THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRAINING:

OR, THE PRINCIPLES AND ART OF

A Normal Education;

WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF ITS ORIGIN AND HISTORY.

ALSO,

REMARKS ON THE PRACTICE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENTS IN SCHOOLS;

AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE PREVAILING MODE OF TEACHING LANGUAGES.

BY A. R. CRAIG.


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TO

MRS. FORBES LEITH,

OF

Whitehaugh.

Dear Madam,

In dedicating the following work to you, in whose hospitable residence the greater part of it was written, would I thus acknowledge, in some small degree, the many kindnesses received, and opportunities for study afforded, while at that time a guest in your family circle. Nor do I deem, that to any one may such a treatise more appropriately be inscribed—a leading principle of which is intended to illustrate the power of maternal affection as an element in moral training—than to a parent, whose own children have so largely participated in the best fruits of that benign influence.

Accept then, Dear Madam, in the dedication of these pages, the full tribute of that esteem which such an act has ever been held to imply; and that every happiness may attend you, is the sincere wish of,

Yours faithfully,

A. R. CRAIG.
PREFACE.

It must often have occurred to those interested in the question of education, and observant of the form in which it is usually presented to the public, how much more attention is ever bestowed upon its merely external features than its intrinsic nature and properties. Too much has ever been taken for granted regarding a knowledge of the subject itself, while the various modes by which its still undefined principles should operate and manifest themselves have been discussed infinitesimally. The questions of a national or voluntary endowment—of a combined religious and secular, or an independent system—of a monitory or simultaneous method—of explanatory modes and intellectual plans, have been the engrossing themes; and a consideration of them has doubtless elicited many valuable suggestions and improvements. But these all refer to so many mere contingencies surrounding the subject—adjectives, as one may say, of a substantive
whose own qualities must be defined before the former can be shaped into harmonious adaptation to them. The learning to read, to write, and to cipher, with all other branches of school instruction, is in itself but a mode of education; the directing of that mode by a staff of monitors or an individual master, but a question of convenience and efficacy in imparting its self-educating means. The explaining of words and better plans of teaching are but organic improvements in the art of applying these means. Even the religious and secular question refers but to the administrative department, while its propagation by national enactment or voluntary efforts, is a question of political and social economy.

All these adventitious circumstances, therefore, however individually important, are but of secondary moment to a consideration of the great first principles from which they all emanate, and of which they form but a physical apparatus or frame-work. This apparatus, too, must ever vary by circumstances; and however valuable the discoveries made for the better working of its machinery, it should be borne in mind that the whole is but a conventional arrangement, and much of it liable to be superseded or remodelled according as clearer views are developed regarding the fundamental laws of education itself, which are above all change, and eternal. But certain systems and modes of administering these essential laws have been generally
assumed as first principles, and whatever improvements have been effected from such data have rather tended outwards from the subject than inwards towards it. The improvements introduced under the Bell and Lancasterian systems are of this nature. These were at first merely organic changes in the external management of a school, with perhaps better modes of teaching what was taught before. But that which was taught before constituted only a small part of education, and hence little improvement in it was thus effected. Nor, for the same reason, was the adoption of the explanatory and intellectual mode much of an essential improvement. While monitorism arranged and methodized its previous materials, the intellectual system improved upon the materials themselves. But neither a better arrangement nor improvement of these instruments was much advance towards a knowledge and practice of their application, or the work to be done by them, much less of that greater and more important part of the work not even subject to their influence. And the reason is, that erroneous systems of belief regarding the nature of that work no less generally prevailed than an ignorance of its practice.

This tendency in the universal mind to deposit, as it were, certain systems of belief and practice, which the lapse of time equally consolidates, whether erroneous or otherwise, is not therefore always beneficial to the cause of truth, but more frequently the reverse. How often,
and how long have the correct principles of science been retarded, in having had thus to struggle up from nature through the superincumbent framework of a popular but erroneous system of contrary opinions! The minds of the majority of mankind, trained up beneath such a canopy of ideas, passively receive the stereotyped impression; while it is only the rare occurrence of some less plastic but more original mind refusing to be thus moulded, that imbibes its convictions of truth from more natural sources. Of this "love of system" as a source of error, specified by Lord Bacon under the allegorical phrase, "The Idol of the Tribe," the Aristotelian philosophy is an instance—though indeed the system of doctrines that became popular under that name was very different from those contained in the genuine writings of the Stagirite. That system was taught in the schools for ages, and a blind submission to its dogmas exacted from pupils. In some universities it was considered scarcely inferior to the Scriptures. It was supported by statutes requiring teachers upon oath to follow no other guide than that of Aristotle, and it was considered a bold innovation when to that philosophy were merely added the writings of Plato, Pythagoras, and the Stoics. Yet the monks and Jesuits, who so loudly denounced that "heresy," as threatening a revolution in the science of mind, might have saved their alarms, had they known that no extension of the same system of reasoning would ever develop sounder views of mental
philosophy. It was but adding to a building whose foundation was unsound, and which indeed, in another way than they feared, accelerated the ruin of the entire structure. But the temple of truth arose upon a different foundation, laid deep in nature, and was gradually reared to perfection by materials derived from the same source. Rejecting the logomachies and sophistries of the schoolmen, a return was made to the natural workings of the mind itself in its examination of nature, and the principles of a system of inductive reasoning drawn from thence, that have revolutionized or modified all former systems, not only of mental but material philosophy.

In a similar way the theories and fallacious systems of ancient astronomy long retarded an advance of the true principles of that science. Its former data were mostly conjectures, from which facts were attempted to be drawn; and though many facts harmonized with such data, it did not therefore follow that these were correct as general principles of astronomy. It was building downwards from heaven to earth by an artificial prop-work, instead of upwards from earth to heaven upon a natural foundation and scaffolding. Yet the consolidating hand of time gave a consistency to these loose principles, which held sway over the human mind for long ages; and as the glimmering of a taper serves but to render the surrounding darkness of night the more intense, the dawning light of a Copernicus only revealed the universality and
magnitude of the errors that had been perpetuated under the Ptolemaic system. In addition to his own early belief, however, Copernicus was also a close observer of nature; and finding discrepancies between the two, happily yielded to the evidence of sense, and drew his own conclusions from the latter. From the simple phenomenon, that must have been familiar to every one, namely, the optical illusion that takes place to a spectator in a boat moving along the banks of a river, the objects on which seem to move past, he drew the sublime induction, that a similar illusion happens with respect to the heavenly bodies, and thus laid the basis of an entirely different system. But aware of the danger of its coming into competition with the former belief, he neither announced his rejection of the one, nor discovery of the other, till near the close of his life, fifty years afterwards. And another half century elapsed before, by the exertions of Galileo, "it was kindled into so bright a flame as to consume the philosophy of Aristotle, to alarm the hierarchy of Rome, and to threaten the existence of every opinion not founded on experience and observation."*

To this "love of system" may also be added the danger that threatened for a time the discovery of the great law of planetary gravitation, inductively though each step of the process was gone through; and had the investigation

* Playfair.
been conducted by a mind less original than that of the immortal discoverer, it must have failed, on coming into collision with formerly received opinions. He traced the power of attraction as being not sensibly diminished from the top of a tree, a building, a mountain, and thence inferred its action upon the moon and planets, and by a laborious mathematical calculation found the law of its ratio. But this truth being incompatible with the system that prevailed regarding the concentric circles of the planetary orbits, he was on the point of abandoning it as hypothetical and fallacious! Happily, however, by a collateral discovery, he found that system itself to be erroneous, and his law to be the origin of a new system, destined to overthrow the "vortices" of the Cartesian philosophy, and to establish its truths upon an investigation into the laws of matter and motion as exemplified by nature herself.

No apology is deemed necessary for adducing such instances as illustrative of the subject of education—for no less has that science suffered through ancient prejudice and conventional system, than the sciences of astronomy and logic. Milton was perhaps the first who suggested a few original ideas on the subject, and pointed out a more rational course than the systems of his day exhibited. Locke followed in exposing the pedantries of what constituted the education of his time. Rousseau and other theorists went still farther. But it
was reserved for a mind intellectually inferior to any of these to strike out the only path that can conduct to a right knowledge and practice of the art of mental training. Henry Pestalozzi may in one sense, therefore, be well compared to Bacon, Copernicus, or Newton, in having literally founded a new 'school' of education, and that upon the same natural principles of observation and induction which they pursued. By this plan the minds of children are brought into immediate contact with the objects of nature, instead of looking at them through the obscurities of language and the mysticism of books, in the same way that those philosophers arrived at truth by natural experiment, instead of groping after it among the speculative systems of their predecessors. Time, therefore, is all that is wanted to carry into effect and consolidate these Pestalozzian principles into an organized system, to supersede all former plans and methods not equally founded in nature.

As an instance of the difficulty of such a task, however, what seems a more hopeless undertaking than any attempt to re-model the present system of classical study, pursued at the endowed universities and grammar schools, or even to depress that study to a secondary pursuit? Yet most people now admit that the mere study of dead languages ought not to consume so many of the precious years of boyhood and youth. But until lately the same error extended down through the whole apparatus of
modern education, and "word-mongering and rote systems" constituted its principal elements.

The following work is an humble effort to review the entire question in the light of nature and Scripture,—that is, to regard the subject of education as unfettered by system and prejudice, and from the manifestations of nature in a human being, to deduce its essential laws,—to show, not only the analogy of nature in training the inferior creation, but the necessity for building upon that principle as a foundation, and proceeding in a uniform line upwards through the very highest departments of intellect and morals. Man is not only a rational, but an instinctive animal; the latter part of his nature should therefore, be regulated rather than restrained by reason. So far as its legitimate influence extends, its promptings should be attended to by reason, which should assume the reins only when it has dropped them. How many of man's best instincts are lost or dwarfed in their development by having their legitimate operations performed by some artifice of reason, or "by that ultra-civilization which strangles the natural feelings!" The promptings of conduct are then not from within, but from without; but it is the inward desires and inclinations that must be attended to, and gratified by reason, up to that point where instinct fails to supply them—when reason must then not only regulate and gratify, but educe the higher and more spiritual aspirations.
The *Norma* of education must, therefore, be drawn, not only from, but by, nature; else, like the addition of the Academic philosophy, to that of the Peripatetics, in monkish times, the institution of normal seminaries upon any other basis, will form but an excrescence upon existing systems, rather than any new system.
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CHAPTER I.

In soliciting attention to the following pages, the writer begs to notice, in limine, that he is entering upon the investigation of a subject now claiming to be ranked not only as a distinct but most comprehensive science. Closely allied to theology, its discussion by parties of different religious views, has tended hitherto rather to mix it up with the sectarianism of peculiar denominations, than to define its own principles and prerogatives; and though so well calculated to promote the best civil interests of the entire community, it has more frequently been degraded into an instrument for serving the mere purposes of a faction. Thus, in most cases, where it has been made a public question, it has only been dragged into the arena of political and polemical strife, dealing wounds upon society, instead of administering its native healing agency to those already inflicted. The progress of truth, however, is gradually detaching it from such an unseemly warfare, unfolding its own high mission and noble aims, and gaining for it the consideration due to its importance as an essential and distinct element in the social constitution. It cannot, however, be denied, that
it is the duty of the legislator to regulate and control the general interests of education, or of the ecclesiastic to lend his efforts in promoting the same cause. But the same thing is no less true regarding every private individual to the extent of his personal and official influence, which, indeed, is but an extension of the same principle that pervades all nature from the inorganic creation upwards. By the law of gravity, the larger masses of matter exert an influence over the smaller, in controlling their operations and movements. A greater degree of heat produces an exuberance of fertility in one climate, and an excess of cold renders barren another. The parent hen fashions the instinctive character and habits of her brood, by the influence of example, and the language of nature; and the propensities of all animals are modified by coming into contact with others of superior sagacity or a higher order. The senior child of a family is the unconscious instructor of his juniors, by exhibiting his own actions and movements as a model for their imitation; and even in what he does teach actively, it being the pure impulse of nature, more character is often formed, and intellect evolved, than from the more formal lessons of an experienced adult. The parent is an educator of a higher class, combining a moral influence with the weight of his natural example. The master of a number of workmen has also an educative power attached to his position; and so, of course, in their respective spheres, have the politician and ecclesiastic. But in all these different relations, the philosophy of an artificial education is never brought fully to bear upon the general purposes of life. Certain natural principles exercise an influence upon their legitimate objects; and, whether these operate actively or passively, upon matter or upon mind, a necessary obedience is yielded to
their authority. In the inorganic and vegetable worlds, transformation is accomplished by the operation of a physical law; and in animal nature a similar effect is produced by a principle of instinctive imitation and self-love. Nor even is it when the principles of an abstract education have been generalised from an observation of the preceding laws, combined and digested by the metaphysician into a system of didactic rules, and assumed by sections of society to advance some party scheme of benevolence, that their intrinsic power is fully manifested. The laws of education are designed by Providence to arrange the discordant elements of the entire moral creation, and breathe an immortal existence into the universal mind. Instead of furthering the ends of many human alliances, they are intended to dissolve them, and remodel their constitutions upon a more philanthropic basis, to unloose the several knots that bind sections of society together, that the cords of affection and brotherly charity may be lengthened, so as to embrace the whole family of man. They are too spiritual in their nature to promote most of the present arrangements of society, based as these generally are upon the superiority of selfish and factional interests. Yet would not this be the case, were our civil and religious institutions inherently and in reality what they profess to be—a means of promoting the essential and universal happiness of man. Were they even as pure as their principles profess, it would be different; but any religious corporation, so far as the practically moral and physical welfare of the people is concerned in the present life, is either too worldly, or—with reverence be it spoken—too abstractly spiritual for the purpose. It is too worldly, inasmuch as its framework is necessarily established upon a pecuniary basis, with an adamantine bulwark of emoluments.
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around it that narrow and restrict the enterprises of its adherents within these prescribed limits. Besides, every social institution has a peculiar species of selfishness attached to it—a kind of aggregate reflection of the selfishness of its individual members; and thus, while the abstract principles upon which any society proposes to act, may tend to a universal good, their operation is often rendered nugatory for this end, by considerations affecting the mere interests of the society. And it is idle to say, that such a feeling pervades churches in any less degree than other civil institutions: while the selfishness of political partisanship is proverbially notorious. Most religious societies are also too abstractly spiritual for the purposes of a temporal education, since their chief business is professedly concerned "with things not of this life." Thus it is that, when any question such as that of modern education comes to be discussed by contending parties of churchmen and politicians, it is treated by each according to the views most conducive to its own separate and social interests. The real merits of the question are soon merged, and become secondary matters in the unworthy, but all engrossing, struggle for ascendency.

Yet of all subjects usually submitted to public attention, it is certainly the best entitled to meet with a calm and dispassionate consideration, and to be discussed with Christian forbearance and courtesy, by people of different views in matters of religion. It is one of the great moral engines that Providence has put into the hands of man for ameliorating and elevating the condition of all ranks of society; but, in accordance with his usual mode of procedure, it is entirely left to a probationary course. It depends, therefore, much upon the animus and skill of those who set it moving, and upon the objects towards which it may be directed, whether it produce its naturally
beneficial effects, or the contrary. If used for party purposes, and for gaining private ends, it will undoubtedly be the innocent cause of effectuating much evil; for, being in itself an acknowledged good, the mischief thus insidiously done, like the administering of poison in some palatable viand, will only be the more concealed and fatal. And in many cases equally lamentable are its individual effects upon those on whom it has partially and prejudicially operated, giving, for example, to the intellectual powers the aid of a heavenly light, by which the wicked purposes of the heart may only be the more extensively and the more fatally executed. Or, on the other hand, if an undue and improper application of it has been made to the feelings, unenlightened by reason and intelligence, no less pernicious consequences will result. In either of these cases it is putting a sharp instrument into the hand; but unless the hand be taught how to wield it, the chances are not small indeed, that pain will only be inflicted upon the operator himself, or upon those around him.

A rightly directed system of education is a moral power in the universe, second only to that creating Energy that formed and sustains in existence its material framework. It is, indeed, a cooperating with the same Divine influence—it is carrying into effect the very laws which the Creator has established for the moral renovation and perfection of the species, for admitting it to a glimpse of that intellectual radiance emanating from the "Father of lights," and for opening up, by the magic influences of love and affection, those springs of joy and gladness that have their source in every human heart, and that would flow forth and encircle the whole family of man in one vast flood of blessedness. That a matter of such importance, therefore, should ever be
turned aside from its legitimate purpose, and made subservient to a paltry spirit of partisanship, is lamentable in the extreme; and indeed, only one of the effects of that partial education of which we have been speaking.

Such being the case, there appears a strong necessity for detaching the whole business of education from its connexion with any religious or political party whatever, and making it practically manifest that it is a universal question, involving the highest interests of every individual, which can only be promoted by a just apprehension and diffusion of its own abstract principles. It is not necessary to fortify this position against the charge of irreligion in the matter of education, as a perusal of the sequel must show such an attempt to be superfluous. Religion has to do with everything in life, and of course with education too; but no less wide is the difference between the pure principles of religion itself, and those that often govern the different societies of religious men, than between the essential laws of education and those religious associations. Education is an abstract science; and when religion is also considered abstractedly, in practice the one becomes the handmaid of the other, because religion imposes an obligation upon each to advance the interests of all, and it is therefore a duty, among other means, to promote this end by diffusing the principles of education.

As most differences on any subject originate in a want of properly defined terms, so the whole of this long agitated controversy seems entirely to hinge upon the want of a clear apprehension of these two questions,—What is a religious, and what is a general education? The latter of these inquiries forms the chief topics in the following pages; and the former may be answered in the first place negatively, by saying, that religion is not
confined to the "standards" of any church; and consequently, whatever any religious society, in their corporate capacity, allege, regarding a union of education with religion, must in general be received as a vague and indefinite idea. By the standards of a church, are of course meant those conventional regulations framed for its government and discipline; while the standards of natural and revealed religion, are the Bible and the works of nature. At the present moment the practical application of this union has been resolved into each separate sect having its separate schools; and while undoubtedly much good may be done in this way, it is equally certain that a disunion of feeling is perpetuated, not only among these religious bodies themselves, but a sectional bias impressed upon the minds of the children of each respective school. It is a union of certain schools to certain churches, and a conformity of school books to particular creeds; but it is no more a union of education to religion in the abstract, than the establishment of a factory school can be said to unite education to the science of cotton-spinning. It must be a purely religious feeling, calling to its aid the instrumentality of those lately developed views regarding the training of the young, which apply to the whole family of man, whatever their speculative opinions on religion, politics, or philosophy, and, regardless of these differences, promoting their practical welfare, that deserves anything like the name of a union. "Pure religion and undefiled," was never intended as a mere theological abstraction, affording excitement to critical minds, so often tending to an alienation of the affections, but to lead those under its influence to practise its precepts. Education is thus subservient to the interests of religion, as the hand is united to the body and becomes the
servant of the mind; but this union can at the most be effected in a very partial manner, by its being made the mere instrument of a sect for sectarian purposes.

Again, as an abstract science, it is a totally different thing from religion. The latter reaches beyond the present life, and treats of mysteries connected with the immortal spirit; the former descends to the physical wants and necessities of man, even before he has been ushered into existence, and from this, as a basis, proceeds to form those moral and intellectual tempers and habits that can alone serve as a sure foundation for a religious education. But inasmuch as two different ends are thus sought to be gained, so are the two influences in operation for those purposes two essentially different things. The foundation of a building is prepared by other means and other instruments, than those employed in rearing the structure: the earthly elements of the soil must be displaced and arranged before the compact materials that raise the edifice to the skies are called into use.

A parallel between a religious and a general education may thus be drawn. The latter comprehends certain principles deduced and generalised from an acquaintance with the constitution and character of man. In ascertaining what this character is, two sources are available—the book of nature and the book of revelation. By means of these it is found that he is a compound being, consisting of separate parts, the two great divisions of which are body and spirit. But as one tree may consist of many branches, so each of these distinct natures has a ramified and complicated existence of its own. The former exists by what are called organs; and the latter, while in the body, manifests itself by means of faculties. Again, of these faculties there are several varieties, just as the body is composed of different organs, that is, as it
appears, several modes by which the soul of man operates upon the body, and is affected by it; and the two great divisions of these, again, are his mental and moral powers. The latter are said to be passive feelings, the former, active principles; and a deduction from this is, that the whole nature of man is influenced in two ways, actively and passively.

Now, according to this description of the subject to be educated, an obvious inference arises, that a different influence must be applied to the different parts of man's nature. His bodily organs, from the largely developed limbs, to those microscopical and invisible tubes pervading the whole interior of his frame, and from which are derived such incontestable proofs of a Divine mechanism, all demand care and attention of a nature peculiar to themselves. Hence is deduced the necessity of a physical education for the complete development and healthy action of these powers. His intellect, also, requires an education peculiarly its own. It seems to subserve the spiritual nature in a manner similar to that by which the stomach administers to the body. The latter requires aliment and exercise; the former, information and reflection. To afford these in proper abundance, therefore, and of a suitable nature, is an intellectual education. The moral faculties, again, demand a still different treatment. These being feelings, and consequently passive, must be quickened and drawn out into action, or, it may be, blunted and repressed—or, in plain language, good habits formed, and bad ones reformed. And as each of these processes implies external assistance and guidance, the necessity of a moral education is equally deducible. Education, then, divides itself into three great branches, physical, intellectual, and moral, each of a different kind, adapted to the different faculties of our nature.
On the other hand, a religious education is something above and beyond all this. The enlightened Christian, however, cannot fail to perceive in the general education of a community an analogous process to that of atmospheric action upon the face of nature. The once rocky surface, by the lapse of time and the attrition of the atmosphere, becomes decomposed and pulverised into the genial and fertile soil; the dews and the rains of heaven fall upon it, and the good seed is cast abroad, bringing forth fruit more or less according to its depth and cultivation. And a moral and intellectual soil must also be spread over the ignorant and depraved masses of the people, before the seed of the word can be expected to take root and flourish and bring forth fruit.

Nor, indeed, can this happy result be expected to take place by a mere process of indoctrinating into the principles of any church, as contained in her formularies and catechisms. The logical and scriptural definition of a religious education must be had, by assuming as data the definitions already laid down regarding the human character, adding, that every spiritual influence affecting the mind and the character is part of a religious education. And this influence may be communicated in two ways, each of which may be seen by an illustration. A child brought up under illiterate and mentally ignorant but pious parents, may become habituated into all the duties of Christianity, and thus be brought under the power of vital religion by a kind of practically deductive process; and another, born of Godless parents, may have his mind enlightened in the knowledge of Christ by means of Sabbath-school instruction, and thus, also, become a practical Christian. Those different influences, however, derive their efficacy from the same source, and are simply the truths of revelation, operating upon the heart
and conscience. A religious education is, therefore, a unique thing, having for its object the immortal spirit, and its instrument, the word of God. But almost an equally important question remains yet to be answered: What are those truths, the communicating of which forms a religious education? And the answer is, The essential doctrines of the Gospel, so plainly revealed, that he that runneth may read them. Yet as there is no principle so sacred, no doctrine so holy, that may not be perverted to party ends and selfish purposes, so around these truths, in many cases, has been thrown a covering of error, gilded and polished it may be, but fatal error still; and to communicate even truth in this way, is simply the true way to communicate error.

Our position then is, that, were education more relieved from its present fragmentary and sectional character, and its benevolent abettors combined in practice as in principle,—were it made a neutral question, and a common ground, upon which men of different sentiments in politics and religion could meet and fraternise, such a scene would exhibit, both in idea and reality, a union of the really homogeneous elements of religion and general education. It would be seen, too, how vast a power has lately been evoked for the welfare of man, but how sadly crippled by his own unseemly divisions. Like the streamlets of a country flowing in different channels, and ready to be dried up at the approach of summer, but, when united, rolling along in an irresistible current, irrigating the lands through which it flows, and carrying health and comfort along its course, so would the combined efforts of such a Christian union diffuse the blessings of moral health and happiness over the wide extent of the land.

What is there in life, indeed, that man desires and hopes for, that is not involved in the consideration of
this question? Even wealth and rank, with all their fascinations, unless the possessor of them has been imbued with correct moral and intellectual principles, pall upon the senses, and often only the more speedily accelerate his ruin; whereas to the man of cultivated mind and refined habits, a perennial spring of delights is thus opened up. And a far nobler object of ambition is his who, subduing his own selfish desires and feelings, acts upon the impulse of a diffusive benevolence, in promoting the happiness of a community, than that which prompts the warrior or the statesman to aim at wielding the destinies of an empire. But with longing eyes and ardent aspirations men still struggle on, through life grasping at these vain shadows, and overlooking the solid advantages of moral power and usefulness within the reach of every one. And what forms the true happiness and virtuous ambition of an individual, or of a family, is no less that of the whole of society. What pleasure on earth is so great to a reflecting and fond parent, as to see his children growing up around him intelligent and amiable, forming an atmosphere of happiness around his home, and reflecting from their bright faces the joy that gladdens his own heart? In such a scene it is, that he forgets the exhaustion of his frame, or his mental anxieties in adversity, that his wounded spirit finds a balm, and derives new courage for future exertions, and in the innocence of their unpolli
ted minds and affections, that he obtains bright glimpses of a better world. Yet without the operation of a correct system of guidance and control, the same household might become a focus for the concentration of everything repulsive in humanity.

Now extend an application of the same principles that render home a paradise, to the national family, and what a scene for the contemplation of the philanthropist! Nor
is it a vain chimera, or a Utopian dream, in which educationists indulge, when they anticipate from a realisation of their principles such happy results, as a country living under the influence of a purely moral government. It is but a question of time. The excellence and necessity of such a principle are admitted in point of fact, and it is only individual and imaginary interests that stand in the way of its practical consummation.

The pecuniary and physical advantages of society still hold a preponderance in the consideration of those in power, and while these are adapted to the lower feelings and instincts of humanity, that hold so powerful sway over the masses, and influence in some degree all ranks, there is still a fearfully indurated surface over the national mind, through which the tender plants of morality and intellect must struggle long ere they attain a pre-eminence. Yet in the struggle they must ultimately prevail; and it is this upheaving of mind above matter, the substitution of intellect for brute force, and kindness for violence, that will alone effect the final renovation of society. Criminal codes may become milder, and the same vindictive process of punishments be diluted into the separate, silent, and solitary systems, but the adamantine mass of corruption and crime will be still undissolved. There must be a superstratum of intelligence and morality formed over the infant mind of the community that shall eventually rise upwards, and, by the warmth of a philanthropic affection, burst asunder the rocky surface of vice, and the iron bands of a physical domination, ere the fruits of virtue appear, to form the last era in the moral geology of the human mind.

Looking at the history of man, as exhibiting a gradual progress to perfection from a state of animalism to
spirituality, I should therefore be disposed to say that the present era is that distinguished by the superiority of pure intellect. So far as history informs us, no nation ever yet attained to such pre-eminence either in point of inventive genius or extent of information. The physical strength of armies has been prostrated before this gigantic power; the waves of the ocean rendered harmless and made the highway of nations; the violence of storm and tempest turned aside; the everlasting mountains levelled and thrown into the sea; men hurry over the surface of the earth with a rapidity rivalling the denizens of air, and equal to the lightning's speed the very thoughts and emotions of the mind can traverse space and awaken kindred thoughts in distant minds. To say, therefore, that the happiness of mankind is not infinitely increased by this subjugation of matter to mind, and the infusion of a universal spirit into inanimate nature would be obviously erroneous. But, humiliating as the statement may be, truth compels the admission, that it is a happiness resulting more from its own inherent and inseparable connexion with these improvements, than from any benevolent intention in the originators of them.

To every physical law of nature there is some latent moral benefit attached, and by the discovery and application of the former the latter is necessarily evolved. The projectors of a railway advocate the claims of a certain district in which they have a pecuniary and commercial interest, and if they are men of influence the line is formed, and thousands of other individuals are collaterally benefited. Yet who would say that such men were the moral benefactors of their neighbourhood? Does a shareholder invest his capital in any scheme that merely promises an advantage to a community, without
first considering the dividends likely to accrue to himself from the speculation? It may as well be asserted, that when Napoleon promised to liberate the Poles from Russian tyranny, their freedom was his ultimate design. Had he done so, however, they would have been benefited; but in freeing them he merely contemplated the advancement of his own ambitious ends, and he would have deserved no gratitude at their hands even had he given them liberty. The patriot, too, spending his wealth and exhausting his energies in schemes that issue in the substantial good of his country, has too often within his heart of hearts a feeling, that he may even delude himself into believing an honourable ambition, but when analysed by the test of motives, will be found only a preference of the world’s applause to a more sordid selfishness. And how much miscalled charity is there in the world! Men die and found institutions for relieving the distressed, and their names get embalmed in the memories of their countrymen as the benefactors of their species; but, viewed in the calm light of reason, they may merit no such honourable recollection. The neediest beggar soliciting an alms from the same individuals, when alive, might have failed to move their sympathies to the extent of a sixpence if the world saw not the deed.

Sorry, too, must every philanthropist be to depreciate the vast efforts made for the Christianisation of the heathen, yet it is somewhat difficult to look upon those vast assemblages annually held in Exeter Hall, and listen to many of the speeches addressed there, more to the feelings than the understandings of an audience, without questioning at least much of the moral and practical utility of such exertions. It may be uncharitable to add that, in many of the speakers, the mere glory of being listened to and applauded by thousands, and read by
tens of thousands in the periodicals of the day, forms the entire secret of their benevolent zeal; while a high-pressure system of religious fervour is thus created in the minds of the people, leading their sympathies more in favour of schemes for diffusing among barbarous nations the mere theology of Christianity, than its practical and essential benefits among the neglected at home.

Equally unhealthy in its nature is such fitful enthusiasm that morbid feeling of sentimentality induced upon the minds of many young persons by the representation of a tragedy or the perusal of a novel. Every one knows the spurious nature of such romance-engendered sympathy, and its influence even in hardening the mind against real sorrow. People like to have their sympathies awakened by ideal woes: they give a false and intoxicating excitement to the feelings, which, subsiding into their ordinary channel, cannot be so easily called forth by the real sufferings of daily life. They will expend money upon books of fiction, because it is a cheaper and more luxurious way of gratifying their feelings than by entering the abodes of misery, and feeding, warming, and clothing the poor: and a similar influence is apparent in many of those who subscribe to foreign missionary enterprises. They pay for the gratification of a romantic though a religious passion, as others pay for a box at the theatre or the last new novel. If the objects of their benevolence be not altogether ideal, they form at least a medium between the fictitious heroes of a romance, and the destitute poor immediately under their own eyes. But the idea is much more poetical, and withal more gratifying to the cravings of vanity, to be enrolled as a subscriber to a society whose every deed comes under the eye of the world, than to go forth, and
enter the dense masses of misery and moral desolation within a few hundred yards from Exeter Hall, and, without the aid of declamation or the eloquence of poetry, look into the faces of God's creatures starving under the very sound of words that sympathise with the natives of a distant land, and in the true spirit of Christian philanthropy alleviate their pressing wants, "not letting the right hand know what the left hand doeth."

Another fashionable mode by which many are deluded into the belief that they are acting upon a charitable motive, is the masquerading idea of a bazaar. To walk through one of these fancy fairs and examine the various articles of bijouterie exposed for sale, cannot fail to inspire something like a conviction of the misdirected ingenuity of the minds that have devised and the hands that have elaborated them. In such places there is often presented an array of toys for grown-up people, many of them of a most complicated nature, but of no earthly use, except to afford the indication of a latent energy and genius in the female mind that as yet have found no field for their legitimate development. And in a moral point of view the very excitement caused by such a public display has an effect the very reverse of that contemplated, in drawing away the mind and inclination from the pure feeling and unostentatious practice of charity. Even a spirit of envious commercial rivalry is often manifested on such occasions, leading the occupants of neighbouring stalls to regard each other with a feeling very unlike that "charity which thinketh no evil and is not easily provoked."

Last in the list of these self-deluding schemes of philanthropy, the very name of a charity ball needs only
to be mentioned to call up in the mind one of the most incongruous ideas that artificial life has yet presented to the world. An appeal is here made to feelings the very opposite to those of charity, for a charitable end. The charitable feeling is, therefore, not only not evoked, but deadened: and even if a temporary purpose be served by making people thus impose upon their own convictions, the true sources of an active and permanent sympathy are dried up. It is holding out a bribe to hypocrisy, and forcing people into the belief that they are giving money to the poor, when they are only sacrificing at the shrine of their own pleasure; or at the best it is adding an unnatural stimulant to produce the fruits of charity, while it permanently injures the soil on which they grow. What a mockery of his sorrows would the poor man feel it to be, were he to enter one of these gilded saloons and gaze upon the rich dresses and sparkling gems of the merry dancers, and be told that all this was done in mercy to him—that these gay revellers were the charitable men and women who felt for his wants, and had compassion on his woes! Were he to draw a moral under such circumstances he might naturally say, that if such a lever power were necessary to excite sympathy with sorrow, how vain would be the attempt to move such frivolous hearts to a charitable deed by a simple representation of misery itself!

God forbid, however, that I should here be thought involving in one general charge of selfishness all who are engaged in the benevolent enterprises enumerated. I know there is on earth the existence of a disinterested philanthropy, and often, under favourable circumstances, does it show itself above the dead level of a worldly morality. I know there are men and women who have learned the luxury of doing good, and go about the
world diffusing happiness from the purest of motives. But a very small knowledge of the human heart and intercourse with the world, is necessary to convince any one that such form the exception, not the rule, of daily life. Neither should I be thought cavilling at those conventional arrangements themselves, many of which have done great good to society. My object has simply been to analyse the motives originating such schemes; and though it is not the province of man to decide upon these individually, there is unfortunately too much evidence always at hand to inspire a doubt regarding the pureness and disinterestedness of the great majority of them, and to show the necessity of some new moral agency being applied to this part of man's nature, namely, a right education of the motives of his conduct.

In all these instances, too, however selfish may be the impelling motives, the actions themselves invariably educe some moral good; and while one looks in vain to man to aid in the development of a higher guiding impulse, the inevitable course of events seems tending to a speedy subjugation of the tyranny of reason, and the ultimate establishment of a moral government. It is, therefore, alike the duty and the interest of man to deduce a rule of conduct from this arrangement of nature, in which the ultimate design of every organised being, and of every moral event, is the diffusion of a universal happiness, and by acting upon this principle co-operate with Providence to the same end. Every new discovery in the works of nature proves that the Almighty Mind itself is obedient to the dictates of goodness, and, in the contrivance of its most complicated plans, that Omniscience has only a benevolent moral end in view.
CHAPTER II.

Taking a hasty review of the history of education, with its rise and progress as an art, there is found abundant evidence of its inherent power for good when under the guidance of benevolent motives, but for evil when misdirected in its objects or partial in its operations. To pursue this inquiry to its source, is a parallel investigation to that of tracing the rise and progress of language, for by this alone can we, with any certainty, discover the gradual development of the universal mind. This subject, however, shrouded as it is in the mist of ages, and necessarily extending to a period when no contemporaneous record existed, is a question regarding which little more than vague conjectures can be formed. It is like one starting from the embouchure of some mighty river to explore its far distant source amid the wild and lonely desert, or the bosom of some inaccessible mountain range. As the traveller advances, he perceives the parent stream gradually diminishing above the junction of each successive tributary, until it shrinks into the tiny brooklet and the gurgling rill oozing in thread-like currents from the bosom of the earth; but while he thus gazes upon its visible source, a veil of obscurity hangs over the further progress of his search, and he still remains undecided, whether to ascribe the formation of
this fountain to the explosion of subterranean vapours, or the precipitation of the rains of heaven. So is it with the literary traveller in quest of the origin of language and education. He sees all around him these phenomena now existing in a state of great perfection, and diffusing a flood of intelligence over the earth; he can track their course far up the stream of time—even to their rudest beginnings in the communicating and perpetuating of the simplest ideas, but, like the origin of the river, he can with no certainty determine whether they have not originated as an invention of man himself or descended upon him as a bright gift from heaven.

According to Dr. Blair, this inquiry naturally resolves itself into two branches—“First, whether man, being originally endowed with the faculty of speech, or having bestowed upon him that peculiar organisation by which he is enabled to articulate sounds, stimulated by a desire for increased social enjoyments and guided by his mental powers, gradually formed language; or whether, in addition to this power, the germs or elements of language were also conferred upon him: these are questions, however, that cannot be answered with any certainty.” In support of the former opinion, it is urged that the history of all languages shows a gradual advancement to perfection from the rudest beginnings, and that at no point of their history are traces wanting of their having existed in a still ruder state—that, in short, the progress of a language in all cases keeps pace with the civilisation of a people, and that as there was a period when the civilisation of every people began, or that they emerged out of a state of entire barbarism; so also must have been the course of their language. “This opinion must, therefore, in a great measure, stand or fall according to the truth or error of the latter supposition, namely, that man being
at first a solitary savage, gradually emerged out of barbarism, and formed the social union simply from his own perception of its superior advantages, which opinion is not only unsupported by any evidence, but contrary to Scripture, so that the idea of man originally inventing and constructing language seems somewhat difficult of entertaining."

Nor can one see, if this be the case, why some of the inferior tribes should not also have acquired a degree of artificial language, for it is certain that many of them possess the power of uttering, both in number and variety, a sufficiency of vocal sounds to form a tolerably copious language; while their mental capacity, in many cases, is anything but inferior to that of the barbarians. What cement or mortar is to the consolidation of the natural building, language is to the moral structure of society. In the former, the materials are prepared previously to their combination by the hands of the mechanic; and the Great Architect of human society appears to have prepared for man not only the faculty but the elements of speech, and, having implanted in his nature the desire and necessity of social union, insured the ultimate erection of the social fabric in the diffusion of these self-educating elements among mankind.

The origin of language, however, is scarcely more obscure than the commencement of an artificial education, for the former being an art, the communicating of it to others by speech or writing, even in its rudest form, must have been necessary to its perpetuity, and, therefore, contemporaneous with its origin. In like manner, whatever other art or science became afterwards known to man would evolve, at the same time, certain modes of communicating it to others. Yet the latter of these could find no channel to flow in, until prepared by the instrumentality of language. Many
branches of art may be taught without the aid of language, but no science can. Hence many rude arts may have flourished long before many families of the human race had acquired even a spoken language; just as we see certain inferior animals imitate others in the construction of their dwellings and modes of procuring their prey; but science, and even theoretical morality, are the pure offspring of language.

Among the lower tribes, however, there can be no art properly so called, that is, an art originating in reflection and perpetuated by speech. Their feelings and wants suggest their contrivances aided by that mysterious principle called instinct, always leading them to act aright whether from the impulse of imitation or necessity. It may, indeed, be difficult to define that wonderful ingenuity manifested by so many of them in their social and physical arrangements. Yet it cannot be called art, or skill, as these terms are applied to human actions, because there is no progressive improvement in their education, similar to that of man. And if they have none of this artificial skill, much less have they any scientific ingenuity, which entirely depends upon abstractions communicable by speech or writing. Their instinct would almost seem to be the operation of some organic law of the brain, producing in certain animals as invariable a routine of actions as the chemical law that perpetuates the same disposition of colours in certain species of birds. Like the coral insects of the Pacific, capable only of raising their submarine islands to the surface of the ocean, this animal intellectuality can only rise to one uniform level, since beyond this the scaffolding of an artificial education can find no foundation to rest upon, affording the means of elevating it into the regions of abstraction.
Yet, after all, man is only a more rational animal than an elephant, or a dog, a bee, an ant, or a beaver; these, again, only a little superior to others of the lower tribes; and it is impossible to say, whether it may not actually be the very same principles that combine, in giving intellectuality to a brute, that, operating under different circumstances, produce the genius of a Newton, or the fancy of a Milton. The instinct of the inferior animals, and the reasoning powers of man, are merely different names for what seems to be essentially the same thing, only varying in its degrees of perfection and capability of enlargement. The reason that a beast arrives at a certain stage of perfection which it cannot pass, is, because it receives its full complement of ideas from nature alone. The intellect of a brute may be said to be composed of materials less expansive than those which constitute the mind of man, but that they are of the same inherent nature, there can be little doubt. The grand difference seems to be in man's capabilities of availing himself of external resources in the development of his mind. The faculty of speech, and of exchanging ideas with those of his own species, and the other material means which he has at command in preserving alive the coinage of his brain, have formed a world of thought and feeling around him, into which the inferior creation can never penetrate. But, when we consider the superiority that one man has over another, and one nation over another, when possessed of the means of acquiring and transmitting knowledge, we have the key to the mystery of his superiority over the lower animals. And, upon the whole, the difference is much greater between an artificially educated person and a savage, than between that savage and one of the irrational tribes.

And even without the aid of artificial language, to
what a high pitch of sagacity do many of them attain, displaying a perception of cause and effect, anticipating consequences, and acting upon fixed purposes, that plainly evince their possession of many faculties strictly akin to those of man; so that with no more certainty may we conclude that the mechanism of a watch implies the existence of an intelligent contriver, or the works of nature prove the being of a God, than the mathematical precision of a honey-comb, or the architecture of an ant's hill, demonstrates the existence of that identical designing principle which is denominated mind.

And no less plainly do they manifest the signs of the most acute and sensitive feelings. The patient dromedary, smarting under a sense of his injuries, from his overtasked powers, sinks, and dies of a broken heart! The melancholy look, and big round tears of the hunted stag, or fawn-rifled doe, portray the agony of feeling within! The indication of their loves, their hopes, their fears, their sorrows, their gratitude, their social dispositions, and their resentful propensities, all tends to show, that in the amount of their innate endowments, they are not so immeasurably behind man. Indeed, in many cases, could we imagine them gifted with the single additional faculty of speech, there would be little perceptible mental difference.

This faculty of articulating sounds, to represent the flow of ideas in the mind, is therefore one of the mightiest importance in the whole moral economy of nature. Although it seems to be the only disconnecting link between man and the subordinate creatures, it has placed him infinitely above them in the scale of moral and mental excellence. By the interchange of thought and sentiment effected by this means, and the other mechanical contrivances for immortalising the existence of his ideas,
he enters within the boundaries of a spiritual world, thus conjured up around him. It is adding wings to his other endowments, by which he soars far above the lower tribes, and rejoices in an atmosphere entirely his own. Upon the whole, therefore, although man, in his natural capacity and endowments, may be superior, originally, to the lower tribes, it is to his education alone that his distinguishing and peculiar characteristics are to be traced. It is this that makes him altogether what he is; enabling him to shed a glow of happiness on all around, and affording him the means of indulging in those abstract and lofty contemplations, denied to the less favoured tribes. In his case, the tree of knowledge may have indeed been planted in a more fertile soil; but it is to education, like the genial influences of the sun, and the fertilising showers, that its progress to maturity is chiefly to be traced. To a beast the same capabilities of cultivating and expanding the sentient principles are denied, and hence the limited development of their faculties.

In generalising a system of artificial education, therefore, these principles must ever be borne in mind. It is not so much the inherent superiority of man’s intellectual endowments, much less of his physical strength, that gives him a pre-eminence in nature, but the application of a course of training to these, unknown to the lower animals. Yet there is no small danger in its application. It should be made instrumental only in assisting nature. Wherever nature points out the way, education should lead; but the guidance of nature herself should never be overlooked or disregarded. A course of training is a lever power applied to many of the same faculties that we possess in common with the lower animals, for raising them to a higher state of excellence; but if it be not also applied to the motives of action, it will only be increasing
the same aggressive system which animals pursue in gratifying their propensities. And if a greater application of it be made to the mental faculties than to the moral and spiritual nature of man, however wonderful may be his discoveries in art and science, they will only become additional means of furthering his own individual selfishness.

The earliest indications of mental development are to be found among the Egyptians. It was in Egypt that the means of diffusing and perpetuating knowledge by hieroglyphical writings were first discovered. These writings, as is well known, are simply pictures of objects, each one of which represents some understood idea. In their first stage they only represent objects; next, concrete ideas; and lastly, abstractions. In this the infancy of the world's literature, showing the gradual unfolding of the universal mind, there is a beautiful analogy with the opening intellect of a child, and from which an admirable lesson of inductive teaching may also be drawn. He sees a tree, and, in its absence, recalls it to memory by some mysterious process of picturing upon the brain. Thus an idea of the tree is formed upon the mind, which may be called the first mental hieroglyphic, analogous to the tree carved upon stone. He sees one object tall and another short, one white and another black, and thus an idea of colour and size is formed, but only in connexion with these objects, which must also be pictured on the memory before the quality of size or colour can be recollected—a process entirely analogous to representing the same concrete idea in a symbolic picture. Lastly, the absolute idea of size or colour is formed by abstracting it from particular objects and applying it universally. But while the unlettered mind of a child, or of a savage, may be capable of thus generalising to a certain extent,—and a similar process may, perhaps, even take place in
the inferior animals,—the discovery of a mode by which such ideas and their reflections could be materialised, made visible, and perpetuated to remotest ages, was the dawning of a new and an immortal existence upon mankind.

This was effected, first, by a certain disposition of the pictures; next, by abbreviations of them; and then by arbitrary marks that ultimately formed themselves into an alphabet, representing sound, however, not objects. In the same way the ideas of virtue and vice, and all the more spiritual thoughts and emotions, are gradually formed in the mind of a child from the concrete to the abstract. To speak to a child of dishonesty without showing an impersonation of the vice, in the hero of some narrative, is simply to utter so many unmeaning sounds; but when the goodness or badness of some individual is seen, it can easily be abstracted and applied in other parallel cases. In its progress to a system of abstract terms, the universal mind has taken a course precisely similar. It first depicted animals in which certain qualities are predominant, as the representatives of these qualities, afterwards abbreviations of them,—which is a similar process to that in the mind of a child gradually forming its abstract notions, but occasionally referring to some impersonation as a help and illustration,—and finally, the arbitrary letters forming the purely abstract word or name of the idea. A striking inference from this is, that as all ideas are formed in the mind of a child before it knows their names, such should be the proper course of instructing him in every branch of study—that ideas of sensation should be first cultivated, next his reflective faculties, and that the moral virtues and vices should be exhibited in concretion before abstractedly.

In the increasing copiousness and literalisation of lan-
Language, therefore, may be seen the most evident indications of the expansion of the human mind, and the accumulation of knowledge. No sooner did the ancient priests of Egypt thus find a vehicle for transmitting their thoughts, than the sciences increased, the arts flourished, and the most just and beautiful conceptions of morals were elicited. But as in their earliest stages these were all wrapped up in symbols, and taught only by the priests to certain classes, their practical benefit in enlightening and moralising the people, was comparatively small. These symbols would be to them as unintelligible as the words of the English tongue are to an unlearned child. While the priests knew the metaphysical truths contained in them, they would only present to the people objects for stupid wonder; and as many of the moral qualities were represented by the pictures of animals, this veneration would naturally attach to their prototypes, and in proportion to the importance of particular qualities, would the animals representing them receive veneration and worship by the uninitiated.

What, then, is this but a similar error in training to that of the present day, in teaching children the mere words of a language without its ideas,—marks without meaning and sound without sense? And it ought to abate much of our contempt for the superstitious Egyptians in worshipping their innumerable deities, when we consider the worship we ourselves pay to so many of the mere sounds and words of our own English tongue. With what unmeaning awe and wonder do many persons listen to the hyperboles and inflated metaphors of some popular orator, and to the very sound of certain words, to which they can attach no definite ideas! And even in the enlightened world, too, how many mere conventional phrases are all but worshipped among men of all ranks!
Much of the mythology of all countries must have arisen from this species of language training; and many superstitions may be traced to it, which have even a hold on the popular mind of the present day. In Egypt, where the people were extending their knowledge of the laws of nature and of abstract truths, without the means of expressing them otherwise than by symbol and personification, a system of mythology would naturally arise out of such circumstances. The attributes of nature, the passions and feelings of the mind, were always invested with a substantial character, and their influences represented as the acts of living agents; and though the true sense of these figures might be recognised by the refined and the liberal, the great majority of the people would only regard them as a sort of minor deities, or genii.

Hence the origin of that error in education that appeals to the venerative faculties without enlightening the judgment. The Egyptians were trained up to feelings of mere ignorant wonder regarding morality and religion; and we are told that, as some cities worshipped certain animals which others disregarded, the most violent battles occasionally took place amongst them—a striking parallel to the wordy warfare of many of the religious controversies of the present day. Besides, in the schools of antiquity it is always the mere teaching of morality that is mentioned, which is but an intellectual exercise, and powerless in regulating conduct. The duties of morality and virtue can only be taught properly in practice; and then, indeed, it matters little whether a theoretical knowledge of them be taught or not.

Among the Egyptians, a striking contrast is presented in the course of their speculative knowledge on morals and religion to that of their physical sciences. The former, at the best, being mere opinions of right and wrong, and a blind enthusiasm regarding divine worship
without an application of these opinions to the purposes of daily life, led them ultimately into the most extravagant excesses of idolatry and vice. It was simply knowledge without wisdom which they possessed, the imbibing of an abstract religion into the head, through an implicit faith, without being habituated to its duties, through a previous cultivation of the feelings and habits. Whereas their knowledge of the physical sciences was called into immediate action, and thus the arts flourished. "Every man," we are told, "had his way of life assigned to him, and it was perpetuated from father to son. Two professions at one time, or a change from that which a man was born to, were never allowed. By this means men became more able and expert in employments which they had always exercised from infancy, and every man adding his own experience to that of his ancestors, was more capable of attaining perfection in his particular art. From this source flowed numberless inventions for the improvement of all the arts, and for rendering life more easy and commodious." It was, therefore, to this system of professional and practical training, not to its abstract speculations, that Egypt owed its riches and plenty, its glory and magnificence. It was this linking of art to science, of practice to invention, that opened up those fountains of wisdom which flowed forth into all lands, and of which Homer, Pythagoras, Plato, Lycurgus, Solon, and a host of other sages and philosophers imbibed their earliest draughts.

Turning from Egypt, as the land on which the artificial light of education first dawned, to other countries, we see in many of them a reflection of the same errors just mentioned, but operating with a more or less baneful influence, according to the various habits of the people and their different degrees of intelligence. And in proportion to the ignorance of each country, or its
distance from the source whence the light of metaphysical knowledge first streamed, does the mere reflection of the light itself become fainter, tending rather to bewilder than enlighten the people. It is like a benighted traveller proceeding on his way by the rays of a lamp that illuminate only a small circle around his path, but as an impenetrable wall of darkness lies beyond, he suddenly stumbles into some pitfall, or loses his footing on the brink of a precipice. Had he trusted only to the natural light of the heavens, his vision would have commanded a wider range, and if it was less brilliant, it would not at least have dazzled and deceived him; or, if not thus fatal, the glare falling upon surrounding objects, rendering them hideous and distorted to his sight, would only incite his terror and alarm, paralysing his reason and conjuring up to his mind the most uncouth fancies.

In Carthage, there is a striking instance of the baneful effects of mythological terrorism in the cruel habits it induced among the people, and the mischievous power afforded by the partial light of science, in distorting human nature, when under the influence of selfish motives. The training of a national character is in every respect similar to that of individual education. It is the feelings and affections of the heart which furnish the impulses of conduct; and whatever be the particular bias given to the former in infancy, the conduct through life will have a tendency in the same direction. Carthage, the daughter of Tyre, the most commercial city in the world, inherited all her parent's propensities for traffic, and these being brought into vigorous activity by means of the wealth of Dido, between her followers and the surrounding inhabitants of Utica, at once stamped a commercial character upon the infant colony.

The manners, language, customs, laws, and religion of
the Carthaginians, were all grafted upon a spirit of commercial enterprise, or arose out of it. The people were descended from the Tyrians, whose language they spoke, which was a dialect or collateral branch of the Hebrew and Canaanitish, and they were called Pæni, or Phæni, because they originally came from Phenicia. Here it was, then, that letters were invented, and the Pænic, or Punic, or Carthaginian language had also its birth.

Let it be remarked here, that in its first application as a vehicle for diffusing the previous knowledge of a people, literal writing can only be employed in making a translation or decipheration of hieroglyphics. In doing so, the names of the pictures are substituted for the pictures themselves. The relation and position these bear to one another, are thus capable of being explained and elucidated by conjunctive and auxiliary words. In symbols this connexion may be understood by the initiated, but cannot be represented except in literal writing. Hence the origin of the metaphor and allegory, which simply arise out of a series of objects deciphered into their respective names, their connexion illustrated by additional words, and the whole forming a continuous tale or narrative. Thus the ideas originally intended to be conveyed become enveloped in a double vehicle, and their esoteric sense rendered more obscure. But the exoteric or outward meaning of such allegories immediately appeals to the concrete understanding of a rude people, and while it captivates their fancy, finds a ready access to their faith.

Even at the present day, on looking back through the transparencies of modern literature upon those images and spectral forms that mark its commencement, standing out in bold relief through the long vista of centuries, one is apt to smile at the grossness of the writer's conceptions of metaphysical truths, or merely to be
pleased with the beautiful fictions detailed; but a closer examination often shows that those personifications embody the most beautiful moral lessons and correct facts. For example, when Homer, in describing the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon in the war council of the Greeks, in which the former was in the act of drawing his sword against the "king of men," wishes to show that the prudence of Achilles on second thoughts withheld his hand, he introduces Minerva, who is represented as laying her hand upon the warrior's arm, and whispering counsel into his ear. Wisdom, or prudence, is here personified as a goddess interfering in the affairs of men. But while Homer meant to convey no fiction by this mode of expression, it was enough to create or perpetuate a belief in the existence of such a being. In this allegorical form, therefore, was it, that the mythology of Egypt was transfused into all languages derived from the same source, and would lend a deeper shade to the peculiar characteristics of any people. To an uncivilised or unintellectual people it would evolve a religion of fear, superstition, and cruelty; in a country of higher mental capabilities it would lay the foundation of poetry and romance.

The genius of the Carthaginian people, it has been said, was entirely commercial, and even its warlike character was but an emanation of the same spirit. The necessity of defending their commerce from neighbouring nations, and of extending it and their empire, led them into incessant wars; but the basis of their common wealth and the grand spring of all their enterprises was their predominant passion for gain. All their talents were directed to this end; their chief glory consisted in amassing riches, of the use of which, after all, they knew but little. A course of national training such as this,
could not but meet with its due reward in raising their nation to a high pitch of splendour and glory. But was the happiness of the people increased in a corresponding degree? or could the pure selfishness of such a grasping principle effect anything but a demoralisation of their habits? It was an excessive training of the acquisitive faculty, rendering all the other powers of the mind subservient to its gratification. The guiding motive, indeed, was not only self-gratification but a gratification of the most selfish principle in human nature. It was the miser's feverish anxiety to accumulate wealth, without regard to the advantages it confers in promoting the elegances of life, the cultivation of the mind, or the highest of all luxuries, the power of doing good to others. Hence their education was confined to writing, arithmetic, book-keeping, and whatever related to traffic; but polite learning, history, eloquence, poetry, and philosophy, seem to have been little known among them; so that, in the course of seven hundred years, Carthage cannot boast of more than three or four writers of any reputation.

Nor did their intercourse with Greece and other civilised nations inspire more ennobling sentiments, so utterly prostrated were all the higher aspirations of the national mind before the sordid and engrossing love of gain. And it is a melancholy but true picture of the tendency of the same disposition in every individual that Cicero draws, in describing that of the Carthaginians, when he says, "their distinguishing characteristics are craft, skill, address, industry, cunning, (calliditas,) which, doubtless, appeared in war, but was still more conspicuous in the rest of their conduct, and this was joined to another quality that bears a very near relation to it, and is still less reputable. Craft and cunning
lead naturally to lying, hypocrisy, and breach of faith; and thereby accustoming the mind insensibly to be less scrupulous with regard to the choice of means for compassing its design, prepare it for the basest frauds and the most perfidious actions. This was also one of the characteristics of the Carthaginians, and it was so notorious that to signify any remarkable dishonesty it was usual to call it *Punic honour, fides Punica*; and to describe a *knarish, deceitful mind*, no expression was thought more proper and emphatical than this—a Carthaginian mind, *Punicum ingenium.*

This immoderate thirst after gain generally gave occasion in Carthage to the committing of base and unjust actions. One single example, mentioned by Livy, may prove this. In the time of a truce granted by Scipio, at the earnest entreaties of the Carthaginians, some Roman vessels, being driven by a storm on the coasts of Carthage, were seized by *order of the senate and people*, who could not suffer so tempting a prey to escape them. They were resolved to get money, however scandalous and dishonourable the means of acquiring it. Even in St. Austin's time, as that father informs us, they showed, on a particular occasion, that they still retained something of their ancient characteristics.

Such, therefore, was the basis of the Carthaginian character, morally deformed by a course of practical training, but over which was raised a superstructure of religious fanaticism, leading, on the other hand, to practices infinitely more revolting.

I have said their language came from Phenicia, and in it, as a vehicle, was also imported their ideas of me-

* Carthaginienses fraudulenti et mendaces,—multis et variis mercatorum advenarumque sermonibus ad studium fallendi quaestus cupiditate vocabantur.—Cic. *Orat.* 2 *in Rull. n.* 94.
taphysics. This was, therefore, the atmosphere through which shone upon them the same "dim religious light" that first dawned in Egypt; but so gross was now the medium, that the spirituality of that religion was entirely obscured; and as the natural rays of the sun, on entering a gloomy horizon, often reflect objects in a distorted form, so, through the density of this moral gloom, did the objects of Egyptian faith assume to the Carthaginian people the most hideous aspect. Ignorance is the parent of fear; and as their cupidity gave them no leisure nor inclination to cultivate literature, which might have enabled them to analyse the meaning of their religious allegories, their ignorant fears deduced from them a system of superstition in which all the ties of humanity were torn asunder, and the tenderest feelings of nature trampled upon. And if fear was thus the origin of their gods, no less did it invest them with a character of the most vindictive nature. To appease the wrath of Saturn, the deity of second rank in their calendar, known in Scripture by the name of Moloch, human sacrifices were offered up in multitudes. This custom passed from Tyre to Carthage,—and hence we may conclude its Egyptian and hieroglyphic origin. Philo mentions, that the kings of Tyre, in great dangers, used to sacrifice their sons to appease the anger of the gods. Particular persons, desirous of averting any great calamity, took the same method, and were so very superstitious, that such as had no children purchased those of the poor, that they might not be deprived of the merit of such a sacrifice. At first, children were inhumanly burnt, either in a fiery furnace, like those in the valley of Hinnom, so often mentioned in Scripture, or in a flaming statue of Saturn. The cries of these unhappy victims were drowned by the uninterrupted noise of drums and trumpets. Mothers made it
a merit and a part of their religion to view this barbarous spectacle with dry eyes, and without so much as a groan; and if a tear or a sigh stole from them the sacrifice was less acceptable to the deity, and all the effect of it was entirely lost. Thus, strength of mind, or rather savage barbarity, was carried to such excess, that even mothers would endeavour with embraces and kisses to hush the cries of their children, lest, had the victim been offered with an unbecoming grace, and in the midst of tears, it should offend the god.

The Carthaginians retained these barbarous practices until the ruin of their city; and even their great generals yielded to the horrid custom. In an action between Gelon the Syracusan monarch, and Hamilcar, the son of Hanno the Carthaginian leader, which lasted from morning to night, we are told the latter was perpetually offering up to the gods sacrifices of living men, who were thrown on a flaming pile; and seeing his troops routed and put to flight, he himself rushed into the pile, that he might not survive his own disgrace, and to extinguish with his own blood this sacrilegious fire when he found it had proved of no service to him.

In times of pestilence they used to sacrifice numbers of children to their gods, unmoved by pity for their tender age. Diodorus relates an instance of this cruelty, which must strike the reader with horror. At the time that Agathocles was going to besiege Carthage, its inhabitants, seeing the extremity to which they were reduced, imputed all their misfortunes to the great anger of Saturn, because that, instead of offering up children nobly born, who were usually sacrificed to him, he had fraudulently been put off with the children of slaves and foreigners. To atone for this crime, two hundred children of the best families in Carthage were sacrificed to Saturn, besides
which, upwards of three hundred citizens, from a sense of their guilt of this pretended crime, voluntarily sacrificed themselves.

Seeing, therefore, to what excesses an ignorant fear will lead mankind when the venerative faculties are under its training, it is almost superfluous to notice an equally certain result of its influence in deforming the social character. Hence we are again told, "They had something austere and savage in their dispositions and genius, a haughty and imperious air, a sort of ferocity which in its first starts was deaf to either reason or remonstrance, and plunged brutally into the utmost excesses of violence. The people, cowardly and grovelling under apprehensions, were fiery and cruel in their transports; at the same time that they trembled under their magistrates, they were dreaded in their turn by their miserable vassals." In war, Livy mentions that "ill success was punished as a crime against the state; and whenever a battle was lost, the general, at his return, was almost sure of ending his life on a gibbet or scaffold. Such was the furious, cruel, and barbarous disposition of the Carthaginians, who were always ready to shed the blood of their citizens as well as of foreigners. The unheard-of tortures which they made Regulus suffer are a manifest proof of this assertion, and their whole history will furnish such instances of it as are not to be read without horror." To read such a page of history as this is indeed a sickening task, but to the moralist not without profit, as indicating the fearful extent of misery that may be brought upon one man by another, and on one nation by another, when the depths of the human heart are moved by selfish motives, when the moral and spiritual feelings are either under-trained or over-trained, and the mental faculties unenlightened.
CHAPTER III.

In Greece, there is a striking example how much the foundation of individual, as well as national, character, is formed by the plastic influence of external circumstances. The mild climate and romantic scenery of that classic land, must have impressed their peculiar characteristics upon its earliest inhabitants. The former would shed a soothing influence over the frame, educing a corresponding moral temperament, and the latter stamp upon the soul an innate impression of the beautiful and sublime. To these native tendencies of the Greeks, there seemed only wanting an extrinsic guidance in harmony with them, to form the living models of mankind; but while much of their education was a deduction from nature itself, forming the best foundation for a course of artificial mental and moral training, the latter was derived from a foreign source—it was an exotic planted in their native soil, producing altogether an original fruit. Their writing, commerce, and navigation, came from Phenicia; the elements of their arts, sciences, religion, and laws from Egypt. In ancient times the country was divided into very small republics, neighbours in point of locality, but differing in their customs, laws, and characters, and of hostile interests. These differences, and their natural desire of aggrandisement at the
expense of their neighbours, produced incessant skirmishes and petty wars. Either from ambition or self-defence, they were, therefore, always under arms, and by the constant exercise of war, a martial spirit and indomitable courage were thus formed in the entire people. In such contests it was, of course, mere animal strength that gained their victories, and the might of the conqueror gave the right of ascendancy.

There is, however, something morally grand and ennobling in wielding even a physical power for the good of a community; and debasing in its tendency though the practice of war may be, and wrong as a means, it is not always resorted to for a bad end, and it certainly does not induce an individual selfishness. It is often an entire abandonment of self to the interests of a community. Still even this motive is inherently the same, only diluted into patriotism, or a family and social selfishness, which seeks to advance the interests of one community at the expense and degradation of others. Knowing, therefore, no higher power of arbitration in their quarrels, than the physical power and combination of numbers, and the strength and agility of individuals, the early Greeks assiduously cultivated bodily exercises as the only means of gaining a superiority, and a spirit of patriotism or love of country as the master passion of their lives. By the constant friction of these animal contests, however, sparks of intellect were occasionally struck out, which ultimately lighted up more artificial modes of warfare, and developed more rational pursuits for ordinary life.

Looking at the history of Greece metaphysically, it may therefore be said that the long struggle between Sparta and Athens was simply a war between animalism and intellectuality, in which the latter ultimately gained
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the supremacy, and for the first time on earth established a dominion over the destinies of man. In Sparta, all that the animal nature of man could do was effected, and that by a course of training of the most arduous kind. "All the laws of Sparta and institutions of Lycurgus," says Rollin, "seem to have had no other object than war, and tended solely to making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises were prohibited amongst them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, even husbandry itself, had no share in their application, and seemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy, no other taste was instilled into them but arms, and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully well adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to shift with little meat or drink, to suffer heat and cold, to exercise continually hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds, so as to vent neither complaint nor groan,—these were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them one day to support all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers." The "habit of obeying, contracted from the most early years respect for the magistrates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws from which no age nor condition was exempt, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which is, in a manner, the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises." Such a course of training, with a uniform application of it to one end, namely, the aggrandisement of herself, could not fail to raise Sparta to a high eminence among the states of Greece, to make her the formidable rival of Athens, and at last, as her ally, the conqueror of the world.

Ambition and military fame were thus the ultimate
objects of attainment and pre-eminent virtues of the Lacedemonians—to these all the faculties of their minds and powers of their bodies were subservient.

It must be admitted, however, that much of this physical training would have been an undeniable good, had it been directed to a beneficial end; the evil was in its misdirection, and being under the guidance of a wrong motive. Self-denial is not in itself a virtue, it is the end which renders such a means virtuous; and this iron system of sacrificing all the finer emotions of the heart, and the energies of the mind and body, at the shrine of an ideal and imaginary good, was only a continued and positive evil, as it entailed upon its victims a life-time of practical suffering, unalleviated by any substantial benefit. It was an illustration of the Stoic's doctrine, that virtue consists in the exercise of self-denial and suffering as an end, not as a means, for it was not the consequences and advantages of victory that the Spartans panted after so much as the mere abstract ideas of glory and patriotism. They endured real grievances to reap imaginary benefits.

And if such an education was calculated to harden the body and render it callous to privation and suffering, it no less indurated the affections of the heart, destroying the very soil on which the richest fruits of virtue and happiness grow. Mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Many people still admire the courage of these Spartan mothers, who could thus hear the news of their children slain in battle, not only without tears, but with joy and satisfaction: but nature never contradicts herself, and no imaginary love of country
can ever thus swallow up maternal affection. Such exhibitions were, therefore, most unnatural and disgusting.

Yet this kind of Stoicism is, perhaps, the less to be wondered at, when it is considered that the children were taken away from their parents at an early age by the state, and placed under a course of training at the public expense, by which the natural bond of parental affection would be very much loosened. The entire spirit and design of the laws of Lycurgus were to form a martial and robust people; that each member of the community might bring into the field the greatest possible amount of strength and activity, and be a mere passive machine in the hands of his leader. As soon as a boy was born the elders of each tribe visited him, and if they found him well made and vigorous, he was subjected to the severe discipline mentioned; but if weakly and delicate, he was exposed to perish. And it is not to be doubted, that the ordinary discipline exercised on many tender children would accelerate their death, for patience and constancy under sufferings were also strictly enjoined. It is said that, in a certain festival celebrated in honour of Diana, surnamed Orthea, the children, before the eyes of their parents, and in presence of the whole city, suffered themselves to be whipped till the blood ran down upon the altar of this cruel goddess, where sometimes they expired under the strokes without the least cry, or suffering even a groan or a sigh to escape them; and even their own fathers, when they saw them covered with blood and wounds, and ready to expire, exhorted them to persevere to the end with constancy and resolution. Plutarch mentions that he had seen with his own eyes a great many children lose their lives on these cruel occasions. Well, therefore, might Horace style such a country Patiens Lacedæmon.
Enormities of a different, but even more revolting character, were also practised in the education of girls, and in their regulations regarding the marriages of young women, giving rise to the most frightful disorders: and to this may only be added the barbarous treatment of their Helot slaves, who were often tortured and destroyed at the merest caprice of their masters, to fill up the measure of that iron despotism of which they were the voluntary subjects, and which finds so many admirers even at the present day. No national glory, however brilliant, can ever compensate for a distortion of the natural affections, the want of softened manners, and a polished understanding. Hence it was that, although the parental and social feelings might be thus frozen over by the chilling influence of such an education, there flowed beneath the hard surface a dangerous flood of passions that often broke out in a "roughness, austerity, and ferocity of temper," that rendered them a disagreeable people even to their own allies. "They were observed," says Aristotle, "to have something almost brutal in their character. A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers haughty, austere, and imperious." Every one knows also the sad stain that rests upon the national character of Sparta, arising from such an obliquity of morals as could induce her senators to legalise undetected stealing, for the sake of rendering the people dexterous in battle, and skilled in strategy.

But a brighter picture is presented in the history of Athens, the impersonation of a higher course of training; the rival and ultimate superior of Sparta. Here it is, for the first time in the annals of the human race, that pure intellect reigns supreme, subjugating many of the animal propensities, and creating an ideal of goodness and beauty worthy of admiration in all ages. In the dedication of their city to Minerva, the personification of
wisdom, the arts, and sciences, there is a beautiful allegory of the supreme place these held in the estimation of the Athenians. All their splendid mythology had the same tendency, and invited their worship only to what was tasteful, intellectual, and sublime. When Homer celebrates the advantages and victories of Greece over Asia, the esoteric sense of his impersonations is simply an ascription of praise to the former for its superior wisdom and virtue, and of reproach to the latter, for its effeminacy and vice. On the side of Asia was Venus, representing the voluptuousness and idle loves of that country; on that of Greece were Juno, signifying gravity with conjugal affection, Mercury with eloquence, and Jupiter with wise policy. With the Asiatics was Mars, an impetuous and brutal deity, representing war carried on with fury; with the Greeks, Pallas, or the science of war, and valour conducted by reason. In a word, it is a description of the true genius of the Athenian spirit subjecting pleasure to virtue, the body to the mind, and physical strength to reason and skill.

Nor was it merely the bare practice of these virtues, arts, and sciences which they exhibited, but the very poetry and perfection of them. Born beneath the clear azure of a Grecian sky, and first opening their eyes upon the loveliest scenes of nature, in the gently undulating pasture lands, wild rocky shores, and "far resounding ocean," the "soil-sprung" sons of Attica received at their very birth impressions of the grand and sublime. The natural disposition of every rude people for war, inherent also in them, induced a course of physical training, in many respects similar to that of the Lacedemonians; but even in this their natural genius for taste prevailed, and threw a charm over all their exercises.
The principal end which the Spartans had in view in their severe discipline, was to inure their youth to the hardships of war, and to render them callous to mental and physical privation and suffering. But the Athenians, in addition to this, had a higher course, that may almost be termed the poetry of physical training. Their Gymnasiun was divided into two departments, the palestric and orchestric. The palestric exercises were intended chiefly to accustom the body to the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and other manual and bodily employments; in the orchestric were taught such rules of motion "as were proper to render the shape free and easy, to give the body a just proportion, and the whole person an unconstrained, noble, and graceful air." And when we consider the national importance that attached to their games, and the rewards and prizes conferred upon those who excelled in robust exercises, feats of skill, and gracefulness in the dance, it may easily be conceived that every facility was afforded for training a race of men whose physical proportions are still referred to as models of perfection. From copying such living models too, was it, that the imitative arts arrived at such perfection, and the statuary and the painter drew their noblest inspirations.

To this polishing of the external man, the early Greeks added the cultivation of music, a means no less efficacious in refining the moral nature, than a course of bodily training tends to render the limbs pliant and graceful. That music is the foundation of a correct taste in many mental occupations there can be little doubt, and still less that it is a powerful auxiliary in moral training. The softened harmony of song falling upon the ear of one excited by strong emotions, is like pouring oil on the troubled waters of the soul. The mother soothes her babe to sleep, and calms its fretfulness and irritation, by
her lulling melodies. Even the savage feels its influence and lays aside his wrathful purposes when the demon has been cast out by its potent agency. But while one kind of music has a relaxing tendency upon the nervous system, inducing a softness of disposition, it is counteracted by the sterner airs of a different kind. In short, there is an eloquence in music adapted to every mental and moral condition, and equally calculated to awaken the better feelings, as to subdue the worse.

Aware of this moral influence in music, it is said to have been a custom of the Pythagoreans, immediately on rising from bed, to sound the lyre to some lively air, in order to rouse the mind and fit it for action; and before going to rest, to touch it to a softer strain to prepare themselves for sleep, by calming the tumultuous thoughts of the day. Polybius also mentions, that it was esteemed necessary "to calm the passions, soften the manners, and even to humanise people naturally savage;" and he thus draws a contrast between two people of Arcadia, the one beloved and esteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to strangers, and piety to the gods; and the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion; the cause of which, in the former, he ascribes to their assiduous cultivation and practice of music, and in the latter, to the neglect of it.

Music was thus considered an essential element in the education of all Greeks, and an ignorance of it reckoned a defect. The greatest of their philosophers and warriors, including Socrates and Alexander, practised and often excelled in it, and to illustrate its power in subduing the most savage and cruel dispositions, has given rise to one of the finest allegories in their mythology. When
Orpheus, by the sound of his lyre, is said to have drawn after him lions and tigers, changed the course of rivers, and melted the rocks, it is simply a personification of its soul-stirring influence upon the passions and purposes of man. It is, however, strictly a physical exercise, a means for allaying the excitability of the nervous system, whence so many of the moral impulses proceed. It may therefore be called with propriety, the physical training of the moral faculties.

Many other circumstances, arising out of the natural and social position of the Greeks, conspired to form the basis of their manly character, to inspire them with exalted and generous sentiments, and, as their freedom and civilisation advanced, to develop their natural genius for taste and refinement. From whatever source derived, and however rude the elements of any branch of knowledge introduced among them, their talent for bringing these to perfection is ever conspicuous. Colonies from Egypt and Phœnicia taught them literature, the arts, and sciences. But while it was merely the sixteen rude characters of the alphabet which Cadmus imported, a few centuries only had elapsed, when the bard of Smyrna produced by their means, the first and best poem the world ever saw. While the mythology of Egypt, spreading into other lands, only inspired terror and alarm into their inhabitants, the intellectual Greeks drew thence some of their sublimest fancies, and the poet, the painter, and the sculptor, again embodied its original figures, thus creating almost a new worship in the admiration, by all ages, of their own matchless genius. And if the famous pyramids, the lake Mœris, the labyrinth, the obelisks and temples of Egypt, show with what ardour and success the Egyptians applied themselves to architecture, it is in Greece alone where the art rises into
the very poetry of excellence. In Asia and Egypt, the massiveness and enormous size of many of the buildings, create awe, but not delight. We wonder at the vast amount of labour bestowed upon them, but in the temples of Diana at Ephesus, Apollo at Miletus, Ceres and Proserpine at Eleusis, Jupiter Olympius at Athens, the mausoleum, the city and lighthouse of Alexandria, the beautiful structures erected at Athens by Pericles, the Acropolis and Parthenon, with a host of other buildings, the imagination is captivated by the elegance of their design, their consummate finish, and adornment.

Nor were they an imaginative people only, but a depth of thought and originality of invention are equally their characteristics. Of this there is no better evidence than the writings they have left us on the physical and moral sciences. Of all the ancients, they arrived at the soundest conclusions in astronomy. This science most probably had its origin in Chaldea, where, in the serene nights, and from the top of the lofty Babel, the people were so fond of contemplating the motions of the heavenly bodies. From Chaldea it passed into Egypt, and thence into Phœnicia, where its speculations were applied to the uses of navigation. It was, then, but these rude elements of star-gazing, which Thales, one of the seven wise men of Greece, brought into his own country, where they were improved upon by a series of philosophers, until at length the penetrating genius of Pythagoras deduced from them that "system" which still bears his name, and the truth of which is as eternal as the heavens themselves. Rejecting the received opinions of the world, and reversing the favourite theory, which ascribed rest to the earth, and motion to the sun, he made that sublime discovery on which the whole basis of modern astronomy is built.
In metaphysical and moral philosophy, too, they excelled all the other pagan nations of antiquity. In respect to these sciences, indeed, the land of Greece seemed a focus wherein were concentrated all the rays of knowledge dispersed throughout the world. From Egypt the priests, from Persia the magi, from Babylon the Chaldeans, from India the Brachmans or Gymnosophists, from Gaul the Druids, sent out each so many scattered beams of intelligence, but it was only in Greece where the concentration of that knowledge reflected so brilliant a lustre. The natural talent of her philosophers for abstract and deductive reasoning, evolved from such materials all that the unaided intellect of man seemed able to do. And more indeed than a mere human light seems to have dictated many of their opinions; for we learn that Pythagoras and others went to Chaldea and Babylon in quest of knowledge; and, considering the extreme probability of their having seen there Ezekiel and Daniel, it may account for the near resemblance, in much of their philosophy, to the Jewish religion. In the doctrines of the soul's immortality and immateriality; the existence of one Supreme Being, the Author of all nature; that men have only to take pains to purify themselves of their passions and vices in order to be united to God; that after this life there is a state of rewards and punishments for the good and the bad, with a belief in the existence of spirits or angels, there is a system of theoretical divinity to a great extent the same as that of modern Christianity.

Besides these merely speculative opinions, it was in Greece, too, where the scattered precepts of morality were first reduced into the form of a science, the abstractions of mental philosophy humanized, and brought to bear upon the duties of life; and apart from
revelation, the first glimpses obtained of that knowledge which teaches the necessity of elevating the moral sentiments, and acting under their guidance, to ensure the enjoyment of happiness. Identified with the science of moral philosophy, and as the founder of it, there is also the brightest name and the best man the pagan world ever saw. It was Socrates, according to Cicero, "who first brought philosophy down from heaven, where she had been employed till then in contemplating the course of the stars, established her in cities, introduced her into private houses, and obliged her to direct her enquiries to what concerned the manners, duties, virtues, and morals of life, to render men more rational, just, and virtuous."

The remark which a woman made to Thales when she saw him fall into a ditch while he was contemplating the stars, was therefore reversed in the case of Socrates,—"How should you know," said she, "what passes in the heavens, when you do not see what passes under your feet?" for it was the light of heaven itself that the latter rendered available in guiding his feet. His opinions concerning the unity of Deity, the immortality of the soul, and a state of future rewards and punishments, are almost in every respect the same as those entertained by Christians. His preceptive morality is sublime, and his own life the brightest example of a man living under its influence. He not only proved the reasonableness of his own doctrines, but gave ample evidence of their efficacy in overcoming wrong habits, and establishing correct ones—perhaps the first instance on record of moral training conducted upon intellectual principles.

Looking back, then, over the history of Greece, from the time of Alexander to Pericles, embracing a period of about two hundred years, it seems as if little had been wanted in the materials and elements of her education, to have
rendered her at that time, a model school for the entire world; and in many things she ever will remain a model to posterity. But while such was the case, she proved her incapacity to secure the advantages of her exalted position. She wanted the animating motives of pure morality. It was the "form without the power" of virtue which she possessed. She was "a whitened sepulchre, beautiful without, but within full of corruption." Her metaphysics and her moral philosophy were merely mental speculations, forming a gymnasium for training the mind, as the palæstric exercises developed the powers of the body. And even in the case of Socrates, and other moral philosophers, who themselves acted upon a system of self-training, it was only a knowledge of preceptive morality they taught to others. There was no school for the formation of virtuous and benevolent habits, and for elevating the Grecian character into the higher regions of philanthropy, beyond the mere delusions of military fame and patriotism. Athens formed the idol of all Grecian hearts, and her glory became the ruling passion of their lives. To advance these, all their education tended, all their physical, mental, and moral faculties were made subservient; and if, during the victorious reign of Alexander, such a course of training raised them to the very summit of fame, shedding a last bright blaze of glory around their country, it was only the lightning's flash, that extinguished their very existence, and rendered the long succeeding darkness the more awfully profound. On the death of that conqueror, who had advanced civilization wherever his army had penetrated, a reaction took place among other countries, and the recoiling waves of barbarism again swept over their classic land, the melancholy history of which thenceforth tells of nothing but crimes and revolutions, anarchy and slavery.
The infant commonwealth of Rome was born and nurtured in blood. Its founder was a fratricide, and his adherents a band of robbers. Such habits naturally induced a wildness and ferocity of temper among themselves, and developed a predominancy of animalism in their descendants, rendering them utterly averse to the humanizing influences of art, and mental cultivation. In time this savage disposition, modified by laws adapted to the spirit of such a community, assumed a rigid severity and sternness of purpose, leading them to rely for success in their enterprises upon their native courage, discipline, and perseverance; and as through all the best part of their history, from Romulus to Augustus, they still retained the same grasping and ambitious character, it was only the increasing extent of their dominions and power that elevated those animal qualities into virtues. The very names were synonymous, and bravery in the field was the highest moral qualification of a Roman. The cultivation of literature, the arts and sciences, was looked upon as effeminating and useless, especially as they found their own discipline and courage sufficient to give them a mastery over other nations more learned and refined than themselves. Being morally undisciplined, they knew no higher aim in life, than a gratification of their national vanity, or their own individual selfishness; and being mentally unenlightened, they could find no better means of promoting these ends, than by training to their highest perfection those physical endowments which had hitherto gained them so many advantages. And though we are accustomed to look upon the ancient Romans with feelings of respect, to admire their prowess in arms, the masculine energy of their minds, and the deep-toned patriotism of their actions, yet these qualities were no more inherent in the
uneducated Roman, than the uncultivated Dacian, or the barbarous Scythian, and were only developed by the education of circumstances, and formed into habits by long and incessant practice.

A course of special training of the most arduous and almost incredible nature, was necessary to constitute the Roman soldier. War was the only science he knew. To the improvement of this he bent all his thoughts, and to the practice of it all the energies of his body. To be enabled to carry heavier arms than other nations, the soldiers of Rome underwent a course of perpetual labour that increased their vigour, and of exercises that gave them an ease and facility in using them. They were inured to the military pace, that is, to walk twenty miles, and sometimes twenty-four miles, in five hours. During these marches they carried burdens of sixty pounds weight, and habituated themselves to running and leaping in full armour. In their exercises they made use of swords, javelins, and arrows, double the weight of common weapons, and these exercises were carried on without intermission. In their marches, in addition to their weapons and armour, they also carried provisions for fifteen days, and whatever they should have occasion for in throwing up trenches, fortifying their camps, and cutting their way through forests.

A system of individual self-reliance was also inspired into the army by such a course of training, as each one more robust, and of greater experience than his enemy, was sure to gain the advantage of him, or if not, to be vanquished by him. Death was the punishment of any one who deserted his post, or turned his back upon the enemy; and so rigid was the principle of obedience to authority, that a general is found putting to death his own son, for conquering without his orders. Such were
some of the principles brought into operation in the physical training of Rome; much of it is after the model of a Spartan education, but having a larger infusion of scientific skill, the inertia of her physical resources was more easily overcome, and the scene of her conquests vastly more extensive.

Rome, indeed, may be said to have arrived at a mature age before she commenced any course of discipline beyond what was necessary in the practice of war; and though among the conquered Greeks she had the most illustrious of examples and the best of teachers, except in the mere arts of rhetoric and poetry she never exhibited any aptitude for their instructions. She resembled an individual in humble life, who, by a long course of industry, has amassed wealth, and with all his former desires and habits strong upon him, sets about acquiring an elegant education and gentlemanly manners; but finding these sit ungracefully upon him he abandons the attempt, and affects to despise them. As long friction, however, will polish, in some degree, the roughest material, her intercourse with Greece had in time some influence in softening and refining her character, and of throwing at least a surface of intellectuality and taste over the essential animalism of her nature.

This began upon her undertaking the defence of Greece against Philip of Macedon, in the year of Rome 555, from which pretext she ultimately gained possession of the whole country. But the study of literature and eloquence was never much cultivated before the arrival of the Achaians in the year of Rome 586. These, among whom was the celebrated Polybius, were sent for out of their own country, where they had been disaffected to the Romans, and dispersed throughout several parts of Italy. Being members of the principal cities of Greece, they
brought with them a knowledge of many of the liberal arts and sciences of their own country. In a short time their example and instructions had wrought such a change upon the Roman youth, that the senate became alarmed lest their ancient discipline should by such means be corrupted, and the minds of the people enervated by study. A consultation was therefore held how to put a stop to the diffusion of such knowledge, as threatened to induce habits so contrary to the warlike disposition of their ancestors; and a decree was passed that no such men as philosophers and rhetoricians should be tolerated at Rome. The tree of knowledge had been planted, however, and though in a rocky soil and ungenial clime, it struggled its way into existence; but the fruit it bore ever gave evidence of the chilling influence of the one and the iron hardness of the other.

Had it not been, indeed, for other collateral circumstances, it might soon have withered away or been eradicated. During the time of Cato the censor, when Grecian literature was beginning to be cultivated by the Roman youth, it happened that the Athenians plundered a city of Bœotia, the inhabitants of which referred the case to the judgment of the Sicyonians, who fined the Athenians in five hundred talents. To procure a mitigation of this fine, certain eloquent Athenians were sent to expostulate with the senate of Rome, whose harangues in favour of abstract justice and right so captivated the Roman youth, that henceforth the study of rhetoric and philosophy began to be assiduously cultivated. But the aged Cato took it so much to heart, lest, as he said, the youth should prefer the glory of speaking to acting, that he dismissed the ambassadors as being "persons who could persuade the people to whatever they pleased." The impressions made upon the minds of the youth,
however, in favour of a more refined education than Rome then afforded, were not so easily eradicated; and we are told they grew every day more enamoured of study, and showed as much diligence in their pursuit of knowledge as they had ever done in their application to war.

To the opposition given to these studies by the senate of Rome, may, therefore, be traced the origin of another contest between the power of reason and the might of the sword, between intellect and animalism; but the result was different from that in Greece, in which the former prevailed, and became a guiding principle of action, having its attributes deified and worshipped. In Rome physical strength and bravery were ever supreme; and however much intellectual pursuits might be cultivated, they were always subordinated to ambitious projects. The study of rhetoric and forensic eloquence opened up a new profession, and the forum became an arena for the exercise of mind, as the Campus Martius was for that of the body. Still the forum was but an auxiliary to the camp. It was the physical might of the army which gave law to Rome. The most influential senators were generally at the same time the most successful commanders, whose position and renown in the army gave weight to their opinions in the senate. The two professions were indeed partly blended, but that of arms was much the more honourable. The glories of victory and conquest dazzled the moral sense, as the glittering panoply of the warrior and the long triumphal procession captivated the natural gaze. These were the themes on which the orator and poet expatiated, and in moving the people to any purpose their eloquence drew thence its most powerful persuasives. The ablest talents and consummate wisdom of Rome's wisest senators were thus so many moral levers applied in directing and promoting the giant strength of their vast empire. Their
city was dedicated to Mars, the personification of animal courage in war; and before the shrine of that brutal deity all the morality and intellect of Rome fell prostrate, doing homage.

And when the motive is analysed, for what purpose were all these mighty exertions made but to gratify the lowest feelings of human nature, to gain a dominancy over other nations and keep them in thraldom, to advance the mere dignity and importance of Rome? In effecting this object, too, what scenes of protracted cruelty and oppression were indulged in! At the end of the first Punic war the gates of the temple of Janus were shut, having remained open for the preceding five hundred years, during all which period wars, rapine, and plunder were being carried on in every part of the known world. The selfishness and cupidity of Rome thus increased as her inordinate desires were gratified, and her intellect became more and more distorted by an incessant perversion of reasoning to justify her motives. The empire rose to a gigantic height, but required in consequence a system of physical domination of equal power, to uphold which among foreign nations the most sanguinary wars were necessarily waged, and at home a spirit of blind subserviency to rulers exacted. To perpetuate this power and prolong this thraldom it was obviously the interest of those in authority to dazzle the minds of the people by representing the glories of conquest, of patriotism, and of Rome, as of paramount consideration. Popular knowledge and freedom generally go hand in hand; and as it was by no means their policy to bestow too large a measure of the latter upon the people, it was found the more convenient way to withhold it by abridging the former.

But the human mind has within itself a principle of elasticity which in proportion to the pressure laid upon it, increasingly tends to produce a reaction, and which in
the rebound not unfrequently overthrows the authors of its degradation. An individual warrior at length gained the sole command, subordinating all who had formerly been in power, and at once and for ever crushed the republican liberties of Rome. In Cæsar there was an ideal concentration of the same physical control that had previously been diffused among the consuls and senators. He thus became the living representative of Rome's tutelar deity, and an embodiment of his attributes; but being less immortal than his prototype, was unable to bear the first pressure of so much power, and fell crushed beneath it. Nevertheless out of the disordered elements that succeeded his fall, a political fabric was constructed which seemed the very acme of perfection to which the physical principle could attain, and a social pyramid, of which the young Octavius formed the apex, erected out of the same adamantine material. Looking, then, at the imperial city, now in the Augustan age, encompassing an area of some fifty miles, with its four millions of inhabitants, and within whose walls were the finest specimens of Grecian art, obelisks and columns from Egypt, the most rare and costly manufactures of Asia, gold, silver, and precious stones from all nations, enriched in short with the spoils of a conquered world; in these we see only the splendid acquisitions resulting from a long and arduous course of special training. And though one must ever admire the power of that principle, which even partially exerted can effect so much; yet the moralist and the Christian can only sigh over the consequences of such misdirected energy, and no other feeling will arise in a well-regulated mind on reviewing those scenes, than would naturally occur on entering the castle of some bold and successful robber, filled with the glittering trophies of his midnight murders.
CHAPTER IV.

It has been said that the progress of a nation from barbarism to civilisation exhibits phenomena in many respects similar to those of an individual passing from infancy to manhood; but the parallel may equally be applied to the entire world. In the infancy of man appetite and passion are the sole impulses to action, and the gratifying of these his chief pleasure. But in the progress of life experience develops higher impulses arising from impressions received from external nature, the gratifying of which affords a still higher pleasure. In time reflection teaches him to distinguish more nicely between objects calculated to produce pleasure and those that give pain, his self-love seeking its gratification in the former and avoiding the latter. As his intellect becomes more matured and a brighter light is shed around his path, he sees yet higher sources of gratification arising out of abstract views of nature, the desire for which is a purely mental craving, and its indulgence equally a mental pleasure.

In exact proportion, therefore, as any one is enlightened, will he be able to discriminate between the sources of pleasure and pain, so far as his mental and bodily nature is concerned; and a similar course is taken in the gradual development of the moral affections; but as these lie still deeper in the nature of man, and are passive
under the influence of external impressions, they require the assistance of a borrowed light to show them what things to choose and what to reject.

The inexperienced and unaided intellect of man, indeed, is not quite sufficient to enable him to discriminate between what is good and bad either for his body or his mind, much less for the desires of his moral nature. He may, however, see much of the former either by instinct or reason, and choose or reject accordingly; but he requires almost entirely to be shown or rather guided into a proper selection of objects for the gratification of the latter. If no correct guidance be afforded to the moral affections, they will be taken hold of by surrounding objects, and involuntarily trained into the formation of ruling habits, which will be of course productive of happiness or misery according to the bias they receive. It is, therefore, of the last importance that a borrowed experience and reflection be called to aid in guiding the outward tendency of these faculties to proper objects. Though passive and yielding in themselves, when trained to maturity and excellence they subordinate the whole faculties of mind and body, rendering them instrumental in promoting the highest pleasures of which man is capable; and if they are of a more delicate nature, and require more careful attention than the mental and animal powers, the fruit they yield amply repays such labour, and is infinitely more valuable.

So has it been, then, in the progress to perfection of the universal man. In the world's infancy his appetites and passions demanded his first care and attention, and to supply these with greater facility the rude arts were invented. From these inventions a mental desire was created, seeking its gratification in kindred pursuits. But as one want satisfied only creates another, the desires of
his moral nature next sought gratification. The full satisfying of these, however, depending not only upon external objects, but in a reaction proceeding from them, to produce which he had no natural desire, having little sympathy with the objects themselves until enlightened reason showed him the advantages of such a reciprocity, it is easy to suppose that a long period in the history of man would elapse ere the happiness arising from such a gratification of the benevolent faculties would be experienced, and much longer before anything like a correct system of principles could be deduced from such a rare practice.

Yet, as a desire and capacity for this happiness are inherent in the nature of man, many were the expedients resorted to both by enlightened nations and individuals to gratify them; but all of which proceeding upon the principle of making self the recipient of pleasure without first communicating it to others, failed in supplying the full measure of enjoyment. The admirable moral precepts deduced by the wisdom and experience of Socrates, Pythagoras, and other heathen sages, merely supplied this moral desideratum up to a certain point. They showed the pleasures of the passive rather than of the active virtues, of refraining from doing evil rather than the doing of good, of benevolence rather than beneficence.

But as bodily and mental action is no less necessary than occasional rest, so is the outward action of the moral powers as necessary to their gratification as passive indulgence. And as the mere stoical benevolence of heathen philosophy had thus within it no principle of reaction and self-diffusion, it was consequently inadequate fully to supply the moral necessities of man.

A higher light seemed, therefore, necessary than that reflected by the unaided intellect of man to discover the
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seeming paradox, that the true secret of moral happiness consists not in the immediate gratification of self, but in the reflection of a happiness bestowed upon others. It was reserved for the light of the Gospel to introduce upon earth this new principle in moral science; and in the simple command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," there was implanted upon earth a standard principle of action and a basis of education destined in time to draw around it all the science and philosophy in the world.

Yet an erroneous practice from a right principle is much more pernicious than a correct practice from a wrong one. Neither the wisdom of the ancients nor the revelation of the Gospel, though adapted to render man as happy as his nature would permit, effected any immediate moral revolution upon earth. These served merely as so many lights pointing out the different paths to happiness and to misery, but men were left to choose the one or the other, according to their own will. Another element in moral training was therefore necessary, namely, the education of the will and the habits, and this is also abundantly supplied in the rewards held out to those who keep the Gospel commandments. These do not, however, consist in something beyond the commandments, but in the keeping of them. This is the allurement held out to commence a course of beneficence, the practice of which, though at first disagreeable, engages the mind, and ultimately bends the will in the same direction. By the repetition of such acts the will and practice at length go together, or rather the former precedes the latter, and hence the inward habit is formed, incessantly prompting the outward conduct.

These principles with others, that taught the superiority of kindness, gentleness, and love, over hatred,
anger, and violence; the forgiveness of injuries, and bestowing of benefits in return; the doing good to others, expecting no recompense, &c., were in reality so many "lights shining in a dark place;" and though destined one day to irradiate the whole earth, they have often been all but swallowed up in profound darkness. They were left to encounter the same obstacles with which other discoveries in morals and physics have often to contend; and in their progress down to us, as if to show by the most striking examples, not only their inefficacy as a rule of life, but extreme danger when entertained as mere speculative opinions, they have in many cases formed a nucleus around which have been gathered, perhaps, more prejudicial errors, giving rise to more human misery, than all the rites of paganism ever produced. In all the preceding systems of heathen superstition, indeed, we find no parallel in atrocious crime to that perpetrated by papal Rome sanctioned by the name of Christianity. This, however, is but a natural consequence of a misdirected application of the venerative faculties. Of all others these require the most careful education; otherwise, if excited beyond mediocrity, and unbalanced by reason, their predominance will lead to superstition and zealotism. The revelations of the Gospel contain abundant materials for polemical controversy, to indulge in which, is much more agreeable than to reduce its doctrines into individual practice. The early "fathers" embarked heart and soul in these hair-splitting controversies, and by their subtle reasonings only rendered the mysteries of revelation the more mysterious. To propagate their favourite dogmas, too, no means were left untried, and the streams of heavenly knowledge became at last so troubled by an intermixture of earthly waters as to prove fatal to all who drank them. The
few sublime precepts of Christianity first communicated to the world became so obscured by the mists of error, prejudice, and superstition, as to be comparatively powerless as a means of moralizing the people. Yet, in proportion as they became inefficacious for this end, did they become serviceable in promoting the political and ambitious purposes of those in power. A false light was thus afforded to the venerative faculties, guiding them to the performance of actions directly opposed to the spirit of the Gospel.

By training these into excess, therefore, the priests of Catholic Rome had, in the people, the most willing and ready instruments for executing their selfish and brutal desires. Religion became an engine of temporal power and a means of gratifying the sordid passions of those in authority; and again were renewed, but under darker colours, the scenes of ancient Rome in the long war of the crusades, in which Palestine, where the blood of Christ was shed to give peace on earth and good-will to men, became one vast reservoir for the blood of those who fought under the influence of the most malignant passions and fiendish hatred.

Such, then, are some of the effects of a partial and misdirected education, both in a national and universal point of view. In all these cases the animal and mental desiers operating under different circumstances were alone the ruling motives; while the moral feelings, that ought ever to have the ascendancy, were kept in abeyance or entirely perverted. No correct system of guidance was ever applied to these in training them into ruling habits. They were ever left to the chance education of circumstances, or merely enlightened by the teaching of moral precepts. Thus in ancient Rome and Sparta the animal propensities were educated to excess, and became pre-
dominant. The habits of those nations were such as in general to repress all the finer feelings by rendering them callous both to their own individual sufferings and to those of others. They were buried under an adamantine soil, above the surface of which they were never permitted to appear; and whatever rays of intellect were emitted merely illumined the soil without warming and calling them forth into life and energy. In Athens an intellectual education was unsustained by a sound practical morality. Taste and refinement were there the master virtues, the cultivation of which was certainly much nearer the objects of a humane and civilizing education; and when we add the gymnasium of physical training so perfect among the Athenians, we have among that people many models after which we ourselves ought to copy. But still these were only a partial education, a polishing of the external man, to the neglect of his higher powers; while the morality that was inculcated was the mere preceptive instructions of Socrates, and the passive virtues, not the diffusive benevolence of the Gospel. In Egypt, the first dawning of literature, the arts and sciences, elicited feelings of wonder, devotion, and superstition; the demoralizing effects of which were only counteracted by an almost equal devotion to mechanical industry and mental improvement. But while the head and the hands were thus engaged, the feelings of the heart were left unregulated. In Carthage, all the powers of body and soul were engrossed in one pursuit, and that the most selfish in which man can be engaged,—the acquisition of riches; and it needs not, therefore, be told what were the lamentable results of such an avaricious spirit. In papal Rome the religious feelings were called forth into unnatural excitement, and a fanatical zeal for propagating the mere dogmas of Christianity, lighted up in the
hearts of men the worst passions of which human nature is susceptible.

Thus, in all these different features of character stamped upon man, either by a system of under or over education, may visibly be traced the origin of nearly all the various forms of human misery under which the world has yet suffered. His whole powers have never, in any instance, had a simultaneous development. The balance has ever been disturbed from one cause or another, and strange it is, that the grossest and most earthly parts of his nature have hitherto been always in the ascendant: like the natural chaos of Ovid, the heavenly fires have never emerged from the confused and superincumbent elements, and chosen a place for themselves in the highest citadel. In some of the instances adduced we see the bodily and mental powers trained almost to the height of perfection, but in no one instance any system in operation for moralizing the habits. All the assistance that art and science could lend were applied in perfecting the former, and if the science of moral training was not altogether unknown, it was never reduced to practice on any extended basis. There has ever been a vast hiatus between a knowledge of its principles and their application as an art, and from a want of which connexion the fruits of virtue have never yet ripened to maturity in any land. The seeds may have been sown, but due cultivation has never been afforded.

Similar effects are also produced upon individuals by a course of misdirected education, to those which result to communities. In this country, other influences were at work to counteract the bad effects of the evils enumerated, in a national point of view; but upon individual character they have had no less fatal an influence. I stop not at present to inquire how, as in the sequel I shall have abundant reason to show. The only inference intended to be drawn from the instances already adduced
is, the paramount necessity of having education reduced to the tangible form of a science, studying it as such, and deducing some systematic mode of procedure in conducting the education of a human being.

Each one of the faculties must be educated, but it must be by different and peculiar means, and each faculty must be exercised upon proper and legitimate objects, before the whole man can be said to have received an education. And that a knowledge of an "art," of such importance in the moral economy of nature, should itself be carefully studied and practised by all who would undertake such a responsible duty, is, I think, no less clear a deduction.

Like every other art, however, skill or proficiency in it can only be attained by practice. An easy matter it is for any writer on education to prescribe rules for a teacher to follow, but it is a far different and a much more difficult thing to follow them. The surgeon has a much more difficult task to perform when he comes to investigate the nature of diseases and wounds, and apply suitable remedies, than in the calm retirement of his study or the class room, in acquiring a speculative knowledge of anatomy. His head may be filled with correct principles, which a want of manual dexterity may render practically useless. He must both study and practise before he acquire a sufficiency of skill. And so must the teacher before he get acquainted with the art of communicating instruction. Nor can he attain to proficiency in the art by a process of self-instruction any more than the surgeon. It is necessary that he undergo a course of practical discipline founded upon correct philosophical principles. In his own person he must form a connecting link between the art and the science of education. Enlightened by the principles of the latter, he will understand how he ought to instruct, and prac-
tising after some model, he will at length become trained to the mechanical art.

An obvious inference hence arises that as an instrument for training others, he must first be trained himself. An apparatus and materials of a different kind are, therefore, necessary to prepare such instruments from those required in a juvenile education. They must be moulded after a certain form, and properly tempered, burnished, and sharpened for the work they have to perform. They must be correct models to others, and therefore modelled upon correct principles themselves. Any school where these principles are in operation is a normal school, that is, an institution for exhibiting the rules according to which teachers ought to practise the art of education; but it will not be complete without materials for practising with, and a visible pattern to copy after, namely, a model school.

Such an apparatus is a phenomenon of modern days, and supplies a desideratum which every candid teacher must acknowledge he has felt on entering upon his duties. Hitherto most writers have merely regarded education as a convenient theme for speculation, and most teachers have entered upon the practice of it trusting to their own resources in arriving at a correct system. But it is of no more avail for a teacher, when he comes to the practice of his art, to have merely read an able treatise on education, than for a surgeon to be only speculatively informed regarding the bodily functions. Indeed, in proportion as the science of mind and morals is more abstruse than that of animal physiology, and its principles established upon a more shifting basis owing to the numberless external causes which affect human character, both knowledge and experience are infinitely more necessary to constitute a teacher than a surgeon. But any general system
of training to these qualifications has never yet been established to any extent—means have hitherto been wanting in the foundation of normal and model institutions for combining a knowledge of principles with practice, so as to bring the didactic art to any degree of perfection. However well educated an individual may be in himself, and however much he may have read and studied books on education, when once he really puts his hand to the work of instructing others, it is at least long before he can find himself at home in the practice. He will find a want of method, in all his procedure, both as regards the form of putting questions, and the kind of questions and exercises to be put, in order not only to inform properly, but to train the intellect and guide the moral powers, which the mere reading of educational works can never supply. Neither is it enough that he may have seen another skilful teacher successfully practising the art, or have attended as a spectator at some well-regulated school. He may continue there for years scrutinising the best systems, examining the best modes of framing questions, and witnessing the superiority of moral influence over physical terror in governing the disobedient, and all the mechanical movements and organisation of the classes. But, if he does not throw himself into the work, and with sections of the children practise the same modes, endeavour to acquire the same aptitude for communicating instruction, and developing the intellect and moral faculties, and the same means of gaining a moral control, for all practical purposes he might as well never have entered the institution. To undergo some probationary course of this kind, is, therefore, the paramount duty of every one who would undertake the responsible duties of a trainer of youth.
CHAPTER V.

Few persons are really aware that there is any difficulty in conveying instruction to the minds of children beyond the fact of getting that same instruction into their own minds, and still fewer how difficult it is. It has been said to be natural to some people to acquire this aptitude, and it may be so to a certain extent; but such individuals must form an exception to the general rule. There are grown-up people to whom, from a natural infantile simplicity and playfulness of manner, children have a much greater affinity than to others of graver habits. And there are some who from a certain facility in narrating striking incidents, or ordinary incidents in a striking manner, will attach children to them, and make their communications sink deep into the minds of the latter. But such instances are by no means more frequent in ordinary life, than the occasional phenomena of certain individuals exhibiting a natural genius for poetry or painting. In the one case it depends upon a superabundance of animal spirits and good humour, and on the other, upon a certain concreteness of intellect and minuteness of detail, giving the power of so individualising abstractions as to render them visible and captivating to the young mind. A mother is almost the only grown-up person who can naturally accommodate herself to the
dispositions of her own children, and to this extent she ought to be a model to the teacher of others. But in order to acquire any measure of this pliancy of manner, the man of a different moral habit must be educated up to it. Above his own natural inclination and habits there must be superinduced an artificial nature similar to those dispositions with which he is expected to sympathise; and equally must a return be made to the simplicity of nature in picturing out his ideas, and rendering them visible to the concrete intellect of his pupil, before the latter can derive instruction from him. The opinion expressed by Pope concerning "writing," is equally applicable in this case.

"True ease in teaching comes by art, not chance,
As those move easiest who have learned to dance."

Let us reflect for a moment what is the nature of this art. It is simply a process of painting, or picturing upon the mind of another, the same image that is in our own. All description, as every one knows, is analogous to the art of painting. In the former case, the image is presented to the mind through the ear, and by words; in the latter, through the eye, and by colours. But the object of both arts is the same, namely, the communicating of ideas; and hence the necessity teachers are under, of resorting to pictures and diagrams, to aid in their verbal descriptions. From a painting, however, the whole idea rises in the mind at once; but from a description, the image is slowly unfolded, and only seen by the mind vividly or otherwise, according to the accuracy of the description. If, then, it be a difficult art, and one in which few excel, to transfer to canvas the image of an object in such a manner as to convey to the mind a correct idea of its prototype, it is evidently much more so,
to call up in the mind ideas of absent objects in a palpable form by means of mere words. It matters not how vivid the impression may be on our own minds; in endeavouring to convey a copy of this to another, we may only make a caricature. Any one, not an artist, may have as correct an impression of a landscape upon his mind as an artist himself; but it is only the latter who can transfer a copy of that impression to the canvas, so as to enable others to have the same idea or impression. And so is it with the teacher; it matters not how learned his own mind may be, how well replenished with ideas, and how vividly soever he sees them—there is a power beyond this necessary to produce copies of these ideas on the minds of others. And the difficulty is increased from the circumstance of a matured intellect receiving its impressions in a different way from that of an immature. The cultivated mind of an adult is like a more highly prepared and sensitive surface, that can catch the impression at once, and even through a dim medium; the mind of a child must undergo a preparatory process, and be subjected to the most favourable influences, before it can take up the picture. And, in fact, it is just this preparatory process that forms the legitimate province of a teacher's operations, rather than the painting. Unaware of this, the unskilful teacher commences instructing his pupil by the same means by which he attained his own knowledge. He communicates mere abstractions, that can never lay hold upon the unpolished fabric of the young mind, or at least be retained there any time; and those terms to which he may be accustomed to attach certain ideas in his own mind, can awaken no corresponding train of thought in the mind of a child. They are like unassimilated food in the animal system, communicating no aliment to the frame, and only
impeding digestion, or similar to the painter's undiluted materials stuck upon the canvas, instantly to fall off again. For example, what idea can arise in the mind of a child regarding a 'rich farmer,' if he be represented as an 'opulent agriculturist?' or of a 'falsehood,' described as 'an act of moral turpitude?' yet such are the terms in which many teachers delight to revel. They deliver themselves of their ideas lucidly enough, perhaps, if grown people were their auditors; but a little cross-examination of children after such lecturing would show that it was mere writing upon sand. Perhaps a better illustration of this sort of verbal instruction cannot be given, than by repeating the following anecdote taken from the "American Annals of Education." "A gentle man, not long ago, took up an apple to show a niece sixteen years of age, who had studied geography several years, something about the shape and motion of the earth. She looked at him a few minutes, and said with much earnestness, 'Why, uncle, you don't mean that the earth really turns round, do you?' He answered, 'But did you not learn that several years ago?' 'Yes,' she replied, 'I learned it, but I never knew it before.'" It certainly is very evident this young lady must have had one of these identical learned preceptors of whom I am speaking. It cannot be supposed that she would be ignorant of the usual vocabulary of astronomical and geographical names, so fluently reiterated at fashionable schools, but for want of some tangible illustration, some picture, ocular or verbal, of the earth's revolution, her mind was as much a blank on that branch of study as before she went to school. And without a close scrutiny into the matter, any one may deceive himself in this way. A single word beyond the comprehension of a child may nullify a whole description, and irreparably mar the
image that was forming in his mind. Unless, therefore, ideas be infused into the mind of a pupil in a concrete form and associated with some palpable object, there is no guarantee that they will remain there any time. And, unless too, the teacher leave his Latinity of style, and be content patiently to administer instruction in a diluted Saxon phraseology and simple terms, he will only deceive himself as to the result of his labours.

But training comprehends much more than this. It is something beyond the mere communicating of information. It is a cultivation of the intellect itself, leading it to think and to deduce facts and conclusions from its own resources. Teaching is a process simply intended to enlighten and inform the mind, whatever be the nature of the subject communicated; but training is an agency that takes cognizance of the whole powers both of body and mind. It is, besides, merely the perceptive faculties that are appealed to in teaching, upon which are imprinted ideas of sensation only, or at the most, reflective ideas through the channel of the senses. These faculties are thus the recipients of materials or data, which the judgment combines and arranges, giving birth to original thoughts of its own. Much, therefore, of course, depends upon teaching, as, according to the number and variety of facts and impressions made upon the intellect, has the judgment more or less the means at command of making its selection, and arriving at sound conclusions. In proportion to the vividness of these impressions, too, does the mind become enlightened, and the judgment see to form correct opinions.

Still, this is only a knowledge without wisdom. Without a sufficiency of information, in reasoning, conclusions may be drawn from too few premises, giving rise to what are called narrow opinions, or opinions resting upon so
slender a basis that they cannot be supported. A person who is thus defectively informed, and whose opinions are so easily overthrown, is said to be of a weak understanding, compared with another whose opinions stand upon a broader foundation of facts. But the judgment must also be guided in making a proper selection of materials for this foundation. It is not enough that it sees them, and knows their individual qualities; it must exert itself in selecting and combining in sufficient number and variety, such as are proper to form a sure foundation of arguments for its opinions. And the strength of these can only be tested by bringing them into contact with the opinions of another, in which comparison such as are most strongly supported by the evidence of facts, will prevail, just as, in a physical contest, the stronger party will overcome the weaker. Yet the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; neither is it always the individual having his mind best stored with facts, who is the ablest reasoner. In wrestling, a slender man, well skilled and trained, may overcome a stronger, if less acquainted with the art, and a mind much exercised in thinking, though less informed, will often arrive at more just conclusions than another highly enlightened and learned individual. Practice, therefore, in the art of reasoning, as well as in all other arts, is the true secret of perfection. There may, also, however, be a right and a wrong practice. Every one reasons in one way or another, and puts forth the powers of his mind into action, as naturally as those of his body; but as in the physical exercise alluded to, in which certain principles must be acted upon, to ensure skill and dexterity, so must the reasoning faculties be artificially cultivated to develop fully their inherent strength. The inexperienced judgment must have a model by which to compare its
opinions, and this is afforded in the matured and experienced judgment of another. It must also have some motives held out to it to allure to the practice of judging correctly, which motives form a sort of leading strings in the process of mental training; and it is a proper understanding of these, and skill in using them, that constitute the indispensable qualification of a mental trainer.

Between teaching and training the mind, there is therefore a vast difference, and much more professional art necessary to the one than to the other. The former is simply an implanting of knowledge in the mind; the latter is calling the mind itself into action, and teaching it a process of self-culture. In gardening, it is a much simpler operation merely to plant a tree, than afterwards to prune, bend, and direct its plant branches. And as the root of the plant draws nourishment from the soil, the latter must also be cultivated and improved, in proportion to the fertility of which, will be the luxuriance and growth of the plant. So, in training the mind, its own native and artificial powers must be drawn out, and rendered available in cultivating and enriching the tree of knowledge so as to bring forth the fruits of wisdom.

This is best effected by a peculiar mode of interrogation, to be explained hereafter, and it matters little for such a purpose what may be the subject of the lesson. By training the tendrils of the vine in a particular direction, the whole plant will follow in the same course; and the mind may be as much drawn into a habit of observation and reflection from a well-directed lesson on a pin, as from the science of astronomy. A focus of attraction must be presented to the mind to concentrate its ideas upon a certain point, forming a stronger brilliancy, the reflection of which may develop new thoughts and ideas.
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It requires, however, no ordinary insight into the workings of the human mind, thus to perceive upon what subjects it is enlightened, so as to reflect from thence a borrowed lustre upon the more obscure, by means of analogy and illustration. By these, the mind is self-illuminated, and reason shown the right path, and it is making use of certain collateral points of information, as landmarks to guide it in its course; but it also requires the outgoing of the mind itself, to arrive at a right conclusion. The chief difficulty as well as the principal duty of the trainer is, therefore, to overcome the mental inertia by removing all needless obstacles out of the way, rendering the path smooth and pleasant, and giving an impulse by means of some exciting or alluring motive. If this object be attained, that is, if the mind be made willing to enter upon a system, and follow out a method of inductive reasoning, until a habit of close thinking be formed, it will ultimately do the same thing it was shown to do, and find out right conclusions itself. "Where there is a will there is a way," is a proverb equally true in mental development and self-culture, as in anything else; and it is the trainer's noblest task so to harmonise this will and practice as to produce habits of correct thinking.

To form this frame of mind is, therefore, of infinitely more importance than to communicate mere knowledge. The latter can do little more than impart individual ideas and isolated facts; the former habituates the reasoning powers to embrace a connected train of thoughts and to arrive at general conclusions. A person will become sooner acquainted with the different streets and localities of a large city, if with a little assistance and his own observation he find his way through them, than by putting himself entirely under the guidance of another. By the latter mode he might reach a certain point sooner,
and by a shorter way, than if he had to find it out himself, but by the former, the general direction of the town would be much more strongly imprinted upon his memory, and a habit of attentive observation more fixed, by reasoning out the position of an unknown point from certain known ones, and thus reaching it, than by being led to the place, or shown it by another. It might also be more agreeable for the time to be guided thither, but it would be more advantageous for the future, to guide himself. Still some assistance and information might be necessary to point out the intricacies and windings of the town to a stranger, and a similar assistance is necessary to guide the unsophisticated mind into a right train of ideas in forming a correct judgment. And herein lies the great difference between a trained and a self-taught master. The latter proceeds at once to tell his pupil all he knows, to store his mind with facts, and dates, and circumstances in the abstract, which the mind itself has nothing to do but to receive. Now, if in the case of teaching a pupil unexplained words, they remain in the memory as so many dead letters, no less do these gratuitously imparted ideas only overload its powers without increasing its activity in administering to the judgment. The strength of the mind, like that of the body, is increased by exercising itself, and by having opportunities afforded for reflection, and taking cognisance of its own thoughts and feelings. To guide it into such a channel, therefore, and to supply it with proper materials for reflection, are not matters that fall naturally in the way of the self-instructed teacher. In short, when we consider the complex mechanism of the mind itself, its difficulty of being properly understood by the most profound thinkers, and the nature of those instruments and apparatus best adapted to set it in motion, and give it a right direction, and reflect that
hitherto no preparatory instruction to the rash operator upon it was deemed necessary, we need scarcely wonder at anything else.

These, however, are not the only subjects that demand study and practice. The guidance of the moral and religious feelings is a matter infinitely more responsible and difficult, and without some initiatory training no master ought ever to lay his hands upon that sacred work. While mere abstract knowledge and skill may go far to constitute a perfect mental trainer, a vast deal more is necessary to form a moral one. Patience and unfailling kindness are, indeed, indispensable qualifications even in mental discipline, but to train morally, the individual must himself be a pattern of all the virtues that adorn humanity; nor must these virtues be passive, but actively employed as instruments in giving birth to others, and in promoting corresponding sentiments in those under his influence. He will require a peculiar insight into the motives that regulate the tempers and form the conduct of children, to apply these beneficially. He must, in short, become a child himself in playfulness and simplicity of manner, combined with which he must possess the penetration and experience of a sage.

Were the human mind, as has been supposed, like a sheet of white paper, the task of the trainer would be comparatively an easy one. He could then impress or write upon it whatever character he chose, and the pupil's character would be an exact transcript of that of the master. Preceptive discipline and example might then do all that was necessary, as no internal counteracting principle would give the faculties an opposite bias. But the moral nature of man is evolved from the physical, and has its root deeply fixed therein. The seed may be planted by the hand of Heaven, but its innate tendencies
receive no inconsiderable bias from the soil in which it has been sown. It may flourish or decay, may never rise above the surface, or bear luxuriant fruit; but as much of this will depend upon the nature of that soil from which it receives or is denied nourishment, as the outward cultivation of the trainer. In a word, the first fruits of virtue and vice depend much upon certain constitutional and accidental physical temperaments. Still, though a good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit, the native excellence of the one may be infinitely deteriorated by bad management, and the stunted growth and repulsive qualities of the other trained to a high degree of perfection by proper care and attention, and so may the innate tendencies of the moral being be improved or deteriorated according to the cultivation it receives. The form of the moral character cannot, therefore, be arbitrarily determined by a trainer, as so much depends upon bodily temperament, and the influence of surrounding circumstances. But many of these can be neutralised if pernicious, and taken advantage of if beneficial in rearing to maturity the delicate plants of virtue and goodness.

There is a much closer sympathy between the physical and moral powers than between the latter of these and the mental, which have more the character of instruments in supplying the wants of the others. It is the bodily wants and necessities seeking their legitimate gratification, and being denied them, that first gives rise to ill-temper and peevishness. In the absence of language to express these wants, they are made known by crying and restlessness; and even should such symptoms be appeased by gentle means, if the producing cause has not been removed, the disappointment still leaves a feeling of unhappiness. This first feeling of unhappiness or want of feeling happy is, therefore, a moral want
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arising from the absence of a natural gratification, and has a prejudicial influence upon the general character. Or, on the other hand, if a child feels that crying procures a gratification of its wants, and resorts to it on every recurrence of them, a spirit of selfishness and obstinacy supervenes above the gratification of its natural desires. To gratify these wants in their incipient stages, or rather to anticipate them, is therefore, the foundation of moral training; but to over-gratify them would merely create other wants arising from bodily disease, the unhappiness of which would no less have a demoralising tendency than that produced by the wants of nature.

The animal nature must thus be kept equally balanced between these two extremes. It is the surplus, deficiency, or unsuitable nature of its gratifications that first deteriorates the moral sensibilities. If its physical wants are not fully attended to and supplied, there is no foundation laid for developing the higher aspirations, all the child's energies are then directed to the gratification of the former, and a spirit of mere animal selfishness is fostered and kept alive; or, if these be pampered and over-indulged, the consequent physical ailments debilitating the nervous system, also re-act prejudicially upon the moral powers. But when the natural wants are suitably supplied, the feelings overflow in cheerfulness and good humour. The gratifying of a physical want creates, therefore, a moral feeling towards the gratifier, and this is the first outgoing of benevolence that the moral trainer must regulate. If these budding affections be met by the smiles of love and kindness, they will expand like the rose in a genial atmosphere, but if chilled by cold looks and a repulsive manner, they will as certainly wither and die. The atmosphere of a mother's love is, therefore, prepared beforehand to receive, nourish, and increase
these feelings. The smile of the grateful infant is met by
the beaming looks of the fond mother, and love grows up
pace between them. Yet the child must first feel gratified
before grateful. The very words indicate that it must be
made so; and when this is done, the moral feeling of grati-
tude as naturally arises as the original desire of being
physically gratified. The one is the fruit of the other,
which when nourished to maturity, amply repays the
cultivator.

A knowledge of what is necessary for this moral culture,
must consequently comprehend an acquaintance with the
organisation of the body. It is not enough that love
prompts a gratification of the child's animal wants, for,
unless that love be guided by principle, it may as readily
duce feelings of ingratitude. There must be an enlight-
ened discrimination made between the legitimate wants of
nature and certain artificial desires, the gratifying of
which is alike injurious to body and mind. If the affec-
tion of a parent be so strong as to deny nothing that the
instinctive impulses of childhood may demand, this over-
supplying of the animal wants will create an artificial
appetite, the satisfying of which corrupts the physical
nature, and prevents the moral feelings of gratitude from
arising. The rank weeds of selfishness will overrun the
soil, and choke the delicate plants of an indigenous and
spontaneous benevolence. When a child thus perceives
that its gratification, and not its advantage, is the govern-
ing principle of its earliest attendant, it is ruined. It has
then gained the ascendancy over her, and simply makes
her an instrument in the indulgence of its unregulated
desires; and as most of these can afford no natural plea-
sure to the one, neither can the other reap any gratitude
in return. Hence the reason is, that pampered and over-
indulged children are always disobedient and ungrateful
to those having the care of them, and intensely selfish in their conduct to all others.

Thus it is, that a knowledge of physics is a knowledge of the source of morals too. And this is much more necessary in infancy than in after years, when language comes to aid the child in expressing its physical necessities. The cries of an infant are the language of nature seeking some relief from pain, but as these are unintelligible in themselves, other means must be taken to ascertain the cause of complaint. This must simply be inferred from a general knowledge of the physiology of the human frame, and removed by the application of a remedy derived from the principles of the same science. There must be a sound body and an enlightened mode of cultivating its powers, and supplying its necessities, before an atmosphere of pure morality can be thrown around it; otherwise, like the exhalations of a marshy soil polluting the natural air, will the affections become tainted and unhealthy under the influence of physical infirmities. But even should these natural wants be anticipated, and the inherent cause of ill-temper and peevishness removed, the same injury may be inflicted upon a child's moral nature by the ill-temper of its early attendant. If the cause be not inherent, it may be communicated from without. The atmosphere may be impregnated by vapours wafted from another clime.

It is not a little upon the manner in which a child's wants are supplied, that its own manners or morals depend; according to the mode of its own treatment will it treat others, and as others feel towards it, so will it feel towards them. No one can esteem a gift, however valuable in itself, if proffered ungraciously. If one's feelings be hurt by the manner of bestowing it, not only does no gratitude arise towards the bestower, but
both himself and his gift are regarded with natural aversion. The intended recipient may, indeed, be termed ungrateful, and, so far as the individual gift is concerned, properly so; but no fault can attach to him for not feeling otherwise, when no attempt was ever made to gratify that feeling. It was an improper feeling that prompted the gift, rendered apparent to the receiver by the manner in which it was offered, and consequently awakened no proper feeling in return. And even should necessity compel a reception of the gift, the moral feeling of gratitude would be nothing increased. That must be called forth by other means not at all depending upon the intrinsic value of a benefaction. If a present of money be given to a needy person amid reproaches for his poverty, he will at once perceive that some sinister motive inspired the gift, and will only despise the hypocrisy of the giver; whereas the few kind and compassionate words of a poor neighbour might instantly elicit the warmest feelings of gratitude. The human heart "leaps kindly back to kindness," in infancy, as well as age; and though the child cannot reason out the cause of his feelings like the man, they are no less regulated by a similar cause.

As the general conduct of an individual is made up of particular acts, so is the general character composed of individual feelings. If the majority of his actions be good, he is said to exhibit a virtuous conduct, and if bad, that it is vicious. Again, as conduct is the outward fruit of character, it is inferred that an individual whose general conduct is good, has a good character, and if bad, the reverse. The conduct naturally flows from the character, however much the manifestation of it may be disguised by artifice. But character is only an aggregate of the feelings matured into habits. It is a condition of the moral being produced by a majority of certain classes of
feelings, the union and strength of which evolve a corresponding conduct. These feelings, it has been said, originate not so much in any mere gratification of the natural desires, as in the antecedent feelings that prompted such gratification, an instinctive perception of which is conveyed to a child by the manner of the gratifier,—and there is a certain manner in which every act is performed to a child by its attendant, which at the earliest dawning of consciousness is perceived and appreciated by the former. Thus manner is the medium through which impressions are first conveyed to the feelings, and is the language or exponent of morals. The affectionate manner of a mother towards her child is that expression of her feelings, by which its moral nature is impressed with similar feelings towards herself. And as in literal language each word conveys an idea, or part of an idea, most of these natural feelings have this appropriate expression.

Thus it is that morality is entirely independent of materialism, though arising out of it. It floats around and above it like the atmosphere about the earth, or as the flame of a lamp may often be seen completely detached from the materials that support it. The moral principle both acts upon the material, and is acted upon by it, but is in itself a distinct essence. The whole conduct is, therefore, in a great degree, governed by feelings, and originates in them, while they themselves are impressed upon the character by the language of the affections. If a preponderance of them be good, the character will be generally so; but if evil, the reverse. The mother's affection is the true source of these impressions, ordained to this end by nature, but more than nature is necessary to regulate the manifestation of that affection. If love, untempered by reason and morality, impress a character upon the child, the latter will become unreasonable in its
moral desires, and be guided by the blind instinct of feeling alone. Or, if the bare reason and rigid morality of a nurse without much affection be the source of its impressions, the warm feelings of gratitude and love, which are the primary elements of a good character, will be undeveloped.

A very young child has no moral character, but acts from the impulse of its individual feelings. Its habits being unformed, it is not individually responsible for its isolated actions, and only knows they are right or wrong from the smile or frown, the warning or encouragement of its mother. It has no moral sense of duty beyond the feeling conveyed by these signs. The mother is its conscience-keeper, and the pain felt on committing a wrong action, arises from a sense of having displeased her, or the satisfaction of a right one from having given her pleasure.

These impressions of pleasure or pain, however, are the means of educating its own conscience. As intellect ripens, and a mother's injunctions are given to avoid one set of actions and perform another, these stand in the place of herself, and are obeyed for her sake. Love to her will constrain obedience to them, and as conscience quickens, a deviation from such commands, or an adherence to them, will equally be followed by a moral pleasure or pain. The child is now acting so far upon a principle of abstract morality, the motive to which is filial love, but it is not an abstraction of reason, at least made by its own reason. The mother is still responsible for its conduct, as it is her wishes that the child obeys; and the inherent criminality or merit of the action to which the child is instrumental, is hers also. If it be founded in reason and religion, the child is thus drawn by the cords of love into the obedience of a moral principle, or simply
trained to do what is right without knowing the reason of so doing. Love habituates into the practice before reason deduces the principle; but when the habit is formed, obedience to the principle naturally follows. The mother is thus to the infant instead of God; she is a moral law-giver, impressing a character upon her child through the medium of its affections. But a more abstract sense of right and wrong must be experienced, before the child is a moral being, acting upon the convictions of its own reason. The child as yet only feels and acts the morality of parental love. As reason dawns, a deduction must be made from this to the absolute requirements and duties of morality. The happiness of obedience to a loving parent in a right action must be shown to be inherent in morality itself, and an ordination of God; and as it has been felt in particular actions, the mind and habits are thus predisposed to virtue in general. And as in particular, the happiness of obedience increases the child's affection to its parent, so in general, the happiness of an abstract obedience to morality induces and strengthens an affection towards God, the universal parent. When the nature of this connexion is somewhat felt and seen, the child is to that extent a moral agent acting upon the warnings of his own conscience. When reason tells him he has done right, his conscience will feel gratified, or, if wrong, pained. Yet it depends upon the degree of enlightenment he possesses, and the previous education of his conscience, whether it yet performs aright its monitory functions. His intellect must, therefore, be taught the duties of morality, and a course of preceptive instruction keep pace with the formation of his habits.

Now when a nurse scolds a child for crying, and afterwards supplies its want, the grateful feeling which would otherwise have arisen is repressed, and an emana-
tion from her own angry spirit implanted in its stead. This "root of bitterness," by a repetition of the same treatment soon bears fruit, manifesting itself in continued crying and peevishness even after its wants have been satisfied. The original cause of this habit may have been removed, but the moral effect is perpetuated by another cause; and as time develops more fully the same unhappy temperament breaking out in occasional fits of anger and resentment, more violence of temper will be exhibited by the attendant, only adding fuel to the flames of these passions, and training them into an uncontrolable bad temper in mature life.

The manner of a trainer, therefore, independently of inherent physical causes, being thus grafted upon the moral constitution of a child, will bring forth those fruits upon the good or bad qualities of which will depend the ultimate happiness or misery of that child. How indispensable is it, then, that those having the earliest care of children should themselves be morally trained, or, at all events, have their natural tempers so schooled into obedience that no outward manifestation of anger should be exhibited before their charge! Our ignorance of that mysterious union between mind and matter, morals and physics, is yet so imperfect, that the most intelligent and active trainer may fail to detect the origin of many immoral tendencies in children, which can then only be counteracted after development. But if the light already afforded by mental science were fully applied in practice, how much could be done in training to almost Godlike perfection the capabilities of a human soul!

In this department of training, however, neither knowledge nor skill, perhaps, is so essential as example. Each is indispensable, but no acted character is perfect; and however skilfully a trainer may demean himself towards a
child, if his conduct before others contradict the general tenor of this professional artificial character, much of his training will be nugatory. There is no simulation in nature,—all is reality; and it is the natural conduct of an attendant that is most naturally imitated by the child. If nature and art thus disagree in a trainer, the child's confidence in him is destroyed. Two different standards are presented, and the child if not kept in ignorance how to act at all, will follow those actions apparently the most natural in his guide. The latter must, therefore, not only do before the child what he wishes him to do, but he must be to him and to all else the same thing he wants him to be. There are, however, no perfect beings any more than perfect actors upon earth, and the frailties of human nature appear as natural and are as easily imitated as its excellences. A knowledge of some art in disguising many of the natural feelings is, therefore, indispensable in a trainer. There is much more acting in the world than this, and of a much more questionable character.

Most people are now aware that moral training commences in the nursery, but few indeed act upon the principle in the selection of their nurse. The very fact of such a person being a hireling and a stranger is inauspicious. She may bestow the most unremitting attention upon her charge, and be a paragon of faithfulness and care in all things pertaining to its bodily comfort—thus laying a good foundation for moral culture; but there must be a superstructure also, and it is the untiring love and affection of a mother that are alone equal to such a task. These cannot be hired or bought with a price. Her affection is the only natural source of moral training, for, however much a nurse may act up to such a character, it is acting still; and the worst of it is, the mask
is more frequently assumed in presence of the mother than of the child. Before the former an affection is often feigned towards the child, from interested motives; but alone with the latter, her natural temper regains its sway. The irritability and fretfulness of the child exhaust her patience, and, being fretted herself, she is utterly incompetent to soothe the temper of her charge.

Besides, among the qualifications of a nurse are seldom or never reckoned those mental attainments necessary to perceive the first outgoings of the intellect and moral powers, and to guide them to proper objects. It is simply a knowledge of bodily wants that is considered essential; but unless a vast deal more supplementary knowledge be brought to the task of mental and moral cultivation, her duties will be but superficially performed. And if the unwise affection of a mother overdo much by gratifying too fully every desire, little, if anything, can be done where that affection is not. Skill and knowledge may effect a "counterfeit presentment" of it, but like the barren rays of a wintry sun, however bright, they will produce but a scanty harvest of the moral affections. A mother's love is warm as well as bright, under the genial influence of which alone the affections can be brought to maturity; and no one but a mother can naturally bestow that love.

A hired nurse—however qualified for her office, mentally, morally, and physically—is at the best but an artist, and, in nine cases out of ten, a self-taught one. A mother has the inspiration of nature for her guide, and an enthusiasm in her labours of love that never fails. It is, therefore, unquestionably an evil in the very outset of nursery training when these labours cannot be rendered available, and when a child is thus handed over to the stepmother offices of the very best nurse. It is hardly
possible that both should agree in their treatment of its physical wants and ailments; and how much less in any uniform system of mental and moral education! It is a similar evil to that which often prevails in the education of after life, when children are hurried about from one school to another and one system to another, the consequence of which is, that they frequently receive the benefits of none, but the worst parts of all. The kind and judicious advice of an intelligent mother will be often entirely lost by the exhibition of a contrary practice in the nurse. The example of the former is most seen by the child, and, consequently, more imitated than that of the mother. Much, too, of the child's natural affection for its parent is thus turned aside, and the foundation of filial obedience consequently weakened.

It has been already said that much of the basis of a character depends upon internal physical causes. This is the reason why some children, even under the same treatment, often exhibit so great a difference in point of firmness or flexibility of temper, one or other of these tendencies becoming apparent among the earliest indications of intelligence, and each of them requiring a peculiar management. The child of a pliant and impressible disposition is, of course, easily managed; but from this very facility readily imbibes all the more objectionable points of its nurse's character. In after life, too, it as easily falls a prey to the prejudices and errors of those with whom it may associate, as their better qualities. Such an individual is seldom of an original turn of mind, has few habits and ideas of his own, but assumes them at second hand from others. This pliancy of manner is, however, very gratifying to an attendant, as it saves much trouble, but it is often trouble spared at the expense of much that is necessary in fortifying the character against
falling into a state of comparative imbecility and helplessness. In this case means should be taken to induce habits of self-reliance, both as regards the supplying of its own bodily wants, and reasoning out the truth of its own ideas and the principles upon which its feelings depend.

On the other hand, the firm child often requires a vast deal of trouble to make it obey a single command or adopt the simplest habit. It has a will of its own, which requires to be bent and guided into obedience by the influence of affection, not broken into it by violence; and proper motives of action should be exhibited, that the natural force of its character may be expended in legitimate employments. Were the same trouble that is often taken by a nurse to overcome a fit of obstinacy, and to compel a reluctant compliance with some foolish order for the mere sake of enforcing an abstract obedience, employed to find out suitable means of gratifying this energy of will, much more pleasure would result to the one and infinitely more advantage to the other. The self-willed and stubborn child is indeed often as much in the right as its nurse, and, despite of its injudicious treatment, in after life becomes not unfrequently one of the choice spirits of our race.

Such are only a few of the principles essential to be known in nursery training, an ignorance or neglect of which will be found to have developed habits that must be eradicated when a child comes under the influence of a school trainer,—a process which requires no less skill and patience than the original formation of good ones. This, indeed, is the most ungracious and disagreeable part of his duty, requiring an amount of self-training and self-denial that few men can boast of possessing. And smaller still is the number of those who bring to the
task any of that artistic skill deemed so essential even in the mechanical professions. The mere artist in painting has a long term of apprenticeship to go through to obtain an acquaintance with the paraphernalia of his art: the science of optics is called in to aid him in the admixture of his colours, the mathematics to assist him in drawing perspectively; models, and masters, and instructions, are not wanting to complete his information on every point; and all this to gratify a mere taste, and to cultivate a very laudable, but insubstantial pursuit; while the teacher, the great moral painter, whose works must all endure for eternity, for better or for worse, has yet but scanty opportunities afforded him of arriving at anything like perfection in his art.
CHAPTER VI.

Not half a century has yet elapsed since an idea was very generally entertained in this country, that anything like an intellectual education for the humbler classes was a matter of very doubtful propriety. A monopoly of the higher fruits of intellect, as well as of power, was confined to the aristocracy; and, as knowledge is power, an exclusive possession of the one was equivalent to a retention of the other. It was not, therefore, to be expected that those in authority should have any strong desire to diffuse knowledge among the people. But it poured in upon them from other sources, and, instead of passing downwards to the lower classes, improved methods of education, like most other moral improvements, first took root among them, and are every day bearing fruit upwards. When the delusive excitement under which all classes laboured during the Napoleon wars, had passed away with the return of peace, the light of truth and the love of freedom pervaded the minds of the people, and led them to regard themselves as something higher in the scale of creation than the mere automata of a government. A spirit of moral and religious inquiry was also excited, and more enlarged views of the relative duties between man and man were elicited. In consequence of this a desire for knowledge increased, and led
the people to suggest modes not only of improving themselves, but of moralising and enlightening the neglected poor around them. And in the van of this heaven-directed movement, as in all others of any real value, the banner of religion is found unfurled. It was a sense of the moral destitution of the children of the poorer classes, that induced Mr. Raikes of Gloucester, Mr. Fox of London, and other founders of Sunday-schools, to give the first impulse to that benevolent movement. But their early attempts only served to show the vastness of the work they had undertaken. A mass of ignorance was found to pervade the lower orders, that even the rapid spread of Sunday-schools was utterly unable to remove, or to reach. Enough was done, however, to draw down upon the originators of these schools the ire of interested parties. But the more they were persecuted the more the good work flourished; and a foundation of morality being thus laid, a more intellectual edifice arose in the erection of increased numbers of day-schools, and improved modes of instruction. To the formation of Sunday-schools, therefore, may be traced a second revival of letters in this country, and a new intellectual era, even as to the Reformation we are indebted for the first, and a new religious epoch. And not unlike the Reformation in another point, was the persecution these schools sustained at the hands of those opposed to them.

The two most prominent names in connexion with popular education, are those of Joseph Lancaster and Dr. Andrew Bell. The former, a member of the society of Friends, and the son of a private soldier, moved by a benevolent feeling towards the neglected children around his father's dwelling in the Borough Road, Southwark, opened a school, and fitted it up at his own cost, and mostly with his own hands, in which he assembled about
ninety children. This was in 1798, a period of public distress as well as of public ignorance; and as necessity is said to be the mother of invention, in this instance a remarkable invention was certainly the result. He found it impossible to give all his attention to the crowds of children who came in upon him, and he was too poor to hire the assistance of others; when perhaps some ideas of the "marshalled host" received from his father, suggested the famous monitorial plan, afterwards identified with his name and system of teaching. Soon after this, he attracted the attention of the Duke of Bedford; and in 1805 he had an audience with George the Third, who on that occasion uttered the memorable words, "I wish that every poor child in my dominions may be able to read the Bible."

From 1807 to 1811, it is said, Lancaster travelled over the kingdom well nigh 7000 miles, and lectured to nearly 50,000 persons; and the result of his labours are the very many Lancasterian or British Schools, now established throughout the country, and the central institution of the British and Foreign School Society, which unites and aids them all.

Almost contemporaneously with this effort of Lancaster, (the priority of which, indeed, has been disputed,) and by way of honourable retaliation, a parallel movement was set on foot, and a convenient organ for the purpose was found in Dr. Bell and the Madras system. Hence arose the National School Society. But such an institution cannot with accuracy be called national any more than the former. It is simply, as every one knows, a well-intentioned scheme to teach the doctrines of religion and morality, with a sprinkling of secular instruction to children belonging to the church. This society, however, though it can never be commensurate with the wants
of the country, has also effected, within its own sphere, a vast good.

The British and Foreign School Society, and the National Society, are therefore the only regularly organised schemes for conducting the popular education of the country; but unfortunately they are inherently of so dissimilar a character as to preclude all hopes of their ever acting in concert for one object.

Another and a novel feature of modern education, is the more recent formation of Infant Schools. These seem to derive their origin from the Pastor Oberlin, who appointed teachers in each commune of the Ban de la Roche, and paid them at his own expense. He also procured rooms where children from two to six years of age might be instructed and amused. It is to the honour of Mr. Robert Owen, that, with all his errors, he was the first Englishman to establish an Infant School in this country. Lord Brougham also devoted much of his influence and talents in forwarding the same cause; and Mr. Wilderspin has laboured more than any other, in advocating and founding such establishments. Mr. Wilderspin, however, claims too much credit for his improvements in these schools; for, like many other inventors, he has simply introduced old ideas under new names. As an instance of this, he lays claim to the invention of the *arithmeticon*, an instrument consisting of a number of balls in a frame of wire, for teaching children to count. This instrument was described in a work on arithmetic by Mr. Friend some sixty years ago, and is, in fact, the same in principle as the *abacus* of the Romans.

To no one, however, is the cause of early education more indebted for an impulsive movement, than to the amiable but melancholy Swiss, Henry Pestalozzi. In his case, too, as in that of Joseph Lancaster, necessity,
that stern instructress, prompted many of his best plans. He was born at Zurich, in 1745, of poor but respectable parents. A deep dissatisfaction with existing modes of education gave a stimulus to his inquiries; and being himself much a disciple of nature, he reduced his own experience to practice, in the work of instructing others. Having selected about fifty pupils from the very dregs of society, he formed his own house into what might rather be called an asylum than a school, in which these children were provided with food, clothing, and instruction. His object was national, and he desired to show the State how the poor might educate themselves. His plans, however, were defeated; but the beneficial results of his experience are still before the world; and his method of oral instead of book instruction, of realities instead of signs, will form part of every enlightened system of instruction while the world stands.

Since the days of these pioneers in the cause of popular instruction, and by the improvements of others upon their suggestions, light has been streaming in from many sources; and philosophic minds have bent to the task of methodising those principles, and reducing them into the tangible form of a science. But while enlightened modes have been thus elicited, and an apparatus formed so adequate for raising the tone of morals and intelligence through the country, a vast hiatus yet remains to be filled up, in the practical application of these means to the wants of the community. The best instruction is to be had; but the people have it not. The sun shines high in the heavens, but darkness broods over the earth; and the fountains of knowledge are pouring abroad their waters, but the land mourneth and is desolate.

If the conviction, even at the present day, were universal, that the poorer classes ought to be educated, this
anomaly, of course, would gradually disappear. But this is far from being the case. Three classes of opinions, or rather of feelings, seem to pervade the public mind on this point. There is a large, and it is hoped, an increasing body, who wish to educate the people for the people's own advantage; aware that there is no evil that may not be dreaded from a state of ignorance, and no real good that may not be expected from an enlightened community. Another party proceed to the work of educating the poor by compulsion rather than choice, and who would do nothing of the sort, if without some such effort they could equally retain their station and social influence. And a third party, more honest indeed, but still less benevolent, openly decry every attempt to educate the humbler classes. The existence of this party is no chimera. "It is impossible," says the assistant poor-law commissioner, Edward Twisleton, Esq., in a late report, "to shut one's eyes to the fact, that a certain portion of the upper and middling classes harbour a rooted distrust of any plan for the education of the poor. . . . Amongst many small farmers, and some of the gentry, unwillingness to educate the poor is openly defended by argument; and a merchant of a sea-port town gravely assured me, not long ago, that an agricultural labourer was very little above a brute, and that to educate him would merely have the effect of rendering him dissatisfied with his situation in life." While such a diversity of feeling and opinion exists, therefore, it is plain no united universal effort can be expected, either of a national or social nature, sufficient to meet the exigencies of the whole case. That it may tend, in some small degree, to harmonise these conflicting opinions, by disseminating more widely clear views of what education really is, is a principal end the writer has had in view in committing to paper
the preceding and following remarks. It is as necessary to have an acquaintance with the remedy as the disease; and before a uniformity of opinion can be obtained regarding certain modes of educating the people, the principle at issue must be analysed and understood.

There are now several Normal Schools in the country. The Glasgow Normal Seminary; the General Assembly's Normal School at Edinburgh, or Sessional School; the British and Foreign School Society's Model and Normal School, Borough-road, Southwark; the National Society's Central Model School, Westminster; the Training School, at Battersea, with others. But before proceeding to say a word or two regarding these, I would beg to call attention for a moment to what must surely have struck many as a remarkable feature in the case. If the object of a Normal School be to set up a standard for a correct mode of teaching and inculcating scientific principles, regarding the best means of governing the minds and habits of the young, such institutions must be necessary for all classes of society, the rich as well as the poor. Human nature is the same in all ranks of life; and the right government of the intellect, and morals, and physics of our common nature, all depends upon the application of the same right principles. But these and all other model schools in the country are designed as nurseries for teachers to the poorer classes of society only; no similar institution has yet arisen to train masters for the higher schools, and tutors to the families of the rich. Connected with the Glasgow Normal School, indeed, a "private seminary" was instituted some years ago, to which from the highness of the fees children of the wealthier classes only were eligible, and this formed a sort of model school, in which the higher branches were taught upon the same great principles that
were in operation in the public schools. But even this was given up, or merged into a preparatory collegiate school having no connexion with the public Normal Institution, except occupying one or two of the halls of the building. At first sight, one should say, the cause of this was, that no such institutions were needed for supplying the superior schools with masters; otherwise, as a lack of means to support them could not be urged, they would have been in existence. A conclusion is here drawn, however, from only one premiss, for although they are not in existence, it may be easily proved that they are much needed. If teaching be an art, and a difficult one,—and few will deny this,—it must also be granted, that, like every other art, it can only be acquired by practice. But where do our higher teachers and tutors acquire the practice of this art? Certainly not at Oxford and Cambridge! or any other inferior college or school throughout the country; and it has already been shown that the mere reading about educational systems, or seeing them in operation, is practically useless. The only conclusion must, therefore, be, that whatever art such instructors attain must be self-acquired, and that, too, at the expense of the moral and intellectual havoc of those juvenile minds upon which they first begin to operate and experiment. Of course, as any person of ordinary intelligence may teach himself an art, and acquire a greater or less degree of dexterity in it, according to his natural abilities and application; so may any one gain an aptitude for teaching, and the moral governance of children, without attending a Normal School. But he cannot do this without first **experimenting** upon children, and without the children being mentally and morally the worse for such a process. It might as well be expected that an artist, on his first attempt to paint, would pro-
duce a correct picture, and never spoil a sheet of paper in his life. The mind of a child, in this respect at least, is a *tabula rasa*, and the blemishes first made upon it by the experimenting teacher are just about as indelible as the misapplied colouring on the material of the painter. It might rather, perhaps, be called a photogenic process, in which similar surfaces presented to the same object under different influences, will carry off very different impressions of that object. A teacher, in the case supposed, is the archetype from whom the impression proceeds; but it depends not a little upon the nature of the medium through which that impression passes, whether a correct likeness or a caricature may be formed, and, consequently, whether the receiving *material* be improved or damaged.

But though the human mind is a recipient of impressions—and indeed the very terms denoting its capacity of thus submitting to foreign influences are scarcely metaphorical—it is not always, like wax, to retain facsimiles of them. The perceptive faculties may be morbidly sensitive or callously obtuse, or ranging anywhere between an extreme quickness and impenetrability of apprehension. In the former instance, an active fancy will not only catch up its ideas at once, but throwing around them certain embellishments of its own, give to the judgment more than the original thoughts of a teacher. Or his language, the medium through which the ideas pass, may be too dazzling for the mind's eye, thus impressing upon it an equally exaggerated picture. The mental vision, through the too much light of fancy, will be dazzled and the judgment darkened. In both cases, there may be a union of the real with the ideal; some truth and some fiction: there may even be a beautiful picture, but no true likeness; and,
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to form correct impressions, the whole must either be rubbed out or chastened down.

It is not difficult, therefore, to see that the mental fabric is itself injured in the process. If clear and just conceptions on any subject be not obtained, the judgment will draw erroneous conclusions, and, as from these, other opinions will be arrived at equally fantastic, like the bend given to a sapling, this tortuous mode of judging in infancy may, if persevered in, be confirmed into a fatal habit in mature years. The imagination will, in this case, be overtrained, and reason left to grope its way into light through the mists of a romantic speculation. Much easier it is to captivate the fancy than to educate the judgment. The former is generally lively and the latter inert. An exuberance of apprehension must therefore frequently be curtailed, and many loose conjectures set aside before a direct appeal be made to reason. The mind must be denuded of this glittering tinsel, and an exposed surface presented to catch the rays of truth so as to fix down a true impression.

Or, on the other hand, there may be an obtuseness of perception, requiring all the light and colouring of fancy to portray the simplest idea. An artificial surface must then be prepared to quicken the mind's perception so as to retain an impression long enough to sink into the understanding. On such a material, even the broad outlines of a picture can with difficulty be drawn. Its colouring must be stronger than nature, and its dimensions exaggerated before it can be perceived. The fancy must be enlightened by the contemplation of some analogous and kindred idea, a reflection of which may illustrate the darker shades of the picture and impress the understanding itself. And if it be thus difficult to delineate a rude sketch from nature, how
much more art and skill are necessary not only to fill up and give a prominence to the same picture, but to depict the minuter shades and details of an image whose archetype is a mere \textit{ens rationis}—a creation of the mind! If, in its absence, it be difficult to describe the size, form, and proportions of the commonest visible object, how much more so to explain, not only its concrete qualities and uses, but these abstractedly, and even compound ideas and reflections from them! Simple and concrete terms must be used, and the description worked into the mind by reiterated efforts to impress an idea of the bare object; while its qualities and reflections, like the perspective and fore-shortening of a print, must be measured and compared with those of other visible objects or \textit{known} ideas to be apprehended. On such a mind, a knowledge of the uses of many objects can only be impressed by seeing them used, and of their qualities by the other external senses, while it is almost entirely incapable of being brightened up to anything deserving the name of \textit{reflection}. The fabric receives no polish, but presents a dull hard surface to the moral painter, often defying all his efforts to imprint a mere outline.

Yet, impenetrable as it may be to receive just and entire impressions, it is not so to admit erroneous and partial views. If a whole picture is not drawn, some members and lineaments of it may be: and the mind filled with these unfinished fragments can only resemble the pages of some initiatory lesson book in drawing. If the mind cannot embrace general views, it conceives limited and distorted notions; and as the judgment will form conclusions from any premises, from such partial data, delusive reflections and opinions only can arise, thus multiplying the errors without training the powers of reason. Nature without is misrepresented within;—
the impressions have either passed through a false medium, or the surface has not been properly adapted to receive them, and it had almost been better that no artistic delineation had been thus attempted. A concrete mind, like the latter, should be as naturally educated; otherwise, like a forced plant, it will only bring forth a spurious fruit. A quick intellect, like the former, should almost be permitted to grow by itself, or even retarded, else the excess of its inherent fecundity may consume its own vitality. The precocity of the mind may exhaust the functions of the body.

Let no one think this is a wire-drawing of the matter, figurative though it be. Few parents, even with all their anxiety, calculate aright the immense influence, for good or for evil, that a teacher exercises over his pupil. The child's mental and moral character insensibly assimilate to those of his preceptor; for the mere power of imitation would impress upon the child a corresponding character to his tutor's, were no attempt made by a single precept to fashion that character. Whatever might be the model, so, in general, would be the copy, for such is the process of nature. But when a wrongly-directed artificial course of preceptive discipline intervenes, the natural character of the tutor is veiled, and a similar artificial covering thrown around that of the pupil. It is not a transcript of the former's own thoughts and feelings which is communicated, but certain abstractions of moral science, appealing to the understanding; and the conduct of the latter is too apt to be the offspring of the mere forms and framework of morality, rather than the warm but well-regulated impulses of the heart. A picture is copied rather than the living original. So that, after all, the great and difficult art in the business of education is simply to become artless, and to return to nature.
But it may be asked, Of what use, then, is a normal school—an institution professedly for the purpose of inculcating the principles of an art in training? I reply, that to return to nature, even in our own actions, requires some art, therefore more is required to guide the actions of others naturally. It is often an effort of art to become natural in manners—how much more so in morals! There must be an acquaintance with the powers of the infant mind to prepare them for the reception of impressions, and the skill of art to make these impressions natural. How many of the laws of nature have been undiscovered, and, so far as man is concerned, useless, until science developed and art applied them! The art of living well is to live in harmony with the laws of nature; but these laws must themselves first be ascertained before the art of obeying them can be prescribed. The point is, first to discover what nature teaches, and to teach accordingly. She furnishes the science of education, and man deduces thence its art. But though art arises thus out of nature, it is no less its province to guide and assist her developments upon principles entirely artificial. The daguerreotype is an artifice to make nature delineate herself; but a knowledge of her laws regarding the properties of light and certain chemical ingredients was first given by nature, and merely guided into action by art. Painting is art imitating nature; but photography is nature artificialised: and according to the degree of knowledge she communicates to art as her guide, will be the perfection of her delineations. There is nothing natural in artistic painting, of which it is the highest praise to say it has produced an exact resemblance of nature. A photogenic picture is an emanation from nature herself. It is, therefore, the perfection of art to return to nature, and guide rather than imitate her manifestations.
In like manner the art of training is a natural art. It is not so much an imitation of nature without, as a guiding and development of nature within. Mental instruction is a process of copying external nature; but mental training is the art of producing original pictures; creating a beau-ideal of nature. Moral instruction is the art of exhibiting conduct pictured out in precepts, or examples; but moral training is the art of guiding and unfolding the natural conduct itself. Teaching is the streaming in of light upon the mind, and filling it with natural images; but training is a preparing of the mind and placing it in harmony with external objects to enable it to retain and recombine these images. As, therefore, it is necessary to understand and practise the principles of photography to produce correct natural pictures, so is it in training, to train naturally.

A normal school, then, is a moral daguerreotype, an apparatus for concentrating the scattered rays of knowledge, regarding the natural and moral laws, and bringing them to bear upon the actual purposes of life. The science of education consists in a knowledge of these laws; and its art, in practising the best modes of rendering them efficacious in developing the faculties of a human being. The alumni of such a seminary are, therefore, the students and the artists of nature; and it is only those who approximate to this standard of simplicity that are in proportion qualified to be trusted with the education of any one, rich or poor. It is no uncommon thing to hear of the poet, the painter, or the sculptor of nature, and such epithets entitle them to rank among the highest of the profession; and if it be difficult for them to descend to this simplicity, it is equally so for the teacher, and equally does he excel in his art who is able to do so. I say descend, for it is a descent, though it places the
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artist, or the teacher, himself on a high eminence above his competitors; and before any one asserts that it is an easy matter to be natural in teaching, let him reflect what is meant by the term. Let him think of the difference, in this respect, there is between the man and the boy. What a highly abstractive atmosphere the former lives continually amidst, while the latter is only emerging from the darkness of chaotic materialism! With the one, names and ideas, thoughts and fancies, are often more prominent than substantial objects; conventional customs and social forms more powerful than natural feelings, and manners more important than morals. An artificial character has in a manner become natural to him; and it is something unnatural to divest himself of it, and return to the concretions and substantialities of nature, but which he must do before he put himself on a level with the boy.

Now, a knowledge of such principles, with many others, or at least skill in practising them, should be considered indispensable in any one who emerges from a normal seminary to teach the very poorest classes of children. But for such a course of training those who are to manage the education of noblemen and gentlemen's sons and daughters, no provision is made at all. If a scion of one of these families falls sick, the parent calls in the skilful and trained physician, whose reputation has been acquired by a long course of study and practice, having for their object the chemistry of nature in its relation to the human frame. He does not employ the mere chemist, eminent though he be in simples and compounds, analyses and syntheses. It is the medical practitioner, not the chemical philosopher, that he knows is best acquainted with the healing art. But when he wants a tutor for the same son, he applies to Oxford or Cambridge, and inquires
of the Regius Professor, who last carried the highest honours of his college. If he is a Bachelor or Master of Arts, such is reckoned a sufficient qualification to enable him to discharge the duties of a tutorship. Yet though his mind may be filled with all the lore of antiquity, and all the science of modern times, he is not on that account one whit the better qualified for the task to which he has been selected. Nay, more, the high eminence he has gained is only a collateral proof that he is less qualified. His own mind, amid the complexities of mathematics, and the subtleties of logic, must be drawn far away from the simplicity necessary to communicate elementary knowledge to young children, and the distance vast indeed, between his own and the unsophisticated mind of the pupil upon whom he has been chosen thus to experiment. To such a person, indeed, the monotonous drudgery of teaching the mere elements of knowledge is often painful in the extreme. Having no specific knowledge of any art in training, he wants the power necessary to break down his own acquirements, and turn them to account in educating children. The labour may be immense, but the result fruitless. He may exhaust his own energy and patience, but the task be still unperformed. He has to wade through the depths of his own learning before he effects a landing on common ground with his pupil. He forgets the rude condition of the boy's mind, and appeals to it in terms as unintelligible as the ideas he is attempting to explain; and as he can perceive no progress on the part of his pupil, he most probably will relapse into a state of careless indifference regarding his work altogether, ascribing his ill success to the stupidity of his charge, or to anything but a want of method in himself. Besides, as the duties of a tutorship are so often undertaken by collegians from hard necessity, or the hope of gaining
patronage, they must be but superficially performed. It is made a stepping-stone to something better, and, like a stepping-stone, its duties are trampled upon, while the mind is busily engaged in quest of obtaining a higher and more eligible position in society. They are performed rather to please the patron than to benefit the pupil, whose temper and disposition are much less studied than the whims and caprices of the former, or, if studied, it may only be as a means of gaining an ascendancy over the mind of the parent.

The same erroneous principle which is here spoken of guides the selection of masters for all public schools of the better classes. It is the talent of the individual that procures him the situation. If a Latin or Greek master be wanted to teach the mere elements of these languages in a grammar school, the profound scholar is fixed upon, he whose memory is best stored with the customs, laws, and manners of ancient Greece and Rome, the history of their battles and conquests, their superstitions and mythologies, and who can himself best translate and write their beautiful but dead languages. The amount of his own abstract knowledge in ancient literature is taken as a proof of his skill in communicating its elements, and the length of time taken to acquire this knowledge held as a guarantee of his fitness for an art to which he has devoted no time. Or, if a mathematical master be required, the fortunate student at Cambridge is the successful candidate. It is seldom suspected that his high qualities will scarcely ever be needed in the situation he is to fill. His aptitude for imparting knowledge is seldom taken into account, or thought of only as a secondary matter. Now, such qualifications may indeed render him eligible as a professor, where less art is necessary in teaching, because he would have to operate upon
more matured intellects; but for elementary and juvenile grammar and other schools, the mere attainments of the master are secondary pre-requisites. If he is a person of the most ordinary attainments, and able to communicate all he knows, he is a most successful teacher indeed. The successful prize-taker at Oxford, or senior wrangler at Cambridge, would never, in all probability, communicate half so much. The abstruse mind of a deep student can have but little sympathy with the intellectual weaknesses of ordinary humanity, much less with the wayward dispositions and eccentric freaks of light-hearted children. Let any one read Sir W. Scott's "Dominie Sampson," and he will there see no overdrawn picture of a specimen of this class. It is evident, that, with all that individual's kind and affectionate manner, his profound learning, and however much Lucy Bertram excelled in the "tongues," and her lost brother might also have done, the chasm was no less "prodigious" between his own abstract and absent intellect and the mind of his pupils, than his unwieldy body was greater than theirs. And Sir W. Scott's example and memorable opinion, in the selection of a governess for his own daughters, is a much better testimony still. A young lady "whose temper and disposition" would be in harmony with the children's, were supreme qualifications in his estimation. He cared little about what were usually called "attainments."

But the strangest part of the anomaly is, that, from these qualifications alone, coupled with a certain degree of clerical rank, is a tutor often selected to teach the mere rudiments of English,—an example of which, if it be not a merely nominal appointment, was lately given to the world in the choice of a preceptor for a pupil of the highest rank in the country. For such a charge, it certainly was not talent but tact that was wanted; not
deep learning, but facility in communicating its elements; not dignity, but playfulness of manner; not the precepts, but the guidance of morality. A man near sixty, however learned and amiable, can have but little sympathy, either mentally or morally, with a child not six, the formation of whose character will therefore be left virtually to the nursery governesses around him, and the menials who tend his physical wants. However well his manners may be regulated by courtly etiquette, the early development of his moral faculties will be in the power of servants, and take place most rapidly under the guidance of those whose active duties are of a different kind. Before he can discern the difference in the form of his alphabetical characters, his own character will have assumed a more definite form in the eyes of others. His mental and moral education will then formally commence under the most competent instructors that can be had, but whose moral effect being partly eradicative, will be half useless: An undoing of much must take place, before anything can be done. The best of precepts, and most illustrious of examples, will be exhibited for imitation, but if any contrary tendency may have been developed by previous nursery treatment, these will fail entirely to correct it. It may be softened by the breath of love, and moulded in a different direction by the most assiduous care, but the elasticity of the habit will cause it ever to return, and though modified, will retain a place in his nature, until the sceptre drop from his hands.

It is true, neither the political nor moral destinies of the country depend upon the chance character that may thus be formed. Fortified by a bulwark of laws and liberty, the British constitution is not dependent upon the caprice of a sovereign's will, but of how much moral influence is that will the source! and in the disposition
and character now forming in the future sovereign of these realms, may already have been implanted, much that may ultimately retard or advance the social happiness and prosperity of his empire. A king is the fountain of honour to all his subjects. How necessary, then, to cleanse and prepare the first springs which compose that fountain, that it may flow forth from the bosom of nature pure and unadulterated! He gives a tone not only to the manners, but the morals of those around him which often vibrates to the lowest depths of society, and if struck in unison with the pure morals of nature, will be caught up and re-echoed universally; but if pitched upon no higher key than a mere political morality, can only awaken a hollow response in the adamant breast of an interested faction.

While, therefore, such means are now at command for moulding and bringing to perfection the character of our young prince, and so much depending upon the result, it is to be hoped that no prejudice will stand in the way of bringing to the task all the light that science has evolved, and art can practise, in conducting his education. No want of sympathy would exist between the prince and the peasant, the ruler and the ruled, if all were alike the subjects of a moral government. On this, as a basis, should rest the education of every individual, as well as the laws, institutions, and government of every country.

In the selection of governesses, a similar error prevails in judging of their qualifications. Among the higher ranks, it is generally young ladies belonging to decayed families that are preferred. So far, therefore, as forming the manners of the pupil is concerned, this will afford a pretty sure guarantee of their fitness. Adversity often improves the manners, as well as refines the character of
its victims. Its cold breath may chill the more ardent aspirations of the mind, and strip off many of the mere blossoms of outward accomplishment, but it as often leaves behind the richer fruits of virtue and true refinement of soul. As, therefore, gentleness of manner and disposition is indispensable in the governess to educe kindred qualities in the pupil, a young lady whose birth has given her an opportunity of mixing with the aristocracy, has been under a good system of training for her task. Her general accomplishments, too, may almost be taken for granted. And, indeed, the female character is naturally more refined than that of the opposite sex; and, if ordinarily educated, any young woman takes more readily to the duties of instruction, than a man. She has a closer sympathy with the feelings and dispositions of children, naturally gliding into their little ways, and leading them by the soft cords of affection, more than the stern airs of command. Less, therefore, of art may be necessary to fit a female teacher for her duties, so far as moral training is concerned. But this very softness and pliability in herself, rendering her own character a fitter mould for that of her pupil, requires on that account more mental enlightenment to guide the impression. Her patience and better temper may proceed from less mental acumen, and if they form a better disposition in the pupil, it may be at the expense of a vast want of mental development.

What, therefore, is most needed in this case, is an improved system of mental training for herself, and a higher tone of female education generally. What are called the "accomplishments," consist principally of drawing, music, and one or two foreign languages, all of which, as branches of study, are well enough adapted to the female character. But much more than accom-
accomplishment is required in woman. She has a "reasonable soul," whose wants cannot be satisfied by the gratification of mere taste: more than the desires of the palate must be studied in administering to the wants of the body; the food must be digestive and nutritious, to communicate vigour to the frame, and the perceptive faculties of the mind must imbibe not only ideas of beauty, but of truth, that the judgment may digest an aliment suited to its spiritual wants. Instead of the melody of sweet sound, it desires the harmony of sense; instead of a delicate ear, a correct understanding; instead of the fair proportions and beautiful colouring of objects, it desires to examine their structures, properties and uses, and instead of the mere words of a foreign language, to investigate the history and morals of those who speak it. There is a power in the female mind of penetrating far beneath the mere surface of nature, and a strong desire to do so, beautiful though the surface may appear. It need not quite desert the realms of fancy, for an occasional sojourn in the domains of reason. The former may be its native province, but the latter, though a foreign possession, is equally its own, and a much richer inheritance. It need not cease contemplating the beauties of the flower garden, though it sometimes cull the fruits of the orchard. Neither is the imagination weakened, but strengthened, by an improvement of the understanding. Unless reason, indeed, guide its erratic propensities, a false taste is engendered, and foolish notions entertained. As the health of the constitution is the best foundation of external handsomeness, so is the soundness of the judgment an equally sure guarantee for the beauty and justness of the fancy.

Neither would her affections be diminished, but in-
creased from the same cause. There is a class of feelings unknown to instinct, and the pure offspring of intelligence. A savage mother may regard her child with a passion as intense as a civilised parent; in all the animalism of his nature, may rejoice to see him grow up in strength and beauty, and excel in feats of bodily skill; but how inferior is it to that affection which delights to perceive the unfolding of his mental and moral nature! Without reason, a mother's affection is mere instinct, and in proportion to the cultivation of the one, does the other rise above it. Apart, therefore, from the education of circumstances, it depends upon the manifestation of this feeling whether the child grows up in a state of barbarism, or civilisation, or a being possessing the mingled nature of both. How imperative is it, therefore, that female education should be established upon the principles of reason and nature—that the useful should precede the ornamental, and the rational the imaginative! But in the tyrant laws that govern society, there must too often be a sacrifice of mental research to mere accomplishment, of feeling to artifice, and of substance to shadow; so that an education in accordance with these conventionalities is not so much art developing nature, as a thing entirely artificial.

So little, therefore, of pure nature being required in conducting such an education, the most amiable and intellectual governess is not on that account always the best adapted for the charge. The parent wants her daughter to be a fine musician, a fine drawer, to dress and dance well, to have finished manners, and a fashionable speech, whatever be her natural genius for any of these acquirements—in a word, not only to be artificially accomplished, but superficially educated. An outward display must be made, at whatever inward sacrifice; and as
no power on earth can create genius or taste where it is not, the governess fails to satisfy, and is dismissed. Or the parent's unguided affection in the early years of her child may have induced a disposition as unsuited to the moral guidance of a governess, as its natural inaptitude for the accomplishments. In either case, whether it be the omnipotence of custom that demands compliance with its laws at whatever cost of nature, or that unreasoning instinct that leads a parent so often to take the part of her child, against the necessary restraint of the governess, the latter is placed in a false and hopeless position.

This, indeed, is only one of a thousand causes, that operate unfavourably between these parties. My present object in stating it is to show the much greater necessity that exists for improving the character of female education, than that of the female educator; that it is not so much a fault of that meek and gentle class of beings who from hard necessity conduct it upon erroneous principles, as in society tolerating the principles themselves. The dawn of a brighter day, however, has here also sprung up, and several institutions are now opening throughout the country for raising the tone of female education. Much they were wanted, and much success may they have. It must therefore be a pleasure to every one to read the prospectuses of such seminaries as those in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and London, for educating females upon a principle that nature herself has taught, and for teaching the art of communicating these principles to others.
CHAPTER VII.

On the whole, therefore, the rich seem much in the rear of improvement in having no fixed principles to guide them in selecting instructors for their children, and a vast field of usefulness is here presented to them in establishing institutions for the purpose of qualifying such instructors. A want of this kind is indeed but a modern desideratum, which time will doubtless supply. It has arisen out of an advanced state of civilisation and intelligence, but affords a suitable fulcrum for an Archimedean power in still further developing the universal mind.

The rise of all the professions—the army, the church, the bar, commerce, literature, and the press—in a similar manner, may be traced to the different wants of society at different periods of the world: each marking a distinct era in the moral history of our race. Like the forming habits of an individual, the separate principles that compose these professions were long in being consolidated into a system, so as to guide the universal conduct. But, when formed, society naturally falls back upon them as a bulwark of defence against the physical anarchy of nature. They are thus the breast-works of civilisation and refinement; but the march of intellect is aggressive in its object. It carries on an incessant war against the sensualism of nature, and though for a time it may entrench itself
behind these barriers, it is ever ready to sally forth and raise a new encampment in the enemy's country. In such a crusade, too, it has more to encounter from the prejudices of half civilisation than the entire barbarism of nature. In the former case it has to fight its way through the mists of error before it can subdue the reason and will, while in the latter it has only to appeal to self-interest to carry the inclinations captive. Thus it is in a country such as this, so much under the influence of early habits, yet feeling the want of a higher state of social happiness, the pioneers who would go forth and establish the outworks of moral improvement, are not so much retarded by the difficulties of the undertaking without, as fettered by those within the time-hallowed precincts of custom. Within these circumscribed limits their operations must be confined, otherwise it matters little how beneficial they may be in themselves; society will either reject the boon or callously wait until it is forced upon its acceptance. At all events, it gives little assistance in forwarding the work or encouraging the labourers who thus step out of the accustomed sphere to reap such benefit. Each of these must stand alone and brave the difficulties from without and the neglect from within, until he gains a footing for himself, and draws around him some equally-devoted spirits, whose united efforts give their position a commanding aspect. Then it is that society gives a tardy acquiescence to their plans, and, finding the advantages they confer, at length supports them.

Such is the case at the present day with regard to normal schools. Their abstract utility is pretty generally acknowledged, and their want felt; but the habit of doing what has always been done is still too strong for the adoption of any new principles, however well founded
in reason and truth. Time, indeed, has not yet been given fully to mature these principles, to establish their position as laws, whose existence can be traced through their effects upon society. It requires a stronger faith than the evidence of sight to admit them in practice. The individual understanding may acknowledge their necessity, but the national mind does not yet sufficiently feel it. The latter looks more to results, the former to causes. Yet a want of normal instruction, that is, of training nature in harmony with her own laws, is a social and natural want, and, in proportion as it comes to be felt, will society look about for the best means of satisfying it. It will then be seen that something more than the innate qualifications of an individual are necessary in the training art—that though he may be able to teach himself the most abstruse sciences, he may be unable to communicate to others their simplest elements; and, although his own moral conduct be unexceptionable, his ignorance of the laws upon which it depends may disqualify him for educing the same conduct in others. Nothing but tangible evidence, however, will satisfy the public mind on this point, and no better proof can be afforded than by adducing one or two parallel cases from the other professions.

A young man intending to study as a surgeon, or a physician, enters college, and graduates, perhaps, in philosophy and literature; but he is not, on that account, deemed the more eligible to practise surgery or medicine. He has a course of special training to go through. He has to attend hospitals and infirmaries, and to witness the experienced operator performing his manipulations; by-and-by he puts to his own hand, and applies the knife under proper direction and guidance; lectures, and
books, and subjects, and models, and diagrams, are all at his command; and, after a proper time spent in such training, he undergoes a strict examination regarding his theoretical and practical knowledge of the art he is about to profess, and, if qualified—as even some are found not to be, with all these opportunities—he receives his diploma, and becomes a surgeon or a physician.

The student for the Church graduates in philosophy, but neither is he yet qualified for the pulpit. A special course of theological training also awaits him. His own character for piety must be attuned to the sacred work—his knowledge of church history considerable—his homilies display an acquaintance with the subjects of which they treat—his skill in biblical criticism acute—the style of his compositions adapted to the capacity of the ignorant as well as the learned—and his usefulness and fitness thus guaranteed as far as human observation can reach. Preaching, however, is but another form of teaching; and even here there is need of improvement, and many a divinity student has expressed the benefit he has derived in attending a normal school, to study the modes there taught of simplifying instruction, that he might adopt the same principle in levelling his discourse to the understanding of an audience. How many learned words and stereotyped phrases are used in the pulpit, which, to the majority of a congregation, are mere sound! But, with exceptions, the routine of clerical study is artistic and special, and well fitted to train the novitiate for the practice of his holy calling.

The lawyer has also a long term of special training to undergo. After studying the theory of his profession at college, he attends the chambers of a judicial pleader or conveyancer to benefit by his conversational lectures.
Text books are referred to as records of general principles, which are illustrated by particular cases. The peculiarities of a certain deed or declaration, are pointed out in a model document, and at last the pupil is set to practise what he has learned by *drawing up similar documents himself*.

The preparation for the bar is also special. It may be true, that the vast framework of statutes and precedents which this profession has thrown around the maxims of natural justice, may occasionally prove an evil in individual cases, but, on the whole, it is necessary, as a bulwark of defence for life and property. It is therefore the intricacy of these statutory forms, that induces the necessity of a distinct profession, an attainment of skill in which involves the equal necessity of an intimate and practical acquaintance with its machinery. It is not the knowledge, but the practice, of law that gives success to the practitioner. In conducting a prosecution for the matter of a few pounds' value, what an amount of technical art must often be brought to bear upon it! To impress conviction being the principal object, an appeal to the understanding alone is studied, and in training for the profession, it is that faculty which is chiefly cultivated. The foundation of success must, therefore, be laid not only in a profound knowledge of abstract law, and a vast stock of general information, but in a certain power of laying hold of the most prominent facts and circumstances of a case, and combining these so as best to strike conviction into the minds of a jury. A counsel is thus also a teacher, and the jury his pupils. He instructs them in the merits of his client's case—lays before them certain points and landmarks to guide their minds in a particular direction, and then appeals to their judgment for a verdict in his favour. His opponent, however, endeavours to gain an
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opposite verdict, by leading their minds in a contrary direction, so that forensic pleading is a mental encounter, in which, in a doubtful case, victory generally inclines to the best reasoner. In special pleading, it may not, indeed, be always the great object to present an abstract truth in the clearest light, but the general intention of the profession is to elicit truth, and forward the ends of justice; to attain which important ends, equally important means are thus employed, and an arduous preparatory course of mental training is, therefore, indispensible.

But it is not necessary to look so high for examples illustrating the principle of special training, as those taken from the learned professions. No mechanic or artisan, whose professional skill depends upon a mere manual dexterity, succeeds in his business unless he serves an apprenticeship to it. And the reason is, the formation of a technical habit is not a thing of intuition, but of action. It is not acquired by merely understanding how a thing is done, but by repeatedly doing it. There is a chasm between these two principles, that practice can alone fill up. The former is a mental impression, and the latter a material operation, proceeding from it by an act of volition. The mind is the teacher of the body, but the body is not always either an apt or an obedient pupil. It must frequently be shown how to do some things, before it can do them once properly; but when once done they are more easily repeated, and when several times repeated, the mind ceases altogether to instruct the body, which then performs the actions spontaneously. A young girl, learning a tune on the piano, must first understand all the notes separately, and see where to plant each finger for each note; but having repeatedly played the tune, her fingers mechanically fly over the keys, un-
prompted by the mind, an emanation from which seems almost to become materialised among the nerves of her fingers. But if the nervous system that forms this link between the muscles and the mind, be imperfect or unsound, the communication will be impeded. In this case, however enlightened and willing the mind may be to perform certain acts, these will be counteracted by a derangement of the appropriate nerves. That system must be in healthy unison with the faculties of the mind, and obedient to their impulse, before either a negative or positive habit can be formed, but when formed, that habit leads captive the mind itself. The reason of a drunkard may show him the danger of his vice, yet his nervous system responds not to the warning, but obeys the impulse of a previous habit. The hand of a paralytic man would equally refuse to be plucked from the fire, in obedience to his mere will, as that of a habitual drunkard to refuse the sparkling wine cup within its grasp. The muscles of the former, uncontrolled by the will within, obeys the law of gravitation without; and when the nervous system of the latter has been thus deteriorated, reason ceases to regulate his movements, which just as naturally gravitate towards the means of his own self-destruction, as the hand of the paralytic man. There is thus a sort of magnetism between the material organs of the human frame, and external objects, over which, when cemented by repeated contact, the intellect has but little control. It may, and often does, effect the union, but whether beneficial or not, it is too often powerless in attempting to undo its own work.

There is also much of mechanism in this part of man's nature. In early life he is formed to certain habits—wound up to run a particular course at a certain speed, and however wrong he may afterwards discover that
course to be, he cannot, without doing some violence to his nature, overcome the mortal inertia, and take a different direction. A carriage fitted for one line of road, must be taken off, and have its wheels refitted, to run in another of a different construction; and a man trained up in a certain course of conduct, is unable to get out of it without some external assistance, and cannot pursue a different line without an alteration of the moving springs of that conduct. Or the attraction of his material nature to a certain course must be overcome, as, however much his mind and fancy may be drawn towards another, this mental desire will be all too light to counterbalance the material—the centrifugal force will be overborne by the centripetal.

Thus it is, that in training either to a moral or a professional habit, an education of the physical as well as the mental nature is indispensable. There must be the active hand, as well as the planning head—a mechanical aptitude for the art, as well as an understanding of the science. A person may be theoretically acquainted with every employment, and unable to practise one of them, and that not only in the case of those requiring manual labour, but even such as depend upon an exertion of mind alone. Every profession requires also to be worked by a machinery of art peculiar to itself, and to be able to work that machinery requires the special training of its artisans. Set a watchmaker to construct a cabinet, or a carpenter a watch,—a sailor to manage a war-steed in battle, or a soldier to work a ship in a storm—a physician to conduct a law-suit, or a lawyer to prescribe medicine, and, however much skill each may have acquired in his own profession, it will be found entirely nugatory in conducting any other. Hence it is, that by a special application to the principles
of one profession, it is itself raised to eminence, and brings up with it a class of men skilled in its practice.

Such, then, would also be the condition of education if more systematically condensed into a profession. It would only be those who, upon examination, were found qualified to practise its principles, that would be tolerated as its professors. While moral character and mental attainments would ever command respect on their own account, an additional qualification would be deemed necessary to invest with a professional character. But at present there is no bond of union to connect the scattered elements of its science sufficiently to elicit and bring to perfection the art, and instead of attaining to a knowledge of it by action, it is thought to be entirely gained by intuition. Hence it is, that a preceptor for the rich is an exception to the rule by which the members of other professions are tested. The higher classes do not in general tolerate a lay preacher, call in an empirical doctor, employ an unskilful mechanic; yet they do worse every day; at least they regulate their choice of a preceptor for their children, from qualifications as foreign to those most necessary to a right discharge of his duty, as it would be to decide the fitness of a clergyman from his mathematics, or a physician from his Greek, and therefore they can have no guarantee that he will prove anything better.

It is true, that the individual members of a profession do not always agree in the details of its practice. Two medical men may disagree about the treatment of a particular disease, but the same general principles are acknowledged by all. Nor will their difference, most probably, arise so much from an ignorance of the effects produced by certain remedies as from the peculiar nature of the disease. Special diseases require special cures,
just as particular tempers require extraordinary treatment; but as the bodily functions are governed by invariable laws, a uniform knowledge of these is essential to rectify their derangement, and as the faculties of the moral being are equally uniform in their development, the same general knowledge is necessary to guide them properly. A lengthened experience, arising from an extensive acquaintance with peculiar cases, will therefore give an increase of skill, in the practice of any profession, but a foundation of permanent success must previously be laid in a knowledge of its first and general principles. The inference that obviously arises from this position is, that a strong necessity exists for institutions to train men to the profession of education, as it is a profession on which so momentous consequences depend. Every candid individual must admit that the duties of a teacher are at least as serviceable to society as those of the clergyman or physician. Many, indeed, will affirm, that his office is of more importance than either of these individually, as the proper sphere of his duties comprehends a part of the duties of both, or rather forms a sort of connecting link between them. The physical discipline of education is a preventive of many bodily diseases, superseding, in no small degree, the necessity of a physician in after life; and without a foundation of moral training in infancy, the labours of a clergyman are too often supererogatory. Therefore to endow, or at least to institute, professorships for cultivating the science and art of education, is as indispensable as it is for divinity and medicine. It would, indeed, prove auxiliary to both the latter. And that education is capable of being reduced to a systematic science and a branch of study, may already be seen, though imperfectly developed, in the institutions of which I am about to
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But in those places, the benefits of whatever discoveries are making in the science are all confined to the poor, and though every one must hail these symptoms with delight, it is very evident they would have a much more permanent hold upon society in general, if shared by the wealthier classes, and the great principles of the whole fixed down in some national or public institutions.
CHAPTER VIII.

All the schools mentioned are, on the admission of the parties themselves, imperfect in some points. Yet, if a combination of the plans pursued at each, were adopted in some one institution, it is conceived that a pretty near approach to a correct system of normal training might be the result. So far as schools for the industrious classes are concerned, in point of mental and moral training, the normal school of Glasgow certainly maintains a high rank. By mental training, let it ever be remembered, is meant the discipline and development of mind itself, and teaching it to think. I am not aware of any other school of a similar class, where this is so systematically attended to. The framing of the questions, for the most part, is conducted upon the principle of inductive philosophy, and is as far superior to mere interrogatory and dogmatical teaching, as Lord Bacon's Novum Organum is to the hypothetical philosophy of Aristotle. The mind is led by analogy and illustration to explain its own difficulties. These are not explained gratuitously. The pupil must fight his way to truth from collateral data; and this is a first principle that obtains throughout the Glasgow system in all its departments, namely, a training to action and self-helpfulness in all the faculties of a child's nature. In matters of
science, he is shown how to reason out his own conclusions; in morality, to do good to others, in order to secure happiness to himself; and to become healthy, to exercise his bodily powers, and live in harmony with the laws of nature. To accomplish these all-important ends, certain means are employed of a nature somewhat different from those in use in other normal schools. The master's own mind is the immediate source whence all the children are trained, and hence the greater responsibility of his charge, than that of a monitorial master, who deputes the most difficult part of his duties to others. It is much easier to teach others how to train, than to train personally. Nevertheless, it is in this individual training that the great virtue, as well as chief difficulty, of the art lies.

The peculiar characteristic of this plan, therefore, in its external aspect, is the simultaneous education, by one teacher, of a large number of children assembled in a gallery, and so arranged that each pupil comes immediately under the eye of his instructor. A difficulty occurs here, however, in getting together a class of children of an average status in point of acquirements. But when this is done, and the system itself to some extent effects an equalisation of attainment, a vein of sympathy pervades the minds of all, connecting them together as one, which renders the task of the trainer much easier and more effective than if he were instructing a single isolated pupil.

Nor is this sympathy of feeling less powerful in moralising the conduct and habits. A standard of public opinion is formed by which all their actions are tested; and this moral agency, the presiding mind of the master, if skilled in his duties, may wield with powerful effect. The outward means and opportunities of training
to practical morality are also afforded. The play-ground is not only a theatre for physical exercises and recreation, but the platform of moral action, in which the lessons of the gallery come into practical operation. But neither is this arena perfect without the superintendence of the master. He there watches and encourages the kind deed, and represses the vicious tendency, cultivating the delicate germs of virtue, and pruning the rank shoots of vice. There is also a considerable apparatus for purely physical training, such as the circular swing, &c.; and the mechanical movements and evolutions of going in and out of school, and to and from classes, are superior, but as most of these are in common with other similar institutions, they do not require particular notice. The chief point of difference in these external arrangements, which affects the vitality of the system, is what has just been alluded to in the simultaneous education of numbers, and the immediate contact that takes place between the mind of each individual pupil, and that of the master. In monitorial schools this is not the case; for no monitor who is a mere scholar himself, can be expected to train his class. He may teach it, but he cannot develop their minds on any subject; and such is the prevailing system in all the London normal schools, though in these places, simultaneous instruction is also partially communicated.

In these institutions, however, the moral control over the children seems perfect. The system itself works the school, while the master seems a mere spectator, and yet the ultimate control is vested in him alone. He holds in his hand the reins of government; but, like an easy and tractable steed, the children never feel them. A little boy with the motion of his finger will regulate the simultaneous movement of five hundred children, many
of them no smaller than himself, and be as implicitly obeyed as the master. The principle of subordination to a system is acknowledged and felt by all. Yet no one can enter a monitorial school, without feeling a doubt whether the master ought to allow himself to be a mere spectator of the scene; what is the use of his own teaching powers, if he does not give the children the advantage of them in a more effectual way than merely sustaining order and diligence in the classes? True, he teaches the monitors, and they teach the school, and the discipline of an army is brought forward as an analogy; but, however good military and physical discipline may be in regulating the organic movements of children, it affects but slightly the intellectual and moral training of their minds. The physical discipline of the British army under the Duke of York, was, perhaps, superior to anything ever exhibited by the Duke of Wellington; but one must look at the campaigns of France and Holland, conducted by the former, and compare these with the Peninsula and Waterloo, before estimating aright the superiority of that moral training the latter so successfully infused into his troops. A question, therefore, arises, to what end is this subordination conducive, and what gives spirit and life to that system, of which monitorism is the body? Passive obedience may be either a good or a bad thing according to the end to which it is a means; and a great deal more than compliance with certain forms is necessary to establish character, and develop mind. A school of a certain number of boys is sectioned out into so many classes, over each of which a boy presides, and to whom the essential work of teaching is committed. But not one boy out of fifty can have a sufficient knowledge of the laws of mind to propose suitable training questions, and
cultivate the reflective powers—or patience and assiduity enough, or even authority to stamp virtuous habits. He at the best but exhibits a faint reflection of the master's plan of teaching, and a very feeble impression must be the result. He may hear lessons, ask questions, and explain words, but he can do little more—while much more requires to be done, that no one else but a master can do.

How, then, is this surplus of work to be effected, even by him? In the industrial schools, large numbers of children must necessarily be assembled, and it is impossible for a master to give his individual attention to each pupil, in going from class to class,—so that they must either be classified under monitors, and only partially taught, or a very small part of them receive effectual teaching. This deficiency would of itself, then, naturally suggest the gallery system, by which the largest possible number could be taught simultaneously. But neither is one man sufficient for this continued exertion, and he, on the other hand, must have recourse to monitory assistance, to supplement his deficiency. It seems, therefore, that while both simultaneous and monitory classification have their defects separately, a combination of the two plans might produce the most satisfactory results. But this, again, entirely depends upon the animating principle of either system, separately or conjoined,—upon the spirit that gives vitality to either body.

The Edinburgh Sessional School, considered as an institution for training mind, seems to occupy a middle position between the others. It is likewise monitory in its organisation, and the chief characteristic of its working principle, the explanatory method. It is much in advance of former mechanical systems of teaching by
mere rote, but still it is teaching only. The sense and meaning of what is read, if not understood, is endeavoured to be conveyed in different terms. One word is explained by its synonime, and if that is not sufficient, by another, and the spirit or ideas of the text thus attempted to be unfolded. As most of this duty, however, devolves upon monitors, even were it an efficient mode of instruction, it must still be but imperfectly performed. But it is seldom efficient, even in the best hands. To explain one word by another, where the idea is not given at the same time, is like exchanging one coin for another of the same value, without receiving or even knowing the present use of it. It may increase a stock of words in the memory, but does not communicate an equal number of ideas to the understanding.

Words are not ideas, much less are they things. They are merely the representatives of the latter. Instead, therefore, of explaining one word by another, in an attempt to get at the idea, and thence a knowledge of the object, the process, as nature herself teaches, ought entirely to be reversed. The presence of an object will impress an idea of it, and when this is received, the name should then be communicated, which being either seen or heard, will, in the absence of the archetype, ever afterwards recall that idea. Now every word has a meaning, in some degree different from another, so that one term can never be fully explained by its cognate. The earth is not a globe, neither is a globe a sphere, but the idea under each term is different from the other. The teaching of synonyms, therefore, refers more to analysing the difference than the resemblance of ideas, and is a study for maturer minds. Hence, by this verbal mode of explanation, instead of giving a clearer idea of one thing by the name of another, there is a danger of only
giving two words for one, and no idea at all. The natural course of mental abstraction is upwards, from things to ideas, and from ideas to names. If an idea does not occur by its own name, the object should either be shown, or pictured out clearly, and this many words cannot always do, much less a mere synonyme. This kind of teaching to children, therefore, as has been mentioned, can merely give a variety of expression without clearness of definition; and while, as a whole, the Sessional School exhibits many excellences, these seem to consist more in improvements upon former modes of teaching, than in having adopted, as a basis, the true principles of training.

German writers, in their numerous treatises on education, divide it into three heads—pedagogik, didaktik, and methodik—or science, art, and method. The first comprehends simply a knowledge of its principles; the second, the practice of its art; and the third, certain modes of administering that practice. This seems a just and philosophical division of the subject, as between art and method there is a very necessary distinction, as much so, indeed, as between science and art. Method is as much more mechanical than art, as art is than science. Science is a pure operation of mind; art is that operation physically developed; while method is a certain mode of its development. Without knowledge, art would be imperfect, but, without method, imperfectly manifested. Both art and science are necessary to construct a watch, but two workmen, equally scientific and skilful, may not construct an equally good watch. One may have a better mode of doing certain little things about it, which will consequently be better done, while the same things, done in a different manner, may be worse executed. One artisan, from a certain mode of arranging his instruments,
having everything at hand and in its proper place at the proper time, will accelerate an operation that requires speed, and thus do it better than another who has a confused mode of arrangement. There may also, however, be different modes of doing the same thing equally well. As fine a polish may be given to a surface by holding the polishing instrument in one way as in another, and a thing may be as speedily and well executed by one arrangement of tools as by another; still there must be some correct modes of doing a thing, otherwise it cannot be done correctly. Certain methods of administering the art of education are, therefore, as necessary to efficiency in teaching, as a just knowledge of its principles is to lay a proper foundation for the art.

Now the organisation of a school, whether simultaneous, monitorial, or mixed, comes immediately under the head of method; and in the schools just alluded to, much imperfection necessarily exists from the classes of children educated in them. In any one school there are far too many pupils to receive efficient instruction from one master. If he had no more pupils than he could educate himself, he would need no assistance, but when the numbers go beyond his personal management, he must call in some kind of aid. If it be as good as he can give, the work will, of course, be as well performed; but if not, it must be worse. Now, when that assistance is given by mere boys, it must either be applied to inferior work, or the ordinary work done in an inferior manner. Consequently, monitorism is only the remedy of an evil, which would not exist if each master had only a suitable number of pupils for his own individual management. For this reason, a purely monitorial school can hardly be a proper model-training school, so far, at least, as the intellectual and moral work is concerned;
and unless the head master with companies of the children exhibit, in his own example, a model of the art of mental training, and the students also practise the same model under his eye and directions, even this organic apparatus will be incomplete. So far as the writer is aware, there are no institutions where the monitory system is carried to such perfection as in the Borough-road Training School, and the National Schools at Westminster. It is saying but little of these excellent seminaries, however, to cite them as good examples of a mere system of organisation. Many of the best discoveries in the science and art of training, are there adopted, and they annually disseminate over the country hundreds of well-qualified young men, imbued with a similar spirit of improvement.

The method of education also embraces the arrangement of desks, suitable school apparatus, and all those external appliances, which may differ according to circumstances, but without some proper arrangement of which little good can be accomplished. It also regards the attitude and gait of the master, the command of his features, and the very tones of his voice. From these merely organic arrangements, however, it ascends to the purely intellectual and moral arts of the science, taking cognisance of the best modes of teaching all the branches of study, and of training all the powers of the human being.

In no school does more attention seem to have been paid to the improvement of method in these latter departments than in the village and training schools at Battersea, near London, established and supported chiefly under the auspices of Dr. Kay Shuttleworth, one of the Poor Law Commissioners, whose benevolent exertions have done so much for the cause of education generally. By way of
following up this idea, schools of method have been established in the metropolis, in which instructions are given regarding the best modes of teaching the most essential branches of education. It is not intended to enter into a detail of these branches, or the methods pursued in each; an analysis of a few of them may serve to show the philosophical principles upon which they are based. Of these, the first in order is naturally the art of Reading.
CHAPTER IX.

Reading is a process by which, at a glance, the mind acquires a knowledge of events, past, present, and future. It is thus a condensed mode of gaining knowledge, and being necessarily complicated, requires much time and practice to become available for that purpose. It is looking at nature through a symbolical medium, but unlike hieroglyphical symbols, in which objects and ideas were delineated and conveyed to the mind by the sense of sight, the connexion between language and objects must be traced mentally. Certain marks, or groups of marks, represent particular sounds, which again signalise certain ideas, or mental pictures of nature. These sounds and words have a merely arbitrary value, and, like the paper currency of a country, are of no use unless sanctioned by authority and representing something of intrinsic worth. To read is, therefore, to look at things through the names of their images, by which the mind obtains a secondary reflection merely, and a very faint miniature of nature; and if it can thus obtain a greater number of ideas in a smaller compass than from a hieroglyphical book, these are necessarily much more obscure individually.

The eyes of the understanding must, therefore, be prepared for the task by a maturity of development, and trained to it by much practice. The initiating into
this process also presumes upon a capacity for retaining and comprehending those ideas of which the names are given. These words or names should serve the mind as an index to its knowledge, but unless associated with the correct ideas, they will only darken the judgment; or if not clearly connected with any ideas, they are of no more practical use, in a mental point of view, than a forged note or a false picture. To read without understanding the meaning, is an act of sensation merely, in which the eye informs the ear how certain marks should be sounded, and is a similar process to reading music from notes. Scarcely any mental exertion takes place in this operation, and no benefit is derived beyond gaining possession of an instrument whose uses have yet to be learned. As by a little practice any one may read Greek fluently, and not understand a word of it, so may a child learn to pronounce all the words in English without receiving any ideas from them, there being no necessary connexion between the one and the other. The Greek reader must appeal to a lexicon for his ideas, and combining these with his Greek terms, thus render these latter vehicles filled with thought, whereas before, they were to him mere empty sounds. And the English student must follow a similar course; he must look into his words to see what they contain, otherwise they will only serve as an indication how to enunciate certain vocal sounds, just as the musician is guided by the disposition of crotchet and quaver in the modulation of his tones and the timing of his song. Ideas should, therefore, be communicated simultaneously, or rather antecedently to their names, both oral and written.

Again, words are combinations of elementary sounds, the marks or letters representing which are equally arbitrary, and even of these letters the greater part, namely,
consonants, are also the marks of combined sounds. The voices, or vowels, are the only true elementary sounds, and of these only three, a, e, o, are purely unmixed. These latter require but one conformation of the vocal organs to pronounce them, and no motion in the organs; the other vowels require a double conformation, and are, in fact, a sort of diphthong, requiring two half sounds to make them up, and so on through all the consonants. It is evident that no description of these sounds can convey a just notion to the ear, how they should be enunciated, neither do the names of the characters representing them afford much indication of this. The living voice must pitch the note, and, as far as possible, in doing so the external organs of speech be exhibited in action. These must be imitated and re-echoed by the pupil before he be able to articulate the same sound. This done, the next step is to present to the eye the mark of that sound upon a black board, and to establish a connexion in the mind between them, so that, on the re-appearance of the same mark in future, the eye may inform the ear what particular sound is to be enunciated.

As many letters in the English tongue, however, have several sounds, a difficulty occurs in remembering this distinction, which obtains as much between the different sounds of the same letter as between different letters, and which can only properly be overcome by practice when letters are being formed into words. When all the elementary sounds have been thus acquired and remembered, the synthetic process commences, and two or more sounds are agglutinated into one, forming a monosyllable, which should also be presented to the eye.

By this time the pupil, if he remember the separate sounds of each letter, will be able to combine them him-
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self and pronounce the word. If this word be the name of anything unknown to the pupil, a higher process should now take place,—the object, or a diagram of it, should be exhibited, and a connexion established between the name and the thing. Thus, an object and its written name being seen together and associated in the mind, an idea of the former will afterwards be called up by seeing its name, or the name by seeing the object. A parallel course to this is to make the pupil write or trace the letter himself on a slate after he has seen it on the black board, and there is nothing to prevent all these operations going on at the same time, and almost in the same lesson, namely, reading, writing, and gaining new ideas.

This way of teaching the alphabet by the sound or powers of the letters rather than by their names, is called the phonic method, and is coming into very general practice in the best schools. In those of the continent it has been long in operation, and within the last few years Dr. Kay Shuttleworth has been the means of introducing it into England, where a trial was first made of it in his training school at Battersea. It is strictly a mental and training exercise, and proceeding upon a principle of nature. To teach the alphabet by the names of the letters, and thence to attempt to form words out of them, requires a constant system of telling, because there is often no connexion between such names and the sounds wanted. Suppose a child knew the names of a and of b, and were requested to join them by the process mentioned, what could he say, but that it was a, b, or, perhaps, abe, he would never think of pronouncing it ab. Whereas, if he knew the power of a, and of b, the very enunciating of each letter consecutively, would give the true pronunciation of the monosyllable. Or were he asked to join e and l from their names, he would, of, course, call it eel,
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and without giving any reason, the master would correct him by simply telling the right sound.

Children who are taught to read on this now antiquated mode derive very little assistance from knowing the names of their letters. It is even possible to teach a clever boy to read before he knows one-half of their names. After learning the alphabet, too, almost every succeeding syllable must be sounded and every lesson told to them. Their progress, therefore, depends entirely upon a process of memory in recalling the sounds of whole words as they have been told them, and not in any acquired power of analysing and recombing their elementary sounds. Every new word is acquired in the same way as an individual letter, and the whole language learned like the entire alphabet, by repeated efforts of memory. Again, when the process is reversed, and an attempt made to analyse words into the names of their letters, or simply to spell vocally, no assistance is gained from the entire sound of the word to discover its individual letters. For example, what phonic connexion is there between the word house and the names of the following letters—h o u s e? When, therefore, a child is asked to spell a word in this way, he never thinks how its letters sound, but the sound of the word recalls to his mind a picture of its appearance as seen in the book, and according to the vividness of his recollection will he spell it correctly or otherwise.

Hence the enormous drudgery to which poor children are often subjected in what is miscalled "learning to spell," a labour without the slightest possible benefit, either as an auxiliary in learning to read or to spell. The use of spelling is not to learn to read, but to copy reading or to convert it into writing, and in this process no sounds are required. It is simply an act of memory recalling the forms of words and the order of their letters, and
arranging them accordingly. Spelling is an imitative art, like painting, and may be commenced at any stage of reading, but it can only be done correctly after the words to be spelt have become familiar to the mind in reading. It follows, that the oftener certain words are read, they will have the better chance of being spelt rightly; so that frequent reading and writing will ensure correct spelling almost as a matter of course. The pupil's first spelling lesson should be simply an act of copying; next, writing from the dictation of another, and then comparing that copy with the printed original; next, to read over a small piece, shut the book and write from memory, then open and compare the two, and, lastly, the constant practice of writing themes, versions, and other original exercises.

It should never be forgotten how purely instrumental a part of education reading is. It gives to the mind an additional power to that conferred by oral speech, by which its faculties are carried to a higher degree of spirituality and refinement, but it is still only a more efficacious means to the same end. Both instruments, however, are practically useless until by exercise the mind can employ them and understand the qualities of the objects with which they have to deal. Speech serves the purpose of a hand to the mind, by which knowledge, its appropriate food, is procured and prepared for contemplation. Reading is a more artificial instrument put into the hand for obtaining a larger supply, and of a more *recherché* description. But both are effective only when the mental organisation is capable of receiving and assimilating such an aliment. They are, then, necessary to aid in a higher process of development than that resulting from mere sensation. A more spiritual nature supervenes upon the sensitive, and becomes a distinct essence from it, but it is, nevertheless,
based upon the latter, and while its roots derive nourishment from that soil, its branches drink in a more ethereal aliment conveyed by speech and reading; it is, therefore, the higher powers of our mental nature to which these administer.

But long before a child is capable either of speaking or reading, his intellectual education ought to be commenced. The senses are the only inlets of his earliest knowledge. Objects bearing a relation to these should, therefore, be presented to them, and early habits of accurate observation formed. The physical powers of the senses, and the nervous machinery attached to them, being thus cultivated, a healthy mental fabric is preparing to receive more delicate impressions. As the eye of a child is unable to calculate the shortest distance aright, and, it is said, views objects in an inverted position, until experience corrects the error, so the mind's eye must be trained by observation and tangible evidence to gain its first knowledge, which reflection will ultimately establish as axiomatical truths. But as the range of a child's observation is limited to the few chance objects around him, the educator must increase the supply, and bring other objects before him on which his faculties may be exercised. Where the child cannot go into the world, the world in sample must be brought in to him. Fragments of nature and art must be submitted to his touch to convey ideas of their hardness or softness; to his olfactory nerves to gain ideas of smell; his ears must be awakened to catch their sound; his eyes to see their form and colour, and his palate to taste their flavour. Such may be called the education of the senses, and the impressions thus conveyed are ideas of sensation. Things of different and contrary qualities must next be submitted, and their contrasts or resemblances perceived, which will be the first
effort of the mind at comparison, and the ideas thus
gained will be those of reflection. Again, from a percep-
tion that several objects and ideas have the same qualities
in common, general and abstract notions will be derived,
and to each of these separate ideas, as soon as communicat-
ced, must be attached its respective name, the want of
which will then be felt to distinguish it from others.

This is entirely treading in the footsteps of nature, and
analogous even to the progress and formation of language
itself. Children, before they are taught artificially, have
a much greater stock of ideas than of names. They know
the nature and qualities of objects, their differences and
resemblances, long before they can indicate or express that
knowledge. So in the early stages of language, when it is
not commensurate to the knowledge of a people, the same
difficulty is felt, but partly met by doubling up terms into
metaphors, or forming new words out of the fragments of
old ones. Every new principle in art or science must be
separately named to distinguish its identity. Words,
therefore, are a result of necessity, and will as naturally
be sought after by a child to denominate a new toy, as by
a philosopher to describe a new planet.

This desire, then, keeps pace with the extension of a
child's knowledge, and should be gratified accordingly;
but the supply should never exceed the demand, else a
spurious verbal knowledge is communicated, darkening
the mind to a clear perception of things. The objects
should in themselves be so clearly understood as not to
be obscured by the intervention of words. They must be
transparent through them. Whereas, if they are repres-
tented at first through this medium, either a confused
notion of them is obtained, or no idea at all. But, neither
must reading be neglected when the mind has acquired a
certain growth and comprehensibility. Small portions of
words, descriptive of known ideas, must be mingled with other unknown terms, which must also be rendered transparent by exhibiting a model, a diagram, or a verbal picture of what they represent. Thus, hand in hand must the knowledge of words accompany an understanding of things, each reflecting light upon the other, and both administering to the growth and strengthening of the mental faculties. This discovery of bringing a child into actual contact with the objects of nature, and educating his powers of observation and reflection before teaching him the nomenclature of knowledge, is due to the justly celebrated Henry Pestalozzi, the morning star of educational reform. With him necessity prompted the plan. He could not be supplied with books and the ordinary school apparatus, and, in attempting to do without them, discovered their comparative inutility. His want of artificial means compelled him to return to nature, and develop the stores of information she herself communicates both to teacher and pupil. His lessons on objects are, therefore, the first principles of a truly intellectual education.

The art of printing, and the diffusion of knowledge by means of printed books, being still a thing of recent origin, much of that blind veneration and awe that formerly attached to letters, still prevails. And in many cases the mere study of dead literature apart from the knowledge it contains forms the principal pursuit in advanced schools; while the same feelings lead to the idea that, even in elementary education, books are the only necessary instruments. But, in point of fact, they should form but a small item in the apparatus of a well-regulated seminary, and consequently, the learning to read them, a very secondary object of school attendance. The most powerful agency in mental development is the living voice directed by the
intelligent mind. A master's instructions should spring from the fountain of his own knowledge, and his voice be the channel of conveying that information to his pupil. A clear articulation, together with a correct accent and emphasis, is, therefore, a principal auxiliary to the same end. It is the correct mode of handling the instrument of speech by which the same truths are more vividly impressed upon the understanding, than by an incorrect utterance. It may be called the mechanical art of speaking, and is equally necessary to attain skill in teaching, as the use of any material instrument whatever is to its correct application. If one learning to write hold the pen in a wrong way, his letters will be incorrectly traced, and many of them illegible to the eye; and from the incorrect utterance of words, equally partial and unintelligible impressions are conveyed to the mind. It is still part of the process of mental picturing. The more distinctly that words are spoken, the more clearly is each member of the picture laid upon the mind and the whole filled up, whereas by an indistinct articulation much of what is said is lost before it reaches the mind, and the picture often curtailed of its most essential proportions. Speech, too, is the dress of ideas, but apart from the style of this dress its manner is no less to be regarded. A tasteful dress may be worn in so careless a manner as to lose its effect in pleasing the eye, and the best style of language may be neutralised by an inarticulate and unemphatic manner of presenting it to the ear. Every one knows how much effect is produced in pulpit and forensic oratory by a deliberate articulation, aided by gesture and intonation. These may be called the poetry of manner, and as they appeal to the feelings before the understanding, a more ready assent is given to truths so conveyed. By these extrinsic accidents, therefore, popularity is more
frequently gained than by the real merits of an orator’s matter. The most trite remarks well delivered become dignified into seemingly original truths; and weak arguments, from the clearness and force with which they are uttered, strike deeper conviction than the most powerful arguments uttered feebly and indistinctly. As formerly stated, all speaking of this nature is simply teaching of a different kind, and the principle applies in a much higher degree in communicating instruction to children. They are, of course, more apt to be led away by specious appearances than grown people. Their keener perception of the language of manner seems indeed to compensate for their inferior power of discriminating truth. They scan the countenance and motion of their teacher, criticise the inflections of his voice and the energy or feebleness of its tone, and thus often arrive at conclusions which his unaided words would either fail to convey or directly controvert.

Now the same aptitude in children to perceive this in others, affords a facility to impress upon themselves a similar practice in their own use of speech. A clear articulation of each syllable, with an accent and emphasis corresponding to the sense, is as necessary, in order to express and impress that meaning aright, as pronunciation itself. Words may be equally misunderstood by an inarticulate as by a wrong pronunciation; and as they may be read in ignorance of what they mean, they may also be articulated so as to convey no definite meaning to others, or a directly opposite one to their true sense. A negative may become an affirmative or an affirmative a negative, while between these extremes it is tone and emphasis alone that regulate every shade of difference. It is evident, therefore, that the meaning of what is read must be previously understood by the pupil before
he can modulate the sound of his voice to the proper expression of that meaning. When an actor studies his part of a drama, he strives to enter into the feelings of the character personated and to modulate his tones according to the language of the several passions; and so must the pupil be guided by the sense of what he reads into the proper manner of reading it.

The best way to induce a habit of correct articulation is to make the pupil pause sensibly between each word and syllable; to let the preceding sound die away before a new one be uttered, that no two consecutive sounds may run together, marring the effect of each. These pauses must be of longer duration at first, but as the utterance improves, they should gradually approximate. To borrow the simile of an able educationist, these pauses may represent the long letters of one learning to write, which, by degrees, are shortened into half text and small hand, as freedom and dexterity in using the pen are acquired. When this is accomplished, too, not only are the letters smaller but executed with more rapidity, and in proportion to the care taken in forming the large letters will be the clearness and distinctness of the small hand. So in rapid articulation, a mere confusion of sounds is produced, unless by a previously slow enunciation, the vocal organs have been accustomed to utter each syllable with clearness and facility, as well as rapidity. While, then, a distinct articulation impresses thought more powerfully upon the mind, a correct accentuation and emphasis render language more pleasant to the ear and grateful to the feelings. They are, indeed, the music of language, and adapted to express the passions and sentiments with many different shades and degrees of qualities that have no adequate terms to express them, and therefore as necessary to be ac-
quired in order to give the full meaning of words, as are the different powers of the same letters to give the various pronunciations of the words themselves.

It may here be remarked that accent and emphasis are but modifications of the same principle. The former points out to the hearer or reader the most important syllable of a word, and the latter the important word or clause of a sentence. Accent also distinguishes between two meanings which sometimes attach to the same word, and thus serves as a sort of compensatory process for the want of an additional word. When I say August, for example, I mean a very different thing from August, gallant from gallant, desert from desert. And by emphasis alone, the meaning of a whole sentence may be changed, by laying the stress upon a different word. In the following well-known example—"Do you ride to town to-day?" the sense may be changed five times, according as one word or another becomes emphatic. The emphatic word generally conveys the principal idea in the sentence, and the natural law of accentuation lays stress upon the root of the word, but an acquaintance with etymology and the harmony of terminations is necessary to discern the law that regulates their conventional position. According to Mr. Walker, "in words from the Saxon the accent is generally on the root; in words from the learned languages it is generally on the termination; and if to these we add the different accent we lay on some words to distinguish them from others, we seem to have the three great principles of accentuation, namely, the radical; the terminational, and the distinctive." It may not, indeed, be necessary for every teacher thus to ascertain the nature and origin of accent and emphasis, but he must at least be familiar with their use, and able to analyse
them to his pupils so as to train them into the practice of this much-neglected part of intellectual education.

As the pupil advances in a knowledge of what he reads, and the manner of reading it, a still higher analytical and synthetical process awaits him in that of etymology. He must be able not only to pronounce and know the meaning of his words, but also to see how that meaning is evolved from them,—not only skilled in handling his literary instrument, but able to analyse its component parts. This, however, can only be a comparative analysis, as the tracing of words to their primitive elemental condition is a study too abstruse, not only for the schoolboy, but the profoundest philologist. The reason is, that the process of agglutinating sounds into words commences long before these words are transmitted to posterity in writing. The phonic method of teaching to read, by joining into monosyllables the elementary sounds of the alphabet, is precisely the way in which an oral language is first formed. A thorough course of etymology would therefore require to analyse words into their primitive sounds, for it is certain that all words were at first simple monosyllables—at least, the farther any language is traced up to its source, the more attenuated does it become, and words of a complex sound become the fewer. Thus the whole of a language, in its early state, consists of a certain number of these simple sounds, each one having a distinct meaning in itself. It is, therefore, up to this point that the philologist must prosecute his inquiries, but most of which must obviously be conjectural. Still, an oral would likely follow a very similar course to that of a written language. Let us suppose a language to have some twenty or thirty of these primitive uncompounded sounds, and each of them to be the sign or name of an
object, and that some other new idea arose requiring a new name, instead of inventing another sound for the purpose, the most obvious course would unquestionably be, to recur to the sounds already in use, and by joining two or three of these together, form a new component term.

This is at least analogous to the composition of written words. For example, when a word was wanted to express the new idea and art, of causing nature to delineate herself by fixing down rays of light upon certain prepared materials, instead of inventing a new sound and new characters to signify that sound, two old words with a little alteration were joined together into the new term "photography," which elegantly expresses the science of drawing by light. Of these primitive vocal sounds, then, new combinations would rapidly be formed, as they are in their nature so favourable for running into one another. This process of agglutination, or of gluing sounds together, owes its existence principally to the necessities of spoken language, and we find, therefore, unwritten tongues as well as written ones, presenting these phenomena of combined elementary sounds. Some of the Indian languages, it is said, are exceedingly rich in all such words as have been formed by this agglutinating process. But as it is nearly impossible to analyse any of these unwritten words into their elemental roots, it is only from the time that a language has been committed to writing that its practical etymology commences. When this takes place, a new process begins, in the construction of words—not by an aggregation of elemental sounds, but a combination of the fragments of existing words, though, unlike the former, it is a combination that prevents not each part of the compound term from retaining its distinctive character. It depends, therefore, on the state of
advancement that a language has made before being committed to writing, whether these elementary forms of speech be few or numerous, for this process of agglutinating sounds into monosyllables necessarily ceases when a language is fixed down in writing, and that of constructing its literal syllables commences.

The component parts of words, then, are now the root, prefix, and postfix; the two last being probably mere fragments of formerly existing words, first used in a relational capacity between words, and latterly to connect several ideas into the same word. In proceeding to the study of etymology, it is therefore the teacher’s duty to detach these concretions from the stock to which they adhere, and to give their own meaning as well as the pure meaning of the root, separately. Lists of these, with their meaning, should be committed to memory, that the pupil may be able to understand and go along with his master in the analytical process. This being done, suppose such a word as infallible is to be explained: instead of simply telling the pupil that it means not deceitable, the meaning of the root fallo is asked and given, together with the separate meanings of in and ible, when, by a very easy process of combination, the above meaning is found. Various forms of the same root are also given as a collateral exercise, and some of the parts of speech of which the word is susceptible. The etymological meaning of a word, however, is not always the current one; and this distinction must be attended to and remedied in a process of mental composition. The secondary or metaphorical use of a term is often the more common way in which it is applied. Though radix signifies a root, literally, and eradicate to root out, yet we cannot talk about eradicating the weeds out of a garden, though that is the most likely example a child would give as an illustration.
of the use of the word. Its figurative application to moral ideas is its conventional use, and error is said to be eradicated from the mind. In accordance with a principle of training, therefore, the pupil is asked to form a sentence embodying the word when defined, which not only fixes in his memory the correct sense of the term, but prepares him, in general, to express his thoughts in clear and perspicuous language.

It is a mistake to imagine it necessary to study Latin and Greek, formally, in order to attain a knowledge of the etymology of English. For all practical purposes, a vocabulary of Latin and Greek roots and prepositions is quite enough. The more extensive that any one's knowledge of these is, of course, the greater will be his facility in analyzing the English terms compounded of them. But very little acquaintance with the construction and syntax of the dead languages is needed to be an English etymologist. It is, therefore, a study accessible to all, and especially necessary in a course of elementary instruction to children. It gives them a power of breaking down words, for themselves, and arriving at the meaning of terms that would, otherwise, require a long paraphrase to explain. And how necessary is it, as a key to the meaning of those technicalities connected with the sciences which formerly threw such an air of mystery around many of the simplest facts in nature!

In the phonic method of teaching to read by the nature and power of letters, and learning to spell by dictation and writing, the first practical part of Grammar is also acquired collaterally. In like manner this branch of etymology, namely, the derivation and composition of words, forms a very important item in its second division. Much of its higher and more intricate departments may even be taught in the same incidental way. Indeed, a
knowledge of the whole basis of grammar is an essential concomitant of learning to read intellectually. When words are seen in their true light as the marks or signs of ideas, and these understood to represent certain classes of objects, qualities, actions, relations, &c., it is very easily inferred that the words themselves must be of different kinds or classes. Hence arises the want of names to distinguish one class from another, while the meaning of the word gives a sure indication to what particular class it belongs. The word man is the sign of a different kind of idea from that of white, and, consequently, a different sort of word from white; but the word horse or tree is the name of a similar kind of idea, that is, it represents one of a similar class of objects, and is, therefore, a word of the same class. All words belonging to this class have, therefore, the same name, and those belonging to a different class have a different name. Equally gradual and natural too, must such a process be to that of acquiring a knowledge of the meaning of the language itself, from concrete to abstract terms. The names of sensible objects are first generalised and classed under the appellation of nouns; those of qualities, as being the next obvious, are collected and called adjectives; the names of actions are denominated verbs; of relations prepositions, &c.

Thus incidentally may a knowledge of all the eight parts of speech be acquired, even according to that division of them; but this is far from being a logical distinction, for when we carry out the same investigation of words into their meaning, they can easily be separated into two great divisions. They either resolve themselves into the names of objects or ideas, or into copulatives and relations between these objects and ideas. To say, therefore, that a noun is the name of an idea is quite correct,
but when we define the name of its qualities or properties, such as the idea of its greenness, size, or action, by the term adjective, attributive, or verb; of course a different term is applied to the sign of a different kind of idea, which is even made more visible to the mind by such a definition, but *large, green, strike*, are as strictly the names of ideas, and therefore, as much nouns, as are *man, tree, river*, names of visible and tangible objects. Yet, as these latter were unquestionably the first parts of speech, and names of qualities, quantities, and action, were next invented, with the view of illustrating some mode or operation of external objects, we cannot so easily recall an idea of the latter without associating them with substantial objects. For example, when the word *tree* occurs, it is not always thought of as a *green* object, or as *waving* in the breeze, because it does not require these accidental properties to render it mentally visible, but the term *green* is more readily associated in the mind with some object, and the word *strike* naturally calls up two other objects to which the action has a reference. These, however, are only the names of qualities in concretion; and when the ideas are generalised, green becomes greenness, and strike becomes stroke, general terms for what is substantially the same thing. So that adjectives and verbs are simply qualifying nouns, that is, concrete names, or names of one set of ideas that qualify others. Apart, therefore, from the associations which these terms naturally raise in the mind, they as distinctly convey entire ideas or notions as any term indicating a sensible and visible object.

A more philosophical, though perhaps not so convenient way of classifying words, has, therefore, been suggested, and that is into sounds or signs, which of themselves convey a notion, hence called notional, and others
which convey no notion of themselves, but showing a relation between others, may be styled relational. Of the former kind are nouns, adjectives, and verbs, and of the latter, prepositions, interjections, and conjunctions. Pronouns and adverbs, being auxiliary to the former, may be classed under the same head. These are not absolutely necessary as parts of speech, but only for convenience; a pronoun is a substitute for a noun, and presents a picture to the mind by reflection, and an adverb can easily be diluted into a periphrasis. Nor is this twofold division of words into notional and relational at all impracticable, as it may easily be ascertained to what division any word belongs. The mention or sight of a notional word, unconnected with any other, calls up a certain picture in the mind, but a relational term leaves the mind as much a blank as before, until the words to which it forms a connecting link have been mentioned. Even these relative words themselves, indeed, are thought to have been originally notional terms, or nouns, forming some of the primitive monosyllabic names of which I have lately spoken—a supposition strictly in accordance with the fact, that in the very earliest formation of a language all its words are nouns, or names of the most palpable objects.

At all events, whatever classification be made, whether into two or eight parts of speech, a knowledge of this part of grammar can only be acquired by finding from the meaning or application of words to what denomination they belong. Without this the names of the parts of speech will be meaningless terms, and the only ideas that can be formed by committing them to memory will refer but to the shape and appearance of the words themselves.

In like manner the different terms used to denote the
modification of words must be pictured out before communicated. It is even injurious to do otherwise, as the mind is so apt to rest satisfied with the apprehension of mere names, and be deceived out of a knowledge of their meaning and import. Of what use is it to commit to memory the statement that "a noun is varied by gender, number, and case," until it be understood what gender, number, and case are, and what is meant by their varying a noun; and when this is understood, what need is there for learning the rule at all? It becomes then a mere formula, necessary, perhaps, in the abstract science of grammar, but of no use in the practice of its art. The meaning of such terms should be illustrated by familiar examples. The words boy, girl, and stone are seen to be nouns as belonging to the same class of tangible objects; but having special qualities, a subdivision takes place, and the difference between each is called gender, of which there are three kinds, according to the three classes, masculine, feminine, and neuter. So also the words tree and trees denote a difference of another kind, which is styled number, and according as one or more objects are particularised, the number is singular or plural. The same word is also seen with a difference of termination, and expressing its idea in three different characters and relations, and a name is given to each of these contingencies or cases, called the nominative, possessive, and objective.

The qualities are also defined by a similar process. The names of these are absolute terms, expressing things the same in kind, but according as one object has a greater or less quantity than another is that difference denoted by the relative terms, positive, comparative, and superlative. It may be exemplified thus: three objects, one four feet long, another five, and another six, have all the same absolute quality of height, but when compared with
one another they are found to have it in different quantities. It is the difference, then, in the amount of quality among these objects that requires to be specified by the relative terms mentioned.*

A very grave question here arises, however, how far it is necessary thus to simplify and inculcate a knowledge of the mere science of grammar to school-boys, even upon the most natural principles. It is an art as well as a science, the art of speaking and writing according to custom; and though it is subject to certain fixed rules and principles, yet it is not so much from a knowledge of these that skill is acquired in it, as from a dexterity in practising the custom. It is like the different influences of precept and example in morals, the former exhibiting human actions as in a mirror, but the latter presenting them in living reality; the one may enlighten the head, but the other more effectually induces the habit. So in grammar, it is not so much a knowledge as a practice of the art that gives the ready habit of correct composition. Of how little advantage would it be to an artist merely to become acquainted with the mathematical rules of perspective drawing, the vanishing point, the visual angle, and the line of beauty, or be so skilled in optics, and the properties of colours, as to compound the richest hues, if he never handled the pencil and the brush in realising this knowledge by a practical imitation of nature! These alone will not educate his eye and his hand, which must be equally trained with the head.

So is it in grammar, whether in learning to speak or to write correctly, the first attempts at which are of necessity entirely imitative, namely, the child imitating the diction of its parents. He requires no grammar to prepare him

* See article on Grammar in Chambers' Information for the People, regarding the same view of other parts of speech.
for oral composition, or, in plain words, to learn to speak. By a constant practice, and after repeated failures, he first learns to articulate words, and then to combine these into sentences. It depends, of course, entirely upon the model after which he copies, whether these sentences are correct or incorrect, and whether his words and phrases are well chosen or the reverse. Or again, suppose the child brought up under French parents, he will of course, speak the French language, or under English parents the English, according to the model which either exhibits. And in proportion to the purity and elegance, or errors and provincialisms of his parents will his own language be pure or the reverse. "If, then, a boy can compose spoken sentences without a previous knowledge of rules, what is to prevent his forming written ones? In the one case the instrument of expression is the tongue, in the other the pen; but the process of combining ideas, and the process of turning these ideas into conventional terms, whether sounds or marks, are precisely the same in both. Where, then, is the absolute need of grammar to teach the pupil to do this? Might it not as well be argued that he must be taught grammar before being allowed to speak, as to insist on its acquisition before he is permitted to write? The legitimate sphere of grammar is correction, not suggestion. Language is the foundation, the source of grammar, and the pupil must be practically trained in the former, before the inferences of the latter can be of service. Hence, not only is there no need of forcing one through a treatise of grammar to make him a composer, but it is positively injurious to do so. Rules are results, and sound mental training, whatever be the science or art, consists in leading the pupil up the steps by which these results are attained, so that he is not only interested in the process, but capable of valuing the product. The
habit thus formed is the great end which, however, can never be attained by reversing the business, or what is still worse, by handing the pupil ready-made rules without even a hint as to the mode of their derivation. To learn grammar and syntax, then, in the end instead of in the beginning, is following precisely the course of nature; it is learning the language analytically,—learning it, in fine, the very way in which the language itself has been formed."

This analogy, indeed, obtains, throughout the whole course of a child's education up to manhood. It is because the means of improvement are more condensed now than in the earlier ages of the world, that in the course of a life-time, man arrives at an amount of knowledge that would formerly have extended over several generations. A rude people spend most of their days in discovering the simplest principles of nature. Their successors rise a step higher, and their descendants still further gain in knowledge, until the results of their experience are so accumulated that succeeding generations, before they have attained to manhood, acquire an amount of information greater than the combined wisdom of centuries. Still, the course of an individual's education of the present day ought to be precisely similar to that of a rude community advancing to civilisation. The same steps must be gone over in both cases, though trodden more rapidly in the former, that is, from the concrete to the abstract in mental development, and from instinct to feeling and sentiment in morals. Much depends, therefore, upon an individual's being put upon a right track at his first outset, and being led along by an easy ascent to mental and moral excellence, otherwise much of the ground must be re-trodden, and much precious time irrecoverably wasted.

* Chambers.
In no branch of education is this more necessary than in learning the English language intellectually. In every stage of learning to read, to spell, and to write his vernacular tongue, the child must be led on by induction, his understanding being under the guidance of principles, not rules merely, so that when he begins a systematic study of grammar, his previous knowledge of its basis, will enable him successfully to generalize its more recondite philosophy. It will then be a study adapted to the enlarged powers of his mind, and preparatory for entering upon a critical examination of the structure and beauties of English literature. The higher authors may now be read with advantage, and the principles of belles lettres, and the higher departments of composition engaged in.
CHAPTER X.

In the same way that abstract terms of qualities are derived from a contemplation of real objects, are ideas of number also gained. A blind man has no idea of colour, having never seen any object of which it is a property, and his mind cannot receive such an impression until it be first enstamped upon the retina of his eye, and thence conveyed to the sensorium by the optic nerve. So must a child be mentally in the dark regarding number as a property of objects, unless his understanding has in some way or other been impressed by the fact in numbering them. There can be no reflections without something to be reflected from, namely, ideas of sensation, and there can be no sensations unless proceeding directly or indirectly from sensible objects. Ideas of sense are indeed almost material emanations themselves, but from the myriad hues they reflect by falling under the prismatic influence of the mind, the imagination can realise out of them scenes brighter than any presented by nature, and the judgment construct an artificial world more complicated, but no less real than the natural. Yet the foundation of these thoughts and fancies must all rest on the materialism of nature, else like the "baseless fabric of a vision" they will vanish at the test of reason. The law of gravitation would never have been discovered nor become the source of so many other discoveries and calculations, had not its in-
fluence been seen in operation in some such familiar instances as the cohesion of dew-drops, or the falling of an apple. Such qualities or properties are only known by their effects on material substances; and if the latter had not been seen, the former would never have been dreamed of. In like manner the student of nature should not take for granted the existence of any such principle until he has abstracted it by his own observation. His faith will rest most securely upon the evidence of sense, and he will penetrate much farther into the unseen world of abstractions by standing upon the eminence of nature. The mind must lay the foundation of its thoughts deep in sense before it can raise a tower of observation high enough to obtain glimpses of things spiritual.

Thus, then, for a child to be set to count up fifty or a hundred, to add, subtract, multiply, and divide so many sounds and figures, without having first associated these with realities, is an attempt to climb without a ladder, or fly without wings. Unless found to be the names of the numbers of his fingers, balls, marbles, or other familiar objects, the shapes and sounds of the nine digits will be shapes and sounds alone, and their combinations on a slate, or even in mind, as aimless as a French puzzle. The arithmetic of tangible and visible objects should, therefore, be among the earliest and most frequent studies of a child from his entrance into school, as clear notions of number and quantity throw so much light upon other branches, and are so well calculated to train and methodize the mental faculties themselves. Its first steps, however, should be of the most gradual and easy kind, and each new idea worked into the very constitution of the mind by repeated examples. The elements of number consist of but a very few leading ideas, which it is imperative should be clearly understood at the outset, that all subsequent combinations may be free from that
perplexity which is the necessary consequence of dealing with principles not arrived at by an inductive process of the mind itself. As the largest volume contains but the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, so the most complicated calculations have only the nine digits and a zero, and the most involved process of arithmetical reasoning is merely a ramification of units. The system of decimal progression, upon which so many of our calculations are based, most probably has been suggested by the number of fingers on the two hands, and the natural tendency to employ them in counting. The student, must, therefore, begin at the root of the science, thus, one finger, two fingers, three fingers; two fingers and three fingers are five fingers, and so on; these must be his first concrete ideas of arithmetic. The objects must be seen in combination, and ought to be given before the arbitrary sounds, one, two, three, &c. Marbles, buttons, apples, oranges, everything that can be seen in combination, may form media for impressing these elementary principles.

The numerical value of money should also be first proved by tangible evidence, and farthings, halfpence, pence, sixpences, and shillings, seen and handled while added and subtracted. Two halfpence in one hand placed beside three in the other, make the sum twopence halfpenny, and a halfpenny taken out of it leaves twopence. The superior value of silver to copper, and of gold to silver, should also be shown by a practical exchange. The sum must thus be seen to increase and diminish before an idea of addition and subtraction can be formed, and the idea must be obtained before there is any necessity for giving such names.

A very appropriate instrument for facilitating visible calculations of this nature, has been brought into use by Mr. Wilderspin, named the Arithmeticon. It is simply
a frame, with a certain number of wooden balls, painted alternately black and white, which move horizontally along the wires on which they are strung. The master combines and arranges these by moving them with his finger, while the children observe and name the different arrangements. Such an exercise gives a reality to the ideas of number which thus attach to palpable and distinct objects. While the eye rests upon the balls, the mind easily calculates the number of them, whereas, in absence of such a point d'appui, it cannot grasp the same amount of combination. The intellect has then nothing tangible to compute, and, strictly speaking, computes nothing; or, if forced to make the attempt, it must first suggest ideas of objects, and calculate these, which is a more complicated process. This principle of object calculation is also akin to that which necessity prompts a rude community to adopt. Hence we hear of one people using knotted strings as a calculating apparatus, another notched sticks, shells, and pebbles—calculi, from whence the term calculation is derived; and even among the Roman and Greek mathematicians there was in use an instrument very similar to the arithmeticon itself, called the Abacus, on which they cast up certain accounts. This instrument, of which Mr. Wilderspin seems to claim the merit of invention—or at least the Abacus—was in familiar use, even in Europe, until a recent period. The modern system of notation by the nine digits and a cipher, is believed to have been derived from the Indians. Through them it descended to the Arabians, and was introduced into Europe by the Moors about the beginning of the eleventh century.

The Roman Abacus was a board with parallel grooves placed perpendicularly, along which the balls or counters were moved. The simple value of each ball was one, but
it had also a positional value, as our common digits have. In an Abacus with a certain number of upright grooves, the one to the right expressed units, that next to it tens, the next hundreds, the next thousands, and so on. For example, the number 31452 would be expressed by two balls on the groove nearest the right hand, five balls on the one next it, four on the next, one on the next, and three on the left hand groove, and any other conceivable number might thus be noted according to the different arrangement of the counters and number of the grooves. It is on the same principle as modern notation, by which different degrees of unity are expressed by different marks, and their values changed by position, and it might approach still nearer to this were differently sized or coloured balls employed to denote the different quantities of 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.

The Abacus was used by both Greeks and Romans, the latter having borrowed it from the former, and it was employed less frequently by the Greeks only because their system of notation by the alphabet was more perfect than the figurative notation of the Romans. The science was indeed but little cultivated among the latter people compared with what it was among the Greeks. Their minds were less adapted to abstract calculations, and hence the necessity of this more palpable mode of computation. This is, therefore, the same reason that renders such means better adapted to the capacities of children than to those more advanced in the science. It appeals to the eye before the mind, and exhibits something calculable before they are required to calculate. The chief difference in point of form between the Arithmeticon and the Abacus is, that the balls move vertically in the latter, and in the former horizontally, and in this respect it more resembles an instrument.
in use among the Chinese for the same purpose, called the Swanpan, the lines of which are horizontal like those of the Arithmeticon. But as the science advanced among other nations, it outgrew these simple expedients, and required methods of computation better adapted to facilitate its higher combinations, just as children advance from counting objects to mental and slate arithmetic.

Besides the numbering of external objects, a child's attention ought early to be directed to their sizes and distances, that he may conceive the elementary ideas of measurement. This is an easy sequence to number, and indeed a practical application of it. He sees one thing longer than another, and by the exercise of his eye and hand, which also gratifies his bodily activity, he finds one thing two or three times larger than another, and two or three things that cannot be brought together equal to one another, by finding them equal to a third or fourth, or by applying a common measure to each. The most natural and obvious means of ascertaining this he finds to be the parts and members of his own body, which he will readily apply in measuring comparative lengths and small distances.

Here again he takes his departure from the same point that a primitive people do, and we find that, in like manner, the Romans and many other nations derived the ideas and names of measure from the various parts of the human body. *Digitus*, a digit, or finger's breadth; *pollex*, a thumb's breadth, or an inch; *palmus*, a hand's breadth, or a palm; *pes*, a foot; *palmipes*, a foot and a hand's breadth; *cubitus*, or *ulna*, a cubit, from the tip of the elbow bent inwards, to the extremity of the middle finger; *passus*, a pace or double step, five feet; *gradus* or *gressus*, an ordinary pace. Then, again, a pole ten feet
long, *decempeda*, was called *pertica*, a perch, changed from *portica*, and that from *portare*, to carry, because carried in the hand for measuring. All these names seem so many literary fossils, indicating the first formation of the science and the rude elements of which it was composed, and also so many finger-posts, pointing out the way in which it ought still to be studied. Real weights and measures, of all kinds, should be exhibited to the pupil; and linear, square, and cubic inches, feet, and yards, quarts, bushels, ounces, and pounds be presented, that his eye and hand may be familiarised with them, their comparative quantities visibly numbered, and their lengths and distances tangibly measured. The drudgery of committing to memory unexplained tables of all these thus comes to be an entirely superfluous task. At least, the whole of their principles may previously be worked into the mind by familiar illustrations such as those mentioned.

The next and higher stage beyond this merely visible arithmetic, is more exclusively a mental operation,—that is, instead of calculating objects, a numerical combination of their ideas takes place. These, however, are only sensible ideas, but the numbering of them is a reflective process. In the former case, the principles of number were gathered from things seen by the natural eye; in this they are applied to effect combinations of their pictures in the mind. Number is now made by synthesis a property of these ideas, as it was before by analysis separated from their archetypes. The science is not yet a pure abstraction, but requires the aid of fictitious representation to become apparent. The mind must see something palpable as the materials of computation, if the eye does not, before the numbering faculty at this stage of development can successfully operate.
For this purpose, mental questions regarding imaginary transactions ought now to be put, and the imagination interested in some narrative. This is exactly similar to conveying moral instruction by parable and anecdote, in which virtue and vice are seen in action, or in teaching the elements of general science by analogy and illustration. Whereas, to discuss number with a child, in its abstract form, is little better than communicating so many moral dogmas or scientific formularies without a knowledge of their meaning. As, however, in moral instruction, precept and parable should be alternated according to the mental capacity, so in arithmetic, abstract calculations should occasionally intermingle with the concrete, or rather arise out of them. If I have three nuts in one hand and four in the other, and give away one, how many have I left? Ans. Six. So then it may be added, three and four, less by one, leave six.

Put eighteen marbles into six bags, in equal numbers, how many will there be in each bag? Three. So six into eighteen, three times, and three times six are eighteen. It is unnecessary to enumerate more examples to illustrate this, as any teacher of the least invention may supply them for himself ad infinitum—but the principle here mentioned should never be lost sight of, namely, that the mind must be withdrawn by the most gradual and easy process from calculating objects and ideas, and trained to the more abstruse computation of abstractions.

Many excellent little works have been published to facilitate these mental calculations, but so far as I have seen, there is none in which the principle here mentioned is more fully recognised, than in a small manual by Mr. McLeod, master of the Normal School at Battersea. In this work, based on the Pestalozzian method, the pupil
is led by the most natural and easy steps, from the table of simple units up to very complicated questions on simple and compound fractions, proportion of fractions, square and cubic measure, &c., not one of which but may be solved by boys of ordinary intellect, before they have ever handled a slate or pencil. Nor, indeed, should these be put into their hands until they be thoroughly grounded in mental calculation. Slate arithmetic bears the same relation to mental, that book instruction has to conversational—the latter of which, in both cases, should, by a long interval, precede the former. Many long and difficult calculations may be made on slate, without an understanding of the principles on which they are based; just as one may arrange the balls of an abacus, without a knowledge of the result of such combinations; or as long passages and compound words may also be read, without yielding any information. The reason is, that figures represent combinations of number, and unless a knowledge of the simple ideas under each has been previously obtained, their cipher marks will be as unintelligible as unexplained words. The nine digits must therefore be analysed into units—multiplication into addition—division into subtraction—and all the ramifications that spread out from them traced to their simplest elements, before these are classified, named, and marked in a synthetic process of slate arithmetic, so as to lay a solid foundation for future progress.

It is, indeed, only when the memory can no longer maintain a process of mental combination, that the extraneous aid of a pencil and slate is necessary. These serve as an artificial memory, enabling the judgment to extend its operations illimitably, just as, in composing an oration, a continuous train of thought must be fixed down in writing, to be again remembered. It is, when
the faculty of number has outgrown the memory, that the adventitious aid of ciphering is necessary to supplement the deficiency. When a building gets beyond the reach of the human arm, a scaffolding is thrown around it, that the edifice may be carried to an indefinite height; so the science of arithmetic, by means of arbitrary symbols, has arrived at a height infinitely surpassing the longest human memory. The formation of the Roman characters may exemplify, in some degree, the synthetic process by which even this scaffolding must have been erected, as well as the unity of the material out of which it all evolved. As the number one is the basis of all arithmetical combinations, so is the mark 1, of their symbols. In expressing a large number by repeating the mark for unity, a classification was made into tens, by crossing each tenth mark, which by abbreviation became the representative of the whole number X; this being halved became V, the mark for the half number of ten. C is the initial of centum, a hundred; and M of mille, a thousand; the old form of the Roman M was CIQ, the half of which was IO, rounded into D, which stands for five hundred; the old form of the Roman C was D, the half of which was L, the mark for two hundred and fifty; so that from I, the symbol of unity, all the rest were formed thus, I, V, X, L, C, D, M. The principles on which other numbers were denoted by these were, simply by repeating the same character, and placing an inferior character after or before superior ones. Yet, whatever may be the nature of this symbolic scaffolding, whether the Roman character, the Arabic, or the alphabetic, an abacus, or an arithmeticon, the foundation of the science itself rests on the solid basement of reason; and whether it be administered to by an artificial or a natural memory, it is only by a combination of the same
elementary principles, that consistency can be given to the fabric. When the memory of the student, therefore, can extend no farther, he ascends this platform of slate arithmetic, and carries on his work to the higher regions of abstract calculation. Nor, indeed, when he has got a slate and arithmetic book before him, ought the master to intermit his guidance. Many principles must be illustrated, and modes of operation shown, and the pupil must see these with his eyes, in model sums upon a black board, the master not only telling him how certain things should be done, but doing them—not only showing the way, but walking in it.

Writing.—In learning this mechanical art, little or no reflection is necessary, but much observation. It is a kindred art to that of drawing, if indeed it be not a modification of the same; in both it is the nerves and muscles of the eye and the hand that must be educated. Simple lessons in drawing should precede those of writing. Being accustomed accurately to regard the form and position of external objects, as straight lines, angles, squares, the pupil should be trained to delineate these on paper, that his hand may attain to a degree of pliancy in holding the pencil, before the more delicate operation of guiding the pen.

This power of observation is in itself capable of vast improvement by exercise. When a child is first born into the world, and opens those "blue pellucid orbs" of his upon the objects of nature, it is only the most prominent of these, the outlines of creation, that make an impression upon him. But, by a lengthened survey, minuter things picture themselves upon the retina, and still smaller in proportion to the ardour of his gaze. Now, as the means of such observation are almost infinite, from the rolling planets of heaven to the myriad
hosts of animalcula peopling a drop of water, this faculty
must depend for strength and development upon its
direction towards such phenomena, and its continued
exercise by the excitement of curiosity.

Ocular vision, too, is the exact counterpart of mental,
and a power of visual discrimination, the source of acute
thinking. The intellect of an unobservant person is
obtuse, from considering only large ideas, but the wits
are sharpened by a minute analysis of thought, as the
eye is improved by a close inspection of objects. Neither
has a child any idea of distance, until he has tangibly
ascertained the fact. He must, in some degree, measure
certain distances by feeling the objects that bound them
before gaining ideas of such distances; but having obtained
these by touch, he infers others by sight, making in a
manner those first ideas measuring rods of other spaces.
His ideas of figure are also first gained by touch, and in-
ferred by sight; and it seems pretty certain that the eye
at first receives inverted impressions of objects which the
experience of touch alone rectifies. Even in mature life,
the eye occasionally relies for assistance upon the hand,
and also the hand upon the eye. In an exhibition of
wax-work one is often tempted to touch certain images
to see whether they be not really alive; while in archery
the experienced eye marks out the distance, and the
direction of the arrow, before the hand impels it along
the same path. So that between these two senses there
is the closest sympathy, each materially aiding the other,
but also capable of much improvement separately. A
blind man has the sense of feeling more acute than one
who sees, because it has been more educated; and a
sailor can distinguish the character of a distant vessel,
that to the untrained eye of a passenger would appear but
a speck upon the horizon. Imagination also assists the
reason, as by partially seeing an object, the fancy can often portray the rest of the picture.

It is, then, upon the principle of this mutual obedience of the eye to the hand, and the hand to the eye, that the art of drawing and writing depends, but the attainment of skill in either must be acquired by practice alone. In the proper direction of this practice, therefore, the same rule holds as in the teaching of every other branch, and that is to simplify the study by analyzing its materials into their elements. In drawing, external objects are analyzed, and fragments of them first submitted to practice, and when proficiency has been acquired in delineating these separately, several parts are drawn in combination, and so on to whole outlines and entire pictures. So in writing, an equally synthetic process is necessary; written characters must be analyzed into their elements, and each slope, angle, and straight line referred to a particular class, and practised separately. In some cases, skeleton diagrams of these are given to be filled up, that the hand may be guided into the right track, and training lines to sustain the right proportions. The pen must be held at the proper angle, and the fingers trained to the right position. The fragments of letters must also be copied large, that their parts and proportions may be better seen, and that the muscles of the hand may gain pliancy in executing them. When facility in forming the different straight lines, curves, and angles has been attained, these are next formed into letters, and practised in combination. Letters are combined into words. Large hand diminishes into half-text, and half-text into finished current hand.

There are of course several modes of teaching these principles, but in all cases a black board, with copybooks to correspond, and a master's hand to form the characters
before the eye, are indispensable. The copyist has thus all the means of improvement in writing placed within his reach, and in proportion to his care and diligence will he excel in the art. Some people smile at the idea of teaching writing upon anything like scientific rules, but science and invention both have been necessary thus to simplify its initiatory principles. The honour of such invention is due to M. Mulhauser, of Geneva, whose method has been adopted in Germany, in the chief normal schools of France, and has lately been introduced into the Battersea Training School by Mr. McLeod, and is or was taught by him to classes of the metropolitan schoolmasters in the School of Method assembling in Exeter Hall.
CHAPTER XI.

GEOGRAPHY.—This science gives a description of the earth and its contents. It is, therefore, a vastly comprehensive study; yet its principles can be made both easy and interesting to children when taught naturally, as it affords the utmost facility for inductive lessoning. Every child possesses a certain amount of geographical knowledge before any formal lessons can be given to him. He knows the locality of his own house, the garden or places around it, and the houses and fields beyond. He sees the boundaries and divisions of hedges and walls defining the properties of different individuals. He may have seen a river, a sea, a mountain, and an island, different kinds of soils—such, at least, as a barren field, a pasture field, and a field of corn, with fine weather and stormy, different sorts of animals, manufactures, and commerce, and also different customs and manners among his neighbours. All these circumstances, and many others, gleaned by his own observation and a previous course of mental training, must be familiar to him, and from this existing knowledge all his future discoveries in geography should arise. These are the seeds of the science shed upon his understanding by the hand of nature, but requiring artificial means to supply them with nourishment, and skilful cul-
tivation to bring them to maturity. The same principle should animate him that inspires the traveller to visit distant lands. His curiosity should be excited to know what lies beyond the range of his natural observation; and, as far as practicable, this should be gratified by taking him short excursions around the vicinity of his home. His eye should there be taught to mark the peculiarities of nature, and his mind to reflect upon them. From the top of an eminence he may observe the extent of a parish or a county, with its many natural and artificial intersections and boundaries—"its hills and dales, and woods, and lawns, and spires"—and thence impress upon his mind the first real map of nature. And as he contemplates such scenes, a desire will naturally be excited to penetrate beyond the sensible horizon that bounds his view. His faith in the existence of places beyond the range of vision will also be strong, arising out of the clear evidence of experience, as the farther he goes from home he ever sees new scenes and new objects presenting themselves; and his clear ideas of number applied in the mental calculation and measurement of distances, will then give him the first general impression of the earth's vast magnitude.

Artificial representation must now supplement the natural: as a telescope is applied to the heavens when the naked eye fails to perceive the distant orbs of space, and magnifies their appearance, so, remote countries are also brought beneath our eyes by the instrumentality of a map or a globe. Yet, that the design of a map may be seen as a delineation of nature and read as a picture of real places, the same inductive method should be continued as before. As the hand of the pupil should, by this time, be somewhat expert in sketching, his first lesson in artificial geography should be the delineation
of a map for himself. This, like the expansion of his own knowledge, should first be an outline of the simplest and most familiar objects and places beneath his view,—the room in which he sits, the playground or garden out of doors, the neighbouring localities around his dwelling, and so on progressively. He will, by this means, fully see and know the nature of a map as a picture of the earth's surface, as he has formerly been taught the nature of words in a book by their reference to objects. And as words come to represent the ideas of objects that he has never seen but inferred by analogy, so the distant parts, that he has never seen, are thus placed before him in a book of maps. His desire for such information having been previously awakened, he will now gladly avail himself of such assistance and also be able to comprehend its use. A map of his own county or country should first be placed before him; yet still as a mere outline of its most prominent features, not crowded with names, but giving a general idea of its natural appearance, with its largest mountains, rivers, towns, &c. Several countries should be gone over in the same way by skeleton maps and conversational instruction. From these smaller natural and political divisions, the eye and the mind should gradually expand over its larger features until they embrace a knowledge of the vast continents and oceans of which the entire globe consists. Nor should his physical knowledge be bounded by our own planet any more than his moral ideas circumscribed by temporal considerations. The earth should appear in its proper position as part of the solar system, and the elements of astronomy succeed to a general knowledge of geography, and naturally evolve out of it. Lessons on the globes are a natural sequence to those on maps, and many of these principles may now be taught; but the
construction of maps upon correct principles, and the
problems on the globes, depend upon a certain know-
ledge of mathematics that ought previously to be ac-
quired, in order to a systematic study and accurate know-
ledge of these branches.

Besides this inductive method of leading the mind on
from place to place until it has embraced the earth’s
surface, like a traveller starting from home to circum
navigate the globe, the same principle must guide the
instructor in analyzing any particular locality; such as,
from the natural advantages and resources of a place
its wealth and commercial importance may be inferred,
or the latter traced to the former. “Physical geography,”
says Dr. Kay in his report of the Training School at
Battersea, “has been deemed the true basis of all instruc-
tion in the geography of industry and commerce—which
ought to form the chief subject of geographical instruc-
tion in elementary schools. The tutor has first endea-
voured to convince the pupils that nothing which presents
itself to the eye in a well-drawn map is to be regarded as
accidental,—the boldness of the promontories, the deep
indentures of the bays, the general bearings of the coast,
are all referable to natural laws. In these respects, the
eastern and western coasts of England are in striking con-
trast—in appearance, character, and in the circum-
stances which occasion their peculiarities. The physical
geography of England commences with a description of
the elevation of the mountain ranges, the different levels,
and the drainage of the country. The course, rapidity,
and volume of the rivers are referable to the elevation
and extent of the country which they drain. From the
climate, levels, and drainage, with little further matter,
the agricultural tracts of the country may be indicated,
and when the great coal-fields and the mineral veins, and
beds, the depth of the bays and rivers are known, the distribution of the population is found to be in strict relation to certain natural laws. Geography taught in this way, is a constant exercise to the reasoning powers. The pupil is led to trace the natural dependence of facts which, in ordinary instruction, are taught as the words of a vocabulary. Geography, taught in the ordinary way, is as reasonable an acquisition as the catalogue of a museum which a student might be compelled to learn as a substitute for natural history. The intelligent tutor should feel himself bound to explain to his pupil the natural dependence of the facts which the map presents to the eye. Thus it is easy to explain why certain tracts are rich pastures, why others are arable; to account for the climate, productions, industry, and commerce of such a county as Lancashire, and to read its history in the natural features of its hills, valleys, streams, coal-beds, rivers, and western site. London, originally the outport to Europe, now the outport to the world, presents a great problem equally instructing and useful to work, compared with which the facts of its being the capital of England and situated on the Thames (ordinarily taught,) are as the cipher detached from the numerical power. Its tidal river, carrying vessels into the heart of the land, its position in relation to the old Norman possession of the conquerors of the country, its subsequent position between the commerce of Europe and the richest tracts of England, the facilities which it affords equally for commerce with the East and West Indies, the resources it derives from the Northumberland and Durham coal-fields, without which its prosperity would suffer a grievous blow from the rivalry of other outports to which coal-beds are readily accessible,—these and a multitude of other considerations, too numerous to relate in this place, constitute that lesson in geography
which the mention of London suggests. Its very place on the map is determined by natural laws of the most positive character, and capable of strict definition. In like manner, but in more general terms, the great streams of our commerce are described and accounted for. The colonies of England form the first step beyond this country, and beyond a general description of the world, and then follow those nations with which we have the most intimate commercial connexion. Thus geography is examined in relation to the great commercial activity of England and the influence of our industry in the Christian civilisation of the world. For the delivery of this course of instruction, the present books and maps are found exceedingly defective. No good school books on geography exist, and the maps at present in use are mere outlines, neglecting most of the great features of physical geography, which is the basis, first of the geography of commerce and industry, and then, in a natural series, of that statistical and political geography which should form a prominent element of the instruction given in schools for the middle classes.

It will be observed that such a course of geography is entirely of a practical character, and it is the report of a school for the middle classes; but the very same principle and the same method ought to be followed in every school, up to this point. And even in a more extensive course, and as far as the study is carried, the same view to practical utility and the same principles of induction should be sedulously adhered to.

History.—Much of this may be taught incidentally, during a course of geography. The latter has, indeed, been called the eyes of the former, as in reading history, unless one sees in his mind, or on a map, the particular places where certain events happened, many of their
details must be unintelligible. Geography presents to view the theatre and scenery of the world, and history introduces the actors upon the stage. Such is the order of nature, too, for the world was prepared for the reception of man before he was created to enter upon its possession. Geography, for this and other reasons, should therefore be taught antecedently to history, and the latter postponed to a maturer age.

The ordinary way of teaching it, indeed, may be entered upon at any age, as it is little more than a mere effort of memory, recalling lists of kings, battles, civil and ecclesiastical rebellions, the overthrow of governments and dynasties, with the rise of new ones, without descending to a nation's social and moral aspect, and deriving thence lessons beneficial for individual and national practice. Such a method, even when understood—which it seldom is—gives the merest outline of a nation's physical character. It is like studying geography by merely looking at the prominent features of the earth's surface, without considering its internal resources, and the adaptation of these to the service and benefit of the human race; or expecting to find from the description of an individual's bodily appearance, those mental and moral characteristics that alone constitute the worth and excellence of man.

There is much, no doubt, in the narrative parts of history that finds a ready access to the sympathies and understandings of children;—as the excitement of battles, the hardships and perils of armies, the bravery of individuals, and the shock of war. But in a moral point of view, it is very questionable whether such descriptions should be read before the mind has acquired penetration enough to ascertain the causes and necessity of such contests. The combativeness of our nature is easily
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evoked by such means, and hatred and revenge against another people, whom we call an enemy, are the sure consequences of its undue excitement. These feelings, when much indulged, may be easily abstracted from a hostile nation and manifested towards individuals, on occasion. To commit such reading into the ‘hands of a child, therefore, without explaining the dire necessity of war only in extreme cases, is holding up to him a mirror reflecting the worst features of humanity, and unconsciously alluring him to copy such in his own conduct. The terms in which such deeds are recorded, too, have a pernicious tendency in captivating the young mind. Children who have seen a regiment of soldiers, arrayed in all the paraphernalia of dress and equipage, performing their marches and evolutions, amid the glitter of arms and the rolling strains of music, cannot but be delighted with the magnificent spectacle, and have their sympathies favourably enlisted. They cannot penetrate beneath the gilded surface and scan the purpose of so much display; and when they peruse accounts of battles and victories, couched in equally dazzling terms, the mind is also seduced from the horrors of those scenes that must have previously been enacted, or even led to regard the strife of the combatants with eager delight. But the same principle of animalism would be gratified only in an inferior degree by the details of a pugilistic encounter, or a cock-fight. Such accounts administer fuel to the latent animal passions, and awaken the instinct of imitation, prompting to give vent to them on the first opportunity. It is long before a child sees any ulterior end to be gained by such engagements, beyond the mere gratifying of passion; and until he sees them in their true nature he should not be indulged with many details of them. He should be taught to look upon
them rather as the terrible effects of misguided passion, avarice, and pride.

The causes for such a dire necessity as that of war, should be inferred from familiar examples, such as the defence of ourselves and property and the lives and properties of our neighbours, the advantages of social union in cases of danger, the abandonment of self-interest to promote a general good, and, as the highest of all sacrifices, the exposing and laying down of life for the service and benefit of others. Thus may the devotion of an army or navy be seen in a general sense—as the defence of the institutions of a country; but it is a more difficult task to reconcile most of the individual wars and battles of a nation with the principles of humanity and justice. Too many of these originate in the mere caprice of a monarch, the grasping ambition of a conqueror, or a nation's desire for aggrandisement.

To read history aright, therefore, it is equally necessary to point out the errors and defects which adhere to a national character, as in biography to show the vices and crimes which blend with the better qualities of an individual. History is, indeed, but the biography of the universal man, whose vices and virtues are the aggregate vices and virtues of individuals. The morality or immorality of a nation's acts is, therefore, the same in kind as that of an individual's, though varied in degree according to the extent and consequences of such acts. But how differently are people accustomed to regard the same action done collectively and individually! To take away the life of a fellow-creature, even in self-defence, is viewed with considerable disgust; but when an invading army is cut to pieces, it becomes a theme for glory and exultation. One stands aghast at the perpetration of a single murder, but calmly reviews the carnage of a battle-field,
where thousands fall; and while a petty theft or burglary
is regarded with due abhorrence, the conquest of a terri-
tory is hailed with delight. The individuals who figure
in such enterprises, too, are lauded as heroes and covered
with rewards and honours, while the private assassin or
robber is deservedly execrated and punished. But the
principles of virtue and vice are of universal extent, and
bend not thus to the conventional policy of nations. If
the solitary robber must be amenable to a higher law
than the desires and passions of his own mind, in the
law of his country, so should the legislators and govern-
ment of a country recognise in all their proceedings the
eternal decrees of justice and morality. Necessary it is,
therefore, in teaching history, to guard against indulging
too much in those details of bloodshed and misery so
thickly bestrewing its pages, lest the mind become ani-
malised by such representations, and blinded to the
fearful criminality of war.

The question, then, is, how should history be studied;
and that is a question perhaps more easily answered nega-
tively than affirmatively. There are no proper school-
books of history, and there can be none without giving
many a dark picture of humanity. Yet, as in the char-
acter of the basest individual there are generally some
redeeming points worthy of our imitation, so in the his-
tory of nations, tarnished as it is with so many foul
deeds, numberless examples of the highest virtues are
yet to be found. It is not, however, among the kings and
great men of the earth that such instances most frequently
appear; and a nation's greatness and true glory may as
often be traced to the combined operations of the hum-
blest individuals of the community, as to those of its
governments and rulers. These are but the results of a
nation's welfare and prosperity; the outworks and em-
battlements thrown around society for its defence and security, but depending no less for their stability upon the skill and industry of those who erected them, than the nature of the materials of which they are composed.

Now inductive teaching leads the mind to trace consequences to their minutest causes. It does not merely tell of the existence of the vast coral reef, but shows the nature of the insect's operations, and, from less to more, deduces the principles upon which the mighty structure arose. It analyzes the towering oak into the gases and juices of which it is composed, and mentally arranges them into the huge trunk and wide-spreading branches. It also resolves the greatness, wealth, power, talents, and goodness of individuals into the operation of minute causes and the diligent application of the smallest means. It shows the genius of a Newton expanding by the direction of its incipient energies to the little machines he constructed when a boy, and the keen scrutiny he bestowed upon the commonest occurrences to find out their causes, and from thence deriving those data upon which future discoveries were based, thus laying the foundation of almost the entire fabric of the modern sciences of optics, and astronomy. It shows the active benevolence of a Howard receiving its first impulse when he lay a prisoner upon the cold stone floors of his miserable dungeon at Brest, and the sympathy he there felt for his fellow-sufferers carried into action in the representations he made to the English government, the comfortable cottages and schools he built on his own property for the poor, and the long journeys he undertook to ascertain the state of jails in his own and other countries, till at length an entire reform of prison discipline was effected throughout Europe. The success of individuals in every department of life, may be
equally shown to be the result of care and diligence in small things; and in all such biographical notices, examples are given how we, too, may benefit ourselves and others. So in history, or universal biography, unless it be taught inductively, it cannot become a practically useful study. It gives the experience of the past for the guidance of the future, but unless the causes of a nation's prosperity be shown, it cannot afford to us a practical lesson for our guidance. There is little use in teaching a mere number of facts and statistical details of kings and governments, wars and conquests, with the rise and fall of states and dynasties, unless the causes of such events be also shown, and their beneficial or prejudicial consequences upon society traced. To teach history in any other way is merely to know a nation as it is or has been, while the true object is to know how it became so, that the same means may be again employed or avoided to gain prosperity or avoid adversity.

The same illustration of method might be continued through all the other branches of study, as well as the preceding. I have merely taken up these few, as being common to almost all classes of schools: in places where the elements of modern science are taught, improved plans of teaching have naturally followed their adoption. Into a general knowledge of these sciences, however, and the best plans of teaching them, must the student at a normal institution be also initiated.

But a still further knowledge of his art is necessary, than a mere acquaintance with this its instrumental practice. He must have, no less, an acquaintance with the object upon which his art has to be applied. He must have an acquaintance with the principles of mental and moral philosophy and physiology, and be a deep student of human character, from his own observation of which he
must deduce his own principles of guidance, that he may be able to accommodate and modify his normal lessons to every variety of character presented to him. No teacher is able, nor, if able, ought to tie himself down to carry out the same details of any system in all cases. These must be left to be regulated in an infinity of ways, by the ever-varying circumstances of the pupils. There is no universal gauge for human intellect.
CHAPTER XII.

The preceding analysis has been chiefly confined to an inquiry into the nature of the instruments of education, their fitness for the work, and the manner in which they ought to be applied, or are misapplied. And on the whole it may be subjoined, that, until lately, they were seldom if ever found engaged upon the right part of the work, or if so, adequate to it, which indeed is but an inference from the fact, that the operators themselves were untaught and inexperienced artists. Let us now shortly examine the nature of the work to be done by these instruments,—the subject to be educated by these branches.

Suppose, then, a sculptor got into his hands a block of marble fresh from the quarry, and that it was his design to operate upon it in forming an image, he would first naturally examine into the nature of the material itself. He would see whether there were any blemishes or deficiencies in the mass. If there were, he would scrutinise the nature of them, and ascertain how far they might be repaired or dressed over, so as not materially to mar the image he had in view to make. He would test the hardness or softness of its grain, and discover its capability of being wrought, and according to the nature of its stamina would he consider what instruments could best be brought to bear upon it; if of a hard and difficult
texture, he would use keen-edged tools and apply more strength,—if soft, more dexterity of hand. Besides, according to that member of the statue on which he was engaged, would he require a particular kind of instrument. To rough-hew the amorphous mass, he would apply the larger and less highly-polished tools: to chisel out an arm, or a leg, differently edged instruments. To carve a neck, a chin, a cheek, and an eye, around which "all the graces might flutter," more delicately polished and finer instruments still; and at this part of the process, his own ingenuity and skill would be taxed to the utmost, in giving a peculiar expression of character and countenance, according to the model of some image he had in his eye. And it need not be added, that not only according to the native excellence of the material, but the artist's skill, would be the perfection of that character, and the general elegance and grace of the statue.

This block of marble, then, brought to the studio, is a child sent to school; the sculptor is the trainer, and the instruments for operating upon him are the different branches of education. It is a human being, naturally in a rude and inert condition; yet having the germs of all those faculties in perfect existence, each in its degree, by which he may ultimately attain so high a rank in the scale of creation. To call forth these into full activity and energy, and to add grace and refinement to their practical uses, is the office of a trainer. Now, as the external appliances of art were necessary in the case of the statue, otherwise it would still have remained a shapeless mass, so also must care, attention, and proper means be employed, to develop and bring out the latent faculties of the living image. True, these would grow of themselves to a certain extent, and in a certain direction; yet without
extrinsic and guiding influences, they would naturally exhibit the rankness of a wilderness, whereas by proper artificial guidance, they might be compared with the bloom and fertility of a garden.

Thus much every one admits, and while it is also granted, that "the proper study of mankind is man," it is not so easily decided what man is, what are the separate elements of his constitution, and consequently how that study should be conducted. It cannot, indeed, be said, that the study of man has been neglected. His bodily powers and spiritual faculties have been the subject of investigation almost since time began. But no results, corresponding to such labours, have yet been obtained from the erroneous methods of inquiry ever adopted. Like other sciences, man's nature was examined hypothetically, rather than analytically. Theories were assumed, and attempted to be solved by facts, instead of facts being made the basis of correct opinions; and until the principles of inductive philosophy were applied in the analysis, but comparatively few sound conclusions were ever obtained. Scholastic logic and metaphysics exhausted their weapons of argument in splitting his thoughts and sentiments, his powers and capacities, into fragments innumerable, out of which many systems of abstract philosophy arose, gratifying, perhaps, to the speculative mind to investigate, but shedding a very dim and imperfect light upon the practical moralities of life. The science of mental philosophy is, therefore, still in its infancy. The late discoveries in chemistry, indeed, with the revelations of anatomy, have thrown much light on the material organs of the body, and an onward progress of discovery is still making with regard to his mental powers. And it is only by a continuation of a similar process, that the anatomy of mind will lead to any sound
results. Man must be regarded as an animal, before examined as a rational being—as a material agent before an immaterial. In anatomy, the student first operates upon the larger features of the human frame, the osseous and muscular systems, and by degrees pursues his inquiries into the minuter ramifications of the nerves and blood, with all their wondrous mechanism and functions; and alike must the mental student first regard the more obvious functions of the mind, and from what is known of these, and palpable to observation, ascend to its more spiritual operations. It seems, indeed, to be at the point where anatomy and physiology fail in the scrutiny for want of data, that mental philosophy, guided by other light, prosecutes the search. Anatomy discovers effects from their causes, functions from their organs, and when no more organs are seen, the investigation drops; but mental philosophy, though equally inductive, traces effects back to their causes, the thoughts to a thinking power, and that power to a bodily organ. The latter science, however, is unquestionably based upon the former, and arises out of it; consequently, a considerable knowledge of the corporeal frame is necessary to ascend into the higher regions of thought and feeling. But in this department of the human constitution, there is still a "terra incognita" over which fancy and conjecture alone hold sway. It is, therefore, natural to expect that much difference of opinion will prevail, regarding certain modes of educing those powers and faculties, the separate existence of which is not acknowledged by all. That the mind and the moral powers are affected and controlled by the brain to a certain extent, all admit; but that each of the mental faculties has a separate section of the brain as its appropriate organ, is a doctrine peculiar to phrenology. To take the still popular view of
the case, then, there are faculties of different kinds belonging to the whole constitution of man. Many of these, from a similarity in their modes of operation, may be referred to the same origin, namely, that which is strictly called mind; others, having functions also peculiar to themselves, are denominated moral and religious feelings; while a third class, having reference more particularly to the powers of the body, are styled physical faculties. This triple division of man is now used by all—phrenologists and anti-phrenologists, under the terms physical, mental, and moral, and as there is no other common ground on which all parties can meet harmoniously, it is so far a good thing; and it may also be added, that, standing upon this platform, many an opponent of the science of phrenology has plucked and appropriated much of its fruit, even while denouncing the science itself. Without expressing an opinion on either side, therefore, I shall take the liberty of assuming the same common ground.

Yet, while the general correctness of this three-fold division may be admitted, it is no less certain that the boundary line between each department is far from being clearly ascertained, and much more obscure is the demarcation between many of the separate faculties themselves. "Shade unperceived so mingles into shade," that, like a ray of light falling upon a prism, by which the eye obtains a view of its several colours without perceiving a clear distinction between them, this triple view of man, while it in some degree unfolds his separate powers, gives but an imperfect view of his whole nature. And the reason is simply to be found in the absolute unity of that nature, however complicated its organism, and various its faculties.

Another important division of man is, that of his
action and passion—feeling and exercise. Man acts and is acted upon by external causes through all his faculties. The knowledge of a mere opinion existing in the mind of another regarding him, will inflict the liveliest feeling of pain or joy, while the outward action of his own mind will produce a corresponding effect upon others. An east wind will make him fretful and irascible; a cloudy day melancholy and sad; a glow of sunshine will awaken bright hopes and prospects within himself; and prompt to the performance of benevolent actions towards his fellow-men, and this to an extent of which few people are aware. It is, therefore, no untrue statement, that "man is the creature of circumstances;" the proposition only wants conclusiveness by omitting to add, that these circumstances are also the creatures of God. Now, for a grown individual to fortify himself against these and all other contingencies is self-training, proceeding from a knowledge of their nature and effects. But a child cannot know anything of external nature, and is, therefore, a mere passive subject, moulded and modified according to their plastic influences. Hence the necessity of a preventive discipline to ward off their evil effects, and the application of a fostering hand, to bring to perfection those inherent preventive qualities—those antidotes that are in embryo in every human being. And a more beautiful link in the chain of Providence does not exist, than where the affections of a mother are called in at this point to fill up the gap. How unfortunate is it, therefore, for the well-being of the human race, that these natural affections are so often cramped and turned aside by her own artificial education and habits! She is nature's own statuary, who alone can throw a sufficient enthusiasm into her labours; for with her it is all a labour of love, and were this love and enthusiasm always
directed aright, the statue, in time, would arrive at the acme of human perfection. But to the task of training her offspring she brings the prejudices of her own early nurture; the secret promptings and desires of her heart must be kept in abeyance to the omnipotent dictates of fashion; her very love and enthusiasm must be moderated and chilled into coldness, and the image rises under her hands a model of fashionable manners and breeding, perhaps, but as far removed from the simplicity of nature, as a caricature from a correct picture. And what a false idea it is to imagine that a parent can *spoil* her child by too much love and affection. It is the very atmosphere the child breathes, and upon which its moral nature depends for life and health—the sunshine of a summer day to a delicate flower, compared with the bleakness of winter; and the advantages of affection to the former are scarcely less physical than warmth to the latter. Such, indeed, are the appliances by which the moral character of the child first assumes a definite shape—and, like the statuary guiding his hand according to the nature of his material, so must the parent her affections, but enlightened and guided by reason these must be ever at work, to mould and fashion that moral character aright.

To produce a perfect image in statuary, too, all the members of the figure must be perfect. No leg, nor arm, nor eye, must want its appropriate chiselling. So is it in the compound living image man, who requires an education suited to the development of all his powers—physical, mental, and moral. It is, therefore, the province of the trainer to operate upon each of these in yielding assistance to nature. Figuratively speaking, they must be drawn out, and as the sculptor, out of his previously unshapen material, develops the features of a countenance, so must a character be engraven upon the child by means of
its own inherent but passive faculties. Each and all of them must receive attention, must be exercised upon legitimate objects, and brought into healthy action, before the whole man can be said to have received an education.

The pedestal, then, upon which the whole living image is based, and out of which its character and habits all evolve, consists of the bodily powers, and these consequently are the first to demand the attentive examination of the trainer. It is not intended here to enter much into the subject of nursery training, as that has been anticipated in a previous part of this work; which, too, is rather the province of the medical than of the scholastic profession; but unquestionably, with a knowledge of the bodily wants of children, a nurse ought to have some acquaintance in developing the mental and moral dispositions of her charge, otherwise the school trainer will have much to undo before commencing his task.

The end and object of physical training is simply to secure a sound and healthy body; but it has other consequences depending upon it, for without a sound and vigorous frame, the mind will also assume a corresponding tone of unhealthiness. On the mother and the nurse, therefore, devolves this earliest duty. And it is not enough that kindness and affection be brought to the task; a certain knowledge of the human frame must guide the mother in all her treatment. When it is estimated that about two-fifths of young children die before attaining their fifth year, there is a pretty sure indication that some part of the nursery system is wrong in all cases. And in many instances, the most careless observer cannot fail to see the cause of much of this infantile mortality. The pernicious custom of giving children alcoholic drinks, careless exposure to cold and heat, im-
proper food, and light or improper clothing, are but a few of these causes. Nor ought the habits of the nurse to be less attended to, as these are the fountains whence spring so many of the child's habits, and, like a barometer indicating the state of the weather, the health of her constitution may in a great degree point out that of the child. And whatever injures or benefits the former, has a corresponding influence upon the latter.

"For the due development of the muscular system of an infant, its dress should sit light and easy upon its person, and its limbs should be allowed free play on all possible occasions. The restless movements of an infant, the tossing about of its head, arms, and limbs, are to be considered as merely impulses of nature, directing it to exercise, and in consequence strengthen its muscular system. These movements should rather, therefore, be encouraged than repressed. Care should be taken that it is not too soon allowed to bear its own weight, as the natural consequence is bending the still soft bones of the leg, which may thus become deformed for life. Whenever a child of proper age is unable to bear its own weight, or walk without this effect following, we may be sure that its general health is defective; and it is a more immediate and pressing duty to take measures for remedying this effect than to attempt to keep the limbs straight by mechanical appliances.

"The work of physical education must go on till the body is brought to the highest perfection of which its powers are capable. For this purpose, the skin, the lungs, the digestive organs, and the muscular system, ought each to have a proper share of attention. There must also be a due supply of fresh and pure air, a regulation of the appetite for food, and exercising of the muscular frame. Under this latter head, falls all the
science of exercise—walking, riding, running, leaping, swinging, skating, dancing, fencing, cricket, ball-play, &c. The importance of these to health in the full development of the muscles and improvement of the frame, has been long known, and by some nations steadily practised. The perfect forms of the Greeks and Persians were the result of this branch of education, and received a large share of national attention. Ample provision for such exercises should be made in all seminaries of education, infant and more advanced."*

But a higher object than mere physical development is gained by such exercises. Every one admits that a certain influence is exercised upon the mind by the body, and the more closely the subject is examined, the connexion will appear the more striking. The flame of a candle is, indeed, not more dependent for its strength and brightness upon the volume and purity of the materials supporting its combustion, than the mental and moral conduct of children upon their bodily frames, and preparatory physical training. Nor is this at all strange, when it is considered that the mind is not only dependent upon the body for its manifestations, but its acquirements, —not only for fulfilling its desires, but creating them. Every idea communicated to the mind from without, is admitted by one or other of the senses; and every idea conceived by the mind, passes without, also by the aid of a material organ. It is evident, therefore, that an injury to any one of the senses, will prevent the admission of knowledge to a certain extent; and to the same extent disintegrate the unity of the mind's operations, lessen its exercise, and weaken its powers. The more

* Chambers.
of these avenues of sense that are shut up, the scantier will be the mind's acquirements, and its growth and operations correspondingly retarded.

Different only in degree is it, then, that an impaired condition of these bodily organs, prevents the mind's growth and development, by presenting to it for reflection, incorrect or insufficient images of external objects. Or the same evil may be induced by a perversion of their uses; an undue excitement of them, or a neglect of their exercise. Thus, sensations proceeding from external causes, may affect the mind disagreeably and prejudicially, from the diseased channels through which they pass.

But many of our sensations, also, arise from the internal organs as well as external objects, and these, if the organs be impaired or excited, may be as injurious to the mind as the former. When any one drinks a certain quantity of intoxicating liquors, the circulation of the blood is quickened, the vessels of the brain are compressed, pleasurable sensations arise, and the mind becomes more rapid in its thoughts and conceptions; an additional quantity of alcohol will induce upon the mind a temporary madness, or entirely suspend its operations in sleep. The reaction again from such a state of mental activity, is a corresponding listlessness, and slowness of conception, equally the result of sensations proceeding from a state of nervous relaxation. These different mental conditions obviously enough proceed entirely from bodily causes, but a vast number of other frames of mind, less perceptible, are equally produced by impressions proceeding from the bodily frame. These states of mind, therefore, may be induced and become habitual either by organic and constitutional diseases,
or by improper treatment of the soundest constitution. To the former, alleviating moral influences can only be applied, but the latter may be counteracted by an opposite course of physical training.

And if the mental faculties thus suffer through bodily deficiency and misguidance, much more serious is the moral depravity arising from the same causes. The animal wants must first be satisfied to a certain extent before the moral desires and aspirations spring up. If an insufficiency of food, air, and exercise be given to the body, the system languishes, and the moral feelings are the first to die. These cannot live healthily in a weakly and diseased frame. The patient's attention is constantly absorbed by emotions from within, and all his efforts of mind and body are directed to the satisfying of these. It may be that he knows not what he wants, but that he wants something he feels, and while that feeling is unappeased, he has room for no other desire. The want of sufficient physical gratification, too, in early years, lays the foundation of permanent bodily infirmities; and as these incessantly, though perhaps unconsciously, engross a partial attention, the moral feelings are to that extent neglected, biased, and prejudiced through life.

But the early feeling of selfishness thus created also increases in itself, and from a mere ungratified wish to obtain some necessary want, grows into a feeling of absolute selfishness. In the same manner some local infirmity or disease acting upon the nerves, generates and perpetuates ill-temper and peevishness. It has been mentioned that the cries of an infant are its only means of obtaining relief to its wants, and if these are unattended to, or unable to be satisfied, its complaints become more frequent, until a habit of fretfulness is formed, leading it to be dissatisfied not only with itself but every one around.
Of course the same remarks apply to the reaction produced by pampering children. It is therefore a first law in our nature, that a certain amount of self-gratification must be obtained before the feelings overflow in desires for the welfare and happiness of others. If a man's income does not supply his own necessities, justice forbids that he bestow it upon others less necessitous. The feeling that would prompt him to do so is not a natural and healthy benevolence. It may be induced by a false sympathy, but the true morality of religion springs from an exercise of the natural feelings alone, and these can only have a sure foundation in the well-balanced physical constitution, and the proper gratification of its necessary wants.

But habits both mental and moral may be formed from a reaction of the mind upon the body, as well as from bodily action upon the mind. As the latter is an instrument for accomplishing the desires of the mind, much therefore depends upon its capacity for such a purpose. If an injury to the body affects the acquirements of the mind, so does it also affect its manifestations,—if the instrument be unsound its operations will be imperfect.

A brief review of the bodily structure will clearly demonstrate its entire subserviency to the mind. It is based upon a framework of bones, an apparently simple piece of mechanism, but wonderful when its adaptations of means to an end are considered. Its different parts are united by joints exquisitely fitted and bound together by strong, light, and flexible ligaments. These bones, in themselves motionless and inert, have muscles and tendons attached to them as their moving agents. But these are also dependent upon a higher source for power to act. Among the muscles, and attached to them, lie the nerves, an infinite number of thread-like substances all branching
to and from the brain and spinal cord, which serve the purpose of communicating motion to the muscles and bones. Still these are but the messengers or media of conveying the moving power, which itself resides in the spinal cord, a prolongation of the brain. But though that power resides there, the brain is of itself equally inert with the bones, and cannot evoke this influence without an exercise of volition—that mysterious principle of the mind which seems the presiding deity over the whole temple of the body. A natural sequence to this inquiry is, What then influences the will? and it is affected by foreign causes, but it is not necessary at present to trace the connexion farther.

Speaking metaphorically, then, when the will desires to accomplish a purpose, it lays an injunction upon the brain, which conveys the order to the nerves, and these, communicating with the muscles, immediately set in motion the particular organ required, or the whole body. Thus it appears that the entire power of muscular action resides in the brain, and is evoked thence by an exercise of the will. And when for a moment one reflects upon the huge masses of matter set in motion externally to the human frame by the same mental impulse, and the mighty power for good or evil thus called into action by a simple desire of the will, the vast importance of that part of education is manifest, which endeavours to anticipate the direction of that power in infancy by regulating the desires of the will through a proper attention to a child's physical wants.

The influence mentioned is rendered more obvious from a negative view of the case. If the brain be diseased or unsound, the will becomes isolated, the former being either incapable of transmitting a desire to the nerves, or conveys a false impression, by which some foolish or
wrong action is the result, as in some cases of insanity. When a paralytic person loses the use of his arm, it is not because the muscles or the bones are impaired, neither is it because the will has no desire to set the limb in motion, but there is a chasm between the two; the medium of communication is destroyed in some injury done to the nerves. And if the muscles or bones of any organ be wanting or unsound, the mechanical operation cannot be completed, as in the case of an amputated hand, or a blind eye. The mind, therefore, has full control over the body only when its organism is complete, and according to its efficiency or deficiency as an instrument, will be the manifestation and development of its powers.

Now this imperfection may also exist from a want of training the bodily organs into a co-operation with the mind; and this is that vast hiatus in the system that modern education aims at supplying. The mind may grow in knowledge without gaining in wisdom, may speculate in all the sciences without acquiring a single art. It is an education of the body alone that renders a man wise and skilful, virtuous and active. He must do good to be good, paint to be a painter, play to be a musician, harangue to be an orator, write to be a writer; and in all these and every other art, it is by a training of the nerves and muscles of the appropriate organs that the actions come to be well executed. In a word, if the will, enlightened by knowledge, first guide to the performance of good actions and special arts, it is the performance of them that alone stamps the virtuous or the technical character, and according to the bodily aptitude for such performance will be the perfection of that character.

But apart from the mental and moral evils resulting from an inattention to early physical training, when one reflects upon the vast amount of bodily suffering
entailed upon a child through life, and often perpetuated through several generations, by the same cause, the paramount importance of this branch of education is no less conspicuous. Nor are the few simple rules of health so difficult to be observed, that much of that misery might not be prevented by proper precautions. The four essential elements of health are food, air, cleanliness, and exercise. A certain quantity of nutritious food is necessary to the support, growth, and expansion of the bodily organs. If it be insufficient, either in nutriment or quantity, the blood is deteriorated, and the system languishes. The parent must be guided by medical rules in apportioning the amount of nourishment to the natural wants of his child. But its appetite must also be regulated. For this purpose the food should be supplied at regular intervals, that no extraordinary longings after it, or carelessness about it, may arise. Simple and natural kinds of food should also lay the foundation of a natural appetite, as artificial and stimulating meats speedily induce a false one. It is this false appetite that causes children to eat to excess when their food is of a stimulating nature, or when the appetite is stimulated by various kinds of food; the consequences of which are, an oppression of the digestive organs, and a corruption of the blood, laying the foundation of a whole train of special diseases, and permanently injuring the digestive powers themselves. The same evils result from partaking too frequently or too largely of indigestible substances, as pastry, oleaginous, dried, and pickled food, much fruit, especially the kernels of nuts, &c.; and of drinks, those containing much alcohol should of course never be taken even in the smallest quantities.

There are thus two different kinds of evils to be avoided in the regulation of diet,—a pampering and an under gra-
tification of the appetite, satiety and inanition. In most
cases the one springs from the poverty of the parents, and
is thus almost beyond control; the other is generally the
result of that blind love of offspring leading a parent to
grant his child all its desires without reflecting upon the
ultimate consequences; and this might easily be remedied
by a little self-denial, if such parents would consider that
nothing so certainly spoils children in every sense of the
term as pampering and satiety.

Air.—No less necessary is it, that this element inhaled
into the lungs be pure, than the food taken into the
stomach nutritious, as both are essential to the composi-
tion and purifying of the blood, and through it of imparting
health and vigour to the general frame. The air is only
suitable for supporting life agreeably, when a fifth part of
its composition is oxygen gas. When it has less, it is
unable to supply the blood with a sufficient quantity of
the life-giving principle, which thus becomes impure,
generating weakness and disease through the system; and it may still further be contaminated by an admixture
of unwholesome gases exhaled from refuse substances in
impure localities, which gases taken into the lungs act as
a slow poison. Now, in a crowded room where no con-
tinuous supply of fresh air is admitted, the requisite
proportion of oxygen is soon diminished, when every
breath that is drawn conveys into the lungs the sure
elements of disease. Hence the greater necessity of ven-
tilation in crowded places, and especially schools, where
children remain so many hours every day. No mental or
moral instruction can have much benefit upon children
whose frames have become relaxed and languid from
sitting in an ill-ventilated and crowded schoolroom. The
bodily instrument is out of tune, and responds not to the
voice of the instructor. The system should at such
times be reinvigorated by a run into the open air, and braced anew by some muscular exercise.

Impure air is bad to all ages, but doubly pernicious to young children. In grown-up people the system is consolidated, and the organs formed, and though for a time it may derange their functions, a change of air may again restore these to healthy operation, and the organs themselves be unimpaired. But it is to the very formation of these organs in children, that pure air is partly necessary. Oxygen gas is the life-giving aliment of the blood, and if it be deprived of a due share of this, the organs formed out of that blood must be correspondingly undeveloped and feeble; not only will their functions be impaired, but themselves arrested in growth. To crowd children into ill-ventilated schools, therefore, is an untraining and a demoralising of them rather than anything else.

The same principle applies to the vast numbers of children and grown people huddled together in the lanes and by-streets of large towns and cities amidst accumulations of filth and every impurity. Not only are the wretched houses of such people badly ventilated, but what air gains admittance to them comes impregnated with the noxious exhalations of the neighbourhood, carrying the seeds of disease and death into their very presence. No less necessary, then, is some municipal arrangement for providing places of resort in the vicinity of such towns, where the pent-up inhabitants might occasionally breathe the unadulterated air of heaven, and obtain recreation, than a playground and gymnastic exercises for exhausted school children. It would open up a safety valve not only for the physical diseases, but the crimes of a community. These remarks, however, are now trite and cognisant to every one; the great difficulty is to inspire directors of schools and guardians of a city with a motive
sufficient to impel them to action, in carrying such knowledge into effect.

The next indispensable element of health is cleanliness. Cleanliness of person, dress, and dwellings, is, like the former, not only healthful but moralising. If it is not absolutely a virtue, it is, at least, the source of much virtuous conduct. The skin is an organ for cleansing the body by carrying off the superfluous and waste matter from its internal parts. It is, for this purpose, perforated with innumerable apertures, and when kept clean and the pores open, there is a constant discharge proceeding from them. This may be seen by any one putting his finger inside a clear tumbler, or near the glass of a window, which speedily gets dimmed from the vaporous exhalations passing through the skin. Now if a free exit be not given to this matter, it is thrown back upon the other excretory organs; and to get rid of it by other channels these are forced into undue action, producing weakness in themselves and communicating specific diseases to the vessels of the bowels and lungs. Being somewhat of an oily nature, too, this excretory matter naturally leaves a deposit upon the surface of the pores, and if unremoved the skin would become in a certain degree impervious, not unlike an oilcloth. This organ must, therefore, be kept in a fit state to perform its functions. It must be bathed and cleansed and brushed, that it may be able to effect the same purifying office to the rest of the frame. It is incalculable how much disease might be prevented by a proper attention to bathing and cleansing the skin. But how many persons actually live on from year to year, and even pass through life, without a more general ablution than that of the hands and face, and, perhaps, occasionally their feet! Regular baths may not be accessible to all, but
every one may have at times an opportunity of sponging the surface of his body with water and rubbing it, thus using the means of bracing the system against the attacks of coughs, colds, and other internal complaints, besides many of those cutaneous diseases produced by the accumulated impurities of the skin's surface.

The teeth ought, also, to be kept carefully clean, not only for the sake of appearance but a pressing necessity. Those particles of food left upon their surface and interstices generate, it is said, animalcules of the coral species, which, by raising a crust over the teeth, cause them to decay, producing the severe pains of toothache, and in the end their entire loss. Nothing more is necessary for cleansing the teeth than repeatedly brushing them with pure water. A similar attention to articles of dress is necessary. The perspiration of the skin settling down upon the inner surface of the clothing and pervading it, accumulates other noxious gases, and impregnates, to a certain extent, the atmosphere around the body. Frequent changes of dress are, therefore, next in order to personal cleanliness. The same principle also applies to the interior and exterior of dwellings. From the spongy nature of the atmosphere, it draws up exhalations from whatever impurities may be collected in or about a house, and from the incessant suction of the lungs, these noxious exhalations are almost as certainly conveyed thither and deposited as the seeds of disease.

Nothing, then, but habits of cleanliness will prevent such results, and nothing but a course of training can form such habits. These may be difficult to acquire in grown-up persons of opposite habits, and, from that unwillingness of restraint and recklessness peculiar to children, it may even be to them a troublesome task for a time; but it is a necessary part of the
civilising process of education to overcome such reluctance, and implant in their nature a desire for tidiness and cleanliness. This desire would never be eradicated, and would go far to secure its possessors against a vast amount of physical and moral disorders arising from an opposite disposition. It would make, too, the scanty and even ragged garments of the poorer children less repulsive to themselves and others, their most wretched abodes wear a more smiling aspect, and their self-respect increase—forming the basis of other higher mental and moral improvements accessible, in some degree, to all.

**Exercise.**—An examination of the mechanical properties of the human frame at once leads to the conclusion, that action was its proper design. Man’s body is an instrument, and was therefore intended for use; it was made for labour, and is organised accordingly. If, then, an overtasking of its powers derange their functions and disable them, no less does the rust of inactivity and indolence corrode them. When, therefore, a certain amount of labour or exercise is performed, they are kept free from disease, and health is the consequence. Unlike other instruments, too, the body is not liable to wear and tear by moderate exercise; it is even improved by it. A provision which is made to prevent the former is very obvious in examining the joints. “A limb,” says Dr. Paley, “shall swing upon its hinge, or play in its socket, many hundred times in an hour for sixty years together without diminution of its agility.” Now two provisions are made to prevent the wearing down of the joints by this constant friction;—first, “by the polish of their cartilaginous surfaces, and by the healing lubrication of the mucilage.” But waste substance is also restored by a compensatory process. When a wound is received in
any part of the body, the blood accumulates there in greater quantities, and by an increased assimilating power repairs the damage. In like manner, when a healthy muscle is exercised, it stimulates the blood and attracts it more towards that part, which thus obtains more nourishment than an unemployed muscle, and increases in size, strength, and pliability. It reaps the fruit of its labours, so to speak, in an increase of substance, while another loses even its natural inheritance by inactivity. Whatever limb is more exercised than another, will also become stronger by an increase of muscular energy; and, consequently, of two persons similarly endowed by nature, he whose muscular action is the greater will, other things being equal, be the stronger and healthier man. Instances of this are abundant. The skin upon the soles of the feet is in infancy no harder than the palm of the hand, and would continue through life so, were they not used in walking. The difference in mature life arises from the constant pressure of the soles upon the ground; and it may be added, that the heel and fore part of the foot being more pressed upon than the intervening arch, are harder than that part. Again, the horny palm of a blacksmith was in infancy as tender as that of the finest gentleman, and his strong brawny arm of no greater thickness and solidity than his; but the grasp and wielding of the huge forge hammer make a great difference in manhood. Pugilists, tumblers, and dancers acquire their superior strength and agility by practice alone. The same principle applies to the internal organs. Much of the difference between a sweet voice and a harsh one is often solely attributable to a greater exercise of the vocal organs. Demosthenes is said to have overcome even an organic impediment by severe exercise. And of Adelaide Kemble
it has also been mentioned, that her present full-toned, mellifluous voice was barely tolerable on her first taking lessons.

The nervous system can likewise be improved by a judicious exercise, and this is, perhaps, the greatest advantage that physical training can bestow upon children. It is the true source of courage, without a considerable degree of which, in a world of so much temptation, the best moral impulses are soon subdued. Cowardice and timidity result entirely from a weakness of the nerves. Courage, both physical and moral, spring from their strength and tone. In short, all the powers of the man simultaneously improve by corporeal exercise, though this harmony is promoted in a much higher degree by some exercises than by others.

The mental and moral faculties require an exercise peculiar to themselves, in the same way that the different bodily organs need a specific training. Bodily exercises, therefore, in which the greatest number of the muscles can be called into play, are consequently the best for the body, and, collaterally, for the mind; but those which engage the mind and feelings, along with the body, directly benefit the whole powers. It is the fault of modern gymnastics, that they afford no excitement to the mind; and the same objection applies to those solemn walks, rank and file, taken by a company of boarding-school misses, under the inspection of a governess. In the latter case the mind is unrelaxed from school discipline, and in the former, not occupied. "The great desideratum in physical education is a series of games of an exciting character, arranged so as to develop the different muscles of the body. The mere exercise of the muscles, while the mind is inert or averse, is, comparatively, of little value. The efficiency of exercise
requires the direction of the attention and the muscular effort to the same point, at the same moment. Most of the common sports of children secure this, but they seldom require the operation of more than a particular set of muscles. It would be desirable to have games which should at once interest, exercise various muscles, and keep all the players as active as possible. Foot-ball perhaps is one of the best in common use. It keeps a whole field in high excitement and action. Ball in a fives-court is excellent, but can occupy no more than four at the same time. Leap-frog exercises the muscles of the limbs and loins in running and jumping, and the muscles of the loins and back in supporting. The game of battledore and shuttlecock is excellent for the arms and chest, and should be played with both hands, not only for the development of the left muscles of the thorax, but also for the exercise of the left arm. Cricket is a fine game, but there is little continuous exercise, except for the striker and the bowler. Prison-base, hunt-the-hare, hoops, whipping-tops, are all good, but there is obviously required a set of games which with an interesting purpose, would keep all engaged in them active, give full play to the voice, and call for the exercise of strength and activity in all the different muscles. Whoever shall supply this want will confer a service of no ordinary kind on education."

* Prize Essay by John Lalor, A. B., of Trinity College, Dublin.
performing gymnastics are slowly coming into use. All games of chance should be discountenanced, while those requiring skill and dexterity, and particularly such as promote the kindly and generous affections, courteousness, and forbearance, should be encouraged. The apparatus of games, caps, and books, should each have its appropriate place, and be rigidly kept. These, with various other details, constitute the physical training of the playground, or of the few minutes of relaxation between the hours of study; and it is, therefore, used both as an end and a means. The end for which it is resorted to is to establish and promote health, and, consequently, to invigorate the mind; but it is also, as has been seen, a very powerful means for aiding in the work of moral training.

And even during the course of giving lessons its aid is sometimes needed. Suppose the children getting languid over their studies, nothing so much awakens them to their duty as some smart simultaneous bodily movement.

"Under this head are also included the training to cleanliness and tidiness of person, to proper modes of walking, and sitting, and running, holding a book or slate, and distinct enunciation, both in reading and speaking. Physical training is, therefore, the handmaid of mental and moral discipline, and is no less necessary in the regulation of a school than marching, wheeling, shouldering of arms, and other military evolutions, are to the discipline of an army."*

Now many of these exercises are not always compatible with the mental and moral routine of ordinary teaching schools; but it is no less certain that others of them ought regularly to alternate with mental studies. Mental

* Stow.
exercise is simply a work of the brain, and that organ requires rest and relaxation as well as the overworked arms or legs; with this difference, too, that the danger of injuring it is much more fatal in its consequences than that of overtasking any other of the physical members. But a vast deal of prejudice must be overcome on this point. Children of acute minds, and of a turn for study, are eagerly pushed on and encouraged to persevere in every sort of intellectual attainment, and the brain thus acquires a morbid and restless activity, that, in far more cases than people are aware of, hurries its victim to a premature grave. Precocity has many different stages, and many more children require to be kept back in their studies than people think. The sculptor’s instrument must be gently and dexterously applied to the soft-grained material, otherwise he may not only mar the image, but destroy the material itself. The perfection of a school would, therefore, be a proper blending together and alternating of mental, moral, and physical exercises, in which each of these three faculties should be exercised upon its appropriate objects. But until very lately the latter of these was never thought of as entering into a course of education, and forming a component and necessary part of it. And even yet, many people passing a school during some few minutes of relaxation, and hearing the merry shout and laugh of the temporarily emancipated inmates, go away with conclusions anything but favourable to such an institution. A play-ground or a large hall is, therefore, an indispensable appendage to a training seminary. It is the physical schoolroom, the principal element there communicated should be the pure air of heaven, and the chief study pursued, how best to expand the muscles and brace the nerves. In the regulation of the plays and amusements of children, no little skill
and experience are necessary. They are indeed the best judges of what games are best adapted to their own amusement, but unless a superintendent watch the progress of the players, and minutely inspect their conduct towards one another in some of their games, much moral evil may be the result. It is unquestionably here that moral, no less than physical, training has its most powerful influence. The native character of a boy, sitting at his lesson and more formally under the eye of the master, is more veiled, the child is more on his guard. But at play all reserve is thrown aside, and the genuine feelings, whether good or the reverse, are brought into action. Thus many habits and tendencies, both good and evil, are discovered, which could never otherwise be found out, and opportunities afforded for correcting the one, and calling forth the other. But at play how seldom is it, on the whole, that the bad feelings gain the ascendancy! The natural desire is to please and be pleased, and the generous affections are thus called into exercise, and nourished by the natural warmth of their own action. Compared with mere preceptive morality, the virtuous emotions of the heart are as much more improved and awakened by this natural training, as the natural warmth of the body produced by exercise is superior to that obtained by artificial means.

But to sympathise with children in these sports requires no less an undoing process of a teacher’s own staid habits and sedate manners, than to descend to their level intellectually. The buoyant sallies of youth and childhood are in general far from being in harmony with his own quiet pursuits and tastes, and in order to gratify his ease, a sacrifice must be made too often of those innocent and necessary enjoyments. But it is this unjust restriction, without doubt, that in numberless instances
lays the foundation of premature disease and death. Healthful amusements and bodily activity, even to weariness, are as necessary to the preservation of health, as food and air are to the preservation of life itself. At the same time, it is no less indispensable that the exuberant spirits of some children be restrained and softened down, for as certainly as the denying of their innocent gratification will superinduce an unhealthy frame, so will their unguided indulgence luxuriate into acts of mischief and wickedness. But this is just the province of a trainer, whether he be a master or a parent.

Many writers and teachers allege the necessity of making instruction altogether a matter of amusement. In support of this idea, too, much stress has been laid upon what has been conceived to be the original intention of schools among the Romans and Greeks. Pliny indeed uses the phrase *ludus literarius*, or a literary amusement, for school; and the Greek word *σχολή*, whence our own word is translated, signifies *ease* or *leisure*; but the truth is, there must be a combination of exertion with relaxation in mental pursuits as well as bodily, to secure a healthy tone to the powers of either. This seems, therefore, to be an idea more pleasant in theory than practical in effect. The acquisition of knowledge as an abstract proposition, is doubtlessly a pleasure; and every facility for acquiring that knowledge ought to be afforded. But that school studies in all cases can be made a mere amusement is simply impossible. Habit may render them so, but this habit must first be acquired; and a certain amount of moral inertia overcome in most cases, which is anything but a pleasurable task either to the teacher or the taught. The more philosophic view of the matter is simply to initiate the pupil by easy stages in the business of his education, as an artist.
or mechanic in his trade. If fair means be then employed, there is no doubt of a sufficiently studious bias being given to the mind; but if study be not relieved by play, or be continued too long at one time, or be of a nature in itself repugnant to the young mind, a taste for it never will be acquired, and never ought to be acquired; which is just one of the wise provisions of nature, in which any process of forcing ever defeats its own purpose. It is not always the best sign of a boy that he is fonder of his books than of his play. The mind may grow at the expense of the body, and as a plant shooting up out of a sterile soil, but under a genial atmosphere, "to-day will flourish and to-morrow die;" so the mental powers may thus soon spring to maturity, but unless they derive much of their strength and action from a sound constitution, by inhaling too largely of an atmosphere of science and literature, they may not only as speedily decay, but, at the same time, irrecoverably injure the bodily constitution.
CHAPTER XIII.

The second branch of education according to the preceding division, has a reference to the intellectual nature of man. In tracing the connexion of the moving powers of the body up through the bones, the muscles, the nerves, the spinal cord, and the brain, it was stated that these all depend for action upon the will. It may now further be remarked, that the will presides no less over the actions of the mental faculties than of the bodily; in short, that it governs the whole man. Yet is this will no irresponsible agent, nor less guided in its operations by these same faculties, than are the nerves and muscles by it. It may have the direction of the conduct and movements, but it acts and moves itself by direction. It may be the ruling power, but it must receive power to rule, and that power is vested in the understanding. It is this which suggests motives of action to the will, or moves the will to act. "No man," says Locke, "ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him as a reason for what he does," and this reason must be contained in the understanding. His motives arise, too, from ideas contained in the understanding; upon the correctness or incorrectness of which, must his conduct depend for its propriety, or impropriety. These ideas are only of two kinds, those prepared by the mind itself, or reflective ideas, which are again derived
from others received by the senses, or sensations. Now as these sensations proceed from objects external to the mind and the body, the whole man, properly speaking, is an agent acting to this extent under the influence of external circumstances. But these circumstances are laws ordained and controlled by Providence, and hence the responsibility of man for his conduct to the Great Creator, as an agent acting under his control and government. During the earliest years of his life, however, a term of apprenticeship must be gone through to qualify him for this agency, and until he be so qualified, he is under the control and direction of a subordinate. That subordinate is a parent, or an instructor, whose province it is to guide him into a proper relation to these laws, that by bringing them to bear upon his understanding, it may be enlightened so as to induce the will to perform right actions; and also qualified for judging of the rectitude of these actions when performed. The understanding must be shown in what direction the laws of nature and Providence tend, that the will may be swayed, and the conduct borne along in the same direction; but if a perverted view of these be given, the conduct will exhibit a corresponding obliquity. If in physical motion, the desires of the will may be thwarted by organic derangement, so the operation of these natural laws may also be refracted, and turned aside, by entering the medium of a perverted understanding. Whatever powers of body or mind, then, the will employs in accomplishing a purpose, it must have had a previous motive communicated to it to do so, and that motive would be a reason produced by the understanding. Any reason would be sufficiently moving to the will, but it must have some reason for moving; if that reason be an enlightened one, the right path of conduct will be shown and entered upon, but if
unenlightened, that path is left in darkness. There is, therefore, no part of education more important in its results than the regulation of the understanding, either as regards its acquirements or manifestations, its knowledge or its power.

A general division of the mind into its separate faculties may best point out the course that should be pursued in its guidance. Modern philosophy arranges these faculties into two classes—feelings and intellect. The former are subdivided into propensities and sentiments, and the latter into powers of perception and reflection. The propensities induce desires, inclinations, and instincts, common to the lower animals with man. The sentiments are a higher grade of feelings joined to the propensities, and induce upon them peculiar emotions. Some of these sentiments are also common to man with the lower animals; but what are called superior sentiments are possessed by man alone.

Again, the intellect is divided into perceptive and reflective faculties. The former perceive the existence of external objects, their qualities and relations, also embracing the faculty of language. This order is the earliest developed, and is limited to the acquisition of knowledge. The reflective faculties are two in number, comparison and reason, and are developed at a maturer age. The former, as its name imports, compares ideas together to show their differences and resemblances, and is the source of wit, oratory, and poetry. The latter, and the noblest power of the mind, is reason, that faculty designed to observe cause and effect, deducing thence principles of guidance for the moral conduct, and those laws upon which the whole material universe depends. Reason is thus not only the distinguishing characteristic between man and the lower animals, giving him a power over their
superior physical strength; but it enables him in some degree to turn aside the very course of nature for his own benefit. This branch of the human intellect, too, enables the mind to pry into itself, and examine the laws of its own structure and functions.

Intellectual education, therefore, resolves itself into two branches according to these two divisions of the intellect, the perceptive and reflective powers. A perception of the existence and qualities of objects, is first communicated to the mind by the senses. Look at a little child playing in its mother's lap with a toy; it grasps it with its tiny fingers, and gains a sensation of its hardness; gazes upon it, and receives an impression of its form; puts it to its mouth and tastes it; catches by chance its smell; knocks it against another substance and hears its sound; and there may be seen a process of education going on, from which the instructor may gain his first lesson in the art of teaching. These are the faculties seeking gratification and amusement, and that is the mode to gratify and amuse them. While awake, the senses of a child are ever open to impressions from external objects, and there is an impulse within constantly inciting him to touch, taste, and handle, that he may receive such impressions.

This is a similar instinct of the mind impelling it to obtain knowledge, to that bodily craving which prompts a child to cling to the breast for its material nourishment. The desire should, therefore, be gratified according to its manifestation; but as it would act blindly and might lead to the reception of injurious impressions, it must be guided to suitable objects to imbibe proper impressions. These objects must also be in sufficient number and variety to gratify its ever restless appetite for novelty, and at the same time keep its curiosity awake. But the same
objects must be repeatedly examined, that the mind may gain clear ideas of their identity and characteristics, as it is this which will lead to the formation of clear ideas in general, and even in infancy prevent the mind from becoming the receptacle of a confused mass of imperfect images. It is also the source of clear thoughts and reflections, and the foundation of a correct judgment. These objects should also be presented to a child in a manner to attract his attention, and keep alive his curiosity until he becomes familiar with their sensible qualities. Such an exercise appeals at once to the faculty of perception; and long before any words can be used to convey ideas by representation, these ideas have been gained by observation and have sunk deep into the mind.

The faculty of language is among the latest of the perceptive powers in being developed, and requires even some reflection to aid its manifestations artificially. To gain the name of any object, two things must be presented to the mind, the name and the thing; and the establishing of a connexion between them is a reflective process. The faculty of natural language is indeed a mere instinct common to the lower animals with man, which is developed to a certain extent by imitation; and even the formality of merely pronouncing words without understanding their meaning is little more. It is when language becomes the handmaid of the higher powers, that its instrumentality is fully unfolded.

In conducting these lessons on objects, therefore, it is necessary that a plan be adhered to, according with the laws of the mind's manifestation. When a child is learning to speak, which it does by imitating its parent, there is an instrument developing itself that must be guided in its application, and directed to a proper end. Each object and quality of which the mind has become
cognisant, must receive its appropriate name. And as a repeated view of an object is necessary to fix its identity in the mind, so must its name be repeatedly pronounced in association with the object to identify this connexion. Successive views of the object will then not only call up an idea of that object but its name, and thus awaken the language faculty to exercise and strength. But it is an artificial tendency, so to speak, that is now induced upon the natural faculty, which thus becomes an organ for the language of the mind rather than of the feelings, the latter of which is an instinctive language. To a clearness of apprehension regarding the existence and qualities of objects, there will now be added the commencement of a course of verbal instruction, equally appealing to an existing faculty of the mind. Both powers must, therefore, be educated simultaneously, that each may reflect light upon the other; but in their incipient stages of development, objects and exercises corresponding to their capacities must alone be submitted.

The observing faculties of the mind have been fitly compared to a camera obscura, into which the senses are constantly transmitting miniature pictures of external objects. A condensed view of a portion of nature is thus obtained in a small compass. But the camera must be adjusted to the view, its tube directed towards the objects, and its glasses properly arranged; or by a collocation and disposition of the objects themselves, they must be brought to bear upon the instrument, and be adapted to its focal diameter. In the arrangement of lessons for the observing faculties of children, a similar adaptation must be made—the objects must be placed before them so as to attract their attention, and be of a nature suited to their comprehension. This disposition of the object to the subject of education, is perhaps rather a branch of
method; already treated of; but it may not be extraneous merely to indicate the course pointed out by Mr. Wilderspin, in his infant lessons, so well adapted to the observing faculties in their incipient stages of development.

This is simply the Pestalozzian principle reduced to art, and teaching from objects rather than books; but instead of going into the fields and gleaning knowledge from things scattered abroad, these are condensed into the focus of a school-room. A large collection of objects or specimens of them are fixed upon a number of boards, and presented to the children in a regular series to be examined and named. These boards are about sixteen inches square, and a quarter of an inch thick, and fitted to slide out and in the grooves of a lesson post. The objects or fragments are glued or fastened to the boards with screws or waxed thread, the children are ranged in front of the board, and the teacher stands beside them, with a pointer in his hand. With this he calls attention to a particular article, and when the children have examined it, he names it, and asks them to repeat the name after him—and proceeds so until they can name them all in succession. It is exactly similar to learning the alphabet, and it is, indeed, the alphabet of the book of nature. The order of these lessons is also calculated to induce a habit of induction, and to trace the arts and manufactures from the natural material.

"The first board contains a small piece of gold in its rough state, a piece of gold in its manufactured state, a piece of silver in both states, a piece of copper in both states, a piece of brass in both states, a piece of iron in both states, a piece of steel in both states, a piece of tinfoil, a piece of solder, a screw, a clasp nail, a clout nail, a hob nail, a spike nail, a sparable, and a tack.

"The next board may contain a piece of hemp, a piece of rope, string, bagging, sacking, canvas, hessian, Scotch
sheeting, unbleached linen, bleached linen, diaper linen, dyed linen, flax, thread, yarn, ticking, raw silk, twisted silk, India silk, figured silk, white plain silk, dyed silk, a piece of ribbon, silk cord, silk velvet," &c.

The next board contains cotton in all its varieties, the next all the different kinds of paper, the next a number of wooden animals from the toy warehouses, the next different kinds of wood, prunings of fruit trees, small articles of ironmongery, and he also suggests the dried leaves of the different kinds of trees, &c.

From these and numberless other articles, then, the children carry off a store of ideas and names, and their minds become the repositories of suitable materials for future reflection. It is another link added to the chain of connexion between their minds and the world without, making an impression upon their understandings of a part of nature in miniature, that, according to its depth, must influence their mental conduct through life. Such impressions, if kept alive, will enable them at once to recognise their archetypes in the world and to name them, or in reading or hearing such names of objects to understand them.

A higher exercise than this mere oral nomenclature of things, however, is necessary in a course of lessons on objects. The qualities of things cannot all be known by sight, some must be handled, tasted, smelt, and heard; the other senses must therefore be appealed to, and sensations of these different qualities formed by actual contact. All these sensations of qualities, as well as the objects, must be named, first orally, but also in writing on a black board, and thus seen; not only associating in the mind spoken, but written names, with clear ideas of what they represent. Pictures of objects that cannot be shown in sample, and particularly of animals, is the next step in the representation of nature, and these can carry the mind much
further than tangible objects. As these, however, may embrace things the qualities of which cannot be sensibly perceived, much more verbal instruction is necessary to be given along with them. In both cases, indeed, a considerable degree of oral teaching is indispensable. But the verbal knowledge thus communicated, is like mortar to a building, binding together its materials; as the separate ideas of objects lying in the mind are thus connected by other minor ideas, and trains of thought established. Much telling is, however, equally bad, as it tends to induce a passiveness upon the mind, which the more it renders the mere reception of ideas agreeable, increases the danger of that supineness of intellect, which prevents the mind itself from acquiring a habit of self-instruction. The best practical exemplification of this great principle of object teaching, discovered by Pestalozzi, may be seen in a well-known little book, by Miss Mayo, entitled "Lessons on Objects." In that manual, the principles of mental philosophy are carefully adhered to, and the lessons well adapted to the gradual development of the perceptive and reflective powers.

From these four sources, then,—objects, pictures, conversation, and reading,—stream the first rays of intelligence that should enlighten the understanding of a child; and if a parallel course be continued in extenso, his mind will thus become enriched with a vast store of information. But there is a higher power of intellect to which such a course does not immediately appeal. It is, however, preparatory to it, and unless the mind has undergone this previous alimentary exercise, the superior faculty of reason has but little means of manifesting its peculiar endowments. As the faculty of language is the last in being brought into action among the observing powers,—its office being to help in arranging, classifying, and naming, previously
accumulated information, filling up, so to speak, those interstices that may disconnect its several parts,—so that of reflection, by means of language, proceeds now to draw out not only isolated ideas, but trains of thought. Nor only does it call forth single ideas in combination, but combined ideas singly; new ideas out of old ones; the ludicrous from the grave, and the grave from the ludicrous; the beautiful and sublime from the simple and common; lofty thoughts from the humblest; truth from error; the cause from the effect, and the effect from the cause. In short, from the old world of reality without, a new world of thought and imagination is thus created within the busy brain of man, into which the tired observer of nature can retreat, and enjoy the most delightful contemplation. These thoughts form of themselves a world to engage the attention of the reflective faculties, as their archetypes in nature served to call forth the observation of the perceptive. But an external guidance of a different kind must be applied to the former, as much more than a mere dreamy observation is needed for their excitement and gratification. They must not only be engaged as spectators of the information acquired, but as workmen in accumulating more out of it; not only treated to a view of the mind's picture gallery, but initiated into the mysteries of its studio.

The method pursued in the intellectual department of the best training seminaries, proceeds upon the principle of taking it for granted that the newly-admitted children of a school know nothing until it has been ascertained by the master. He proceeds to excavate the soil, and to lay a foundation, by inculcating the simplest facts in his own way, whether these facts may have been communicated previously or not. There is thus, so to speak, a superstratum formed over the mind's antecedent know-
ledge, affording him ground to stand upon in examining the depths beneath and eliciting further results; and in a gallery class all are thus prepared to proceed from the same point. The same principle is carried out through every succeeding lesson, though of course in inculcating additional facts, and drawing out additional inferences or lessons. As little, however, is told to the children as possible; certain facts, indeed, must be stated; but from these facts as a basis, the children are trained to deduce inferences, and arrive at results, through the exercise of their own minds. When a fact or principle becomes thus impressed upon the mind, it remains there with all the force of a discovery; the permanency of which is, therefore, much greater in the mind of a child than that of any fact it may have been taught. But this is not the chief advantage. In being told facts, the mind may be gratified, but it can hardly be said to be improved. It becomes, then, a mere passive recipient: in other words, the faculty of perception has only been engaged, and even that but partially, while the judgment is altogether inoperative. To receive facts in this way may, therefore, make a child cognisant of many circumstances and events in the abstract; but out of these materials he will be utterly unable to deduce new and correct ideas, his reflective powers not having been called into play. This can only be done by a mental effort either in the child or the man. It is by contrasting and comparing one set of ideas with another that new ones are produced, and that a judgment is formed upon any subject. Hence, indeed, the very meaning of the word reflection, which signifies a bending back of the mind upon itself, and taking cognisance of ideas previously communicated. In the process under consideration, therefore, the child is not only taught new ideas, but is trained to the art
of using these ideas; or, in other words, is simply taught how to think properly on any subject. The judgment or reasoning faculty is thus called into exercise; and as certainly as the muscles of the body are developed and strengthened by healthy action, so also will the mind by such an exercise become invigorated and improved. In training, the mind is made to work out for itself, from given materials, what in teaching is gratuitously given; and in the act of so doing, the habit of reasoning or of tracing effects to their cause, is formed. Teaching, for example, is to tell a child the results of other people's experience and investigation; but training is to enable him to find out these results by his own experience and research; with this addition, that training, as it includes teaching, both furnishes the mind with facts, and enables it to deduce inferences and conclusions from these facts.

There are several ways in which the former of these may be accomplished. It is, however, a peculiarity of the normal system at Glasgow, to effect this by speaking to the children elliptically, and allowing them to fill up the gap, and then, by a certain form of catechising, eliciting the result. To form an ellipsis, properly, is not by any means so simple a matter as it appears, and that is the reason that in the hands of an unskilful person it looks so very meaningless. It is not enough merely to omit a word or two of a sentence and let the children fill in such as would have occurred as a matter of course. The hiatus must comprehend the conclusion of a proposition, or at least a result which the preceding part of the sentence led to as a rational sequence. It should contain the very pith of the remark, without which the previous words would be unmeaning and unintelligible; like the space left for the key-stone of an arch, the whole of which depends for its stability upon
the insertion of the stone. By a proper combination of questions and ellipses, the mind becomes both replenished with facts, and enabled by reflection to draw conclusions from these facts. It is in many respects an application of the inductive philosophy to the science of education; and it may safely be asserted, that the carrying out of such a principle would produce no less satisfactory results in that science, than it has done in any other to which it has been applied. By this means, the geologist, from the slender data afforded in the discovery of a few bones embedded in a rock, can trace the structure and habits of many races of extinct animals, and can even describe the appearance of our globe long ere it assumed its present form. The historian, from the single fact that “fine linen existed in Egypt in the time of Moses,” can deduce many other facts relative to the state of Egypt,—such as its government, science, and art, at that period. He sees, for example, that fine linen could only be made from fine thread, and fine thread from fine flax; and that fine flax must go through various acts of preparation, in which many workmen must have been employed before fine linen could have been made. The weaving of fine linen presupposes artists having acquired skill and dexterity in the art by imitation and example. Hence the existence of the art; and its perfection may also be deduced from the fineness of the fabric. The state of agriculture in the country may also be deduced in the same way. And by the same process did the immortal Newton, setting aside the theories and hypotheses of the ancients regarding their “cycle and epicycle, orb on orb,” demonstrate, from the apparently trivial circumstance of the falling apple, that the myriad hosts of heaven revolve around each other by the same law. Nor does this process of inductive reasoning
involve any principle which is not clearly intelligible, and easily practised, at an early age.

The relative duties of a trainer and his pupil in such a course, are those of analysis and synthesis; both of which may be illustrated by a single example from etymology. It is the work of the trainer to analyse a word into its component parts, and show the meaning of these separately, while that of the pupil is to reconstruct these separate elements into the same word, and show their combined meaning. The master analyses, the pupil combines. For example, to tell a pupil that the word "reconstruction" is composed of four different parts, each having a separate and distinct meaning; that "re" signifies again—"con" together—"struc" build, and "tion" the act of—is to analyse the word so far as is necessary; but when the boy, from this knowledge, combines these meanings, and finds that they signify the "act of building together again," he is proceeding synthetically, and arriving at a correct understanding of the term. He thus not only sees the meaning of the word, but how it comes to have such a meaning.

It is necessary to call particular attention to this point, for it is to this alone that almost all modern improvements in reflective education may be referred; and it is now coming into universal application in well-conducted schools, from the most elementary knowledge to the highest branches of study. It is by adhering to this mode, from the alphabet upwards, that most schools in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, are conducted so efficiently and intellectually. And the reason is, that it is entirely the process which nature pursues in developing the mind—first, by collecting facts, and then gradually comparing, combining, and finally analysing these facts. What is it, indeed, but a process of nature
itself in the arrangements of the material creation? When bodies undergo decomposition and decay, their elementary particles enter into new arrangements and combinations with other bodies. New forms are thus created by synthesis. When a piece of wood is heated in a certain manner, it is analysed into water, an acid, several kinds of gas, and charcoal; and when animal and vegetable bodies are decomposed beneath the surface of the earth, they become assimilated to the soil, enter into the nourishment of other plants and vegetables, and in turn, also form component parts of other animals by synthesis.

What has of late been so frequently styled the "analytical" method of instruction, is, therefore, only half the required process. It is true that to analyse any subject, and present it to the mind in a clear and popular manner, is intellectual teaching, and a vast improvement it is upon former methods; but it is by no means intellectual training, which is a matter of vastly greater moment. Teaching, or analysis, is to inform a child that atmospheric air is composed of nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon: training, or synthesis, is to lead the mind from a knowledge of the nature and properties of these separate gases, to deduce the ideas, not only of what air is composed, but how balloons float in it, how water rises in a pump, how mercury oscillates in the tube of a barometer, how water boils at different temperatures. Teaching is to show a pupil the cut stem of a tree, with its concentric circles, and to tell him these indicate the age of that tree; but training leads the mind to observe how the moisture of the soil ascends the trunk, and the nitrogen of the air descends by its leaves and branches, to meet this sap and deposit this annual contribution of matter. Teaching is to say that the
camel can sustain life in the desert for a number of days without water; but training shows how it can do so, by mentally analysing the sacs and membranes of its stomach, showing the separation of the imbibed fluid from the intestines, from its mixing with the solid aliment, the gastric juice and digestive action of the stomach; with the singular power of muscle possessed by the animal, in wringing out the fluid from its reservoirs when incited by thirst. Teaching is to tell a child that man is curiously and wonderfully made; but training enables him to perceive the wonder for himself, from an analysis of the body’s mechanism and functions; and teaching, too, may tell of the wisdom and goodness of that body’s Creator; but training leads the mind, by the most infallible steps, to read the sublime lesson for itself in the wonderful adaptation of that body’s parts and functions. The former is simply an administering of aliment to the mind without allowing it exercise sufficient to assimilate such knowledge with the mental constitution, the consequence of which is, that, while the memory may be overloaded with information, there will still be a want of that mental elasticity and power of forming a correct judgment, even on trivial matters, that characterise so many of what are called learned men.

The mind in this respect, indeed, seems to acknowledge the same law that regulates our physical nature. Luxurious living, and want of corporal exercise, expand the body to unnatural dimensions, thus rendering it unfit for many of the active pleasures and enjoyments of life; and the mind, when sated with facts and gratuitous intelligence, seems also to grow incapable of bending to the task of eliciting truth by any lengthened train of reasoning. The synthetic or constructive method of teaching affords the means of supplying this desideratum. By analysis,
materials are only prepared for the mind of the pupil; by synthesis, these materials are put together, and that also by a mental act of the pupil; and it is by thus acting or doing for itself, that the mind acquires that independent self-reliance, that power of discriminating between truth and error, that flexibility and strength, which form the true characteristics of a well-cultivated mind. In accordance with this plan, therefore, instead of loading a child's memory with unexplained *rules*, he should be taught principles, and left to deduce the rules for himself out of these principles. In teaching arithmetic, for example, instead of telling a boy that the upper figure of a fraction is the numerator, and the under figure its denominator, and leaving him in possession of that bare fact, and these unexplained terms, the meaning of a fraction should be analysed and explained by some familiar illustration, and the names of its parts at last communicated. He will then see the connexion between these names and the principle upon which they are based. And in grammar, instead of making him commit to memory the mere nomenclature of the parts of speech, he should be shown, incidentally from his own reading lesson, that all the words in his book belong to certain classes or kinds, and that every class has a certain name attached to it. And at a further stage, the influence of one word on another should be explained in a similar manner. Last of all, the *rules* may be committed to memory; that is, after the principles have been understood, when the meaning of the former is easily comprehended. In order to teach grammar efficiently, it must be first taught incidentally, and then systematically. In the oral lessons, too, ideas are always communicated before the *names* of these ideas. Nothing can be more strictly in harmony with nature than this. Language
being a mere arbitrary and artificial invention, it is long after children have arrived at perfectly correct ideas of many things that they can express these in words. The very infant, unable to articulate a single word, has a certain amount of knowledge, and would continue increasing that stock through life, were there no such thing as a language in the world. The intervention of language is only a means for facilitating the acquisition and expression of knowledge. It is, therefore, of secondary importance, and must be communicated after the ideas of which it is the symbol have been received into the mind.

In conversational teaching, it is not the natural course to ask a child what geography or chemistry means. The science itself must be pictured out, and made obvious to the mind, and after the child sees the meaning, he feels the necessity of the term, should the latter be communicated. Thus will the one, ever afterwards by association, call up the other. Whereas, by reversing the process, it is too frequently the case that the word remains in the memory as a mere sound, without any definite meaning attached to it. And not only is this the course along which nature guides children, in acquiring a knowledge of their vernacular tongue, but it is the very process by which language itself was formed, simply from a necessity of terms to express accumulating ideas. In ordinary reading lessons, however, where words must be analysed etymologically, the usual course is adopted, namely, to separate the root from its prefix and postfix, and show how the current meaning is evolved. As a subsidiary exercise to this, mental composition is also practised. This is a very simple process, though as a habit of expressing thought, and a preparatory exercise to written composition, it is of very high importance. When the
root of a word has been brought out with its prefix and postfix, other words from the same root are then required, each child repeating the first that occurs to him. He is then required to give a sentence, embodying the exact word, thus cultivating a habit of thought in giving the term. By forming the word into a sentence, a proof is also afforded that he knows the meaning of it; or if it be used in a wrong sense or ungrammatically, it is the duty of the master to show the proper arrangement. Geography should likewise be conducted incidentally, before a systematic course has commenced. In the ordinary reading lesson, when allusion may have been made to any place, its productions, manufactures, or manners of its inhabitants, and other circumstances will be noticed; and by such means many geographical facts be obtained. Spelling is also taught subsequently to reading. It is a great mistake to imagine that it is necessary to learn to read by spelling, at least spelling by means of the names of the letters, for between these names and the sound of a word there is not in most cases the remotest connexion. If spelling be used at all in order to facilitate reading, it must be done by means of the sounds of the letters, phonically. But the principal use of spelling, or correct orthography, is, that one may be able to write properly; to retrace, upon paper, the relative situation of the letters in a word without misplacing them. It is, in short, a kindred art to that of painting from memory. The painter, remembering the features of an absent object, can transfer these to his canvas each in its order, and thus form a copy of the original; and the child learning to spell cannot do so by thinking how the word sounds, but by remembering how it looks. It is the eye, therefore, more than the ear, that must become familiar with the word before it can be readily spelt. Nor should the
child ever be set to spell the word, until he has become able to read it; and then, too, if it were possible, instead of spelling it orally, it ought to be written down. The letters of the alphabet are also taught by their sounds instead of their names.

From all these instances, here shortly recapitulated, it must be obvious that an improved system of modern education is an entirely opposite course to former methods. It is in most cases a beginning where they ended, and ending where they began. Ideas are communicated before words; principles before rules; the judgment cultivated before the memory; incidental information before systematic; reading before spelling; the sound of the letters before their names; and, on the whole, it may be added, nature before art.

Education has a double end in view, namely, the preparation of a child for the duties of the present life, as well as for the enjoyment of another; and in order to fit him for a proper discharge of the former, a knowledge of the arts and sciences is indispensable. The period of attending school is obviously the best time for acquiring this knowledge; not, perhaps, all the details and more abstruse points of science, but the general features, or the great and leading principles. From these as a basis, his future reading, or attendance on lectures, or even practical application in the business of life, will be rendered infinitely more available. By the present method the two principal obstructions to the diffusion of scientific knowledge are removed; namely, the want of a fixed habit of thinking and investigating cause and effect; and the difficulty of comprehending the technical terms employed. It has been already shown how a system of training teaches to think, gives an impulse and a right direction to the mental powers, and by means of the habit.
of analysing words etymologically, a key is also afforded to open up the meaning of any term. In giving a scientific lesson on any subject, there are three ways of presenting it to the mind, either by exhibiting the bona fide object itself, a visible illustration, or a verbal picture of it. The first of these, or Pestalozzian method, is of course not always practicable; and even if a specimen of the material object could be always obtained, there are certain qualities, abstractions, and relations, that no combination of material objects could ever represent. The second method, for a similar reason, can only give a partial view of the subject. In the training system, however, all the three methods are adopted; the object itself, when possible, or a diagram of it, and the details or abstractions by a verbal picturing out. In the absence of the two former, and where the subject cannot be brought before the eye, analogy and illustration are had recourse to; some analogous facts of which the children are already cognizant are brought forward, and thus from the known are they led on to the unknown; from the clear to the obscure; until they have received a full comprehension of the whole subject.*

This, then, being the main principle of the art of training, namely, the cultivation of the understanding, it is applied to all subjects, sacred as well as secular, and for this simple reason, that the religion of the Bible is addressed to the heart through the medium of the understanding. Our holy religion is a religion of reason as well as of revelation. While it treats of sublime mysteries, which it is our duty simply to believe, it is no less a reasonable service. In accordance with this view,

* See Mr. Stow's excellent work on the Training System, for examples of this mode of lessoning.
therefore, the same method of training the understanding is adopted. Analogy and illustration are here employed, with perhaps more powerful effect than in any merely secular subject. All must have felt the superiority of a preacher who is in the habit of illustrating his subject by a reference to natural objects, over another who contents himself with a simple statement of facts. For example, to assert that the corrupted will is the source of all moral depravity, may fall powerlessly upon the ear, or pass as a kind of truism; while it is impossible not to be struck with the melancholy fact, when our spiritual nature is pictured out by some such analogy as a watch, the main-spring of which, representing the will, has become injured to the consequent derangement of its parts. Or to announce that the doctrines of the Gospel are unwelcome to sinners, may be believed in as true, but it will be seen and felt to be so much more strongly, from some such analogy as the fragrant odour of new-mown hay, which to a person in a healthy frame is delightful and invigorating, while to one afflicted with asthma, it will bring on a paroxysm of his disease—the smell being the same to all, but the capacity of each being different to receive it. Besides, He who spake as never man spake, had recourse to the very same method. A grain of mustard-seed, the flowers of the field, the tares and the wheat, the fig tree, the fowls of the air, the beasts of the field, were all called into requisition to illustrate and enforce the great lessons he taught. And the reason is, that spiritual things being invisible to the natural eye, can only become visible to mental observation, when presented in the frame-work of a material object. There is no fear of the Bible and the book of nature not harmonising together, when taught upon such a principle. The entire Bible may therefore become a text-book, and
be placed in the hands of every child capable of reading it, not as a task-book for mere reading and spelling, but for moral and religious instruction. When a passage is read, every part of it should be explained separately, the connexion of each part be shown, and the ideas of the children developed from the whole.

In such a way, therefore, is it, that the seeds of spiritual knowledge are sown, not in the form of abstruse theological terms, but in the simple language of Christ himself. By this daily exercise, the understanding is enlightened, and the affections drawn forth, and instead of the reading of that blessed book being looked upon as a task, it comes to be regarded as a pleasure. It is to be borne in mind, however, that the cultivation of the understanding is not here an end, but a means; the teaching of the heart and regulation of the feelings being the sole end in view. Scientific subjects are doubtless introduced into many of these Bible lessons, and analysed; but this is done for the purpose of elucidating some doctrine or moral precept contained beneath such imagery. Suppose the lesson be taken from that passage in the Psalms where David compares himself to the hart panting after the water-brooks; the natural history and habits of the hart will be pictured out; the nature of the climate with its scorching heat and dust; the great value of water in such a country; the panting and longing of the thirsty animal for the water-brooks, at which it may have been accustomed to drink, but which are now dried up: then the character of David, with the circumstances in which he was placed at the time, deprived of public ordinances, and at a distance from the tabernacle; and finally, his strong desire of again enjoying these privileges. This latter, however, being the lesson, does not need to be drawn; it
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is at once seen. With such a lesson it is impossible for a child not to be delighted. The imagination is captivated, and the understanding improved, by the natural picture; the melancholy circumstances of David at the time call forth the best sympathies of the heart; his strong desire to return to his country, and hold communion with his people and his God, is not only seen, but almost felt; the feeling is admired, and the resolution to copy after it insensibly formed. Strange, indeed, that a book so adapted to our fallen nature as the Bible is—adapted to it also by the unerring inspiration of Omniscience—should not find a more ready response in the bosoms of the most unthinking, and compel their attention to its interesting truths more forcibly than it does. Strange, I say, but only so to one not cognizant of the fact, that the hitherto mechanical processes of teaching it, have, in a great measure, positively neutralized its effects. That heavenly Teacher sent from God has left us in this, as in all his other deeds of humanity, an example of 'didactic' lessoning, the sublime simplicity of which, if applied to the lessons of Christianity and universally acted upon, would give religion a very different aspect. That the natural mind is at enmity with God is, of course, a melancholy truth; but it is also true that religion is adapted to destroy that enmity. Why, then, is it not more generally powerful than it is? It may be answered without hesitation—that, among other reasons, one principal cause is, it is not presented to the mind in a sufficiently attractive form, neither is it sufficiently addressed to the understanding. It is, in too many cases, more a rhapsody of mere words, than of well-defined ideas; of names and sounds, rather than of heavenly knowledge. And it is because the Bible has been made a book for mere reading and spelling—has
been conned over and over to weariness in the committing to memory of its unexplained passages, and not unfrequently associated in the mind with sobs and tears and bodily chastisement, that most of the dislike and repugnance which a child entertains towards it have been engendered. Or it may be, that some of its sublimest passages, or of those essential to salvation, have been given to be committed to memory as a *punishment* for some offence; an error which has only its counterpart in the penances of the Church of Rome, or the repeating of so many prayers a certain number of times as an imaginary atonement for sin. The Bible contains strong meat for men, as well as milk for babes, with food for those of every intermediate stage. If, then, this natural process be reversed, and abstruse points of theology, with their difficult and unexplained terms, be given to children, it is no more to be wondered at that they should turn away from these, than from that which is disagreeable to their natural palate. But let a proper and judicious selection be made of what doctrines and passages are suited to their capacity, and let them see their way through, and properly understand these, and let them be communicated in the *spirit* of the Gospel, and there is no fear but they will find a ready access to their affections. The Gospel is the "power of God unto salvation," and it is an omnipotent moral lever power; but in order to a proper application of it, it must rest upon the understanding as its fulcrum.

Another, though an inferior motive, in the inculcating of morality is, to give a greater prominence than is usually done to the temporal consequences attached to a virtuous life. Godliness is *profitable* for the *life that now is*, as well as for that which is to come. This is, therefore, a perfectly legitimate motive, and
one which immediately appeals to the child's observation and experience. The happiness of virtue and the miseries of vice are visible on every side of him; and if, in accordance with this, it be shown how great is the actual amount of happiness conferred upon an individual, in the keeping of God's commandments, the understanding at least acknowledges the fact, and, other things being equal, will act upon it. It is, therefore, the duty of the trainer, as well as the preacher, to appeal to every legitimate motive; in order to gain his end, he must be "all things to all." It is by these means, then, that the foundation of Christian morality must be laid, and in which process the same system is pursued, as in the secular division of the intellectual department; that is, by analogy, illustration, and picturing out, enabling a child to deduce the principles and ideas of Christianity, previously to his being put into possession of its difficult terms. Nor should a single term be employed before it be analysed, explained, and broken down to the level of the child's comprehension. The shell of the nut must be broken, and the kernel presented; or rather, the casket must be unlocked, and the gems taken forth by the instructor, before the child can either relish the taste of the one, or admire the beauty of the other.

Let it once be granted that the acquisition of knowledge is a pleasure, when the mind is trained to observe and reflect, whether that knowledge be secular or sacred, and whether the object of it be the man or the boy; and the cause of both moral and mental ignorance prevailing to such an extent must, in a great measure, be acknowledged to be the want of having information sufficiently popularized, and the reasoning faculties properly developed. Our land is filled with universities, and churches,
and schools; and a liberal provision is made by government for the support of these; yet scanty indeed are the offerings laid upon the altar of popular and elementary education; but without which, much of the machinery of the former is too often found to be superfluous. The grand error has always been to consider children as incapable of reasoning, to have them treated as so many automata, the guidance of whose education any one might undertake. Now it is doubtless true, that children cannot reason so accurately or so extensively as men and women, but neither can they walk so far, nor endure so much bodily fatigue; and it would therefore be as reasonable to deny them the liberty of using their limbs until they arrived at manhood, as the pleasure of exercising their reason until a similar period. On the whole, therefore, it seems the more onerous and responsible duty of the two rightly to manage the education of children; and that it is at least equally the duty of a government to take this department of instruction under its patronage and to make as liberal a provision for it, as for the instruction of adults, is no less obvious than its vast importance in the economy of a nation's prosperity.
CHAPTER XIV.

The last division of education is that of the moral faculties of man. In comparing the structure and physical arrangements of the globe with the different kinds and degrees of life pervading nature, a very singular analogy may here be instituted. In the primary and secondary formations, no traces of organic remains are to be found. In the tertiary, fossils of a simple kind only are to be met with; but as we ascend through the upper strata, these memorials of extinct vitality assume a more elaborated appearance and finished mechanism, until we arrive at the surface, peopled with living tribes, at the head of which stands man, the last but noblest work of the Creator. So is it in the vegetative, sentient, intellectual, and moral worlds. All vegetable nature is pervaded by a living principle of the humblest kind, which may be considered the basis, or primary formation, of life. Higher in the scale, the inferior tribes exhibit a different kind of existence, in their possession of sensation and voluntary motion; while above this, or in a manner agglomerated to it, and serving as a link between their nature and that of man, they are also endowed with instinct, which in man expands into what is called intellect. But beyond these different strata, and having nothing of mere animalism in it, there
is a higher principle still, as far transcending the vegetable, instinctive, and intellectual existences, as the atmosphere in its ethereal purity surpasses the grovelling attributes of earth. This is a principle of moral vitality, a purely heaven-descended life; and like the atmosphere resting upon the earth as a basis, but in proportion to its altitude becoming attenuated, and vanishing far into the realms of ether, this moral life, though sustained by material elements, yet reaches from earth to heaven, and forms a link between the nature of man and the spiritual existence of the inhabitants of another world.

It is also found in many stages of advancement to perfection in the human race. In savages it may be called a mere fossil, indicating that, in ages long gone by, it was co-extensive with the existence of the human family, until destroyed and buried under a deposit of grosser matter. In civilised life, much of this superincumbent soil has been removed, and an intellectual vitality being communicated, the plant has sprung to some maturity; but it is only in the pure atmosphere of Christianity, that it has ever produced its heaven-born fruits. Yet by the light of history, a universal process of redemption from this moral death may no less plainly be seen in operation, than by the light of science may be traced the gradual evolving of that life, and light, and beauty, which now everywhere surround us in the material world. The savage, therefore, in whom this moral principle is extinct or imperfect, is little above one of the lower tribes. The germs of a moral existence may be within his breast, but they cannot pierce the stony soil under which they are deposited. A glimmering of reason may guide him in providing for his selfish wants and appetites, even as instinct guides an humbler
animal to the same end. But in the enjoyment of a moral existence, something apart from selfish considerations is implied. There is an outgoing of the desires and affections towards our fellow-men, in aspirations after their welfare, and a feeling towards the Great Supreme in a desire to promote his benevolent purposes.

It needs not be added, therefore, that these ought to be the guiding springs of all human conduct. But—alas for this being so!—at wide intervals only, in point of space, and at long intervals in point of time, do we ever see such principles manifested. Reason, in bondage to the passions, has hitherto almost universally wielded the destinies of man. In gratifying these passions, it may have called to its aid whatever art can devise in supplying the defects of bodily strength. It may have subdued animals more powerful than man, and exacted their services to promote his ends; and it may have gained a partial control even over the elements of nature itself. Yet, if it has thus bestowed upon man a superiority over the lower animals, of itself it only renders him a superior animal—if it creates him a lord of the universe, it confines his enjoyments to the lower domains of material nature, and without a higher patent of nobility he can never enter into those azure fields of bliss inhabited by purer and nobler spirits. It is by reason of the very strength of this principle, that it should be under a higher control than that of the passions; else, like the greater strength of a fierce animal, the extent of its power would only be the extent of its danger. It must be morally subdued, that it may seek its gratification in the good of others, and not physically excited, which leads to self-gratification at the expense of others. Until this fact be acknowledged, and acted
upon, human conduct will exhibit little superior to that of the lower tribes. Whatever the passions and desires of man may indicate, his intellect will assist him in procuring; and it may easily be seen, where clashing interests prevail, what will be the result—which, indeed, has been the result from the commencement of his history, in those scenes of moral anarchy and confusion so widely spread over the face of the earth.

In a preceding part of this work, it has been my object to trace the gradual unfolding of the moral principle, from the animalism and intellectuality of our nature, which have at various periods swayed the destinies of different sections of the world. It may now be remarked, that the present age seems characterised above all preceding periods, not only for the fulness of its intellectual attainments, but the commencement of a more purely moral manifestation. Let it not be understood, however, that it is in the mere possession of this power as a mental principle that such pre-eminence consists, but as a habit of life. It is to that part of moral education that appeals to the conduct through the understanding, and modifies the character into an agent for accomplishing good to others, and thereby reaping a greater individual happiness in return, that its unique characteristics may be traced. Physical and mental training may beautify the external man and ennable his inferior powers, but moral training animates the soul itself with a spark divine, and assimilates the character and conduct to those of the great Creator. In the mere possession of this moral nature, man enjoys a pre-eminence over the other inhabitants of the earth; but it is according to the bias it receives in early youth, that he becomes the scourge of his fellow-men and a source of misery to himself, or the benefactor of his race and an unfailing spring of self-gratification.
By means of a cultivated intellect, man may penetrate the recesses of the earth and unfold its hidden mysteries; may roam abroad over its surface, and in the rolling ocean, the yielding air, and the waving forest, perceive with amazement and delight the innumerable wonders of creation; or, soaring a still bolder flight, he may unravel the mystic dance of heaven's far-rolling orbs, may tell their nature, calculate their distances, and describe their motions; may indulge in "thoughts that wander through eternity," yet the full tide of pleasure, ever flowing from the well-regulated affections, and the heart at peace with its Maker, is beyond all comparison greater. How passing strange is it, then, that until within the last few years, not a single effort in a public capacity has ever been made properly to educate these! Many improvements of late have doubtless been made in education, but, almost exclusively, these have referred to the cultivation of the mental powers. No provision has been made for the training of the moral faculties, for restraining the evil propensities, and cultivating the virtuous habits of the young. Let me not be misunderstood: I do not say that moral and religious instruction has been neglected—there is no lack of this in our favoured land; and by the blessing of God, which can even work without means, incalculable good has been effected by it; but what I do say is, that the communication of mere theoretical knowledge, without the means afforded for its practical application, is no guarantee for the establishment of a Christian character. It would be as reasonable to expect this, as that, after communicating a knowledge of the theory of music, and showing a pupil how to play on a certain instrument, he were to be expected, without any practice, to discourse sweet music from that instrument. There must be the practice, as well as the knowledge, in both cases. Now it is doubt-
less true, that most parents not only teach, but endeavour to train their children into the practice of piety; but how many parents have never themselves been trained, and how many more are necessarily absent from their children during the greater part of the day! so that this all-important duty is either neglected or left to whatever companions or servants may fall in their way, and who may have been as much neglected as themselves. Neither is the moral teaching of the Sunday-school, much as it has done for the cause of Christianity, an antidote sufficient fully to counteract the wide-spread evil. The religious instruction there communicated, if in harmony with a correct system of home-training, may be a powerful auxiliary in the same good work. It may supply principles that will have an opportunity of being practised, and may thus prove the means of facilitating the good habits forming at home. And even the seeds of correct moral and religious principles may be there implanted that may spring up under the most adverse circumstances. But in general, what lasting benefit can accrue from the inculcation of merely abstract truths to the understanding, when the will and habits have received a different bias previously, and when all the desires and inclinations of the heart are not only repugnant to the practice of such truths, but have every facility for gratifying feelings of an opposite description? The few good lessons of a Sunday evening are soon effaced from the memory amidst the temptations of the week. Nor can there be any means of moral training in a Sunday-school room, which necessarily implies the regulation of the ordinary conduct; and in the promiscuous assemblages of children going and returning from school, temptations to swerve from the right path are so numerous as to render it a grave question indeed, whether the danger of following bad example
in the street, is not greater than the chance of benefiting by the good instruction of the school. But Sunday-schools have certainly done much good, and far be it from me to depreciate their advantages, or discourage the gratuitous and disinterested labourers in that well-intentioned undertaking.

Ragged schools are another feature in the philanthropy of the present day, which present a similar error in the conception of what is most needed to reform society. The idea and intention of thus snatching the outcast children of great cities from the paths of crime and infamy, by means of an educational power, is one of the most Godlike enterprises that the world has yet witnessed. But truth compels the statement, that it is only the operation of a partially-enlightened benevolence. It is a misdirection of energy to give such children a mere intellectual instruction, even on the best subjects, while no corresponding means are afforded of moralising and redeeming their depraved daily habits. To prevent such a class from falling into crime, to which they are predisposed by habits and circumstances, their social condition must first be improved, and themselves withdrawn from the temptations to crime, by alleviating the pressure of their physical wants. The wants of the body must undoubtedly be appeased before any higher principle can be developed. A foundation to this noble work should therefore be laid by initiating those children in the practice of mechanical employments, and giving them the means of providing for their own bodily support, before an aliment suited to their higher nature be administered.

In the latter part of the intellectual division of this subject, it has been shown how the preceptive department of morality is conducted; and it only now remains briefly to notice what is meant by the practical application of it.
The remark has often been made, that in flourishing manufacturing districts, and other places where masses of people are daily congregated together, wickedness and immorality increase in a fearful ratio. Now, this is just what might be expected, for as the odds are vast indeed, that the greater number of these individuals are untrained in the ways of godliness, from the sympathetic action of numbers, and the power of imitation,—if no countervailing force has been in operation, the minority will very speedily assume a kindred character. This sympathy of numbers, however, is a very powerful instrument for good as well as for evil; and if the prevailing tone of any community be of a moral and virtuous character, it not unfrequently influences, and in a great measure subdues, the immoral tendencies of the minority. This, then, is the first principle in a training school whether it be for the richer or the poorer classes,—to endeavour to get the majority enlisted on the side of virtue, and to form thus a nucleus, or to raise a standard around which the less virtuous may in time rally. To introduce children into such society, where all they see and hear breathes of goodness, purity, and happiness, and being removed from the contaminating influence of evil companionship, they have both the temptations to evil removed, and the incentives to virtuous conduct placed before them. Whatever habits of rudeness, or selfishness, or deceit, or any other, they may have formerly indulged among their street companions with impunity, find no sympathy. These are discountenanced by their new companions, and, in time, the habit of indulging them wears out. They now breathe a purer moral atmosphere, which of itself is no less powerful in removing a moral disease, than a change of air, and a more salubrious clime, in neutralising the effects of certain natural complaints.
Public schools are frequently objected to altogether, and private tuition is eagerly sought after by some people; and this upon the principle, that in the former, children learn many mischievous and bad habits from their associates in school. Now, there is much truth in this, where there is no proper moral superintendence; for in such a case the bad passions will undoubtedly predominate, and, like an uncultivated garden, the school will become a nursery of much that is vicious; but if the contrary be the case, no private tuition, however good, can be compared with it. Man is born for society; and, sooner or later, he must come into contact with the world. The school, then, is the world in miniature. Here mind comes into collision with mind, and the bluntness and shyness of the recluse give way to frankness and ease, at a period when it is particularly desirable; while, instead of burying the generous affections of a child within his own bosom at home, or affording them only a limited scope, within the family circle, they have among his young friends at school abundant opportunities of being drawn forth and exercised into a much higher-toned benevolence. A properly-conducted school is, therefore, a sort of moral gymnasium, preparatory to the great struggle on the arena of life. But besides these advantages, there is a restraining influence constantly exercised upon the evil propensities and habits. "Every kind of indecency, disorder, evil-speaking, cruelty, want of courtesy, anger, revenge, injustice, impatience, covetousness, and dishonesty, are suppressed as soon as they are developed; while, on the contrary, all the amiable feelings and Christian virtues are cultivated—such as speaking truth, obedience to parents and all in lawful authority, honesty, justice, forbearance, generosity, gentleness, kindness, fidelity to promises, courteousness, habits of attention,
docility, disinterestedness, kindness to inferior animals, pity for the lame and distressed, and the weak in intellect, and in general doing to others as we would wish to be done by."* The former of these must be subdued, that is, the habit of indulging in them must be worn out, and the latter drawn out and formed into habits. This cannot be done by lecturing a child about them. The child may know his duty as well as his instructor, but it is a far different thing to do it; and it is only by this doing, or repetition of doings, that the habit can be formed. Knowledge, it is well known, and practice are very different things, and not by any means always found in the same individual. If you wish a child to be of a self-denying disposition, you must give him an opportunity of endeavouring to become so. It has, however, been alleged by some, that in order to cultivate a self-denying disposition, articles of value should not be put out of the way of children, but in their way, and that they should be trained not to touch them; and otherwise that they should be exposed to situations where their virtue might have an opportunity of carrying them off triumphant from temptation. But this, if true in theory, seems to be at least practically dangerous. Temptation in all cases is certainly an evil to be avoided; else why have we that clause in the Lord's Prayer that teaches us to ask for deliverance from it? It is true that without trial there can be no real virtue; but certainly there are enough of trials and temptations in the world to prove the faith and stedfastness of grown people as well as of children, without needlessly multiplying them. It is in the very nature of our faculties to be drawn forth into activity when any exciting cause is placed before them.

* Stow.
and every successive out-going of these faculties towards whatever object they may be directed, gives them a future bias towards that object. The mind, therefore, can only be fortified against such contingencies in some analogous way to that by which the body is secured against catching certain diseases. And though it is true, that even bodily afflictions may sometimes have a beneficial moral and spiritual effect, yet no one would say that diseases ought therefore to be courted. Both temptations and bodily troubles are in themselves pure evils incident to an imperfect humanity, and their inevitable approach should be neutralised by a previous course of training; but, as in the case of the latter, this can only be done by taking advantage of the premonitory symptoms, and destroying the predisposing causes; so in the former, the faculties ought to be drawn forth and exercised upon objects the very reverse of those that form the temptation. By this means, an object which otherwise would be a temptation now ceases to be so, the moral attraction, so to speak, between it and the faculties being destroyed, and perhaps even a principle of antagonism established between them.

"Train to forgiveness," says Mr. Stow, "by causing the child to do a generous action to another who may have offended him. Discourage the slightest approach to cruelty. Train to benevolence and generosity by making the child practically so, no matter how trivial the action or gift. The principle may be exhibited equally with a penny as with a pound; by a kind look as by great personal sacrifice; by the widow's two mites as by the rich man's gift. If a child does a thing improperly, or neglects to do a thing it has been told to do, the simplest way to check such impropriety is, to cause the child to do the thing. He may have thrown his cap
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on the floor, instead of hanging it on a peg; simply call him back, and see that he hangs it properly. You may have told him to walk softly up-stairs; you hear him beating his feet as he ascends; call him back, and see that he walks up every step in the way you wish him. This method repeated will produce the habit; when a threat or a scold without the doing may be instantly forgotten. The certainty of being obliged to do is better for the memory than the longest speech or the severest threatening." To accomplish this, however, is no easy task, and it may well be asked, who is sufficient for it? Nor is it a work of days, or weeks, or even of months, at least in a juvenile school. Moral training, it cannot be denied, is here far less effective than in an infant school. In the latter, the trainer has but comparatively few bad habits to eradicate; he has therefore by far the start of a juvenile-master. The former has only to begin to do; the latter has to begin by undoing. The one has only to commence rearing a superstructure; the other has to demolish a ruin, and to lay a new foundation before his edifice can appear. Perhaps no better illustration of this can be given than the parallel case of a tree, the difficulty of bending or training which increases in exact proportion to its age. At first, when young and pliant, it is easily moulded into whatever form or shape the gardener wishes; but as it gains strength and thickness, whatever wrong bias it may have taken, requires both more time and attention to rectify, till at length it becomes an utter impossibility to do so. So is it with habits whether good or bad, they grow with our growth, and gain strength with our advancing years, until a period arrives when all human exertions to repress the one and call forth the other, seem to prove unavailing. And no doubt the grace of God is omnipotent, and can change the heart
even of the most abandoned, at any period of life and without any human instrumentality. Yet must we never shut our eyes to the fact, that the more common way in which the Spirit of God manifests itself, is in blessing the means used in the moral education of the ungodly.

It may here be mentioned what is, perhaps, superfluous, that a system of moral training is all founded upon Bible training; in other words, on the principles of the immutable standard of revealed truth, and stimulated by its high and holy sanctions. To the law and to the testimony a uniform appeal must be made. Its promises must be held out as an inducement to virtue, and its threatenings as a warning to vice. Love to God the motive for keeping his commandments, and fear of offending him the preventive against breaking them. It would take up more space than is now convenient to enter into a detailed account of all the wrong habits and propensities that ought to be remedied, and of the right principles and conduct that should be formed in a course of moral education. I shall, therefore, simply endeavour to indicate the manifestations of the moral feelings, and notice one or two of the most prominent principles which should be borne in mind in regulating these.

It has been said that a child playing in its mother's lap with a toy is thus seeking the means of gratifying its senses, receiving ideas of sensation from a contact with objects, and laying a foundation for the future exercise of his reflective faculties. But his moral education is going on at the same time, and a similar process of abstraction is taking place among the feelings. The earliest manifestation of these is a selfish desire to receive mere animal gratification, and the mother is the source of this enjoyment. She soothes the child's first
pains and administers to his earliest pleasures, and the first overflowing of his gratified feelings accordingly centres upon her. But a monopoly of this gratitude will not be confined to her alone. As the child advances in intelligence, he will perceive around him other beings from whom he also derives pleasure, and a similar feeling will be drawn out towards them; and as reflection dawns, he will ultimately raise his gratitude to the supreme Source of all happiness. When, therefore, a child feels gratefully towards its parent, in doing so it places itself under obedience to her. It voluntarily, or unconsciously rather, surrenders a power into her hand for its own guidance, and she will then lead her child by the soft cords of its own affections. It will follow her into the right path if she lead the way. To the extent, also, of its affection for others will it confide in them and follow wherever they lead, and ultimately, its obedience and conformity to the will of God will be in proportion to its enlightened affection and gratitude to himself.

Now the educator must adapt himself to these manifestations. He must enter into the child's pains and pleasures, and by attention to these gain a command over his affections. When he has acquired this mastery, he has the reins in his hands by which he may guide the entire conduct. The child's kindly feelings towards those around him will soon manifest itself in acts of kindness. These should be met not by praise, but by signs of affectionate acknowledgment. This should be a natural result to the child of a kind deed, a remembrance of which would prompt to similar acts in future, and a repetition of such acts would stamp the habit. When this kindly disposition has been somewhat established, his attention should be directed to the distresses of others, and a natural impulse created to alleviate them, which of
course ought, if possible, to be gratified. Such an impulse, indeed, should hardly be awakened unless opportunities be also afforded to call it into action, as it is so liable to be trained into a mere barren sentimentality. Religion must doubtless be the basis of such an education, and the "good works" of Scripture the means of forming the moral character and habits. But the instructor will prove incompetent to the task he has assumed, if he proceed upon the most common mode of inculcating the morality of the Bible. Its practice must be antecedent to its precepts, and even in communicating a knowledge of the latter, an equally inductive mode must be adopted, to the formation of the habits. A child loves and feels kindly towards its parents and others, because they first manifested love and kindness to him, and God must be represented in a similar character before either a feeling or a belief of his goodness can be inspired. "We love him because he first loved us." Whereas if he be first represented as an avenging and terrible Being, who inflicts everlasting torture upon his creatures,—I say if this view of his character be given before the child is able fully to see the demerits of sinful conduct, God cannot be loved, but will be feared, and most probably hated; and that religion, the very essence of which is love, mercy, and kindness, will be found to be a yoke too heavy to be borne. But no mother, nor instructor is perfect; and by the time that the child has advanced a little in years, many faults will have been developed under the best guidance, to remedy which a counteracting process must be resorted to, and go hand in hand with direct training.

The necessity of obedience as an element in training is obvious to every one, but it does not so readily occur that an obedient and docile habit is naturally yielded to an instructor who establishes a just relationship between
a child and the moral laws. An obedience to these laws is found to be in harmony with the child's nature, obedience is therefore naturally given to them; but there is no such thing as an innate sense of moral rectitude. A child grows up with feelings biased in favour of one set of actions, and prejudiced against others, through impressions received from external causes. Hence, in mature life, one individual regards a certain action as virtuous, which another may consider immoral, and by one nation the customs and practices of another nation are looked upon as criminal, which, by the latter may be regarded as strictly moral. Polygamy in Turkey is reckoned no crime, while in England it is; but an English child educated under Turkish parents would not regard it as criminal, neither would a Turkish child, brought up in England, consider it as anything but immoral. The standard of pure morality is neither set up by the conflicting opinions of mankind, nor arrived at by the innate feelings of the human heart. Its principles are a deduction from general conduct, in the observing of which the greatest amount of individual happiness is acknowledged by all to be derived, or communicated by revelation for universal guidance. There are, therefore, established laws that must be obeyed in order to secure this happiness; or if disobeyed, the consequence will be a general feeling of unhappiness.

Now as children are naturally ignorant of any higher rule of conduct than their own blind desires, they must be guided into a proper relation to these laws, and imbued with right principles by an instructor. If he be under the influence of correct moral principles himself, their obedience to him is an obedience of these laws, and to the extent of their submission to his authority will their happiness be increased, and their conduct and habits harmonise with the principles of universal morality. He is to
them in the place of God, an executor of the Divine will, and in gaining the children's obedience, he must adopt the same means and for the same end, that the Creator of these laws employs in gaining the universal obedience of his creatures. Having gained a control over their affections, the exertion of that power must be characterised by the same inflexible regularity which marks the operations of the Divine government, and every command be given for the children's ultimate benefit, irrespective of their immediate comfort, the consequence of which should be felt to be advantageous, or its neglect followed by a disadvantage. These orders and their consequences should be as intimately connected as cause and effect, and the conviction thus inspired within a child's heart, would soon become developed into a reigning principle of implicit obedience to his guide and instructor.

A child soon accommodates himself to what he feels to be a natural order of things, and when he finds that his resistance to a command, or request, or even his cries and tears, make no change in the calm determination of his superior, he submits as to an inevitable necessity, and since he cannot control his master's will, suffers himself to be controlled by it. If the master yield, however, in a single instance, in gratifying a wrong desire through a pertinacity of resistance, a retrograde movement will be effected, and the work of months may be lost. Nor will his object be gained should the trainer be ever so inflexible and just, if much asperity of tone and manner attach to his injunctions. This will indicate an approach to a spirit of vindictiveness, nothing of which is congenial to a course of purely moral discipline. It represses those affections by which so strong a hold is obtained over the character, and elicits fear, which is a physical instinct; and though a temporary submission may follow, there will
be no step gained in securing an obedient habit. Nothing but a steady adherence to a system of treatment based upon a kindness of feeling, and operating inflexibly upon enlightened principles, in restraining what is wrong, and encouraging what is right, will ever impress the obedient disposition.

An adherence to veracity is also a habit that ought assiduously to be cultivated in early years. Its violation is a breach of one of the ten commandments, and no unusual way in which it is denounced, is by dogmatically telling children that it is a sin which they must not commit under pain of eternal punishment. But like every other moral duty, the obligation to speak truth may be shown from the evil consequences of its infringement, and the benefits of its observance. This may be illustrated by some supposed case in which a falsehood may be seen to be as injurious in its nature and effects, as robbery and murder. Its reactive influence upon the propagator himself, may also be seen, in destroying his credibility and the confidence of others towards him, and its abstract heinousness deduced from its general evil consequences upon society in destroying all mutual confidence. The different shades of falsehood should likewise be shown by analogous examples, and its wrong tendency manifested even when no confidence is violated, such as in many idle tales for amusement, doubles entendre, and exaggerated statements. The error of such falsehoods does not so much consist in any positive mischief, as in their tendency to induce a habit of deception; and among children, where a single element may turn the scale in the formation of character, all such ambiguities should be strenuously discouraged. Those who indulge in such literal falsehoods, too, unconsciously impair their own general veracity, as in a historical novel where truth and
fiction are indiscriminately blended, no implicit reliance can be placed upon any of its statements. The reality and essence of a moral truth, or falsehood, should be clearly pictured out to the mind. A false statement made even with a good design should be shown to be wrong, as tending to impair an absolute confidence in true statements. Prevarication should be seen as a falsehood in reality, though couched in ambiguous language, as the intention is to deceive. Intended deceit is thus a lie in whatever way it may be manifested. If a speaker uses words, and attaches to them ideas different from what he knows the hearer will apply, he lies, by intentionally deceiving the other, though he has uttered no literal falsehood. Or, in a substantially true statement, he may deceive by conveying more than the simple truth, or omitting some of its most important particulars. A lie may also be acted by a gesture of the body, or some other outward manifestation, intentionally conveying a false impression. All such forms of deception, with many other modifications of the same vice, must therefore be illustrated, the motives to truth enforced by its personal and social advantages, and its obligation enjoined as a duty contained in the word of God.

ANGER.—This feeling must also be analyzed to children, and its effects shown. It is either a passive affection of the mind, a pain felt on receiving an injury, or a desire stimulating to active revenge. The former should be modified, but the latter entirely repressed. The feeling of anger may be alleviated in intensity, and shortened in its duration by reason and reflection. A thorough investigation into the grounds of an offence, will often strip it of many aggravating circumstances that the first burst of passion threw around it. If it be found that no injury was really intended, the pain should be endured.
merely as the result of an accident, or if inflicted for a malignant purpose, still, the irritating impression may be allayed by striving to forget it, and considering the aggressor only in the light of a dangerous companion. The feeling of anger will die away with a recollection of the injury, and the folly of keeping alive such an impression may be illustrated by the similar example of needlessly irritating a bodily wound, and keeping it always painful. But Scripture suggests the most powerful motive to subdue resentment. "If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly Father forgive you." Let a child see what would be his own position if his offences against God should be entertained in the Divine mind in the same spirit that he would be disposed to brood over an injury done to himself, and he will find a sufficient cause to feel differently towards the offender, and endeavour to obliterate the offence from his memory. Or let him in imagination change positions with the offender, and ask himself how he should wish to be dealt by in such circumstances, and he will likely put a more charitable construction upon the motives of the former, and see less cause for his own mental uneasiness. In short, there are many ways in which he might be reasoned out of his passion.

Yet anger has its legitimate functions in the mental economy, and when kept within due bounds, is a just and a right feeling. It is by an excessive action upon the mind that it increases into revenge, which must be entirely suppressed. This feeling, instead of desiring to overlook, magnifies an offence, and stirs up the animal passions to inflict pain in return. It argues, therefore, the possession of less reason in any one thus subject to its influence. Being an impulse of the lower nature, it must be met on its own ground by an appeal to motives of
self-interest. It should be represented not only as a crime but as cowardice, and another mode of obtaining a much greater satisfaction shown, by doing good in return for the evil received. The superiority of this principle may be illustrated from many examples, and it is one that children can more readily appreciate and reduce to practice than grown-up people. To carry into effect this divine sentiment, therefore, in a training school, is one of the noblest employments that can engage the skill and energies of man.

Justice.—The foundation of this virtue is to do unto others as we should wish to be done unto, and there is no better way of implanting a conviction of its necessity, and inducing its practice, than by proceeding upon the same golden rule. Every boy has some property belonging to him, his clothes, his play-things, or his books, and if another takes away any of these without his consent, he feels grieved and vexed at their loss. Let this feeling, then, be a first principle to start from, in the process of moral induction, towards impressing upon him an idea of the absolute necessity of just dealing. Begin with his internal knowledge, and build outwards. Tell him what another's feeling would be in similar circumstances, and he will understand it, and feel a motive for respecting the property of his playfellows. Yet if some temptation prove too strong for this feeling of sympathy, or if his selfish, be stronger than his benevolent feelings, the sense of shame attending such an action will prove an auxiliary against him. Or, if he has an attachment to his master, or parent, a fear of offending him will be an additional preventive. He must also be warned of the wickedness of the action in the sight of God, and deterred by the fear of disobeying him. But this is an extreme infringement of justice that comparatively few children
are guilty of; its more common manifestation is in unfair dealing, evil speaking, and other of its modifications, all of which must be illustrated with examples, their disadvantages made manifest, and the benefits of honesty and a respect to character and feelings shown in a similar way, by appealing to some previous internal conviction. The best opportunities for developing this habit are during the games of children, in watching the progress of the players; and guiding their movements, when the very fact of overlooking them will restrain any unjust or unfair tendency so apt at such times to arise.

BENEVOLENCE.—Both in Scripture and philosophy this virtue stands in the highest rank. It is the same principle as the "charity" of Scripture, and the "good-will to men" proclaimed by angels from heaven. It is also the active part of that love which was said to be the fulfilling or fulfilment of the law, and of that "new commandment" which comprised the sum and substance of the entire decalogue. The definition of "pure and undefiled religion" is also given, simply as the practice of benevolence. That there is a corresponding faculty in the mind to obey its dictates may, therefore, be presumed à priori, and modern philosophy establishes the truth of the supposition. In every well-balanced mind benevolence is easily educated, as it is inherent in all, and by cultivation may gain pre-eminence in any. All that is necessary is to afford opportunities for its development by leading it into action. A child first loves its mother because it receives gratification from her, and it loves others from a similar cause, but this is not benevolence. To feel kindness in such cases is natural gratitude, which is a kind of price paid for value received, having no merit in it. "If ye love those that love you, what thank have ye?" The feeling must be drawn out and strengthened to a much greater degree
than this. A child must be led to feel kindly towards those from whom he received no previous benefit, and even from whom he can expect no gratitude in return for his kindesses, nor anything but the mere pleasure of doing them good. There must be a disposition within him, ever prompting to active goodness, instead of cherishing mere kindly feelings; and instead of being under the obligations of gratitude to others, he should desire to educe gratitude from them, or at least to do them kindesses for the pleasure of doing so. It may be said, however, that even this is but a selfish motive, and it is partly so; but I am at present considering the education of the feeling irrespective of the motive, and as in other parts of education, an appeal must be sometimes made to a lower faculty to develop a higher, and guide it into action, so in benevolence, it is equally legitimate to show its individual advantages, that a personal interest in these may give the first stimulus to its weaker manifestations. Besides, everlasting happiness is the scriptural motive to benevolence, and this is essentially the same quality of happiness which is felt to be the natural consequence of a temporal good action. The motive is, therefore, only different in degree, from that suggested by the will of God, as the rule of benevolence. When this motive is felt, it becomes a rule of conduct, and the will of God is thus obeyed practically before reason deduces the abstract commandment; so that he who rules the child by laying hold of this motive, is pursuing a course strictly parallel with the will and commandments of God. It is also similar in principle to training to a practical knowledge of things before giving their names.

The first manifestation of this feeling may be seen in a child's little acts of kindness towards its parent, or guide, which should be carefully rewarded by the fond
caress or endearing smile. This would encourage to
the performance of similar acts in future, and thus the
continued outward tendency of the feeling would in time
become strengthened into a habit of kindness. An
abstract pleasure would soon attach to the exercise of the
feeling independently of that arising from the approba-
tion of its parent, or instructor. It should then be
directed to neutral objects, and kindnesses done for the
mere pleasure of doing them; nor is it true that such
deeds, if judiciously applied, will often meet with ungrate-
ful returns. There is less natural ingratitude in human
nature than is generally suspected, but the reason why so
much of it is apparently manifested, is because so little
pure and disinterested kindness is to be found. At all
events, few can resist the spontaneous kindness of a little
child in offering some trifling gift; and what child does
not feel a glow of pleasure when its gift is kindly received,
and gratefully acknowledged? The feeling thus culti-
vated, will by degrees show itself in various other ways,
springing up and spreading out in many branches. It
will assume a readiness to oblige, and the obligation
should be as readily acknowledged. It will also desire to
relieve distress, and it should always have the means of
doing so. It is the foundation of good nature, good
temper, and amiability; it will therefore charitably con-
sider the failings and faults of others. To all such
objects, and many others, the moral trainer must find the
means of guiding the manifestation of this heavenly sen-
timent, and calling it forth into a ruling habit.

But it is also liable to abuse; and if acting without
counsel and reflection, its benefactions may do as much
harm as good, and its extreme action cause itself to lux-
uriate into a very dangerous principle. It may be over-
tasked and become diseased, as well as enfeebled from
inaction. It may be increased to an undue intensity by a false excitement, and unregulated by prudence may indulge in indiscriminate acts of charity or almsgiving, which may as readily administer to the depravity of the indolent as the necessities of the deserving. In another form it may induce a wasteful and extravagant disposition, hurrying its possessor on to ruin, or exposing him to the designs of the cunning, or it may soften down his character into that of the mere good-natured simpleton.

It is doubtless an excess of this feeling, too, joined to a high degree of religious fervour, which induces many to give large sums of money to foreign purposes, in preference to home charities. Its healthiest operation is most frequently to be found in unobtrusive individual endeavours to alleviate poverty and distress wherever found. It is an indwelling desire to communicate happiness to all men whenever an opportunity occurs, and whatever may be the nature of the occasion. This is a principle, therefore, of the highest importance in the moral nature of man, and requiring the utmost care and skill, not only to call it into exercise, but to guide to a proper choice of objects and occasions for its manifestation. Happily there are many examples afforded in history for its illustration, and in the precepts and life of Christ, a golden treasury of its richest fruits may be found. "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. For if ye love them which love you, what thank have ye? for sinners also love those that love them. And if ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? for sinners also do even the same. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward

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shall be great; and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful." Nor is there a single precept given that had not a living illustration in his own spotless life.

Such, then, is the manner in which certain of the vicious propensities must be attempted to be suppressed, and opposite tendencies called forth; and I shall now only sum up in one word the end which must be aimed at in this as in all the other divisions of education,—namely, to form good habits. The formation of a virtuous and good character is the sum and substance, the alpha and the omega, of moral training. And here I cannot but remark the disadvantage under which a school of this kind must labour compared with another that proceeds upon the popular method. It is not attempted by some intellectual display to exhibit the scholars to advantage before strangers. In fact, this is believed to have an immoral tendency, as being apt to generate feelings of pride and self-consequence in a few, and envy in others. The regulation of the affections, and the formation of correct habits of thinking, are the principal objects, and these are results not visible to the casual observer. The acquisition of mere reading and writing, and acquiring ever so extensive a knowledge of precepts and rules, either moral or intellectual, are not by any means the most important objects to be gained; they only fall under the numerous class of means in operation for a certain end, yet it may confidently be affirmed that there is no well-conducted training school, where these are not at least on a par with any other mere teaching school. As the principles of the former must, therefore, be recognised as in harmony with nature, I would thus beg, with every feeling of respect, to recom-
mend them, not only to the members of the scholastic profession, but to parents and all who have an interest in the education of the young.

It may naturally have been expected, that a word or two should have been here said regarding corporal punishments as an agency in moral training, but such a system recognises not that most degrading and exasperating mode of correcting offences. It is conceived, that to treat children in almost every respect with the same deference and courtesy that are used towards our equals, comes much nearer the correct standard than most people think. And if any person imagine that he will gain his end better by applying harsh means to his neighbour and coercing him into compliance with his wishes, than by a spirit of Christian courtesy and persuasion, of course he will advocate a similar treatment of children. The scriptural authority on the point, too, must be admitted; yet when the same object can be effected by other means, it is in strict harmony with all the arrangements of Providence to lean to the side of mercy and adopt these.

Neither is it less a principle in moral science, that kindness is power, whether applied to man or beast, than the corresponding maxim regarding knowledge. Love, and not fear, must be the ruling principle, otherwise the boundary line separating between moral and physical government has assuredly been passed; and as certainly as a judicious application of the former will produce obedience in all cases, so will the latter only harden the disposition and render the disobedient still more so. The fable of the wind and sun contending against the traveller has a moral application of the highest importance in training. And the same principle of kindness applies equally to the lower animals. A dog belonging
to a man of a violent and irascible nature will assume a kindred snappishness and quarrelsomeness, and though beaten ever so much, will only become the more vicious. Whereas, who has not heard of the docile disposition and gentle manners of the Arabian courser, whose master would sooner think of inflicting punishment upon himself than of laying a rude hand upon that affectionate creature?

Nor does one often see a fractious horse pass along the more willingly for a beating. His proud spirit, no less than his aching hide, winces under the ungenerous treatment, and he embraces the first opportunity of turning restive again. Kindness is an omnipotent governing power pervading all sentient nature. That people can be ruled by fear is true. Slaves are so managed; but one has only to look at the present moment to the southern states of North America, to see whether such a system of terror will not very speedily undergo a reaction. The proprietors of human flesh in those places will unquestionably be overwhelmed in their own abhorrent devices to prolong such a system.

I do not at present enter upon the question, what kind of moral stimuli of an extrinsic nature may be necessary to induce good conduct, and repress the vicious tendencies of the young. It may only be remarked in general, that rewards and punishments, even of a moral kind, are at best but necessary evils. Much cannot be said in defence of a system of bribing to obedience, though there is, perhaps, not much harm in that nevertheless. It is an appeal to the lower feelings, and of course may be resorted to when higher motives fail. It may be necessary before a habit is formed, and as a means of inducing that habit, but it ought to be left off when the habit itself has become the guiding power.
The preceding analysis of the object of education in its threefold capacity, presents of course but a very limited outline of the entire duties of an educator. It would, indeed, be impossible to particularise these in detail, not only from their number but infinite variety of application. Each of the sciences of physics, intellect, and morals, too, is but in progress of being fully understood, and consequently the existence of many duties that he ought to perform is yet unknown. The best qualified instructor can therefore be only partially informed as to his duties, and in many things must grope his way by his own experience alone. Nor will the best information guide him to a correct practice of these duties: his own character must be previously trained as a model to fashion others by. In short, a properly qualified educator must be a perfect man, and there is none such upon earth. All that can be done is to carry into effect those well-ascertained principles of mental philosophy which bear upon the practice of his calling, by establishing and encouraging institutions for the formation of a normal character up to such requirements.

Much has also been said and written about raising the social status of the educator, but this would certainly follow if society had just grounds for entertaining a higher estimate of the intrinsic character of his profession. Hitherto, it is no breach of charity to say, the professional character of the majority of schoolmasters has raised them as high in society as they deserved. Whatever may have been their private worth, by entering a profession antiquated in its forms and inadequate in its qualifications to the great end designed by it, they assumed a social position similar to a man of inherent moral worth, but rude manners, in a fashionable drawing-room. In the eye of taste he would be ridiculous, however his
native excellence might be appreciated. If the end of
the profession were the sole criterion of deciding its
social rank, it would probably stand much higher than it
does; but its means to gain this end have hitherto de-
pressed it; its manners have excluded it from the posi-
tion due to its morals. If, therefore, enlightened modes
of education be cultivated and adopted by the profession,
they will prove the means of advancing its importance
in the social economy, and its professors will be advanced
along with it.

Various are the causes that have combined in depressing
the educator in social esteem. In ancient Greece and Rome
the office was generally filled by slaves, and consequently
held in degradation by the free-born of those countries:
Nor is it likely that during the dark ages, if such an
office at all existed, it would be held in much higher
respect. And when a revival of letters came, and
the dead languages were translated into living tongues,
the same sentiments were transfused into the latter, and
gained currency among the customs of modern days.
Neither was the office redeemed from this degradation in
any degree by the personal qualifications and modes of
government of those who administered its functions.
Their teaching duties were confined to reading, writing,
and accounts, with a sprinkling of the dead languages
—the mere instruments of acquiring knowledge, not
knowledge itself. It was therefore no higher than a
mechanical employment in point of intellectual labour, and
hence he who was employed in it gained no higher con-
sideration than was due to a mechanic. But still less did
he either deserve or gain respect from the modes of disci-
pline resorted to in checking the waywardness of youth,
by compelling an abject submission to his tyrannical
authority through fear of bodily punishment. That
society, indeed, should be somewhat tardy in recognising as gentlemen, individuals whose duties were so similar in their nature to those occasionally performed by "the drummer of a regiment, the whipper-in of a pack of hounds, or the policeman of a city," cannot, on the whole, be looked upon as a very unhealthy state of social feeling. And certainly no other element in the character of a schoolmaster has ever militated so strongly against his social elevation as the use of this degrading kind of punishment.

It is true there are other classes whose duties are no less vindictive, admitted to the best society, but there is at least no such apparent incongruity in their callings. Those of the schoolmaster relate chiefly to the mental powers. He thus enters, in point of fact, upon a sphere of labour above that of the more favoured classes, and when he descends to physical means to gain his higher ends, he practically acknowledges his incompetency to sustain that moral rank, and becomes liable to ridicule. This ridicule extends to the profession, and all its members come to be regarded as occupying the same false position. While other classes, too, such as the army, the navy, and the bar, direct their punitive and aggressive measures against men capable of defending themselves, and many of them often expose their own lives in doing so, the school flagellator directs his cowardly punishments against mere helpless infancy; so that as long as society prefers courage to cowardice, cool temper to irritability, and talent to incompetency, either the individual or profession that gives proofs of such disqualifications must be kept in the back-ground. It is the profession itself, therefore, that must throw off the stigma that has so long attached to it both as regards its incapacity and cruelty; and while the overwhelming importance of its object
must be acknowledged by all, there is no doubt that the right thinking part of the community will readily accede to its strong claims for advancement in the social scale. As the question of corporal punishments, however, is one of the greatest importance, both as regards the educator and education, I shall devote the following chapter exclusively to an examination of the practice, and endeavour to suggest the means of its prevention by indicating a course of moral discipline.
CHAPTER XV.

In the preceding chapter I have said that the present age is distinguished above every former period for the practical manifestation of a moral influence in the guidance of human conduct. But as this power is only beginning to be acknowledged, and its operations are the result of individual and isolated exertions, it has still to struggle against the might and mastery of formerly existing institutions, framed upon a far different principle. Many of these have been based upon the lower feelings of human nature and conducted by intellectual means, for purely selfish purposes. Their establishment was therefore but an artificial extension of animalism, in which superior degrees of intelligence only increased the means of aggressive violence, or secured a more sure defence from the violence of others. Hence the existence of armies and navies, with all their death-dispensing apparatus and machinery. What are all these but a mighty exertion of intellect to seize and keep possession for selfish purposes? In many cases it is "might over right," but in all cases a departure from the principle of rendering "good for evil." And if their necessity can be at all defended, it must be on the plea of other nations acting with equal selfishness, which only the more strongly proves the same melancholy statement.
No wonder is it, then, when society receives its first impression from an iron mould like this, that it should itself become indurated, and convey a similar impression to its various individual institutions. Army and navy discipline is mere physical coercion. Soldiers and sailors are flogged into obedience, and kept in subjection through fear. Even civil government is a pure compulsion, backed by an appeal to physical force, and capital punishments, banishment, and imprisonment, the usual means employed in reclaiming refractory subjects. But whatever may be said in defence of this iron rule, where the mere physical wants of man are legislated for, and where the subject himself is little more than the fragment of a machine, in those institutions where mind and moral faculties are under discipline, and where even the germs of a spiritual existence ought to be cultivated, anything like a system of terror-training is egregiously out of place. The intellect can never be held in fetters forged by human hands, nor stimulated to any healthful activity by bodily stripes. To chain the viewless winds, and calm the heaving ocean, are not more impossible.

Where such methods are resorted to in the present day in schools, they are still the fragments of barbarism, and a line of conduct indicated by the passions in supremacy,—as much so as that which leads inferior animals to retaliate upon one another. The only difference, indeed, seems to be, not in the animus which prompts to such punishments, but in the medium through which they are carried into effect. Reason has suggested more artificial and complicated modes of thus gratifying the passions. It is a more polished and effective weapon than instinct, but the wielding power is substantially the same. And, to carry out the metaphor, it is only the glare of this bright instrument that dazzles the eye and prevents us from
seeing the malignancy of the power that unsheathes it. It is only the perverted reason of man that enables him so successfully to hide the unreasonableness of his conduct; and much it is to be feared that even the arguments adduced in support of such treatment are often given against the secret convictions of those who adduce them. Nor does it require, certainly, any great degree of mental acuteness to see, that an error in judgment can never be repaired by any bodily infliction, any more than a physical deformity can be cured by a mere effort of mind. And as a moral offence proceeds but from one or other of two causes,—either a perversity of the will, or an inveteracy of habit,—it is only the former that can ever be rectified by a mental influence, while immoralities which have gained the force of habits are far beyond the reach of mere precept, and can only be counteracted by opposite habits. How vain, then, is it to attempt reaching these by merely material influences—that is, by bodily punishments!

But this discrepancy between opinion and action—between the dictates of conscience and the promptings of passion, proves at least a sort of transitional state, and an approach to better things. And as in the analogy adduced, where instinct merges into intellect, so in the treatment of offences a very perceptible change is taking place in the world. Punishments, in theory at least, are conducted more upon intellectual principles, and less upon the impulse of an instinctive vengeance. People now reason upon the necessity of bodily punishments, and in awarding such, endeavour to apportion a proper amount of pain to the magnitude of the crime. But it is still a vicarious punishment; and I repeat, that it is equally unjust to inflict an injury upon the feelings for a bodily defect, as to inflict bodily pain for a moral delinquency.
Having premised this general statement, in the following remarks I shall merely select a few instances at random, by way of illustrating this proposition:—That a system of moral training is not a thing naturally adopted by a teacher; that it is a generalisation drawn from human conduct by an intellectual process, and must therefore be referred to intellectually, in guiding the conduct; or, in short, that the passions must be held in check by the judgment, and the judgment itself under control of the moral faculties.

Suppose, then, a boy talking loudly to his companions in school: he offends his master's sense of propriety, and ruffles the tranquillity of his mind. The latter commands the boy to be silent; and perhaps he becomes so. Ten to one, however, the command is given with some asperity of manner, and in an angry tone of voice, which are neither more nor less than the result of a vindictive feeling, prompting a retaliation for the injury he himself sustained. It is substantially the same feeling that prompts one boy to return another a blow who has struck him. Now the boy, as has been said, may obey his master, and be still by such means, as well as by an opposite treatment; but to a moral certainty the germ of a vindictive feeling has been implanted in his mind against his master. The angry feeling was evidently governing the intellect, and as far as the cause of such an ebullition was concerned, the individual acted on a level with the inferior creation. Anger was first felt at the boy's disobedience, and an instinct impelled the master to this outward manifestation of his displeasure; but the result was entirely of a vindictive character, and made in perfect forgetfulness or ignorance of the moral tendency of such conduct. The intellect, so far as it had to do in the case by shaping the angry feeling into
words, was simply an instrument; whereas the angry feeling should have acted the part of a monitor to the intellect, giving notice of the fault, that it might have been dealt with according to some reasonable mode of treatment. An inferior animal would have acted in the same way; it would have vented its feelings in an angry growl, or have wreaked its fury in some bodily infliction. Both would thus be acting from an instinctive impulse; whereas the former of course should have taken reason as a guide. On the part of the master it was the natural and untrained feeling arising spontaneously, and manifesting itself in this aggressive form. It was acting blindly and without the control of reason.

It is not asserted, however, that it is wrong to entertain a feeling of anger. Anger is a good feeling, and implanted within us for good purposes. It is indeed given to protect from injuries,—that is, to make the aggressor sensible of his wrong, and prevent a repetition of it. But the point is, how is this best to be done, and there is an abundant answer furnished in the sublimest of all moral precepts,—“Overcome evil with good”—an answer that all the philosophy of the world never before supplied. To expect that the child’s talkative or trifling inclination would be restrained by exhibiting an angry aspect and bitter words, would be equally reasonable as to expect that a distemper could be cured by irritating the part most infected. The angry feeling must therefore be kept entirely in subjection to the judgment. It may prompt the latter to the discharge of its duty, but it must never take the duty in hand itself. The mind, guided by experience, and upon a moment’s reflection, will see, that the proper way to proceed is, to treat the case as if no personal inconvenience had been at all experienced. Let the child be kindly admonished or gently reminded
of his error by a motion of the hand, accompanied by a calm look, and the same thing will be effected: but more will also be done. The harsh word would suppress the noise only to break out the more violently on the first opportunity; but a calm and affectionate remonstrance, besides repressing the particular act, throws a soothing influence over the whole character, forming the best preventive against any repetition of it.

The obvious inference from this is, that severe scolding and threatening, no less than bodily punishments, are morally injurious. Indeed, what are they but a species of punishment? It is a wounding of the feelings, an infliction of moral pain, which may be rendered much more acute than any corporal sufferings; and in flogging schools, too, they derive much of their poignancy from being a mere reflection of the rod, or rather the darkening shadow of the coming storm. In timid children, in fact, it is more a dread of what is beyond the scolding which influences them, than the mere scolding itself, against which they very soon become hardened.

The basis of a remedy, therefore, for the fault specified, and for every other act of disobedience, is to educe and cultivate a kindly feeling in children towards him whom they ought to obey; and, to lay this foundation, kind looks, words, and actions, must first be exhibited towards them. These will prove like so much good seed that will produce a kindred fruit in whatever soil it may be sown, more or less, of course, according to the previous state of cultivation. The other mode may be compared to lopping off some excrescences from a noxious plant, only giving increased facilities to the stem to send forth a greater number of rank shoots in other directions. The plant itself must be dug up, and the soil rendered unfit for any "root of bitterness" to live in it. It should
ever be remembered, therefore, that a display of angry conduct not only has no effect whatever, in repressing a disobedient tendency, but the very contrary effect. I repeat, that compliance with any request, or any number of requests, may be gained by such conduct, but far different is it in principle, from the Constraining and habitual tendency which prompts the child at once to respond to the call of duty.

Now if such be the result where mere words and feelings are exhibited, how much more culpable and erroneous is the too frequent custom of applying physical violence to enforce obedience! Children from custom begin to disregard the angry words of their master, who is obliged to call to his aid an additional degree of coercion. He shakes them roughly, or gives them a sudden box on the ear. But let any one observe the effects of such treatment even on a boy of generally obedient and good habits. A frown comes over his countenance and he mutters something of defiance, on hearing which, the master, most likely, repeats the blow with interest; and now the wrath and fury of a demon have taken possession of him, and a feeling of the most stubborn resistance engendered against, and by, the very person who foolishly thought thus to bend the child's disposition to his wishes. A most unfortunate figure of speech this bending of the disposition is, at least when used in this sense. Like many other metaphors, it has deceived the world long. A child's disposition can be bent, however, easily and pleasantly, by gentle means,—but by superior physical force, never. A spirit of obstinacy is aroused that will bid defiance to all opposition. The disposition may thus be broken, but it cannot be bent. In the case supposed, the master would have inflicted an injury upon the child's moral nature, which the committing to memory and to
judgment too, of all the precepts concerning obedience ever promulgated, could never remove. It may be counteracted by a different line of action, but no reasoning on earth can convince him that he has not been wronged, simply because he feels it.

But a boy accustomed to be thus roughly handled will very soon require a more cruel treatment still. Like one giving way to the seductive influences of opium, whose relaxed nerves require a constant supply of the stimulus, such harsh measures must be constantly plied, to ensure even a modicum of obedience. Hence the painful and humiliating spectacle of some masters never intermitting the use of the rod, but walking about amidst their trembling charge with ferula in hand, an apt impersonation of American slave-drivers, but from the circumstance of the objects of their punishment being unprotected infancy, infinitely more revolting to a humane mind. And it is all bad enough when such a course is deemed necessary to ensure obedience, or to repress some really immoral and wicked acts. In this case it is simply a mistaken mode of treating such offences,—a grievous one indeed to the object of it. But the cause of such punishments may perhaps have emanated from the children themselves in their own thoughtless conduct, and in this respect they are only on a level with their seniors in the world, many of whose faults, from the customs and etiquette of modish society, often draw down upon them consequences much more severe than they ever deserved. But the case has no parallel in point of cruelty when a boy, conscious of his own natural inability to perform some mental task, finds that he must inevitably succumb to the lash. This is no hypothetical case. It occurs almost every day, in every school in the empire where corporal punishment is resorted to.
Take, for instance, the case of a boy naturally deficient in the faculty of language, but classed with another more largely endowed with that faculty. It is evident that the latter by very little exertion will overtake a task to which the former is utterly inadequate. Such, in fact, is a difference simply arising from a certain configuration of the brain, or at all events depending on some physical cause, over which, of course, he has no possible control. The gifted boy has therefore no more merit, morally speaking, in outstripping his class-fellow, than a fleet racer would have in a contest with a dray-horse. But the same tasks are usually allotted to each, and while the boy who by force of mere natural endowments is praised for getting that which to him cost little trouble, the boy denied by Providence the same faculty in equal strength, but who, perhaps, exerted himself more than the other and failed, receives the recompense of his labours in a castigation. Mental ability and the possession of certain faculties in different degrees of strength and activity, are as much the mere endowments of nature and Providence, as a strong constitution and a vigorous bodily frame; it were therefore as just and reasonable to punish a boy who should fail in a trial of mere bodily strength with another, as him who fails in the mental struggle. Besides, one boy is not only thus rewarded for possessing what he received from Providence as a gift, but by this invidious system of attaching a moral consideration to a mere accident of mind, another boy is punished on his account. In a class, lessons are seldom adapted to the capacity of the inferior boys, but to that of the more forward, for whose superior endowments the former are thus made to suffer. Yet it is hard to say on which of the two such treatment sheds the most baneful influence. One boy has his love of esteem, or, in com-
mon language, his pride, trained to excess in finding himself over-praised for his slight exertions, and a feeling of vanity and arrogance supervenes, that may prove the bane of his future happiness; and another, feeling himself degraded and maltreated undeservedly, may sink into the gloomy and careless dunce, cherishing a spirit of resentment against his master, and of envy towards his more fortunate rival. The self-esteem of the latter is thus unduly repressed, by which, that confidence in his own powers, so necessary for every mental effort, is destroyed.

Or supposing it to be a task in which a mere exercise of memory is concerned, how widely different are children constituted in this respect! The natural ability of one boy will enable him to get a lesson by heart in five minutes, which would require another an hour or more. How different is the actual amount of labour here, and how mortifying is it for the less gifted boy to see his comrade praised and rewarded for his trifling exertion, while all his own labour only procured him a beating! But reverse the case,—set a boy of a good memory but deficient in judgment, and one of acute reasoning powers but wanting in the faculty of an abstract memory, to demonstrate a proposition in Euclid, and it is easy to see how immeasurably the latter would have an advantage over the former. And equally clear is it in a case where nothing but dates and unassociated facts were to be committed to memory, how far he would be outstripped by the other. But in general, where teachers resort to physical punishments to enforce the getting of lessons, no attention is paid to this distinction; the same lesson must be got by all the class, in the same time, and with the same degree of accuracy, and the same punishment awaits each defaulter whatever may be the cause of his failure.
Another thing is, the same motive presented to a class does not influence all alike, even though felt as strongly by one as another. The difference in point of labour necessary to get the lesson destroys the relative power of the motive. To a boy who can with small labour perform his task, the same motive is much stronger than to another who requires much exertion to do so. The latter has a counteracting motive in the difficulty of the task, and he weighs his own ease in refraining from it, against the inducement held out; and of course according to the difficulty of getting the task will the original motive lose its power. Nay, should he even throw the anticipated caning into the scale, the motive will often be found all too light. The talented boy has no consideration of this kind to overcome, for to him the lesson itself is perhaps a pleasure.

Or the same thing may not even be a motive to all. Suppose the inducement simply be the approbation of the master, in those who have a large share of self-esteem, this will be powerful enough; while to others, not so constituted, it will prove no stimulus at all. The love of gaining a prize, which is a purely selfish feeling, will influence one boy, while, upon another, of perhaps better feelings, it will have no effect. One will be swayed by a sense of fear more than another possessed of firmer nerves; and a third will be stimulated by a mere sense of duty, more than another of less regulated habits. In short, there can hardly be a class of three boys, to each of whom the same thing would prove an equally powerful motive, or on whom the same motive would operate with equal power. But the rod settles all these distinctions: it is the magician's wand, reducing all capacities to the same dead level. Now the most careless observer must see that every boy differs from another in some depart-
ment of his mental nature. It is, therefore, equally vain to imagine that one set of motives would equally influence all, as that one suit of clothes would fit all.

Perhaps nothing in the science of education more imperatively demands the teacher’s attentive study than the principle of motives, and to make himself acquainted with which, a correct knowledge of the nature and constitution of the human mind is indispensable.

Much of what is called bad conduct in children, both in school and in the family, is simply conduct troublesome to those who have the charge of them. In the case first adduced of a boy’s loud talking and restlessness, the master’s love of order and decorum was disturbed, and the serenity of his mind ruffled, and these feelings vented themselves against the aggressor. But no moral delinquency can be said properly to attach to such an error in the boy. It is much more a restraint upon the natural propensities of children to refrain from noise, than disagreeable to the master to listen to it. It is only a breach of those conventional rules he has established for his own convenience, and much at variance many of them are with the fresh and joyous outpourings of the youthful mind. Still, the order and decorum of a school must be maintained even at the expense of this exaction; but as it is more in favour of the party exacting it, than any compliance with a principle of morality, the idea of enforcing silence and stillness under the penalty of the lash, is a tolerable stretch of absolutism. And if we analyse the feeling which suggests the infliction of corporal pain for the omission of some tedious and stupid task, without inquiring into the causes of the omission, it will be found to have its origin either in the ignorance, the indolence, or the cruelty of the inflicter. A master is gratified to
hear a boy repeat his lessons accurately; his own serenity of mind is thus promoted, and he praises the "good boy" for his diligence and assiduity. But the "bad boy," that is, he to whom Providence has denied the blessing of a retentive memory, or as acute powers of perception, of course blunders a lesson not adapted to his capacity, and disturbs his master's equanimity. Anger and resentment arise in the mind, that seek for gratification in the punishment of the author of them. Yet the innocent boy should by no means be called the author of such feelings. They were called into existence by the master's ignorance or indolence. He either could not detect, or did not take the pains to detect, the want of capacity and the absence of a sufficient motive to perform the task. He set the child to achieve an impossibility, and punished him for not doing so.

How few persons who are in the habit of inflicting punishments of this kind, would, for a moment, entertain the idea, that it is a mere gratifying of revenge! This may appear startling to those who have but little reflected upon the matter, and many may persuade themselves into a belief, that they are acting under an imperative sense of duty in doing so. But even the calmest and most deliberate chastisement of this sort is in its very nature a vindictive procedure, and there is no purely vindictive punishment but what is an unmitigated evil. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," belong to the abrogated code of the Mosaic economy, while the Christian dispensation teaches us, to "render not evil for evil."

Why should an offence call for any outward punishment at all? The foolish answer too often is, that a sense of offended justice calls for it, or some such phrase. But
few things have caused more misery to the human race than a literal rendering of such phrases, which, for the most part, are simply personifications of abstract ideas, taken from the mythology of pagan nations. There is no such idea of "justice" between man and man in the Christian religion. "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for, in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head." This is all the vengeance that man is allowed to indulge in under that dispensation, and the true philosophy of retaliation; and it is a principle revealed for his guidance in the treatment of every offence. The true answer is, that punishments are awarded to offenders, either in ignorance of such a principle, or in distrust of its efficacy. It is either acting from an impulse of the feelings, without reasoning at all, or defending a line of action by arguments drawn from anything but an enlightened view of human nature.

Let it be borne in mind, that every really immoral act has a punishment attached to itself; and to the enlightened and educated conscience, either of a man or a boy, this ought to form, and will form, a sufficient safeguard against the commission of crime. Such is one of the great principles upon which God himself conducts the moral affairs of his creatures. He is the superintending and controlling agent over a system of government. There is no caprice in his administration of justice, no isolated cases, or contingencies, which such system does not comprehend, and has not made provision for. He has also afforded to his creatures the means of enlightenment as to a knowledge of that system, has shown them, by experience and revelation, the consequences of obedience and of disobedience to its requirements, so that they are without excuse if they incur the penalties
annexed to a breach of his laws. Nor are even these penalties of a vindictive, but of a remedial character. They are always commensurate with the flagrancy of the crime, and of a nature adapted to counteract the propensity inciting to any particular offence. Dishonesty is not punished with the loss of health, nor immoderate eating with the forfeiture of a good name; yet each error has within itself the germ of its own peculiar punishment, a corrective property, which re-acts upon the offender for the beneficent purpose of warning him of his offence and effecting his reformation.

Such a statement, it is hoped, will not be regarded as anything like a declension towards materialism or German metaphysics. That virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment, is a maxim common to both ancient and modern, Christian and heathen morality, and as old as the first dawning of intelligence upon earth. It was reserved for Christianity alone, however, to promulgate the practical adoption of it, or the training to it as necessary to regulate conduct. What is meant to be impressed by the allusion is, that in the moral government of human affairs, by God, no extrinsic punishments occur, in ordinary cases—that, whenever such interpositions are resorted to, they are to be regarded in the light of miracles, or a counteraction and suspension of the ordinary laws of nature. Our inference is, that in the dealings of men towards one another, a similar course ought to be followed, but with this exception, that so far as extraordinary means, or what are usually called judgments, are concerned, the case has no parallel. Such is the prerogative of the Omniscient alone: “Vengeance belongeth unto me, saith the Lord.” Unquestionably, therefore, these views ought to form the basis of every penal code, whether for the regulation of prisons, peni-
tentaries, or schools. Punishments, if the name must be retained, should be remedies adapted to the disease.

What, then, is the best mode of correcting a fault upon such principles? And the answer is involved in another question—What is the best mode of curing a bodily ailment? The physician examines into the nature of the disease, and the causes from which it springs, and applies a remedy calculated to reach the source of the evil; and so must the moral physician. He must inquire into the nature and the causes of the offence, and apply a remedy adequate to reach and remove these. Many punishments there are, adequate enough to prevent the committing of certain acts, that are not only powerless in removing the tendency to such acts, but in reality promote and foster the tendency. Who can look upon the cruelties of slavery without seeing an illustration of this truth? Slaves are flogged into obedience; but if their disobedience is thus repressed, their hatred and animosity are increased, and that to such a degree as to induce them, on the first favourable opportunity, to take away the lives of their tyrants; and they are flogged to make them work, but their repugnance to their tasks being only thus increased, their idleness will increase in a similar ratio. And precisely the same feeling is established in a school where the mere terror of punishment is the guiding motive. It will make a child obey his master, but will never make an obedient child. It will also compel attention to his tasks, but will never inspire him with a love for knowledge. It ought rather to be said, perhaps, that it is the rod that is obeyed more than the master, and that, also, which obeys the master is more the rod than the child. It is matter acting upon matter, and dragging the unwilling mind captive, whereas without the willing mind there can be no proper obedience.
at all. To repress turbulence and noise by such means, is like drugging a patient in a fever with alcohol to throw him into a sleep, from which he would only awake ten times more feverish than before.

Now it has been said that God does not leave his creatures in ignorance of his mode of governing them. He shows them their own advantage in following the right path, but if, through a perversity of will, they adopt a wrong one, the difficulties that attend their progress are so many appointed means to set them right. What then should moral education be but the carrying into effect of these broad and well-defined principles? In every individual, old and young, the Creator has implanted what has been aptly styled his vicegerent—the conscience. This monitor is given to man to warn him of his errors, and prompt him to a performance of duty. Even with the light of nature, it shows him, to a certain extent, his duty and interest; for by mere experience of the past, it points out his course for the future. It has, therefore, been implanted for a unity of purpose, but still it is simply an instrument intended for good, and by the perversion of its uses it may be rendered an instrument of incalculable evil. It is a lamp placed in a dark chamber, but it requires to be lighted up to be of any service there. But where is the light to be obtained? and the answer is, from two sources,—the ever-burning lamp of nature, and the torch of revelation. Yet another question arises, Who are the parties qualified to apply this light? and the answer can only be, Those who themselves are living under the influence of an enlightened conscience. They must have light sufficient to guide their own conduct, and be able to govern their own passions and feelings, ere they attempt the governance of others. And this unquestionably is the point at
which moral training must commence. The trainer must have his own feelings under the control of reason. He must make these the reins of government, and hold them with a firm hand. He, also, it is, who must apply the light from which his pupils may catch the flame. And little or no application of it may be necessary. The lamp when brought to the flame, will ignite as readily as when the latter is applied to it; and the pupil, when brought into contact with his master, will assimilate to him in character as readily by a mere instinctive imitation, as through the medium of any preceptive discipline exhibited by the latter. The great leading principle is, then, that physical punishments may be entirely superseded, not only in schools, but in families too, by the moral action of an enlightened and educated conscience. Enlightened and educated, however, it must be, and this requires the active interference of the educating party.

By an enlightened conscientiousness, it is not meant that this faculty can of itself discover what is right and what is wrong, and discriminate between them. That is the province of reason and judgment; but when it has been settled in the mind what is duty, the cultivated conscience binds down to a performance of it. What is it that makes one individual an honest man and another fraudulent? simply because each thinks it his own advantage to act as he does. The conscience of the latter is, as it were, encased in a panoply of ignorance, through which compunction for a dishonest act is not felt; that of the former, denuded of this covering, is exposed to the keen shafts of remorse. A dishonest man is morally uninformed of the nature and consequences of his crime, and commits it; an honest man sees the error, and avoids it. Whatever any one thinks wrong, he will feel pain
at having committed; or, whatever he deems right, he will experience satisfaction in having performed. Hence the anomaly of such men as Rob Roy and Robin Hood remorselessly plundering their neighbours under a sense of lawless justice. Such men would have scorned to do an act of injustice or oppression according to their views of right and wrong. Their conscientiousness was simply unenlightened. If the dishonest man were morally convinced that by following his fraudulent practices he would ultimately become a loser, he would abandon them—but he neither sees nor feels such a consequence. I speak not at present of another element in the case, namely, the force of habit, but of the original cause which induced the habit. Instead, therefore, of sending such a person to the treadmill, or house of correction, on the commission of some flagrant act, so far as either his dishonest habits, or cause of such habits, are concerned, it is very evident nothing will be gained there. He may now feel, certainly, that he acted wrongly for himself in some particular instance, but he will ascribe his failure to some accident or mismanagement, and still be of opinion that success in his schemes would have been profitable. He does not see that dishonesty in its very nature is unprofitable; and hence, on his liberation, being unconvinced of the "error of his ways," he would immediately resort to the same practices. But the loss would now fall upon the community; he would bring into operation an additional degree of cautiousness, and become a more expert swindler. At all events, the treadmill would have no effect in removing the perversity of his habits.

Now such is precisely the case in school. Flogging may repress, as I have said, any number of acts, but can never reach the cause of them. It must, therefore, be continually exerted upon the same individual, just as...
we see the same offender brought up again and again for punishment at the Old Bailey. There being no reformation of conduct, a boy will become more expert in deceiving his master, more hypocritical while doing that which is wrong, but he will not give up doing the wrong. And the reason of a boy's adhering to an immoral line of conduct, in defiance of punishment, is the very same that sways his senior in crime. He is not morally convinced that he is acting against his own interest in doing so. He never feels in his conscience the remorse of his error, because he does not see the error itself properly. Or if he should feel any compunction, it is entirely obliterated by the stronger feeling of resentment against the author of the punishment that immediately follows. So that even his own conscience has not an opportunity of performing its functions aright. The still small voice is lost amidst the roar of the coming storm that breaks upon his devoted head. This is the instrument, however, which the master ought to have wielded; for a gentle appeal to this monitor, made in the spirit of love, and accompanied with a clear statement of the fault, would melt into true penitence the hardest culprit.

Let no one say that this is all too powerless a means of preventing offences. It is the means furnished by God himself, for the purpose; and if cleared of the mists of ignorance, it will form an infallible specific for every offence. It must be remarked, however, that such offence must be against a moral law, strictly so called, for it cannot be imagined that much remorse will be felt for a breach of many of those mechanical formalities of school, that are absolutely in themselves unnatural and immoral restrictions. The laws of a school where moral training can be expected to flourish, must be in harmony with all the freshness and buoyancy of children.
In proceeding to correct a fault morally, therefore, the nature of the offence must be ascertained. It must be seen whether any immorality really attaches to it, or whether it has merely arisen from some unnatural position of the offender with regard to the regulations of the school. For example, what can be more intolerable to healthy children, and more at variance with the laws of nature, than to compel them, under pain of a beating, to sit still in one position for an indefinite period? And when to this may be added the dreariness and stupidity of committing some unintelligible memory lesson, the temptation to exchange a joke with a joyous companion, the physical depression of an ill-ventilated room, or a wet day, all these are circumstances, as the phrase goes, over which the poor child has no control. He cannot, therefore, be sorry at obeying their impulse, simply because he feels he has done no wrong, and however much he may be lectured about the matter, or even flogged, he will be as unconvinced as ever. Such being the case, his restlessness will recur as soon as the master's back is turned and similar temptations present themselves.

Now it is evident that the substitute for the rod, in this case, would be simply to remove the cause of such restlessness, and its consequent mischief. Give the child the exercise he requires, and of the want of which, such restlessness is a sure sign. This would decidedly supersede the necessity for either a scolding or a caning. A little physical amusement will do infinitely more good than any amount of physical punishment. Both the cause and the effect of the delinquency will be made to cease by the former method, whereas the latter will do neither. The teacher's own reason and experience must here be called into exercise. He must not act upon an impulse of his feelings. His self-training must lead him to act.
in harmony with the symptoms manifested, not in opposition to them; thus he will not only prevent an evil befalling the children, but confer upon them a most essential benefit.

Or suppose it is the case of a memory lesson. This is a matter of pure labour, which ought, of course, to be apportioned to the capacity of the learner. The injustice of giving the same task to all, without regard to a difference of mental constitution, has been already noticed. In a boy of weak memory, therefore, the substitute for the rod is simply to give a fair average amount of labour to be performed. And it is the master's duty to ascertain what this amount may be, by making himself acquainted with the mental character of his pupils. Nor only must a suitable task be given, but an adequate motive to stimulate to the performance of it. The committing to memory of anything being in itself purely a disagreeable work, when no other motive is given than a fear of punishment, the child has simply to choose between two evils. The motive in such a case may be called a propulsive one, not impulsive. Fear pushes on the learner against his own will, thus increasing the irksome nature of his task. It is like rolling a stone up-hill, the moving power being from without, and requiring to be constantly exerted; whereas some internal impulse being given is like the same metaphor reversed, the stone rolling spontaneously down an inclined plane. So that unless fear of the punishment be stronger than a dislike to getting the task, there is but little certainty that it will be got after all. For as I have said, it is simply a weighing of disadvantages to choose the less—fear against repugnance; and whichever of the two the boy feels to be the less disagreeable, that will become the ruling motive, and he will get his lesson, or leave it undone accordingly.
Now it is readily granted that the lesson may be equally well got through fear, as from a higher motive; but the moral result in the one case is vastly different from the other. Where fear of this kind is the motive, there is in fact no moral guidance at all. It is a mere instinct or propensity common to all the inferior creatures, urging them to do things for the most part contrary to their inclinations; whereas a moral motive implies the consent of the will to the performance of an action. The getting of a lesson by memory through fear of a punishment, is similar to swallowing disagreeable medicine from the same motive. The lesson itself may prove beneficial to the mind, and the medicine to the body,—equally so, perhaps, as if there had been no repugnance felt to them. But, by such a mode of getting lessons, a collateral result is produced upon the moral feelings, of a very prejudicial tendency, and a dislike to the person giving it, is an almost inevitable consequence.

A different course should therefore be adopted in both cases. The advantages of the medicine ought to be shown, that the patient might see his interest in submitting to take it; and the benefits of the lesson ought also to be explained, that the learner might perceive the reason of his getting it. Thus, disagreeable though the task be in itself, the willing mind and the interested motive would carry the learner triumphantly over the difficulty, and predispose him favourably towards his master, who gave him the opportunity of doing so. Whereas, if it is not got, and flogging ensues, his fear is only changed into revenge against his taskmaster; and, on the other hand, if a punishment does not follow the omission of it, even the master's physical control is at an end, for the chances of a similar escape in time to come will neutralise the most positive threatenings of punish-
ment. In every aspect, therefore, it seems an act of pure cruelty to flog boys for failure in getting a memory task. Either the fear of punishment must be so strong as to bear down all repugnance, or the latter feeling diminished by giving a smaller task, or some higher moral inducement held out that would carry the willing mind along with it. The boy will thus have an impulse within himself, in the inspiring reflection that he is overcoming a difficulty to obtain a positive advantage—a buoyant spring of action which will keep moving in harmony all the mechanism both of his moral and mental nature. And having thus overcome one difficulty by his own self-sustaining energy, an accelerated motion would be gained, enabling him in future successfully to grapple with similar difficulties. Besides, the habit of obeying a right impulse, or simply the call of duty, beset by temptation, would also be formed—the only habit deserving the name of virtuous.

In this case, as in every other, the same feeling on the part of the inflicter of the punishment will be found at the root of the matter. A boy blunders in his lesson and raises a feeling of anger and resentment in the mind of the master, and these guide him in awarding the punishment. This cannot be denied. Let any one examine his own mind, and he will find it too true. A feeling of disappointment is first experienced, which very soon irritates and raises up the worse feelings. How very few resort to such an alternative as flogging from a conviction of its absolute necessity! In nine cases out of ten it is impulsive and instantaneous—on the spot—at the moment. It was a true remark that the writer once heard a parent make, who had been beating his child for some offence, and remonstrated with by another for doing so in a passion—that if the child was not
flogged when he was angry at the fault, he would never be flogged at all. Why? Because reason and affection would soon return to suggest a more rational and moral mode of correction.

Let me not be mistaken, however, about an appeal to fear. Like every other feeling and faculty, it is implanted in our nature with a beneficent design. In children it is generally stronger than in grown persons. This is a wise provision, for while the other faculties are immature, a judicious exercise of this instinct prevents many evil consequences. But it is also exceedingly liable to abuse at that early period. If brought into an undue state of excitement, it relaxes the nervous system, and in certain constitutions may even lay the foundation of insanity. Every one knows the baneful influences upon children of sudden alarms, of narratives about supernatural appearances, and other modes of exciting fear. Being an instinct, one would say, it ought never to be appealed to physically at all, and much less ought it to be roused into terror by playing upon the untutored fancy. But teachers and parents both find it easily excited, and thus a convenient instrument for their purposes. They do not consider that in proportion as it is stimulated to excess, it degrades the moral character, and establishes an influence over the mind similar to that which guides many of the actions of the irrational tribes. If trained aright, however, and guided by a rational motive, such as the overcoming of a difficulty through fear of some moral or intellectual evil, it will become a feeling of circumspection, one of the most powerful auxiliaries in forming a virtuous habit. It thus lays hold of a virtuous motive, and will guide the conduct virtuously; whereas, in the other case, it is a mere physical excitement; strong it may be, but stupid. If morally trained itself, it will train morally;
if physically excited, it will excite physically. In the one case it will be a sure guide; in the other a blind guide. Thus it may be brought into legitimate action even in committing a lesson to memory. Only present a sufficiently powerful moral inducement to get a task, and the fear of failure will be abundantly strong to urge on the learner. Nor will the fear of displeasing a kind parent or master be an inconsiderable stimulus, and this exercise of the feeling is, perhaps, the most healthy of all: not even the rod can inflict so keen a wound upon a sensitive child as the pain caused by a breach of duty towards one whom he loves and respects. Fear, then, is a perfectly legitimate motive in school discipline, but it has also proper objects to be exercised upon, and a moral, not a physical, influence should be applied to it.

How many, how very many, indeed, of the causes of those little faults at school, that are punishable by the rod, have their origin in the castigator himself! How often does one see, in the streets, the driver of a cab, by his own stupidity, getting entangled among a crowd of other vehicles. He loses temper at the delay and trouble, and wreaks his fury upon the unoffending animal in hard blows and cuts. If the animal had been properly guided beforehand, it would never have got into the difficulty. It was the driver's fault entirely, but for which the poor beast had to suffer. So is it at school, where blind force is resorted to in urging forwards boys in their studies. The reasons of failure are seldom taken into account in awarding the penalty, otherwise it would often be found as much the master's fault as the pupils. The former does not bestow sufficient pains in guiding his pupils into a right path, or does not show them the way properly out of a wrong one, but summarily flogs them through it.

Perhaps, in no instance is this better exemplified than
in studying Latin under the still popular plan. In translating a difficult passage, it is no exaggeration to say, that out of a class of six boys, on an average, four of them never can make out the sense unassisted. But where is the assistance to come from? Perhaps no help can be got at home, and the casual explanation of a comrade at school is not sufficient; his own judgment is bewildered in attempting to solve the enigma, and he finds himself in a labyrinth of perplexity, from which there is no escape. But the lesson must be got under pain of a beating, and to this alternative he at last submits in moody despair. And wise he is to do so, for few corporal punishments are worse than the mental torture arising from a vain attempt at unravelling an involved passage of Latin or Greek unassisted, and aggravated by the thought that an undeserved punishment is all that is likely to be the result. No one but those conversant in the customs of many grammar-schools, would believe the amount of misery thus inflicted upon innocent children. The prejudice against an interlinear translation, or any other improved mode of teaching Latin and Greek, prevents their being adopted in such places, and the almost unaided powers of children are set to cope with difficulties that masters themselves seldom voluntarily attempt. It is well known that the latter often resort to English translations to assist in reading an author. But then they do it hypocritically, decry the use of them, and prohibit their scholars from doing so. Professors in colleges do the same,—at least the writer once remembers having a stolen glance at the manual of one of his professors, and found it interlined every word, and this, too, a gentleman who had gained the highest prizes both at Cambridge and Oxford. Why not offer then, to boys, the same assistance that is found so convenient to masters;
or, at all events, why flog children for not surmounting difficulties that masters often feel troublesome to themselves? The simple substitute for thousands upon thousands of bodily punishments, in such cases, for groans and tears and broken hearts without number, for depraved moral habits and stunted mental powers, would be the simplest of all possible expedients—an interlined copy of the Latin or Greek author read.

It would be needless, and indeed impossible, to enumerate all the cases that occur at school, punishable by the rod; and I shall only, therefore, mention one or two other instances by way of illustration of the whole erroneous system.

Perhaps the most besetting sin of school-boys, and the source of many other evils, is a general want of attention to their lessons. The causes of this are obvious at a glance—the lessons are not sufficiently attractive; indeed, it is a truism to say so. That they can be made entirely so, indeed, to every capacity, and to the vastly diversified dispositions and minds of pupils, is, perhaps, impossible; but to imagine that anything like uniformity of attention will be gained by physical compulsion, is extremely absurd. It is a mistake similar to that which induced religious bigots of the dark ages to institute the inquisition, and the rack, to compel a uniformity of faith in matters of religion. Such a process might, of course, gain a hypocritical assent to any set of doctrines by the unthinking, but could only inspire disgust in those who reflected upon the matter; and the terrors of the rod in school, may also compel a stupid and sullen stare at the book, or the instructor's face, but the willing mind, by such a method, will be far away.

If a lesson is not attentively received, it is either not attractive in itself, not made so, or the bent of the boy's
mind and disposition is at variance with that particular branch of study. The second of these is most frequently the case. What is here alluded to principally is, in what may be called explanatory or descriptive teaching. In speaking to children, even upon a subject naturally interesting to them, the prevailing error in untrained teachers is a want of simplification, or what has been aptly styled a "pulverising" process. They describe a thing to children as they would to grown people. Abstract ideas, a Latin style, and learned words are employed, and the pupils soon lose themselves in a vain attempt to make out what it can be all about. The announcement of the subject perhaps may arrest their attention, and, expecting to be entertained, they prepare themselves to listen. By-and-by, however, some terms are introduced beyond their capacity, and their minds get bewildered. The picture they expected to see turns out a mere confusion of colours, on looking at which they can perceive no beauty, nothing attractive. But, in the whispered information of a companion regarding some incident naturally arising out of the lesson, a very striking and interesting picture is presented, and the listener's mind seizes upon it with avidity. It naturally calls up a kindred association in his own mind, which is also detailed sotto voce. Of course the master's elaborate description falls upon heedless ears; his vanity, perhaps, is mortified that all his fine speeches should go for nought, and his indignation aroused against the whispering and, to him, inattentive boys. This feeling calls forth a threat, or a scold, or as a more convenient and summary mode to those who have the rod constantly in hand, it may be a cut across the shoulders. Strange mode of recalling attention! Yet it will do so, though in a very different way from that anticipated. Attention will be fixed upon the master, in an
instantaneous and concentrated feeling of resentment. The boy was not to blame, however,—he was merely attracted by what he found attractive, and tired of listening to what he could not understand.

How imperative is it upon a teacher, even for his own comfort, to study the bias of the young mind, in giving such a lesson! If a little liberty be given, the children themselves will often point out the proper course of the lesson by their own suggestions and remarks. In the case mentioned, the master could easily have perceived, that what the two boys had been talking about had reference to the subject. They should have been encouraged to express themselves audibly and without restraint. Perhaps in a lesson on the natural history of an animal, a boy will recall some incident or circumstance that came under his own notice connected with the animal's habits. This he should have an opportunity of relating aloud, instead of secretly to his companion. The incident should be taken up by the master, with whatever additions or improvements his own mind may suggest. The boy's attention would thus be taken captive as it were, drawn out, and guided into that very channel best adapted for its development. And not only would this boy's mind and attention be secured from wandering, but it would prove the means of fixing the attention of all, for such, in all probability, would be the very course the lesson ought naturally to have taken. But, like an obstruction to the natural current of a river, turning it aside, and throwing its surplus waters over a fertile plain, to inundate it, and mar its fertility, the rod represses every such natural outgoing of the young mind, and throws it back upon itself, to stagnate upon the feelings and demoralise them.

Confessedly the most difficult cases to be dealt with, are those of a really immoral and wicked character, such
as the breaking out of some bad passion and bad conduct. Still, keeping out of view those very depraved cases, in which every higher motive has been tried and found unavailing, and in which the excitement of fear, by some means extraneous to the offence, may be thought necessary, gentle means will still be found the best. No bad passions can be excited without a cause, hence there can be no bad conduct either without some occasion for it. A boy strikes another a blow—but the latter has provoked it to a certainty; scarcely any boy would wantonly do so. The cause, indeed, may not appear a sufficient one, either in the light of reason, or in the eyes of the master; but still it was sufficient to the untrained boy. He must have felt himself affronted or aggrieved in some way or other, and the only remedy that suggested itself to his unenlightened mind, was a retaliation of this kind. In a flogging school, few cases would more certainly be punished by the rod, than this; yet, perhaps, in no case would a beating have a more prejudicial tendency. The boy’s wrath was the original cause of the strife, and to prevent a repetition of the offence, it should of course have been turned away. But, by flogging, his wrath, if diverted from his opponent for a time, is doubly excited against his master; and being unconvinced of his offence against the boy, he would do the same thing again, on the recurrence of a similar temptation. Not, however, in the presence of the master, being afraid of him. His cautiousness would now be excited, and he would take measures to gratify his revenge more effectually, unseen, and unknown. This revenge would, also, be increased from a recollection of the master’s beating; and the unfortunate object on whom it might again fall, would doubly suffer. It is obvious that the resentful feeling is here fostered and perpetuated by the master’s treatment.
The act of fighting and striking other boys in school in future, might be prevented, but there would be an undercurrent of secret revenge opened up instead, in the boy’s bosom, prompting him, on receiving an imaginary injury in future, to avenge it secretly, and in a cowardly and more cruel manner. And by the sight of the master’s punishing other boys, this feeling would even be increased in no ordinary degree. In few cases is the principle of imitation more powerful than in this, where it is a mere propensity of the physical nature that is excited. It is, therefore, one of the strongest of all reasons, why physical punishments should be left off altogether, that such conduct in a master towards his pupils, creates the very same conduct in the latter towards one another. Frequently to scold a boy will make him a scold towards others, and to flog him, especially for an act of fighting, will only increase his propensity into a habit. It may also be added, that a habit of reproaching a boy for bad actions, will only make him in reality habitually bad. It would almost seem as if these modes of correction actually impressed a character upon the object of them, for the converse is no less true. Praise a child for being good, and he will become so. Speak to him kindly, and gently, and confidentially, and he will become kind and gentle, and worthy of all confidence. In a word, be to him what you would wish him to be to others, and he will become so. What, after all, is a moral precept but a picture of some part of conduct? and as no picture can be equal to the thing pictured, so no precept can be equal to an exhibition of the conduct itself. In preceptive morality, conduct is exhibited as through a glass darkly; in practical morality it is seen face to face. Moral training, in theory at least, excludes all motives whatever arising from rewards and punishments—that is,
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affecting one set of faculties agreeably or disagreeably, that others may be kept right. Each faculty must be trained by exercising itself. Punishment is a corrective process—training a directive; the former may be a necessary evil, but the latter is a positive good.

In treating such a case as the one mentioned, the cause of the blow of course ought first to be examined into. Let a scrutiny be made into all the circumstances attending the quarrel. It may have been a reproachful word in the boy struck, and even this may have been called forth by the striker himself in some antecedent impulse. It is often, in fact, deeply interesting to trace such a quarrel to its origin, and requires not a little judgment to give a proper decision in the matter. The circumstance producing the original feeling, however, must first be taken into account, and the boy made to see that after all, instead of being the aggrieved party, it was he himself perhaps who first set the strife in motion. Illustrate the point by some apposite analogy, such as, The beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water; or, the setting in motion of a body down an inclined plane, and thus show how the originator of any cause is responsible for its effects. In short, mentally convince the boy of his error by "soft words," until his wrath be "turned away." Let him kindly see his error, and he must be a depraved boy indeed if he does not feel that he has done wrong; let this feeling be strengthened and become predominant, and it will be found perfectly adequate to prevent him from committing a similar offence again, or at all events, the repetition of it will be followed by an increased feeling of compunction. The conscience, then, not the whip, must be made the "scourge," and to this end it must be prepared by the moral disciplinarian. Its "stings and arrows" must be sharpened at the whetstone of the understanding, to
render it the most powerful of all stimulants to good conduct. Every one knows that wrath is simply the feelings getting the better of the judgment; the remedy is, therefore, equally simple,—let the judgment get the better of the feelings. The mistaken mode of doing so, however, is by exasperating the feelings without improving the judgment, whereas the judgment ought to be strengthened to such a degree as to obtain a permanent mastery over the unimpaired feelings.

The last case I shall mention is that of lying and prevarication. It is curious to remark the different tendencies to this vice, even in children brought up under the same course of training, and in every respect subjected to the same temptations. Than a deduction of this sort, however, nothing more strikingly shows how much the faculties depend upon some physical organisation for their manifestation and enlargement, and how much the moral and intellectual nature of man is, after all, indebted for its greatness and its weakness, its virtues and its vices, to the mere corporeal elements that sustain it. These faculties are among themselves subject to a perturbing influence similar to that exerted by the planetary bodies on one another; for no more certainly will the planet Venus in her approach to the Earth draw the latter aside from her orbit, than will the existence of one faculty in over-abundant strength and excitement, cause a weaker faculty to swerve from the line of rectitude. The phrase, "a well-balanced mind," is therefore not so figurative as many would imagine, for it is only such an equipoise of the faculties that can ensure a continuation of virtuous conduct. And in training, it is by the depression of one, and the drawing out of another, that such a balance can be effected, at least so far as the physical basis of these faculties will permit.
A disposition to prevaricate or falsify, can only be excited in any one for the sake of gaining some personal advantage, for gratifying some feeling, or preventing some injury. A person addicted to this vice is simply uninformed, and morally unconvinced as to the ultimate evil consequences of his habit. It is a mental darkness that ought to be enlightened, a moral weakness that ought to be strengthened. It is one strong feeling gaining the ascendancy, and leading a weaker one captive: the former should, therefore, be repressed; the latter educated. A timid boy commits a fault, for which he fears a punishment. This latter feeling being stronger than his conscientiousness, or love of truth,—which, it must be confessed, is an artificial and highly refined virtue, at least it often requires a considerable power of abstraction to see the necessity of adhering to it, and of moral firmness to do so,—leads captive his judgment, or rather makes it instrumental in fabricating a means of defence against the impending punishment. The mind is also,

* It is somewhat difficult to admit Dr. Reid’s theory of an “innate propensity to truth.” *Cateris paribus,* a child may incline to relate a simple fact truly, apart from any temptation to the contrary, but to speak truth in opposition to falsehood, argues a mental process. If a child believe that a greater advantage would be gained by a concealment of this fact, I think he would naturally conceal it. This would, therefore, be the first moral impulse arising out of a mental operation, and it requires another deduction to see what is duty in the matter, while to act upon this conviction in the face of a present disadvantage, argues a habit based upon reason. If there were no vice in the world, neither would there be any virtue; and if there were no falsehood, there would be no moral truth. Each one may be called the negative of the other; but as an adherence to the latter proves a higher point of civilization in the universal man, so does it a superiority of intelligence in the individual.
in this instance, the slave of an animal instinct; and, "in proportion to the severity of the expected punishment and the strength of his fear, will be the certainty that such a boy will tell a falsehood to protect himself. It is a mere matter of self-defence; a questionable shield no doubt, but the only one his fear can furnish him on the occasion. But why need this shield at all, and this protection? If there were no severe punishment, there would be no necessity for resorting to such a defence. It is the punishment, therefore, that causes the artifice; at least, it is the cause of exciting the boy's fear, and his fear suggests the falsehood. Take away the cause, and the effect will cease. Instead of frightening children of a timid disposition from doing that which is wrong, it is much better on most occasions that they actually be suffered to do the wrong, for the terror of a beating will assuredly lead them to adopt this vice, of almost all others, the most to be shunned. The boy's fear will not allow him to see any greater evil than the punishment, and thus it has upon him a blinding influence to the consequences of his error. He is stunned, as it were, into a sort of moral derangement, and momentary forgetfulness of himself, by the anticipated chastisement. Who does not see, then, that severe measures of correcting faults, especially in timid children, will only strengthen and perpetuate an early developed tendency to falsehood? Nay, they will call forth the tendency where it never before existed. Oppression, it is said, will make a wise man mad; and it will also make a truth-loving child a confirmed deceiver.

The remedy, or at least the first step in the remedy, is simply, as in all other cases mentioned, to remove the cause or the temptation. If a merely timid boy has com-
mitted a fault, and has no fear of a punishment for it, he will not thus, without any motive, conceal his offence by a falsehood. Hence there will be no lie, because there was no temptation. And the chances are also in favour even of having the original offence rectified, for the falsehood may be successful in concealing it. But, whether or not, it must have been a serious offence indeed, to call for such severity as would thus jeopardise the offender's character for truth. And again, if detected and flogged, what, after all, is the consequence? The propensity is not thus repressed, but around the same propensity is now thrown an additional degree of cautiousness. The pain felt on one occasion will not so much deter from the re-commission, as prompt to the better concealment of an offence, and the result will only be, in future, a more elaborated falsehood.

But in attempting to rectify the habit of prevaricating and falsehood, the feeling of fear must by no means be kept out of view. It only requires, indeed, to be enlightened, to prove a very powerful auxiliary in eradicating the habit. In the absence of any particular act, a foundation must be laid by means of reason and argument. The vice must be shown in action, pictured out in some familiar illustration, and the fatal consequences of the habit shown. Excite a fear of these consequences, and by a natural gradation, of their cause. Turn thus the feeling into a right channel, so far as earthly means go. But the higher sanctions of religion must also be resorted to. Yet even here most persons certainly commit a great mistake. They transfer their own mode of dealing with offenders to religion, and, fancying how they should feel and act in certain cases, ascribe such modes to the Deity. God is, therefore, represented to children as being
"angry" with those who tell lies. Now this is true: he is said to be angry with the wicked every day; but it is only true metaphorically. One cannot imagine anger literally, to be a feeling in the Divine mind, otherwise it must also be admitted, that its serenity can be ruffled, and a feeling of unhappiness experienced, which is impossible. Children, however, have no other idea of anger, than what they see exhibited on the countenance and in the conduct of a furious and passionate man, while such an ebullition in a human being, is mere animal revenge, and it is this idea they ascribe to God. But such violent displays in a fellow-creature only call forth their own resentment and obstinacy; and how can they feel differently, when God is exhibited in such a character? They feel, of course, afraid for so terrible a Being, but it is not a moral fear. It is the terror of a slave, not filial remorse. It is true, indeed, that many of the attributes of God's character are necessarily described in language primarily descriptive of the frail passions of humanity. But, as it is only these passions in their sinful excess that are palpable to the understandings of children, too great caution cannot be taken in conveying an idea of the character of God from such imperfect data. The wounded feelings of a kind and sorrowing parent, however, are certainly the true figure here, and yet only a figure, for regret, no more than anger, can be a feeling in a perfectly happy mind. A representation of anger and resentment against any one, if it does not rouse within him similar feelings, will sink him into a state of moody sullenness, while an exhibition of sorrow and regret cannot fail to inspire a remorseful impression; and this will be increased when the offender sees that such feelings have been called forth in another, at something he has done, only prejudicial to himself, or at least in which he would
be the greatest sufferer. Let the boy's fear, then, be turned in this direction, and it will be legitimately exercised.

Before this can be done, however, it is evident that an enlightening process must have been undergone. As all falsehood, like every other vice, is purely prejudicial to the individual practising it, he only requires to know and to feel that it is so, to endeavour to avoid it. I speak not at present of the constraining influence of habit in such cases, where the will and the conduct are so often in direct opposition to one another, but of the original motives which induce the habit, which are all evidently traceable to some merely intellectual emotions.

I would say, then, morally enlighten a child of his duty and interest, his own duty, and his own interest in refraining from falsehood. Let him feel, by all the higher sentiments of his nature, the prospective misery of an opposite course; remove every needless temptation out of his way, and cause of exciting fear and alarm for punishment on the committing of an offence. Draw out his love and confidence instead, and the basis of a truthful character will thus be laid. "Perfect love casteth out fear, and there is no fear in love." If a child love his master or parent and have confidence in him, he will have no fear of telling him his faults. Thus he will never have this temptation to falsify placed in his way; but if he entertain a mere physical terror or awe of his superior, even though he should not beat him, a constant temptation to prevaricate, on the committing of every offence, will be in his way. His inordinate fear must, therefore, be repressed, or cast out by love, which is the real parent feeling, not only of truth, indeed, but of every other virtue that adorns humanity.

Before concluding these remarks, a question naturally
arises regarding the scriptural warrant for resorting to physical punishment in the training of children. In several parts of the Old Testament the custom is alluded to, and the use of the rod by parents unquestionably has the sanction of some of the inspired writers. It would seem, however, that in this case, as in many others where a too strict adherence is kept to the mere letter of Scripture, its spirit and design are overlooked. And, in passing, it may be noticed, that if such passages are to be taken quite literally and in an unlimited sense, nothing else but a rod ought ever to be used in correction, and no one but a parent ought ever to wield it. Hence the authority assumed by schoolmasters for this purpose, and the use of any other instrument of pain, must be altogether apocryphal. But, such passages certainly admit of a much more liberal interpretation.

Nothing is more evident, than that most of the rigorous injunctions of the Old Testament, where they were not entirely abolished, were vastly softened down in the new dispensation; and in the mild precepts of Christ and his apostles, scarcely anything approaching to severity in morals is observable. In the rude ages before Christ, severe punishments of all kinds seemed in harmony with the stern genius of the Jewish people. Their unmoralised natures, so to speak, were not perhaps amenable to a milder treatment. In the absence of this moral sensibility in a people, it may be necessary that some physical and coercive means should be employed. Such individuals can be made to feel only where they are sensible, and that is in their physical nature. Its wants and necessities may therefore be turned to account in legislating for a rude community. But when the "fallow ground" of society has been broken up, and the fruits of morality and virtue become apparent—when the intellect
and feelings have assumed a predominancy, higher and more powerful incentives to good conduct are then developed. Different modes of punishment, it is granted, may therefore be necessary in different stages of civilisation, even as a different treatment is necessary to the different characters of children. Hence the apparent discrepancy, in many places, between the Old Testament and the New. The end to be gained is uniformly the same, but the means employed vary according to circumstances. The law was said to be a "schoolmaster" to bring us unto Christ; but on his appearing, a new school of morality was organised. The law was a physical instrument, rough-hewing society, as it were, and preparing it for receiving the moral and spiritual impress of the Gospel. The latter is a spiritual power, stamping a character upon society through its feelings and affections. Now, to fall back upon the iron sway of the ceremonial law, and to justify a similar treatment of the children of our day to what may have been necessary in those rude ages, since we know, too, that most of those ordinances were merely temporary and "ordained to pass away," is taking anything—but a liberal view of Scripture.

And it is doubtless true, that even in the New Testament allusion is sometimes made to fathers "correcting" and "chastising" their children; but it will be found that such passages are not alluded to by way of examples to be imitated, but simply as referring to an existing practice, for an illustration of some other doctrine. It is needless, I think, to cite any particular passage to prove this hypothesis. The whole tenor of the New Testament is in favour of it. The morality of the Gospel rests entirely upon the power of gentleness, kindness, meekness, long-suffering, forgiveness, non-resistance to injuries, persuasiveness, love, moral conviction. It dis-
cards everything like a retaliation by physical pain. If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also: endure reviling, suffer wrong, nay, do good in return, for by so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon the head of the aggressor. That is, his own conscience will in time reprove him, and lead him to repair the wrong,—which, evidently, is the only rod sanctioned by Christian morality.

But much of this reasoning may be admitted; and it may be replied, that it only refers to the government of adults, and that a different treatment is necessary in the management of children. Not so. It is indeed a great mistake to treat them differently. The feelings and affections of children are often stronger than those of their seniors, and they are infinitely more pliant. The means of moral training are, therefore more available in the case of the former than in that of the latter. The dews and rains of heaven are more necessary in nourishing the tender sapling than the hardy plant. The same kind of food is given to old and young, and the same remedy for a bodily disease applied to all; and a similar remedy in morals will be found alike efficacious, only varying in degree according to circumstances.

If, then, an appeal is made to Scripture at all in adjudicating the question, it ought certainly to be to the New Testament; and there, every precept of Christ, and every act of his life, will be found directly opposed to the conclusion, that severity in punishing even the most depraved offenders is beneficial. And much were it to be wished that a kindred spirit should influence our modern senators and judges, and that they should prefer a liberal interpretation of the New Testament as a standard in their decisions and enactments, to a literal and
restricted reading of certain isolated passages of the Old. Such a disposition would then evince no inconsiderable approach to the happy age so glowingly depicted by the Roman bard—

——— quae vindice nullo,
Sponte sua sine lege fideum rectumque colebat,
Poenæ metusque aberant, nec verba minacia fixo,
Ære legebantur; nec supplex turba timebat
Judicias ora sui: sed erant sine vindice tuti.
CHAPTER XVI.

I now come to the last division of these remarks, namely, the utility or inutility of a course of *classical instruction* as a regular branch of school study. Of late years, much discussion has arisen on this point, and, of course, not a little keen feeling been manifested on both sides. Like almost every other question that has antiquity on its side, it has been regarded in two extreme points of view; one party asserting its entire inutility and absurdity, and the consequent necessity that it should be altogether omitted in a course of school study, and another insisting upon its being preserved intact, with all its sins upon its head. Perhaps the error of the one party is in drawing a conclusion unfavourable to the thing itself, from the obviously deficient modes in which it has hitherto been taught; while the other, not unaware of these antiquated modes and their inconvenience, still value the advantages of a classical education too highly to think of disturbing them. In this, as in most other questions where extreme and conflicting opinions prevail, a middle course seems to be that which comes nearest the standard of truth.

In estimating the value of any particular branch of study, one prominent principle ought ever to be borne in mind, namely, the end or object of all education; that it
is simply the formation of correct tastes and habits of mind and body. Whatever, therefore, has a tendency to refine and cultivate these habitudes, even apart from its own intrinsic worth, is admissible into a routine of study, and valuable in proportion to its instrumental efficacy. School studies of any kind, are, or at least ought to be, so many moral and mental exercises, modes of training and developing those powers and faculties, which ultimately must be left to their own growth, and to bring forth their own fruit. Now, as these tastes and habits are of different kinds, according to the different faculties of our nature, so also must the means employed in the development of them be various. Every one acknowledges, for instance, the efficacy of mathematics and arithmetic in eliciting the reasoning faculties and fixing attention; and were there nothing of instruction conveyed to the mind from a study of these branches, they would still be valuable on this account alone. At the hazard of being thought to place too much reliance upon the many speculations of phrenology, it has been already stated that the Creator has endowed man with distinct organs for each faculty of the mind, and it may be added that the organ of language, in particular, is very clearly defined. The development of this faculty depends upon its being exercised upon those artificial signs and symbols called words and letters. It is not a faculty peculiar to man, but doubtless one of the principal auxiliaries, by means of which, and aided by these arbitrary symbols, he gains so great a superiority over the lower creation, and the illiterate and uncultivated among his own species. Its province is in mere names, not things; philological investigations into the origin and analogy of terms, independently of their meaning. The learning of languages is, therefore, much
of a mechanical process. But, inasmuch as an artisan will operate more efficiently, and furnish a more beautiful specimen of his art, by having superior and well-appointed instruments, so will the literary man, in all his scientific pursuits, have this mechanical advantage over his less learned competitor. And the mere fact of the existence of such a faculty is of itself a sufficient reason why it ought sedulously to be cultivated.

Now, that there are other means of educing this power of the mind than by an initiation into the literature of ancient Greece and Rome, is obvious enough, but I question much whether in any other language, ancient or modern, there are equal facilities afforded for a similar process of mental training. In the complexities of their structure, and the profound philosophical principles upon which their syntax and etymology are based, there is an apparatus at hand of the most exquisite kind for cultivating and refining this talent. And this quality, it must ever be contended, is that which gives a chief value to any branch, namely, its adaptation as an instrument in training, independently of the communication of a single idea. By any process, and by all fair means, let a boy's mind once be taught to think and investigate for itself, and the work of education has taken a right direction.

Besides, that the study of mere literature has a highly refining and polishing effect upon the mind, is matter of every day's observation. Literary habits, and elegance of deportment and manners, may indeed not always be conjoined, though there is nothing incongruous in them; but the higher and purer graces of mental embellishment, and even moral excellence, are, in a majority of cases, the natural result of the former. Nor can any one doubt, that the vast care and attention which the ancient Greeks
and Romans bestowed upon their beautiful languages, had a reflex influence in softening and refining their own characters, and must have formed a principal antidote against the barbarizing effects of their otherwise warlike habits: so that, as a mere accomplishment in our own day, they ought still to be entitled to a place in a curriculum of liberal education. And when we consider the almost universal diffusion of Greek and Latin through all other European tongues, thus forming a substratum to the literature of the whole civilized world, it is obvious that a vast facility in mastering any other language must be acquired from a knowledge of the former. They have thus been aptly styled the key of all modern literature; and while they hold so prominent a place in the composition of our own English tongue in particular, the etymology of which can never be studied without an acquaintance with them, their claims to be regarded favourably become still more powerful.

But it is not only as a collection of words and roots that they act as a key to the English; there is a Latinity of style and thought pervading our tongue, the beauties of which can only be detected and appreciated by the classic reader, and which, perhaps, the classical writer alone can throw into his own compositions. An individual who is in the habit of mixing in good society, though he may not have had a classical education, may not, perhaps, in speaking, commit any solecism against the rules that govern polite conversation; but let him commit his thoughts to paper, at least to any extent, and the chances are great indeed, that he will transgress in the use of many words and phrases. It would be equally wrong to assert, however, that the converse is always true, for many a profound classical student writes bad enough English; but this is just the result of a too
exclusive attention to one thing. English must be studied in order to acquire a knowledge of itself, as well as the Latin or Greek.

And were there no greater inducement to a study of these languages, than the mere pleasure of being able to peruse in the original, the immortal works of Homer, Virgil, Horace, and other ancient authors, even this of itself is no mean incentive. No translation whatever can convey to the mind the thoughts conceived by these masters in the art, with such a thrill of emotion and delight as the original form in which they were first given to the world. The spirit refuses to animate another frame, and must be evoked only through this instrumentality. And one would imagine there are few persons of literary taste, who do not reckon this pleasure alone much of a recompense for all their previous preparatory course, painful as that process too often is. But as I intend to show, which indeed is the object of these remarks, that this pleasure and these advantages may all be acquired by a course of study in itself agreeable, and by devoting not one-sixth part of the time formerly deemed necessary for that purpose.

But while thus pleading for the necessity of a course of classical instruction, it cannot be denied that after all, it is only a special branch of schooling. To those whose future pursuits will most likely be of a literary or scientific nature, it is still indispensable, and, therefore, equally necessary to those whose fortune it is to be born to an independent station. And it is here where the chief error lies. Instead of being considered as forming only a special branch in a routine of study, it was formerly regarded as the great and staple business of education.

On the revival of letters throughout Europe, all the
sciences and arts were in a manner locked up within these dead languages, and it was only through a knowledge of them that a way was opened up to the former. Hence they were assiduously cultivated, and became the only medium of communication among the learned, by whom they were not only written but spoken to a very considerable extent. Besides, the charm which attached to the mere study of them, itself added not a little to their being so generally cultivated. But a brighter day arose than the dim light which mere literature shed upon the world; and when the true method of investigating the operations and the laws of nature was discovered, in the application of inductive philosophy to the sciences, and the "triumphs" of art succeeded to these discoveries, because based upon them, a new and vast field of instruction opened up to the student. The study of letters properly became a mere unit in the aggregate of these branches; but so much are mankind the slaves of custom, and the devotees of antiquity, that while the inculcating of scientific knowledge—certainly a matter of much greater moment—was left to be acquired accidentally, the richest endowments were, and are still, lavished upon those institutions that communicate a mere knowledge of letters. These places also, being the resort of the rich and fashionable, give a tone to all other minor schools throughout the country that aim at embracing the younger members of the same classes of society; and as the terms of their endowment for the most part enjoin, that not only shall a prominence be given to classical instruction, but that the mode of conducting it shall be according to certain ancient forms, the evil has taken deep root, and its ramifications are very widely spread.

The present mode of teaching Latin, which may be
taken as illustrative of the rest, since the same error in principle pervades the teaching of all languages, is to put into the hands of a boy an Eton Grammar, or a primer compiled upon the same plan, and cause him to wade through the tedious abstractions of its weary pages. To say these can be explained and made intelligible to him at this stage, is simply to assert an impossibility; they are therefore to be got by heart. As an extenuation of this enormity, it is argued, that its collateral advantages are an improvement, and strengthening of the memory. Any one, however, at all conversant in mental science knows, that no similar process of cramming the memory with unexplained facts, upon which the principle of association cannot operate, benefits, but oppresses and injures that faculty. But even to this memory system itself, many unnecessary difficulties are opposed. Most editions of the Eton Grammar are wholly in Latin, which obviously cuts off the learner from having the aid of his own judgment in preserving a recollection of its rules; for one half of what he thus gets by heart he cannot understand. It is worth while for any one just to try the experiment upon himself. Let him take into his hand a book of some hundred and thirty pages, written in a language of which he knows not a single word, and endeavour to convince himself that it is necessary to commit to memory the entire of its unintelligible text before he can derive some given benefit, and the advantage must be great indeed that would induce him to undertake the task. Happy it is for children, therefore, that a kind Providence denies them any great degree of prévoyance—for such is undoubtedly the initiatory step in their classical career. Many of these grammars are indeed in English, as far as possible, but, like all other grammars, they are necessarily
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A mere string of abstractions and generalizations, of which the mind of a child can take no possible hold.

At the time this grammar was introduced into schools, which was in the reign of Henry VIII., a very different mode of studying the Latin language was then pursued. At all the monastic institutions of the country, and by the learned men of that age, Latin was universally spoken. The novitiates and students at these places, therefore, acquired the foundation of their knowledge of Latin orally from their preceptors and superiors. Practice thus naturally preceded theory. A basis of words and sentences was laid, and after the student had acquired a colloquial acquaintance with it, he was introduced to the grammar as a means of polishing and completing his studies. It was a similar course to what is now pursued in a study of English. Grammar is not given to a child learning to read English, but after he has attained a very considerable knowledge of it, he is made acquainted with its structure and higher graces. And in passing, it may be remarked, that more English grammar can be taught incidentally, and by mere conversation, than by all the rules that ever were elaborated for that purpose. But with regard to this Latin grammar, it was at least as well adapted to the study of Latin as taught in the days of Henry VIII., as any modern English grammar is to complete a course of English studies in the present day. Such a process might be symbolised by a scaffolding erected to finish and ornament the extreme parts of a building, whose services can of course only be required when the building has attained some height. But the converse is now the case; for instead of laying a foundation and proceeding with the edifice, thus forming a natural scaffolding of itself, a huge apparatus is thrown around the site of the building before a single stone is
laid; and it is not difficult to see, that instead of such an arrangement facilitating the progress of the work, it can only throw needless impediments in the way. Or it is taking the sculptor's finer instrument by which he polishes and adds the higher graces to the statue, and applying it to the rough hewing of the shapeless mass.

Subsequently I shall have occasion to show, that the mode of teaching languages about to be advocated, so far from being a modern improvement in education, is as ancient as the first cultivation of letters in this country. Before proceeding to do so, however, it may be well to advert to the *rationale* of the thing itself.

What, then, is grammar? It is a collocation of laws generalised and gleaned from the usages of the best writers and speakers. It is a standard by which to compare different modes of speaking and writing; and it is therefore obvious, that before its services can be required, a considerable degree of practice, both in writing and speaking, must have been attained, because the act of comparing these different modes is in itself a process of generalisation, an abstractive exercise of the mind, taking cognisance of previously accumulated data, and these data consist of different kinds of words and sentences. The province of grammar, therefore, is *correction*, and in order to its proper application, it must of course have something to correct. It is not a suggestive art, prompting the proper words and phrases, but when these are suggested, it is a rule by which their correctness is tested. The obvious illustration that occurs here, is the mode by which infants acquire a knowledge of language, namely, by imitating those who have the earliest care over them. No rules can be available in their case to guide them, either to a correct pro-
nunciation or an elegant phraseology. These must depend upon the models after which they copy, and these models are the living voice and diction of their parents or guardians; and let it be supposed that the pronunciation and language of their parents are elegant and correct, so will those of the child, without an idea ever entering his mind that there is such a thing as a grammar in the world. The imitative faculty is alone sufficient to form a style so far as oral language is concerned, and precisely the same analogy applies to written compositions, for the mental process is the same in both cases. In the latter, ideas are represented by marks, and in the former, expressed by sounds; but the same ideas, and the same order and arrangement of them, are alike capable of being appropriated in both forms. In teaching English written composition, therefore, the same error unquestionably obtains that is here treated of in reference to other languages. Notwithstanding all the grammar rules that may have been given to a pupil concerning the order and arrangement of his sentences, in actual practice, the mind involuntarily recurs to some palpable model which had previously struck his mind. In short, the course of his former reading, and the natural bent of his own mind, will form the basis of his style, however that may be ultimately improved by the test of grammar rules. Such, then, being a natural principle, we may expect to find it operating in all similar cases, modified only by circumstances, for to the laws of nature there are no exceptions.

The object of acquiring a knowledge of Latin and Greek is different from that of learning a modern living language. The former, as has been already stated, being strictly for literary and philosophical purposes, it is not essential that they be acquired phonically and orally.
The training of the eye is therefore the first object in this case, which is analogous to a child learning to read his own tongue; and this, again, is a process similar in every respect to that of his learning to speak. In the latter case, the repetition of a certain sound in connexion with the same object calls up the image of that object; and when by imitation the child learns to re-echo the same sound himself, the sound and the object become for ever afterwards inseparably blended in his mind. And in reading, the form of certain marks calls up at first the mere sound of which they are the symbol, and through this the idea; but after some practice, the idea itself is immediately called up by merely looking at the word on paper. So in translating a foreign language, the pupil receives his ideas through a double vehicle; the word "homo," for instance, does not at first suggest the idea of a man, but the equivalent English term, from which latter he gets the idea. Practice, however, in this also, shortens the course of arriving at the idea. An obvious inference from this, therefore, seems to be, that when the words are placed in juxtaposition with one another, the impression of their correspondence will be both more vivid and more lasting than by any other mode, simply from their being more closely associated in the mind.

Professor Blackie, of Aberdeen, in an able essay upon the learning of languages, strongly insists upon a revival of the ancient oral method of teaching Latin, as being the strictly natural course. With all deference to so competent an authority, and fully aware of the fact, that it certainly is the most natural course with regard to a living language, still, bearing in mind the proper object of a classical education, that it is not to promote the interchange of thought among living men,
but to infuse, through the silent oracle of books, a higher tone to the intellect, I think the same object can more immediately be accomplished through an initiatory process of interlineary translation. The acquiring of equivalent English and Latin terms being decidedly the first step, there cannot possibly be a more rapid mode than this. No master alive can be so perfect as to speak Latin in any degree approaching to so good a style as the most inferior of those ancient Latin authors we have in our hand. But even were he able to do so, and to teach his pupil a similar degree of excellence, a second course, namely, that of learning to read, must afterwards be gone through, thus, in fact, doubling the labour instead of simplifying it. Knowledge of any kind, when presented to the eye, obtains a readier access to the understanding than by the ear; and as economy of time in the learning of languages is a matter of the first importance, this interlineary mode has many advantages in this respect over oral translation.

It is hardly possible to conceive a greater mass of absurdity, connected with any subject, than that of learning Latin according to the popular plan. At every stage of the child's progress is he obstructed by needless difficulties. At his first entrance on the study he is set to learn by heart a whole book of grammar, consisting of declensions of nouns, conjugations of verbs, abstract rules of syntax, of gender, and even of prosody, before he is permitted to translate a single sentence; and when he does arrive at that consummation of his hopes, how illusory does it often prove! He has to work his way into the meaning of a passage by the most tortuous and painful process. A delectus of detached sentences is generally put into his hand, and for the meaning of every word he has to consult the pages of a dictionary. Let any
one reflect for a moment, or try the experiment himself, and see how many precious minutes are thus consumed in ascertaining the meaning of a single word; and let him sum up the amount necessary to master a page of Latin, and he will no longer wonder how so few boys, even after a course of eight years' study, can read a passage of Latin from a strange author ad aperturam libri. Besides, in a dictionary a single word has sometimes a dozen meanings attached to it, and which of these conflicting senses is the bewildered child to choose? If it be said that the scope of the passage will assist him, in most initiatory books that is of a very limited nature indeed. Take the delectus, and it would be no difficult matter to select passages that would puzzle for no little time much older heads than those generally engaged on it, simply from this want of a context. It is, however, entirely from the scope of the passage that the child proceeds to analyse its meaning, which, by the way, is also a practical argument against the utility of all his former preparatory course of grammar for the same purpose. But the meaning of the words is not all he has to contend with,—the involved order of the sentences is another Gordian knot which his rules, to say the truth of them, are totally incapable of unfolding. In many passages these rules will apply to several senses, neither of which, after all, may be the right one. Now, it cannot be denied that both these exercises—the studying of the different shades of meaning that attach to words, and the keen scrutiny into the sense of a passage, are well adapted to sharpen the powers of perception and reflection, and generally to improve the mind. But the task is too onerous for an early stage; and in most cases it either overpowers and bewilders these faculties, when proper assistance is not afforded, or gives a pre-
mature and morbid excitement to them. Besides, in the simple fact, that it is a needless labour, a toiling up the rugged height of some precipitous mountain, when the same eminence might be gained by an easy ascent, and thus an enormous waste of valuable time, there is abundant reason for its condemnation.

And if these were some of the impediments to the learning of Latin, the avenues to Greek were doubly blocked up. Greek grammars were explained in Latin; and even lexicons shed their imperfect light through the same medium. All explanatory notes, if such they could be called, were also in Latin. Fancy a boy of ten or eleven years of age, whose Latin vocabulary, by the theoretical course mentioned, is not very extensive, making his first attempt at translating a sentence in Greek. He comes upon the particle ἄν, and refers to his lexicon for an explanation. Instead of getting anything of the kind, however, or simply being told that it meant "could," "would," or "should," he is gratified with the intelligence that it is "Particula potentialis, de qua consulendus est doctissimus Hoogeveen, de L. G. Particulis, Greek Exer." Who this most learned Hoogeveen may be, whom he is requested to consult upon this important affair, where he may be found, or when found, whether he might prove anything more communicative than doctissimus Schrevelius, are questions anything but suggestive of encouragement to the Greek tyro. Every boy sees and feels the absurdity of these things himself. Hence the repeated questions of all intelligent boys to their tutors—What is the use of learning Latin and Greek by such means, and what ultimate advantage can compensate for so much labour? To this an answer may probably be received, that it is a more classical mode; but whether this solution of his
doubts may be anything more satisfactory than the preceding, is itself a very doubtful question.

William Lilly, the first master of St. Paul's School, Dean Colet, its founder, and Erasmus, were the three parties who composed what is now known as the Eton Latin Grammar. But neither of these three scholars either recommended or practised its modern application. It was rather meant as a philosophical work for the study of mature minds, than for novitiates entering upon classical studies; and it was written in Latin that it might form a standard, not only for the masters of this country but of other countries, who might translate it into their own tongues, and frame rules and abridgments out of it for the use of their own pupils. The very fact of its being written in Latin shows that it was intended for the use of masters and not of pupils, which was a similar mode to that adopted in drawing up any other digest of learning or philosophy. In Lilly's own example, too, there is a proof of this. From this philosophical Latin Grammar he drew up a short "Introduction" in English for the use of his own pupils, which, with the "oral assistance of a good master," was reckoned then quite sufficient for school purposes. It was his own custom, then, to teach from this English abridgment, and which he also recommended to others. The larger grammar, in Latin, however, was afterwards by public authority introduced into schools all over England. The consequence was, that the difficulty of explaining it to children was vastly increased, and the indolence of the masters speedily suggested the more comfortable way of rolling the burden from their own upon the learners' shoulders, and making them commit to memory its unexplained rules.

The practice of referring to lexicons in learning a
language came into use in a similar way. It is very certain that the earliest mode of teaching Latin and Greek was either colloquially or by the oral interpretation of a master. He explained the meaning of individual words and the connective sense of passages, serving the purpose both of a grammar and lexicon in his own person; but when dictionaries came to be published, instead of deriving from them additional facilities in continuing the same plan, he abandoned it entirely, and devolved upon the pupil the task of teaching himself. It was in every respect the same thing as if one of our best English teachers of the present day, instead of analysing words etymologically to his pupils, were to send them to Walker's English Dictionary to look up their meaning for themselves. They would there find other words and perhaps several meanings, but the immediate import of that they were in quest of would likely be as obscure as before. And doubtless this would be an easier method to the master, but it may readily be conceived how little it would benefit the scholars. So when the art of printing increased the number of these Latin dictionaries, it in like manner increased the pupil's labour and lessened that of the teacher; and while as an instrument in the master's hands it might have aided in the pupil's advancement, in those of the latter it only added to his confusion and bewilderment.

What is proposed, then, as a better course of acquiring a knowledge of Latin and Greek is indeed not a new mode, but the revival of a system which was in full operation three hundred years ago, and has the sanction of some names of the highest celebrity in English literature. It is simply following the same course in reference to a foreign language, that nature and necessity point out to the infant in acquiring a
knowledge of its parent tongue. It has been mentioned that the same analogy obtains between learning to speak and learning to read; but there is even a closer analogy to the former in the process of translating one language into another. Two different terms are thus taken to represent the same idea, so that, independently of the lost time and labour necessary to get an equivalent and corresponding term in a dictionary, from association, the connexion of these two terms is much better remembered by having seen them opposite to one another. This leads at once to interlinear translation, and such is accordingly the mode here advocated.

Let it be understood, however, that the general principle contended for is not limited to this mode of translation; the object is to give every possible facility to an acquaintance with a foreign language, and to remove every needless obstruction out of the way, to which end an interlinear translation is but a valuable auxiliary. Like every other innovation upon a time-honoured custom, this method, though much older than the present popular system, is looked upon with anything but approbation at all public institutions. Being both natural and simple, however, it is silently making its way to public favour, and ere long, one would think, will be very generally practised. Neither is it wonderful that it should be so strongly opposed, coming into collision, as it very materially does, with the interest of many of its opponents. Classical instruction forms a prominent feature in all colleges, universities, and schools throughout the country, and consequently the professors and teachers in those institutions find a corresponding profit to the length of time over which a course of classical study extends. Besides, as less individual instruction is necessary on the part of such professors and teachers
from the additional labour thus given to the students, the duties of the former are found more easy and comfortable than by an explanatory mode of oral grammaring.

The principal objection urged against it worthy of notice is, that it leaves the student ignorant of the grammatical structure of the language. There is no foundation for this remark, as shall presently be shown; but admitting it to be correct, it might with equal justice be replied, that the popular method, if it does initiate the pupil in any better way to an acquaintance with the rules that govern the language, in nine cases out of ten leaves him in possession of these barren honours alone. But that a more thorough grounding in the principles of the language can be effected by the plan under notice must appear, from the simple reason, that the pupil has in his first course a groundwork to stand upon. He proceeds from practice to deduce a theory, rather than make an ill-understood theory square with a more unintelligible practice. He collects his materials and begins the work, and when it has advanced beyond the limits of his experience, he calls to his aid the rule and compasses to harmonise its proportions and beautify its parts.

Of the different modes of conducting a course of study in Latin and Greek by an interlinear translation, certainly the most comprehensive plan that has yet appeared is embraced in a series of works published a few years ago under the title of "Locke's System." That profound thinker, from whose suggestions these works were principally compiled, being himself much engaged in teaching, was deeply conscious of the defective modes then in use in teaching Latin. With his characteristic originality, therefore, he set about remedying the evil, and his strong good sense at once dictated the necessity of introducing a pupil to the practice of a language before troubling
him with its etymological and syntactical structure. His memorable words are, "Take some easy and pleasant book, such as Æsop’s Fables, and write the English translation, made as literal as it can be, in one line, and the Latin words which answer each of them just over it in another;" and he also left among his other valuable writings a small work as a model of the plan, entitled "Æsop’s Fables, in Latin and English interlinearly; for the benefit of those who, not having a master, would learn either of these tongues. By John Locke, Gent."

What is known as the Hamiltonian system is considerably like this, both giving strictly literal translations; but while Locke’s system preserves a certain grammatical structure in the English translations, Mr. Hamilton, endeavouring to infuse into these certain barbarisms peculiar to the original, destroys the grammatical structure and connexion. The Hamiltonian system, however, sets up claims to an originality of invention, though, with such proofs of identity as are manifest between his works and this little model of Locke’s, it is somewhat difficult to concede them. But, whether original or not, and much inferior as they certainly are to the series of volumes mentioned, they are a vast improvement upon the popular system. But these treatises, besides giving a better translation, surpass Mr. Hamilton’s works in another and most important particular, and that is, their enabling any student at all acquainted with English grammar to acquire incidentally all the different parts of speech of the Latin. In the Hamiltonian books a noun may be placed opposite to a verb, and an adjective given as the translation of a noun, to keep up the idiomatic style mentioned; but in Locke’s system the more natural and philosophical mode is adopted, of rendering every word as far as possible into
Its corresponding part of speech. All, therefore, that is necessary for the pupil to do, in order to distinguish the parts of speech of the Latin words, is to ascertain what their equivalents in English are. Thus, grammar to a considerable extent is learned contemporaneously with the meaning of words, and without the least difficulty or exertion on the part of the pupil. It is indeed analogous to the best mode of teaching English grammar, in which the part of speech is ascertained, not by the form of the word, but by its meaning. But during the first stage, or during the reading of the first book in the series, this is all the grammar that is taught.

It may be mentioned, for the sake of those who are unacquainted with the nature of these interlinear works, that the pure Latin in its original order, and without a translation, is again given at the end of the book, so that after the sense of the passage has been got from the translation, it is there the pupil reads his lesson. In the translation, too, the sentences are presented "in ordine," that is, the arrangement of the Latin words is according to the order of an English sentence. The involved Latin order, however, is restored at the end of the book, where the pupil reconstrues it. Three things are therefore acquired during the reading of the first book,—the meaning of a considerable number of Latin words, the distinction of many of the parts of speech, and a certain acquaintance with the involved style of Roman writers. By this, which is strictly a process of training, a foundation—for there is no better figure—of words and sentences is laid. But the lesson is not finished until a re-translation has again been made without book in Latin, and also unassisted by the connexion of the narrative.

At a further stage the inflection of words is got in the
following manner, which is entirely a deductive process, a
generalising and classifying of details. Having ascertained,
through the medium of the English word, to what part of
speech its equivalent Latin term belongs, the pupil also
sees the same word assuming different forms in different
positions. He sees *musa* taking the form of *musa*,
*musam*, *musarum*, *musis*, *musas*, and also finds that
each of these forms has some corresponding change in
signification. He is then taught the distinction that
obtains in this respect between the English and Latin,
that while the former expresses the relation of words and
ideas by other auxiliary words, the Latin does the
same thing by a difference of termination in the word
itself. And as analogy and illustration are always the
most powerful means of conveying instruction on any
subject, they can in this instance be applied with con-
siderable effect. These different forms may be represented
by some tangible object having suffered an accident.
The word *musa*, for instance, undergoes an accident
when it assumes the form of *musarum*, and this acci-
dental property of words is therefore called *case*. But as
these accidents or cases are of different kinds, they are
named accordingly, and hence the six cases of nouns and
the different terminations that belong to each. And now
is the proper time to give the *paradigm* of these, when
the pupil really feels the want of such a standard.

In like manner are the pronoun, the verb, and other
parts of speech thus taught. They are previously *pictured
out*, as Mr. Stow aptly phrases this mode of teaching,
and their several details and ramifications explained
in connexion with some clause of the passage read; and
when they are thus incidentally and collaterally deduced
and distinguished from other parts, they are ultimately
classified and tested by an appeal to the grammar. Such
an exercise, therefore, it must be evident, is in itself an excellent training process. It disposes the mind to a general habit of investigation on other subjects, and to collect and classify facts for itself; whereas, the popular method entirely precludes the necessity of deduction. It is what Locke denounces as a "sort of Egyptian tyranny, bidding children make bricks who have not any of the materials."

It must be obvious that, according to this plan, the syntactical parts of grammar are deferred to a considerably late period; because a person learning to read Latin is just in the position of a child learning to read his native tongue, to whom the form, the sense, and the orthography of words, are alone a sufficient study. But after, by the preceding method, he has been made acquainted with the peculiar genius of the Latin tongue, and sees wherein it differs from and agrees with the English, he is then introduced to a systematic mode of construing it. This is done altogether without the aid of a translation, and by a method as entirely inductive as the former. It should be remarked, that as an accompaniment to the works published on this plan, there is a course of "parsing lessons," which form an entire praxis of the inflections. This, therefore, studied as a sequel to his former incidental course of training, fully prepares the student for entering upon the duty of construing, unaided by an interlinear translation. Hitherto he has been guided in his course by leading-strings; he is now left to a trial of his own powers, and that he will still find considerable difficulties to encounter is certain; but that he will meet and encounter these with an advantage infinitely superior to the mere grammar-taught student, is a test by which the merits of the respective systems may be confidently tried.

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The last part of the course is entirely an imitative exercise, which has been called by Ascham, "double translation." This plan, so far as antiquity may be considered a recommendation, has the advantage of all others. It is recommended by Cicero, and the younger Pliny, to those who wished to acquire the Greek language, and that it would therefore be extensively practised at that time is pretty certain. In comparatively modern times, it was adopted by the celebrated scholar Roger Ascham, tutor to Queen Elizabeth, in the education of that accomplished princess. He also followed a preparatory course similar in principle to that spoken of; for, though it does not appear that he interlined his lessons, he accomplished the same end by acting himself as a translator, by "grounding the pupil in the cause and matter of the lesson," and "construing it into English so oft, that the pupil might easily carry away the understanding of it." And by the same mode of double translation was it, that the late Sir William Jones so rapidly became acquainted with no fewer than twenty-eight languages. His custom was, after having translated a passage from any foreign author into English, to shut the book and from memory endeavour to restore in writing his own translation into the original. He would then open the book and compare the two, by which means he was enabled to detect his own errors, and acquire the style and idioms of the original. It may also be remarked in passing, that this mode of teaching a pupil to speak a foreign language has been found of admirable effect. The manner in which it is done is simply to make him translate a passage orally into English, and then again orally into the original from the English. By these means the idioms are acquired in their natural connexion, instead of being
got by heart in an isolated form, as is too generally the case. It thus becomes an exercise of the imitative faculty alone, aided by the memory, and therefore precisely following the order of nature. The same plan, I believe, is pursued to a very considerable extent in the teaching of French in the Mechanics' Institute at Liverpool.

In fact, so fully are some educationists impressed with the excellence and utility of this mode, they venture to affirm that, were an extensive course of it continued, the use of a grammar for all practical purposes might be utterly discarded. One may attain a correct style of speaking and writing English, though he may never have seen nor heard of an English grammar in his life, simply by imitating and practising after the best models. And this is the entire genius and spirit of the plan, namely, a practical imitation. Let any one try it on a single passage of French or Italian. Let him from an interlinear copy, or by any other means, ascertain the sense of the passage, convey this into literal English of his own writing, then begin to translate into the original, and let him examine the course of his own mind during the process, and he will find that he is proceeding precisely upon a principle of synthesis—that is, combining and grouping words and sentences that have been previously analysed in the English translation. All this is done, too, according to some visible model or picture of the original that is still lingering in his mind's eye. The mind in such a process has a series of concrete ideas upon which it can lay hold, and by concatenation the whole scope of the passage is gradually unfolded. Phrases and idioms are acquired without an effort, falling naturally into their own places, and melting down as it were into the very current of the passage. Of course, the blunders that a tyro will make in this way are very
numerous, and of a nature perhaps different from those of the grammar-bred student. In his first and many subsequent attempts he will be found committing solecisms against the most elementary principles of grammar. A pronoun of the first person may be found agreeing with a verb in the third person, and a masculine noun with a feminine adjective. But what of that? the same errors are made by a child learning to speak, or any one learning to speak a foreign tongue, which practice ultimately corrects. Therefore, let not any one say that this is a proof of some grounding process previously necessary, unless he is also prepared to admit that a child requires some preparatory grammaring before he is permitted to lisp forth his incoherent sentences. Let the student go on, fearless of ridicule; every successive imitation will be an improvement of his style, and an accession to his stock of words and phrases, till by degrees he approximates to the perfection of those employed by the author he imitates. It is not the place here to inquire how far this fear of offending "against some solemn grammar rule," as Professor Blackie calls it, injures a pupil in his progress, but every one will acknowledge the power of an opposite feeling in the parallel case of children forming their first imperfect sentences. To the parent, and indeed to any one, there is a peculiar charm in these disjointed fragments of speech in a little child—the first buddings of his expanding intellect. Hence every attempt of the child is generally met with a smile of approbation; and how far this accelerates his acquisition of the powers of speech it may not be easy to judge, but that it must materially assist in the process, is a supposition in strict accordance with a first principle in morals. The student should therefore be encouraged to go on fearlessly, as no one ever spoke properly without first
committing many blunders, according to the Italian pro-
verb, "Per parlare bene, bisogna parlare male."

Perhaps the most absurd of all modes of teaching
French is that of presenting a pupil with long lists of
idioms to be got by heart, a task which is only equalled
in atrocity by that of setting children to commit whole
spelling-books by heart in columns to teach them ortho-
graphy. It is, however, still a favourite mode of teach-
ing that language, even in many seminaries of high
name. But it would seem that if a premium were
awarded to any one who should devise the most difficult
and protracted mode of learning French, the inventor of
such a method would decidedly carry off the palm.
These idioms are—many of them at least—incapable of a
literal rendering; and as no analysis of them is ever
attempted, they lie upon the memory a mere "rudis
indigestaque molés." No association of thoughts can
call them up at will. They are like the disjointed frag-
ments of a machine, of no use apart from its entire
structure, and can never be of service until their place be
ascertained in general conversation. Perhaps a somewhat
analogous course to this would be in a child learning
to speak, instead of assisting him to articulate the names
of familiar objects around him, that he should be taught
first to enunciate some of the abstract phrases of English
conversation. This practice, however, is quite of a piece
with the whole routine of modern language teaching.
Everything that is most difficult and formidable is accu-
mulated at the very portals, which should open, or be
opened rather, to admit the student; and hence so many
are repulsed from entering upon these studies.

It would appear, then, that this process of double
translation ought to be the last in the course; and in
all submission to the talented editors of "Locke's
System, I would therefore venture to dissent from the opinions they have expressed in favour of a higher course of versification and even conversation. Of what earthly use it can be to set children to compose Latin verses, and becloud their tender fancies in the arrangement of catalectic, acatalectic, and hypercatalectic, dimeters, pentameters and hexameters, must certainly require a poet's fancy to explain. Nor will any ordinary individual be fanciful enough to say that even the famous Oxford prize essays in verse have anything like the quality of poetry in them. The very best of these learned and most elaborate productions may have to the eye, and the ear indeed, the shape and sound of poetry, but the living, breathing spirit that once animated these lifeless fragments has long since fled from the earth. It is something like an attempt at galvanising a dead body, producing only a melancholy caricature of the living frame. Yet it would be saying much to assert that this is a fault peculiar to modern Latin poesy, for the most unimaginative proser by labour and study may, and often does, write volumes of English verses. In fact, this power of versifying and what is strictly the province of ideality are essentially distinct; and a person may write the most beautiful poetry in prose, and the most grovelling prose in verse. The former of these faculties, taking cognisance as it does, of size and number, is more nearly allied to mathematics and arithmetic, which every one knows are the very antipodes to poetry. At all events, with regard to modern Latin poetry, it seems to be a sort of excrescence in literature, generated only amid the unhealthy seclusions of those institutions that shut out the pure light of nature from developing a healthier education.

It is further argued, that the practice of Latin versifi-
cation lends a better insight into the peculiar graces of original Latin compositions. But, as many who never wrote English poetry in their lives, may yet surpass the voluminous poet, in appreciating the graces of English literature, from the distinction that obtains between the mere faculty of scanning metres and that of presenting ideas in a fascinating and attractive manner, so is it doubtless in Latin compositions: and even if it has this effect, which is extremely doubtful, it must at all events be one of those luxuries which are purchased too dearly by such a course of study as is necessary to write those verses with any degree of correctness. In writing Latin verse it is not thoughts and ideas that the student hunts after, but synonymous words of a certain length and a certain number of feet, just as an operative builder mechanically fits into the edifice his materials, without regard to the general harmony of its parts. Milton, speaking on this subject, says, "It is a preposterous exaction, forcing the empty wits of children to compose themes, verses, and orations, which are the acts of ripest judgment, and the final work of a head filled, by long reading and observing, with elegant maxims and copious inventions. These are not matters to be wrung from poor striplings like blood out of the nose, or the plucking of untimely fruit."

Another reason urged in favour of it is, that it tends to impress upon the mind the quantities of Latin syllables more deeply, and secures a more correct pronunciation. It is, perhaps, matter of regret that an affair so trifling as the misplacing of a quantity in pronunciation should be held as any test of attainment in classical knowledge, but so it certainly is at present; and as matters stand, the slightest lapse in this respect at once sets down the utterer of it as a sciolist in the art. But
all this is on a wrong principle. It is rearing a most elaborate and complex standard of scholarly refinement upon a basis of the most unsubstantial kind. It is surely at best a questionable employment of those Godlike faculties with which man is gifted, to bend all their energies, “to shun delights and live laborious days,” in order to ascertain whether certain vocables were sounded long or short some three thousand years ago. It may be said, indeed, that this shibboleth in the aristocracy of letters is nothing more absurd than many things forming the criteria of taste and refinement in ordinary life. The solecism of “eating olives with a fork” may overthrow the pretensions of some nouveau riche to the conventional character of a gentleman. But there is a great difference in point of principle between the two cases. Gentlemanly habits and polished manners are based upon sound morality, and to support such a standard is equivalent to promoting many of the courtesies and amenities of life. Whereas, this labouring after such barren honours is only gaining the name without the solid advantages of scholarship.

But it is very doubtful whether writing Latin hexameters and pentameters does impress more deeply upon the mind of the pupil the quantities of Latin syllables. If the writer, whose lot it was to compose a fair average of such effusions at the university, may be allowed to cite his own experience in the matter, the solitary recollection of one quantity being more deeply impressed upon his mind by writing it in a copy of verses, is all the advantage he can lay claim to. It occurred in the word Sardanapalus, which he had chanced to read a few days before in Juvenal, in the only line that decides the length of its penultimate syllable. How far the same object could have been effected by simply committing the line itself
to memory, or even one of those lines in which it occurs, in Lord Byron's beautiful poem on that effeminate monarch, let philologists decide.

Professor Blackie, and the compilers of the "Locke System," seem both to favour the idea of cultivating a knowledge of Latin by means of conversation. The former, indeed, insists upon having it taught in this manner alone. It would seem, however, that this is now simply impossible, and even if it could be done, the chief object of teaching Latin would not be thus secured. It would doubtless be a restoration of the ancient practice established by Henry VIII. in the schools of his time. It was by help of "some use in speaking which must necessarily be had," that the boy was to be "brought past the wearisome bitterness of his learning." Lilly himself, in his Monita Pedagogica, says, Et quoties loqueris, memor esto loquare Latine. But it must be remembered that the object of learning Latin in those days was very different from what it is now. It was then the chief medium of intercourse among learned men, and had many advantages in this respect, as it formed a common bond of intimacy, not only among the philosophers of England but of Europe. Besides, a colloquial knowledge of it was then indispensable to those intended for the church, the law, or the medical profession. And if at the present day there were any necessity for learning it as a vehicle for imparting our thoughts to others by speech or writing, an arrangement to that effect would still be the best.

But there is no necessity for this: its services at the best are but auxiliary to the formation of a good English style, which is by far the best exponent of English thought; and it may furnish many words and fragments of words to beautify and enlarge the fabric of the English
tongue; but the latter is now too comfortable and elegant a garb to be laid aside for the scanty integuments of a Latin dress. It is said also, conversation naturally follows from a course of study such as that mentioned; and true, it does; but the current can find no channel in the conversation of ordinary life, and on a student’s emerging from school or college, must necessarily soon dry up. The only fountains of Latin conversation are in the Catholic colleges of Europe; but as the Latin colloquies there practised are intended for preparing novitiates for the forms and ceremonies of the Church of Rome, they cannot surely be set up as a model for Protestant colleges. It may therefore be a better way of teaching Latin for a certain purpose, but that purpose is anything but an enlightened one, and of no practical use in general literature. Indeed, it is readily granted that this mode of acquiring either Latin or any other language is a very natural one, second only to studying from a native. Between this plan and the method of acquiring a language by detached words and idiomatic phrases, there is all the difference already adverted to, between ideas received into the mind concretely, and abstractedly. By concatenation, whole sentences rise in the mind in a connected train, instead of the mind itself labouring to throw together the single words and phrases that may be lying disjointedly upon the memory. But the true object of the study is not to acquire the Latin tongue as an end of conversation, but as a means of cultivating the mind.

It may seem paradoxical to assert that an Englishman is really better adapted to teach his own countryman French than a native of France; but, with the exception of a very few niceties of intonation and accent, and some high-flown complimentary phrases, for imparting the
stamina of the language, such seems really the case. The reason is obvious; for in many instances the French teacher has just about as much of English to learn as his pupil has of French. He cannot thus communicate or infuse into the mind of the pupil the unidiomised English of his own French. The latter may get French for his English; but he cannot get the true English for his French, which is nearly as bad. A native, then, may be of service to an advanced pupil as what may be correctly styled in this instance, a "finishing master;" but for all the earlier stages, an intelligent Englishman, with a good pronunciation, will serve equally well, if not better. Every one has heard of Goldsmith's famous Irishism, when he went to Holland to teach English to the Dutch; and only found out his mistake when about to enter upon his duties, in being as much at a loss for Dutch as they for English: and so is it really the case with many Frenchmen.

As one of the objects designed by throwing these remarks into the present form was, that teachers and others might see the course of study, and the principles of that system of instruction, now beginning to be adopted in many of the best institutions of the country, the following very brief outline of the plan is here submitted to their consideration. It is almost entirely similar to that marked out by the authors of "Locke's System,"—decidedly the best arrangement in use.

The first book put into the hands of a boy beginning Latin is a versified copy of "Æsop's Fables," by Phædrus, with an interlinear translation and notes. By the assistance of these he prepares his lesson, and makes himself thoroughly master of the sense of each fable in the single Latin text, that is, in the pure Latin. From this again, a re-translation is made into the Latin,
the English for which is given orally by the master, and the Latin orally by the pupil. A decided improvement on these books, in my opinion, would therefore be, to have also a separate English version of the fable, so that from sight a translation from this might be read in Latin, as from the Latin original an English translation is read by sight. The advantages of such an arrangement must be obvious. Like other languages, the sound of Latin words affords no index to the manner in which they ought to be spelt; and it is by writing, alone, that the orthography of this or any other language can be acquired. Besides, though a boy may know the sound of many Latin words in this way, and their corresponding English, it is no guarantee that he would know these same words on seeing them on paper. It is, in fact, really teaching Latin to a considerable extent by conversation, which, it must ever be remembered, is not the mode best calculated to promote the object of learning that tongue.

It ought also to be mentioned, that not only is the passage translated in the connexion of the story, but without the book, each Latin word is taken separately and turned into English, and each separate English word into Latin.

By the time a boy has gone through this course of reading he will have acquired a very considerable number of Latin words, be able to tell to what parts of speech they belong, and have gained a little knowledge of the involved Latin order of sentences. But no further analysis of them will yet be given.

He next enters upon the first book of "Ovid's Metamorphoses," and proceeds in exactly the same manner. In this author many words of less common use occur, the acquisition of which will make a large addition to his vocabulary. But a study of the accidence must
now accompany a reading of this book. Proceeding inductively, the student will observe what words in the lesson appear to correspond in form with the first declension of nouns. These will be inflected through all their cases, the tables of which will now also be got by heart. But it is quite possible to teach even the tables in this way by mere conversation. The same course is followed with the other declensions, and with all the other parts of speech, until the distinction of these is clearly understood.

The regular inflections being thus acquired and tested by examples from the grammar; the next book in the course is now taken, which is the first book of "Virgil's Æneid." In this, as in "Phædrus" and "Ovid," the Latin text is construed according to the interlinear translation, but in addition, from a supplementary volume of "parsing lessons," each sentence is analysed, each word assigned to its proper part of speech, and a full description of its peculiar modification given.

As a good training exercise at this stage, the sign and forms of nouns and verbs in the single English version may be altered, and the different cases and tenses of the same Latin word required, by which means an entire command over all the inflections will be gained.

"Caesar's Invasion of Britain" is the next book in the series, which is translated as the others. Each reading is now accompanied with a small portion of the syntax, as the reading of Ovid was accompanied with the accidence. The style of the Commentaries is remarkably easy of construction, and therefore peculiarly adapted to this exercise. The best grammar for this mode of study is the "London Latin Grammar;" and as the rules of syntax are there principally exemplified from this part of Cæsar and the first book of Virgil, it is again necessary
to recur to Virgil, which before was used only as a praxis of inflection, to get acquainted with its structure by the rules in that grammar. The scanning of hexameters may also be taught by the rules there laid down; but a very few conversational lessons so far as Virgil is concerned, may serve to initiate the pupil into all the mysteries of dactyles and spondees.

Hitherto the exercises in parsing and syntax have been conducted separately; in the next book, which is the "Life of Agricola, by Tacitus," they are combined; single words and their modifications being referred to their proper declensions and conjugations, and compound phrases and sentences according to their relations and dependences.

To recapitulate—In "Phaedrus," simple reading and translation, with naming of the parts of speech.

"Ovid," the same, accompanied with a study of the accidence.

"Virgil," the same, with a higher and more extended course of parsing.

"Cæsar," the same, with syntax and construction.

"Life of Agricola," the same, combining both parsing and syntax.

Such may, therefore, be called an initiatory or first course. In order to attain a thorough knowledge of the grammar and structure of Latin, it will be expedient for the student to return to the earlier volumes in the same order as before, and apply the whole of his grammatical knowledge to each of these. In this course the interlinear translation will be discarded, and the notes also more fully attended to than formerly.

The length of time necessary for such a course, is not in many instances greater than what is required to commit to memory, and plod through the unintelligible
pages of an Eton grammar. And how far it is superior as a mental exercise, in pleasantness and ultimate utility, let candid judges say.

At this point of his career the student is now left to his own resources; and higher classics, without interlineation, are put into the hands of those designed for literary or scientific pursuits.

At this stage, therefore, it is, that the excellence or inutility of such a preparatory course will be tested. But as many collateral circumstances must also be taken into account, such as the aptness and diligence of the pupil, and skill of the instructor, a candid judgment will also embrace these in coming to a conclusion regarding its merits. And perhaps for these reasons, the more tangible criterion will simply be the rationale of the plan itself, apart from ulterior and contingent circumstances; but to either of which an appeal may confidently be made.

In a course of Greek, precisely the same method is followed.

"Lucian's Dialogues" furnish a vocabulary. In "Anacreon's Odes," the parts of speech are distinguished. "Homer's Iliad," with "Parsing Lessons," involves a complete praxis of inflections. "Xenophon's Memorabilia" serve as an introduction to syntax; amplified by recurring to the Iliad; while "Herodotus' Histories" afford subjects for practising in combination the exercises previously taken separately.

It has been already mentioned, that the principle on which the preceding plan is based, is not an innovation upon the original system of classic instruction. It is the present popular mode that is a corruption of the primitive. "The so-called innovations," says the Quarterly Review, No. 77, "appear, when investigated, to be in
the spirit, and even according to the letter of that system which was digested by some of the ablest and most learned men of a learned age." This will appear beyond controversy from the following extracts taken from the writings of the founders of St. Paul's, and other English schools, during the reign of Henry the Eighth, and even from that monarch's own injuctions, and subsequently from others of a still higher literary eminence, who set themselves to expose and reform the corruptions that had crept into these original systems in their days. It will be remarked, too, that the principle of the system is the same whether it may have been administered colloquially, by oral interpretation, or by interlineation. Another essential point, in which they all agree, regards the time and manner of using the grammar; that the student should be prepared for the grammar by a course of reading, rather than to read by a course of grammaring.

It is well known that Henry the Eighth established a method of colloquial instruction in all the grammar schools then existing, or being founded. In this single fact, therefore, it is indicated in what manner the basis of that instruction was laid, whatever may have been the collateral and higher departments of the course. For it may easily be seen that, if Latin be taught to any extent by conversation, the student, so acquiring it, assumes the same character and position as a child learning his parent tongue, or any one learning a foreign language from a native, in either of which cases grammar must necessarily be postponed to a mature stage of the course. Next to Henry the Eighth, the most celebrated authority of the same period is Cardinal Wolsey—himself a school-master in his earlier days.* This great statesman drew

* Ex ludimagistro subvectus est ad regnum.—Erasmus.
up and enjoined a plan of studies to be adopted by all the public schools of the country. And it is to this plan that, according to the charters of their foundation, such schools ought still to adhere. But although it is nominally observed, a few extracts from his address to the masters of Ipswich school, may serve to show how widely all of them have now chosen to depart from its spirit. In that letter there is no mention made of anything like committing to memory the rules of an unexplained grammar, nor looking out the words of a dictionary, but, on the contrary, there is prescribed in the clearest terms, a plan of "lessoning," that is, orally explaining the text of an author, and of "exercising" upon the grammar, the materials for which exercise arise out of the former:

"In the first place, it has been not improperly resolved that our school be divided into eight classes. The first of these is to contain the less forward boys, who should be diligently exercised in the eight parts of speech; and whose now flexible accent it should be your chief concern to form; making them repeat the elements assigned them with the most distinct and delicate pronunciation.

"Next in order, after pupils of this age have made satisfactory progress in the first rudiments, we would wish them to be called into the second form, to practise speaking Latin, and to render into Latin some English proposition; which should not be without point or pertinence; but should contain some piquant or beautiful sentiment, sufficiently suitable to the capacity of boys. As soon as this is rendered, it should be set down in Roman characters; and you will daily pay attention, that each of the whole party have this note-book perfectly correct, and written as fairly as possible with his own hand."
For the third class he recommends the reading of Æsop and Terence, with Lilly's Genders of Nouns.

For the fourth class, Virgil; and he also adds—"As well adapted to this form, Lilly will furnish the past tenses and supines of verbs. But although I confess such things are necessary, yet, as far as possible, we could wish them so appointed, as not to occupy the more valuable part of the day."

For the fifth class, after dissuading from anything like harsh treatment, he says—"Your principal concern will be, to lesson them in some select epistles of Cicero; as none other seem to us more easy in their style, or more productive of rich copiousness of language."

For the sixth class, Sallust, or Caesar's Commentaries, with Lilly's Syntax.

"The party in the seventh form should regularly have in hand either Horace's Epistles, or Ovid's Metamorphoses or Fasti; occasionally composing verse or an epistle of their own. It will also be of very great importance, that they sometimes turn verse into prose, or reduce prose into metre. In order that what is learnt by hearing may not be forgotten, the boy should re-peruse it with you, or with others. Just before retiring to rest he should study something choice, or worthy of remembrance, to repeat to the master the next morning.

"At intervals, attention should be relaxed, and recreation introduced; but recreation of an elegant nature, worthy of polite literature. Indeed, even with his studies, pleasure should be so intimately blended, that a boy may think it rather a game at learning, than a task. And caution must be used, lest by immoderate exertion the faculties of learners be overwhelmed, or be fatigued by reading very far prolonged: for either way alike there is a fault."
"Lastly, when by exercise of this kind the party has attained to some proficiency in conversation-style, they should be recalled to the higher precepts of grammar; as, for instance, to the figures prescribed by Donatus, to the elegance of Valla, and to any ancient authors whatever in the Latin tongue. In lessoning from these, we would remind you to endeavour to inform yourselves at least on the points it may be proper should be illustrated on each present occasion. For example, when intending to expound at length a comedy of Terence, you may first discuss in few words the author's rank in life, his peculiar talent, and elegance of style. You may then remark how great the pleasure and utility involved in reading comedies; of which word you should explain the signification and derivation. Next you may briefly but perspicuously unravel the substance of the plot; and carefully point out the particular kind of verse. You may afterwards arrange the words in more simple order; and wherever there may appear any remarkable elegance, any antiquated, new-modelled, or Grecian phrase, any obscurity of expression, any point of etymology, whether derivation or composition, any order of construction rather harsh and confused, any point of orthography, any figure of speech, uncommon beauty of style, rhetorical ornament, or proverbial expression, in short, anything proper or improper for imitation, it should be scrupulously noticed to the young party.

"Moreover, you will pay attention that in play-time the party speak with all possible correctness; sometimes commending the speaker, when a phrase is rather apposite, or improving his expression when erroneous. Occasionally some pithy subject for a short epistle in their native tongue should be proposed. And, to conclude, you may exhibit, if you please, some formulae,
which serving as a guide, a given theme may conveniently be treated."*

The opinions of the learned Erasmus were in harmony with these views; and indeed the essayist from whom the preceding address is here copied says that whole passages of that letter are taken verbatim from the works of Erasmus. He also, along with Ludovicus Vives, at the request of Queen Catherine, drew up a scheme of teaching the Latin tongue for the use of the Princess Mary, based upon the same method; and in his works generally many passages may be found corroborative of the same principle. In his Ecclesiastes he says, "When I speak of grammar, I do not mean the inflection of nouns and verbs, and the agreement of one word with another according to its place; but the modes of speaking correctly and properly, which can only be acquired from multifarious reading of the ancients, who excelled in elegance of speech." And in his Dialog. de Pronunciatione, speaking of what constitutes the basis of a language, he says, "A thorough knowledge of words, and a ready and proper naming of everything that occurs, is an admirable and necessary foundation for learning: yet this is neglected above measure in the common methods of teaching; by which omission it happens, that after children have trudged many years in the elements of erudition, they scarce know the proper names of the several species of trees, fishes, birds, beasts or grain; even at home, the very furniture about them, or the various necessaries which are there daily used, they know not how rightly to name in Latin; so that if they want

* For a full translation of this address with its preface, see "Essay on a System of Classical Instruction," published for the London University, from which the preceding extracts are taken.
a napkin, they say not *Da mihi mantile*, but *Da mihi rem*; and are either forced to supply this incapacity by pointing with the finger at what they cannot name, or putting in auxiliary words from their mother-tongue to explain their meaning."

Dr. Colet, the founder of St. Paul's School, was also the friend of Erasmus and Cardinal Wolsey, and, along with Lilly, one of the compilers of the Eton Grammar. In his preface to it, addressing the masters of St. Paul's, he gives precisely the same sentiments that his contemporaries entertained on the subject. "Of these eight parts of speech," says he, "in order well construed, be made reasons, and sentences, and long orations. But how, and in what manner, and with what construction of words, and all the varieties and diversities and changes in Latin speech, (which be innumerable) if any man will know and by that knowledge attain to understand Latin books, and to speak and to write clean Latin, let him all busily learn and read good Latin authors, of chosen poets and orators, and note wisely how they wrote and spake, and study always how to follow them, desiring none other rules but their examples. For in the beginning, men spake not Latin because such rules were made, but contrariwise; because men spake such Latin, upon that followed the rules and were made. That is to say, Latin speech was before the rules, and not the rules before the Latin speech. Wherefore, well-beloved masters and teachers of grammar, after the parts of speech sufficiently known in our schools, read and expound plainly unto your scholars good authors. And show to them every word, and in every sentence what they shall note and observe, warning them busily to follow and do like, both in writing and in speaking; and be to them your own self also speaking with them the pure Latin very
present, and leave the rules. For reading of good books, diligent information of learned masters, studious advertence and taking heed of learners, hearing eloquent men speak, and finally, busy imitation with tongue and pen, more availeth shortly to get the true eloquent speech than all the traditions, rules, and precepts of masters."

Such, then, were the views and intentions of those great men who founded and prescribed rules for the public seminaries of this country; and had they been adhered to, the state of education in after times would have been much less deplorable. Nor at the present day would the study of Latin and Greek have been anything but a subordinate department of instruction, a healthy auxiliary perhaps, in training the mind for higher purposes, instead of engrossing so much of its attention, and spreading over so large a period of time. But less than forty years had elapsed, when a degenerate practice supervened upon these rational principles; and though many eminent men, from that period to the present day, have loudly protested against such a declension, the absurd practice still remains intact and apparently intangible. In Queen Elizabeth's time, several of her ministers of state were sensible of the erroneous practices of school education, and Roger Ascham, her majesty's preceptor in Latin and Greek, was requested by the treasurer, Sir Richard Sackville, to draw up a statement of better principles for teaching the learned languages; which he did, in a work entitled the "Schoolmaster," published after his death. In that work he details the principles of the plan he himself pursued. It is said that he learned this mode from his own tutor, Sir John Cheke, who had previously practised it in the education of King Edward VI., and which Ascham also adopted in that of Queen Elizabeth. One
or two extracts will show its resemblance to the principles of Erasmus and the linguists of King Henry's day.

With regard to his plan of "double translation," he says:—"Plinius Secundus, a wise senator of great experience, excellently learned himself, a liberal patron of learned men, and the purest writer, in mine opinion, of all his age, (I except not Suetonius, his two schoolmasters Quintillian and Tacitus, nor yet his most excellent learned uncle, the elder Plinius) doth express, in an epistle to his friend Fuscus, many good ways for order in study; but he beginneth with translation, and preferreth it before all the rest.

"But a better and nearer example herein may be our most noble Queen Elizabeth, who never took yet Greek nor Latin grammar in her hand, after the first declining of a noun and a verb; but only by this double translating of Demosthenes and Isocrates daily, without missing every forenoon, and likewise some part of Tully every afternoon, for the space of a year or two, hath attained to such a perfect understanding in both the tongues, and to such a ready utterance of the Latin, and that with such a judgment as there be few in number in both the universities or elsewhere in England, that be in both tongues comparable with her majesty. And to conclude in a short room all the commodities of double translation, surely the mind, by daily marking, first, the cause and matter; then, the words and phrases; next, the order and composition; after, the reason and arguments; then, the forms and figures of both the tongues; lastly, the measure and compass of every sentence, must needs, by little and little, draw unto it the like shape of eloquence as the author doth use, which is read. And thus much for double translation."

Regarding the construction of sentences, according to...
a hint from Cicero De Oratore, he says: "First, let him teach the child cheerfully and plainly the cause and matter of the letter; then let him construe it into English so oft, as the child may easily carry away the understanding of it; lastly, parse it over perfectly. This done thus, let the child, by-and-by, both construe and parse it over again, so that it may appear that the child doubteth in nothing that his master taught him before. After this, the child must take a paper book, and sitting in some place where no man shall prompt him, by himself, let him translate into English his former lesson. Then showing it to his master, let the master take from him his Latin book, and pausing an hour at the least, then let the child translate his own English into Latin again in another paper book. When the master shall compare Tully's book with the scholar's translation, let the master at the first lead and teach his scholar to join the rules of his grammar-book with the examples of his present lesson, until the scholar by himself be able to fetch out of his grammar every rule for every example; so that the grammar-book be ever in the scholar's hand, and also used of him as a dictionary for every present use."

In the reign of Charles the First, a reformation had also commenced; and in the year 1641, Amos Comenius, a "man born for such purposes," was appointed to superintend the work of improvement; but the troubles of that stormy period overthrew the design. A few years later appeared Milton, whose genius was also directed to the same end; and in his famous letter to Mr. Hartlib, written in the year 1650, are the following sentences:—

"And seeing every nation affords not experience and tradition enough for all kinds of learning, therefore we are chiefly taught the languages of those people who
have at any time been most industrious after wisdom; so that language is but the instrument conveying to us things useful to be known. And though a linguist should pride himself to have all the tongues that Babel cleft the world into, yet, if he have not studied the solid things in them, as well as the words and lexicons, he were nothing so much to be esteemed a learned man as a yeoman or tradesman competently wise in his mother dialect only. Hence appear the many mistakes which have made learning generally so unpleasing and so unsuccessful. First, we do amiss to spend seven or eight years, merely in scraping together so much miserable Latin and Greek as might be learned otherwise easily and delightfully in one year. And that which casts our proficiency therein so much behind, is our time lost partly in too oft idle vacancies given both to schools and universities, partly in a preposterous exaction, forcing the empty wits of children to compose themes, verses, and orations, which are the acts of ripest judgment, and the final work of a head filled, by long reading and observing, with elegant maxims and copious invention. These are not matters to be wrung from poor striplings like blood out of the nose, or the plucking of untimely fruit. Besides the ill habit which they get of wretched barbarising against the Latin and Greek idiom, with their untutored Anglicisms, odious to be read, yet not to be avoided without a well-continued and judicious conversing among pure authors digested, which they scarce taste; whereas, if after some preparatory grounds of speech by their certain forms got into memory, they were led to the praxis thereof in some chosen short book lessoned thoroughly to them, they might then forthwith proceed to learn the substance of good things, and arts in due order, which would bring the whole language
quickly into their power. This I take to be the most rational and most profitable way of learning languages, and whereby we may best hope to give account to God of our youth spent herein."

All the authority of Locke, a few years after Milton, is to the same effect.—"When I consider what ado is made about a little Latin and Greek, how many years are spent in it, and what a noise and business it makes to no purpose, I can hardly forbear thinking that the parents of children still live in fear of the schoolmaster's rod, which they look upon as the only instrument of education; as a language or two to be its whole business. How else is it possible that a child should be chained to the oar seven, eight, or ten of the best years of his life, to get a language or two, which I think might be had at a great deal cheaper rate of pains and time, and be learned almost in playing!

"As soon as he can speak English, it is time for him to learn some other language. This nobody doubts of when French is proposed; and the reason is, because people are accustomed to the right way of teaching that language, which is by talking it into children in constant conversation, and not by grammatical rules. The Latin tongue would easily be taught the same way if his tutor being constantly with him, would talk nothing else to him, and make him answer still in the same language."

"But if such a man cannot be got, who speaks good Latin, and, being able to instruct your son in these parts of knowledge, will undertake it by this method; the next best is to have him taught as near this way as may be, which is by taking some easy and pleasant book, such as Æsop's Fables, and write the English translation (made as literal as it can be) in one line, and the Latin words which answer each of them, just over it in another.
These let him read every day over and over again, till he perfectly understands the Latin; and then go on to another fable, till he be also perfect in that, not omitting what he is already perfect in, but sometimes reviewing that to keep it in his memory. And when he comes to write, let these be set him for copies, which with the exercise of his hand, will also advance him in Latin. This being a more imperfect way than by talking Latin unto him, the formation of the verbs first, and afterwards the declensions of the nouns and pronouns perfectly learned by heart, may facilitate his acquaintance with the genius and manner of the Latin tongue, which varies the signification of verbs and nouns, not as the modern languages do, by particles prefixed, but by changing the last syllables. More than this of grammar I think he need not have, till he can read, himself, Sanctii Minerva, with Scioippius and Perizonius's notes.

One or two fragments from a paper by Richard Carew, Esquire, in answer to the question, "Whether the ordinary way of teaching Latin, by the rules of grammar, be the best?" convey the same opinions as the preceding.

"Being sent into France, that there I might learn the French tongue, which language, though it seemed very hard to me in the beginning, because mine ignorance made me unable to distinguish one word from another, and so imagine that those people used to talk much faster than we did, in a little time, when by often hearing their talk I began to discern the distance of one word from another, I found they used to talk rather more deliberately than we do; and so by reading and talking, I learned more French in three-quarters of a year, than I had done Latin in above thirteen; wherein, though I will not deny, but the use of my Latin Grammar did something help me to make me the better apprehend the
coherence of speech, yet I have ever since conceived, upon my learning by practice, that usual talking and much writing and reading, open a surer and readier way to attain any tongue, than the tedious course which is used in the Latin, by constraining and parsing according to the rules of grammar, in observing of the number, gender, case, and declension of all variable words; partly, because so much time is spent in the declination of every word, according to the forms set down in the grammar; and partly, in the overloading of the weak wits of youths with such a multitude of ordinary rules, and such a world of exception in particular words, as are acknowledged to differ from the general rules, as is able to confound both the memory and understanding of men of years.

"I could wish, therefore, that when children are first taught the grammar, instead of that they were employed in much reading and writing, and turning their Latin books into English, and returning the same back again into Latin, whereby they should, in that wasted time of their youth, gain the knowledge of many good authors, which they could not have time to read; and which, by their dulness in learning the rules of grammar, they are so tired with the difficulty thereof, that they conceive an impossibility ever to attain it, and so quit it, though they prove men of excellent understanding when they come to ripeness of age. And the help prescribed by the grammar rules, how to put the nominative case before the verb, the accusative after, and to join the substantive with the adjective, and the ordering of every word according to our English fashion, may be more easily directed by placing figures of number to express their order."

Of Cowley it is said: "I find that our countryman
Mr. Cowley, who learned nothing while a boy that he needed to forget when he came to be a man, could never be brought to retain the ordinary rules of grammar, but conversed with the books themselves whence those rules were drawn: and that, no doubt, was the better way. He afterwards found this benefit by it, that having got the Greek and Latin languages, as he had done his own, not by precept but use, he practised them not as a scholar, but as a native."

Nor less was the same principle appreciated and acted upon by many celebrated French scholars. The Abbot Calcavi, a learned Frenchman, and library-keeper to Louis XIV., was taught by the same method, and acquired an astonishing proficiency as a linguist when but a boy.

Montaigne in his Essays relates the course his father adopted in his education. After "having sought among the wisest men of the age for a shorter method of teaching than that universally received in schools," he engaged a man to teach him colloquially; from his progress under which mode he soon acquired "as pure a Latin style as any master could speak."

In an account of the education of the Dauphin, son to Louis XIV., by the famous M. Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, his preceptor, contained in a letter to Pope Innocent XI., it is said:—

"We need not be long upon the method of his grammar-learning. We endeavoured to teach him the Latin and French tongues both together, first of all their propriety, then their elegance. We relieved the tediousness of this part of learning by convincing him of the usefulness of it, and by forming the knowledge of things with that of words, so far as his age would admit."

The same principles are also recognised in a treatise
on the "Method of Teaching the Learned Languages," by Tanaquil Faber, Professor of Greek and Latin in the university of Saumur about 1660. M. Faber was the father of the famous Madame Dacier, well known for her commentaries on so many Greek and Latin authors; and it was by the method detailed in this treatise that he conducted those studies in which she displayed so great a proficiency, both in infancy and mature years.

On the whole, then, such evidence as that adduced in the preceding pages, ought surely to inspire some degree of conviction that the present mode of conducting a classical education is based upon a wrong practice, induced by indolence; and that the adoption of a method of oral or interlinear translation, with simply reading and being exercised upon the grammar at an advanced stage, would be a return to those principles laid down by the founders of endowed English schools, and in harmony with the opinions of some of the most learned men of the last three centuries.

In bringing these remarks to a close, I shall but add a single word regarding the time necessary for such a course of study. Of late, so great has been the rage for every kind of novelty, and so multitudinous the means resorted to in order to gratify this diseased state of the public mind, that thinking people naturally regard with a degree of scepticism, any innovation upon an established order of things. That the teaching of languages by a shorter method has also been taken advantage of, for this purpose, by the empiric and the charlatan, is what cannot be denied. One hears every day of French, Italian, &c., being taught in "five lessons," and in "four months," and so on; pretensions that carry an absurdity in their very announcement; and it is the failure of such mushroom systems that compels people to fall back upon the anti-
quated mode. I do not say, however, that any, or indeed all of these plans are not preferable to the popular mode; many of them seem to be good; but how much French can any one acquire in "five lessons," unless these be of the most Brobdignagian dimensions, or even in "four months," at two hours a-week? Yet every one of any penetration may see, that some remedy ought to be applied to abridge the term of study, at present deemed necessary to obtain a knowledge of languages.

It seems, therefore, the more prudent course to refrain from expressing an opinion in the case, and merely to recapitulate a few sentences from some of the authorities already adduced, with others bearing upon the same point, from whose opinions few persons of candour will dissent.

Making some little abatement for the peculiar circumstances of Roger Ascham, tutor to Queen Elizabeth, in speaking of the attainments of that learned princess, he says: "In the space of a year or two she attained to such a perfection in understanding both Latin and Greek, and to such a ready utterance of the Latin, and that with a judgment as they be few in number in both universities, or elsewhere in England, that be in both tongues comparable to her Majesty."

He also mentions a young gentlemen of his acquaintance, who, by the plan described, "in eight months, was able to translate English into Latin, so choicely, so orderly, so without any great miss in the hardest points of grammar, that some seven years in grammar schools, yea, and some in the university, cannot do half so well."

Locke says, "Whatever stir there is made about getting of Latin, as the great and difficult business, (of a boy's education,) his mother may teach it him herself, if she will spend two or three hours a day with him."
And the words of Milton, which serve as a motto to the books on the "Locke system," are to the following effect—"We do amiss to spend seven or eight years merely in scraping together so much miserable Latin and Greek, as might be learned otherwise, easily and delightfully in one year."

M. Tanaquil Faber gives his opinion in these words: "Thus much I will be bold to say, that youth may be instructed in such a method, as to be deemed men and scholars at those earlier years; when others, educated in the common road, deserve only the name of school-boys."

In a treatise entitled, "Examen de la manière d'Enseigner le Latin aux Enfans par le seul usage, à Paris chez Jean Baptiste Corgnior, 1668," an example is inserted of a boy in Paris, who learned to speak Latin by "use alone," and could express himself properly on any subject, suitable to his tender age, when but four years old.

In a tract, published by J. T. Phillips, one of the masters at Westminster, about 1720, dedicated to the Duke of Buckingham, he says, "I am very well assured, if the Latin Testament was published with a literal English translation interlined, men of business, who have any time to spare, if they would but spend a week or a fortnight to learn their verbs and nouns, may in a shorter time than I dare express here, attain to the understanding of any Latin author in prose."

In the letter of the Bishop of Meaux to the pope regarding his pupil the Dauphin, it is said, "We were so happy in this method, that when he was little more than a child, he understood the best Latin authors, and was seldom at a loss where they were most difficult."

The Abbot Calcavi "was well skilled in nine languages when but thirteen years of age."
Montaigne describing his progress under a colloquial master, says, "And as for myself, I was above *six years old*, and could understand no more French than Arabic, but without rule or grammar I had gotten as pure a Latin style as any master could speak."

It would be no difficult matter to multiply authorities of inferior note on this point, but I shall conclude with the mention of one illustrious individual, whose statue occupies a niche in St. Paul's among other memorials of the departed great; and how much he was indebted for obtaining that honourable rank in the memory of his countrymen to this very plan, it would be rash to say; but that his rapid attainment of so many oriental tongues, so astonishing to every one, was entirely owing to this mode of "double translation," he himself admits. The late accomplished oriental scholar, Sir William Jones, here alluded to, said, that "he considered a course of *six months* study by the mode he practised, a sufficient length of time to acquire a thorough knowledge of any language."

To these testimonials, therefore, in favour of some more abbreviated mode of teaching the classics than that in popular use, I would, in conclusion, beg to call the attention of all such as still deem a knowledge of them an indispensable element in a course of liberal education.

**THE END.**
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