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GORDON'S CAMPAIGN IN CHINA

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WITH

An Introduction and Short Account of the Tai-Ping Rebellion .

By COLONEL R. H. VETCH, C.B.
Retired List, Royal Engineers

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INTRODUCTION.

In some of the biographies of Charles George Gordon -notably in the latest by Mr. Demetrius C. Boulger, published in 1896—fairly good accounts have been given of the campaign in China in which Gordon commanded an army of irregular Chinese for the suppression of the Tai-ping-rebellion. Several works have also been published dealing solely and at length with this part of Gordon's career. Of these the most considerable are: (1) The "Ever Victorious Army," A History of the Chinese Campaign under Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Gordon, C.B., R.E., and of the Suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion, by Andrew Wilson, formerly editor of The China Mail, published by William Blackwood & Sons in 1868; (2) General Gordon's Private Diary of his Exploits in China, amplified by Samuel Mossman, editor of The North China Herald during Gordon's suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion, published by Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington in 1885; and (3) Events in the Taiping Rebellion, being Reprints of MSS. copied by General Gordon, C.B., in his own handwriting, with

Monograph, Introduction, and Notes, by A. Egmont Hake, editor of General Gordon's Journal at Khartoum, &c., published by W. H. Allen & Co. in 1891.

Mr. Andrew Wilson, whose book is much the best of the three, had the advantage of writing his work not long after the events recorded and in communication with Gordon, who gave him access to his journals, correspondence, and other papers connected with the Tai-ping campaign. But, as Colonel Charles C. Chesney, a brother-officer of Gordon, pointed out in his Military Biographies; by introducing into his work disquisitions on the Chinese system of philosophy, the foreign policy of Pekin, and a variety of other topics, Mr. Wilson contrived to obscure what he intended to illustrate, and managed to bury a great epic under a heap of information which could only be adequately set forth in several ponderous volumes.

12

The second work—Mr. Mossman's—is mere bookmaking. Gordon's rough notes, which Mr. Mossman dignifies with the name of a private diary, were no doubt scribbled off in the interval of operations in the field to oblige the editor of *The North China Herald* by enabling him to furnish his readers with articles on the progress of the campaign. They were evidently written in haste, did not occupy more than twenty pages of foolscap, and were marked in

red ink "Private paper, not to leave Mr. Moss-man's hands." Mr. Mossman does not explain how, with such an inscription, he came to publish the paper. Its contents—less than fourteen pages of printed matter—are scattered throughout a book of three hundred pages, and the term "amplified" on the title-page is fully justified.

Mr. Mossman naively tells us that when he came to England after the Tai-ping war was over, Gordon asked him to write a history of the suppression of the rebellion; that the proposal fell through because Mr. Mossman desired that it should be published with Gordon's imprimatur, which he objected to give; and that "another party undertook the task, which appeared in magazine and book form under the title of The Ever Victorious Army." That is Mr. Andrew Wilson's book, which appeared originally in Blackwood's Magazine, and was afterwards published separately with many additions.

The last of the three works mentioned, and the most bulky — running to over 500 pages—is a detailed account of the rebellion and its suppression, preceded by reflections of the editor upon Gordon as a leader of men, and upon the foreign relations of the Chinese Empire during the Tai-ping rebellion, and followed by the Reminiscences of Major Story, who served under Gordon. It is not stated

how much of the main portion of the work was found in Gordon's handwriting, nor whether he accepted any responsibility for its correctness, and the names of the authors of the original are not Small pains have been taken in editing given. the work, and there are mistakes and contradictions which, with some overlapping of parts, give the impression of a compilation from various sources. It is difficult for anyone acquainted with Gordon to imagine him copying out with his own hand the whole of so lengthy a document, the latter part of which abounds with the phrase "Major Gordon did this" and "Major Gordon did that," and still more difficult is it to suppose that he would not have inserted marginal corrections where he disagreed with the narrative.

No apology need therefore be made—on the score of what has been already published—for presenting to the public Gordon's own account of the suppression of the Tai-ping rebellion, which is both shorter and simpler than that edited by Mr. Hake, and differs from it in some details. In any case, it would be of public interest simply because it was written by Gordon, but it is also a clear, concise, and necessarily an authentic narrative of the events in which he took so prominent a part. It bears the characteristic feature of self-effacement, for although he was

the leading personality in the incidents which he chronicles, he rarely alludes to himself.

Just now the eyes of the whole civilised world are fixed with the deepest interest upon the tragical A death-struggle has drama playing in China. commenced between East and West, between the representatives of modern civilisation and all that the term embraces, and the effete institutions of ancient semi-barbarous races, between isolated selfsufficiency and collective self-interest. moment is opportune to publish an authoritative account of the suppression of a rebellion of Chinese subjects, which, born in discontent with the existing Government, and influenced by foreigners, and even by Christianity, overran a large part of China, developed into a cruel and fanatical despotism, professed a grotesque and blasphemous creed, and having seated itself for years in the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang—a standing menace to Shang-hai and the provinces in which British interests preponderate—was finally destroyed by Gordon.

The notes, now for the first time published by permission of Miss E. M. Dunlop, General Gordon's niece, and of the Committee of the Royal Engineers Institute, were written by Gordon, for the information of his brother officers, and contributed to Vol. xix. of The Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal

Engineers, 1871. These papers at that time were not published, but were printed for the use of the officers of Royal Engineers only. Gordon's contribution formed No. xiii. of the volume, and was entitled, Notes on the Operations Round Shanghai in 1862-63-64, by Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Gordon, C.B., R.E.

As Gordon gives no information as to the origin and history of the Tai-ping rebellion, a brief summary of it, and an account of how he came to be at hand to command the force which suppressed it, will form an appropriate introduction to Gordon's own narrative.

ROBERT H. VETCH.

London, 1900.

SHORT HISTORY OF THE TAI-PING REBELLION.

Hung-sen-tsuen, the originator and leader of the rebellion, who afterwards styled himself the "Tien Wang," or "Heavenly King," was the son of a small farmer, who lived near the North River, within thirty miles of Canton, and belonged to a race of squatters called "Hakkas," or "Strangers," considered almost too low to be entitled to enter the civil service of the State—the natural privilege of every true-born Chinaman. Hung was born in 1813, and when he attained to manhood, whether from prejudice on account of his race, or from his own want of ability, he was repeatedly unsuccessful in the competitive examinations at Canton, and failed to take a degree.

Disappointment and poverty, as well as ambition and revenge, combined to work upon a diseased imagination, and instigated him to action against the Government and the established order of things. He developed into a religious fanatic. He set himself up as a reformer and the destroyer of the

system of idolatry, venerated by the followers of He became subject to trances and Confucius. ecstasies, and was soon the admired leader of a large band of followers. He read Christian tracts, and in 1847 put himself under the teaching of a halfeducated American missionary, with the result that he engrafted on his own superstitions all kinds of fantastic caricatures of Christianity. Finding favour with the missionaries, his subtle mind imbibed their instruction only to use it to advance his own pretensions to a divine mission. He lived concealed in the hills, propagating a new creed, which was eagerly accepted by thousands of the poor and wretched who had nothing to lose and everything to gain by revolution.

The new creed abhorred idolatry, adopted the ten commandments as its moral code, and the belief in one God as its main tenet. Although it was certainly an advance upon Confucianism, it was a curious medley of very partially comprehended Christian dogma, gross superstitions, and the glorification of its chief apostle Hung-sen-tsuen.

An attempt to arrest Hung in 1850 led him to proclaim his intention to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, and to establish a new one, named "Taiping," or "Universal Peace," in its place, with himself at its head, under the title of the "Tien-Wang,"

or Heavenly King. His adherents, whose number rapidly assumed large proportions, allowed their hair to grow long, and twisted it round their heads like a turban, in token of their allegiance to the "Tien-Wang." They plundered and massacred wherever they went. Hung nominated five of his friends, of the same low extraction as himself, to be "Wangs." They were given commands, and were known as the Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, and Assistant Kings.

Hung's ability as an organiser and as a leader was unquestionable. The army was organised on the system of the Chow dynasty, divided into divisions and regiments. Instructions for discipline were issued in careful detail. A civil administration was also elaborated.

After various successes in the south the "Tien-Wang" left Yung-gan, which he had captured, and with a large army commenced his predatory march to the north early in 1852. Although frequently defeated, city after city fell before him until in March, 1853, he captured Nankin, the second city of the Empire, massacring 20,000 Manchus he found there. By the rapidity of his movements, aided by the peculiar Chinese system which makes each province independent and careless of the welfare of the other, and provides no permanent military organisa-

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tion for home defence or the suppression of outbreaks, he had succeeded in establishing himself on the Yang-tse-Kiang, and had thus cut the Empire in two. He strengthened the defences of Nankin and other places by means of forced labour, and laid in an ample store of provisions to enable the city to stand a prolonged siege.

Having dispatched an army to march on Pekin, the "Tien-Wang" lived in retirement in his palace, where he led a life of self-indulgence and fanaticism. He displayed considerable administrative ability, and although he never appeared in public, he nevertheless retained a remarkable power over his adherents both as their religious and secular head.

The sympathy of the missionaries, and even of the foreign consuls and officials, in spite of the wholesale massacres of Manchus, had been with the Tai-pings, who were represented as a people struggling to be free, with aspirations after a purer faith. The missionary, Dr. Medhurst, author of China: Its State and Prospects, 1853, wrote: that "it would be sad to see Christian nations engaged in putting down the movement, as the insurgents possess an energy and a tendency to improvement and general reform which the Imperialists never have exhibited and never can be expected to display." (Parliamentary Papers, 1853.) In May, 1853, Sir George Bonham,

the Governor of Hongkong, officially visited Nankin to inform the "Tien-Wang" as to our treaty with China, and of our intention to remain neutral.

In the autumn of the same year a secret organisation called "Triads," aided by the mob, gained possession of the native city of Shang-hai, while a similar rising, with a like result, occurred at the same time at Amoy. The foreign settlement at Shang-hai was in a state of siege, protected by the foreign menof-war at the anchorage and by a volunteer corps ashore. This state of affairs lasted for more than a year, during which time an Imperial army besieged the rebels without effect. In December, 1854, the French admiral assisted in the attack, bombarded the native city, and landed a storming party, which was repulsed; and it was not until famine compelled the rebels, in February, 1855, to make a sortie that possession of the town was recovered by the Imperialist authorities.

The damage done to trade, and the heavy losses entailed on the China merchants of the European settlements by these risings, made foreign Governments doubt the wisdom of their policy of a benevolent neutrality in favour of the Tai-pings; and the fear that the spread of the rebellion might endanger the European interests at the mouth of the Yangtse-Kiang gradually led to a conviction that both for

the sake of civilisation and trade the rebellion should be put down.

In the meantime, the army dispatched by the "Tien-Wang" to march on Pekin, devastating the country on its way, succeeded in forcing the Lin-Limming pass, and entered the metropolitan province of Pe-chi-li, reaching Tsing-hai at the end of October, 1853. Here it was within twenty miles of Tien-tsin. and a hundred miles of Pekin. The Emperor was seriously alarmed for the safety of his dynasty, and strenuous and successful efforts were made to ward off the impending danger. The rebels, opposed, in front, by the Tien-tsin militia and the Mongol cavalry and, in rear, by the levies of Hunan, were soon besieged in their hastily-fortified camp at Tsing-hai. Another army was sent from Nankin to their relief. and in March, 1854, the retreat of the combined armies began. It proved slow and disastrous. March, 1855, not a Tai-ping remained north of the Yellow River, and but a small remnant made good their retreat to Nankin.

Several missionaries, who had hitherto believed that the Tai-pings were paving the way for the triumphant spread of Christianity, visited Nankin after these occurrences. They were speedily disillusioned. They found that the grotesque and blasphemous adoption of Christian terms covered the grossest superstition. The illusion, however, had already been imported to England, and among the supporters of foreign missions much sympathy was exhibited with the rebels. An illusion is always difficult to dispel, and the favoured idea at home that the rebels, if not Christians, were at any rate favourable to Christianity, took a long time to eradicate. This accounts for the want of enthusiasm exhibited some years later, when mail after mail brought intelligence of victories gained by Gordon in his energetic efforts to smash up the "Heavenly King".

The "Tien-Wang's" life of retirement gave considerable scope to the power and ambitions of his lieutenants. Jealousy and intrigue were rife. The Eastern King endeavoured to supplant his master, and was assassinated by the Northern King at Nankin, and some twenty thousand of his adherents were massacred. Then the Northern King put to the sword all the adherents of the Assistant King, until his cruelties and arrogance at last caused a rising in Nankin, and he massassinated by order of the "Tien-Wanga"

These internal dissensions would have proved fatal to the Tai-ping cause had it not been for the appearance of a new figure on the scene—a young officer, Le-tze-ching by name, afterwards known as the "Chung Wang," or "Faithful King," who had

risen rapidly by the skill and bravery he had dis-He distinguished himself in his first command by defeating a large Imperial army besieging Ching-Kiang, and subsequently by driving the main Imperial army from their trenches before Nankin. He was the most able of all the "Wangs." Gordon wrote of him: "He was the bravest, most talented, and enterprising leader the rebels had. He had been in more engagements than any other rebel leader, and could always be distinguished. His presence with the Tai-pings was equal to a reinforcement of five thousand men, and was always felt by the superior way in which the rebels resisted. He was the only rebel chief whose death was to be regretted; the others, his followers, were a ruthless set of bandit chiefs."

The struggle went on, the Imperialists were gradually gaining ground, and the prospects of the Tai-pings were becoming critical, when this country became embroiled with China. In 1856 difficulties with the Chinese local government at Canton came to a head with the lorcha Arrow incident, when the British admiral took action, which led to our second war with China. Canton was captured in December, 1857, the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho taken in May, 1858, and the Chinese Government forced to conclude the treaty of Tien-

tsin at the end of the following June. The treaty provided for a British and a French resident at Pekin, but, on the urgent representation of the Chinese Government as to the embarrassment which such a humiliation would cause them in face of the Tai-ping rebellion, it was decided to allow the provision to remain in abeyance until the exchange of the treaty ratifications should take place at Pekin in the following year.

In 1859 the Hon. (afterwards Sir) Frederick Bruce, Lord Elgin's brother, was appointed British plenipotentiary to exchange the treaty ratifications at Pekin, but on arriving at the mouth of the Peiho his further progress was opposed. The Taku forts were then attacked by the gunboats of the British fleet, and by troops landed to assault. The attack was repulsed with the loss of three gunboats and three hundred men, and it was decided to withdraw and await instructions from home.

An anti-foreign feeling manifested itself by riots at some of the treaty ports, notably at Shang-hai. England and France resolved upon combined action, and a joint naval and military expedition was sent to support the plenipotentiaries, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, in their demand for the ratification of the treaty and an indemnity. The demand was categorically refused. The English and French

forces under Generals Sir Hope Grant and de Montauban landed at Pehtang on the Peh-tang river in August, 1860, to attack the northern Taku forts in Sin-ho was captured on 12th August, Tangku two days after, and the redoubtable Taku forts were carried by assault on the 21st August. The expedition advanced to Tien-tsin and Ho-si-wu, when Mr. (afterwards Sir) Harry Parkes, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Loch and others went to Tung-chow under a flag of truce to arrange preliminaries of negotiations between the plenipotentiaries, and were made prisoners; while the allies were confronted by a Chinese army. The victories of Chan-chia-wan and Pa-le-chiaw on the 18th and 21st September cleared the way to Pekin, and the summer palace of the Emperor, near that city, was occupied on 7th October.

Gordon joined the army at Pa-le-chiaw and took part in the march to Pekin, the occupation of the An-ting gate, and the state entry of the plenipotentiaries. On the conclusion of peace a force of three thousand men under Brigadier-General (afterwards Sir) Charles Staveley was left at Tien-tsin and in occupation of the Taku forts, pending the payment of the indemnity. To this force Gordon was attached, and he remained there until, the Chinese Government having sufficiently complied

with treaty obligations, headquarters were moved to Shang-hai in the spring of 1862.

The diversion caused by the European embroilment, and the subsequent war which China had to wage with England and France, had given fresh life to the Tai-ping cause, and the valour and capacity of the "Chung-Wang" enabled the rebels to retrieve their fortune. By the end of May, 1860, they held Nankin, Tung-Ching, Hochow, Tung-pu, Ngan-kin, Wu-hu, the Two Pillars, Tai-ping-fu, Su-chow, Quinsan, Tsing-pu, Tai-tsan, and other places, and were prepared to make a dash at Shanghai. Such was the alarm of the Chinese Governor-General of the Two Kiangs that, while the French expedition was preparing at Shang-hai for the Pekin campaign, he actually applied for its aid to attack the Tai-pings! All the assistance he could obtain from the European enemies of his country was a guarantee given in a proclamation of the 26th May, 1860, that Shang-hai should be protected. Some troops were therefore left at Shang-hai on the departure of the expedition.

The Chinese authorities at Shang-hai themselves made preparations to recover from the rebels some of the neighbouring places, and the wealthy inhabitants, headed by one Ta-kee and the foreign merchants, guaranteed funds for raising and paying a

small force of foreigners to fight against the rebels. Some American adventurers—Frederick Ward, Forrester and Burgevine, of the filibustering type, were engaged to organise the force, which Ward commanded, with the other two as his deputies. Ward's first operation was an unsuccessful attack, with about one hundred foreigners-mostly seafaring men-on Sung-Kiong in July. After augmenting his force by a company of Manilla men, he seized a gate of the city and held it gallantly until the Imperialists were able to come up and drive the Tai-pings out of the city. This success, and the high rate of pay given to the men of the force, with special payments by results, attracted plenty of recruits. August, Ward attacked Sing-pu, but was himself severely wounded, and his force driven back with great loss.

On the 18th August, 1860, the "Chung Wang" advanced, burning everything before him, and attacked the Imperialists within a mile of Shanghai, driving them into the city; but the European troops in garrison manned the walls and repulsed the rebels. The attack was renewed on the two succeeding days, but easily repulsed. The "Chung Wang" then relinquished the attempt on Shang-hai, but devastated the country round and captured Ping-hu and other towns.

About this time Mr. Holmes, an American missionary, visited Nankin. He found the "Tien-Wang" had developed his creed, had assumed the position of a Person of the Godhead and bestowed divine honours on his son. He also displayed an arrogance towards foreigners that completely prevented Mr. Holmes from entertaining any hope that missionary enterprise would succeed in Nankin, and he came away thoroughly convinced that the missionaries had been the victims of gross deception.

The treaty of peace signed at Pekin at the end of October, 1860, left the British admiral, Sir James Hope, free to turn his attention to the question of treaty ports opened by it to trade and to the detrimental influence exercised on trade by the Tai-ping rebellion. In February, 1861, he went up the Yangtse-Kiang to Nankin, and entered into an agreement with the "Tien-Wang" by which, if the European Powers remained neutral, the Heavenly King bound himself not to interfere with Shang-hai for a year, nor to allow his adherents to approach within thirty miles of the city. In May, 1861, Ward made arrangements to attack Sing-pu again, but the admiral and consuls, fearing that such action might compromise them with the Tai-pings, and would also be a great incentive to sailors to desert from the foreign men-of-war and merchant vessels at the port, arrested Ward at Sung-Kiong. He claimed Chinese nationality and was released, but agreed to disband his force, among whom were found many deserters from the British Navy. Burgevine, who was entrenched with some Imperialists near Sing-pu, determined to make an attempt on the city before his men were disbanded, but his attack was defeated with loss.

In September, 1861, Ward and Burgevine began to drill Chinese, and being well supported by Takee and other merchants, the force was raised, to which was afterwards given the high-sounding title of "Ch'ang Sheng Chi'un" or "Ever Victorious Army," but which was known officially, in less ornate language, as "The Disciplined Chinese," or "The Foreign-officered Chinese."

In the meantime the fighting between the Taipings and the Imperialists went on without break. On the one side Ngan-kin, held by the rebels, fell in November, after a siege of three years, during the last part of which they had endured the worst horrors of a famine, having been reduced to feed upon human flesh, which was openly sold at about a penny a pound. On the other side, Hang-chow, held by the Imperialists, was reduced to similar extremities, and fell to the rebels at the end of December, 1861, the Manchu garrison blowing themselves up.

The death of the Emperor of China in the previous August, and Prince Kung's coup d'état of the 2nd November, which overthrew the anti-foreign party, executed its leaders, and placed the young Emperor under the regency of the dowager Empress, enabled the European allies to act with greater confidence in the interests of the foreign communities. Towards the end of the year, on account of persistent rumours of the intention of the Tai-pings to attack Shang-hai, Sir James Hope again visited Nankin and warned the "Tien-Wang" of the inevitable consequences which would follow such an attempt. His answer was insolent, pointing out that the year of the agreement had nearly expired, and that no consideration of trade could affect the operations of his "divine troops." The British admiral intimated that any attack on Shang-hai or Wu-sung would be at his peril.

In January, 1862, the British force at Shang-hai consisted of a battery of Royal Artillery, the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, and a wing of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry, to which were added early in February two companies of the 99th Regiment of Foot, while Ward's disciplined Chinese force was over a thousand strong, drilled, and armed with Tower muskets. In the middle of January the "Chung Wang" again moved on Shang-hai and

ravished the country close up to the foreign settlements. On the 10th February Ward sallied out of Sung-Kiong, which he had made his head-quarters, and captured the rebel position of Quan-fu-ling. The British and French admirals, acting in concert with Ward and with the Imperialist forces, by a combined attack on the 21st February, captured Ka-chiaw, a rebel stronghold in the south, and, a week later, the town of Tsee-dong. It was these successes that caused the Pekin Government to acknowledge the services of Ward's force by bestowing upon it the title of "The Ever Victorious Army" in a very handsome decree dated 16th March, 1862.

At the end of March the country round Ka-chiaw was ravished by the rebels, and it was decided, on the representations of the admirals, and with the approval of the legations and the Pekin Government, to clear them out of the district within a thirty-mile radius from Shang-hai. Brigadier-General Staveley was free, as we have seen, to move his headquarters from Tien-tsin to Shang-hai, and he arrived there at the end of March with part of the 31st and of the 67th Regiments of Foot and a detachment of Royal Engineers.

A joint naval and military expedition, under the admirals and Brigadier-General Staveley, attacked

the rebels on the 4th April at Wong-kadza, twelve miles to the west of Shang-hai, driving them out of their entrenchments, when they fell back on a series of stockaded defences some miles in rear. Ward, with 500 men of his force, accompanied the British admiral in pursuit, but met with a severe check; Sir James Hope and seven other officers were wounded and 70 men killed; but the next day the stockades were captured. A fortnight later Brigadier-General Staveley, assisted by the British and French naval forces, captured Isi-pu, a rebel stronghold twelve miles above Shang-hai, on the right bank of the Wompoa river. A combined force also moved on Kah-ding on 26th April, and the place was carried by storm on 1st May, 1862.

Captain Charles George Gordon left the Peiho with the headquarters of his company of Royal Engineers on 28th April, and reached Shang-hai on 3rd May, to find preparations in hand for an attack on Tsing-pu. It is a great temptation to tell of Gordon's doings and to relate what he has omitted, but this has partly been told elsewhere, and may be more fully related in another way. My object here and now is to furnish such an introduction that the thread of Gordon's own narrative may be readily picked up and followed by the reader.

NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS ROUND SHANGHAI IN 1862-63-64.

BY LIEUT,-COLONEL C. G. GORDON, C.B., R.E.

THE following notes deal only with the military operations of the foreign-officered and the co-operating Chinese forces against the Taiping rebels in the province of Kiangsoo, in the years 1863-64. For the history of this rebellion, and the reasons why our Government desired its suppression, other works must be consulted.

The country in which the operations were carried on consists of the triangular alluvial tract between the Yang-tze-Kiang and Hang-chow Bay; it is perfectly flat and intersected in every direction by large deep creeks and canals, varying from 10 to 100 yards in width; these sometimes widen out into large lakes, B to 10 and even 40 miles in length and breadth, narrow roads or causeways generally following the courses of the principal canals, to which they serve as towing paths, and over which they cross at times by stone and wooden bridges of

various sizes. The country is covered in prosperous times with large and flourishing villages and towns, the principal ones being surrounded by brick walls from 18 feet to 24 feet high, generally possessing four gateways which project as bastions to the general line of the walls: outside these gates are large suburbs, where most of the trade is carried on to avoid the duty on goods taken through the gates.

The walled towns are placed on the principal canals, generally where two or more meet, and it is the depth and width of the canals which decide the size of the villages or towns, while the importance of their junction decides their being walled or not.

Thus though there seems only an intricate network of creeks, a careful observer will as soon perceive the main features of the country as if there were ranges of mountains and corresponding valleys; he will see by the size of the arches on some of the canals that the largest boats can pass, and will comprehend that these must lead to important places.

In the spring of 1862, the rebel leaders held the whole of the towns, with one exception (Sungkiong), within ten miles of Shanghai; they had contemned the dispatches of the British and French authorities. directing them to keep a radius of thirty miles free from their troops, and had hinted their intention of

28 Gordon's Campaign in China.

taking Shanghai itself. The British and French Admirals and Generals determined on driving them back to the thirty-mile radius, for which purpose it was necessary to capture the towns of Kahding, Singpoo, Najow, and Cholin.

Kahding was breached and stormed on the 1st



May, 1862; Singpoo, on the 13th; Najow, on the 17th; and Cholin, on the 20th, by the British and French forces; the garrisons of these towns were allowed to escape through the cities not having been surrounded. A detachment of British troops was left with the Imperialists to garrison Kahding; and on

the day of the capture of Cholin, information was received that Chung Wang, the chief leader of the rebels, had advanced on and surrounded that place, after defeating and capturing an Imperialist force, which had imprudently advanced from Kahding towards Taitsan. The morning of the 21st May, 1862, saw the allied British and French forces returning from Cholin after burning it and blowing up one of its gates, at the same time that the rebel garrisons of three cities-Yongmei, Naiwai, and Chuenza, numbering from 6,000 to 8,000, and of Cholin and Najow, who had escaped—were defiling along the sea-wall on the edge of Hangchow Bay, the capture of Cholin having completely cut them off from their comrades. Leaving a detachment at Najow, the allied forces returned to Shanghai, and advanced again to Kahding. The rebels fell back on their approach. The garrison being withdrawn, the allied forces returned to Shanghai, and the rebels re-occupied Kahding, and flocked down to and surrounded Singpoo, which was then occupied by the foreign-officered force of Chinese, under an American, named Ward, whose headquarters were at Sungkiong. On the 10th June, 1862, the allied forces were obliged to advance to Singpoo to relieve its garrison: the rebels fell back on their approach, and recocupied it on its evacuation. Thus ended the spri

operations, leaving the rebels in possession of Kahding and Singpoo.

On the 21st October, 1862, the British and French forces again advanced on Kahding, breached the wall and retook it, the garrison escaping. Singpoo was taken by Ward's foreign-officered force of Chinese, on the 17th August, 1862. The end of 1862 found the thirty-miles radius cleared of the rebels, and the cessation of active operations against them on the part of the British and French forces in the province of Kiangsoo.

It is necessary to describe the foreign-officered force known by the Imperial Government under the name of "Ever Victorious Army," or Chang Sheng Chiun. Its creation is due to the American, Ward, who, on the invasion of Kiangsoo by the rebels in 1860, undertook the recapture of Sungkiong with a party of 100 foreigners for a certain sum of money. This he accomplished by seizing a gate at dusk, and maintaining his party there against the repeated attacks of the rebels till the morning, when the Imperialists came up to their assistance. The impetus that this success gave to the desertion of seamen from the Royal Navy and merchant shipping to join him, led to Ward's being arrested and his foreigners disbanded. He then took to drilling Chinese, the funds for their support being found by

the rich merchants of Shanghai, and support was also given him by the British authorities in the way of allowing him to purchase old arms. He eventually worked this nucleus into a force of from 6,000 to 7,000 Chinese, officered by foreigners of all nationalities, and of all degrees of life. They were armed with Tower muskets, and had a powerful artillery. It was with this force he breached, assaulted, and captured Singpoo in August, 1862. He was killed in the attack of Tseki, September 21st, 1862, and left the command of the force to Burgevine, also an American. Ward was a brave, clear-headed man, much liked by the Chinese mandarins, to whom he was courteous in his manner, and a very fit man for the command of the force he had raised.

Burgevine was a man of a different stamp, far better educated than Ward; and it is said that to him is due the idea of training Chinese troops in the foreign manner to oppose the rebels; he was, however, when in command, indolent, temporising, and arrogant in his manner to the Chinese merchants who paid the force.

He took the command of the Cháng Sheng Chíun on Ward's death, and held it till December, 1862, when, in consequence of an altercation he had with one of the principal Mandarins about the pay of his troops, in which he lost his temper and struck the


official, he was removed by Li Hung Chang, the Governor of Kiangsoo, from the command of the force. The only action which occurred during his tenure of office was on November 13th, 1862, when he repulsed with great slaughter, near Powokong, a large force of the rebels who had moved down to attack Singpoo.

Previous to Burgevine's removal from the command of the force, Admiral Sir J. Hope had lent him as chief of his staff Captain Holland, R.M., and on the fracas above alluded to having taken place, the Governor Li applied to General Staveley to appoint an officer. General Staveley nominated the writer of these notes; but unwilling to supersede Capt. Holland, he suspended his assumption of the command until the British Minister at Peking had given his decision on the advisability of a British Officer taking any part in the matter. Captain (now Major) Holland retained the command till March 23rd, 1863, when the Home Government instructed the General to place a British Officer in charge of the force if opportunity offered itself. The General consequently named the undersigned, who took over the command at the end of that month.

During Major Holland's tenure of office, he had made an expedition against Taitsan, a city north of Kahding, breached the walls, 14th February, 1863,

near one of the gates, but failed in the assault and lost two 32-pdrs., which the rebels, by a rush out over the breach, captured.

At this epoch the Imperialists were in a difficulty about the city of Chanzu, whose rebel leader had with his troops given in their adhesion to the Im-



perialist Government; this city was now hemmed in by the rebels under Chung Wang, who had captured the fortified post of Fushan, which barred the passage from the Yangtze to Chanzu. Chanzu stands some 25 miles and Fushan about 5 miles from the Yangtze.

Previous to the writer's taking the command, several attacks had been made on Fushan, which the rebels had repulsed, and the state of Chanzu was most critical. The Governor Li requested that Fushan might be taken, and on the 31st March, 1863, the 5th Regiment, four 12-pdr. howitzers and a 32-pdr. on siege carriages, were embarked from Sungkiong and proceeded up the Yangtze to the Imperial camps which were posted near Fushan. The troops were disembarked on the 2nd, and the place reconnoitred on the 3rd.

The rebels held the large stone bridge over the canal which runs from Chanzu to the Yangtze; they had enclosed a considerable number of houses with a strong loop-holed wall, ditches and abattis on each side of the bridge, which was on a bend of the canal; but near it on the west side of the canal were some ruins which afforded cover close up to the stockaded positions, and it was in these ruins the guns were placed in the night of the 3rd of April. It was determined to attack the eastern stockade, though the troops and guns were on the western side of the canal, it having been observed that the canal leading to Chanzu was but imperfectly staked, and that boats to form a bridge could be passed up it to the walls of this stockade, which stood somewhat in advance of the western one; the rebels had

relied on the width of this canal and had no abattis along the walls; the guns also could bear both on the connecting bridge and on the main road leading from Chanzu, and thus prevent reinforcements coming up.

Could confidence have been placed in the troops the whole position could have been turned, and the result would, in all probability, have been an evacuation; but the troops had been twice defeated, and their slight morale was shaken under the continual changes of commanders.

At 7 A.M. the guns opened on the stockades at a distance of 700 yards, the walls fell in flakes under the 32-pdr. shot, a breach was soon made and the rebel fire silenced. At 10 A.M. the boats advanced slowly along the canal and pulled up the stakes, and the 12-pdr. howitzers were advanced to the edge of the ruins; a portion of the storming party were in the boats, which, under the foreign officers, formed a bridge, and the place was entered, the rebels leaving the other stockade as the men landed; the loss was two killed and six wounded. The rebels made a vigorous and nearly successful attempt to retake the position about an hour after its capture. which was repulsed with difficulty; they had sent reinforcements into the works during the firing; which, considering it was along the road directly in

the line of fire of the 32-pdrs., speaks well for their courage.

On the night of the 4th April Chung Wang and his troops fell back from Chanzu, which, nearly at its last extremity, opened its gates to the Imperialists. Chung Wang had made many attempts to take the place, and had tried to breach the walls with the two 32-pdrs. he had captured at Taitsan, one of which had burst from the rough shot fired from it.

The expeditionary troops returned to Sungkiong on the 6th April, and to the end of the month every effort was made to get the troops, which numbered from 3,000 to 4,000, properly equipped, and to organise the departments.

The force was divided into five regiments of infantry and one of artillery, averaging from 600 men each, officered by men of all nationalities, the non-commissioned officers being Chinese; to each regiment was attached an interpreter. The artillery consisted of two 8-in. howitzers, four 32-pdr. 25 cwt. guns, three 24-pdr. howitzers, twelve 12-pdr. howitzers on naval field carriages, eighteen 12-pdr. mountain howitzers, fourteen mortars, of which four were 8-in., and the remainder $5\frac{1}{2}$ -in. and $4\frac{1}{2}$ -in., and three rocket tubes. The guns were on siege carriages, and the whole of the ordnance and ammunition were contained in sixteen large boats. A

large assortment of planks for platforms and bridges, rope, and 3-in. elm mantlets, 10 ft. broad and 8 ft. high, which were placed by the guns in action, and which answered admirably in protecting the gunners, were carried with these boats, together with about 150 feet of Blanshard's infantry pontoon bridge. The flotilla consisted of from 40 to 50 Chinese gunboats, which would carry from 40 to 50 men each, thus enabling 2,000 infantry to be moved by water with celerity in any direction; these boats carried a 9-pdr. or 12-pdr. gun in their bows. The rations were conveyed in eight or ten large boats, and consisted of rice and pork sufficient for the whole force for ten or twelve days.

The commanding officers of regiments had a proportion of bamboo ladders (with planks strapped on them) and tools handed over to them, so that each regiment could march across any country, however intersected with creeks; they also had a party of coolies to carry the spare ammunition. The men were armed generally with Tower muskets, with some 500 to 700 Enfields among the force.

The commanding officers dealt with their prisoners according to a regular code, only extreme cases being brought before the Commanding Officer of the force, whose endeavour was to leave as much as possible to the commanding officers of regiments, after

generally defining what he considered the interior economy of the troops should be; acting in the same manner with respect to the Commissariat and Military Store Departments, and dismissing the men who failed to carry on their duties. By this means he eventually got leaders who were zealous and painstaking, and who could be trusted. By frequent personal and minute inspection, without the slightest attempt at formality in the same, he had the personal assurance of the state of each regiment and department.

The hospital arrangements were under the care of Staff Assistant-Surgeon Moffitt, who knew his work so well as never to require anything more than encouragement, and whose name and skill will be remembered for many a long day in the province of Kiangsoo.

It is not necessary to dwell longer on the organisation of the force. The arrangements were just such as any officer invested with absolute power and a little common sense would carry out. As a general rule orders were given viva voce, and were seen carried out; forms and ceremonies were as much as possible avoided (an advantage, as there were many Americans in the force), and each commanding officer, supreme in his command, felt himself trusted.

Attached to the force at various times were from one to three small paddle-steamers, 90 ft. long and 24 ft. wide, drawing 3 ft. to 4 ft. of water, carrying a 32-pdr. gun in the bow, and a 12-pdr. howitzer in the stern. These were commanded by Americans, and did first-rate service.

The force at the end of April was thus well equipped in every way, its departments organised, and the means of transport available to move it in any direction with celerity, and it was now determined to use it against the rebels. The Governor Li had stated that the rebel chief Isah, of Taitsan, was prepared to give over his city if the adjoining town of Quinsan was attacked; and accordingly the force started for that town on the 27th April. It reached Lokapan, a village fifteen miles from Quinsan, on the 29th April, 1863, when dispatches arrived from Li to the effect that Isah had treacherously decoyed his brother's troops into the city of Taitsan, that 1,600 of them had been killed, and his brother's camp taken. He requested that the operations against Quinsan might be deferred, and that the force should march across and attack Taitsan. the 30th they marched to the south gate of Taitsan, and on the 1st May turned towards the west gate, where the rebels had two large stockaded works some 700 yards from the walls of the city. Fire

was opened at 1 P.M. on the nearest stockade, and in the meantime a regiment, under the cover of the ruins which lay between the stockade and the town, pushed on in skirmishing order to cut off the retreat of the defenders of the stockade, on whom the artillery fire had begun to tell. Just as it was decided on attempting the assault of the work, its defenders, seeing their retreat menaced, evacuated it, and a few shots compelled the rebels to retreat from the other stockade. Thus fell with little loss the two and only outworks of Taitsan.

On the morning of the 2nd May, a regiment was detached to prevent the escape of the rebels from the north gate, and thus the east gate only was open to them, and that led away from their supporting cities, and would force them to make a long detour by byeways to escape. Had there been troops available this exit would also have been closed.

On reconnoitring the town, it seemed that the creek leading up to the west gate, and then bifurcating, formed the ditch; it was clear of stakes, the rebels having depended on the exterior stockades, now captured, to prevent an attack on that side. As this would enable boats to be pushed up into the ditch to form a bridge, it was determined to attack here, though disadvantageous on account of the projecting bastioned gateway.

The guns were landed one by one among the ruins of the suburb, and opening at 500 or 600 yards' distance from the wall, soon began to bring it down. As the enemy's defences got more and more dilapidated, the guns were moved nearer, a heavy



fire of musketry was kept up on the walls, and under this fire the boats were pushed up little by little to the breach. The rebels kept up a very fair fire, but lay concealed. At 3 P.M. the breach was practicable, and the boats being pushed up to the ditch, the storming party advanced. In a moment

the breach was crowded with rebels, who stood boldly up, and threw bags of powder, with fuzes attached, into the boats. The troops pushed on across the bridge—one of the boats of which had been sunk by the explosion of a powder bag-but could not mount the breach, the rebels presenting a forest of spears against their advance. Two 8-in. howitzers were then brought up, and firing blind shells over the heads of the stormers, moved down the defenders of the breach in scores, though they still attempted to fire down at the storming party which lay in the ditch. The sounding of the "advance" made them show again, but after a time they got more wary, and another attempt was made to mount the breach, again to be frustrated. The rebel chief's snake flags still floated out on the breach, and till he left, it was said the breach would be defended. A violent fire was directed on the spot, which hurled masses of brickwork on the crouching rebels. Another and third attempt by a fresh regiment was made to mount, which was stoutly met by the rebels, and the contending bodies swayed on the edge of the breach for a moment, and then the stormers surged over and the place was won, the flags of the chief disappearing at the last moment. On the breach the rebels lay in great numbers: among them, fighting to the last, were two Americans, two Frenchmen, and three Sepoys of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry—deserters. Several other foreigners who were fighting for the rebels escaped; and in the town was captured Private Hargreaves, a deserter from the 31st Regiment, severely wounded. The losses the force had sustained incapacitated it from an active pursuit, and the chief, Isah, with the greatest part of his fighting men, who numbered from 8,000 to 10,000, escaped to Soochow. Had the Imperialists been active they might have caused much greater loss in the pursuit, but they were cowed by the disastrous treachery of the previous week, and did little beyond looking on.


Two mandarins of high rank and 300 Imperialist soldiers, who had been taken prisoners by the previous treachery, were set at liberty, and the Imperialists gained a town which had been the scene of two disastrous defeats. The chief, Isah, left a fuze burning in a vault of powder under his house, which in the course of the morning blew up, but did little harm.

On the 4th May the force moved towards Quinsan to carry out the original programme, but the soldiers were so burthened with loot that it was found necessary to return to Sungkiong; an Imperialist force under General Ching having stockaded itself off the west gate.

On the return of the force to Sungkiong, a difficulty arose concerning its command. Burgevine after his dismissal had gone to Pekin, and through the intervention of the British and American Ministers, who considered him ill-treated by the Governor, had returned with an edict authorising him to retake the command; this the Governor Li would not accede to, and the British General Brown refusing to interfere, the force remained under the undersigned.

On the 24th May, the force left Sungkiong for the last time for Quinsan, it having been observed that its discipline would be better maintained in the field than in garrison away from the enemy. Quinsan is a town of great strategical importance; it is situated 40 miles south of Chanzu, and from it diverge large navigable canals. Its possession by a force in command of the waters precluded any hostile advance on Shanghai. It is a city with a wall 18 feet high and four miles in circumference, and with a very wide ditch. To the north of it, and inside the walls, rises a steep hill 250 feet to 350 feet high, with a pagoda on the top. From this the flat country around can be seen on a clear day for 30 miles.

A large canal runs from its west gate to Soochow, the prefectural city of the province; large lakes



extend to the north and south of this canal, along the north bank of which runs the only road to Soochow; another road leads from the north gate to Chanzu, then garrisoned by Imperialists. It will, therefore, be seen that if the road to Soochow was cut, the garrison of Quinsan must either surrender or starve. The experience gained at Taitsan showed that efforts should be made to avoid the costly mode of attack by breach and assault, and to strike at the rebel communications.

It has been related that the Imperialists under General Ching had entrenched themselves off the east gate of Quinsan soon after the fall of Taitsan. and in the middle of May the rebels had issued out from Soochow, and had almost surrounded the Imperialists' position by stockades and breastworks. It was therefore necessary to drive these forces back before any further movements against Quinsan could be undertaken. Accordingly, on the arrival of the force at Ching's camp on the 28th May, the rebels were attacked in flank, and, after a sharp but short engagement, they evacuated their positions, and retired to the north and west of the city. On the 29th May the great canal leading round the city and joining the great canal from the east gate of Quinsan to Soochow was reconnoitred by the steamer Hyson; an imprudent proceeding, as it might have shown the rebels their weak points. This canal joins the other about 10 miles from the east gate of Quinsan, and this junction was defended by two stockades, with the village of Chunye strongly intrenched a little way to the north-east.

At 3 A.M. on the 31st May the steamer Hyson, 350 infantry embarked on board Chinese gunboats. and a proportion of field artillery, started for Chunve. The rebels mustered much more strongly than the day before, and replied briskly to the fire of the 32-pounder on board the steamer, which steamed up to the stakes that stretched across the creek. A part of the infantry were landed, and advanced towards the stockade, which was on the same side of the great canal as they were, and which was quite isolated. The defenders of this stockade, seeing the steamer pushing its way through the stakes, threw themselves into boats and into the water and evacuated the work, a proceeding followed immediately after by the defenders of the other stockade. The infantry then crossed and occupied it, and leaving a party in it, passed on towards the village of Chunye, which was evacuated on their approach; thus the grand line of retreat was cut, and with only the loss of two men. As the Hyson turned to the left towards Soochow, a large

body of rebels appeared coming down from that place to reinforce the stockades; she opened on them with grape and shell, and pressed their rear as they retreated along the narrow causeway: they could not go to the right, for there at no great distance lay the Yangsing Lake, which had large branches running from it to the main canal, over which branches the causeway passed by narrow and At each of these bridges delays high bridges. occurred, and the rebels suffered severely. About three miles from Chunye a large masonry fort defended the advance, which was taken by the fugitives rushing pell-mell into it. A large singlearch bridge crossed the canal here, which the steamer, lowering her funnel, passed under, while runaways were crossing over the bridge above. The retreating mass, joined by the garrison of Ta Edin, continued to fly in front of the steamer until Sisou Edin. another strong stockade, was reached, which, with another called Waiquaidong, was evacuated on its approach. This was a mile from Soochow, whose garrison were evidently in a great state of alarm; but here it was necessary to turn, for it was 7 P.M. and the chase had lasted since 1 P.M.

On its return the steamer met crowds of rebels whom it had left behind, who opened fire on it, and who met with sweeping showers of grape and canister.

The neighbouring villagers flocked down, looted the stockades, and murdered such of the rebels as were lurking about. At 2 A.M. on the 1st June the steamer passed Ta Edin, and all at once a heavy fire was opened from the stockades which had been captured, mingled with cheers and yells. It was the garrison of Quinsan attempting their escape. It is doubtful how the matter might have gone, had not the Hyson steamed up and delivered a charge of grape into the assailants, who fell back dismayed towards the town, and who eventually to the number of 8,000 surrendered. The remaining part of the force which had been left at the west gate entered (the city at daybreak. The loss of the rebels was upwards of 4,000 killed by the Hyson's artillery and the peasantry, and drowned in the creeks in attempting their escape.

It was decided to make Quinsan the headquarters of the force, instead of Sungkiong, which was too far removed from the enemy.

It was now necessary to look to the capture of Soochow, which was admirably situated for having its communications cut off by a force strong on the water. On the east side the Imperialists, under Ching, held Waiquaidong; on the south, the town of Wokong was wanted to cut off the communications in that direction, and to enable the steamers

to get into the Taiho lake to cut off the city to the west; and the town of Wusieh was wanted to cut off the communications to the north: these two towns captured, it would be only a question of time when Soochow would fall.

The force left Quinsan for Wokong on the 26th July, and on the 28th it arrived in face of Kahpoo, where the canal from Quinsan joins the grand canal; this junction was defended by two strong stockades. out of which the rebels fled after the troops had begun to threaten their communications with Socchow. The communications of Socchow to the south and west were now virtually cut, for from Kahpoo runs, from the grand canal, the waterway for steamers into the Taiho lake; but Wokong was too near Kahpoo for its safety; it might be attacked from both sides and cracked like a nut, though perhaps it would have proved a hard one. It was desirable to take Wokong, so that when captured its garrison would look after attacks from the south, while Kahpoo repelled them from the north.

On the 29th July, after leaving a garrison in Kahpoo, the force marched along the grand canal towards Wokong, and surprised the large bridge over it near the east gate; the rebels rushed out to reinforce a stockade they had some 700 yards from the north gate, but one of the regiments was too quick

for them, and following them up, entered the stockade with them. The north and east gates were now closed; on the west was the Taiho lake; and there was only the south gate to secure in order to have the city. Leaving a regiment at the east and north gates, the remainder of the force pushed on to the south, where the rebels had a large stone stockade, rather too far from the city to be afforded any help. The moment a company crossed the canal and threatened its rear, the rebels vacated the stockade, and the city was surrounded.

It was now 11 A.M., but there remained another stockade about a mile to the south of the grand canal, which was evacuated on the approach of a company; it was on the junction of a large stream from the east with the grand canal, and soon after the occupation of it there came sailing down this stream a large flotilla of rebel gunboats, which had been dislodged from some outlying districts to the east of Wokong. On their seeing that the creek they were descending was in hostile occupation, they turned off into the creek leading into the grand canal near the east gate of Wokong, not knowing that the work at its junction had fallen. The regiment let them approach close, and pouring a volley into them captured them all; thus adding to the force's flotilla 35 good gunboats.

Though expecting a heavy sortie at dusk, everything remained quiet till 4 A.M. on the 30th July, when the gates of the city were thrown open and the place surrendered. Four thousand prisoners were taken, and in this case, as with the prisoners at Quinsan, several hundreds were taken into the ranks to fill the gaps caused by desertion ensuing on successful looting in the town. The chief of the city, who was a brother of Chung Wang, had escaped in the night by a boat.

Thus were gained in four days the rebel communications to the south, and a free entry into the Taiho lake, which cut them off from the west; the east was already held by the Imperialists at Waiquaidong; while to the north was Chunye. The capture of Wokong compelled the rebels to make a detour of the Taiho lake in order to communicate with the cities they held in the south.

It was now decided to try and capture Wusieh to cut the line of retreat to the north-west, but the departure of Burgevine with 120 foreigners and a small steamer, the *Kajow*, changed the aspect of affairs and compelled a more cautious warfare. The Imperialists put garrisons into Wokong and Kahpoo, and the force returned to Quinsan.

Burgevine's arrival at Soochow encouraged the rebels greatly, and led to the chief making a

vigorous attack on the Kahpoo position on the 4th August, which the Imperialists repulsed with difficulty; it was sufficiently near success to oblige reinforcements being sent from the force at Quinsan, which, supported by the steamers, drove back the rebels and their foreigners, and pursued them towards Socohow. They had been very daring, and had brought up a 12-pounder against the stockades, to the ditches of which they had advanced in their attacks.

Affairs remained very quiet till the end of September, the weather being very hot, and the number of foreigners in Soochow rendering any great flank movement towards Wusieh a dangerous proceeding.

The troops being unhealthy in Quinsan, it was determined to move them to Waiquaidong, and put them under canvas. At the end of September a move was made which was attended with important consequences; at a place on the grand canal called Patachiaou, about a mile and a-half from the southeast angle of Soochow, a large and deep canal leads towards Shanghai; this cut the line of Imperialist communications between Waiquaidong and Kahpoo, and if an exit of rebel troops were made in force by this canal, the communications of the force would be jeopardised, and itself exposed to an attack in flank.

It was therefore determined to try and capture Patachiaou by surprise, and thus close this exit.

On the 29th September, 1863, at 2 A.M., in a drizzling rain, 500 infantry, with artillery, and the Hyson steamer, moved from Waiquaidong towards Patachiaou, the vicinity of which they reached about 5 A.M.; the rebels were completely surprised, and fled from their strong works at almost the first shot. An effort was made, later in the day, by the rebel chiefs of Soochow and their foreigners to retake the position, but it was easily repelled; the foreigners appeared in Garibaldian shirts, but in this instance their efforts did not amount to much. Experience showed in these operations that attacks made in wet weather on Asiatics were generally very successful, their minds apparently becoming easily depressed.

On the 1st October the steamer Kajow, with a cargo boat on each side of her, descended the grand canal, flanked by Burgevine and his followers and a large body of rebels, led by Mow Wang, the chief of Soochow. The Kajow and one of the cargo boats had 12-pounder howitzers in their bows, while on the other cargo boat was a 32-pounder. The small force at Patachiaou barricaded the gorge of their work, and prepared for defence. The rebel artillery fire was very accurate, and affairs looked doubtful, when the Hyson came round the point from Waiquaidong;

this caused the rebels to hesitate, and when they did advance to the assault they were attacked by a heavy fire in flank, from a company which had been placed outside the work, under the bank of the creek leading to the west. They retired, and, keeping up a desultory fire for some time, eventually returned to Soochow. During the night they attempted to surprise the stockade, but were discovered at about 700 yards from the work, and gave up the attempt.

Two days after this Burgevine came down with a flag of truce, and saw the writer of these notes. He professed himself disappointed with the conduct of the rebel chiefs, and willing to come over with the foreigners, and steamer, and artillery, if the men were paid for their service with the rebels; this was agreed to, and Burgevine returned to Soochow; it being left to him to fix his own time.

Things remained quiet till the 12th October, when information was received that the old rebel chief Isah of Taitsan had come up against Wokong, and had entrenched his force off the south gate. The Imperialists were greatly alarmed, and requested an expedition to be sent against him. On the 13th October this was done, and his position being attacked in front was taken only with great difficulty, time not allowing a flank movement. The rebels lost but slightly, as their retreat was not

molested. Two heavy explosions had been heard from the north of Soochow on the 12th October, and the cause of them was ascertained on the return of the expedition to Wokong, where two of Burgevine's officers had come in with a flag of truce. It appeared that Burgevine, always vacillating, thought he would try and capture the Imperialist position at Ta Chiaoku, to the north-west of Soochow: this was held by the troops of the Futai, or Governor's brother, who had starved Kongyin, a city on the Yantgtze, into submission, and whose force, numbering from 10 to 20,000, had taken up a position parallel to the grand canal, their right being about 12 miles from Wusieh, and their left at Ta Chiaoku.

Burgevine, with the Kajow steamer and his artillery and foreigners, started with the Chung Wang, who had arrived from Nankin. On the 12th October they approached the position and surprised 35 Imperial gunboats, and two large boats laden with powder. Burgevine, whose relations with Chung Wang were not on the best footing, undertook to capture the stockades, upon which he opened a violent fire. He had landed the foreigners for the assault, when a spark fell into a powder case in the Kajow, and blew her bow open. The Imperialists, who had already begun to evacuate the stockade, saw the steamer sinking, and returning to the loop-

holes drove the assaulting party back. Burgevine then retired, leaving the wreck of the Kajow, and put his wounded into the powder boats he captured in the morning. By some accident one of them exploded, and at the close of the day he had lost the steamer and nearly half his foreigners. Wang was so put out at his failure that he ordered him and his party back to Soochow, where they arrived on the 13th, regarded with the greatest suspicion by the rebels. This was the account given by Burgevine's officers, who said that if a false attack was made on the next day, they would during it pass over from the rebels. They returned to the city, and on the concerted false attack being made from 40 to 50 foreigners came over. Burgevine, however, was not with them, but on the following day he came out by the permission of the rebels, and thus, though some of his party remained with the rebels, the formidable aspect which affairs had assumed no longer existed, and the force was left at liberty to carry out the original programme of cutting off the remaining communications of the city.

On the 23rd October, Wuliungchiaou, a strong stockaded position west of Patachiaou, was taken. On the 26th, another attempt from the south to take Wokong was repulsed with great loss to the rebels; and then, turning north, the positions of Leeku

(November 1st) and Wanti (November 11th) were captured. In all these engagements the rebels lost heavily, their positions being surrounded and taken before reinforcements could reach them from the city. Their garrisons numbered from 800 to 1,000 strong, but their stockades were narrow, and the 32-pounders tore through them from side to side. At Wanti, through a mistake, one column entered on one side The rebels as another column came in at the other. fought desperately, which, together with the cross fire of the assaulting troops, caused many casualties. In these attacks an attentive reconnaissance of the rebel works and an overwhelming artillery fire rendered the captures easy. The dates on which they occurred fell almost day for day on the days agreed on-after Burgevine had left the rebels-with the Chinese generals that they should be taken.

The capture of Wanti completed the junction of the forces under the Futai's brother with those under the writer and General Ching, whose troops garrisoned the captured works—the former extending parallel to the grand canal (as has been remarked), from a place opposite, and 12 miles from Wusieh, where his right wing rested, to Ta Chiaoku, which his left wing occupied. Ching's right wing rested on Wanti, and extended by Leeku, Waiquaidong, Patachiaou, to Wuliungchiaou, which his left wing

occupied; while the steamers and a large flotilla of gunboats occupied the Taiho lake.

It remained only to cut the grand canal to isolate the city; to do this was a perilous undertaking, as any force advancing towards it was liable to be attacked in flank by the Chung Wang, who held a strong position at Mehtachiaou near Wusieh, or by a sortie from the garrison of Soochow. It had been arranged that two positions should be captured on the grand canal, viz., Monding and Fusaiqwan; the object of this being to avoid a simultaneous attack on both sides, from Wusieh and Soochow, which might have ensued had only one position been taken. By the capture of Monding and Fusiaqwan, the garrison of the former would face Wusieh, and the garrison of the latter oppose any attack from Soochow. The Futai's brother agreed to throw forward his left wing and garrison Monding when taken, if Ching would bring forward his right wing and occupy Fusaiqwan when taken.

The capture of the Firefly steamer—in the employ of the force—in the harbour of Shanghai, by some rebel sympathisers, on the eve of the force proceeding to the attack of Chung Wang's position at Mehtachiao, preliminary to the advance on Monding, upset these plans, and necessitated contentment with the capture of Fusaiqwan alone, the Futai's brother,

in virtue of the non-capture of Monding, considering himself absolved from giving any help.

The position of Fusaiqwan was surprised and taken without loss on the 19th November, the rebel reinforcements from Soochow, as usual, coming only in time to be driven back with loss, and thus, with the exception of a small country road by the hills near the Taiho lake, the city of Soochow was surrounded.

Ching, however, fearing to be nuterackered, objected to garrison Fusaiqwan, which necessitated the leaving of the 1st Regiment and some artillery there, a serious diminution of the force, at the time when it needed every man. There now remained the second line of stockades, which extended round the city at the distance of 500 yards from the walls. These defences were very strong; a breastwork ran along the whole front on the edge of a wide creek. and the stockades were admirably placed as redoubts behind it. When the breastwork was taken the stockades could hold out, and the flatness of the general line presenting no salient, and the proximity of the city walls, which mounted several cannon, among which was the 32-pounder captured at Taitsan, prevented any attempt being made to cut off the rebel retreat.

In the Malakoff, the Russians allowed the front of

their redoubt to be in the outer line, a mistake which lost them Sebastopol, for when the outer line was entered, the redoubt was as useful to the French as if they had made it.

From the reports of the foreigners who had come out of Soochow, it was supposed that these works were left weakly guarded at night, and that they could be easily captured by surprise. Accordingly, arrangements were made for a night attack on the nearest stockade close to the east gate. Several significant signs seemed to presage a failure. The attack was fixed for 2 A.M., on the 27th November. midnight an eclipse of the moon took place, a phenomenon much feared by the Chinese. At 1 A.M. a prisoner, on being questioned as to a lantern on the east gate, declared it to be a sign that Mow Wang was there. The attack, however, took place, and the troops pushed up quietly in boats to the stockade and landed in silence. The creek was passed by a causeway the rebels had left, and it was only as they scaled the breastwork that they met with a volley They pushed on and carried right in their faces. the breastwork, but could not be got to try the stockade, which kept up a heavy fire on them. After an hour or two it seemed useless to persevere, as the losses had been heavy, and the troops were more or less in disorder, so they fell back, carrying off the

dead and wounded. It appears that Mow Wang knew of the attack, and that he was with his body guard in the stockade. He lost a good many of his best men, and was described as being very much cast down. Several foreigners who were with him were killed.


It was now determined to attack by daylight, and to employ the heavy artillery to break down the works. At 7 A.M. on the 29th November, fire was opened on the works, and the stockade was set on fire; large gaps soon appeared, and at 11 A.M. the assault was made. By some mistake the length of Blanshard's bridge which was put together was found too short, but the troops managed to ford and get across by the broken causeway; and though the rebel resistance was very bold, and Chung Wang who had come down was most daring in leading on his men, the work was carried. Turning to the left, the troops carried the other stockade, and then passing to the right, they compelled the evacuation of the whole outer line, and captured a 24-pounder howitzer.

Thus fell the second line of rebel works, though costing a heavy loss of life—twenty-seven officers being killed and wounded. The rebels lost about twenty-five stockades in the panic which seized them after the action.

From the captured stockades the city ditch. 300 feet wide, and the walls, 24 feet high, could be seen; and the point of attack was decided on at the north-east angle, where an enfilade fire could be obtained on the two faces. Batteries were thrown up at night to cover the guns, and the Blanshard bridge stretched out by planks and other means to span the stupendous ditch; but symptoms of wavering began to show themselves in the garrison. Overtures of surrender were made by some of the chiefs, which were suspected by Mow Wang, whom the conspirators slew at the council table, at 2 P.M. on the 5th December. They sent out his head to the Futai that night, and gave up the city on the 6th December. They were, however, treacherously murdered by the Futai on the afternoon of the 7th December.

Large stores and a number of foreign guns were captured in the city, whose fall caused the evacuation of Wusieh, on the 13th December.

The force remained inactive at Quinsan till the end of February, in consequence of the above treachery of the Governor; but though the same was inexcusable, the writer did not consider that the object which the British Government had in view when they allowed him to serve the Imperialists should be allowed to fall through, and, consequently,




the force resumed active operations on the 23rd February.

The position of the rebels was peculiar; the shape of the country they held resembled a dumb-bell; in the upper part of which they had Nankin, Tayan, Kintang and Chanchufu; in the waist they had Yesing and Liyang; and in the lower part they held Changching, Wuchu, Kashing, Hangchow, and several other smaller towns. It will be seen that a vital blow would be struck if the waist were cut through by the captures of Yesing and Liyang, to approach which the Taiho was most convenient.

This plan was agreed on, and on the 26th February the force, passing through Soochow and Wusieh, reached the north gate of Yesing, to the surprise of its garrison. This city lies between two lakes, one on the east and the other on the west. The Imperialists undertook to guard the north of the city, while the force was crossed over to the eastern lake to the south. At 3 P.M. on the 27th February a regiment was passed over with artillery and disembarked on the south side of the lake, meeting with but feeble resistance from the rebels, who retired into their stockades. These were followed by the remainder of the force next morning.

On reconnoitring, it appeared that a large deep canal ran south of the city, and 800 yards from it,



from lake to lake; over this was a large high stone bridge; the line of this canal and this bridge was defended by breastworks and stockades. It looked difficult to attack, so the infantry were directed to move parallel to it and out of range, to the western With the view of distracting attention and lake. enabling two hundred infantry to cross the canal and carry the breastwork unperceived, these men were concealed in boats in a branch creek leading into the canal, and their advance was to be covered with artillery also concealed in the adjacent ruins. ruse succeeded, for the rebels drew the bulk of their forces off towards the great bridge which they thought was threatened. Through a mistake the troops, making a detour, got further off from the city than was intended; and while they were in this position a large force of the rebel reinforcements was seen wending its way towards the high bridge from Livang. This force was allowed to pass on to the narrow causeway which, with a wide ditch on each side, led to the bridge. Once on this they could not deploy, and the troops pressing them in rear caused a fearful panic. The rebels at the bridge shut the gates, but the fugitive Liyang reinforcement stormed the position in spite of the fire the Yesing men opened on them. The pursuing infantry entered with them, at the same moment as the two hundred

infantry pushed across the canal, and carrying the breastwork, turned the position.

By noon the whole of the rebels' positions outside the walls south of the city were captured, the north was already closed, and the lakes prevented any escape to the east and west. At 2 A.M. on the 29th February the city threw open its gates and surrendered, its chiefs having escaped by boat.

The lake to the east of Yesing is joined by two deep canals with the Taiho lake, and on the most southern of these, Tapuku, the rebels had a cluster of stockades. Some of their chiefs wanted to surrender, others did not, so it was necessary to send down a small force to compel the unwilling chiefs into submission. This small force arrived off the place at dusk, and communicated with the friendly chiefs, who described their stockades to be on the north of the creek, and those of the unfriendly chiefs to be on the south. The attack would have been rather a difficult one, but the flight of the unfriendlies settled the matter.

On the return of this force to Yesing, the *Hyson* steamer made her appearance, having passed in through the northern canal from the Taiho lake.

On the 7th March the force marched by land towards Liyang; the flotilla, convoyed by the *Hyson* steamer, proceeded in the same direction, with in-

structions to feel their left at about 18 miles from Yesing, where it was intended to halt. Through some mistake they did not do so, and the troops, separated from the convoy, for the first and only time during these operations received no rations. On the 8th the mistake was rectified, but several boats went astray and fell into the hands of the rebels.

It was found that the road from Yesing to Liyang to the south made too great a detour, so that it was necessary to move the 3,000 infantry and 4,000 Imperialists across to the northern road, a distance of eight miles, no small operation, as there were upwards of 13 canals from 60 to 100 yards wide to cross over; however, with the help of the gunboats, all was accomplished by the night of the 8th March.

At 9 P.M. some of the boats which went astray into the rebel lines came back with a letter from the rebel chiefs of Liyang, offering the surrender of the city. The Hyson started with 150 infantry at once, and at dawn reached the stockades outside the city. The rebels scarcely expected their arrival so soon; however, they gave over one stockade, and eventually opened the gates of the city. The remainder of the force came up in the course of the day, having had to cross twenty-seven wide creeks, as the rebels had

broken all the bridges: and thus the waist of the dumb-bell was cut.

The garrison of Liyang could not have been less than 20,000 men; the chief Shih Wang was next to the Chung Wang in rank. He had gone out the day before to reconnoitre, and had been shut out by the other chiefs, who surrendered as related.

It should have been mentioned that to the west of Liyang were 40,000 Imperialist soldiers belonging to Tseng Qwo Fau, the Generalissimo commanding the forces round Nankin. These troops acted as a covering force to the investment. The capture of Liyang liberated these troops for other duties.

It had already been considered that, in the event of success in the captures of Yesing and Liyang, the force should move from the latter city on Kintang and Tayan, and thus cut Chanchufu off from Nankin. Accordingly 1,600 of the Liyang rebels having been taken into the force, about 1,500 men, the artillery, and the *Hyson* started for the capture of Kintang, which, it was expected, would surrender.

On the 18th March these troops marched through a devastated country for Kintang, in the vicinity of which they arrived on the 21st. The city is small and had little cover round it except on the northeast angle, which it was determined to breach. The rebels made little show, and at daybreak the guns

were placed in position. Just, however, as they were about to open fire, a courier came in from the Governor of Soochow reporting the irruption of a large rebel force from Chanchufu towards Kongvin and Chanzu; as they had already taken Fushan and were threatening the two former cities, causing great alarm at Soochow and Quinsan, which were only weakly garrisoned, the Governor concluded by requesting the return of some of the force to repel this invasion. The guns being now in position, it was thought better to try and capture the city before returning, and arrangements were made for the assault by placing the men in boats on the creek leading into the ditch of the city. A breach was soon formed and the gunboats started to the assault, when the rebels mounted the breach and opened a heavy fire on the advance; the writer (who went along the bank with the gunboats) on approaching the edge of the ditch saw that the stone bridge over it was unbroken and imprudently ordered a change of plan in the moment of execution of the assault, directing the troops to land, and assault across the This change of plan gave the rebels bridge. courage, and though the breach was thrice assaulted, they repelled each attempt with considerable loss to It was, therefore, determined to the assailants. desist, and to return to Liyang, leaving the 1,000

infantry who had been engaged at Kintang to proceed with a fresh regiment to the attack of the invading rebels from Chanchufu. The Kintang rebels harassed the force very much during the night of the 23rd March, creeping up and throwing powder bags into the boats, but at daybreak they fell back and the retreat was unmolested.

Arriving at Liyang on the night of the 24th, the defeated troops were disembarked, and a fresh regiment, with 1,600 of the Liyang ex-rebels who had been drafted into the force, started for Yesing and Wusieh, where they arrived on the 26th March, and where more information was obtained of the rebel invasion which had thrown the country into a regular panic.

It appeared that the rebels had established posts from Chanchufu along the south of Kongyin to Chanzu, where the head of the force lay, and as time pressed, it was thought advisable to let their Chiefs know that the troops were still in existence by attacking their communications, which would tend to bring them back and slacken their efforts against Chanzu.

A series of skirmishes near Niukiuchiaow occurred on the 27th and 28th, which tended to bring the rebels back from Chanzu, but as the attacks were made in a direction which might drive them into

settled districts, it was thought advisable to move round and attack Waisso—where they had now accumulated—from the east side, and to drive them on the Imperialists who had now come from the south and out of Kongyin, and held positions, barring the rebels from returning to Chanchufu; along this line they had broken all the bridges, and thus the rebels were in a complete cul de sac.

The regiment of infantry and the 1,600 enlisted rebels were directed to move by road from Liukiuchow towards Waisso on the morning of the 31st March, with directions to feel their right so as to keep up a communication with the light artillery boats which proceeded by water to the east side of Waisso. With the artillery boats was the writer. who was unable to walk from a wound in the leg received at Kintang. At noon the boats approached Waisso, but there was no sign of the infantry, though sounds of firing had been heard in the dis-The rebels perceived the boats, which tance. managed to get back with difficulty to Liukiuchow. to which the infantry had returned in the greatest disorder, seven officers and 450 men, out of 2,000, having been captured and killed. It appeared that the officer in command had been lured on to the vicinity of the rebel stockades, which he thought he would take before the artillery came up; his

arrangements were so long in being made that, when he was ready, the rebels had large parties out on each of his flanks, on which he began to retire. The retreat soon degenerated into a rout, and the rebel horsemen rode through and through the ranks until close down to Liukiuchow, when the fire of a company of infantry and a couple of guns stopped them. After such a disaster it became necessary to fall back to Siangchow and to send for more troops. The Governor now agreed to garrison Liyang, from which place the force was withdrawn on the 6th April. They arrived at Liukiuchow on the 9th, and on the 11th were moved up towards the east side of Waisso, which was surrounded by sixteen stockades; a close reconnaissance showed that the most northerly stockade was weakly garrisoned, the rebel forces being massed towards the south. By a quick movement a regiment seized this stockade, which turned the rebel position and compelled them into a retreat, soon to be a flight. They were now hemmed in on all sides, and had no entrenchments; the Imperialists and villagers hunted them down, and out of the whole of this invading force barely 1,000 got back to Chanchufu. The bodies of the officers and men killed on the disastrous 31st March were recovered and buried.

In spite of the treachery, five cities in the south

had surrendered to the Imperialists since the fall of Soochow, and on the 20th March General Ching, who had got some artillery officered by foreigners, breached and carried by storm the city of Kachungfu, which lies on the grand canal below Wokong. He was, however, mortally wounded in the assault; and thus the Imperialists lost the best general they had. Ching was a very brave, intelligent man, and would have been a good leader in any country. On the 21st March the large city of Hangchow was evacuated, after having repulsed an assault made by the Franco-Chinese force.

The force now turned towards Chanchufu, which was nearly surrounded by the Imperialist forces to the number of 80,000. It was defended by Hu Wang, a most noted rebel chief, and a large garrison of determined men. A detour was made to reach the west gate, where the rebels had a nest of stockades outside the walls, and some distance from them. On the 22nd and 23rd April, these were attacked and evacuated after a feeble resistance. In the grand canal which runs close to the city, was the wreck of the Firefly steamer, burnt by the Imperialists, when lying at a stockade off the west gate, midway between Chanchufu and Tayan, and which stockade they had surprised.

As the ground admitted of it, and time did not

press, batteries were thrown up 150 yards from the wall for the breaching guns. These were made at night by the Chinese, who worked admirably and quietly; they were finished by the 26th, and the attack was fixed for the 27th. The Governor wished that the Imperialists should try their hand in the assault at two breaches which had been made at different places in the wall by some foreigners they had in their employ, and that the assault by the foreign officered troops should be delayed till they had tried.

Accordingly the Imperialists made their attempt at 1 p.m., but failed signally. At 2 p.m. the assault of the force took place, a breach having been made in the morning. The ditch was crossed by a bridge of Blanshard's pontoons, but the rebels behaved with such gallantry that they repulsed two attacks, forced back the attacking column, and obliged them to abandon the bridge, which the rebels, during the next night, took up the breach into the town.

On the 9th May the troops and artillery of the late General Ching arrived, and a bridge of casks having been prepared, an approach was made from the batteries to the edge of the ditch, by which the attacking columns could advance to the assault under cover. The cask bridge was boomed across on the night of the 10th of May, and another breach

having been made by Ching's artillery, the place was assaulted at both these breaches, after giving the rebels several false alarms by bugle. A party of Imperialists, under Co Sung Ling, attacked with the foreign officered force. Both assaults succeeded, though the rebels fought desperately, and threw the usual amount of powder bags among the stormers.

The 32-pounder gun taken from the *Firefly* steamer lay on the other side of the breach, loaded to the muzzle, and intended to sweep the breach; it had, however, missed fire.

The rebel chief, Hu Wang, was beheaded; but, as a rule, few others fell.

With this action ended the operations of the force, which was paid off and dissolved by the lat June.

The fall of Chanchufu led to the evacuation of Tayan, on the 13th May; Kintang had been evacuated on the 25th April, and there only remained in rebel possession Changehing, which surrendered on the 4th July; Nankin, which was taken by storm on the 13th July, the 42-foot wall having been blown down for a distance of 150 feet by a mine placed at the end of a gallery driven from a stockade 200 yards from the city; and Wuchufu, which was evacuated on the 28th August, 1864.


In concluding these imperfect notes, testimony

must be borne to the gallant behaviour of the brave foreigners who officered the force. Numbering in all 130, they had 35 killed and 73 wounded; while the Chinese, out of 4,000, had 520 killed and 920 wounded. The losses at Waisso raised the number of killed beyond its usual proportion to the number wounded.

The total cost of the force for the fourteen months the writer held the command was about £200,000.

Should any future war with China arise, too much attention cannot be paid to the close reconnoitring of the enemy's positions, in which there are always some weak points; and it is to be hoped that our leaders may incline to a more scientific mode of attack than has hitherto been in vogue. The hasty attacks generally made on Asiatic positions cost valuable lives, invite failure, and prevent the science of war theoretically acquired at considerable cost being tested in the best school, viz., that of actual practice.

C. G. G.







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