn mév òlwr âra Tô Ἕnu ouî ân eîh Smïkrôtês, åll' eî̇per, èn méreî. naî. ouîdê ge èn pântî aŭ tîr méreî eî dè µῆ, taûtâ pouîseî âpter prôs tî òllon' ísîh êstata î meîzôn tûn mérousw, èn Ὁ ἕ ân âei ënîh. ânâgkê. ouîdevî pote âra ênêstata tôw óntwv Smïkrôtês, µîî' èn méreî µîî' èn òlwr ëngyynoîmênê' ouîdê tî êstata smïkrôn plhèn aûthês Smïkrôtêtos. ouî ëoikey. ouîd' âra mégebôs ênêstata èn aútô. meîzôn gâr ân tî eîh ållô, kai plhèn aûtôi Mègêbous, èkêîno èn Ὁ Tô Mègêbôs ëneîh, kai taûta smîkrôu aûtôi ouû òntos, ouî ânâgkê úpereîchewn, êânπter ἕ µêga: tôûto dè âdûnaton, èpeîdê Smïkrôtês ouîdamos ènî. ållhêh. ållâ µûν aûtô Mègêbôs ouû ållôu meîzôn ἕ aûthês Smïkrôtêtos, ouîdê Smïkrôtês ållôu ëlattôv ἕ aûtôi Mègêbous. ouî gâr. ouîte âra Tå ἩÅllâ meîzôw Tôû
'Ενὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτῶ τούτῳ πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἔχετον τὴν ἀ δύναμιν τὴν τού ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλων, οὔτε αὐ Τὸ "Ἐν τούτῳ οὐδὲ Τῶν 'Ἀλλων μεῖζον ἀν οὔδ᾽ ἐλαττον εἰη, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὔκουν φαίνεται γε. ἄρ' οὖν εἰ μήτε μειζὸν μήτε ἐλαττον Τὸ "Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μηθ᾽ ὑπερέχεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὔκοιν τὸ γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μηθ᾽ ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἰς ἵςον εἶναι, εἰς ἵςον δὲ ὅν ἵςον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὗ; καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτὸ ο γε Τὸ "Ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὖτος ἀν ἔχοι μήτε Μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ᾽ ἀν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ᾽ ἀν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἵςον ὅν ἵςον ἀν εἰη ἑαυτῷ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὸ "Ἐν ἀρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς ἵςον ἀν εἰη. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀν εἰη ἐξωθεν, καὶ περεχόν μὲν μειζὸν ἀν ἑαυτοῦ εἰη. περεχόμενον δὲ ἐλαττον, καὶ οὖτω μειζὸν ἀν καὶ ἐλαττὸν εἰη 151 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ "Εν. εἰη γὰρ ἀν. οὔκοιν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τε καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων. πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι πον δεὶ τὸ γε ὅν ἀεί. ναί. οὔκοιν τὸ γε ἐν τῷ ὅν ἐν μειζον εσται ἐλαττον ὅν; οὐ γὰρ ἄν Ἀλλως ἐτερὸν ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἰη. οὐ γὰρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐτερόν ἐστι χωρὶς Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, δεὶ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὔκ ἀνάγκη ἣδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, Τά τε Ἀλλα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ Τὸ "Ἐν ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς, ἡ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἀρα Τὸ "Ἐν ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖς ἐνεστι, μεῖζω ἀν εἰη Τά Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, περεχόντα αὐτὸ, Τὸ δὲ "Ἐν ἐλαττὸν Τῶν
"Ἀλλων, περιεχόμενον ὅτι δὲ Τὰ ᾿Αλλα ἐν Τῷ ᾿Ενί, Τὸ ᾿Εν Τῶν ᾿Αλλων κατὰ τὸν ἀυτὸν λόγον μείζων ἄν εἶη, Τὰ δὲ ᾿Αλλα Τοῦ ᾿Ενὸς ἐλάττω. ἔσκεν. Τὸ ᾿Εν ἀρα ᾿Ισὸν τε καὶ μείζων καὶ ἐλαττὸν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν ᾿Αλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἰπερ μείζων καὶ ἐλαττον καὶ ᾿Ισον, ᾿Ισον ἄν εἰη μέτρων καὶ πλειώνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ Τοῖς ᾿Αλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερών. πῶς δ᾿ οὔ; ᾿Ισον μὲν ἀρα μέτρων διν καὶ πλειώνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐλαττὸν ἄν καὶ πλεόν εἰη αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν ᾿Αλλων, καὶ ᾿Ισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς ᾿Αλλοις κατὰ ταύτα. πῶς; ὁντερ μείζων ἐστὶ, πλειώνων ποι καὶ μέτρων ἄν εἰη αὐτῶν ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερών καὶ δὲν ἐλαττον, ὡσαύτως καὶ οἷς ᾿Ισον, κατὰ ταύτα. οὕτως. οὐκοίν ἐαυτοῦ μείζων καὶ ἐλαττον διν καὶ ᾿Ισον ᾿Ισον ἄν εἰη μέτρων καὶ πλειώνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερών; πῶς δ᾿ οὔ; ᾿Ισον μὲν ἀρα μερῶν διν αὐτῷ ᾿Ισον ἄν τὸ πλήθος αὐτῷ Εἰη, πλειώνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ. φαίνεται. οὐκοίν καὶ πρὸς Τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει Τὸ ᾿Εν· ὅτι μὲν μείζων αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἐλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ᾿Ισον μεγέθει, ᾿Ισον καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι Τοῖς ἀλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἐσοκε, Τὸ ᾿Εν καὶ ᾿Ισον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ ἐσται καὶ Τῶν ᾿Αλλων. ἐσται. (9) ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει Τὸ ᾿Εν, καὶ ᾿Εστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν ᾿Αλλων, καὶ οὕτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε Τῶν ᾿Αλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς; (9) The One admits of the modes of duration, Prior, Simultaneous, and Sub-
εἶναι μὲν ποὺ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἐπερ ἐν ἔστιν. ναὶ. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἢ μεθέξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἡμ μὲτα τοῦ παρε-
ληθυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ἐστὶ γάρ. μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, ἐπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναὶ. ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἐαυτοῦ, ἐπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνων. ἀνάγκη. ἃρ’ οὖν μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι νεωτέρον γι-
γονομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; μεμνήμεθα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ ὑ
gίγνεται Τὸ Ἔν, νεωτέρον ἀν γιγνομένου ἐαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ

sequent, both with regard to itself and Τάλλα, everything else.
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ. 41

τερον. πάνω μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν οὔτερ εγίγνετο
πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἐστιν' εγίγνετο δὲ αυτοῦ; 
ναὶ. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον πρεσβύ-
τερον; ἔστι. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἔστι
Τὸ Ἐν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἑντύχῃ τὸ
νῦν. ἀνάγκη. τὸ γε μὴν νῦν οἳ ἔπεστι Τῶ Ἐν
dιὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ οἳ νῦν ὅταντερ ἥ.
pῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἀρε ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύ-
tερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον Τὸ Ἐν. ἐοικεν. πλείω
δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἡ γίγνεται, ἡ τὸν ἴσον;
τὸν ἴσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἡ γιγνό-
μενον ἡ δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἠλευθίαν ἐχει. πῶς δ' οὖ; τὸ
dὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἠλευθίαν ἐχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε
νεώτερον ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον
χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἢν οὔτε
νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔστὶν οὐδὲ γί-

153 ὅ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δὲ; Τῶ ἒ Ἀλλων; οὐκ ἐχὼ
λέγειν. τόδε γε μὴν ἐχεις λέγειν, οὕτω Τὰ ἒ Ἀλλα
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, εἴπερ ἐτερά ἔστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐτερον, πλείω
ἔστιν ἐνός' ἐτερον μὲν γὰρ ἕν ἐν ἄν ἣν, ἐτερὰ δὲ
οντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστὶ καὶ πλῆθος ἄν ἐχοι. ἐχοι
γὰρ ἄν. πλῆθος δὲ ἄν ἄρισθμον πλείονος ἄν μετέχοι
ἢ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς. πῶς δ' οὖ; τί οὐν; ἄρισθμον φήσομεν
tὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ
tὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὅλον ἱστον ἄρα πρῶτον
b τούτο δ' ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐν' ἢ γάρ; ναὶ. πάντων ἄρα
Τὸ Ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἄρισθμον ἐχόντων. ἐχει
δὲ καὶ Τάλλα πάντα ἄρισθμον, εἴπερ ἀλλά καὶ μὴ
ἀλλο ἐστίν. ἐχει γάρ. πρῶτον δὲ γε, οἷμαι, γεγο-
νός πρότερον γέγονε, Τὰ δὲ ἒ Ἀλλα ὕστερον' τὰ δ'
ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος.
καὶ οὖτως ἂν εἰ Ἡ Τάλλα νεώτερα Τοῦ Ἐνός, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν πρεσβύτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων. εἰ ἡ γὰρ ἂν. τί δὲ τόδε; ἂρ' ἂν εἰ Ἡ Ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη Ἐν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. ναὶ. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ Τοῦ Ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου Τῶν Ἀλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τάλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μὴν; καὶ μὴν μορία γε φήσομεν ταύτ' εἶναι πάντα Τάλλα Τοῦ Ὀλού τε καὶ Ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἁμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλου. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτῇ δὲ οἴμαι γε ὡστὶν γίγνεται τοῦτῳ δ' ἁμα Τὸ Ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι. ἡ στ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν ἡ γίγνεσθαι, ἁμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἀν γεγονός ωστὶν αὐτὸν Ἐν Ἀλλων πεφυκὸς εἰς γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἁρα Τῶν Ἀλλων Τὸ Ἐν ἐστί. Τὰ δ' Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός πρεσβύτερα. οὖτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἡ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτι οὗν Τοῦ Ἐνός ἡ ἄλλον ὅτονον, εἶτε στέρνει μέρος ἡ ἄλλα μή μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὅν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν ἁμα τῇ πρῶτῳ γεγονομένῳ γίγνοσθ' ἀν καὶ τῇ τῇ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γεγονομένων, ὅ τι περ ἀν προσγίγνοται ὅτῳον, ἐν χροὸν τὸ ἔσχατον διελθόν ὅλον ἐν γένεται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρῶτον οὔτε ἑσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθέν ἐν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ. πάσιν ἁρα Τόις Ἀλλοις τήν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἵσχει Τὸ Ἐν. ἡ στ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε πρῶτον οὔθ' ύστερον Ἀλλων γεγονός ἀν εἰη. ἄλλ ἁμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων 154
οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἄν εἰη, οὔδὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ Τάλλα έκεινον ὡσαύτως. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἐστι μὲν δὴ οὖτως ἔχων τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γῆγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γῆγνεσθαι; ἀρα ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὔτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἦ έτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον ἐτέρου, γῆγνεσθαί τε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἐτί, ἦ ὑσ τὸ πρῶτον εὔθες γενόμενον δὴγνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐκ ἀν ἐτὶ δύναντο, οὔδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ἤν ἐτὶ νεώτερον γῆγνεσθαι ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἵσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὀτρώοιν, ἵσῳ ποιεὶ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὀσφέρει ἄν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ, πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐκ ἄρα τὸ γε ὅν τοῦ ὄντος γῆγνοντ' ἄν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὔδὲ νεώτερον, εἰπερ ἵσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γῆγνεται δ' οὐ. ἀληθή. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα δὲν Τῶν Ἀλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ποτὲ οὔτε νεώτερον γῆγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὁρὰ δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γῆγνεται. πη δη'; ἦ Τὸ τε Ἐν Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἑφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. τί οὖν; ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων πρεσβύτερον ἤ, ἀ πλείω ποι χρόνον γέγονεν ἦ Τὰ Ἀλλα. ναὶ. πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέοι καὶ ἐλάττονον χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἵσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἵσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἡ σμικροτέρῳ· σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐσται, ὅ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς Τάλλα ἡλικία διαφέρον Τὸ Ἐν, τούτο καὶ
"Αλλως ἠλαττῶν ἡ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἡ πρότερον· ἦ οὐ; ναὶ. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἠλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρὸς τῇ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἀν ἦ· ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἄ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον; νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ Τάλλα πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἡ πρότερον; πάνυ γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονός πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἃν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεώτερον νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἱὸντε γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεώτερον' γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὐκ τε ἐίην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐτὶ γέγονοτο ἀλλ' εἶεν ἂν, νῦν δὲ γέγονεν εἰ μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα. Τὸ μὲν Ἐν Τὸν Ἀλλως νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ἃν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, Τὰ δὲ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὑστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ Τάλλα οὕτω πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἵσχει, ἔπειδήτερον αὐτῶν πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται γὰρ οὗν οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἐτέρων ἐτέρων πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἵσχω ἀριθμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἃεὶ διαφέρειν, οὐτὲ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἃν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὐτὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς· ἢ δὲ Ἀλλὰ ἃεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ e
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

υστερα των προτέρων, ταυτη δη ανάγκη πρεσβύτερα τε και νεώτερα ἄλληλων γίγνεσθαι Τά τε Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνδος καὶ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταὐτα Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ ὦτε πρεσβύτερον οὐτε νεώτερον οὔτ’ ἐστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν Ἀλλων. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδή δὲ χρόνον μετέχει Τὸ Ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἃρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχει καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνον μετέχει; ἀνάγκη. ἢν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενησταί. τί μή; καὶ εἴη ἢν τι ἐκεῖνη καὶ ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἢν καὶ ἐστι καὶ ἐσται. πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἢν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀισθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμείς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταύτα πράττομεν. ὅρθως λέγεις. καὶ ὁνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὁνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὀσπερ e καὶ περὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἐστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

ἐτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. (1) Τὸ Ἐν εὶ ἐστιν οὗν διελεύθαμεν, ἃρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ἰν καὶ πολλά καὶ μίτη ἐν μίτη πολλά καὶ μετέχου χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἐστιν ἐν, οὕσιας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι ὅ’ οὐκ ἐστὶ, μὴ μετέχειν αὐτοῦ ποτέ οὕσιας; ἀνάγκη. ἃρ’ οὖν ὅτε μετέχει, οὗν τε ἐσται τότε μὴ μετέχει, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχει; οὐχ οὗν τε. ἐν ἄλλῳ ἃρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὗ μετέχει οὕτω γὰρ ἢν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὗ μετέχοι. 156 ὅρθως. οὐκοῦν ἐστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμ-

(III.) The Third Hypothesis:

εἰ ἐν ἐστι = εἰ ἐν οὕσιας μετέχει.

(1) the One admits of contrary predicates by means of the achronic Point of In-difference,
βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἴον τε ἐσταὶ τοτε μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτῷ, τοτε δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ; οὔδαμῶς. τὸ δ' οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἐγώγε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. Τὸ Ἐν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφίειν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη. (2) ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὦν, καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ἄρ' οὔχ. ὡς ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μην ἀνόμοιον γε καὶ ὁμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοοὐσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοοὐσθαί; ναί. καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἐλαττὸν καὶ ἰσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνεω καὶ ἴσονσθαι; οὕτως. ὅταν δὲ κινούμενον τε ἱστηται καὶ ὅταν ἐστός ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δει δή ποὺ αὐτὸ γε μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δὴ; ἐστός τε πρὸτερον ὑστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὑστερον ἐστάναι, ἀνεν μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὖχ οἴον τε ἐσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γὰρ; χρόνος δὲ γε οὐδὲις ἔστων, ἐν ὁ τι οἴον τε ἀμα μητὶ κινεῖσθαι μηθ' ἐστάναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πῶς οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστός ἂν οὔτε κινούμενον ἄποκράτλλοι, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὦν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἄρ' οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ὁ τοῦτ' ἂν εἶν, οὔτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποὺν δή; τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιὸν δὲ τι ἐοίκε σημαίνειν, ὡς εἰς ἐκεῖνον μεταβάλλον εἰς ἐκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι
παρμενίδης.

εστώτος ἐτὶ μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινοµένης ἐτὶ μεταβάλλει· ἀλλ' ἡ ἕξαίφνης αὐτὴ φύσις ἀτοµός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὸ τε κινούµενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖται. κυνδυνεύει. καὶ ὁ Ὁ Ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἑστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἄν ἐὰν ἐκάτερα· µόνος γὰρ ἀν οὔτως ἀµφότερα ποιεῖ· μεταβάλλον δ' ἕξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἃν εἰς, οὐδὲ κινοῦτ' ἃν τότε, οὐδ' ἃν σταῖτ. οὐ γὰρ. ἄρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἶς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ µὴ εἶναι εἶς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξὺ των τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεως, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἐοικε γοῦν. κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ εἴς ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἱδ' καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἑστὶν οὔτε πολλᾶ, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ εἴς ὁµοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόµοιον καὶ εἴς ἀνόµοιον ἐπὶ ὁµοίον ἱδ' οὔτε ὁµοίου οὔτε ἀνόµοιον, οὔτε ὁµοιούµενον οὔτε ἀνοµιούµενον.

καὶ ἐκ σµικρὸν ἐπὶ µέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἱδ' οὔτε σµικρὸν οὔτε µέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανοµένον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἴσοµενον εἴη ἃν. οὐκ ἐοικε. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήµατα πάντ' ἃν πάσχοι Ἄν, εἰ ἐστὶν. πῶς δ' οὖ;

τί δὲ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, Ἄν εἰ ἐστὶν, ἃρα οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον. (1) λέγωµεν δὴ, ἐν εἰ ἐστὶ, Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τὶ χρῆ πεποιθέναι; λέγωµεν. οὐκοῦν ἐπειπέρ ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐστὶν, οὔτε Τὸ Ἐν ἐστὶ Τάλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς (IV.) The Fourth Hypothesis: the effect of the existence of the One on Τάλλα: they
admit contrary predicates. (1) If the One exist, 
Talla will not be one; but (2) Talla cannot be altogether unconnected with the One, but (3) will bear to it the relation of Fractional Parts to an Integral Whole; and in the same way (4) each Part is related to Unity as the Parts of the Whole are related to Unity; and, therefore, 

ἡν. ὅρθως. (2) οὔδε μὴν στερεταί γε παντάπασι ο ὁΤοῦ Ἐνὸς Τάλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει τῇ. πῇ δῇ; (3) ὅτι ποῦ Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἀλλὰ ἐστίν εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἄν ἐν εἰῃ. ὅρθως. (4) μόρια δὲ γε, φαμέν, τούτων ἐστίν ὅ ἀν ὅλον ἧ. φαμέν γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρῆ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου. πῶς τοῦτο; εἰ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἰη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἰῃ, ἐαυτοῦ τε δῇ ποὺ μόριον ἔσται, ὁ ἐστὶν αἱ ἀδύνατον, καὶ Τῶν Ἀλλῶν δῇ ἔνος ἐκάστου, εἰπέρ καὶ πάντων. ἔνος γὰρ μὴ ὅν μόριον, πλὴν τοῦτου Τῶν Ἀλλῶν ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἔνος ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὅν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὔδενος τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὅν πάντων τοὺτων τι εἶναι, δὲν οὐδενὸς οὔδεν ἔστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἀλλο ὅτιον ἀδύνατον εἶναι. φαίνεται γε δῇ. οὐκ ἂρα τῶν πολλῶν οὔδε πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μίας τινὸς ἑδεάς καὶ ἔνος τινος, δ᾽ ἐκαλοῦμεν ὅλου, ε ἐξ ἀπαντῶν ἐν τέλειοι γεγονός, τοῦτοι μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἰη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἂρα Τάλλα μόρια ἔχει, καὶ Τοῦ Ὁλου τε καὶ Ἐνὸς μετέχου. πάνυ γε. ἐν ἂρα ὅλον τελεύων μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς. ἀνάγκη. (5) καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς. εἰ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν μόριών ἐστι, τὸ γε ἐκαστὸν εἶναι ἐν δῇ ποὺ σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν Τῶν Ἀλλῶν, καθ' αὐτοῦ δὲ ὅν, εἰπέρ ἐκαστὸν ἔσται. ὅρθως. μετέχου δὲ γε ἄν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς δὴλον ὅτι ἀλλο ὅν ἦ ἔν' οὐ γὰρ ἄν μετείχειν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἄν αὐτὸ ἐν' νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι
πλὴν αὐτῷ Τῷ Ἐνν ἀδύνατόν που. ἀδύνατον. μετέχειν δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνν ἀνάγκη τῷ τῇ ὀλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὀλον ἐσται, ὁμοία τὰ μόρια: τὸ δὲ αὖ ἐκαστὸν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὀλου, ὃν ἄν ἦ μόριον ὀλου. οὕτως. (6) οὐκοῦν ἔτερα ὄντα Τοῦ Ἐνν μεθεξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἔτερα Τοῦ Ἐνν πολλὰ που ἄν εἰη. εἰ γὰρ μηθ' ἐν μηθ' Ἐνν πλείω ἐη Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνν, οὐδέν ἄν εἰη. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ γε πλείω Ἐνν ἐστι τὰ τῇ Τοῦ Ἐνν μορίου καὶ Τὰ Τοῦ Ἐνν ὀλου μετέχοντα, οὗκ ἀνάγκη ἠδ' πλήθει άπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκείνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα Τοῦ Ἐνν; πῶς; ὡδ' ἰδωμεν. ἀλλο τι οὐχ ἐν οὕντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ Ἐνν τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; δηλα δη. οὐκοῦν πλήθη οὕντα, ἐν οἷς Τῷ Ἐνν οὐκ ἐν; πλήθη μέντοι. τὶ οὖν; εἰ ἐθελομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφέλειν ὡς οἷοι τέ ἐσμεν ὃ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνν μη μετέχου, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἐν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοπούντι αὐὴν καθ' αὐὴν τῇ ἐπέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους, ὥσον ἄν αὐὴς ἀεὶ ὀρώμεν, ἀπειρον ἐσται πλήθει; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ}

μὴν ἐπειδὰν γε ἐν ἐκαστὸν μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἠδ' ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλῆλα καὶ πρὸς τῷ ὀλον, καὶ τὸ ὀλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τοῖς Ἀλλοις δὴ Τοῦ Ἐνν ξυμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν Τοῦ Ἐνν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἀλλῆλα: ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν. φαίνεται. οὔτω δὴ Τά Ἀλλα Του Ἐνν καὶ ὁλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετεχει.
πάνυ γε. (7) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ έαυτοῖς; πὴ δὴ; ἢ μὲν ποι ἀπειρά ἑστι κατὰ τὴν έαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταύτων πεπονθότα δὲ εἰ ἡ ταύτη. πάνυ γε. καὶ μὴν ἢ γε ἀπαντά πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἀν εἰ ἡ ταύτων πεπονθότα. πῶς δ' οὖ; ἢ δ' ἐγε πεπερασμένα τε εἴναι καὶ ἀπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλους ὄντα ταύτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οὖν τε ἀνομοιότατα. τί μὴν; κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοία ἀν εἰ ἡ αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα. κινδυνεύει. οὖτω δὴ Τὰ Ἀλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλους ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀν εἰ. οὖτως. καὶ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἑτέρα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστώτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταύτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα. ἡ ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

οὐκοῦν ταύτα μὲν ἦδη ἐώμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἐστιν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός ἢ οὖτω μόνον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχής, ἐν εἰ ἐστι, τί χρὴ Τὰ Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἃρ' οὖν οὐ χωρίς μὲν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἀλλῶν, χωρίς δὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός εἶναι; τί δή; ότι που οὐκ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταύτα ἑτέρον, δ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ Τῶν Ἀλλῶν. πάντα γὰρ εἰρήται, όταν ῥηθῇ Τὸ τε Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. πάντα γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐτ' ἐστιν ἑτέρον τούτων, ἐν ώ Ἰ Τὸ τε Ἐν ἂν εἰ ἡ τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταύτῳ ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. οὐκ έοικεν. χωρίς ἄρα; ναί.
(2) οὐδὲ μὴν μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν Τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔν. πῶς γὰρ; οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅλον εἴῃ ἂν Τὸ Ἔν ἐν Τοῖς Ἀλλοις οὐτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἐστὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. πῶς γὰρ; οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχου ἃν Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός, μὴτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μὴτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν Τάλλα ἑστίν, οὐδ᾽ ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδεν. οὔ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πολλά ἐστὶ Τάλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλον, εἰ πολλὰ ἤν· νῦν δὲ οὐθ᾽ ἐν οὐτε πολλά οὐθ᾽ ὅλον οὐτε μόρια ἐστὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός, ἑπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. ὅρθως. (3) οὐδ᾽ ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὐτε αὐτά ἐστὶ Ἀλλα οὐτέ ἑνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐπερ Τοῦ Ἑνός παυταχῇ στέρεται. οὐτως.

(4) οὐδὲ ὁμοία ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὐτε αὐτά ἐστι Τῷ Ἑνῷ Τάλλα, οὐτε ἑνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ ἐι η ἐχοι ἐν ἐαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἰδὴ ἑναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἄν ἐν ἐαυτοῖς Ἀλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός. φαίνεται. ἦν δὲ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινῶν μετέχειν ἥ μηδ᾽ ἔνος μετέχοι. ἀδύνατον. οὐτ᾽ ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτ᾽ ἀνόμοια ἑστιν οὔτ᾽ ἀμφότερα

160 Τάλλα. ὁμοια μὲν γὰρ οντα ἦ ἀνόμοια ἔνος ἀν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δε οντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἑναντίον ταῦτα δε ἀδύνατα ἑφάνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ᾽ ἁρα Τα αὐτα οὐδ᾽ ἐτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα. οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδέν πεπονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ το τοιούτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει Τα Ἀλλα, καὶ ἔνος καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, δὲν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον the One and Τάλλα be an exhaustive division, there can be no middle-term between the two, therefore, (2) Τάλλα can in no way admit the One, either fractionally or integrally, nor can Τάλλα admit Plurality, which is a mode of the One, and, therefore, (3) not Two, or any other number, each of which is a repetition of Unity: and, therefore, (4) not of Similarity or Dis-similarity, or any other mode of Quality whatsoever, if the One be completely eliminated. The conclusion of the four last hypotheses is: that, if the One exist, the One must exist as all actual individual
εφάνη μετέχειν, Τοῦ 'Ενός γε πάντη πάντως δι
στερομένων. ἀληθεστατά. οὔτω δὴ ἐν εἰ ἔστι,
pάντα τέ ἐστι Τὸ ἴν καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς
ἐαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς Τὰ Ἀλλα ὅσαύτως. παντελῶς μὲν
οὖν.

ἐδειν' εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἐστι Τὸ ἴν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν,
ἀρ' οὖ σκεπτόν μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτόν γάρ. τίς
οὖν ἀν εἰη αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἄρα τι
diaφέρει τῇςδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; diaφέρει μέντοι.
diaφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πάν τούναντίον ἐστίν εἰσπείν,
eἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἐστιν, τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; πάν τούναν-
tίον. τί δ' εἰ τις λέγωι, εἰ Μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἡ
Σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἀλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢρα
ἐφ' ἕκαστον ἀν δηλοὶ, ὅτι ἐτερὸν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;
pάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοὶ, ὃτι ἐτερὸν λέγει
Τῶν Ἀλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν ἐπήγ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, καὶ
ἰσμεν ὁ λέγει; ἵσμεν. πρῶτον μὲν ἀρα γνωστόν
ti λέγει, ἐπειτα ἐτερὸν τῶν ἀλλων, ὅταν ἐπήγ ἐν,
εἰτε τὸ εἶναι αὑτῷ προσθέει εἰτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι' οὐδὲν
γὰρ ἤττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, ἂ
καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἀλλων. ἢ οὔ; ἀνάγκη.

διδε ἀρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ
eἶναι. (1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τουτοῦ ὑπάρχειν
dei, ὡς οἰκεῖν, εἶναι αὑτῶν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ μὴ δὲ ὁ
ti λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις ἐπήγ ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ. (2) οὐκοῦν καὶ Τὰ Ἀλλα ἐτερ' αὐτῶν
eἶναι, ἢ μὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐτερὸν Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγεσθαι;
pάνυ γε. καὶ ἐτεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὑτῷ πρὸς τῇ
ἐπιστήμην. οὐ γὰρ τὴν Τῶν Ἀλλων ἐτεροιότητα
 λέγει, ὅταν Τὸ ἴν ἐτερὸν Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγη, ἄλλα ἐ
τὴν ἐκείνου. φαίνεται. (3) καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου

(B.) The negative argu-
ment. The meaning of Negation: Negation implies
knowledge and difference.

(VI.) The Sixth Hypo-
thesis: ἵν εἰ μὴ
ἐστὶ = εἰ τὸ ἴ
ἐστὶ μὴ
καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺτων καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Τὸ Ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ’ ἂν Τὸῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνου, οὐδ’ ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετήν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τοιτών.

ὅρθως. εἶναι μὲν δὴ Τὸ Ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶον τε, εἰπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰπερ Τὸ γε Ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ἐκεῖνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεὶ οὐδέν: εἰ δὲ Τὸ Ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκεῖνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκην αὐτῷ μετείναι καὶ πάνυ γε.

(4) καὶ Ἀνομοιότης ἄρ’ ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τά ἄλλα. Τὰ γὰρ Ἀλλὰ, Τὸῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα, ἑτεροίᾳ καὶ εἰς ἄν. ναὶ. τὰ δ’ ἑτεροίᾳ οὐκ ἄλλοια; πῶς δ’ οὐ; τὰ δ’ ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν οὐκοῦν εἰπερ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνόμοια ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίως τὰ γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἄν εἰς. δῆλον. εἰς δὴ ἂν καὶ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἂν Τὰ Ἀλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἔστιν. έσικεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ Τῶν Ἀλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἔνδο ἀνομοιότης ἔστι Τῷ Ἐνὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποὺ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἰς οἶον Τὸῦ Ἐνὸς, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἰς περὶ ἔνδο, ἄλλα περὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἔνδο. πάνυ γε. οὐ c δὲι δέ γε. οὐ δῆτα. δεὶ ἄρ’ ὀμοιότητα Τῷ Ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ εἶναι. δεὶ. (5) καὶ μὴ οὐδ’ αὐτὶ ἰσον ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἰς ἰσον, εἰς τε ἂν ἦθη καὶ ὁμοιον ἂν εἰς αὐτοῖς κατά τὴν ἱσότητα: ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἰπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν. ἀδύνατα.
επειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ Τοῦ Ἁλλού ἵσον, δὴ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τάλλη ἐκεῖνη μὴ ἵσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. τὰ δὲ μὴ ἵσα οὐκ ἀνίσα; ναι. τὰ δὲ ἀνίσα οὐ Τῷ Ἀνίσῳ ἀνίσα; πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ Ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει Τῷ Ἔν, πρὸς ἦν Τάλλ' αὐτῶ ἐστιν ἀνίσα; δι' μετέχει. ἀλλὰ μέντοι Ἀνισότητος γ' ἐστὶ Μέγεθος τε καὶ Συμκρότης. ἐστὶ γάρ. ἐστιν ἄρα καὶ Μέγεθος τε καὶ Συμκρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ εὗ; κινδυνεύει. Μέγεθος μὴ καὶ Συμκρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλου. πάνυ γε. μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτῶ ἀεὶ ἐστιν. ἐστιν. ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἢ Ἰσότητα; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. ὅτι ἄρα ἐστι Μέγεθος καὶ Συμκρότης, ἐστι καὶ Ἰσότης αὐτῶ, μεταξὺ τούτων οὖσα. φαίνεται. Τῷ δὴ Ἔν μὴ ε ὄντι, ὃς οὐκε, καὶ Ἰσότητος ἄν μετείχη καὶ Μεγέθος καὶ Συμκρότης. ἐοικεν. (6) καὶ μὴ καὶ οὐσίας γε δεὶ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη. πῶς δὴ; ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεὶ οὖτως ὁς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὖτως ἔχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἥμεις λέγοντες Τῷ Ἔν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι οὖν αὐτὰ λέγομεν ἢ οὐχ οὖτως; οὖτω μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγεων, ἀνάγκη ἢμῖν φάναι καὶ οὖντα λέγεων. ἀνάγκη. ἐστιν ἄρα, ὃς οὐκε, Τῷ Ἔν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ 162 γὰρ μὴ ἐστιν μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἐστιν ὄν. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. δεὶ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὡμοίως ὡσπερ τὸ, ὃν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ἥ. οὖτως γὰρ ἄν τὸ τε ὃν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν οὖκ ἄν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὃν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως b
εἰναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὅν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὅντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὅντι τοῦ εἶναι μετέστη, καὶ Τῷ Ἐν, ἐπειδὴ οὔκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετείναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται Τῷ Ἐν, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἁρα, εἰπερ μὴ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὐ;
(7) οἰόν τε οὐν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχεω οὔτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἔξεως; οὐχ οἰόν τε. πᾶν ὁ ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολῆν σημαίνει, δ' ἂν οὔτω τε καὶ μὴ οὐτῶς ἔχη. πῶς δ' οὐ; μεταβολὴ δὲ κύνησις, ἣ τὶ φήσομεν; κύνησις. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν ὃν τε καὶ οὐκ ἔν ἔφανη; ναί. οὔτως ἁρα καὶ οὐχ οὔτως ἔχον φαίνεται. έουκεν. καὶ κινοῦμενον ἁρα τὸ οὐκ ἄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολῆν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν οὐτών, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὔδ' ἂν μεθίστατο ποθέν ποι. πῶς γάρ; οὐκ ἁρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν. οὐ
d γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄν στρέφοιτο· ταύτοι γάρ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπτεται. ὅν γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταύτον' τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν ἐν τῷ οὐτῶν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκ ἁρα Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὅν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύνατο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ οὐν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται ποι Τὸ Ἐν ἐαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὅν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὅν. οὐ γάρ ἄν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἐτι περὶ Τοὐ Ἐνός, εἰπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡλλοῦ τιμός. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταύτῷ στρέ-
φεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πὴ ἐτὶ κινοῖτο; πῶς
gάρ; τὸ γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ήσυχίαν ἁγειν,
of all the other predicates of modification, Motion, and Production in either direction.

(VII.) The Seventh Hypothesis: ἐὰν ἕν ἐίπῃ τὴν ἀρχήν ἱώμεν πάλιν, ὅψιμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἦ ἔτερα. ἀλλὰ χρή. οὐκόν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τῇ χρῆν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔμμεθα苣; ναί. (1) ὅταν ἑστὶν ἄνω τῶν λέγωμεν, ἅρα μὴ τῷ ἄλλῳ σημαίνει ἡ οὐσίας ἀποστάζων τούτῳ ὃ ἄν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὔδὲν ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἰναί τι, πῶς οὐκ εἰναί φαμέν αὐτὸ, πῶς δὲ εἰναι; ἦ τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ἕστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὔδε τῇ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ οὖν; ἀπλοῦστα μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἅρα εἰναι δύναιτο ἄν τῷ μὴ ὑν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν. οὐ γάρ. ὁ
(2) τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπολλυσθαι μὴ τί ἄλλο ἤ, ἦ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δὲ ἀπολλύσθαι οὐσίαν; οὔδέν ἄλλο. ὃ δὲ γε μηδὲν τούτῳ μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἀν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύσθαι αὐτῷ. πῶς γάρ; Τῷ Εὐν ἀρα, ἔπειθή οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὐθ' ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτεόν οὔτε μεταληπτέόν οὐσίας οὐδαμῷ. εἰκός. οὔτ' ἀρ' ἀπολλυσθαι τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας. οὐ φαίνεται. οὔτ' ἀρ' ἀλλοιώσθαι οὐδαμῇ ἦδη γὰρ ἄν γίγνοντο τε καὶ ἀπολλύοντο τοῦτο πάσχον. ἀλήθη. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄλλοιώσθαι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κωείσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὔδὲ μὴν ἔσταναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμὸ ὃν. τὸ γὰρ ἔστος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δὲι ἀεὶ εἴναι. τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς γὰρ οὗ; οὔτω δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ὅν μήτε ποθ' ἔσταναι μήτε κωείσθαι λέγωμεν. μὴ γὰρ οὗν. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτ' ἐστὶ γε αὐτῷ τὶ τῶν ὄντων. ἥδη γὰρ ἄν τοι τοῦτον οὐσίας μετέχοι. 

(3) of any mode of Quantity by way of Equality, Excess, or Defect, nor (4) of their results—Similarity or Diversity—and, (5) therefore, as a general conclusion the One, as non-existent, cannot exist in any possible way.
пепουθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄλλα μὴν ποὺ δὲι αὐτὰ εἰναὶ εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων λέγοιτο. οὔτως. (2) εἰ δὲ περὶ Τῶν Ἀλλων ὁ λόγος, Τά γε Ἀλλα ἐτέρα ἐστὶν. ἥ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς Τὸ τε Ἀλλο καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον; εἰ ἐγὼγε. ἐτερον δὲ γε ποὺ φαμεν τὸ ἐτερον εἰναι ἐτέρον, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἰναι ἄλλον; ναὶ. καὶ Τοῖς Ἀλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἰναι, ἐστὶ τι ὑπό ἄλλα ἐσται. ἀνάγκη. (3) τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἐνὸσ οὐκ ἐσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὑντος γε. οὐ γάρ. ἄλληλων ἄρα ἐστὶ τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτι λείπεται, ἡ μηδενὸς εἰναι ἄλλοις. ὀρθώς. (4) κατὰ πλήθη ἀρ’ ἐκαστα ἄλληλων ἄλλα ἐστὶ. καθ’ ἐν γάρ οὐκ ἂν οἶα τε εἴη, μὴ ὑντος ἐνός ἀλλ’ ἐκαστος, ἡς οὐκεν, ὁ ὅγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν Τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἰναι λάβῃ τις, ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὑπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνησι ἀνθε' ἔνος δόξαντος εἰναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικρότατον παμμέγεθε πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὀρθότατα. τοιοῦτων δὴ ὅγκων ἄλλα ἄλληλων ἂν εἴῃ Τᾶλλα, εἰ ἔνος μὴ ὑντος ἄλλα ἐστὶν. κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὅγκοι ἐσονται, εἰς ἐκαστος φαινόμενος, ὅν δὲ οὖ, εἶπερ ἐν μὴ ἐσται; οὔτως. (5) καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἰναὶ αὐτῶν δόξει, εἶπερ καὶ ἐν ἐκαστον, πολλῶν ὑντων. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοίς ὑντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἰπερ ἐν μὴ ἐσται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (6) καὶ μὴ καὶ σμικρότατον γε, φαμεν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνείναι' φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἐκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὑντων. πῶς δ’ οὖ; καὶ ἰσος μὴν τὸς 165 πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἐκαστος ὅγκος δοξασθήσεται
παρμενίδης.

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εἰναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβασεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἐλαττωνον
φαινόμενον, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειν ἐλθὼν τούτο
δὴ εἰ ἂν φάντασμα ἱσότητος. εἰκός. οὐκοῦν καὶ
πρὸς ἀλλον ὅγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτὸς γε πρὸς αὐτὸν
οὔτε ἀρχὴν ὀὔτε πέρας ὀὔτε μέσον ἔχων; τῇ δῇ;
ὁτι ἂει αὐτῶν ὅταν τὸς τὶς λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τοὺς
τούτων ὀν, πρὸ τῇς ἀρχῆς ἀλλὰ ἂει φαίνεται

άρχη, μετὰ τῇ τῇν τελευτὴν ἐτέρα ὑπολειπομένη
τελευτή, ἐν τῇ τῷ μέσῳ ἀλλὰ μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου,
σμικρότερα δὲ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐτῶν
ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀτε ὁὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός,
ἄληθεστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δῇ, οἷα, κερματιζό-
μενον ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ ὄν, δ ἂν τὸς λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ.
ὁγκος γάρ που ἀνευ ἐνός λαμβάνουτ' ἂν. πάνι
μὲν ὀν. (7) οὐκοῦν τὸ γε τοοὐτον πόρρωθεν μὲν

ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλύ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν
δὲ καὶ δὲν νοοῦντι πλήθει ἀπειρον ἐν ἐκαστον
φανῆναι, εἴτερ στέρεται Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος;
ἀναγκαίοστατον μὲν ὀν. οὔτω δὴ ἀπειρά τε καὶ
πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκαστα Τάλλα δὲ
φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστων, ἀλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός. δὲθ
γάρ. (8) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξεi
ἐναι; τῇ δῇ; οἴων ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν
ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταυτῶν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι
d καὶ ὁμοία εἰναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δὲ γε
πολλὰ καὶ ἐτέρα καὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἐτέρου φαντάσματι
ἐτεροία καὶ ἀνόμοια ἐαυτοῖς. οὔτως. (9) καὶ ὁμοίως
δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τούς ὅγκους αὐτοὺς τε ἐαυτοῖς
ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλληλοις. πάνυ μὲν ὀν.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐτέρους ἄλληλων, καὶ
ἀποτελούμενος καὶ χωρίς ἐαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους
masses, and not as genuine pluralities; and, there-
fore,
(6) Number and its
modes will
only have
an apparent
existence, and,
therefore,
(7) there
will be the
appearance
of a
Minimum,
which in
turn will
appear a
Majas as
contrasted
with a still
smaller
Mines, and
so on to
infinity; hence,
(8) in the
absence of
real unity,
Unity will
be a mere
confused
view arising
from imperfect
vision,
closer in-
pection
suggesting
an infinite
Mines as
before; hence,
(9) Similar
arity and
Dissimila-
ty, and the
other
modes of
Modification
and Quality,
will have an ap-
tance only, for there is no unity to give them cohesion.

(IX.) The Ninth Hypothesis: 

εν ει μη 

εστι = ει 
Τα ην ού 

πην ωσιας 

μετέχει; 

the effect of 

the non- 

existence of 

Unity on 

Τάλλα, 

i. e., 

Τάλλα 

love their 

phenomenal 

existence, 

and the 

result is 

absolute 

Nothing. 

(1) In the 

total ab- 

sence of 

Unity, the 

notion of 

Unity and 

therefore of 

Plurality is 

impossible, 

and, there- 

fore,

πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνο-
μένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδετερα, καὶ πάντα 

που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀ διελθεῖν εὑπετεῖς ἤδη ἤμιψ, εἰ ἐ 

ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστων. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ἐτὶ δὴ ἀπαξ ἐξὸντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰπω-

μεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἑστὶ, Τάλλα δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς, τὶ χρῆ 

ἔιναι. εἰπώμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ 

ἔσται Τάλλα. πῶς γάρ; οὐδὲ μὴν πολλὰ γε ἐν 

γὰρ πολλοῖς οὐσιν ἐνείη ἀν καὶ ἐν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν 

αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἐν, ἀπαντα οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὡστε οὐδ' ἄν 

πολλὰ εἰη. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνὸντος δὲ ἐνὸς ἐν Τοῖς 

"Αλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὐθ' ἐν ἑστὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. 

οὐδὲ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δὴ; ὅτι Τάλλα 

τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμιαν 

κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδὲ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ Τῶν 

"Αλλων τῷ ἔστων. οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἔστι τοῖς μὴ 

οὕσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἀρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ 

Τοῖς "Αλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδὲ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξά-

ζει τινα ὀνόμαμη οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄντος ἐν ὅπο 

Τῶν "Αλλων. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἐν ἀρα εἰ μη ἑστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζει 

τι Τῶν "Αλλων ἐν εἴη τιν οὐδὲ πολλά. ἀνευ γὰρ ἐνὸς 

πολλὰ δοξάζαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γὰρ. ἐν ἀρα 

ei μη ἑστι, Τάλλα οὔτε ἑστιν οὔτε δοξάζειτι ἐν 

οὐδὲ πολλὰ. οὐκ έοικεν. (2) οὐδ' ἀρα ὡμοίᾳ οὐδὲ 

ἀνόμαα. οὐ γὰρ. οὐδέ μὴν τὰ αὐτὰ γε οὐδ' ἔτερα, 

οὐδὲ ἀπόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς. οὐδὲ ἀλλα ὡς ἐν τοῖς 

πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φανόμενα αὐτά, τούτων 

οὔτε τι ἑστιν οὔτε φαίνεται Τάλλα, ἐν εἰ μη ἑστιν. 

ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἰπόμεν, ἐν εἰ ω 

μη ἑστιν, οὐδέν ἑστιν, ἀρθῶς ἄν εἰπόμεν; παντά-

πασι μὲν οὖν.
eirhýsôw toûnûn toûtô te kai óti, ñs éoikey, "En eît' estèn eite múh estèn, autô te kai Tállla kai prôs autâ kai prôs állhla pantâ pantâs esti te kai ouk esti kai faînetai te kai ou faînetai. álēthésestata.

The sum of the affirmative and negative arguments is: affirmatively, that if the One exists, the One, both in relation to itself and in relation to Tállla, exists in every mode of conditioned existence, and in its opposite, and so, the One is not unconditioned or absolute unity, so far as it exists in these modes: negatively, if the One does not exist, then all existence both in relation to Unity, and in itself, is phenomenal, and this phenomenal existence, when closely scrutinized, is entirely destitute of even phenomenal Unity, and therefore of all categories of Quantity and Quality whatsoever. The conclusion therefore is: the Universe—Τὸ Πᾶν—is neither ἐν alone nor πολλὰ alone, but ἐν-καὶ-πολλὰ.
NOTES.
NOTES.

THE piece is a monologue by Cephalus of Clazomenae. The conversation between the philosophers is supposed to have been originally reported by Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato, and then retailed by Antiphon to Cephalus. Plato, by selecting Antiphon, who is a sporting character, fond of horses (126 c), perhaps wishes to hint that Antiphon has not tampered with the dialogue, ἡκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμον, as he says of Aristotle (137 b), and thus offers it as the exposition of his own views. He may also have wished to compliment his half-brother Antiphon, just as he introduces Glauco and Adimantus in the Republic. The monologue is thus, on the face of it, a hearsay of a hearsay. Hermann, to get rid of some chronological difficulties, which are insuperable, makes Glauco and Adimantus cousins, and not brothers, of Antiphon. But it is vain to look for the precision of modern history in an ancient imaginative composition. Such exactness is the result of matter-of-fact habits, and of abundant means of verification, such as books of reference, &c. No such habits or means existed till the other day. A strong proof of this is the inaccuracy of quotation, common to all ancient writers, even professed critics.

126 a. Κλαζομενῶν.

Stallbaum points out that some people in Clazomenae, townspeople, and perhaps followers of Anaxagoras, would
naturally take an interest in the discussion. The influence of Anaxagoras on Platonic thought is evidenced by the *Phaedo*. To Anaxagoras, Mind owes the recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. He set it in a sphere apart, and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, *i.e.* unlimited or untrammeled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only real existence. Plato is fond of putting doctrines which he adopts into the mouth of a person of the original school. Thus Timæus expounds physics, and the Eleatic Stranger metaphysics, and the more practical Socrates ethics.

126 c. *Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης.*

Parmenides and Zeno are described by Strabo as ἀνέδρες Πυθαγόρειοι, vi. 1. Their connexion with Pythagoreanism is philosophically real, as one column of the Pythagorean συ-στοιχία is reducible to τὸ πέρας, and the other to τὸ ἀπειρόν.

127 b. *Πολὺ γὰρ ἐφη ἐργον εἶναι.*

Such a feat of memory, though here a dramatic fiction, *cf. Symp.* 172 a, is rendered plausible by Niceratus’s statement that he could repeat the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey* : Xen. *Conv.* iii. 5. Many rhapsodists could do the same: *ibid.* 6.

127 b. *παιδικά.*

.λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι show that Stallbaum’s charitable explanation is untenable. There is no doubt suggested of their present friendship: *Ζήνων ὁδὲ οὐ μόνον τῷ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ψεκεισθαί ἄλλᾳ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι, 128 a.*
127 e. \( \text{ἐὶ πολλὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα.} \)

The argument is as follows:—In the order of Time or subjectivity, the perception of difference between two things \( A \) and \( B \) precedes the perception of their similarity; but in the order of existence or objectivity, the differentia of each of the differentia depends on the individual peculiarities of each different. Each of the relatives thus exhibits Identity in relation to itself, and Difference in relation to the other, and so to all other things. If we assume, then, with Zeno, for argument’s sake, \( τὸ πᾶν \)—existence—\( τὰ ὄντα \)—to be plural, each of \( τὰ ὄντα \) is \( \text{per se ὄμοιον} \); but the aggregate is plural, and therefore \( τὰ ὄντα \) being plural are distinct, and therefore \( \text{inter se ἄνόμοια} \). Zeno accordingly agrees with Leibnitz as to the identity of indiscernibles, thus: Indiscernibles are identical, and therefore non-plural, since primordial things cannot be differed \( \text{inter se} \) without having been previously differed \( \text{per se} \). The Platonist and Hegelian say Plurality is subsumed by Unity without being destroyed by it. The \( \text{Aufhebung} \) settles everything.

127 e. \( \text{Tὰ ἄνόμοια.} \)

Stallbaum remarks: Zeno callida conclusione effecit, non esse multa, quam hoc tantum consequatur, non posse huic eidemque rei eadem spectatae ratione plura eaque contraria attribui. To a Greek, the order of Notions would be Motion, Change, Plurality; Motion denoting not merely physical Motion, \( ποθέν ποι \), but the notional movement of Metaphysics. The identity, in the Hegelian sense, of Cause and Effect, is the notion which brings the scientific order of Time into harmony with the order of Logic.

128 d. \( \text{ἐὶ ἐν ἐστὶ.} \)

Sc. \( τὸ Πᾶν \). This is the Subject of the Proposition, for which Philosophy undertakes to find the Predicate:
NOTES.

τὸ πᾶν is ἕν, said the Eleatic; it is πολλά, said the Ionic: it is ἕν καὶ πολλά, said Plato, and to prove this is the gist of the Parmenides.

128 d. εἰ πολλά ἐστιν: sc. τὸ Πᾶν.

The gist of Zeno's argument has been perpetually mistaken: Zeno does not deny Motion as a fact, but argues that as implying change, and therefore dissimilarity, it conflicts with the changeless uniformity of the One. In the One there is no contrariety, while contrariety is the essence of Motion. It may be remarked that, if Zeno's two moving bodies be made conscious, one will have double the consciousness of the other. The order of analysis is—Motion implies change, and change plurality. (See Appendix A.)

129 d. ἔπτα ἡμῶν ὑντων.

This is irreconcilable with ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτῶν πολλῶν, 127 c. If we leave out Cephalus the reciter and Glaucus, who does not speak, we can count up seven persons, viz., Adimantus and Antiphon in the introduction; Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, and Aristotle in the discussion. Ἐπτά shows that Plato either forgot the original plan or did not care to adhere to it—another proof of the historical unreality of the piece.

130 b. Χωρίς.

Χωρίς, a notion derived from physical separation: things are properly χωρίς which are not ἀπτόμενα, and then the word is applied to things which, as existing under totally distinct conditions, differ in kind. It should be recollected that all notions which differ in any degree are metaphysically distinct, e. g. 3 and 4 are as distinct as 3 and 4 millions.
NOTES.

Moderns look principally to the origin or genesis of things and notions in determining their resemblance or difference, and not to their characteristics when matured.

131 d. \(\tauο\upsilon\upsilonον \delta' αυτού.\)

With Hermann, I retain the Vulgate \(\tauο\upsilon\upsilonον \delta' αυτού.\) Heindorf's \(\tauο\upsilon\upsilonον \delta' αυτον\) is plainly wrong. The argument is: If any of us shall have a fragment of smallness, the real smallness will be bigger, because it is the whole, of which the fragment is a part.

131 e. \(\muεταλαμβάνειν.\)

\(\muεταλαμβάνειν\) is a more material expression than \(\muετεχειν.\) Both, however, express the truth, that the Sensible element, in cognition, without the Intelligible, is inconceivable. Professor Huxley invests Sensation with all the Categories, and then tells us we do not want them. Sensibles have, in Hegel's words, Richtigkeit, and not Wahrheit.

132 a, b. \(\text{The unique } είδος.\)

This passage gives the reason why the \(είδος\) is unique:—In referring an object to a class we have two things in hand, the particular instance and the genus, \(e.g.\) the particular man, Socrates, and the genus man, \(i.e.\) the first and second intentions. Parmenides argues, that to connect the particular with the genus there must be a third concept or notion, and then another to comprehend the three, and so on to infinity. If this be so, \(είδος\) is not unique, but \(απειρον.\) Now, \(απειρον\) denotes privation of all \(πέρας,\) Limitation, therefore of Form, therefore of all Cogitability. But every thing must be either \(ε\nu\) or \(απειρον,\) as follows:—In strict logic, the contrary of \(το\) \(απειρον\) is \(το\) \(πεπερασμένον;\) but \(το\) \(πεπερασμένον\) yields on analysis—(1) \(το\) \(πέρας;\) and (2)
NOTES.

something which is not τὸ πέρας, and so ἄπειρον. What is τὸ πέρας, when out of any definite relation to τὸ πεπερασμένον? It must be quantifying power, and we must hold that power to be not plural, but unique; for plural equipollent powers, if adverse, cancel; and if corroborative, result in unity. Τὸ πέρας, therefore, must be ἑν, and therefore Τὸ Ἔν; for the ultimate Form must be one, and, without τὸ ἑν, as Plato afterwards proves, οὐδὲ φαίνεται τι. The ἐκδος, therefore, since it is Form, cannot be ἄπειρον, and therefore must be one. This is Plato’s answer to the objections urged in pars. 7 and 9, and known to Greek Logicians as ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. “We may remark,” says Mr. Jowett, “that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end,” iii. p. 237. Plato, in the Philebus, gives the rationale of the Universal. (See Appendix B.)

132 c. Objection to Conceptualism.

Either each thing consists of νοῆμα, i.e. acts of intelligence, and therefore each thing is the being intelligent, i.e. intelligence, or if it be an act of intelligence, it is unintelligent, q.a.e. This argument is a case of the Platonic principle ὁμοιον ὁμοίῳ γιγνώσκεται. It is substantially the same as Berkeley’s position that mind is mind, that therefore nothing but mind is mind, and, as a further consequence, that nothing but mind can have the properties of mind; it is therefore illogical to ascribe to that which is not mind the properties of mind. Plato does not hold νοῦς to be the ultimate existence either in the moral or in the physical sphere. In the ethical sphere we have Τάγαθον; Rep. vi. 509 b; in the physical, ψυχή: Τοῦτω δὲ [sc. νοῦς ἑπιστήμη τε] ἐν ὑ τῶν ὁντων ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅν ποτέ τις αὐτῷ ἄλλῳ πλήν ψυχήν, πάν μᾶλλον ἡ τάληθες ἐρεῖ, Tim. 36 c; σοφία
133 c.  
\[\textit{\text{άπιθανος = δυσανάπειστος}}\]

133 d.  
\[\textit{oûτω and oûτως.}\]

With regard to the orthography of these words, the insertion of \(c\) before a vowel is plausible. But we must recollect that we can prove that \(\tau\) was not elided, and that \(\muέχρι\) and \(\acute{\alpha}\chiρ\) had no \(c\).

134 c.  
**Objection to the Absolute from the subjective side.**

This brings out the true sense of absolute—\(\text{T}ο \ \text{\text{αννπόθετων}}, \text{Rep. vi.}—\)that which does not depend on anything else for its essence, or outcome, or priority—\(\lambdaόγη)—in order of thought. Of course, \(\text{quà \ γνωστόν}\) to us, it depends on us; but the Absolute may be and is \(\gammaνωστόν\) to itself. With regard to us, it is ultimum relatum; with regard to itself, it is not referred to anything else.

135 a.  
**Objection to the Absolute from the objective side.**

This objection is urged by both Hamilton and Mill, \(\text{δντες} \ \text{έχθιστοι} \ \text{τ}ο \ \text{πρίν}\); but it assumes that because partial knowledge is not plenary knowledge, they therefore contra-
dict each other. How is the geography of Ireland contradictory to the geography of Europe? Plenary knowledge, of course, will correct partial knowledge, and may put it in quite a new light, but the facts on which the partial knowledge is grounded cannot be shaken by the fullest knowledge. Aristotle objects ἀδύνατον χωρίς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία. If χωρίς means that there is a bridgeless chasm between the two, the objection holds—not otherwise. Sense and Intellect are essentially χωρίς, yet every act of Perception is a blending of both. That the objective sphere, or Things-in-themselves, is unknown and unknowable to us, is held by Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Comte. This doctrine is favoured by the antithesis between phenomenon and reality. As a matter of fact, the Greek word is in the present participle, i.e. φαντάσμενον, and meant that which is in the course of appearing, and not φανέν, that which did appear. In a word, the modern means by φαντάσμενον what the Greeks call φάντασμα, a kind of delusive appearance. Carneades distinguishes the act of perception into three parts—τὸ φανταστόν, the object; τὸ φαντασιώμενον, the subject; and φαντασία, the act. Now Plato’s meaning is, that τὰ φαντάμενα, or τὰ γιγνόμενα, are possible, because they are produced by permanent reality which is discernible through them. For his conception of genesis of phenomena, see note 154 c.

137 c-143 a. 

Τὸ ἐν.

Τὸ ἐν, all through the first proposition, means pure unity prior to all evolution. Like Hegel’s Seyn, it has not been stripped of attributes, but is prior to all attributes. It is, like the Seyn, a postulate of completed thought.

137 d. 

πέρας.

Πέρας is the limit ab intra: cf. τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἰκάστου: hence, as τὸ ἐν has neither ab intra, it is ἀπειρον.
NOTES.

This is taken from Melissus Τὸ δὲ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε τελευτήν, ἀπειρον τουχάνει ἔον. Fr. 2. Plato does not discuss the other possibility, argued by Melissus, that ἀπειρον could have limits ab extra: for there cannot be more than one τὸ ἐν.

137 e. Plato's right line.

This definition is exact: it is obvious there can only be one such line; and, if it is unique, it follows it is the shortest in rerum natura. If Helmholtz's reasoning—beings of two dimensions living on the surface of a sphere understood the definition given by Plato, they would see it to be the shortest possible, and that their own geodetic line was not. If they liked to call the latter straight, of course they might; which is as irrelevant as the entire of Helmholtz's argument.

138 c. ἀντι γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

In the Laws—893 b–895—ten modes of motion are specified. Eight of these belong to body: (1), without change of place, i.e. on an axis; (2), with change of place—(a), either without change of base, e.g. a stone sliding on ice; (β), or with change of base, e.g. a ball rolling. The next two are where motion gives rise to—(3), concretion, or (4), decretion. The next two are where concretion is prolonged into (5) growth, or discretion turns into (6) waste. The next is where growth in bulk is prolonged into (7) production of state, and waste into (8) decay. The two movements of mind are (9) to move things other than itself, itself being moved; and (10) to move itself of itself out of a previous state of rest.

The power of transmitting motion as a link in the Chain of Sequence is the only power allowed man by Hume and his followers. The 10th motion includes free-will.
139 b–e.

The One has not Identity with itself or anything else that has distinctness: nor is it distinct from itself or anything else that has distinctness.

That is, the One, being one and nothing else, admits of no relation whatsoever; if it did, there would be unity and relation, something more than unity, and therefore not unity, *q. a. e.*

It cannot even possess Distinctness, for Distinctness means that A is distinct from B, and so B is in turn distinct from A. If, then, Unity possessed Distinctness, it could only be distinct by means of Unity and not by means of Distinctness; but Unity, *ex vi termini,* is not Distinctness. Therefore Το ὁ Ἐν cannot be distinct in itself. A similar argument was urged against St. Anselm, that Unity was not Perfection. The mode of argument is due to the Megarics. The *Aufhebung* is the answer.

139 d. *Source of τὸ ἔτερον.*

*I.e.* supplying the ellipses *εἰ μὴ τούτω—τῷ ἐν εἶναι—'

ἔσται ἔτερον, οὐχ ἔαντι ἔσται ἔτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔαντι

ἔσται ἔτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἔτερον. (See note 127 e.)

141 c. *διαφορότης.*

*Διαφορότης* was read by Proclus, T. vi. 237, and is supported by πνιότης, *Theaetet. 182 a.*

141 e. *γεγόνει.*

For *γέγονεν,* Hermann reads *γεγόνει,* as *γέγονεν* has to be taken in two senses, perfect and past.
NOTES.

141 e. γενηθήσεται.

οὔτ' ἐπείγα γενήθησεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται, will neither come into being, nor be brought into being; will neither come of itself, nor be brought by anything else.

141 e. Ambiguity of ἐν.

Τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐστιν, i. e., Τὸ ἐν is neither the relation Unity, nor the quality Existence.

142 a. ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ.

ἐὰν ἐν τι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ, would it have any affection resulting to it, or proceeding from it: any income or outcome; i. e. either accident or property.

142 a. ὄνομα, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, κ.τ.λ.

Plato gives the following explanation of these terms:—

ὄνομα = the term.

λόγος = definition.

ἐπιστήμη = ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, ὡς δῆλον ἐπερόν τε ὑν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε λεχθέντων τριῶν, i. e. ὄνομα, λόγος, εἰδωλον.—Epist. vii. 342–3.

ἐπιστήμη is the psychical aspect of αὐτῷ, and is a process of intense activity. Plato objects to the sensible figure of the Circle, that it partakes of the Straight, i. e. is really a zigzag line. The Circle then would be the process of describing it without a sensible line (Epist. vii.), and in this way ἐπιστήμη resembles the Kantian schema. The Epistles are considered genuine by Cobet and Grote, and are very characteristic. At all events, the passage in the 7th could only have been written by a great metaphysician.
NOTES.

δόξα, ἐκ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.— Phil. 38 b.
aἰσθήσεις = τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινὴ γιγνόμενον, κοινὴ καὶ κινεῖσθαι.— Phil., 34 a. This is scientifically true: the sensation lasts only as long as the impressed condition of the nerve is kept up.

142 b–155 e. Τὸ ἔν.

In the second proposition, Τὸ ἔν is in combination with ἐστὶ. Each element is distinct before combination and in combination; though the combination may and does give rise to new relations.

142 d—e. Relation of Τὸ ἔν and ὄν.

I. e. τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Ὀντος (Τὸ ὑπὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ὀν), ἃρα ἀπολειπέσθουν, ἣ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ Ὀντος ἐίναι μορίου, ἣ Τὸ Ὀν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐίναι μορίου; i.e. where there is Τὸ Ἐν, Τὸ Ἐν is in combination with Τὸ Ὀν, and Τὸ Ὀν is in combination with Τὸ Ἐν.

ἐίναι, c. gen. = to be a property of: cf. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ-ἐντεῦ ἐὰν ἄν τι, ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; 141 a. Can a nonentity have either accident or property?

142 e. μόριον.

Each one μόριον—either τὸ Ἐν, or τὸ Ὀν—of the two μορία τὸ Ἐν and τὸ Ὀν, holds in combination Ἐν and Ὀν, and so on, ad infinit.

This is strictly true: the universe has unity, and the universe exists; and each of the motes that people the sun’s beam has equally existence and unity. One is Form: Existence is Matter, and to show that the One formulates existence into plurality is the aim of the second part of the Parmenides.
143 c.—144 a.  *Genesis of Number*, i.e. a system of *Monads*.

There are three *συνγνώλαι* or pairs, *viz.*:

- οὐσία and ἕτερον;
- οὐσία and ἐν;
- ἐν and ἕτερον.

Now every pair is ἀμφω, and therefore δυo; therefore each member of the pair is ἐκάτερον, and therefore one: so that in each pair we have two members,

\[ 2 \cdot 1 = 2, \]

and each member being unified by the index 1, we have three symbols,

\[ 3 \cdot 1 = 3. \]

Now where there is Two, we have δίς ἐν, and where there is Three, we have τρις ἐν; where, therefore, there are three symbols, we have two members

\[ (2 \text{ m. } 1 = \text{δίς } \text{ἐν } \text{ὅντων}), \]

and where there are two members we have three symbols

\[ (3 \text{ symbols } . \ 1 = 1 \text{ τρις } \text{ἐν } \text{ὅντων}). \]

Three (symbols) therefore must be two (members), and two (members) must be three (symbols). Therefore ἀρτια (≡ δυo = δίς ἐν) = ἀρτιάκις (≡ δίς ἐν): and περιττά (= τρις = τρις ἐν) = περιττάκις (≡ τρις ἐν): and ἀρτια (≡ δυo, i.e. members) = περιττάκις (≡ τρις ἐν, i.e. symbols; and περιττά (≡ τρις, i.e. symbols) = ἀρτιάκις = (δίς ἐν) members. From this we have the genesis of every number: for 2 = δίς ἐν is ἀρτια ἀρτιάκις, that is even numbers even times; and 3 = τρις ἐν is περιττά περιττάκις, that is, odd numbers odd times; and 2 (members) = 3 (symbols) is ἀρτια, even numbers odd times, περιττάκις; and 3 (symbols) = 2 (members) is περιττά, odd numbers even times, ἀρτιάκις.
NOTES.

143 d. *ou'di μία.*

An instance of Plato's habit of using in the ordinary sense the philosophic word which is under argument: other examples are noticed in note on 157 d.

143 d.

*οὐ τρία γίνεται τὰ πάντα*; i. e. are there not three distinct symbols? lit., are not the distinct things three?

143 d. Interdependence of 2 and 3.

Let there be two roots, *x* and *y*; let them have a common index, say *e.gr.* 1; and let *x* = 1: then we have *x*¹, *y*¹.

We have thus three distinct symbols, *x*, *y*, and 1; *x* and *y* denoting the two roots, and 1 the index common to both. Now, as there are three symbols, the three symbols involve the index twice; that is, *x*¹ and *y*¹; but *x* as a root = 1, and *y* is made one by its index;

∴ *x* and *y*¹ = 1 + 1 = 2. 1 = 2.

Likewise the two roots *x* and *y*, and the identical index 1, require three symbols for their notation;

∴ *x* and *y* and ¹ = 1 + 1¹ + ¹ = 3. 1 = 3.

To apply this:—Whatever admits of the predicate *both*, admits of the predicate two, and the predicate *two* indicates that each of the binaries is one. Now *one* as index being incorporated with each number of each syzygy, each syzygy involves the index twice;

∴ 2. 1 = 2,

and as each syzygy requires, as we have seen, three symbols for its notation, each syzygy involves one thrice,

∴ 3. 1 = 3.
Thus, in Aristotelian language, Three is the Form of Two, and Two is the Matter of Three. Hence, we may see why the Pythagoreans made Two the symbol of indefinite existence, for Matter without Form is indefinite; likewise why they made Three the symbol of definite existence. In the order of existence—φύσει—Three is prior to Two, for we require as prerequisites of Three

(1). The radical 1; = 1 \( \varepsilon \nu \);

(2). The other thing; which = \( \Theta \alpha \tau \varepsilon \rho \omega \nu \), being unquantified, to be construed to thought requires quantification, and thereto requires

(3). The index 1.

Without these we cannot have Two, for 2 = 1 and 1 = 2.1.

143 d–e. Genesis of all the Numbers from \( \Pi \) \( \varepsilon \nu \) and \( \Pi \) \( \delta \nu \).

Supplying ellipses—δυοιν \( \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu \), \( \omicron \upomicron \kappa \ \alpha \nu \alpha \gamma \kappa \eta \ \epsilon \iota \nu \iota \ kai \ \delta \iota \varsigma \ \epsilon \nu \nu \); kai \( \tau \rho \iota \omega \nu \ \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \epsilon \iota \nu \iota \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \ \epsilon \nu \nu \), ε\( \iota \pi \varepsilon \rho \ \upsilon \alpha \rho \chi \varepsilon i \ \tau \omega \ \tau \delta \ \varepsilon \iota \varsigma -\epsilon \nu \), kai \( \tau \Omega \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \ \tau \delta \ \tau \rho \iota \varsigma -\epsilon \nu \); i.e.:

\[ \Pi. = 2 \cdot 1, \text{ and } \Pi I. = 3 \cdot 1. \]

Then, \( \Delta \nu o\nu \ \varepsilon \kappa \ \delta \iota \varsigma -\epsilon \nu \ \kai \ \delta \iota \varsigma -\epsilon \nu \), \( \omicron \upomicron \kappa \ \alpha \nu \alpha \gamma \kappa \ \delta \nu \ \delta \iota \varsigma \ \epsilon \iota \nu \iota \); i.e.

\[ x^1 + y^1 = 1^1 + 1^1 = 1(1^1 + 1^1), \]

but

\[ x \text{ and } y = 2, \text{ and the indices } 1 \text{ and } 1 = 2; \]

∴ we have \( \delta \nu \delta \iota \varsigma \) in the notion II.

So mut. mut. of 3 = 1(1\(^1\) + 1\(^1\) + 1\(^1\)) =

\[ 1x^1 + 1y^1 + 1 \cdot 1^1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3, \]

but

\[ 1 + 1 + 1 = 3; \]

and

\[ x + y + 1' = 3; \]

and indices

\[ 1 + 1 + 1 = 3; \]
we have \( \tau \rho \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \) in the notion \( \text{III.} \). That is, each couple is two things; it is also two single things; and the unity of each single thing is a third thing, \( \text{i.e.} \ x \) and \( y \) and \( 1 \).

In Aristotelian language:—Formed Matter contains (1) Form, and (2) Formless Matter = \( 1 + 1 = \text{II.} \); but Formless Matter is incogitable; therefore we have Matter unified by Form. But Form = \( 1 \); Matter = \( 1 \); and Unification = \( 1 \); \( \therefore 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 \). The mote in the sunbeam contains three metaphysical elements—(1) that which unifies; (2) that which is unified; and (3) the unification of 1 and 2, \( \text{i.e.} \ \text{III.} \). It is a pity the scholastic distinction between \emph{metaphysical} and \emph{physical} is not kept up. Metaphysical entities were those that could not exist separately, \( \text{e.g.} \) concave and convex: physical, those that could, \( \text{i.e.} \ \lambda \gamma \eta \) and \( \phi \upsilon \sigma \varepsilon \).
NOTES.

144 a.

ἀριθμός does not mean a single unit, but a collection of units. Thus one is not ἀριθμός, but two is: ἀριθμός ἐστι πλῆθος ὑποσμένον ἡ μονάδων σύστημα ἡ ποσότητος χύμα ἐκ μονάδων συνκείμενων.—Nic. Ger. i. vii. 1.

In speaking of Numbers, both the Platonists and the Pythagoreans meant always whole numbers, and not fractions, the unit being the foot, lineal, square, and cubic. The numbers, or rather rectangles, were ἀρτίοι, an even base by an even side; περιττοί, an odd base by an odd side; ἀρτίοι περιττάκις, an even base by an odd side; and περιττοὶ ἀρτιάκις, an odd base by an even side.

144 e. Τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμένον.

Justifies ὑπὸ in 166 a.

145 c, d.

A part contains the following notions:

1. Its separate existence;
2. Its own relation to its fellow parts;
3. Its common relation to the whole.

This may be illustrated by a piece of a dissected map. The map is not all the separate pieces one by one—τὰ πάντα—not any one: yet if any piece did not fit, it would not be in the map when it was put together, τὰ ἀπαντά; but if the piece belong to the map, it must be one of the separate pieces.

Metaphysically, all distinct ideas are equally distinct.

145 c, d.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γε ὅλον αὐ oὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πάσιν οὔτε ἐν τινὶ. (ἐι γὰρ ἐν πάσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ. ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὅν οὐκ ἂν ἐτι που δύνατο ἐν γε ἀπασιν εἶναι.)
NOTES.

ei de touto men to ev twv aptantwn esti, to de olon ev toutw
ein, pws eti ev ge tois pasin enestai; oudamiws. oude mhn ev
tisi twv merwv. ei xaro ev tisi to olon eth, to pleson ev ev
ti elaptoun eth, o estin adunaton.

The Whole is distinct from the parts; for if the Whole is in
each quaque of the parts, it must be in some one quavis; and if
that particular part contains the Whole, that one part cannot be
one of the parts.

The argument is: if the Whole is in the parts, it is in all,
some, or one; the clause from ev tivoi to ethai is the converse
opposite of the clause ei xaro ev pasin, anagky kai ev ev.
In the clause to de olon ev toutw [mu] ev, Hermann brackets
[mu]. I have struck it out, as it spoils the argument, which
is: if the Whole is in each part, it is in some one part. If so,
the part thus specialised is differentiated from its former
peers, but it is so differentiated by containing the Whole,
not by not containing it.

Hegel says: The relation of the Whole and the parts is
untrue to this extent—that the notion and the reality of the
relation are not in harmony. The notion of the Whole is to
contain parts; but if the Whole is taken, and made what its
notion implies, i.e., if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a
Whole.—Logic, p. 211. All through the Parmenides it must
be kept in view, that any two notions in any degree distinct
are totally distinct. “Each thing,” says Butler, “is what
it is, and not another thing.”

Ta pantai is the roll or litany of items; apantai is the sum
total of the same items summed: Ta pantai are the parts of
the sum; apantai is the sum of the parts. It is a pity that
modern English has lost its neuter plural and verb singular:
“hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot
deeds, and hot deeds is love.”

145 e. 

The notion Whole is not the notion Aggregate of items:
cf. Kai to olon ek twv merwv legewx gegovos ev ti eidoes etepou
τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ἕγγεε.—Theaet. 204 a, b. The order of notions is—(1) τὰ μέρη; (2) τὰ πάντα; (3) τὰ ἄπαντα; (4) τὸ ὅλον; (5) τὸ πᾶν.

145 e. 

κινεῖσθαι.

Zeno's contribution to thinking is, the showing that motion is relative to a something which is not moved. This is well brought out in the Flying Arrow, which at any given moment coincides with its equivalent in the space through which it is passing.

146 a. 

μηδὲ ἔστάναι, μὴ ἔστως δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

By Excluded Middle; if not the one, it must be the other.

146 a, b. 

ἔτερον.

Hegel's view, that Otherness is negation, is supported by the history of the particle μὴ. If μὴ is etymologically ne, as Curtius mentions, comparing the Lithuanian nei (r. 317), na in the Vedas very often means as, and the order then would be—assertion, comparison, negation: cf. ἀνά and ἄλλος, ib. 307.

146 a–148 e.

1. Everything possesses Identity, and, in that respect, it resembles primarily everything else.

2. Everything is distinct from everything else, and, in that respect, it differs primarily from everything else.

3. In being distinct, it, eo ipso, resembles secondarily everything else; and, therefore,

4. Differs secondarily from everything else by the contrary of diversity—identity.

Hence τὸ ἐν, in possessing either quality, has resemblances, primarily and secondarily, to

(a) itself, and to

(b) ἄλλα; and,
in possessing either quality, has diversities primary and secondary to

(a) itself, and to
(b) ταλλα.

In possessing both, τὸ ἐν

is primarily like itself and ταλλα, and
is primarily unlike itself and ταλλα.

Nothing can be clearer than that Plato held that there were εἰδὴ τῶν πρῶτος τι. Idealism is only the development of relations.

The One is identical and diverse to itself, and is identical and diverse to ταλλα, i.e. all ideas or objects of Reason are equally ideas, and therefore distinct: they all agree in distinctness; but, being distinct, they differ; therefore they agree through Difference, they differ through Identity; and as each has both Identity and Diversity together, each agrees with and differs from itself, and each agrees with and differs from ταλλα. The One agrees with ταλλα in having both qualities; and the very having both qualities is the essence of its individuality.

148 c.

The order of notions is—

(1) ταυτὸν;
(2) μὴ ἄλλοιον;
(3) μὴ ἀνομοιοῖον;
(4) ὦμοιον.

Τὸ Ἐν is ταυτὸν Τοῖς Ἀλλοῖοι;
Τὸ Ἐν is ἔτερον Τῶν Ἀλλῶν.

Taking each case separately:—

(1). Τὸ Ἐν is like ταλλα;
(2). Τὸ Ἐν is unlike ταλλα.
NOTES.

Taking both together—

Τὸ Ἐν is both like and unlike τᾶλλα;

and so, by parity of reasoning,

Τὸ Ἐν is like and unlike itself.

148 d–149 e.

Ancient arithmetic was originally geometrical: hence the notions,

Whole and Parts:

Contact.

149 a.

Contact—ἀψις—presupposes—

1. Something distinct, e.g.

\[ a \quad b \]; and

2. Something else in immediate contiguity to it; e.g.

\[ a \quad b \quad c \].

Here \( a \ b \) is distinct from \( b \ c \), and \( b \ c \) is in immediate contiguity. If to \( b \ c \) we add \( c \ d \),

\[ a \quad b \quad c \quad d \],

\[ \alphaυτὰ \ μὲν \ τρία, \varepsilonσταὶ \ αἱ \ δὲ \ αψις \ δύο. \] Hence, \textit{ad fin.}, the things, τὰ ἀπτόμενα, are always one in advance of \( αἱ \ αψις \). Hence, if τᾶλλα be totally devoid of unity, junction between τὸ Ἐν and τᾶλλα is impossible, for τᾶλλα must be one, before it can combine with τὸ Ἐν to form two.

149 e.

\[ \alphaυταῖς \ γε \ ταῦταις \ ταῖς \ οὐσίαις, \ i.\ e. \ essences, notions, \iδέαι: \]

cf. \textit{Phaed.} 78 c–d.

\[ \varepsilonιδη, \] Stall.
150 a.  

τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἴσοτητος; ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἐαυτῆς.

τί τινος = attribute.

150 c–d.

Τὸ "Εὐ, quā "Εὐ, is ἔν, and nothing else: τάλλα quā ἀλλα, is ἀλλα, and nothing else: τὸ μέγεθος, quā μέγεθος, is μέγεθος, and nothing else: and ἡ σμικρότης, quā σμικρότης, is σμικρότης, and nothing else. Τὸ "Εὐ therefore cannot be greater than τάλλα, nor τάλλα greater than Τὸ "Εὐ: in the same way, neither is less than the other: but if neither greater nor less, they are not unequal, and therefore equal.

So it is commonly said, all infinites are equal. Metaphysically, there is only one infinite, that whose essence it is to have no bounds or limit. It is evident there cannot be two of this nature, for each would overlap, and so bound the other. But in mathematical infinites, infinity merely means infinitely divisible or infinitely addible; i. e. a process which may be worked as long as there is anything to work on. The process is always one and the same, and so infinite: the material is always finite, and may be as different as one pleases.

150 d.

ὑπερέχω takes the genitive; therefore the vexed passage in the Phaedo runs thus, if the ellipses are supplied—one of the surest ways of construing Plato:—Τοῦ μὲν Σωκράτους (τῷ μεγέθει τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὴν σμικρότητα ύπερέχειν) ύπερέχων, i.e., τῷ ύπερέχειν = cause; μεγέθει = instrument; Σωκράτους sub. = gen. on ύπερέχειν; and τὴν σμικρότητα = acc. de quo.

151 a.  

μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Grote says: "Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and com-
parisons of our own senses and consciousness. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One."—Plato, i. 105–6. Here "absolute" is used in the sense of out of all possible range, a sense popularised by the frivolous discussions of Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

151 d.

The order of notions is—

1. Magnitude;
2. Measure;
3. Parts.

151 d.

"But that a thing, which bears no relation to any one (cuivis) given item, should bear any relation to each (cuique) of the sum total of items, to no one of which (cuiquam) does it bear any actual relation either as part or otherwise, is impossible."

151 d–e.

Shadworth Hodgson makes similar remarks on the subjective embracing the objective, and vice versa, Space and Time, pp. 45, sqq.

154 e–d.

Τὸ ἑν does not grow younger or older than τὰλλα, because it is so already: it has had so much start, and equals added to unequals leave the difference absolutely as before; but, if we subtract the difference, the residue is always growing larger, and therefore the difference is growing less relatively to the residue: e.g. A is born a year before B; thus A is always a year older than B; but when A is two years old the relative difference is greater than when A is ninety.
154 c.

γίγνεται, the emphatic word, is not *growing* or *becoming*, because it *is*.

154 c.

γένεσις is explained in the *Laws* thus: γίγνεται δι' πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ' ἂν τι πάθος ὦ; δήλον, ὡς ὁπότεν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὐξην εἰς τὴν δεύτεραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτῆς εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἰσθησιν σχῆ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, 894 a. The steps are—

1. αὐξη;
2. ξείς καθεστηκυία;
3. ξείς μένουσα.

155 c.

μεταλαμβάνειν differs from μετέχειν: μεταλαμβάνω is to coincide in part with, to have share in; μετέχειν is to form one with, to unite with; cf. 158 b.

155 c–157 a.

The One in this hypothesis passes from one state into another, and so do its attributes. The transition takes place through an unextended point: that is, time is cut in two by a timeless point, just as Space is cut in two by a breadthless line. Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point possessed duration. It is well explained by Damascius—ἀμερὲς ἐστι τῇ ἴδιότητι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον.

156 a–157.

The notion is, any one state or condition which passes into a different condition has to pass through an intermediate
NOTES.

state, in which it is neither what it was nor what it is in course of becoming. Anaxagoras, from whom Plato took much of his Physics, says: οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοψαι πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, Fr. 13 Mullach. This joined with his doctrine, adopted by Plato, that there is no minimum, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ γε ἐστι τὸ γε ἐλάχιστον, ἄλλ' ἐλάσσον αἰεί, necessitates the presence of τὸ ἐν in and out of Space and Time.

156 d–e.

ἀὖ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ὑ τὸ τῶν ἐν ὑπ ὑτε μετα-
βάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δῆ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης . . . (see 155 e).

157 b–159 b.

Here Τάλλα owe their predicates to their participation of τὸ ἐν. Cetera and ceterum are very inadequate renderings of the Greek neuter plural, Τάλλα expressing neither unity nor plurality, but food for both.

157 b.

Here we have the full phrase τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

157 c.

The correlatives are δῶν and μόρια: now τὸ δῶν = πολλ-
ὰ μόρια, therefore any one μόριον is not μόριον of τὰ πολλὰ
μόρια, but of τὸ δῶν. For unless τὸ μόριον—any given part
—be part of itself, there must be one part of the lot of which
the given Part is not part. Consequently if the given Part
be a part of many parts, it must be a part of the parts minus
the given Part. But if it be a part of the other parts, it must
be a part of every one of the several parts taken by them-
selves, since *qua* parts the parts are similar, and therefore must be a part of itself: *q. a. e.* E. g. a shilling is part of a pound, but a shilling is not a part of the several shillings which make up the pound. For, if it be a part τὸν πολλὰς shillings, it must be either a part of itself, *q. a. e.*, or of the remaining nineteen shillings. But as the other nineteen shillings, when out of relation to the pound, are nineteen totally independent units, the Part must be a part of them *qua* units, and therefore of every one of them (since there is no difference between them *qua* units), and therefore of itself, which is exactly similar to the rest. A Part is correlative to a Whole, but it has no relation whatsoever to any one or all of the other parts, save that of being a fellow-part of the same integer.

In Plato's day, abstract language was taken from Geometry; perhaps *fraction* and *integer* would be better renderings of μόριαν and ὄλον. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same reasoning is triumphant against Natural Realism, substituting Quality for Part, and Body for Whole. The Natural Realist makes all qualities, minus one, depend on the residual quality; so that we have either a quality which is more than a quality, or which is not a quality. The same reasoning applies to the Antithesis of Kant's Fourth Antinomy.

157 a. *ἰόν.*

Justifies the vulgate in *Phaedr.*, 249 b.

157 b.

The order of notions in the order of analysis is—

1. εἴναι;
2. γίγνεσθαι;
3. συγκρίνεσθαι;
4. ὁμοιοῦσθαι.

Order of genesis *e contra.*
The Platonic μέθεξις is best illustrated by the Concret of Hegel, i.e. where an object or thought is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements—to be a process in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of view; each object to be equal to itself, multiplied into all other things.—Wallace's Hegel, clxxvi. Cicero makes use of the same principle: semper enim ita assumit aliquid (sc. natura) ut ea quae prima dederit, ne deserat.—De Fin. iv. 14. It is the ideal side of the doctrine of Development.

157 c. μετέχει πη.

Here, c—τὸ γε ὅλον = ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν in d, = ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλαιον γεγονός.

157 d. ἀδύνατον εἶναι: Sc. ἐστι.

Plato often uses words both in the ordinary and philosophic sense in the same passage: cf. οὐδὲ µία, 143 d: αὐτοῦ Παρµενίδου, 136 d: ἀπειροῦ, Phil. 17 e: συµφέρεσθαι, Theaet. 152 e.

157 e.

Τὰλλα participates in Τὸ “Ἐν through τὸ ὅλον; in modern language, through the notion Law, i.e. in the scientific meaning of the term, when “we think of the parts as held together by a certain force.” This is Hamilton’s description of physical unity.—Reid, 852.

158 a. δ ἄν ᾗ µόριον ὅλον.

So the MSS., and they are right. The conjecture µορίου ὅλον is a mere truism, for the notion Whole is the correlation
of the notion Part. But μόριον ὡλον is emphatic, that which is a genuine part, and not a part per accidens. A shilling is \( \frac{1}{20} \) of the amount of silver defined to be a legal pound: it is therefore, \( quā \frac{1}{20}, μόριον ὡλον \), because \( \frac{1}{20} \times 20 = 1 \); whereas a shilling \( quā \) shilling is only one amongst any number of shillings, and is only \( \frac{1}{20} \) of £1, per accidens, just as it is \( \frac{1}{10} \) of £5. Each part must be one, because the parts are πολλά. Cf. οὐδ’ ἄρα πολλά ἐστι Τάλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἄν ἦν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὡλον, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν. 159. Besides, the proposed change would require τοῦ μορίου τὸ ὡλον.

158 e.

The order of notions is—

1. ἀπειρα καὶ πεπερασμένα;
2. ἐναντία;
3. ἀνόμοια.

159 a. Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον.

(1). Τάλλα quā πεπερασμένα are similar;
(2). Τάλλα quā ἀπειρα are similar;
(3). Τάλλα quā πεπερασμένα καὶ ἀπειρα are dissimilar, both per se and inter se.

ἀμφοτέρως, i.e. as uniting two opposite predicates, a double contrariety, ἐναλλάξ,

(1). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἀπειρα.

(2). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἀπειρα.

159 b–160 b.

Τάλλα are capable of no predicates whatsoever, if the One be one in aloofness. The key to this section is the notion
χωρίς—aloofness—the negation of actual relation. The One is allowed to be, but is relegated to isolation.

160 a.

Illustrates Hypothesis ii., as the order of Number is ἐνός, ἓνοιν, τριῶν, περιττοῦ, ἄρτιον. The order is objective, φύσει.

160 b–d. τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Negation is considered as relative to knowledge, and thus giving rise to the notion ἐτερον—otherness—distinctness.

160 b.

The order of notions is—

1. γνωστῶν;
2. ἐτερον.

The order is subjective.

160 d–163 b.

The One in this section, though non-existent, admits of positive predicates, which are contrary opposites. Here the One is granted what we would call a subjective existence.

160 e.

In scholastic language τὸ μὴ-ὄν has—

1. Illudditas;
2. Quidditas;
3. Hocceitas.
If ὰ Ἐν have unlikeness to one, then the argument will not turn on anything like ὰ Ἐν, nor will the hypothesis relate to one, but to something different. That is, ὰ Ἐν, the subject of discussion, must have unity for its essence; if not, the hypothesis deals with something else. Mr. Jowett ignores the difference between ὰ Ἐν and Ἐν.

Τὸ μὴ ὄν has ὄσια + μὴ-ὄσια; it therefore involves μεταβολὴ; and therefore all incompatible predicates. Here we have Hegelianism in concreto, as applied to ὰ ὄν. Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his Philosophy of Reflection, attacks Hegelianism on the following grounds, which apply equally to Plato’s proposition. It must be premised that Mr. Hodgson uses the term contradictory to signify, not the opposition of general and particular, but that between a proposition and its negative, i.e. difference of quality only: e.g. Α is Α, Α is not Α; while by a contrary he means that the negative particle joins on to the predicate: e.g. Α is Α, Α is not-Α. To resume, the objection is as follows: “The evolution of the concrete concept is his (Hegel’s) fundamental idea; it evolves itself by Entgegensetzung, a concrete opposition containing undistinguished the purely logical opposition of contradiction, and the opposition of content, which is contrariety. The former gives the motive power, the latter the order and arrangement, of the evolution. Thus the pure Nothing, Nichts, at the beginning is logically opposed to the pure Being, Sein; hence the movement between them. There is no opposition of content, no difference of content at all, between them, until they are conceived together; then they are perceived to be different in content, but at the same time to be a process, a Werden, not (either of them) a state or thing. The Whole makes one undistinguishable process of opposition, a becoming, Entgegensetzung, a Werden. To analyse
this process, to show what is due to perception, what to concep-
tion, what part of the opposition is due to content, and
what to logical contradiction, would be to destroy it as a
theory of the universe."—Vol. i. pp. 384, 5. Again: "Of
two wholly contradictory terms, the one is thought as exis-
tent, the other as non-existent." "The negative member of
a pair of contradictory terms, which is a pure creature of
logical method, analogous to imaginary quantities in mathe-
matics, is treated by Hegel as if it were a concept with a
perceptual content. The "Nichts" at the beginning of the
Logik is the first instance of it."—p. 382.

The question is, What is the value of a creature of logic?
And here comes in the work of Kant. Kant showed that
the intelligible element was indispensable. The universe was
not a lot of separate things, set in an intellectual substratum,
like stars in the heavens. No; the intelligible was required
both for the stars and for the space in which they float. Be
this theory as it may, it was extended by Hegel to the
object; hence, in rerum natura, the intelligible element has
more reality than its content, so far as that content is
sensible. But as logic is the explicit statement of the in-
telligible, it follows that the logical form has more Wahrheit
than its sensible padding. As to negation, which is the
point of the process, Mr. Hodgson makes it arise from our
fixing our attention on some one in a train of differents
(p. 376). But surely things are different because they are
already differenced, and the logical description of differen-
tiation is Otherness, or Negation. And as before, the
Negation of Logic is more real than the same material of
sensation.

162 a.

I. e. δεῖ αὐτὸ Τὸ μὴ ὁ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-δὲν δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-
εἶναι (ἐ μέλλει μὴ-εἶναι), ὁμοίως ὡσπερ δεῖ Τὸ ὁ ἔχειν
τὸ μὴ εἶναι Τὸ-μὴ ὁ δεσμὸν τοῦ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐτὸν
εἶναι ὑπὲρ τῆς τινος οὐκ.
I. e. Τὸ μὴ-"Ον requires as a security for its existence as μὴ-ὁν, that the proposition should be affirmative; i.e.

Τὸ μὴ-"Ον is μὴ-ὁν;

and Τὸ"Ον requires in the same way that the proposition should be negative; i.e.

Τὸ"Ον is not μὴ-ὁν.

Here Plato apparently regards affirmation and negation as an affection of the copula. The reasoning assumes that contrariorum eadem scientia. This is true of reflex, but not of direct consciousness. Of course all Philosophy is reflex.

162 a.

μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὅν οὐσίας (μὲν) τοῦ εἶναι-ὁν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-ὁν. μὲν is understood after the first οὐσίας by a common ellipse: cf. τὸ δὲ μὴ-ὁν, μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-ὁν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-ὁν. For sense see preceding note, ib. b.

162 a.

I. e. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-ὁν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-ὁν (ἀλλὰ ἀνύησε τι τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ-ὁν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-ὁν), εὑθὺς τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔσται ὁν.

ἀλλὰ introduces the same proposition in another form, thus:

εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-ὁν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-ὁν = the non-existent is non-existent: an affirmative proposition: ἀλλὰ introduces it in another form: if the non-existent gives up its being non-existent, and becomes not being the non-existent, the negatives are cancelled, and the non-existent exists.

It may be rendered, "if it does allow the affirmative essence of the Copula—the is—to merge in the negative essence of the
NOTES. 97

Predicate—the \textit{is not}—the Copula becomes \textit{is not}; and there-
by cancels the \textit{is-not} of the Predicate.”

\textit{άνήσει} is metaphorically the correlative of \textit{δεσμός}, \textit{infra},
unless it hold fast by and not let its \textit{is} slip into \textit{is-not}.

163 b–164 b.

In this proposition, \textit{τὸ ἡν} is totally deprived of \textit{ἔστι}, and
the emphasis is on \textit{οὐσίας ἀπουσία}.

164 a–b.

This conclusion is apparently the same as that of the
First Hypothesis. In reality nothing can be more diverse.
In the former case, The One possesses actually \textit{no} predicate in
particular, although, as the second proposition shows, it is
capable of combining with all predicates whatsoever. In the
latter case, The One has actually \textit{no} predicate at all, because
it is incapable of having any.

164 b–165 e.

In this proposition \textit{οὐσία} is taken away from the \textit{τὸ ἡν},
and the effect on \textit{τὰλλα} is considered. The result is \textit{φαίνεσθαι}, \textit{i.e.} a presented unity in things, somewhat like the Cause
and Substance of Hume, mere fictions. This is the view set
forth by Brown, Lect. V. The emphasis is on \textit{φαίνεται}.

164 b.

This proposition represents the views held by the majority
of British philosophers and scientific men of the present day.
Unity exists only in the mind; the object, according to cir-
cumstances, is only a majus or a minus in Quantity, Quality,
or Degree.
In this proposition, **οὐσία** is totally denied of **τὸ ἐν**: what amount of **οὐσία**, then, can **τὰλλα** retain? None whatever; not even the impression—**δόξα**—can be produced by **Τᾶλλα**. That is to say, in the non-existence of The One, **Τᾶλλα** cannot produce in us the idea of quasi-unity allowed in the last hypothesis. Real unity being no more, artificial unity is gone too. Hume's quasi-idea is impossible.

MSS. **ὑπό**, rightly. The meaning is, the **δόξα τὸ μὴ ὑν** is never produced by **τὰλλα**. **ὑπό** is applied to the action of a notion, **διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκλίνου**, sc., **ἐνὸς—πάθος**. **Soph.** 245 d, e. **δοξάζω** is used passively in this dialogue.

This is the solemn conclusion, the amen of the exposition. Nothing can be in worse taste than to censure the dialogue as **ἀπονυ**. An ethical discourse, which deals with our emotions, may conclude with an allegory; but a discussion like the *Parmenides*, conducted with mathematical formality and colourlessness, would show against the gorgeousness of a Platonic myth, somewhat like the Parthenon in a transformation scene.
APPENDICES.
THE fragments of Zeno, which illustrate the notion ῥα πολλά and its results, are as follows:—

1. εἰ πολλά ἦστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσάῦτα εἶναι ὡς ἦστιν, καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. Εἰ δὲ τοσάῦτα ἦστιν ὡς ἦστι, πεπερασμένα ἰὰν εἴη. Which conclusion conflicts with Τὸ ἔν.

2. εἰ πολλὰ ἦστιν, ἀπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἦστιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐτερα μεταξύ τῶν ὄντων ἦστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἐτερα μεταξύ. Καὶ οὔτως ἀπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἦστι. Which conclusion conflicts with the former, and both with Τὸ ἔν.

3. εἰ πολλὰ ἦστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρὰ τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μὲν, ὡστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὡστε ἀπειρα εἶναι. Zeno here points out the true objection to the atom and space as metaphysical ultima: the atom is all quality, and space is all quantity.

Zeno’s arguments against motion bring the fact, when analysed, into collision with Τὸ ἔν. Thus motion takes place from point to point, therefore within determinate limits: therefore, to make motion rational, intelligible things must be πεπερασμένα: q.a.e. Again, the space between the points is ἀπειρον: q.a.e.
The Flying Arrow is made comprehensible by Mr. Proctor's *Photographs of a Galloping Horse.* At a given moment, the horse is point-blank to the plate. Professor Monck's objection, that the body might move during the breaks,† would have served Zeno, for it would bring out his point that rest is motion and motion rest.

Plato makes much use of Zeno; for ῥή ἔλθε, being ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, is on the way to motion.

* * 

* Gentleman's Magazine, December, 1881. 
† Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 98.
APPENDIX B.

ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρώπος.

PLATO'S method of specification is given most fully in the *Philebus*, 14 c–18 d. It has nothing to do with referring, say, an individual man to the class Man, a process which is justly caricatured in Ὅ τρίτος ἀνθρώπος. If the man is in the class, why do you take him out of it? If he is not in it, how do you get him into it? By a medium, which must be related, and both; therefore Ὅ τρίτος ἀνθρώπος is irrepressible.

The Platonic process states that there is a unity which can be discerned; that such unity is one pole, while the other is lost in indefiniteness, τὸ ἄπειρον; that the investigator must discover and count the varieties which lie between the two limits, and in that way approach real unity; and when such unity is discovered, we may then disregard the endless variety of intermediate details. It is, therefore, a process of positive research, and not a barren negative. The thing is to be found, if we search, εὐφόσειν γὰρ ἐνώσαι. The basis of the process is Τὸ ἐν, just as the basis of Aristotle's view is the existence of γένη in nature. Mill, similarly, has to build his logic on causation, as he understands it; but, to the consistent empirical, there can be no basis of logic except τὸ
συμβεβηκός. "All things," says Hegel, "are a judgment: that is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves. They are a universal, which is individuality. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other."* Plato's process, as well as Hegel's, is safe against ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρώπος, which no empirical logic is.

* Wallace's Hegel, p. 258.